



# 1857

*In the Muslim Historiography*

*Compiled & edited by*  
**M. Ikram Chaghatai**





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**M. Ikram Chaghatai**

To, Iqbal Mujaddadi Sahib,  
a reputed scholar  
and bibliophile  
M. Ikram Chaghatai  
4.9.2010



**SANG-E-MEEL PUBLICATIONS**  
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## PREFACE

During the millennium of Muslim rule, India never witnessed such a woeful upheaval against the ruling race as it did in the 1857 event. The severe clashes between the rulers (the British) and the ruled (Muslims and Hindus) produced deep-rooted and far-reaching effects. The Britishers alleged that the excesses of the "insurgents" were responsible for the inhuman crimes but, on the contrary, according to the indigenous people, the atrocities committed by the British in vindictive mood exceeded all limits, such as public whipping, hanging, shooting, impaling, mutilating, burning alive, blowing from the guns and sewing alive in the pig skins after subjecting the innumerable victims of vengeance to every conceivable humiliation and torture, regardless of age and sex. This biased attitude of the major warring nations of 1857 has been explicitly demonstrated by the various denominations of this historic incident, like 'war of independence', 'freedom movement' etc. mostly by the Muslims and 'revolt', 'mutiny' (*ghadr*) etc. by the colonialists which means perfidy, treachery and base ingratitude and, thus, most of our heroic deeds are coloured and branded by them.

So far, a huge corpus of material (voluminous books, contemporary records, diaries and memoirs) is available, but still it seems difficult for the concerned groups to throw off the shackles of old prejudices and partialities. Apart from all these diverse opinions, one can hardly deny the significance of the debacle of 1857 as a turning-point in the history of Indian subcontinent. It tells the history of fading glory, fleeting kingship and elusive power of the centuries-old Mughal Empire and narrates the story of the transfer of power from the Company to the Crown, the drastic changes introduced in the administration and the army, the 'Political Law' regulating the relations with the states etc. aimed at strengthening and perpetuating the British rule in India.

The uprising of 1857 was not quite an isolated unrelated phenomenon: it was neither an abruptly erupted "mutiny" of the "native" sepoys, nor a revolt of dispossessed feudal chieftains. Both these factors did play their own limited role in intensifying or accelerating this war. But to claim that discrimination against the sepoys and annexation of princely states were responsible for the subcontinent-wise upsurge is an injustice to the patriotism of the intelligentsia, the peasant and the artisan classes who rose up in mass insurrection.

The 1857 Movement had a socio-political background and an ideological basis. The cauldron was simmering for over a hundred years and it could burst at any moment. The interests of the masses of people had been axed and their feelings grievously outraged. No doubt, it was the culmination of complex social



forces, and though it failed to achieve its goal immediately and even released a wave of brutal repression from which Muslims took long to recover. The foremost among the aggrieved were the Muslims. Political power passed away from their hands. It was the Muslims and the Muslims alone whose resistance the Paramount Power feared most.

In comparison to other major participants in this war, the Muslims suffered more. Even afterwards, they were harshly victimized and the distortions of facts and travesties of truth have gained currency in the process of time. British and Hindu historians incessantly tried to their views and continued to diminish the historic role, played by the Muslims. Because of the sheer inertia and slothfulness, the Muslims responded, but rather weakly, and to some extent lately.

On the occasion of 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of this fiasco of 1857 (2007), a voluminous project has been launched which aimed at bringing into light the contribution of Muslim historians to the study and evaluation of this war according to their own viewpoint. Though their contribution is comparatively meagre, intermingled with divergent views, but it deserves to be minutely studied and seriously considered. As a part of this project, three books in Urdu have already been published, comprising a collection of Hasan Nizami's prolific writings about 1857 (2007), a collection of diaries, contemporary sources and memoirs (2007) and 1857 in a historical, intellectual and literary perspective (2007). The present book entitled *1857 in the Muslim Historiography* is the last volume of the afore-mentioned project which is primarily meant to rescue the history of Muslims in the subcontinent from the inaccuracies and prejudices that have developed around 1857 and then to represent the character and importance of this historic event for wider understanding by the people who are proud heirs of a great tradition. This book has been divided in different sections in order to cover all the important aspects of 1857.

Here, it is not possible to name all my friends and colleagues, in the country and abroad, who have tremendously helped me in locating and finding the concerned sources. I am heartily grateful to all of them.

Lahore  
6<sup>th</sup> March, 2007

M. Ikram Chaghatai



## 1857 (Chronological Table)

June 23rd, 1757	Battle of Plassey. Commencement of British rule in India.
1806	Sepoy mutiny at Vellore (Southern India).
1842	Disastrous British retreat from Kabul.
1845	First Sikh War.
1848-9	Second Sikh War. Annexation of Punjab.
1848-56	Governor-generalship of Lord Dalhousie.
January 1856	Annexation of Oudh.
February 1856	Governor-generalship of Lord Canning began.
1856	War against Persia. General service enlistment commenced for Bengal Army. Musketry depots established for training with the new Enfield rifle.
<b>1857</b>	
January	Scare about "greased cartridges" started in Dum Dum.
February 25th	Mutiny of the 19th N.I. at Berhampore.
March	Mysterious affair of the chupattis.
March 29th	Affair of Mangal Pandi in Barrackpore.
March 30th	Disbandment of the 19th N.I. in Barrackpore.
April 3rd	Execution of Mangal Pandi at Barrackpore.
April 21st	Execution of Jemadar Issuri Pandi.
April	Unrest and incendiarism in Ambala.
May 3rd	Mutiny in Lucknow scotched by Lawrence. Disbandment of 7th Irregular Cavalry.
May 6th	Disbandment of the 34th N.I. in Barrackpore.
May 10th	<i>Mutiny and massacre at Meerut.</i> This marked the outbreak of the Mutiny as a whole.
May	Meerut Mutiny followed by outbreaks in Delhi, Ferozepore, Bombay, Aligarh, Mainpuri, Etawah, Bulandshar, Nasirabad, Bareilly, Moradabad, Shahjehanpore, and many smaller stations. Mutinies prevented or neutralized by disarmament of the sepoys in Lahore, Lucknow, Agra, Peshawar, and Mardan. (Many of these crises occurred on or just before May 31st.)



Other events in May were the advance of the Delhi Field Force to Kurnaul and the death of General Anson.

June

Mutinies at Sitapore, Hansi, Hissar, Azimgarh, Gorakhpore, and Neemuch. Siege of surviving Europeans in Neemuch fort. Mutinies at Gwalior, Bhurtpore, and Jhansi. Short siege of Europeans in Jhansi, followed by treacherous massacre.

*Mutiny at Cawnpore, followed by siege of European survivors (4th-25th) and treacherous massacre in the boats after surrender. Women and children reserved for later massacre.*

Intended mutiny in Benares forestalled by Colonel Neill. Sepoys and doubtful Sikh battalion dispersed by gunfire.

Mutinies at Jewanpore, Allahabad, Jullundur, Phillaur, Nowgong, Rhoni, Fatehgarh, Aurangabad (Deccan), Fatehpore, and Jubbulpore. Aurangabad mutiny suppressed after a few days and rebels dispersed.

Indian units forcibly disarmed at Nagpore and Barrackpore.

Mutinies at Fyzabad, Sultanpore, and Lucknow. (Order restored in last-named, but city and neighbourhood remained disturbed. Europeans concentrated in the Residency.)

British defeat (30th) at Chinhat, near Lucknow. *Siege of Lucknow commenced.*

June

Other events of June were:

Battle of Badli-ke-Serai (8th). Delhi Field Force took up positions on the Ridge and commenced operations against Delhi. Throughout June anarchy spread through the Ganges plain, Rajputana, Central India, and in parts of Bengal. Innumerable small communities of Europeans obliterated. A few survivors reached safety after many weeks of hairbreadth adventures.

July

Mutinies at Indore and Mhow, Auggur, Jhelum, Saugor, Sialkot, Dinapore, and of the Kotah Contingent at Agra. Europeans concentrated in Agra fort.

Siege of Lucknow Residency continued throughout month. So, also, did operations of Delhi Field Force against the city of Delhi. General Barnard died of illness (5th).

Havelock's force advanced from Allahabad to relieve Cawnpore. Arrived there on 17th, one day too late to save the women and children (massacred on night 15th/16th).

Indian units in Rawalpindi disarmed. Sialkot mutineers crushed by General John Nicholson at Battle of Trimmu Ghat (16th).

August

Siege and relief of Arrah. Vincent Eyre's victory over Koer Singh and destruction of latter's stronghold of Jagdespur.

Mutinies at Kohlapur (Bombay Presidency), Poonamali (near Madras), Jubbulpore, Bhōpawur (near Indore), Mian Mir (near



## Chronological Table

	Lahore). Outbreak forestalled at Jalpaiguri (near frontier of Bhutan). During August insurrection spread throughout Saugor and Narbadda districts. Other events in August. Surprise disarmament of Indian units in Berhampore (1st). Siege of the Lucknow Residency continued throughout the month. Havelock's first attempt at relief unsuccessful.
September	Rising forestalled in Karachi (14th). More outbreaks in Saugor and Narbadda districts. Siege of Saugor commenced. <i>Assault and recapture of Delhi (14th-20th)</i> <i>Relief of Lucknow by Havelock and Outram (25th)</i> . Fresh siege of the reinforced garrison commenced.
October	Mutiny at Bhogalpur (near Dinapore). Troubles in Behar, North Bengal, and Assam. Mutiny in Bombay city forestalled (15th). Rising in Kotah State (15th). Murder of Major Burton, the political agent.
November	<i>Relief of Lucknow by Sir Colin Campbell (17th)</i> . Evacuation of the garrison and temporary abandonment of the Residency and city. Defeat of General Windham outside Cawnpore (28th). Line of retreat from Lucknow gravely threatened.
December	<i>Decisive battle of Cawnpore (December 6th)</i> . Sir Colin Campbell routed armies of the Rao Sahib (the Nana Sahib's nephew) and Tantia Topi. Campaign in Ganges Doab. Capture of Fatehgarh.
<b>1858</b>	
January	Commencement of Central India campaign by Sir Hugh Rose. Commencement of Sir Colin Campbell's campaign for recapture of Lucknow.
February	Gurkha army of Nepal lent to British for Lucknow campaign. Relief of Saugor by Sir Hugh Rose (2nd). Capture of Garhakota. Sir Colin's "Army of Oudh" gradually assembled along the Cawnpore-Lucknow road and awaited arrival of the Gurkha army, under Shamshere Jung Bahadur.
March	<i>Recapture of Lucknow (21st)</i> , after three weeks of hard fighting. Rebel armies dispersed into Oudh. Campaign of Sir Hugh Rose continued. Forcing of the Madanpur Pass (5th). River Betwa crossed (17th). Chanderi stormed (17th). Siege of Jhansi commenced (21st).
April	Battle of the Betwa (1st). Tantia Topi defeated. <i>Storming of Jhansi (3rd)</i> . Flight of the Rani (4th). Capture of Jhansi completed (6th). Sir Hugh Rose resumed advance on Kalpi (25th).



Sir Colin Campbell commenced reconquest of Rohilkhand.

Fresh rising in Behar, led by Koer Singh, who besieged a small force near Arrah.

Campaign against Koer Singh in Behar. Azimgarh recaptured and beleaguered garrison relieved (6th). Jewanpore reoccupied (15th). Koer Singh, wounded, reached Jagdespur, his stronghold. Disastrous attack on Jagdespur by Captain Le Grand. British detachment wiped out and guns lost. Arrah again in danger. Koer Singh died of wounds in Jagdespur.

May

Battle of Bareilly (5th). Bareilly recaptured (7th). Battle of Mohumdi (24th). End of resistance in Rohilkhand.

Second relief of Arrah (1st). Recapture of Jagdespur (10th). Recapture of lost British guns (27th). Rebels begin guerrilla warfare in the jungle.

Campaign in Central India. Battle of Kunch (7th). Defeat of Tantia Topi; extreme heat prevented effective British pursuit. Battle of Golaoli (near Kalpi) (22nd). British reoccupation of Kalpi (23rd). Tantia Topi and Rani of Jhansi at gates of Gwalior. Tantia and Rani seize Gwalior by surprise, Scindia's army having deserted to the rebels (1st). Sir Hugh Rose marches from Kalpi (6th). Arrival outside Gwalior (16th). Battle of Kotah-ki-Serai (17th) and death of the Rani of Jhansi. *Battle of Gwalior (19th). Capture of the fortress (20th).* Flight of Tantia Topi.

June

Suppression of scattered guerrilla forces continued in Oudh, Behar, and along the Nepalese frontier.

July-December Guerrilla bands gradually suppressed everywhere, except Rajputana and Central India, where Tantia Topi continued to elude capture and maintained active resistance. Battle of the Rapti (December 31st) ended resistance in N. India.

November 1st Regime of East India Company terminated by a Royal Proclamation. Queen Victoria became Empress of India.

1859

Pursuit of Tantia Topi continued till April 7th when he was betrayed by Man Singh, captured, tried (April 15th), and executed (April 18th).

Campaigning against guerrillas continued, within Nepal, during January.

1861

Final sparks of rebellion extinguished.



## MEMOIRS OF HAKIM AHSANULLAH KHAN

Hakim Ahsanullah Khan was one of the most eminent personalities of Delhi in the pre-revolutionary period. He claimed descent from Hazrat Abu Bakr, the first caliph of Islam. One of his ancestors, Khwajah Zayn-al-Din migrated from Herat and settled in Kashmir. Subsequently the family shifted to Delhi where Ahsanullah's father Azizullah, earned distinction as a *tabib* (physician).<sup>1</sup>

Ahsanullah studied *tibb* (medicine) under his father. After completing the course of studies he started practice as a physician. Delhi being too big a place for a novice he joined service in the private estate of Nawwab Ahmad Khan of Firuzpur Jharka. Later he came to Jhajjar and remained for a time in the service of its chief, Fayz Muhammad Khan. As by now he had earned some reputation as a physician, he could manage to obtain service at the imperial court after the death of his master. When Bahadur Shah ascended the throne in 1837 he not only retained the services of Ahsanullah Khan but added to his position by conferring upon him the title of *Ihtaram-al-Daulah Thabit Jang*. Soon he became a confidant of the new Emperor and, in the words of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, "no problem, even though it was connected with the *wizarat*, could be settled *in toto* or in part without the consultation of this man who had a sound judgment."<sup>2</sup>

Ahsanullah Khan was interested in the art of building. In 1854 (1270 H.) he purchased an old building known as Haweli Badal Beg and built a beautiful gate on its site. The famous poet Ghalib composed the following chronogram.<sup>3</sup>

نہادہ بنا احسن اللہ خاں      سر راہ بد انسان در دلکشا  
کہ غالب بے سال تاریخ او      رقم کرد در دلکشا حذا

Tr. Ahsanullah Khan laid the foundation, by the road in such a manner, a delightful gate; That Ghalib with a view to composing its chronogram wrote *dar-i-dilkusha*,

It would be of some interest to mention that the Haweli Badal Beg on the site of which this gate was raised was originally the palace of I'timad-al-Daulah Qamar-

<sup>1</sup> Sayyid Ahmad: *Athar-us-Sanadid* (Newal Kishore Press), chap. IV, p. 24.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35. This statement of Sayyid Ahmad is fully substantiated by the incident narrated in the *Memoirs*.

<sup>3</sup> Bashiruddin: *Waqi'at Darul Hukumat-i-Dehli*, vol. II, pp. 199.



al-Din Khan. After his death it was partitioned and divided, Badal Beg got one of its parts, and since then it was known after his name.

In the thirteenth year of his reign Bahadur Shah ordered the compilation of a book containing chronological tables of the dates of birth, coronation and deaths of the Mughul Emperors and some princes of other dynasties, such as the Safawids. The book was compiled by Muhammad Fakhruddin Husain and is known as *Miri-at-ul Ashbab Salatin Asman Jah*. Besides the painters, Ghulam 'Ali Khan and Babur 'Ali Khan, the author was also assisted in his work by Hakim Ahsanullah Khan.<sup>4</sup>

In spite of Ahsanullah Khan's loyalty to the East India Company he had to pass the last years of his life in obscurity and destitution. For a time he was kept under watch and was not above suspicion. In a letter dated 1 April 1858 Ghalib writes to his brother-in-law, Hakim Ghulam Najaf Khan, "The sepoy who was appointed to keep watch over the Hakim has been withdrawn and he has been allowed to live as he like, but he cannot get out of the city without permission. Once a week he has to appear at the *Kutcheri*. He is now residing in the house of Mirza Jagan behind the *Kuchcha Bagh*. Safdar had come to me, and this is what he has related. I long to see the Hakim, but cannot go because I have to be cautious."<sup>5</sup> Subsequently, his house was restored to him and he was allowed to occupy it,<sup>6</sup> but he was not free in his movements. The only reward that Hakim Ahsanullah got for his treachery to the cause of freedom was a pension of Rs. two hundred per month.<sup>7</sup> He could not however regain the position and respect which he had enjoyed before the Revolution. His life in Delhi was therefore far from happy. Ultimately he left the city and settled in Baroda where he died in September 1873 in a state of complete oblivion.<sup>9</sup>

Hakim Ahsanullah Khan's role in the Revolution was important but thoroughly discreditable. He was strongly of the view that as the power and prestige of the Mughul dynasty had gone for ever and that even the nominal existence of the Emperor depended on the sweet will of the East India Company it would be foolish to displease its authorities, and to defy its power would be an act of madness. An incident reported by the *Ahsanul Akhbar* of Bombay on November 13, 1846 will give an idea of his attitude towards the Company's officers. "Hakim Ahsanullah Bahadur," says the paper, "Said (to the Emperor) that the Sahib Kalan Bahadur (meaning, the agent) was angry with him and he would like to know what steps he should take to remove this anger from his heart. His Majesty wrote to the Sahib Kalan, " 'Hakim Ahsanullah Khan is a well wishing person; it is not proper to be displeased with him. You should therefore

<sup>4</sup> Vide Catalogue of Persian Mss. British Museum, vol. I, pp. 285.

<sup>5</sup> *Khatut-i-Ghalib* (Lahore: 1951) vol. II, p. 69. Letter addressed to Hakim Ghulam Najaf Khan dated 1st April 1858.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid* Vol. I, p. 180. Letter addressed to Mirzu Har Gopal Tafta, dated 5. November. 1859.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid* Vol. II, p. 94. letter addressed to Husain Mirza.

<sup>8</sup> *Qaisarut Tawarikh*, vol. II, p. 458.

<sup>9</sup> *Qamus-ul Mashahir* (Nizami Press, Badaun), vol. I, p. 63.



remove displeasure from your heart and make it free (from) anger." The Sahib Kalan obeyed the directions of His Majesty and purified his heart of the dirt and displeasure which was there. Hakim Sahib was highly pleased by his kindness and consideration, and gave proof of his obedience and devotion by thanking His Majesty for this favour, and praying for the increase of his position and status and the extension of his dominion.<sup>10</sup>

Ahsanullah Khan's efforts to help the British in their attempt to suppress the Revolution did not long remain a secret. The officers of the revolutionary forces knew that he was "in league with the English" and acted as their spy. They wanted to put him to death and would have certainly cut short his life if the Emperor had not stood by him.<sup>11</sup>

Ahsanullah Khan was generally known as a man of sound judgment and political foresight. After the defeat of the revolutionaries and the re-establishment of the British rule he was praised for his wisdom by those who were inclined to a policy of cooperation with the company's Government. The author of the *Nusratnamah*, for instance, speaks of his policy in the words: "what the wise and foresighted people do in view of the requirements of the time is not devoid of wisdom and expediency. Among such persons are Hakim Ahsanullah Khan and the queen of the Emperor, Nawwab Zinat Mahal. They conveyed the news of the outbreak of this revolution to the Lieutenant Governor of Agra by sending a royal *shuqqah* and continued to correspond secretly with him. In reply to this *shuqqah* the Lieutenant Governor wrote, 'We were sorry to learn of these matters. You must however remain satisfied that in the near future this mischief will be undone' "<sup>12</sup> Kamal-uddin Haydar goes a step further and asserts that Hakim Ahsanullah Khan had made three promises to the British. He fulfilled them to a letter but the British did not bother about rewarding his services to them.<sup>13</sup>

Ahsanullah had considerable influence over the Emperor, who willingly or unwillingly, had become the pivot of the Great Revolution. In 1857 Bahadur Shah was past eighty. He lacked strength of will and could easily be persuaded to follow a course or change it under pressure from friends and colleagues. He was anxious to see the exit of foreign power and resuscitate the lost glories and power of his dynasty. He knew that these could not be restored without a bloody war and that a great risk had to be faced. He was therefore dragged into the struggle

<sup>10</sup> Quoted in *Dehli Ka Akhri Sans* (Delhi, 1925) pp. 120-121

<sup>11</sup> Ghalib relates an interesting incident in this connection. He says that a person whom the Hakim had patronised wanted to see his patron put to death because he knew his secrets. He therefore spread the rumour that the Hakim was a spy and friend of the British. This infuriated the revolutionaries and although they could not kill the Hakim because the Emperor protected him personally, they satisfied their hatred by plundering his house. "No slave," he draws the moral, "will behave towards his master in this way if he is of pure birth." *Dastunbu*. Newal Kishore Press, 1871) pp. 386-387.

<sup>12</sup> This corroborates Ahsanullah Khan's own version in the *Memoirs*, p. 5

<sup>13</sup> The three promises mentioned by him were, that he would not let the Emperor go with the revolutionaries, make arrangement for the arrest of the Princes and place the royal secretariat at the disposal of the Government.



by the revolutionary forces and agreed to lead the movement. But at the same time he could not resist the persuasions of his beloved queen and clever minister Hakim Ahsanullah Khan. The courage and determination which he was able to muster was more than neutralized by the agents of the enemy. According to the author of the *Qaisar ut-Tawarikh* the Hakim had promised the British that he would not let the Emperor go with the revolutionary forces, and he did fulfill this undertaking. If this is correct, and there is no reason to believe that it is not, then to a very great extent the failure of the movement was due to the role played by the Hakim. If Bahadur Shah had accepted Bakht Khan's advice and accompanied him to Rohilkhand the course of the war would have been changed. Bahadur Shah's surrender to Hodson, manouvered by Hakim Ahsanullah and his co-workers, was a great disaster. It laid the foundation of the collapse of the entire movement.

The *Memoirs* of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan, are being published for the first time. The original text is not available, but their 'rough translation' by a British officer is preserved in the India Office Library in Sir John Kaye's papers. According to the translator the memoirs were written at his request. The writer had no sympathy with the cause of the revolutionaries; nor could he take a detached view of the progress of events during the hectic twenty weeks of war in Delhi. Even a cursory glance over the document will show that it is by no means an impartial account and the reader has to be very careful when studying it. But perhaps this is the case with almost all contemporary or nearly contemporary accounts of the War of Independence, 1857-59. Never-the-less Ahsanullah Khan's account is a useful source of information for several reasons. He was a participator in most of the events which he relates; about those which did not occur before his own eyes he learnt from persons who gave him first hand information. One of the common weaknesses of the writers of autobiographies and memoirs is that they suppress or try to cover up their own faults. Ahsanullah Khan is no exception to this. In spite of this drawback, however, he gives us some very useful information; which throws light on various aspects of the great Revolution. The attitude of the Emperor towards the Revolution which he was called upon to lead, the conduct and behaviour of the Princes after their appointment as commanders, the role played by the *Maulawis* and the *Jehadis*, the problems and difficulties of the Revolutionary Government and the obstacles it had to face in maintaining peace and order on the one hand and providing supplies and ammunitions for war on the other are among the aspects of the Movement on which we find useful material in the *Memoirs*.

The *Memoirs* begin with the narration of occurrences under the date 11 May 1857, but later on no dates are mentioned although the writer is often particular about giving the time and the hour of the incidents which he relates. In some cases he begins his story with "Next day" or "after some days"; the translator has on this basis tried to give the dates on the margin. Even these are scanty, and not of much help. It is beyond doubt that the Hakim had forgotten the dates and has therefore confused the sequence of events.



The language of the translation is very unsatisfactory, as the translator has himself admitted it is only a "rough translation." But what makes it difficult reading is his carelessness in reporting conversations. He is not consistent in the mode of narration. He would report a few sentences in the direct words of the speaker and then without completing the report start using indirect method of narration. In spelling proper names he is not uniform, as, for instance, "Mirza Moghul" has been spelt in different ways at different places. Some words and phrases could not be read correctly; this has been indicated by putting "(illegible)" within brackets in place of those words.

### Memoirs

On Monday 16th Ramazan (1273 Hijri) corresponding to 11th May, 1857, about 8 a.m. Muhammad Bakhsh darwan Darwazah 'Diwan Khas' came to me, and stated that a sepoy was knocking at the Lahori Gate of the Fort saying that the native army Horse and Foot had mutinied against the English at Meerut<sup>14</sup> and were close at hand, and that he would join them. On hearing this I said to him, "Bring the sepoy to me that I may enquire into his story." Before he could return with an answer or the sepoy His Majesty sent for me. When I arrived at the Diwan Khas then the people there pointed out 20 *sawars* coming towards the Fort from the Bridge and at a distance the Salimpur Toll<sup>15</sup> was seen burning. The King was then outside. Sharf-ud-daula, the King's *wakeel*, was with him. The King sent him to Captain Douglas, Commander Palace Guard, to ask why the *sawars* were coming. A sepoy (illegible). His Majesty went into the Palace and I also went to my own house, outside the Diwan Khas, when a messenger came up and said "the Commander, Palace Guard, is coming." I returned quietly to the Diwan Khas. I saw 9 or 10 *sawars* wearing the uniforms of the Irregular Cavalry (Turk *sawar*) were near the Burj Musamman (Octagonal Bastion) where Saunders<sup>16</sup> lives. With his Majesty's leave I closed the door under the lattice (*jharoka*). After this the Commander of the Palace Guard came with S(h)arf-ud-daulah and having heard of the *sawars* arrival at the Lower Bastion intended to go outside the door. Under the lattice (illegible) the door to be opened. I prevented this and said, "You have no armed soldiers with you. They have firearms. You oughtn't to go near them." Captain Douglas remained in the oratory (where Saunders' office now sits) standing by the marble parapet told the *sawars* that they were troubling His Majesty by their voice and call for justice.

<sup>14</sup> The reference is to the rising of the 3rd light cavalry and the 11th and 20th Regiments of the Infantry at Meerut on the 10th May, 1857. The rising had taken place at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. Soon after nightfall the *sawars* and sepoys left Meerut for Delhi, reaching there early in the morning.

<sup>15</sup> Zakauallah, *Tarikh 'Uruj 'Ahd-i-Saltanat-i-Inglishia-i-Hind*, page, 408.  
"Outside the palace on the river side stands a strong fortification called Selimgarh, which was connected with the place by a small bridge which spanned the wide moat which surrounds it" (G.W. Forrest, *A History of the Indian Mutiny*, London, 1904, Vol. I, pp. 39-40).

<sup>16</sup> He was Agent to the Lieutenant-Governor for his evidence in the trial of Bahadur Shah, see Kaye, V.V. 323.



that these were His Majesty's private apartments and that they must be off. The *sawars* (who must have been standing under the Diwan Khas outside the Fort by the river) went off towards the Rajghat Darwaza.<sup>17</sup> The King then came out. Captain Douglas re-assured him and begged him not to be alarmed that they were mutinous *sawars* and that that matter would soon be settled. He took his leave and the King retired inside. I went home. After a little while Pooran, the Commandant's Jamadar, came to me and said that his master had been wounded in the foot, and was lying down in the lower storey, and has (had?) sent for me to come quickly. On this I went off with him and took with me S(h)arf-ud-daulah who was by me at the time. On arriving at the spot I found that they had taken Captain Douglas upstairs. I was going up too, when I found that the Company of the sepoy had mutinied. When I mounted the steps I found the guard there still more excited (*ziyadah barham*). In short when I went inside I found the Commandant lying on a couch. A lady was giving him some soup or tea. On seeing me the Sahib said, "Get me quickly two *palkees* (*bahlis*)<sup>18</sup> and some men from the King, that the lady may be carried away to the Queen who will protect her. A gentleman is lying inside wounded.<sup>19</sup> Send for a tengeon"<sup>20</sup>. I went into the other room to see him. Mr. Simon Fraser was coming out at the time. On seeing me and S(h)arf-ud-daulah he said "Get two guns at once from the King." I said to S(h)arf-ud-daulah 'go quickly and get permission for the despatch of the guns. I am coming.' He went down with Mr. Fraser. I after seeing the gentleman who was wounded, a young man, bearded, and wounded, I think, in the right arm, went off quickly to the Diwan Khas and informed the King of these occurrences. The King and Queen (Zinat Mahal) came into the bed room and gave permission for the despatch of two *palkees* and two guns. The *palkees* were at once sent off, and an order was sent to the artillery for the guns, and also for a tengeon. After a little while Kahar came and said that a *sawar* had killed<sup>21</sup> the Bara Sahib (Mr. S.

<sup>17</sup> The *sawars* entered the city by this gate. There are different statements in contemporary works as to who opened the gate. Zahir Dehlawi says that the Hindus who had gone out early in the morning to take a bath in the Jumna wanted to return by this gate. When the guards refused to open it the Hindu bathers whose number was nearly five hundreds broke it open and forced their entry. According to Zakaullah the gate was opened by a "disloyal" *Najib*. He adds that the general rumour was that some mysterious person dressed in green came there, opened the gate and disappeared. (Zahir Dihlawi, *Dastan-i-Ghadr* (1955) p. 86; Zakaullah, p. 410).

Kaye is definite that "it was opened to them by the Muhammadans of the Thana Bazar, and they clattered into the town." (vol. II, p. 58)

<sup>18</sup> It appears that the translator has confused *bahli* with *palki*. Evidently *bahli* (bullock cart) is out of the question.

<sup>19</sup> Mr. Hutchinson, collector and magistrate of Delhi.

<sup>20</sup> A type of small *palki* carried by bearers.

<sup>21</sup> Mr. Fraser's murder has been a subject of controversy because of discordant evidence. He was murdered at the stairs of the apartments of Captain Douglas. He "was addressing a noisy crowd, when a man named Mughul Beg, an orderly of the palace Guards, rushed upon him and clove his check to the bone." For this statement Kaye relies on the evidence of two Hindus, Bakhtawar Singh and Kishan Singh. Zahir adds that the funeral arrangements of the deceased were made under orders from the Emperor. *Dastan*, pp. 98-99.



Fraser) on the stairs of the Commandant's Quarters, and that several men with drawn swords had gone upstairs. Again after a little while the news came that they had killed the Commandant and all *sab kot* and that the Sepoy Company at the gates and the murderous *sawars* were plundering their property. His Majesty gave orders for closing of all the gates of the Palace and the Diwan Khas. The Darwan returned and said that the sepoy's belonging to the Companies stationed at the gates of the Fort were at the gates and wouldn't allow them to be closed. Soon after this 50 sepoy's and a large number of *sawars* came suddenly into the Diwan Khas and said, "We have come to fight for our religion and to pay our respect to His Majesty." Before the King came out a regiment came in from cantonment and said the same.<sup>22</sup> The eunuch of the household (*khwaja-sara*) took the messages unto the King who came out. They made themselves (?) and said as before. His Majesty said "I have neither troops, magazine or treasury. I am not in a condition to join any one." They said, "Only give us your countenance (*chamare sar par hath rakhuji*)."<sup>23</sup> we will provide everything." The King went inside. The *sawars* remained in the Bagh and the sepoy's in the Diwan Khas. After a little while more sepoy's and *sawars* came. By evening 300 irregular cavalry (*Turk-sawars*) and three regiments from cantonments and two from Meerut had taken up their quarters in the Fort, the Malpert Regiment in Salimgarh, and the rest in the Diwan Khas, Diwan-Am, the Stables and Naqqar Khanah. In the evening I presented myself to His Majesty. The Queen was with him. I said, "It is necessary to write an account of these occurrences to the Lieutenant Governor at Agra,"<sup>24</sup> for there is no government here." The King told the Munshi quickly to write "*suk-rosa*" (*shuqqah* ?) and send off a camel *sawar* privately. The Queen also approved. I told the Munshi at once who having come between 9 and 10 wrote a letter and sent it to the Queen. Having examined and signed (lit. sealed) she gave it over to be carried by *usalat* (camel *sawar*) to Agra. It was sent off then and there. But the eunuch into whose hands the Munshi gave it told eunuchs Basant Ali and Nasir of its despatch. They gave information to Gulab Shah and few of the *Turk-sawars* who used to frequent their company; an officer of the Volunteer Regiment was present at the time. He said "This Hakeem is in league with the English. First the Commandant called for him. It was he who sent the

<sup>22</sup> This is a very clear indication of the object of the revolution. The leaders of the Movement had prepared the sepoy and the common man for a holy war to safeguard their faith. This is why their war cry was *Deen*. Muinuddin's statement corroborates this. Describing the incidents of the first day of the rising he writes, "Shortly afterwards two Mahommadans *sawars* had ridden up, and called out, 'Are you all here for your religion or against it?' The Kotwal had replied, 'We are all for our religion.' The convicts then made a rush for a blacksmith's shop, and assisted each other to cut off their irons. After this two men mounted on camels and dressed in green with red turbans rode by at a trot, calling out, 'Hear, ye people, the drum of religion is sounded.' Whence they had come or whither they went, my inforcement knew not, but the excited and terrified crowds in the streets believed they were heavenly messengers." *Two Native Narratives*, p. 48).

<sup>23</sup> Zahir's words are almost identical. *Dastan*, p. 79.

<sup>24</sup> See *Trial of Bahadur Shah*.



*palkee* and gave orders for despatch of guns. Now he has sent off the letter to Agra. He must be settled." They answered, "He is Mahbub Ali Khan's Mukhtar. Mahbub will bring all the Princes over to us, and the Hakeem's influence with the King will be destroyed." They listened, and then these two eunuchs continued a secret meeting before the Princes and Gulab Shah, and the officers of the volunteer, and other regiments and determined that the Hakeem should have nothing to say to the troops, nor communicate with the King or Queen, or Mahbub Ali Khan. To carry this out, on the third day (Wednesday) the Princes came to the King in the morning and stated that the officers of the troops were willing to serve under them. The eunuchs also seconded them. The officers of the troops expressed their wish to have the Princes for their commanders. The King then consented and made over a regiment by name to each Prince. He ordered that they should put in writing their agreement to serve the King. All of them consented. About 2 p.m. (*tisra-pahr*) I and the Queen again represented to the King that it was not advisable to appoint the Princes to the command of the troops, and that it would be better to reappoint the old *thanahdars* and the *kotwals*, and to make over the administration of the city to the *muftis* and (illegible) Sudder Ameen<sup>25</sup> and that all should remain under the King's immediate order, and that to the officers of the Regiments it should be explained that the King's sons were young and inexperienced in military science and the art of war and incompetent to command, and on this excuse he should allow none of them to hold an appointment in the army. The King concurred, and expressed his concurrence saying that when the English rule was established those people would disclose all this and the English Government would be pleased. The Munshi was ordered to make enquiries and write *parwanahs* to all the *muftis* and *thanahdars* and to bring them forward.

In the morning of that day the Princes again presented themselves and applied for *parwanahs* of appointment.<sup>26</sup> The King replied, "You don't know the work. What will you do as officers?" All departed, disappointed. The eunuchs disclosed the particulars of the conversation, me (I ?) and Queen held with the King. The Princes were convinced that I had prevented their appointment to the military commands.

After 12 o'clock when I was absent from the Darbar all the officers of the troops were introduced by the eunuchs and influenced the King to appoint Princes. The King remained silent and then said, "Mirza Moghul wants to be the commander-in-chief, what do you wish?" They answered, "Agreeable." Two days after (Friday) the Princes asked the King to ride through the city, in order

<sup>25</sup> Mufti Sadruddin Khan Bahadur was sent for and appointed City Magistrate, "to try all cases and decide them with impartiality and justice. The Moulvie excused himself on the plea of bad health." (Jeewan Lal in *Two Native Narratives*, p. 90.)

<sup>26</sup> According to Muinuddin Hasan Khan "The following princes were appointed as colonels to Regiments: Mirza Jewan Bukht, Mirza Mogul, Mirza Kider Sultan Mirza Suruh Hindi, Mirza Sidu Beg, Mirza Buktour Shah, Mirza Abdullah, Son of Mirza Shah Ruk, Mirza Abu Bakr. (T.N.N. p. 58). The corruption in spelling is obvious.



that the people might be re-assured and that plunder might be put an end to. They recommended that Muin-ud-din Hasan Khan<sup>28</sup> son of Kudratullah Beg Khan who had ordered to take kotwalship should be appointed *kotwal*. The King ordered that the former *kotwal*<sup>29</sup> should be searched for. If he could be found he was to be appointed. The Princes answered that he had run off and that Muin-ud-din ought to be appointed. This was agreed to.

About 2 p.m. the King set out on an elephant and stopped beyond the door of the Chandni Chowk garden and there gave the *khillat* of appointment to Muin-ud-din agreeable to Mirza Moghul's recommendation.

Khizr Sultan applied to be invested with the Command of Mapert Regiment which he had brought with him. He alighted from his horse and came before the elephant. I then said aloud that such an appointment was not befitting a prince of high degree and (illegible), that it was contrary to etiquette to take a *khillat* in the face of the whole bazaar. The King concurred and wouldn't grant him *khillat*. This very much displeased him and all the officers of the army too, and the eunuchs. When the party returned in the evening all the officers especially those of the Turk-sawars represented that *parwanahs* should be issued to all *rajahs* and chiefs, far and near. They declared that His Majesty's officers were in league with the English and in the habit of writing to them and not to those to whom they ought to write.

The Munshi was told to write *parwanahs* to all the *rajahs* and chiefs and to bring them for signature.

In the morning Mahbub Ali Khan came into the Fort. He and I were seated together when the officers of the cavalry and infantry came up and said, "You are both in league with the English and send them information of all that goes on. A guard of our men will remain in the *Daftar* so that we may know what you write." Mahbub Ali Khan swore he had written nothing. If they wished to make sure of his innocence "he would swear on the Kuran. He then called for the Kuran and placed his hands on it and mine also. I also said, "I'll never write anything." Then Gulab Shah put his hands on the Kuran and said, "I have now no suspicion." He then went off to the King and obtained permission to post a guard

<sup>27</sup> Zakaullah has described in detail the procession of the Emperor and says that the sepoy were crying *Bahadur Shah Ki jai*. See pp. 661, 662; Jeewan Lal also mentions this incident. T.N.N. p. 86.

<sup>28</sup> Jeewan Lal mentions his appointment under May, 13. His own account may also be read. He gives interesting details and says, "I then rode to the Palace to ask for an interview with the King, in the hopes that I might get some appointment to give me influence to stop the butchery of Europeans, and ensure the protection of my own family." (T.N.N. pp. 49-50 and p. 89.)

<sup>29</sup> Sharaful Haqq was the former *kotwal*, see *Qaisar ul Tawarikh*, vol. II: 438.

<sup>30</sup> It appears Muinuddin was forced into joining the 'Mutiny' because his safety and that of his family lay in taking up the cause of the rebels. "These steps," he admits, "no doubt implicated me in the rebellion; but I was actuated by no feeling of opposition to the English, against whom I knew the struggle was hopeless." (T.N.N. p. 56). He makes this statement soon after referring to the fact that he had a meeting with Mirza Mughul and requested him to obtain for himself the command of the Volunteer Regiment of N.I.



of his own soldiers and a Musalman able to read in the *Daftar* to keep watch. He posted a *daffadar* with several *sawars* over Mahbub Ali Khan. He told the King that the troops should receive daily allowance for their food. The King replied that he had no money. He answered, "The Queen and Mahbub Ali Khan are your agents. They will make temporary arrangements and some money will be coming in from all quarters. From that they can take whatever you give. To bring in supplies, to provide guards, and to remain with the Princes, as orderlies, new troops must be raised so that there may (might ?) be no suspicion that any one is (was) in league with the English. The King answered, "Where is the pay to come to (from ?) ? The allowance of one lakh a month to the House and descendants of Taimur-----even that will be stopped. Under these circumstances, whence will additional servants be paid?" They replied, "Let Mahbub Ali Khan get a loan from the merchants in the city and distribute the pay." The Princes who were present at the time seconded them. A *parwanah* was written to Mahbub Ali Khan to procure money, another to Mirza Moghul to entertain (?) new troops to be placed under Mahbub Ali Khan's order that he might procure a loan and pay them.

In the afternoon of the same day they again came with Mirza Moghul, Mirza Khizr Sultan and Mirza Abu Bakr and represented that "many men in the city especially the pensioners and English Government officials send information of what is going on, and that all of them should be summoned to the *darbar*." The Darwan (illegible) to attend.

In the evening Khwajah Wahiduddin Khan<sup>31</sup> came and importuned the King to appoint the Princes to the command of the troops saying that "the army will be treasured as soon as you grant *khillats* of appointment to the Princes, otherwise the troops, who have killed their officers will misbehave to you; if he didn't (you wouldn't ?) respect their wishes." On hearing this the King directed the *khillats* to be prepared and enjoined on Mahbub Ali Khan to bestow the (illegible) *khillats* on Mirza Moghul, Mirza Khizr Sultan, Mirza Abu Bakr, Mirza Sohrab-i-Hindi, Mirza Bakhtawar Shah and Mirza Abdullah.<sup>32</sup>

At night the Queen remonstrated that the King paid no attention to her, and (he?) replied, "Let what God wills happen."

Two days after some of the Royal Family were collected and the conversation turned on the grant of *khillats* to the Princes. "Will Jawan Bakht get no appointment." The King answered that "his mother is my agent. He will be appointed Wazeer." Then the King ordered that a *khillat* should be prepared for Jawan Bakht as Wazeer, that he might exercise the functions of royalty, and not interfere with the army. Mahbub Ali Khan was also enjoined to grant a daily allowance in money to the troops (illegible) to Mirza Moghul's arrangements. All were then dismissed.

<sup>31</sup> He was the son of Khwajah Farid-ud-din and maternal uncle of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. See *Hayat-i-Javid*.

<sup>32</sup> See note 26.

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About noon several officers with several women, ladies and children were brought prisoners to the door. It was requested (not said, by whom) that they should be imprisoned. The King ordered them to be taken off to jail, and well supplied with food. One lady wife of an English merchant who before this was living with the Queen in the Palace was taken away with the rest. At the close of the day Mirza Moghul sent the rough draft of several *parwanahs* to the King that he might issue such and such orders for the entertainment of the fresh troops, and begged that Muinuddin Hasan Khan Kotwal, an intelligent man might serve under him in the army.<sup>33</sup>

The petition after signature (*i.e.* to the order thereon recorded) was made over to his servant and the *parwanahs* to the Munshi to be made out agreeably (?) to Mirza Moghul's petition.

In the evening the *sawars* brought the prisoners, English ladies and children. They were ordered off to the jail.

Mahbub Ali Khan represented that agreeably to Mirza Moghul's suggestions he had distributed 4 annas to each sepoy and 1 rupee to each *sawar*, but that the officers of the cavalry and infantry refused to give nominal roll, etc. saying that the army would be (illegible) and become dispirited; that they told the truth. Mirza Moghul was ordered to appoint a writer to each regiment to make out a correct nominal roll. In the evening all the officers came forward and begged that the Princes might be (illegible) with the *khillats*. All of them were called at (?) and *khillats* given to them, and Mirza Moghul proclaimed Commander-in-Chief of the whole army. Khizr Sultan, Commandant of the Mapert's 54 Regiment, Mirza Abdullah Commandant of the 20th (Bailee) Regiment, Mirza Sohrab-i-Hindi Commandant of the 11th Regiment (illegible), Mirza Bakhtawar Shah Commandant of the 7th Regiment and Mirza Abu Bakr Commandant of the whole cavalry. After this Jawan Bakht was invested with the *khillat* of the Prime Minister.<sup>34</sup>

The officials all begged that all orders regarding the army might be issued through the General of the army, and that no officer of the Government (*Ahlkar-i-Badshahi*) should be allowed to interfere. The King agreed.

Several officers then begged that *hukumnamahs* should be despatched to the officers of the Regiments at Jullundur, Ferozpur etc. The Munshi was told to write them at once. In the afternoon several other English prisoners were brought to the door. They were ordered to be confined with the other prisoners.

At night the Turk-*sawars* sent word to the King, through Basant Ali Khan and Sidi Nasir eunuchs that the English prisoners must be killed. The King replied (*hukum hua*) that there was no risk in keeping the women and children in confinement, and that there was no advantage in killing them. In the morning when I presented myself to the King, His Majesty said that the Turk-*sawars*

<sup>33</sup> See note 28.

<sup>34</sup> Jeewan Lal writes under May 19, "The King presented Mirza Jawan Bakht with a *Khillat* and appointed him his minister." (*T.N.N.* p. 97. also see *Trial of Bahadur Shah*, p. 185)



wanted permission to kill the prisoners. I represented that it was forbidden by the Muhammadan Law (*Shara'*)<sup>35</sup> to kill children and women. Besides this it was contrary to the dictates of worldly wisdom to perpetrate such atrocities (*aisi buri harkat*) that if the King took care of these people they would give evidence of their good treatment to his favour when the English were victorious and would remove all suspicions from the minds of the English of having been in league with the mutineers. As he had heard Muhammad Akbar Khan, son of Dost Muhammad Khan, Chief of Kabul did, who pleased (released?) the captives, so that they all wrote in favour of Dost Muhammad Khan and caused him to be freed from confinement and resealed on the throne.<sup>36</sup>

The King assented saying, "I myself said at night that their murder cannot never be allowed. The Queen too seconded me earnestly." The eunuchs reported all this conversation to the officers of the *sawars*. They all began to cry out that the murder of the prisoners is (was?) forbidden owing to the intrigues of the Hakeem, the Queen and Mahbub Ali Khan, and that they (meaning this Hakeem and Mahbub Ali Khan) have had? perjured themselves. All the army was convinced by these representations of my intriguing with the English. They plotted to forge a paper in my name and to send a Company to the fort to take me prisoner on the pretence of having found a correspondence between us, the Queen, Mahbub Ali Khan and the English.

When I heard of these people having arrived at Delhi Gate of the Fort, I went to the King and represented this matter to him. He ordered Mirza Moghul to prevent the Company entering the Fort and to demand the letter and papers which had been intercepted and said that the persons by whom they were written should without fail be punished. The King said to me (to) get my seal quickly and he also sent for Mahbub Ali Khan with his seal, and sent for the Queen's seal from inside the Palace. The seals were soon brought and their impressions made on blank paper. He then sent for the letter and papers in the possession of the sepoys. Mirza Moghul and Khizr Sultan came and said that no paper with a seal attached to it had been seized, but that there was a paper in which the Hakeem's name was mentioned, which some person had brought from somewhere or other, and begged that the officer might be sent away. The King forbade such unfounded accusations in future. Mirza Moghul then recommended Mir Haidar Hussain Khan for the daroghaship of the artillery and the Khan presented his service offerings. Mirza Moghul ordered all attached to the artillery to obey his orders. The nobles of the city, the *jagirdars* and pensioners presented themselves

<sup>35</sup> Sayyid Ahmad Khan has included him in the list of "Loyal Mohammadans" and speaks of him in these words: ".....Yet this Nawab made one effort to save these Christian Captives; for he addressed a letter to the King, in which he besought him not to sanction the massacre for which the soldeirs were thirsting...." (Graham, *The Life and Works of Syed Ahmed Khan*, 1885 p. 67. Also see *Trial*, p. 39, and Zakauallah, p. 432.)

<sup>36</sup> After his surrender in the first Afghan War Dost Muhammad Khan was sent to Calcutta. He was allowed to reoccupy his throne.

Evidently the translator forgot to strike off the word "not", which he had in mind to do.



and their offerings (to the King) and complained of plundering of the troops. Mirza Moghul was ordered to see to it and to prohibit the army from oppressing the people. The sepoys brought petitions from several officers and begged that they might be summoned to appear soon. The Munshi was directed to write the order.

The Rao of Dadree<sup>37</sup> being introduced by Basant Ali, eunuch, presented a *nazar* and petitioned for the privilege of a drum to be sounded and standard (?) armoural bearing. He stated that he would allow no supplies to be furnished to the English at Meerut and that he would so plunder and pound them that they would be bothered (?) out of their lives. The officers of the Turk-*sawars* were loud in his praise. The order was passed that he should be allowed at once the privilege of using a drum and standard. He also begged that an allowance might be made him. The officers of the *sawars* recommended that he should get Rs. 5 a day from that day. The order was issued to take him to Mahbub Ali Khan who would disburse.

In the evening again the officers of the army and Turk-*sawars* represented through the eunuchs of the household (that) H.M. officials were in league with the English and that it was they who prevented the killing of the English prisoners and that the King should give us (them?) free permission to kill them, else they would do it themselves tomorrow (next day?). They were told that they would get a reply next morning.

When I went to the King in the morning he narrated this (illegible) to me. I represented that it would be advisable both for the present and the future to preserve the lives of those innocent people. If they were killed the result would be disastrous. When I went away I found that 30 *sawars* armed with guns and pistols were rushing forward (illegible) the Diwan Khas and crying out that they would kill me as I came out. I therefore remained in the Diwan Khas. I said to Kale Khan, Basant Ali Khan and Sidi Nasir that it was against the Muhammadan Law to kill the prisoners (illegible) and the *sawars* have the power to do so. The three went to His Majesty who afterwards sent permission by Sidi Nasir. Those *sawars* with Sidi Nasir went to the Jail and I heard that all the prisoners were killed by the sword and murdered — all those innocent persons — on the Nakkār Khanah tank and the Stables.<sup>38</sup> After this Mirza Moghul came to the door (of the

<sup>37</sup> A small town not far from Delhi.

<sup>38</sup> Kaye gives the number of the prisoners as nearly fifty. He relates a small incident which is interesting. "After four or five days of this suffering, a servant of the King asked one of the ladies in the dungeon how, if they were restored to power, the English would treat the natives; and the answer was, "Just as you have treated our husbands and children." On the following day they were led forth to die." (vol. II, p. 74.) Against Ahsanullah Khan's version we have the following statement of Zahir Dehlavi, a staunch supporter of the British cause. He writes: "One day early in the morning I went to the Fort.....when I was near the Mahtab Darwazah I saw that the Poorbeahs had brought the prisoners outside the garden..... I went to Ahsanullah Khan and said to him, '.....do something for them.' He replied, 'what can we do?' I said, 'Hakeem Sahib, this is the moment to show your loyalty. If you want to save the King then save the prisoners through persuasions; otherwise remember, the English would



King's apartments) with Khizr Sultan, Mir Nawwab, son of Mir Tafazzul Hussain, was with them. He was left outside. They went in to the King. After a while they came out and said to Mir Nawwab, "You are permitted to go off to Garhi Har Saran (4 *kos* from Gurgaon) with some Turk-*sawars* and a company of sepoys. It is certain that there is some treasure there. Bring it back with you." He said, "Very well. Be pleased to give order for the troops." On this Mirza Moghul sent the order.

Several officers of the Force came to the door and said, "We won't take our daily pay from Mahbub Ali Khan. He bothers unnecessarily. Let the money be sent to Mirza Moghul who will distribute it. Mahbub Ali Khan was ordered to send the money to Mirza Moghul, who would himself have it paid out. Those officers then represented that "H.M.'s officials were (are?) in league with the English. Consequently no answers have been received from the Chiefs to whom *parwanahs* had been sent, from this it was evident that no *parwanahs* had been despatched. Otherwise it is impossible that not a single Rais had sent a reply or made his appearance." The Munshi was ordered to write other *parwanahs* which the officers of the Army might despatch in which mode they liked that their suspicions might be removed, and that inquiry should be made in (?) the *parwanahs* that no answer had been sent to the *parwanahs* despatched on such and such date that the truth might be ascertained regarding the despatch of *parwanahs*; (illegible) Mahbub Ali Khan was ordered to distribute half the pay getting loan on the faith of the Government from the merchants as soon as possible.

He immediately issued orders to several merchants and enjoined Lala Mukand Lal to bring all the merchants to him, that he might take a loan from them and then distribute pay.

Petitions began to pour in from the officers of the army. All were directed to go to Mirza Moghul who was ordered to ascertain the usual custom, and act accordingly. Several of the officers were dissatisfied at this and declared that they would look for orders to their own officers, e.g. Khizr Sultan Commander of the Mapert Paltan. They were told to send their petitions through him to the King; that Mirza Moghul was Commander-in-Chief, that it was necessary that Khizr Sultan (illegible) general and (illegible) to submit to him; that his age was greater.

On that same day my servant who was in charge of my house at the *Qutab* (*Qutb*?) came in and said, (illegible) Gujars came to Mr. Theophilus Metcalfe's (Thomas Sahib's) house to plunder it. It was told that the *chaprasis* and keepers (*muhafiz*) saved it, that the *chaprasis* put the property into the *Tahkhanah* and closed up the opening with great care. Two sepoys came

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raze the (city of Delhi) to the ground. Ahsanullah Khan replied, "You are just a child. You do not understand that man prefers.....to.....If we say anything to them they would murder us before they lay their hands on them." Later, Zahir adds, the Emperor ordered the Hakim to take necessary steps to save the prisoners but the Hakim whiled away the time and the prisoners were put to death. (*Dastan*, p. 119)



yesterday and looked both at the (illegible) house. It is probable that a large number of sepoy's will come to plunder the property and open the *Lahkhanah*. In the evening I told both the King and Queen that the house and property must be looked after that His Majesty had regarded the deceased "Moazam-ud-daulah that is, Sir T. Metcalfe" as his son, that he should take care that the house was neither plundered nor burnt. H. M. replied, "Send two guards there tomorrow." I sent orders to the *thamahdar* that he should take care of the house and *Lahkhanah*.

Accordingly I sent off instructions next morning (24th or 25th May) and sent for the keeper and reassured telling him to take care of the property, and that he should (would ?) receive pay. I also told the Princes their troops sent off to looting. In the morning the King was informed to forbid that Mir Nawwab had brought the treasure from Gurhi Saran. Mirza Moghul and Khizr Sultan brought men with a *khazaneh* of rupees and a Company of infantry. There were, I believe, 17000 odd hundred rupees with eight anna or four anna pieces. Agreeably to the representation of the officer it was ordered that 200 rupees be given to the soldiers and the rest lodged in the treasury. Basant Ali begged that communication between the King and the army should be made through him. He was ordered always to be in attendance and to ascertain the wishes of any one who presented himself at the door and to communicate them.

\* In the evening (24th May) Kaley Khan eunuch of the household stated that Mir Nawwab had brought back from Gurgaon a young woman who lived with some gentleman there and had kept her and her property in her own house that she had a large amount of jewels. Mir Haider Hussain was told to investigate the matter and to take care that the jewels were not made away with. A petition came from Mahbub Ali Khan that he was sick and could not appear, begging that orders should be sent him in writing. He was ordered to take immediate measures for the distribution of the pay, and pay in the daily allowance day by day to Mirza Moghul. After a day or two the King was informed that the troops at Ruhtak had taken possession of the treasure and that if help was sent it might be brought over. The matter was reported to Mirza Moghul.

Mirza Moghul came about 2 p.m. and said "Mir Nawwab, son of Tafazzul Hussain Wakeel, undertakes to bring it over but requires some irregular Cavalry, and horse artillery guns and requests that Mir Fath Ali may accompany him." Mirza Moghul was ordered to make the arrangements and to see that the King's subjects were not oppressed by the troops.

After some days when this caravan returned with somewhat above a lakh of rupees it was ascertained that the people of the country had been plundered and beaten, and that their women had killed themselves to save themselves from being dishonoured. The King was very much displeased on hearing this but Mirza Fath Ali and Mir Nawwab denied it in toto and (illegible) them all (illegible) into believing it was all a malicious report but some days after several men came from Ruhtak who confirmed the truth of the story. In short the money was lodged in the Treasury and the order was passed that "from today the daily



allowance should be made to Mirza Moghul from the Treasury, without application to Mahbub Ali.' Day by day Mahbub Ali became weaker.

Some time after this the King was informed that Mirza Abu Bakr with Irregular Cavalry had invaded Nawwab Hāmid Ali Khan's premises and beseeched (besieged?) him bringing up guns against the house to blow him away on the pretext that he was in league with the English and that an European was concealed in his house. After this a petition came in from the Nawwab "that a Sayyid was being unjustly done to death that the eunuchs and female servants of the King's household be sent to search throughout my house. If any gentleman be produced out of my house do to me what you think fit, if he is not produced let my traducers be punished."

The King forthwith ordered the *darwans* and *chobdars* to take the eunuchs of the household to Abu Bakr that he might make the search through their means and that he should commit no violence after this as Mir Nawwab was bringing the Nawwab as his prisoner. The *darwans* and *chobdars* returned. When they arrived at the door the King was enraged and at once released Hāmid Ali Khan and censured Mir Nawwab Ali Khan severely. Hāmid Ali Khan was ordered to attend the King and to give in a list of his plundered property. The Turk *sawars* were told not to obey such orders of Abu Bakr. They answered "He is our officer. Why should we not go when there is any suspicion (of some one being hid) but we will commit no violence."<sup>39</sup> About noon the officers of the Infantry Regiment came and requested that the Jhujjur Nawwab should be called upon to furnish money stating that the King's officials were in league with the English otherwise he would have been present ere this. A *parwanah* to this effect was directed to be written and to be made over to Ghulam Nabi Khan, his confidential agent. They also requested that a *parwanah* should be sent to Luchmi Chand Seth to direct his *gumashtah* to accept the office of the Treasurer, or without such an office business could not proceed. The Munshi was directed to write a *parwanah* to this effect.<sup>40</sup>

The King was informed that Muinuddin Hasan Khan Kotwal had been plundering the people of the city extensively. Mirza Moghul was directed to dismiss him from kotwalship and to select some other person for the post. It was further ordered that his property after investigation should be restored to any of

<sup>39</sup> Hāmid 'Ali Khan: he was the nephew and son-in-law of Mir Fazl Ali Khan (d. 1829) wazir of the ruler of Oudh. The author of *Qaisar ut-Tawarikh* says that he had concealed a British officer and a lady in his house. He was one of the informants of Maulavi Rajab, an agent of, Hudson, who was in charge of the intelligence branch of the British army: he also supplied provisions to the besieging forces of the British. After the fall of Delhi he is stated to have paid a lakh of rupees in the form of a promissory note. (*Qaisar-ut Tawarikh*, vol. II, pp. 461-62)

Mir Fazl Ali had donated a sum of one lakh and seventy thousand rupees for the Delhi College. Hāmid 'Ali Khan was appointed to supervise the administration of the fund. (*Delhi College*, 2nd edition, 1945, p. 9.)

<sup>40</sup> Nawwab Abdur Rahman Khan of Jhajjar promised to collect three lakhs of rupees (*T.N.N.*, p. 197)



the citizens who had been plundered and that the kotwal should be punished. In the evening Khwajah Waheed-ud-din Khan came and praised the seventh Regiment (*Alexander ki Paltan*) and said "they were encamped at the Delhi Gate and that they were ready to fight but were troubled for want of supplies. If Khwajah Ahmad Ali Khan, my near relative and a good man of business, be directed to furnish supplies regularly he will do the work efficiently, and also act as General Mirza Bakhtawar Shah's deputy." It was ordered that a *parwanah* to this effect be addressed to him.

In the morning agreeably to the same Waheed-ud-din's recommendations a *prawanah* of appointment to the *kotwali* was addressed to Qazi Faizullah<sup>41</sup> who was called to swear that he would not take bribes or commit oppression.

Treasure was brought by the sepoy's from across the river, either from Bulandshahr or Aligarh.<sup>42</sup> It was said that the Gujar's meddled with the treasury (treasure?) near the Bridge, and that the sepoy's had appropriated a part. The balance was brought to Delhi. It was ordered that it should be lodged in the Treasury. After this treasure came from Muttra<sup>43</sup> brought by a Company of sepoy's. The customs people (*admi*) and Saiduddin's *Jehadis* (fanatics)<sup>44</sup> were with them.

Some days after this Prince Muhammad Azim with a Company of Lukhya Paltan and the Hansi Risala and the customs people and some *Jehadis* brought forth rupees which were placed in the Treasury. Some of the royal family represented that they were badly off having received no pay for two months. Mahbub Ali Khan was enjoined to distribute one month's pay among them from the funds collected from the *sahukars*. He answered that "upwards of 60000 Rs. have been collected. The *sahukars* have promised to give the rest soon. As soon as 120000 Rs. are collected pay will be given to all, new and old servants." He was directed to realize the amount as soon as possible.

In the evening information was brought that Mahbub Ali Khan had fainted and is (was?) very weak. The Darwan was directed to go and (illegible) news of him. At night it was reported that he was insensible and in the morning his death was proclaimed. It was ordered that his funeral should take place and

<sup>41</sup> Qazi Faizullah was appointed *Kotwal* of Delhi for a short period after Mumuddin Hasan Khan. On the fall of Delhi he fled to Ballabgarh, but was ultimately arrested and sentenced to death (*Qaisar-ut Tawarikh*, vol. II, pp. 461-62).

<sup>42</sup> The treasure was brought from Aligarh (*Trial*, p. 270).

<sup>43</sup> The revolutionary sepoy's brought one lakh from Muttra (*Ibid.*).

<sup>44</sup> Saiduddin: His correct name was Saidullah; he was the son of Hakim Azimullah, resident of Aonla (Bareilly district). He was a staunch revolutionary and belonged to the group of Maulawi Fazl-i Haqq. Like the later he was also a signatory of the famous *fatwa* of *jihad*. He came to Delhi with his followers in order to join the war. From Delhi he returned to Rohilkhand and is stated to have taken part in the battle of Kakrala. After the fall of Bareilly he went into hiding (M. Ayub Qadri, *Maulana Faiz Ahmad Badauni*, Karachi 1957, p. 27; *Kanzut Tawarikh*, 1907, pp. 351-52).



that his tomb should be erected near Kalimullah's in the Khanum Bazar,<sup>45</sup> all at Government expenses.

In the afternoon the Queen was ordered to distribute the pay quickly the best way she could. She said, "By tomorrow I will procure what money is wanted."

Next day having sent for the balance from her own house, and having got some from the Treasury she distributed pay to all, and begged the King to endorse the papers containing the amounts of daily expenditure distributed to the army by Mahbub Ali Khan and to pay the amount back from the Treasury. Orders to this effect were passed and at the Queen's request all the servants of the King and officials were informed that in place of Mahbub Ali Khan, Shams-ud-daulah Ahmad Kuli Khan was appointed *mukhtar*, that all should present their offerings to him, and obey his orders.<sup>46</sup>

The officers of the Regiment and *sawars* presented petitions from General Bakht Muhammad Khan, and other officials praying for permission to wait on the King. The required instructions were made over to the messenger who brought the petitions. The officers of the army represented that "supplies are not properly furnished to the troops who go out to light and also that many of them won't take water from the *Bihishtis* and eat (illegible) nothing but things made with milk, such as *barfi*, *pera*, etc. This is why they returned driven back by hunger before the battle is over. No help is sent out to the fighting party. This must be seen to. Y.M. officials who are leagued with the English, and also Y.M. Queen and Hakeem wish to annoy the army and to drive them away and to admit the English whom they have called hither." It was explained to them that "none are in league with the English, but parties who were at enmity make such (illegible) against each other, that as the officials had nothing to say to the army Mirza Moghul will arrange all they wished and furnish assistance to the troops, that all the officials should make arrangements in concert, that in this matter no orders were required from the King, that they called this a religious war, why then did they not assist their brethren in arms. Such complaints were improper." They requested, besides the Princes, officers might be appointed, both from old royal troops and the new levees who should lead them to the attack and see that all the sepoys did their duty. The King answered that he had no old or new servants acquainted with the military art, that if any one was appointed it would be of no use.

In the Hansi Irregular Cavalry or the Lukhia Paltan there was a Rangar Harun Bakhsh Khan who one evening came to the door of the King's apartments

<sup>45</sup> *Khanum Ka Bazar*: It was a busy shopping centre near the surrounding wall of the city, see *Waqiat Darul Hukumat-i-Delhi*, vol. II, p. 123.

<sup>46</sup> Samsam-ud-Daulah Ahmad Quli Khan was the grandson of Ahmad Shah Abdali's *Wazir*, Shah Wali Khan. Ahmad Quli was the father of Bahadur Shah's favoured wife, Zinat Mahal. On the fall of Delhi he escaped to Jhajjar, but was later captured and brought to Delhi and thrown into prison. He could not stand the rigours of imprisonment and succumbed to them. His palatial house was confiscated. *Qaisar-ut Tawarikh*, vol. II p. 458.



and said, "There is certain information that a large quantity of magazine stores laden on hundreds of carts are coming to some place. The *chaudhri* of the *gariwans* is with me. If he can get from the Government the price of the carts and cattle he will (illegible) them all on fire." This news was communicated through Basant Ali. The King answered, "Where can so (much) money be procured (from) and what proof is there that these are so many carts of magazine stores and that this man is their owner?" The Rangar answered, "I'll be responsible. Give nothing now except a signed paper agreeing to pay 50,000 Rs. in the event of my account being true and the magazine being fired." He was told that no Munshi was then present, but that he should receive the papers next day. The Risalahdar above mentioned was importunate saying, "The time is passing by, and then nothing can be done. Let this paper be at once made out. I'll make it." His Majesty said, "Very well." After a while he brought it ready written and when seal was affixed took it away with him. But no result appeared, nor did we hear of magazine carts being fired. But this Risalahdar was always ill-disposed and was always accusing the King's officials plotting with the English. He was most particular to abuse me and Mahbub Ali Khan and even extorted an agreement from Mahbub Ali Khan to the effect that if he joined himself to the English, and it was proved, he might inflict on him, whatever punishment he thought proper. Afterwards this Risalahdar went with Prince Muhammad Azim to administer Hansi and Hissar.

The Princes, and especially Mirza Moghul complained of Kazi Fazlullah (Faizullah?) that he had taken and then let loose several *Krames*<sup>47</sup> and that he, with his colleagues, took bribes in many cases. A *parwanah* was addressed to him calling for an explanation. He answered that according to Khizr Sultan's orders and the orders signed by the King he had released them and had taken nothing from nobody (anybody?) and that Muhammad Hussain Khan acting under Mirza Khizr Sultan's orders had taken them away. With this explanation he sent in his resignation. Mirza Moghul accepted and appointed Mubarak Shah in his place.<sup>48</sup>

The King was informed that the sepoy were plundering the house of Kanhiya Lal servant in the Post Office. The man sent by (illegible) cried out for redress with great importunity at the door of the King's apartments. Mirza Moghul was directed to go at once himself or send one of the Princes to put a stop to plundering.

In the afternoon it was reported that the bazaar of the Braziers (*kasera*) was being plundered. Mirza Moghul was ordered to go off himself and to tell the

<sup>47</sup> *Krames*: It appears that the translator has failed to read this word correctly. However, in the manuscript of the English translation it is written in this way.

<sup>48</sup> He originally came from Muzaffarnagar. He was in the beginning posted as a police officer in Saharanpur. He was with the revolutionaries and says that he had signed the *fatwa* of *Jihad*. At the instance of R.M. Edward, collector of Muzaffarnagar, he wrote an account of the events at Delhi. See *Baghi Hindustan*, (Bijnor, 1948,) p. 156; *Trial*, p. 28, 31.



officers of the army that such oppressive treatment of the people was improper.<sup>49</sup>

The King was informed that Khizr Sultan for the last two days was in the house of Gungu the Kulavati, and releasing and imprisoning whom he wished.

The King ordered that Maulavi Faiz Ahmad who had come from Agra should be brought forward. When he came all the office work was made over to him, and the Munshi was directed to write to all the *thanahdars* and *kotwal*, that they would send their applications to the Maulavi, and obey his orders, that the Princes had no jurisdiction in the matter, and that the Maulavi should bring important cases before the King; that he should write daily an abstract of the *thanah* reports, and bring it before the King.<sup>50</sup>

A petition came from Bakht Muhammad Khan, General of the Bareilly army, stating that he was approaching with artillery and troops and requesting a place for encamping. A *parwanah* was written directing him to come next day into the city by way of the Bridge and encamp outside the Delhi Gate. Next day in the morning the King ordered that Ahmad Kuli Khan should bring him with him. When the Khan (Bakht) reached the Bridge it was found that the Bridge was broken and that the artillery could not be brought across. Then Mirza Khizr Sultan came with Ahmad Kuli Khan to the King and represented the matter, saying that Bakht Khan was enraged at the breaking of the Bridge. Orders were given for its immediate repairs, the money for same to be disbursed by Mirza Moghul.<sup>51</sup>

The next day Bakht Khan presented himself before the King with the Risalahdars and officers of his Regiment and the *Jehadis* who were with him. But contrary to etiquette he did not make his obeisance at the *Red Purdah*, nor did his companions, and though many people remonstrated with him he paid no attention. When he came near the King's Chair in the Diwan Khas, he salaamed as though to an equal, and merely taking his sword from his side, presented it to the King. The King was chafed (?) at this want of courtesy, but praised the bravery of his troops. The Risalahdar Muhammad Shafi<sup>52</sup> and Maulavi Imdad Ali said, "Your Majesty should bestow a sword and buckler on Bakht Khan, for he deserves them, and such a favour is but proper for such a chief." At first the King

<sup>49</sup> See *Trial*, p. 37.

<sup>50</sup> Maulavi Faiz Ahmad: He was the son of Hakim Ghulam Ahmad and was born in Badaun in 1808. He joined service under the E.I. Company's Government in the Sadr Nizamat at Agra and was later promoted to the post of *Sarishtadar*. Subsequently he came under the influence of Maulana Ahmadullah Shah, joined the movement, and arrived in Delhi. On the fall of the city he withdrew to Rohilkhand took part in the battles there. Ultimately he went into hiding. Nothing is known about his end. A fairly detailed account of his life and activities may be read in M. Ayub Qadri's book, *Maulana Faiz Ahmad Badauni*, Karachi, 1957.

<sup>51</sup> The details of Bakht Khan's arrival in Delhi may be read in any comprehensive history as well in contemporary narratives of the Revolution as for instance, Jeewan Lal's version in *T.N.N.*, pp. 132-36.

<sup>52</sup> Resalahdar Muhammad Shafi: He was a *risalahdar Major* in the 8th irregular cavalry stationed at Bareilly. He was one of the leading persons among the revolutionaries of Bareilly; and he came to Delhi with Bakht Khan and thus participated in the fighting there. (Zakaullah, pp. 822-23).



excused himself, saying they are not ready, but being importuned called for them from the armoury, and bestowed them on Bakht Khan. But even then he ordered no *nazr* to the King. He said "I hear that you have given the Princes jurisdiction on the army. That is bad. Give the power to me, and I will make proper arrangements. What do these people know of the customs, etc., of the English army?" The King answered, "The Princes were appointed at the request of the officers of the army." He was then dismissed.<sup>53</sup>

The King was informed that the quarter inhabited by the Dasas (a caste of *Banya*) was being plundered, and that many of them had been shot down by the sepoys. Mirza Abdullah was ordered to set off at once and to tell Mirza Moghul to ride off and save these poor people. Several sepoys seized and brought a man in the afternoon and said, "This is the Patiala Raja's *vakil*. This paper, written by him, has been seized." It was read. In truth it contained an account of the cruelties licensed (?) by the troops on the people of the city. The sepoys asked permission to kill him. The man complained saying, "I have written nothing but the truth. I am a Sayyid, I shall be wrongfully killed if you don't interfere," and then represented that the Sayyid was a Musalman and a truthful man, that to kill him was contrary to Muhammadan Law. If he were to be imprisoned for a short time it would not matter. The King so ordered. The sepoys were very much dissatisfied and said, "This Hakeem is in league with the Patiala Raja and moreover sends information through news-writers. In the evening the officers of the army came and represented the same matter. The King said, "You are mistaken. He has no connection with the Patiala Raja but merely stated what is enjoined by the Muhammadan Law."

Orders were sent to keep the *vakil* carefully in the Kotwali, and to let no one take him there until the King ordered.

A petition came from Jhansi *sawars* stating that they were in the neighbourhood of the city and would make their appearance as soon as permitted and encamp where they were ordered. Mirza Moghul was ordered to write a *parwanah*, calling them in, and to tell them to encamp at the Ajmeri Gate, as there was no room inside the city.<sup>54</sup>

The next day a proclamation was issued through Maulana Sarfaraz Ali<sup>55</sup> and Abdul Ghafur who were with Bakht Khan calling on all the inhabitants of the city, Hindus and Musalmans, to obey his orders.<sup>56</sup>

(3<sup>rd</sup> July). In the afternoon the *kotwal* reported that Bakht Khan had ordered all the inhabitants of the city to go about armed, that any one going about

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *T.N.N.*, 134.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *Trial* p. 270-

<sup>55</sup> Maulawi Sarfaraz 'Ali: He belonged to Shahjahanpur and had considerable influence in the surrounding districts. He was a disciple of one of the disciples of the well-know Shah Fakhruddin of Delhi. Maulawi Sarfaraz 'Ali was one of the most devoted and active workers in the cause of the Freedom Movement. He acted as the lieutenant of Maulana Ahmadullah Shah after the fall of Delhi. (*Tarikh-i-Shahjihanpur*, p. 331.)

<sup>56</sup> A group of the 'ulama preached to the citizens of Delhi. see *Trial*, p. 282.



unarmed would be liable to punishment. Orders were given to *thanahdars* to publish the order in all the quarters of the city and to obey all his orders.

Two servants of Raja Ajeet Singh, son of the Patiala Raja's paternal uncle, came to me and said, that the sepoy had attacked his house and were plundering his property and had imprisoned the Raja. I informed the King of this and orders were sent to Mirza Moghul, and several *darwans* were sent to the Kotwali to bring Ajeet Singh behind Mirza Moghul. His Majesty came out and Raja narrated the story of being plundered imprisoned and brought barefoot. The King ordered Mirza Moghul to enquire into the matter and punish the sepoy who had plundered the Raja and give the Raja a guard of Hindustanis and sepoys.<sup>57</sup>

(4<sup>th</sup> July). After this a petition was delivered through Bakht Muhammad Khan from general Ghaus Muhammad Khan of Neemuch<sup>58</sup> Brigade and the officers of the Regiment. Sudar Singh, etc. brought draft of an answer was with its. The contents (were) as follows: "His Majesty is delighted at our appearing here. Come here quickly and with the consent of Lord Governor General Bakht Khan attack this Pahari". A clean copy was made and signed.

(July 5<sup>th</sup>). Next day Maulavi Sarfaraz Ali and Munshi Khairat Ali appeared and begged that the title of Gr. should be conferred on Bakht Khan, for the whole army would not obey him till this title was conferred and evils existing in the army would be best remedied. The Munshi gave a paper in which was written that Muhammad Khan was appointed Governor General and C-in-C (Commander-in-Chief) of all the forces. The King signed it, and the rough draft of several *parwanahs* to the effect that the Khan alone was to command and that the Princes had nothing to say to the army. These orders were issued by the evening. At night Bakht Khan came. His title as Gr. were (was?) proclaimed before him and having borrowed 5 or 6 gold Mohars from the Queen presented them to the King as his offering.

Next day in the afternoon (illegible) Qanbar(?) and Tale Yar Khan, with other officers of the regiment gave in a very long petition to the King saying, "Bakht Khan was an officer of artillery. You have conferred on him the title of Governor General and proposed to place us all under his order. It is contrary to the rules of Government. He is not fit for such a trust. You have dismissed your sons and appointed him. This does not please us. Some few of us have brought treasure. He has distributed what he obtained among his sepoys and not given you a farthing. Besides this, since he has been here, he has not once attended the Darbar. What claims has he? If your Majesty wishes to keep (help?) you then allow us to select in concert, with the Princes, from the several regiments, such

<sup>57</sup> Ajit Singh was the uncle of the ruling chief of Patiala and had been living in Delhi for many years. He had settled in Ghaziabad after the fall of Delhi. Subsequently he returned to Delhi and then returned to Patiala. *Nusratnamah* (Urdu translation, p. 65). For Patiala's share in the confiscated properties of the revolutionaries. See *Tazkirat-i-Rausa-i-Panjab*, vol. 11, p. 95.

<sup>58</sup> *Trial*, pp. 269-70.

It appears that the translator forgot to add or strike off some words here, because in its present form the sentence is not complete.



men as are lit to be general, and bring them up to you for confirmation of their appointment. Let the sepoy's fight under their own officers so that there be no new complaints that no help is sent out to them." His Majesty taking the petition said that they would get an answer next day. The Munshi was ordered to send a copy of this petition to Bakht Khan that he might suggest an answer. This was done, and the other petitions were given as the King was riding out.<sup>59</sup> All were sent to Mirza Moghul to arrange as he thought fit. Another petition came from Ghaus Muhammad through Bakht Khan saying that he was approaching that Bakht Khan had written that he must first assault the Pahari of Alipur, but that he couldn't do so until he had presented himself and procured the munitions of war.<sup>60</sup>

After it was read it was returned to Bakht Khan's servants.

(July 6<sup>th</sup>). In the evening the King was informed that Mirza Abu Bakr with his cavalry had attacked the Teraha Bairam Khan Quarter, and in a state of intoxication had wounded 2 or 3 men, had seized the Naib-Kotwal's horse and plundered the house of Munshi Ikramuddin and Farkhundah Zamani Begum. His Majesty was very much displeased and wrote a *parwanah* to Bakht Khan to go at once with *sawars*, take Abu Bakr prisoner and bring him to the King. After this it was ascertained that Mirza Abu Bakr was at Mirza Moghul's house. Mirza Khizr Sultan was sent to take him prisoner and the *sawars* with him, and to proclaim that he was dismissed from the command of the Cavalry.

A cavalry officer, probably of Gwalior contingent came and said that Mir Nawwab had taken the jewels belonging to Musammatt Piari Begum who was kept by the Gurgain Sahib, that (illegible) of her property and vessels were with a zamindar at Gurgaon, that if some *sawars* and camels were sent with them they would bring the property and a small gun. He was sent to Mirza Moghul that he might arrange as he suggested.

(July 7<sup>th</sup>). Next day that officer brought the property and vessels and a small gun and (illegible) them.

The *khazanchi* represented that very little money was left in the Treasury, not even 10,000 rupees and that the expenses of the powder magazine etc., etc., were great. Some arrangement must be made. A *parwanah* was addressed to Mirza Moghul in the evening. He stated that "I informed all the officers of the low state of the Treasury, that a *parwanah* should be written to the officers of the Neemuch army either to bring 5 lakhs from Muttra from Luchmi Chand or his *gumashta* who should accept the post of *Fotehdar*,<sup>61</sup> and also to the Jhajjar Nawwab, to send a loan at once of 5 or 6 lakhs and that money should be secured from all *sahukars* and men of ranks and the officials of the late English

<sup>59</sup> Cf. T.N.N. p. 152.

<sup>60</sup> In the document the word 'until' has been misspelt. Necessary corrections have been made.

<sup>61</sup> Alipur is situated on the right bank of the Jumna, about 13 miles from Delhi.

<sup>61</sup> *Fotadar*: A banker; a cash-keeper; money changer (H.H. Willon, *Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms*, p. (160). It was a regular office under the Mughuls, with whom the collectors of revenue were to deposit their collections.



Government who were all men of wealth, that business could go on, that until the batteries in the Pahari are taken the country could not be settled, that unless this was done the money could not be procured."

At this time Mirza Khizr Sultan came and said that if he were not interfered with he would levy 3 lakhs from the *sahukars* of the city. The King agreed and the Munshi was directed to write orders to the officers of the Neemuch army and to the Jhajjar Nawwab.

Bakht Khan sent an unsigned petition from Raja Gulab Singh to the effect that he was about to march with a force to Delhi, that he would polish off the Patiala Raja on the road for he had behaved very badly in assisting the English; that he had also abused him, so he had heard; that Dost Muhammad Khan, ruler of Kabul, was his friend, that he would join with his troops when told to do so. A *parwanah* was written (illegible) Bakht Khan which Maulavi Sarfaraz Ali signed.<sup>62</sup>

After this Bakht Khan sent a petition to the King stating that "Maulavi Sarfaraz Ali is Head of the *Jehadis*. All the Musalmans and the people of the city have been told to go to him, that His Majesty should enjoin on Hakeem Ahsanullah Khan and Maulavi Mahbub Ali<sup>63</sup> and Maulavi Sadruddin<sup>64</sup> to go out on a *Jihad* with the Maulavis and nobles of the city."

The order was passed that whoever wished he might accompany them, that the Hakeem and nobles were not acquainted with the art of the war, what use would there be? If they had to fight with swords they might do something, but what against firearms?

A petition came in from Neemuch army that Luchmi Chand Seth had gone on a pilgrimage, that his *gumashtah* had not so much money, that they were near at hand and would encamp where they were ordered. They were told to encamp on the unoccupied *maidan* between the Turkman and Delhi Gate. Two or three days after some *sawars* (probably of Jhansi) came. They were ordered to encamp with the Neemuch troops.

Mirza Moghul sent a petition on the part of all the officers of the Regiments that the affairs of the army could not be administered until the Court was established; that the following individuals were eligible. Many names were written. A *parwanah* was sent in reply.

The Royal family petitioned saying 'the second month is going on, and we have received no pay, and are hard up.' The servants gave in a similar petition

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Zakaulfah, p. 671

<sup>63</sup> Maulawi Mahbub Ali. (1200-1280. A.H.). He was a great scholar and was among the pupils of Shah Abdul Aziz Sahib. (*Wakiat Darul Hukumat-i-Delhi*, vol. II, p. 575). Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanwi says on the authority of Amir Shah Khan that during the Revolution Maulana Mahbub Ali preached to the people not join it because it was not a *jihad*. When the British rule was re-established the Government offered a *jagir* to Maulawi Mahbub Ali and sent a *Sanad* for the same. He got infuriated on this and tore the *Sanad* saying that whatever he had preached was for the sake of truth and not to please or help the Government. *Hikayat-i Aulia*, p. 461.

<sup>64</sup> For Mufti Sadruddin Khan's life see *Abjadul 'ulum*, pp. 903-05; *Tazkirat-i-Ulama-i Hind* pp. 93-94; *Hadaiq-ul Hanafiyah*, pp. 481-84



through the eunuchs of the household. The Queen was ordered to make the best arrangements she could for the distribution of the pay. She said, "I can arrange at once for the payment of 60,000 Rupees." The King ordered that "the balance should be paid from the Treasury. The advance shall be paid when the remittance comes from Jhajjar and *sahukars* have paid in what they have promised." Then the Queen went to her house. She returned with 60,000 Rupees, laden in *rathis* getting the balance from the Treasury. She distributed the pay.

Mirza Khizr Sultan represented that he had levied 25,000 Rupees from the Punjabi merchants and remitted to Mirza Moghul for expenses of the army and that he would levy more from the *mahajans* and it in.

Between 5 or (and?) 6 p.m. the King rode off to Salimgarh when all at once a great smoke was seen in the direction of the south quarter of the city. As there was a great smoke, it was thought that the magazine contained in the house of Begum Sumroo<sup>65</sup> in the Churigars Quarter was on fire. Enquiry was directed to be made and water conveyed thither. A man came running from my house and stated that as soon as the fire broke out, a thousand sepoy's attacked my house and commenced burning it, carrying off all my property and that they had beaten and kicked out all my servants.<sup>66</sup> On hearing this I immediately went to the Diwan Khas and on the King's return from his airing told my story. The King's servants were ordered to go and stop the sepoy's and then return. Mirza Moghul was to be despatched thither, when the cavalcade reached the gate of the Nakkār Khana then people said that Mirza Moghul was coming himself and that a large body of sepoy's were coming along, making a great row and exclaiming that the Hakeem had fired the powder magazine, that they were coming to seize him and that the cavalcade ought not to go in that direction. Then it returned to the Diwan Khas and Mirza Moghul came. When he reached the door the Telingas<sup>67</sup> also came up. Several of them ran forward with drawn swords. Mirza Moghul and the others with him seized their hands and the cavalcade came inside the oratory. The King seized my hand, and took me aside. The row went on outside. I heard that nearly 1000 sepoy's remained collected there till the evening. They sent word by the eunuchs, and Mirza Moghul and Khizr Sultan that the Hakeem was in league with the English, that he should be given up to them and imprisoned till the *pahari* was taken. His Majesty refused and said that no confidence was to be placed in their assertions that he would never give me up. In short this dispute continued for two hours. At last Basant Ali Khan, eunuch of the household, and Kale Khan came and said to the King, "If you don't give the Hakeem they will come in (illegible) and seize him." I then begged that the King should no longer

\* The last three words should have been struck off.

<sup>65</sup> For Begam Samru see *Waqiat Darul Hukumat-i-Delhi*, vol. II, p. 209.

<sup>66</sup> The author of *Kanzul Tarikh* (Badaun, 1907) gives an eye-witness account of the plunder of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan's house, see pp. 312-14.

<sup>67</sup> *Telanga*: A foot-soldier. Originally it meant an inhabitant of Tilang (Modern Carnatic). It was here that the Indian soldiers were dressed and disciplined in European fashion for the first time. Hence this name was given to foot-soldiers.



keep me with him, that I would take my chance. God forbid that I should bring His Majesty to shame and disgrace. Then the King sent Mirza Moghul and Mirza Hussain Bakhsh to extract the promise that the Hakeem's life should be saved and that he should remain in his usual residence in the Fort, and that a guard should be placed at his door to prevent his going elsewhere, and that one of his sons, both these brothers and two other gentlemen should remain with the Hakeem who should be put to no inconvenience and that if they should consent to this he would send the Hakeem out. If not let them do what they liked. In short after a while all came and agreed. I went out with the Princes. Gauri Shankar was quieting the sepoys. Apparently they showed great friendship for me, and then Mirza Khizr Sultan, Kaisar, Hussain Bakhsh brought me with a guard to my house. In short I remained in confinement from that time. Next day the King ordered that the Government sepoys should take charge and protect me. When they reached my house they found such a crowd of sepoys that they could not remain. Many of them said that the sepoys would not let them enter the house. The King on hearing this was enraged and calling Mirza Moghul declared that they all were plundering in concert and that he had put up the army to confine the Hakeem. He denied the charge and said that he would see all put right. In short they plundered the house day and night.<sup>(a)</sup> At last on the 3rd day General Tale Yar Khan went with guns and stopped the plundering. Then they broke open a built up room in which my niece's dowry was deposited and a house in which her father resided and plundered them of all the valuable property they contained and the rest Tale Yar Khan packing (?) put up on the *salitas* with many bundles brought to the Diwan Khas. They ordered that they should be put into a room which should be locked up and a guard put over it. Tale Yar Khan begged that the *Bihishtis* be ordered to put out the fire as the house was still burning. The King ordered that the Kotwal should take a large number of *Bihishtis* and put out the fire.<sup>(b)</sup> Anwar Mahal's eunuch told the King that his house and Mir Nawwab's who was Haidar Ali's son-in-law and Raja Mohan Lal's brother's houses had been plundered owing to their vicinity to the powder magazine, and that the doors and window frames had been taken away. The King ordered that Mirza Moghul should at once see to it. Their petitions too were referred to him that he might at once take charge of their property. Mirza Moghul was told to send the Hakeem to the King that H. M. might enquire into his circumstances.

He said that the members of the Court were not present, that without their permission the guards would not obey his orders. His Majesty was displeased and remained silent. In the morning he called him again. He sent word that the officers who assaulted the *pahari* at night had not yet returned, that when they returned the members of the Court would wait on His Majesty and arrange the matter.<sup>68</sup>

(a) See Kedar Nath.

(b) Kedarnath's Journal. date 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> August.

<sup>68</sup> For the constitution and functions of the "Court", see Sen: *Eighteen-Fifty Seven*, Delhi, 1957. pp. 75-76.



The King was informed through the eunuchs of the household that yesterday when the Hakeem's house was plundered all the houses in that ward, both of rich and poor, had been plundered, and that the sepoy's had carried off money and property of great value from the house of Tan(?) Kishore Vakeel and also from Ahmad Khan Risalahdar's house. The King ordered all the sufferers to give in a list of their property with their petitions and sent word to Mirza Moghul to enjoin on all to give up the plundered property of his subjects, that the sepoy's had plundered the Hakeem's house on the pretext that as a friend to the English he had fired the powder magazine. On what pretext had they plundered the rest? What was their fault? From this it was clear that their only object was plunder.

Next day Maulavi Fazl-i Hakk came, and presented a *nazr* and was loud in the praise of the bravery of the rebel army. He added that 'now was the time for giving them assistance, both in the way of money and supplies that they obtain some repose (from their hardships).' The King answered, 'where's the money?' Besides supplies come in but scanty owing to their ill-treatment of the people of the city and country.<sup>69</sup> The Maulavi answered, 'All His Majesty's servants are incompetent. Let money be demanded from all the gentry far and near and let an intelligent individual be appointed to procure supplies. My sons and relatives will do work of Tehseeldars and also procure supplies.' The King answered, 'You are on the spot. Do you make arrangements?' He begged that a *parwanah* of appointment to the Tehseeldari and collectorship of Gurgaon should be granted to my (his?) nephew and others (?); that they would arrange everything, that *parwanahs* should be addressed to the Raja of Alwar<sup>70</sup> and the chiefs of Jhajjar, Balabgarh and Patiala, that although the last was apparently leagued with the English, yet if a friendly correspondence were opened with him he would come over.

The King said that a *parwanah* had been despatched by Bakht Khan to Patiala Raja agreeably to the request of Pirzadah Abu Islam, that no answer had yet been received. The Maulavi said that he was to write to his brother, who was a servant of the Raja's to send an answer quickly. Whenever the Maulavi used to come and see the King, he used to advise him to encourage his subjects to fight, and to go out with them, and to pay the troops as best he could, otherwise if the English were victorious not only would the House of Taimur but all the Musalmans also be exterminated.

The King ordered that *parwanahs* should be written, as the Maulavi suggested and quickly despatched.<sup>71</sup>

Kadir Bakhsh, officer of the Sappers and Miners, who was present, said to the Maulavi, "Do you yourself write out the rough draft, and get them (it?)

<sup>69</sup> Cf. T.N.N. p. 196.

<sup>70</sup> This is corroborated by Jeewan Lal, T.N.N. p. 200.

<sup>71</sup> Letters were sent from time to time on behalf of the Emperor to ruling chiefs and influential zamindars.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. for instance Trial, p. 274.



copied before you. The people here are in league with the English. The King gives one order and they write another."

On the third day the King sent a *parwanah* blaming Mirza Moghul for not allowing Hakeem Ahsanullah Khan to come to him when he was ill, although he had made him over at the Mirza's entreaty, and for imprisoning him wrongfully, that it was all very fine (?), and that he would release the Hakeem himself, and depart with him to Khwajah Sahib's shrine (i.e. the *Kutb*) and he'd like to see any one stop him. In short when this *parwanah* was issued, all the officers of the regiment infantry and cavalry and the Princes met at the balcony of the Lahori Gate and determined that the Hakeem should be allowed to visit the King twice a day to feel his pulse and prescribe for him and then return home, and that interfere in no business whatever. A petition to this effect was written. At night the Princes and officers came and took the Hakeem with them to the door of the King's apartments. The King called the Hakeem and the Princes inside and spoke of his own health. He then said, "These Princes have been the ruin of my old age. No good will come of this traitor army. The end of it will be that we shall all of us be killed and the army after plundering us will run off." Ahsanullah Khan<sup>\*</sup> said, "I have no wish to serve, since this army came I have done nothing. I had better give in my resignation. I am no longer fit to doctor the King." The King answered, "This will never do." In short we were then dismissed.

In the morning a *parwanah* was issued that all the officers should publish that all the Hakeem's property had been plundered and his house burnt to the ground, that if any one belonging to the army went to his house and ill-treated him blood would be shed and that no redress would be got out of the King. Mirza Moghul was told that all the Shahzadas' signatures should be affixed after that of the King and also the signatures or "his marks" of the officers, and that the proclamation should be posted on the gate of the Hakeem's house. General Tale<sup>\*\*</sup> Yar Khan was ordered to search for a native officer, I believe of the 9th N. I., restore the Hakeem's plundered property.

An officer of the cavalry came with Mirza Nadir Bakht and Kalandar Bakhsh *Budmaash* and represented that the Nawwab of Jhajjar had not yet sent any money to the King, that if he were ordered to do so he would take those two individuals with him and bring the money quickly, that Bakht Khan had written him an order, which he showed. Permission was granted him to do, as he proposed.

According to Maulavi Sarfaraz Ali's request a *parwanah* was sent to Tula Ram who had been appointed to Rewari to remit 5000 Rs. in return for his *sanad* of appointment and 10,000 Rs. in account of balance of the Kharif List (?).

\* The author has used "I" for himself, except on this occasion. Probably the translator has put his name here.

\*\* This mark \* is given in the manuscript.



Maulavi Liakat Ali<sup>73</sup> chief of the Jehadi's of Allahabad, came with Bakht Muhammad Khan. He was appointed Soubah of those parts (Allahabad) and a *parwanah* was addressed to Khan Bahadur Khan,<sup>74</sup> calling for money.

Next day all the officers assembled first at Mirza Moghul's house, then at the King's and represented that money would never be collected until the King impressed on the chief men of the city the necessity of so doing. The King said, 'very well. Let Mirza Moghul issue orders to all.' Consequently all Hindus and Musalmans were called on, and Mirza Moghul was told that he should tell all to unite and make such arrangement that the people should not be disturbed and get the army be provided for.

One day after this the King was informed that the sepoy's had confined and brought Munshi Agha Jan and Munshi Saadat Ali both of whom had filled the office of Head Munshi at Ajmer, and were now, I believe, pensioners, that they had confined them at Lahori Gate of the Fort and said that they would not release them until they paid a lakh of rupees.

After this Kadir Bakhsh, officer of the Sappers and Miners, came and said that, "Khwajah Wahid-ud-din, eldest son of Dabir-ud-daulah Khwajah Farid Khan is one of the ancient nobility. You ought to have such a man about you. He undertakes to collect a lakh of rupees from the nobles of the city. The two Munshis who are confined are among those nobles."

The King ordered the members of the Court to release these two Munshis. The order was sent to Mirza Moghul to release them at once. In the afternoon Maulavi Sadr-ud-Din Khan, Principal Sadr Amin came, and said, "Munshi Agha Jan, is my brother-in-law and has been wrongfully confined. A lakh of rupees is demanded from him. He is a helpless pensioner. True he has some few thousand rupees worth of property. If His Majesty wishes he may take it, but where has he that amount in cash?" He was told that "the order for his release has been issued at Kadir Bakhsh's request, but he must pay up the quota at which Khwajah Wahid-ud-din has assessed him."

After this the King was informed that the members of the court had confined the merchants of the city and were treating them cruelly. Mirza Moghul was ordered to forbid them and not allow such ill-treatment of the King's subjects, that the people were done to death; that it was better to take what each agreed to give and to realize it by gentle means. He replied, "Maulavi Sadr-ud-Din Khan<sup>(a)</sup>, Amin-ud-din Khan<sup>(b)</sup>, Ziad-ud-Din Khan<sup>(c)</sup> and Hukeem Abdul Nakki<sup>(d)</sup>(?) have promised each to give 500 rupees. We have not meddled with

<sup>73</sup> Several letters were addressed to the raja of Patiala but they failed to stake his loyalty to the British. One of these imperial *Shuqqahs* is to be found in the Record Office, Lahore.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. *Trial*, p. 279. For details see Kanhayya Lal's *Maharbah-i-Azim*. (Newal Kishore Press), pp. 296-307.

(a) The Government Principal Sadr Amin.

(b) Nawwab of Loharu.

(c) Brother of No. 2.

(d) Mukhtar of Raja of Bulumgarh: Hanged.



them. These are the recusants who won't contribute. The members of the Court will not therefore listen to me."

After this the sepoys having collected came and represented that "the officers composing the Court embezzle the money they get; let the Court be abolished and two sepoys of each regiment sit together and constitute a Court, that the money as it was collected daily should be lodged in the Treasury and be expended after the receipt of His Majesty's authority." Their request was granted and permission given to Mirza Moghul to carry out this arrangement.

Two or three days after a petition was given in complaining that Bakht Muhammad Khan was confining the *sahukars* and people of the city and extorting money from them and would listen to no excuse or promises to bring the coin money, for instance, he has extorted from Maharaja Raja Debe Singh and Raja Salig Ram, having first put them into confinement and had confined several other citizens.

Maulavi Sarfaraz Ali who always remained in attendance told them to explain to Bakht Khan that such oppressiveness was wrong. The members of the Court came and said, "The *gumashta* of Seth Luchmi Chand has been taken in the camp of the Bareilly troops. Release him quickly else there will be a row."

The Maulavi was ordered to go at once and release him as he had already given his contributions of money.

(7<sup>th</sup> Sept. See Kedar Nath). I believe that the next day but one the members of the Court assembled and sent an order to Mirza Moghul, and also to all the *thamahdars* and to the *kotwal* to call on all shopkeepers in the bazaar for three months rent, that if they refused to pay it, the shops should be at once plundered and themselves imprisoned. The rent of the several of the bazaar was realized by evening.

(9<sup>th</sup> Sept.). Two days after this I believe that the members of the Court summoned to the Lahori Gate of the Fort Wahid-ud-Din Khan, Hakeem Abdul Nakki, Nawwab Ahmad Kuli Khan, Nawwab Hāmid Ali Khan and Lala Mukand Lal and demanded a lakh of Rupees from them and told them to get the money as best they could, as it was wanted for the pay of the army or else they'd be imprisoned. They said, "We can pay 2 (2000?) or 4000 Rupees. Take that: Take our property. Where is there so much cash amount (with) us?. In short we can each pay 500 Rs." They gave no heed and confined them all, and would'nt obey the King's order for their release.

The Queen was informed that Lala Ramjee Mull Sahu Gurwalu had been seized and that a large amount of money was demanded from him. The Queen got the King to seek a special permission stating that he had already given large loans, and that his first loan, negotiated by Mahbub Ali Khan had not yet been paid, that he was to be released at once. Particular injunctions were sent to Mirza Moghul. He was accordingly released at once.

(10<sup>th</sup> Sept.). Next day the King called up Tale Yar Khan and Gori Shankar and gave them strict orders for the release of the nobles, and to bring them at once to him, else he would go himself to release them.



In the evening Ahmad Kuli Khan and the rest were brought to the King. Soubah Bakht Muhammad Khan also came and represented that the *wakeel* of the present king (*Wali*) of Lucknow<sup>75</sup> had brought a petition and a *nazr*, the same from Yusuf Ali Khan, chief of Rampur,<sup>76</sup> and Khan Bahadur Khan,<sup>77</sup> that the *wakeels* would take up their quarters where His Majesty should direct.

He was told to lodge them where he thought proper, and to bring them the next day but one in the afternoon and to bring for His Majesty's inspection next morning the horses he had brought from Babugarh, and also the elephants. He answered, "Very well." And what did he next morning but bring indifferent horses and colts and left the good horses in his own camp! Some one told Mirza Moghul of this. Mirza Moghul told the King privately. On hearing this and seeing such indifferent horses the King was much disappointed and put out. He said, "Put some of the horses into the Artillery, keep the rest. As you have got the good horses you may as well have the bad ones too." He answered, "The horses have been given to horse-*sawars* with me whose horses have been killed in battle. I have taken none for myself. He then represented that if the King would ride out to attack the *pahari* the whole city would accompany him, and they would gain a complete victory. The King answered, "I haven't the strength to do so; as for the people of the city they neither have firearms nor know how to use them. This is the condition too of the royal troops who have rusty old swords and haven't handled any weapons for years. What good will their accompanying you do? Bakht Khan replied, "Quite true! but Your Majesty's good fortune (*ikbal*) will do the business."

At midnight Mirza Khizr Sultan, at Bakht Khan's orders and the instigation of Kudratullah Khan published a proclamation in the city, calling on all the people to go to the Fort, as His Majesty's suite would move to the attack of the *pahari*. I heard that many men armed with sticks only, some few with swords and four or five with muskets assembled at the Fort and found that the King was in bed, and the Princes all asleep all night (?), in the early morning they returned home.

(12<sup>th</sup> Sept.). Next day Maulavi Sarfaraz Ali and Maulavi Abdul Ghafur and many Maulavis from outside came to the King after 12 o'clock and importuned him to ride forth, and take his troops with him otherwise the sepoys would make a disturbance asking, "Why does not the King send out his servants to attack the *pahari* if he is in truth the enemy of the English? Although the order has been given (*i.e.* to attack the *pahari*) yet the King's servants never advance beyond the Lahori Gate. True some boys went one day with the sepoys and their officer was wounded and died. The Kamona (?) youth, *i.e.* Sardar went out daily

<sup>75</sup> Cf. *Trial*, p. 278; also *T.N.N.*, p. 143

<sup>76</sup> For Yusuf Ali Khan's role in the war, see Najmul Ghani, *Akhbar-us-Sanadid* (Newal Kishore Press), p.; *T.N.N.*: 143, 123.

<sup>77</sup> For Yusuf Ali Khan's role in the war, see Najmul Ghani *Akhbar-us-Sanadid* (Newal Kishore Press), p. *T.N.N.*: 143, 123.



to the attack. He, too, 4 days ago, was severely wounded." In short they continued to talk thus until the King, unable to help himself, set out.<sup>78</sup>

At this moment some officers of the army came up. Having gone out of the Fort by the Delhi Gate they stopped at the Ellenborough Tank (Lal Diggi). As soon as I heard the news I went too. At that time people about the King said, "Advance and place the guns on the further side of the magazine. The cavalcade was about to move on when I remonstrated and said, "Pray don't advance but return to the Fort for balls are flying about here even." After much discussion about the time of afternoon prayers (*i.e.* 4 p.m.) the cavalcade returned the Fort. I said, "These people bring disgrace on Your Majesty for nothing. You never ought to have ridden forth." The King replied, "Those Maulavis rendered me powerless." I said "God forbid that the sepoys should take Your Majesty out to the front of the battle, and then run off and you be taken prisoner. Never. You had better mused what they say.

Next day Muhammad Khan came and said, "It is all false what people say about the Europeans having entered the city and taken two of the Gates. On the day of the assault nearly 100 men entered the city most of whom have been killed. The army will soon dispose of the survivors. But there is a great scarcity of gun powder and the troops can't get even a parched gram (?). If Your Majesty give the money the matter will soon be arranged." The King replied, "See, what there is in the Treasury, and take." Mirza Khizr Sultan stated that there was about 2000 rupees cash in the Treasury. Bakht Khan asked, "What can be done with that? Let Your Majesty disburse some of the gold *mohurs* and *nazrs* which the chiefs of Lucknow, Rampur and Bareilly have presented." I heard that a portion of them were made over but did not hear who gave them as I was absent at that time.

After this Kadir Bakhsh, officer of the Sappers and Miners, came and complimented the King on the assistance rendered by the Sappers and Miners to the fanatics by means of which the Europeans who had advanced to the bastions had been repulsed and the bastions left in their possession. The sepoys who were present testified to the truth of his story.<sup>79</sup>

There was a Brahman with Kadir Bakhsh, who told the King that if he were placed in a well-protected house for three days and allowed whatever materials he required for creating odorous fumes he would contrive that the King should be victorious within three days. His Majesty replied, "Kadir Bakhsh may place you where he pleases." Kadir Bakhsh took him away saying he would arrange everything.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>78</sup> This is corroborated by Jeewan Lal, p. 229.

<sup>79</sup> Kadir Bakhsh: Jeewan Lal mentions in connection with a charge which he brought against Bakht Khan. He said, "Many days had passed and the General had not led his forces to tight....." (*T.N.N.*, p. 17)

<sup>80</sup> The deteriorating situation seems to have completed by unnerved the aged Emperor. He was ready in this state of helplessness to believe in the efficacy of the Brahmanical enchantments.



The King was told that the gun powder was expended and that the officers of the several regiments wouldn't give up the barrels they had. The King ordered a list to be made out, showing what quantity each had. Mirza Moghul made out and gave in this list. There were (illegible) 2000 barrels with the Maperts (54), Balumteer (38th N.I.) Baillee (20th N.I.) Ranscel (11th N.I.) and Alexendar (74th) Regiments, all of them were told to give up the powder at once. None of them obeyed. Bakht Khan presented to the King 40,000 Rs. sent by Tula Ram of Rewaree through Maulavi Sarfaraz Ali. Bakht Khan was ordered to call in Tula Ram for the balance still due, Rs. 15,000, and to pay it into the Treasury.

On hearing the receipt of this sum the officers of the regiments with several officers of the cavalry came, and complained of being hard up. The artillery officers did the same. The people of the magazine also asked for payment of their arrears. The King grew angry and said, "Can you all be paid out of this sum? Have patience and wait a little. Money will come in from other quarters, when all will be paid."

In the morning Mirza Moghul, and Mirza Khizr Sultan with several officers came, and demanded money and brought a written paper with them. The King ordered in the afternoon that each should receive something according to this paper. Those who got nothing dunned violently, on which His Majesty took up his cushion from the throne and threw it down and said, "Send the horse harness, and the silver *howdas* and chairs to Mirza Moghul, that he may sell them and pay all with the proceeds. I have nothing else left. The matter was put off. But in the morning particular orders were issued to send the chairs.<sup>81</sup>

Next day in the evening Bakht Khan and Kadir Bakhsh of the Sappers and Miners, came and said that the King must go by stealth to the *Kutb* and send his womankind too for their lives were in danger if they remained. They advised him to go by boat to Humayun's Tomb and thence to the *Kutb* by palanqueen and that they would follow, that they would not have another such opportunity.<sup>82</sup>

At first His Majesty made excuses but afterwards consented. Mir Fath Ali was then directed to get ready one boat, and two palanqueens and bearers. I heard that at midnight they got out by the door under the lattices and embarked. When the Queen and the Royal family heard of the King's departure they set out without any luggage. When the cavalcade reached Humayun's Tomb (the *Mudrassah, Marif*) they said that it would be difficult to reach the *Kutb*, that all had lost heart, and never could reach the place. The party therefore alighted at the tomb. All the household furniture was placed and left in the Diwan Khas and the doors were closed, the jewels excepted. Such was the case with the inner apartments and the Nau Mahal.

<sup>81</sup> From the very outset the Revolutionary Government lacked financial stability. The unscrupulous conduct of the Princes and some of the sepoys worsened the position. Bahadur Shah was however fully conscious of his delicate responsibilities.

<sup>82</sup> The Emperor left the Palace on 19 September. He in Humayun's Tomb on the following day. (K. Young, *Delhi* 1857), p. 319.



All the residents of the Palace went off, leaving their property behind them.

I was in my own house that evening and was unable to get out of the Fort owing to the vast crowd of sepoys in the Bazaar and at the principal gate. On the morning of Friday I sent a man who returned saying the door of the Diwan Khas was closed. I heard nothing more. But in the afternoon of the same day one of the residents of the Fort ascertained the fact. I have recorded above. Being astounded I wrote a petition to the King asking the reason of his departure without informing me of it. In the evening a reply came summoning me and saying that a verbal explanation of the King's bad case would be given me.

In reply to the above I sent another petition in the morning stating that my bearers and *syce* had run off, and that I had no means of travelling, that if His Majesty would furnish me with a conveyance I would go off at once to him.

In the afternoon of Saturday two elephants came, on one of which I placed my things and on the other my brother Hakeem Ghulam Najaf Khan<sup>83</sup> and myself. We started for the tomb towards the close of the afternoon. On the road the mutineer army abused me and called me a Christian. In short I reached the King in the evening and at night the conversation turned at the conduct of the army to the King.

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## APPENDIX

Copy of a Journal kept by me from the Commencement of the outbreak upto the 11th September 1857.

Delhi  
30th Nov. 1857

KEDARNATH  
Late Clerk in the  
Delhi Gazette Press.

### 11th May Monday

At 9 o'clock in the morning troops of the 25th Cavy. and some Sepoys of the 11th. Regt. N.I. arrived from Meerut and massacred the whole European Community of the Station. Consumed the Banks and destroyed the whole Govt. and private offices--Took possession of the Magazine and the treasury, set fire to the Cantonment and murdered the officers who are to be found--A few Europeans escaped, Magazine (blown?) up and killed the remaining European, in the Magazine--also some hundreds spectators on the road and in the Vicinity--Captives all released from the prison who also looted the city.

<sup>83</sup> He was in fact brother-in-law of Ahsanullah Khan and was a friend of Mirza Ghalib. Sayyid Ahmed has included him in the list of distinguished men of Delhi (*Ithar us-Sanadi*). Mistakes appearing in the original have not been corrected.



**12th May Tuesday**

Insurgents and the citizens have plundered many parts of the city and have blown down the remaining Europeans at Derrioagunge. The King have ordered for the procession in the city and have proclaimed when a few shops were opened, plunderings still going on.

**13th May Wednesday**

Tumult going on. The shops of Hasanwara plundered by Sepoys of the 74th., 54th. and 38th. N.I. shops of cloth merchants are plundered in the Chota Dureeba. Bazars all closed. Agha Hasan Jan escaped with great difficulty.

**14th May Thursday**

The City is in the same way as on the 13th May. Few shops of necessary uses were opened with great fear of being plundered.

**15th May Friday**

Still usual. Magazine stores plundering going on by the insurgents and being carried away to the city garrison when they have collected a large stores for a battle.

**16th May Saturday**

Still usual. Magazine stores is still going on for collection in the fort. Narain Dass Mahajin has been robbed to many lakhs --when the insurgents have been reputed them, an European has been concealed by him. Europeans murder is the order of the day whenever they are to be found.

**17th May Sunday**

Still usual. Some Europeans and Eurasians were shot by King's servants who were confined from three or four days--Preparation going on, on the walls of the city to fortify with large guns.

**18th May Monday**

Still usual. Fortifying at Salimghur and on the walls of the city. A few hundred men of the Sappers and Miners arrived from Roorkhie to join the rebels-- Some treasure is brought into the palace from Hasan Ka Gareeh.

**19th May Tuesday**

Fortifying still going on--Firing of the guns is the order of the day -- Mahomedans have erected a flag on Jumma Musjid and at Cashmere gate of their religion calling the people to join them against the English - It is reasoned that the British at Meerutt have been blown up by Bareilly forces.

**20th May Wednesday**

The King inviting the princes of the palace to officiate for the officer to



manage the affairs of the city—All Europeans and the ladies have been seized from a tailor's house—Fortifying going on by the insurgents. King sent for the Bankers of the city and wish them to pay five laks of Cash to manage the business.

#### **21st May Thursday**

Many shops of necessary uses are opened. The people residing near the Delhi Gate, have been looted by Sepoys to a great extent.

#### **22nd May Friday**

As usual—Being Ulvida—The King, many of the princes came to the Jumma Musjid to offer their prayers—A Wing of the 9th. Regt. N.I. arrived to join the rebels with some treasure—It is proclaimed by order of the King that the Mahomedans would not dare (?) to guard among themselves—They will be severely punished on finding the fault to the party.

#### **23rd May Saturday**

It is said that a force of the Mutineers with some guns started for Rohtuck, to bring some treasure under command of a prince. It is proclaimed by order of the King that whoever have looted the property of Magazine are informed to throw the same at the Kotwallee—if not he will be severely punished.

#### **24th May Sunday**

Revolution still going. There were thousand rumours of various narrations spreading in the city.

#### **25th May Monday**

Revolution is the order of the day. Being Eedool-fittur—The King offered his prayers in Garrison Mosque. It is resumed (?) in Eedgah that the British forces are at hand when a rush of people commenced and with great difficulty the folks reached their homes.

#### **26th May Tuesday**

It is said that the Mutineers find the guns at Selimgurh loaded with and have doubted and suspected that Hakeem\* Hasanollah Khan—Mahboob Allee Khan and Zeenat Mahal have ordered to do so on account of this being joined with British.

#### **27th May Wednesday**

The Mutineers force arrived from Rohtuck with 1¼ lakh of treasure—A Troop of Cavy. of the Seindiahs Contingent consisting 150 or 200 troopers

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\* He writes the name of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan in this style throughout the document.



arrived from Gwalior—also the remaining portion of the 9th Regt N.I. from Etawah.

#### **28th May Thursday**

It is said that Mahboob Allee Khan sent for the whole Native Non Commd. Officers of the different corps and threatened them to perform what they will be ordered by the King—and not to plunder the city as they do - A small force with sent towards Subzee Mundee in search of Europeans - A Banyan named (illegible) has been imprisoned on the ground that a gun was found in his shop.

#### **29th May Friday**

Hakeem Hasan-ollah Khan threatened the Native officers of the force injustice and excite them to march to Meerutt under command of a prince - A Fukeer is killed as it is said that he was one of the Lawrence Sahib in the Mutineer's opinion.

#### **30th May Saturday**

It is said that a force containing of two Regts. 500 Sawars and some guns left early in the morning to Meerutt and met the British force across the Hindun Bridge and have been defeated at afternoon—A Sikh with three Sawar has been seized and confined on the ground that he is a newswriter to the Raja of Pattialah—Firing of guns on the city walls the whole night—The disbanded Sepoys who have arrived from the North West have looted the arms &c. from the Magazine lines—Several Mahomedans accompanied the force to fight for the religion.

#### **31st May Sunday**

Many shops were not opened on account of danger. Mutineers force have been totally defeated on the Hindun Bridge. Firing of guns on the city walls at night. Mahomedans are quite disheartened.

#### **1st June Monday**

All shops unopened—Many residents and inhabitants of the fort have come out of it and inhabited themselves into the city fearing of not their being bombarded—Firing of guns on the city walls at night.

#### **2nd June Tuesday**

All shops unopened—It is said that the Mutineers raised a battery on the hill near Cantonment to check the entrance of the Europeans from that side - Firing of guns on the city walls at night—It is proclaimed by the King that no Sepoy would be dared to take any arm from the Magazine without the sanction of Mirza Mogul the Genl. A fire was blazing at night in the Infantry Lines at Cantonment.



**3rd June Wednesday**

(?) Irregular Cavalry with Hurrianah Lt. Nofy (?) arrived from Hansie with three lacs of treasure to join the rebels—Firing of guns on the city walls.

**4th June Thursday**

Arrival of a detachment of Infantry with some Sawars from Muttra with treasure—Firing of guns on the city walls the whole night. A man named Mahomed Ibraheem seized by the rebels on English letter found in his possession.

**5th June Friday**

Arrival of some hundred Sepoys from Agra to join the Mutineers force—It is said that a large force of rebels marched out of the city to raise their batteries towards the west to attack English forces which is said are at Allipore—A Soobahdar is shot to death at Lahore Gate.

**6th June Saturday**

It is rumoured than (?) an Irr. Cavy. arrived from Oude to join the rebels with a few disarmed Sepoys from Agra - It is also stated that (illegible) at night some Goojurs of the Baghput district have brought a few carts loaden with English provision &c.

**7th June Sunday**

News spread in the city that the rebels have brought some unloaded camels from Allipore - Arrival of some hundred disbanded Sepoys from Agra.

**8th June Monday**

Early in the morning firing of guns are heard representing that the British force attacked the Mutineers at their batteries and totally defeated them - the fighting it is said continued till evening - Mahomedans are flocking in great numbers to the fields of battle in assistance of the rebels - This day the British forces raised and erected their batteries on the Cantonment Hill.

**9th June Tuesday**

Fighting is the order of the day—Mahomodans continued to flock in great numbers to the fields of battles. It appears that the rebels have been totally defeated - Many wounded men of the rebels are brought into the city as well as Mahomedans.

**10th June Wednesday**

It is said that several shells fell into the city from the British camp. Mutineers guns were heard till evening. Citizens living towards Lahore and Cashmere gate are flocking into the city—British force is expected hourly.



**11th June Thursday**

Early in the morning firing of guns are heard - Some Sawars and the remaining Cavalry of the Hurriamah Lt. Nofy arrived from Sersa (?) with treasure - Rajah Ajeet Singh has been seized by Mutineers - It is said that a Khansama's house is destroyed by the force on the ground that an European is found in his house.

**12th June Friday**

Firing of guns and upto 10 o'clock when a fierce battle is fought and the rebels have been totally defeated. Wounded men are brought into the city to a great number - Mahomedans are still flocking to the fields of battle.

**13th June Saturday**

Buldeo Sahe, the late durgah of the bridge and brother of Luckor Singh has been killed hanged headlong at the Kotwalee - It is also said that several Hindoos and a few Mahomedans were seized by the Mutineers on the ground that they are joined with the English and that they supply them with provisions &c. Mutineers force attacked the English camp twice viz. at evening and at night and have been routed with great loss.

**14th June Sunday**

Nawab Mahboob Allee Khan died by poison death (?). It is said that the Mutineers force again attacked the English camp. Shells passing through the city direct to the place falling some time here and there - the enforcements arriving to join the rebels.

**15th June Tuesday**

It is rumoured that Mutineers in large number attacked the British camp and have been routed with great loss. Canon shells passing through the city, some falling here and there - Citizens are in great fear and danger on account of shells. It is said that the city wall where the Mutineers guns are placed have been breached and the 24 (illegible) gun be fired.

**16th June Tuesday**

It is heard in the morning that the guns were firing from both sides - some 400 of Infantry and Cavalry arrived from out stations. A fire break out at the Ice Pits (?) out of the Ajmere Gate. Shells passing through the city and falling into the palace. No fighting took place this day.

**17th June Wednesday**

A fighting has been fought this day making a great loss of Mutineers force. It is said that the rebels have raised a battery at the old fort to check the entrance of British from that side. A fire break out at Teleewarra.



**18th June Thursday**

Two Native Infantry Regiments *i.e.* 15th. and 30th arrived from Nasseerabad with six guns to join the rebels.

**19th June Friday**

Mutineers attacked the British camp at evening and it is rumoured that the Mutineers have taken possession of the Hill battery - A few houses are plundered by the Mutineers in the Mohalla of Bullie-Maran —where two Sepoys have been killed and few wounded.

**20th June Saturday**

Firing of guns are heard from early in the morning and lasted till noon - Peoples are flocking out of the city. Unnumbered rumours spreaded in the city that the Mutiny is all over India and the whole corps will reach Delhi to join and to be in the service of the King.

**21st June Sunday**

It is said that two Native Infy. Regt. and a Regt. of Cavalry (not in full) arrived from Jullundur also a few horsemen and some Sepoys with an elephant from Saharanpore. A Banker named Kanhia Dukwala's house was attacked by the Mutineers to whom he has paid a few hundred rupees. The people of Meer Asiq Ka Kooncha have been alarmed by the insurgents.

**22nd June Monday**

It is rumoured that four Europeans Regt. arrived into the British camp from Meerutt - At afternoon it is cried into the city that a very large heavy gun will be fired at evening—at which time citizens ought to sit into their compounds and not under Kutcha houses - The gun not fired at all - Mutineers sent for some Brahmins of the city and asked from them the omens of their going to the field of battle.

**23rd June Thursday**

A bloody battle has been fought this day- and that the perfidious force has been routed with an enormous loss.

**24th June Wednesday**

Sword has been drawn in Mohalla Imlee and that two or three Banyas have been wounded - Also a wrangling happened in Mahboob Bagh between the Sawars and Sepoys.

**25th June Thursday**

It is said that a hundred Artillery men arrived from Jeypore to join the rebels. Mutineers have arranged to prepare gun-powder in the Mohalla of



Choorie Walan in the house of Begum.

**26th June Firday**

Mutineers force marched out of the city intending to attack the British camp- but returned back without loosing any time.

**27th June Saturday**

Mutineers attacked the British camp from two sides i.e., from Cashmere and Lahore gates and returned with great loss. It is also rumoured that two European soldiers have been brought into the fort.

**28th June Sunday**

Mutineers attacked the British camp but returned insistenty. Firing of the guns going on. A few Sawars arrived from Gwalior. It is said that Bagput has been plundered by the Mutineers.

**29th June Monday**

Mutineers have taken possession of many buildings and shops in the city to take shelter on account of ruin. At evening shells are falling here and there thundering of guns at night.

**30th June Tuesday**

Mutineers force attacked the British camp from early in the morning the fighting lasted till 2 o' clock- and they have been routed with great loss. A person of the Sappers and Miners has been shot and hanged headlong at Kotwalee.

**1st July Wednesday**

It is said that the English have thrown their shells on the Mutineers gun when a few Golandazes have been killed and wounded and prepared themselves instently to attack the camp but returned at the same time. Rohilcund forces arrived on the left bank of river Jumna.

**2nd July Thursday**

Four Regiments of Infantry and a Regt. of Cavalry with some guns arrived from Rohilcund with great baggage viz. unnumbered carts, Horse, Elephants &c.

**3rd July Friday**

It is said that a Mahomedan in the Rohilcund force appointed and named himself a General of the force and proclaimed in the city that every citizen ought to arm themselves in order to protect their houses from freebooters calling at the same time to the warriors in the field of battle. Two Regts. are despatched towards Allipore by the circuitous rout to attack the English Camp.



**4th July Saturday**

It is authenticated the Mutineers force attacked the English Camp from several sides but have been totally defeated. At afternoon thunders informed the citizens to wait at evening in the streets to hear the Gen.'s notice or speech of the war. A great crowd of the flock's assembled in Chandnee Chowk waiting for the new General to hear the news of the war till candle-light no one came warm the people.

**5th July Sunday**

Nothing of importance is heard this day only that it is cried in the city by order of the King that the Chawkeedare tax will remain as before and should be properly paid. Mahomedans are assembling in great number from out-stations to join the war against the English.

**6th July Monday**

It is rumoured that Mirza Aboo Bakur King's grandson has been imprisoned—Thousands of rumours are spreading against English. A Golanaz has been killed in Salimgurh. Unnumbered swords are selling on the Jumma Musjid.

**7th July Tuesday**

A butcher has been seized by three Sawars from street of Golion. Hurruck Chandel Jeweller's two Carts have been seized at the old fort when some arms &c. have been found in them. There were some disputes into the fort about the Hindoo and Mahomedan religion.

**8th July Wednesday**

Five butchers have been shot to death out of Delhi gate in the General's camp though he ordered to confine them.

**9th July Thursday**

Mutineers attacked the English Camp but have been defeated and routed with a great loss, the war lasted till afternoon. They also brought into the city a few heads of Europeans as well as some Camels. Mohamedans were also in company with the Mutineers.

**10th July Friday**

It is rumoured at noon in the city that the Europeans are pushing on when a great rush of people have happened—At the same time a force of ten thousand men prepared and went out of the city, but returned instantly without any attack.

**11th July Saturday**

It is said that yesterday or day before a petition has been received by the King from the Mutineers force at Agra stating that the forces have taken



possession the Agra fort asking at the same time an assistance of 100 men of Sappers and Miners with two large guns of bombs &c.

**12th July Sunday**

It is rumoured five Sawars of English Camp have been seized on the road to Agra. At Evening it is cried into the city by order of the King that the Agra fort has been conquered by the Mutineer's force on the 5th.

**13th July Monday**

Nothing is heard of any importance this day with the exception that the Mutineers force have looted a great quantity of timber &c. at Paharganje and at the Tall of Koorseen Bugh.

**14th July Tuesday**

Mutineers attacked the British Camp in great number from different sides but have been defeated and routed with great loss.

**15th July Wednesday**

A lot of money is subscribed from wealthied inhabitants of the city for His Majesty's monthly expenditure.

**16th July Thursday**

The 14th. Regt. Irr. Cavy. and a few Compys. of an Infy. arrived from Nowganj and Jhansie to join the rebels- Mahomedans are gathering to join in the war of religion.

**17th July Friday**

Nothing is heard of any importance this day with the exception that the money is subscribed from Mahajuns &c. by order of the King. Arms are selling innumerably—Delhi, Jullundur and Nusseerabad forces have fixed their General separately.

**18th July Saturday**

Mutineers forces have attacked the British Camp by three or four columns during the day but without any success. A bloody battle has been fought this day- An European head is brought into the city as well as many wounded men, the insurgents and Mahomedans.

**19th July Sunday**

It is said that the Mutineers force have marched out of the city to attack the British forces but no fighting took place — only the guns were fired from both sides.



**20th July Monday**

Mutineers force attacked the British Camp with great number-- but have been routed with an enormous loss.

**21st July Tuesday**

It is said that about 130 Sawars of the 9th and 17th Irr. Cavy. escaped from the British Camp and joined the rebels. It is also rumoured that 200 Sawars arrived from Rewarie with two camels of treasure.

**22nd July Wednesday**

At evening the whole force assembled in the city on the high road from Delhi to the Cashmere gate to hear the order of the King. They were instructed and warned they will be invested with land and money on their taking possession of the British hill battery. Some Bengalese have been seized this day from the city.

**23rd July Thursday**

Some 500 Sawars and a few Compys. of Infy. arrived from Benares-A battle has been fought this day in which it is said that a great number of the Mutineers have been killed wounded and drowned in the river.

**24th July Friday**

Nothing of any importance with the exception that a few Mahomedans arrived from Tónk to join the war against the English.

**25th July Saturday**

Alopee Purshad's house in Mohulla Bullee Maran has been plundered and dugged to the ground - He has been seized and imprisoned accusing that he is joined with the British - also a few other houses in his neighbourhood to a great extent as well as some houses in Mohulla Suttur Ka Kooncha. The rebels have resolved to raise a battery across the Jumna in front of Sir Metcalfe's mansion.

**26th July Sunday**

The Indoore and Neemuch forces that attacked Agra and have been totally defeated, these have been arrived in Delhi and encamped under the old fort to join the Mutineers - They have a Hindoo General among them.

**27th July Monday**

Nothing is heard of any importance with exception that the Mutineers were preparing to raise their batteries across the river.

**28th July Tuesday**

It is proclaimed in the city that the Mahomedans must not kill cows in



the day of Eed Ozzooha or else they will be severely punished

**29th July Wednesday**

It is again cried on the above subject. It is rumoured that some men of the Cavy. and Infy. after having fled from the lower provinces have taken refuge in Delhi- stating that the British have retaken Cawnpore.

**30th July Thursday**

It is said that the Mutineers force have gone towards Allipore to attack the English Camp- It is further stated that a few Sawars of the King having fled from Ghazeeabad arrived mentioning that the English force reached there- Canon balls and shells &c. were raiding in the city from noon to midnight.

**31st July Friday**

A detachment of Infantry and Cavalry have been despatched across the river and towards Allipore- An attack has also been made from the Cashmere Gate- whence the Mutineers have been routed with loss.

**1st August Saturday**

This day being Eed-oozzooha which quietly is passed very without any disturbance. It is rumoured that the force which was sent towards Allipore returned with a great loss *i.e.*, a stream of water in torrent swept away a great part of the force. A skirmish has been between the Mutineers and the English Camp under the hill battery-A great many shells have fallen into the city.

**2nd August Sunday**

An attack has been made this day by the Mutineers force on the British Camp without any success, but have been routed with a dreadful loss. The force was much disheartened this day.

**3rd August Monday**

It is cried into the city by order of the King that Akhoonjee with a great army will arrive on the 5th. that is notified that every warrior must obey him. It is also rumoured that a great number of the rebels (Jihadee) have fled away to their homes this day. An earthquake has been felt this evening.

**4th August Wednesday**

It is rumoured that the Proclamation which was cried yesterday has been countermanded- Shells &c. are passing through the city till midnight. Swords guns &c. are selling unnumerably on the Jumma Musjid. Tumult and quarrelling is the order of day in (elligible).

**5th August Wednesday**

Nothing heard of any more importance with exception of that several



shells &c. were passing through the city during the day and night making a dreadful loss to the poor inhabitants of the city.

#### **6th August Thursday**

Mutineers attacked the British camp and fixed their batteries. Out of the city a great canonading was the order of the day. Nawwab of Kamoona arrived with a force consisting of more than a thousand.

#### **7th August Friday**

Firing of guns was continued to night. At evening the Gunpowder house at the Mohalla of Chooreewalan is blownd up burning consuming and killing to death about 400 men, women and children of labourers. Hakeem Hasan-ollah Khan's house has been plundered by the rebels.

#### **8th August Saturday**

Firing of guns continued on from the Mutineers batteries which was raised out of the city. Hakeem Hasan-ollah Khan's house plundered to the ground where some treasure was found. He is also put in confinement in the fort. A great part of the houses and shops have also been plundered in the neighbourhood of Hakeem's house.

#### **9th August Sunday**

The guns of the Mutineers are still firing in the same way but no result of these days fighting is known.

#### **10th August Monday**

It is said that a great number of the Mutineers have been killed and wounded at their batteries out of the Lahore and Cashmere gates- A few shells were passing through the city.

#### **11th August Tuesday**

Cannonading is the order of the day- and the loss of the rebels have been to the same extent as on the 10th Hakeem Hasan-ollah Khan has been released from confinement. Shells are passing through the city.

#### **12th. August Wednesday**

At 3 o'clock A.M. English attacked the Mutineers, and defeated them to a great number, and taken away some of their guns. During the day Mutineers attacked four times to regain their guns but routed with great loss without any success.

#### **13th August Thursday**

Mutineers were firing their guns from their batteries out of the city- loosing their men by the English guns- Sawars it is said are scampering off to



their homes.

#### **14th August Friday**

The same as above.

#### **15th August Saturday**

The same as above. Nothing is heard of any particular with exception of thousand rumours of the city.

#### **16th August Sunday**

Mutineers were firing their guns from their batteries out of the city-and are quite disheartened-A great number of them are scampered off to their homes

#### **17th August Monday**

The same as above.

Some grass-cutters are fired to death by the English Camp when they out of the Lahore Gate to bring the grass.

#### **18th August Tuesday**

Mutineers were firing their guns from the ramparts of the city Mahajuns and inhabitants were summoned by the King to pay the money for the expenses.

#### **19th August Wednesday**

The same as above.

#### **20th August Thursday**

The same as above. It is heard that a great number of Mutineers camels were taken away to the British Camp.

#### **21st August Friday**

Mutineers raised their new battery across the river and a great part of them across it with their baggage &c. stating that they are going towards Malagurh.

#### **22nd August Saturday**

Mutineers firing their guns from their new battery. It is said that some of their force marched towards the Goorgaon district especially for the assistance of their force sent towards Hansie some time ago. Lalla Maan Sing's house is confiscated and he himself is seized and put in confinement on the ground that he is a newswriter to the British.

#### **23rd August Sunday**

It is rumoured that the Bareilly and Neemuch forces left the station for Baghput and Allipor to attack the English Camp from those sides.



**24th August Monday**

It is rumoured on the above subject.

**25th August Tuesday**

Some of the Mutineers have been killed at Teleewarrah.

**26th August Wednesday**

Early in the morning it is rumoured in the city that the whole Neemuch forces have been destroyed towards Allipore with 12 of their guns. A great force of the rebels as well as H.M. battalions attacked English hill battery but have been routed with enormous loss.

**27th August Thursday**

When it is reported that the Neemuch forces have been destroyed. The Mahomedans rumoured that it is contrary *i.e.* they are still on the field and have regained their guns and that a great part of zemindars with them against the British.

**28th August Friday**

Mutineers are alarmed at 11 o'clock at night that the English forces are at hand when they were firing their guns incessantly.

**29th August Saturday**

It is rumoured that Mirza Mogul has been dismissed from his office. Bareilly forces returned from Allipore and encamped again out the Delhi gate. Mutineers and Mahomedans of the city are rumouring to the Commander of the Bareilly that he is joined with the British.

**30th August Sunday**

It is said that the son of Mendoo Khan arrived from Bareilly with some present for the King (*viz.* a hundred golden ohurs (Mohr) and gold cup &c.) accompanied with 300 men.

**31st August Monday**

Nothing is heard of any particular this day with exception the inhabitants were alarmed when some muskets were fired under the fort with a Tazeeah.

**1st September Tuesday**

There was a roar, into the fort, of the Mutineers- stating that the King's sons have embezzled the whole money which was collected by subscription from the inhabitants of the city- on which some Begum promised to pay the amount from her pocket for the support of the force.



**2nd September Wednesday**

A very trifling amount is distributed among the force viz. 3 Rs. to Sawar and Rs. 1/- to foot man. A proclamation has been cried in the city informing the poor people of the city to bring as much as wood as they can from Husam Bagh and Depaty gunje- the latter place it is said is all destroyed. Mahomedans again rumoured this day that the garrison of Agra is subjected

**3rd September Thursday**

A great number of beams and planks are brought into the city and sold to a very lower price- Mutineers disguising themselves and are scampering off in small number- Some Mahomedans are also flying away with their families to the adjacent cities and villages through fear, when they were given to understand that the British forces are at hand.

**4th September Friday**

Some of the Mutineers force gone across the river towards Gadeenuggar. It is rumoured that the labels have plundered this day the mansion of Sir Metcalfe's at Kutoob. (?)

**5th September Saturday**

Mirza Mogul, Khizr Sultan, Abdoollah and other princes are roving in procession in the city with great pomp and every day followed by a great number of Mutineers Sawars. This force which went towards Ghazceabad returned this evening. Ram Lall two other persons were captured from the Mohulla of Malleewara.

**6th September Sunday**

Native Bankers of the city were again summoned by the King to pay money for the army- It is said that the Mint Eistabt. is sanctioned by the King to coin the money.

**7th September Monday**

Mutineers are scampering off- It is proposed by the Court of Mutineers and seconded by the King that the rent-holders of the city must pay three months rent in advance to force, Mokund Lall and Hamid Allie Khan are under arrest.

**8th September Tuesday**

The above persons have been released. British force advanced from their hill battery and raised a new battery in the midst of the city and Cantonment and eradicated the Seaah Boorj and fractured a great part of the city walls to that side. Mutineers suffered a great loss.

**9th September Wednesday**

Cannonading were heard the whole day- The Mutineers were quite



disheartened. A great loss of them scampered off this day as well as killed and wounded.

#### 10th September Thursday

Connonading were heard the whole day- Mutineers were preparing their batteries within the city and were catching the inhabitants to assist them in gathering clay &c.

#### 11th September Friday

As above- A large portion of the Mahomedans assembled in Jumma Musjid and prepared themselves to accompany with the force to attack the English batteries. Mirza Mogul it is said went towards Allipore with a thousand Sawars to attack on that side.

My journal ceased here as I have been away from the city.

Kedarnath  
late Clerk Delhi Gazette Press.

(Memoirs of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan. Edited by S. Moinul Haq. Karachi 1958)





SIR SYED AHMAD KHAN

## THE CAUSES OF THE INDIAN REVOLT

Since I began this Essay on the causes of the Rebellion in Hindustan, I have been tempted to keep silence on the events of the past, and even to wish my remembrance of them should be blotted out. The proclamation issued by Her Majesty contains such ample redress for every grievance which led up to that revolt, that a man writing on the subject feels his pen fall from his hands. Why enter further into the matter when the cause of all the dissatisfaction has been discovered and provided against? Yet I think that loyal men, and such as really wish well to their Government, should not content themselves with reflection: but explain with all possible fidelity, their views on the origin of this rebellion. Although, therefore, the causes of complaint have been met, and the grievances redressed, I think it my duty to record my opinion on the subject. That many well-informed, able, and experienced men have written on the causes of the disturbance, I know; but I am not aware that any native of the country has hitherto been among their number. I venture therefore, publicly to express my opinion.

### *What were the causes of the Rebellion in Hindustan?*

#### **Definition of "Rebellion" exemplified with instances**

Before answering this question, let us ask what is the meaning of the word, Rebellion. To fight against the Government, to aid and assist those who are resisting the authority of Government, to set at nought, and disobey the orders of Government with a view to resist its authority, or with contempt, and disrespect to infringe the rights of Government, and disregard its prerogations in any, or in all of these, I take it that Rebellion consists.

*Let us clearly recapitulate the above.*

1. To fight with, or oppose, the servants, or subjects of Government.
2. To neglect, and set at nought the Orders of Government, with a view to resist its authority.
3. To aid and assist or in any way take part with those who are in open opposition to Government.
4. To shew a turbulent disposition, and such as is likely to lead to lawless



riot, and disregard of the Authority of Government.

5. To swerve at heart from respect and loyalty to the Government; and in times of trouble, to withhold from it an active support.

In that sad year, 1857, there was not one of these forms of rebellion which did not find a place. There are but few men in truth, even amongst the best of us, who may not be connected under the latter head; which, though in appearance of little import, is in reality of no small weight.

### **Why it is resorted to**

The primary causes of rebellion are, I fancy, everywhere the same. It invariably results from the existence of a policy obnoxious to the dispositions, aims, habits, and views, of those by whom the rebellion is brought about.

From this it follows that widely-spread disaffection cannot spring from any solitary, or local cause. Universal rebellion must arise from universal grounds for discontent or from streams, deriving from many different sources, but finally merging into one wide-spreading, turbulent water.

### **The Rebellion of 1857 did not originate from a single cause, but from a complication of causes**

As regards the Rebellion of 1857, the fact is, that for a long period, many grievances had been rankling in the hearts of the people. In course of time, a vast store of explosive material had been collected. It wanted but the application of a match to light it, and that match was applied by the Mutinous Army,

### **The distribution of "Chuppaties," had not league for its object**

In the course of the year 1856, and almost simultaneously with the outbreak, "Chuppaties" were passed from hand to hand in many districts. Cholera happened at that time to be raging in Hindustan. Some have imagined that these "Chuppaties" were used as a kind of Talisman to keep off the Cholera, the superstitious Hindustanees being in the habit of using such talismans. The fact is that even at the present day we do not know what caused the distribution of those "Chuppaties". We may be very sure, however, that they could never have been used with the object of spreading a conspiracy. We have, in Hindustan, I know, a custom of passing messages from tongue to tongue in this way: but with these "Chuppaties" there was no such message passed. Had there been, it would have been sure to have leaked out; known as it would have become to every native, to all races and tribes, and to men holding every kind of opinion. The manner in which the rebellion spread, first here, then there, now breaking out in this place and now in that, is alone good proof that there existed no wide-spread conspiracy.

### **Russia and Persia not chargeable with a league in this matter**

Nor is there the slightest reason for thinking that the rebels in Hindustan received any aid from Russia or from Persia. The Hindustanees have no



conception of the views of Russia, and it is not probable that they would league themselves with her. Nor can I think that they would ever be likely to receive any help from Persia. As between Roman Catholics and Protestants, so between the Mussulman of Persia and of Hindustan, cordial co-operation is impossible. To me it seems just as credible that night and day should be merged in one, as that these men should ever act in concert. Surely, if such were the case, it is very strange that during the Russian and Persian wars, Hindustan should have remained completely tranquil. Nor on the other hand is it less strange that while Hindustan was in flames, there should have been in those countries no visible aid whatever. The notion of an understanding existing between these countries must be set aside as preposterous.

### **The subject of the Proclamation which was found in the tent of a Persian Prince discussed**

The proclamation found in the tent of a Persian Prince is no proof of a secret understanding with Hindustan. It was evidently written with the view of animating and encouraging the Persians. The Mutinies are spoken of in order to keep up the spirit of the Persian Soldiers. There is nothing whatever to imply the existence of an understanding with the Mutineers.

### **The despatch of a Firman by the Ex-king of Delhi to the king of Persia not improbable, but not the origin of the Rebellion**

I see nothing strange in the fact, if fact it were, of the Ex-king of Delhi having written a *farman* to the Persians. Such an imbecile was the Ex-king that had one assured him that the angels of Heaven were his slaves, he would have welcomed the assurance, and would have caused half a dozen *farmans* to be prepared immediately. The Ex-king had a fixed idea that he could transform himself into a fly or gnat, and that he could in this guise convey himself to other countries, and learn what was going on there. Seriously, he firmly believed that he possessed the power of transformation. He was in the habit of asking his courtiers in Durbar if it were not so, and his courtiers were not the men to undeceive him. Is there anything wonderful in the fact of such a dotard writing a *farman* to any person, or at any man's instigation? Surely not: But it is perfectly incredible that such a *farman* should have formed the basis of any league. Strange that such wide conspiracies should have been for so long hatching, and that none of our rulers should have been aware of them! After the revolt had broken out, no volunteer, whether Soldier or Civilian, ever alluded to such a thing; and yet had any league existed, there could then have no longer been any reason for concealing it.

### **The annexation of Oudh not the cause of the general rise**

Nor do I believe that the annexation of Oudh was the cause of this rebellion. No doubt, men of all classes were irritated at its annexation, all agreed in thinking that the Honourable East India Company had acted in defiance of its



treaties, and in contempt of the word which it had pledged. The people of Oudh felt on this occasion much as other men have felt whose countries have been annexed by the East India Company. Of this, however, more hereafter. But what I mean here is that the men who would be the most irritated and dismayed at such a step, were the noblemen, and independent princes of Hindustan. These all saw that sooner or later such a policy must lead to the overthrow of their own independence and confiscation of their own lands. Nevertheless we find that there was not one of the great landed princes who espoused the rebel cause. The mutineers were for the most part men who had nothing to lose, the governed not the governing class. To cite in contradiction of what I say the cases of the Nawab of Jhujjar, and the Rajah of Bulubgurh, and other such petty feudatories would shew little else than ignorance of the *status* of the various Hindustanee chiefs.

### **The national league not framed with the view of overthrowing the government of strangers**

So too we must reject the idea that the natives of this country rose of one accord to throw off the yoke of foreigners, whom they hated and detested. The English did not obtain the Government of Hindustan in a day. By little and little they have spread their authority. They ~~date~~ date its commencement from the year 1757: the year in which Suraj-ul-dowlah was overthrown on the plains of Plassy, from that day until a comparatively recent date, all men, high or low, have remained well-affected to the English Government. They have long been accustomed to hear of the good faith, the clemency, the consideration, and the leniency of the Government, of the noble qualities and the high moral character of those by whom it has been conducted. Hindu and Mussulman, all who have been under English rule have been well content to sit under its shadow. Foreign princes have relied implicitly upon the English. A promise given, or an agreement made by them has been looked upon as graven on stone. The Government is twice as strong in these times as it was in the earlier years of the century; while the native princes, the Subahdars and the nobles do not retain one tenth of the power they then had. The Government was continually engaged at that period in wars with every race and religion in India, with Hindu and with Mussulman alike. Its career was one long victory. All natives of the country saw that some day the English sway would extend itself over the whole of Hindustan, and that all races and religions alike must sooner or later be held within the English grasp. And yet during those early years we hear of no attempt at revolt, no striving against English authority. Find if you can any mention of such in the History of India. Had a national hatred been the cause of this rebellion, should we not have found it betraying itself in former times; in times, as I have said, when the relative power of the nations gave far greater facilities for such an outbreak? During the wars which commenced in 1839, there was not a single attempt at revolt in Hindustan, and yet for a hundred years Hindustan had been governed by the race from which sprang the Princes against whom those wars were conducted. It was to those Princes that the Mussulman owed their very



preference and influence in India. How then, can it be supposed that the present revolt originated from hatred on the part of the Mussulman against those who had wrenched the kingdom from them?

**The position of the Ex-king of Delhi well known within the town, and its environs, but overrated in the district Provinces**

No one ever had the slightest hope that the King of Delhi would revive the Empire. The eccentricities and follies of the King and of his house had lost him all respect in the eyes of the world. It is no doubt true that people outside the walls of Delhi, who were less well informed as to his conditions, his mode of life, and his general incompetence, did look on him as emperor. The Hon'ble East India Company, they believed to be his Viceroy. But those who lived in and about Delhi held him in no esteem whatever. Hence it happened that when the King was virtually deposed, no Hindustanee felt the slightest regret.

**The declaration of Lord Amherst, in the year 1827, to the effect that the sovereignty of India belongs to the British Government, and that it no longer existed in the Timour family did not offend any one**

It will be remembered that in the year 1827 Lord Amherst openly declared that our Government was no longer in any way subservient to the house of Timour, and that the East India Company was *de facto* the sole Sovereign power in Hindustan, and that when this declaration was made, the natives expressed no dissatisfaction. The only men probably who felt any chagrin were the relatives and personal attendants of the King.

**The Muhammadans did not contemplate "Jehad" against the Christians prior to the outbreak**

There are again no grounds for supposing that the Muhammadans had for a long time been conspiring or plotting a simultaneous rise, or a religious crusade against the professors of a different faith. The English Government does not interfere with the Muhammadans in the practice of their religion. For this sole reason it is impossible that the idea of religious crusade should have been entertained.

**The preaching of "Jehad" in India, 35 years before with this reservation, its practice against the British Government was opposed to the doctrines of the Muhammadan religion, and from the same cause its practice on the other side of the Indus provinces, i.e., against the Seiks was held, before**

Thirty five years ago a celebrated Maulvie Muhammad Ismael by name preached a religious crusade in Hindustan and called upon all men to aid him in carrying it out. But on that occasion he distinctly stated that natives of Hindustan, subject to the British Government could not conscientiously take part in a religious war within the limits of Hindustan. Accordingly while thousands of "Jehadees" congregated in every district of Hindustan, there was no sort of



disturbance raised within British Territory. Going northwards, these men crossed the Panjab frontier, and waged a war in those parts of the country. And even if we should imitate the know nothings in the various districts and call the late disturbance a religious war, it is very certain that no preparations were made for it before the tenth of May, 1857.

**None of the acts committed by the Muhammadan rebels during the disturbances were in accordance with the tenets of the Muhammadan religion**

It must be remembered that the men who in those times raised so loud the cry of "Jehad" were vagabonds and ill-conditioned men. They were wine drinkers and men who spent their time in debauchery and dissipation. They were men floating without profession or occupation on the surface of society. Can such fellows as these be called leaders of a religious war? It was very little that they thought about religion. Their only object was to plunder Government Treasuries and to steal Government property. To be faithless to one's salt is to disregard the first principles of our religion. To slaughter innocents, especially women, children and old men would be accounted abominable. Can it possibly be imagined then, that this outbreak was of the nature of a religious war? The fact seems to be that some scoundrels prompted by greed and hoping to gain their end by deceiving fools and increasing their own numbers, gave the disturbances the title of a religious war. The project was worthy of the men, but there was no crusade.

**The "Futwa" of "Jehad" printed at Delhi was a counterfeit one**

I know that the "Futwah" which was printed at Dehli is looked upon as a convincing proof that the rebellion was in fact a crusade. I have gone into the question, and I find very strong proof to the effect that this "Futwah" was a forgery. I am told that when the mutineers arrived at Dehli from Meerut, some persons expressed a wish for a "Futwah" as to the expediency of a religious war. Every opinion given was against such a step. I have only seen a copy of the "Futwah" I allude to. The original has been lost and it is impossible to say how far the copy may be authentic. But I may mention that on the arrival of the Bareilly mutineers at Dehli, a second "Futwah" was published with the object of instigating a religious war, and there is not the smallest doubt that this second Futwah was a forgery. The man who had it printed, and who was a turbulent fellow, and a noted scoundrel, attached certain names to it in order to deceive the public, and gained for it thus a degree of credit. He stamped it, by the way, with the seal of a man who had died before the commencement of the mutinees. It may be added that some of the Bareilly mutineers, and their rebel brethren caused several seals to be forged. This fact has become a matter of notoriety.



**A large number of the Moulvies who considered the King of Delhi a violator of the law left off praying in the Royal Mosque**

Many of the Delhi Moulvies and their followers considered the King little better than a heretic. They were of opinion that it was not right to pray in the Mosques to which he was in the habit of going and which were under his patronage. These men never read prayers in the Jumma Musjid. Long before the mutiny broke out, they had published a "Futwah" on the point. Can it be thought that men holding such views would give a "Futwah" in favour of a religious war and of placing the King at the head of it. Among the men whose seals were affixed to the "Futwah" above alluded to, were many who have sheltered Christians, and guarded their honour and their lives. Of these men not one took an active part in the rebellion, or shewed himself in the ranks of the rebel army. If they in reality held the opinions which are usually ascribed to them, why did they act in this way?

**The same persons whose seals are said to be affixed to the "Futwah" at Delhi protected the lives and honor of Christians**

It is my firm belief that the Muhammadans never dreamed of forming a combination in order to carry a religious war against the Christians. It was ignorant and disaffected men who raised the cry of "Jehad" and "Haidree". Presently I shall speak of the causes of discontent among the Muhammadans on the score of religion. I will then shew how far such discontent really did exist. That the Muhammadans were, in every respect more dissatisfied than the Hindus, there is little doubt. Hence it was that, in many districts the greater proportion of rebels were found in their ranks. Nevertheless, in districts where the Hindus rebelled, matters were carried to as great extremes.

**The Bengal army was not previously in league for an outbreak**

A conspiracy, or concerted league never existed in the army. It is well known that after the mutiny had broken out, no Sepoy ever mentioned such a thing. True that after the affair at Barrackpore, and especially in the Punjab, on the introduction of the new drill, men of several regiments used to meet together and declare they would never allow the use of the new cartridges. But they formed no plan whatever, on the contrary, they believed that Government would not insist on carrying out the order. The order was not carried out. But after the 2nd of May, when it had been withdrawn, the mutinies had broken out, and could no longer be checked by such means, a flame had been lit, that was not to be thus quenched.

**Nor was there any league between the army and the Ex-King though it is not improbable that some Sepoy or Non-commissioned Officer may have been his disciple**

So too there never existed a previous understanding between the rebel army and the Ex-King. The idea is entirely without foundation. No one looked



upon the King as sovereign or as consecrate, men used to flatter him to his face, and laugh at him behind his back. The people clung to him from no feeling of loyalty, but with a view to their own advantage. Very likely privates, and Subahdars in some of the regiments were in communication with him. This however does not prove that there was any general understanding between him and the mutineers. The rebel army collected at Dehli, it is true, but after it had thrown off its allegiance to the Government, there was no one out the King of Dehli round whom it could rally. The fact of their gathering at Dehli is in itself no proof of a conspiracy. It was impolitic and unwise of Government to keep up the semblance of a King at Dehli. Lord Ellenborough's views on this point were sound and it is a pity they were not put more thoroughly into practice. The King of Delhi was a spark from a furnace which, wafted by the wind, eventually set all Hindustan in a blaze.

### **The non-admission of a native as a member into the Legislative Council was the original cause of the outbreak**

I believe that this Rebellion owes its origin to one great cause to which all others are but secondary Branches so to speak of the parent stem. I do not found my belief on any speculative grounds or any favourite theory of my own. For centuries, many able and thoughtful men have concurred in the views I am about to express. All treatises and works on the principles of Government bear me out. All Histories either of the one or the other hemisphere are witnesses to the soundness of my opinions.

### **The importance of such on admission discussed**

Most men, I believe, agree in thinking that it is highly conducive to the welfare and prosperity of Government: indeed is essential to its stability that the people should have a voice in its Councils. It is from the voice of the people only that Government can learn whether its projects are likely to be well received. The voice of the people can alone check errors in the bud, and warn us of dangers before they burst upon, and destroy us.

A needle may dam the gushing rivulet. An elephant must turn aside from the swollen torrent. This voice however can never be heard and this security never acquired, unless the people are allowed a share in the consultations of Government. The men who have ruled India should never have forgotten that they were here in the position of foreigners, that they differed from its natives in religion, in customs, in habits of life and of thought. The security of a Government, it will be remembered, is founded on its knowledge of the character of the governed, as well on its careful observance of their rights and privileges. Look back at the pages of History, the record of the experience of the past, and you will not fail to be struck with the differences and distinctions that have existed between the manners, the opinions, and the customs of the various races of men: differences which have been acquired by no written rule, or prescribed by any printed form. They are in every instance the inheritance of the peculiar



race. It is to these differences of thought and of custom that the laws must be adapted, for they cannot be adapted to the laws. In their due observance lies the welfare and security of Government. From the beginning of things, to disregard these has been to disregard the nature of man, and the neglect of them has ever been the cause of universal discontent. Can we forget the confusion that ensued on the acceptance of the Dewannee by the British Government in the year, 1760, a confusion brought about by the ignorance then prevailing? If one wishes to recall those times, he can read of them in Marshman's *History*. Who, on the contrary, does not remember the prosperity of Bengal when under the rule of Lord Hastings? I attribute it to the knowledge of its peculiarities and the acquaintance with the Vernacular which obtained in those days.

To form a Parliament from the natives of India is of course out of the question. It is not only impossible, but useless. There is no reason however why the natives of this country should be excluded from the Legislative Council, and here it is that you come upon the one great root of all this evil. Here is the origin of all the troubles that have befallen Hindustan. From causes connected with this matter sprang all the evil that has lately happened.

I do not say that Government has made no attempt to acquaint itself with the characteristics, and economy of the country. I am well aware that serious efforts have been made. The Regulations of Government, the Circulars of the Board of Revenue, and Mr. Thomason's Directions to Revenue Officers are sufficient proof of this. But I do say that Government has not succeeded in acquainting itself with the daily habits, the modes of thought and of life, the likes, and dislikes, and the prejudices of the people. Our Government never knew what troubles each succeeding sun might bring with it to its subjects, or what sorrow might fall upon them with the night. Yet day by day troubles and anxieties were increasing upon them. Secret causes of complaint were rankling in their breasts. Little by little a cloud was gathering strength, which finally burst over us in all its violence.

**The non-admission of such a member proved a hinderance to the development of the good feeling of the Indian subject towards the Government and of their good intentions towards; on the contrary, contrary effects were produced**

The evils, which resulted to India from the non-admission of natives into the Legislative Council of India were various. Government could never know the inadvisability of the laws and regulations which it passed. It could never hear as it ought to have heard the voice of the people on such a subject. The people had no means of protesting against what they might feel to be a foolish measure, or of giving public expression to their own wishes. But the greatest mischief lay in this that the people misunderstood the views and the intentions of Government. They misapprehended every act, and whatever law was passed was misconstrued by men who had no share in the framing of it, and hence no means of judging of its spirit. At length the Hindustanees fell into the habit of thinking that all the laws



were passed with a view to degrade and ruin them, and to deprive them and their fellows of their religion. Such acts as were repugnant to native customs and character, whether in themselves good or bad, increased this suspicion. At last came the time when all men looked upon the English Government as slow poison, a rope of sand, a treacherous flame of fire. They learned to think that if to-day they escaped from the hands of Government, tomorrow they would fall into them; or that even if they escaped on the morrow, the third day would see their ruin. There was no man to reason with them, no one to point out to them the absurdity of such ideas. When the Governors and the governed occupy relatively such a position as this, what hope is there of loyalty or of good-will? Granted that the intentions of Government were excellent, there was no man who could convince the people of it; no one was at hand to correct the errors which they had adopted. And why? Because there was not one of their own member among the members of the Legislative Council. Had there been, these evils that have happened to us, would have been averted. The more one thinks the matter over, the more one is convinced that here we have the one great cause which was the origin of all smaller causes of dissatisfaction.

I see no force in the argument that the Government has allowed a perfectly free Press, forbidding it merely to print abusive or seditious language or language of an inflammatory nature. Nor was it of any use to circulate laws before they were finally passed so that every man should have an opportunity of speaking his mind out about them. It was not by such measures as these that evils such as I am writing about could be remedied. Far from it, these half measures were useless.

I do not wish to enter here into the question as to how the ignorant and uneducated natives of Hindustan could be allowed a share in the deliberations of the Legislative Council: or as to how they should be selected to form an assembly like the English Parliament. These are knotty points. All I wish to prove here is that such a step is not only advisable, but absolutely necessary, and that the disturbances are due to the neglect of such a measure. As regards the details of the question, I have elsewhere discussed them, and those who wish to enter into it can read what I have said.

### **The outbreak of rebellion proceeded from the following five causes**

This mistake of the Government then made itself felt in every matter connected with Hindustan. All causes of rebellion, however various, can be traced to this from the following one. And if we look at these various causes separately and distinctly we shall I think, find that they may be classed under five heads.

1. Ignorance on the part of the people: by which I mean misapprehension of the intentions of Government.

2. The passing of such laws and regulations and forms of procedure as jarred with the established customs and practices of Hindustan, and the introduction of such as were in themselves objectionable.



3. Ignorance on the part of the Government of the condition of the people; of their modes of thought and of life, and of the grievances through which their hearts were becoming estranged.

4. The neglect on the part of our rulers of such points as were essential to the good Government of Hindustan.

5. The bad management, and disaffection of the army.

I shall now proceed to consider these five heads, and all that may be classed under them, distinctly, and in detail.

### CAUSE I

*Ignorance on the part of the people, that is, misapprehension of the intentions of Government.*

#### **Misunderstanding on the part of the Indians**

I would here say that I do not wish it to be understood that the views of Government were in reality such as have been imputed to them. I only wish to say that they were misconstrued by the people, and that this misconstruction hurried on the rebellion. Had there been a native of Hindustan in the Legislative Council, the people would never have fallen into such errors.

#### **Apprehension of interference of Government with the religious customs of the Indians**

*Interference in matters of religion.* There is not the smallest doubt that all men whether ignorant, or well-informed, whether high or low, felt a firm conviction that the English Government was bent on interfering with their religion, and with their old established customs. They believed that Government intended to force the Christian Religion and foreign customs upon Hindu and Mussulman alike. This was the chief among the secondary causes of the rebellion. It was believed by every one that Government was slowly but surely developing its plans. Every step it was thought was being taken with the most extreme caution. Hence it is that men said that Government does not speak of proselytising Muhammadans summarily, and by force; but it will throw off the veil as it feels itself stronger, and will act with greater decision. Events, as I shall presently shew, increased and strengthened this conviction. Men never thought that our Government would openly compel them to change their religion. The idea was that indirect steps would be taken, such as doing away with the study of Arabic and Sanscrit, and reducing the people to ignorance and poverty. In this way, it was supposed, the people would be deprived of a knowledge of the principles of their own faith, and their attention turned to books containing the principles of the Christian Creed. It was supposed that Government would then work on the cupidity, and poverty of its subjects and on condition of their abjuring their faith, offer them employment in its own service.



### **Mention of the Secundra Orphan Asylum**

In the year 1837, the year of the great drought, the step which was taken of rearing orphans in the principles of the Christian faith, was looked upon throughout the N. W. P. as an example of the schemes of Government. It was supposed that when Government had similarly brought all Hindustanees to a pitch of ignorance and poverty, it would convert them to its own creed. The Hindustanees used, as I have said, to feel an increasing dismay at the annexation of each successive country by the Hon'ble East India Company. But I assert without fear of contradiction that this feeling arose solely from the belief in their minds, that as the power of Government increased, and there no longer remained foreign enemies to fight against, or internal troubles to quell, it would turn its attention inwards, and carry out a more systematic interference with their creed and religious observances.

### **Religious discussion being carried to a great height during the present time**

In the first days of British rule in Hindustan, there used to be less talk than at present on the subject of religion. Discussion on this point has been increasing day by day and has now reached its climax. I do not say that Government has interfered in these matters; but it has been the general opinion that all that was done was according to the instructions and hints of Government, and was by no means displeasing to it. It has been commonly believed that Government appointed Missionaries and maintained them at its own cost. It has been supposed that Government, and the officers of Government throughout the country were in the habit of giving large sums of money to these Missionaries with the intention of covering their expenses, enabling them to distribute books, and in every way aiding them.

### **The covenanted officers assumed the Missionary functions**

Many covenanted officers, and many Military men have been in the habit of talking to their subordinates about religion; some of them would bid their servants come to their houses, and listen to the preaching of Missionaries, and thus it happened that in the course of time no man felt sure that his creed would last even his own life time.

### **Preaching of the Gospel by the Misssionaries**

The Missionaries moreover introduced a new system of preaching. They took to printing and circulating controversial tracts, in the shape of questions and answers. Men of a different faith were spoken of in those tracts in a most offensive and irritating way. In Hindustan these things have always been managed very differently. Every man in this country, preaches and explains his views in his own Mosque, or his own house. If any one wishes to listen to him, he can go to the Mosque, or house, and hear what he has to say. But the Missionaries' plan was exactly the opposite. They used to attend places of public resort, markets for instance, and fairs where men of different creeds were



collected together, and used to begin preaching there. It was only from fear of the authorities that no one bid them be off about their business. In some districts the Missionaries were actually attended by Policemen from the station. And then the Missionaries did not confine themselves to explaining the doctrines of their own books. In violent and unmeasured language they attacked the followers and the holy places of other creeds: annoying, and insulting beyond expression the feelings of those who listened to them. In this way, too, the seeds of discontent were sown deep in the hearts of the people.

### **The establishment of Missionary Schools and the covenanted officers attending examinations at them**

Then Missionary schools were started in which the principles of the Christian faith were taught. Men said it was by the order of Government. In some districts covenanted officers of high position and of great influence used to visit the schools and encourage the people to attend them. Examinations were held in books which taught the tenets of the Christian religion. Lads who attended the schools used to be asked such questions as the following "who is your God?" "who is your Redeemer," and these questions they were obliged to answer agreeably to the Christian belief; prizes being given accordingly. This again added to the prevailing ill-will. But it may be said with some justice, "If the people were not satisfied with this course of education, why did they let their children go to the schools?" The fact is that we have here no question of like or dislike. On the contrary we must account for this by the painfully degraded and ignorant state of the people. They believed that if their children were entered at the schools, they might have employment given them by Government, and be enabled to find some means of subsistence. Hence they put up with a state of affairs in reality disagreeable enough to them. But it must not be thought that they ever liked those schools.

### **Village Schools**

When the village Schools were established; the general belief was that they were instituted solely with the view of teaching the doctrines of Jesus. The Pergunnah visitors, and deputy inspectors, who used to go from village to village, and town to town, advising the people to enter their children at these Schools, got the nickname of Native Clergyman. When the Pergunnah visitor, or Deputy Inspector entered any village the people used to say that the Native Clergyman had come. Their sole idea was that these were Christian Schools, established with the view of converting them. Well-informed men, although they did not credit this, saw nevertheless that in these Schools nothing but Urdu was taught. They were afraid that boys while reading only Urdu would forget the tenets of their own faith, and that they would thus drift into Christianity. They believed also, that Government wished such books as bore upon the doctrines of the former religions of Hindustan, to fall into entire disuse. This was to be done with the view of ensuring the spread of Christianity. In many of the Eastern districts of



Hindustan where these Schools were established, boys were entered at them by compulsion, and by compulsion only. It was currently reported that all this was in pursuance of the orders of Government.

### **The introduction of female education**

There was at the same time a great deal of talk in Hindustan about female education. Men believed it to be the wish of Government, that girls should attend, and be taught at these Schools, and leave off the habit of sitting veiled. Anything more obnoxious than this to the feelings of the Hindustanees cannot be conceived. In some districts the practice was actually introduced. The pergunnah visitors, and Deputy Inspectors hoped by enforcing the attendance of girls, to gain credit with their Superior. In every way, therefore, right or wrong, they tried to carry out their object. Here then was another cause of discontent among the people, through which they became confirmed in error.

### **Alterations in the usual system of education in large Colleges**

The large Colleges, established in the towns, were from the first a source of suspicion. At the time of their establishment Shah Abdulazeez, a celebrated Moulvie of Hindustan was alive. The Muhammadans asked him for a "Futwah" on the subject. His answer was distinct. "Go," he said, "Read in the English Colleges, and learn the English Tongue. The laws of Islam admit it." Acting on this opinion the Muhammadans did not hesitate to enter these Colleges. At that time, however, the Colleges were conducted on a principle widely different from that which is at present adopted. Arabic, Persian, Sanskrit, and English, were equally taught. The "Fickah," "Hadees" and other such books were read. Examinations were held in the "Fickah" for which certificates of proficiency were given. Religion was not in any way thrust forward. The professors were men of worth and weight: all Scholars of great reputation, wide knowledge and sound moral character. But all this has been changed. The study of Arabic is little thought of. The "Fickah" and "Hadees" were suddenly dropped. Persian is almost entirely neglected. Books and methods of teaching have been changed. But the study of Urdu and of English has greatly increased. All this has tended to strengthen the idea that Government wished to wipe out the religions which it found in Hindustan. The professors are no longer men of weight or acquirements. Students at the College, in whom people have not gained confidence, have for some time past been appointed professors. And hence it is that throughout the country these Colleges have fallen into disrepute.

### **The issue of Government proclamation on the subject of admitting Government College English students to appointments in preference to other candidates**

Such was the state of the village Schools and the Colleges. Such the general feeling of distrust throughout the country as to the views of Government about conversion, when a proclamation was issued by Government to the



following effect. Whoever had studied and passed an examination in certain Sciences, and in the English language, and had received a Certificate to that effect, was to be considered as having prior claims for employment in the Public Service. Petty appointments were granted on the production of certificates from the Deputy Inspectors: the very men who had hitherto been nicknamed Native Clergymen. This came as a blow to every one. Suspicion increased tenfold. The rumour again arose that Government wished to deprive the Hindustanees of all means of subsistence and by impoverishing them gradually, to substitute its own religion in the place of theirs.

### **Introduction of the messing system in the Jails**

It was at this time, that the practice was introduced in some district jails, of making prisoners eat food which had been cooked by a single man; such a measure as this was fatal to the caste of Hindus. To the Muhammadan creed it was not actually obnoxious, nevertheless Muhammadans were annoyed at its introduction. They looked upon it as another proof that Government wished to meddle with all creeds alike. They saw in it but another part of one huge plan.

### **The circulation of Mr. R. Edmond's letters from Calcutta**

Whilst all these discontents were at their height, there suddenly appeared, in 1855, a letter by Mr. Edmond, which was circulated publicly from Calcutta, and a copy of which was sent to all the principal officials of Government. It was to the effect that all Hindustan was now under one rule, that the telegraph had so connected all parts of the country that they were as one, that the rail road had brought them so near that all towns were as one; the time had clearly come when there should be but one faith; it was right therefore, that we should all become Christians.. It is no metaphor to say that men were blinded with fear at the receipt of this Circular. The ground seemed at last to have given way beneath their feet. They cried out that the long-expected hour had indeed arrived. The servants of Government were first to be made Christians, then the mass of the people. This circular it was said was written by order of Government. Natives in Government employ were asked whether they had received the circular, and this was in fact to taunt them with having turned Christians, on the condition of getting Government employ. The native officials were so ashamed of the circular that those to whom it had been sent, used to hide the fact from fear of being ridiculed and abused, and would deny having ever received it. They used to say "It has not been sent to us": and the answer used to be "well, well; Be sure that it will come. Are you not in Government employ?" Looking into the subject, one feels that this unhappy circular set the finishing stroke to the public suspicion and ill-will. And yet again at this crisis there was no one at hand to set men's minds at rest. It will surprise no one to find that there should have been something very like conspiracy and more or less disturbance about this time. This was in fact the case. But the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal soon heard of it, and issued a Proclamation which soothed men's minds and put suspicion to sleep for a time: It was however but a



temporary relief; men still thought that Government had given up its projects only for a while, but that when it found itself a little stronger, it would resume them.

### **The interference in religious matters more repugnant to the feelings of the Muhammadans, and its causes**

All these causes rendered the Muhammadans more uneasy than the Hindus. The reason of this, I take to be that the Hindu faith consists rather in the practice of long established rites and forms, than in the study of doctrine. The Hindus recognize no canons and laws, or appeals to the heart and conscience. Their creed does not admit of such things. Hence it is that they are exceedingly indifferent about speculative doctrine. They insist upon nothing, excepting the strict observance of their old rites, and of their modes of eating and drinking. It does not annoy or grieve them, to see such rites and observances, as they consider necessary, disregarded by other men. Muhammadans, on the contrary, looking upon the tenets of their creed as necessary to Salvation; and upon the neglect of them as damnation, are thoroughly well-grounded in them. They regard their religious precepts as the ordinances of God. Hence it was that the Muhammadans were more uneasy than the Hindus, and that, as might have been expected, they formed the majority of the rebels. It is wrong and impolitic on the part of a Government to interfere in any way with the faith of its subjects. But of all courses, the most unjust is to hinder the study of the tenets of their religion: and especially of such an one as is heartily believed by its votaries to be true. But be this as it may, all I wish here to prove is that whatever the intentions of Government might be, matters were so managed that the people were left to stumble on, in error, suspicion, and ill-will.

### **CAUSE II**

*"The passing of such laws, regulations and forms of procedure as were inconsistent with the established customs and practice of Hindustan: and the introduction of such as were in themselves objectionable."*

### **The promulgation of objectionable laws and procedures, Act 21 of 1850**

The Legislative Council is not free from the charge of having meddled with religious matters. Act XXI of 1850, was without doubt prejudicial to the professors of other creeds. This act was thought to have been passed with the view of cozening men into Christianity. The Hindu faith, as is known, allows of no converts. To the Hindus, therefore this act brought no benefit. If a man again become a convert to Islam, he is forbidden by the laws of his new religion, from inheriting property left to him by men of another creed. No Muhammadan convert, therefore, could profit by this act. To such men, however, as became Christians it offered great advantages. Hence this act was said not only to interfere with people's religion, but to hold out strong inducements to conversion.



### **Act 15 of 1856**

Act 15 of 1856 again, relating to Hindu widows was opposed to the practice of the Hindu religion. There is, I grant, much controversy on this point, and there always has been; but it is none the less a fact that the Hindus, who cling particularly to the forms, and customs of their faith, were greatly annoyed at this Act. They thought that its provisions were little less than an insult to them. The suspicion arose that this act was intended to free widows from all restraint, and to give them the power of doing whatever they might think proper. So too it would be impossible to overstate the disgust which was felt by all Hindustanees at the licence given to women in criminal actions, even married women were recognized to the Criminal Courts as competent.

### **Giving liberty to females**

To give a married woman such liberty, was simply to deprive her guardian of all power over her; and not only this but the measure was altogether opposed to the spirit of the existing religions. The remedy provided for such cases by a suit in the Civil Courts was little better than useless. Cases of this kind which according to our belief and practice should have met with prompt attention, were so delayed and deferred, that the remedy was nearly as bad as the grievance. The decrees of the Civil Court for the restoration of married women are very often waste paper. It often happens that a woman has borne two or three children to the man who abducted her, before her husband can find a trace of her whereabouts.

### **The promulgation of certain Acts in cases wherein the parties are of one religion**

Moreover, certain acts and laws were passed which led to decisions in the Civil Courts opposed to the religious practice of litigants, even where they happened to be of the same faith. I would not have the Government shew a partiality for any creed whatever. When parties to a suit are of different creeds, Government should be careful, provided that due respect is paid to the religious practice of the litigants, to ensure equal justice. When however the litigants are of the same creed, it is but right, that decrees, affecting rights, issued by the Courts should be in accordance with the religious practice of the parties.

### **The resumption of M'afis**

The laws, providing for the resumption of Revenue free lands, the last of which was regulation 6 of 1819, were most obnoxious. Nothing disgusted the natives of this country more with the English Government than this resumption of Revenue free lands. Sir T. Munro and the Duke of Wellington said truly enough that to resume lands granted revenue free, was to let the whole people against us, and to make beggars of the masses. I cannot describe the odium, and the hatred which this act brought on Government, or the extent to which it



beggared the people.

**The result of extinguishing the Native states, according to Sir Thomas Munro, in place of raising to debase the whole people. And according to the Duke of Wellington "To degrade and beggar the natives making them all enemies."**

Many lands which had been held revenue free for centuries, were suddenly resumed on the flimsiest pretexts. The people said that Government not only did nothing for them itself, but undid what former Governments had done. This measure, altogether lost for the Government, the confidence of its subjects. It may be said that if revenue free lands were not resumed, some other source of income would have to be sought, or some new Tax imposed to meet the charges of Government: so that the people would have still to bear the burthen. This may be so; but the people do not see it. It is a remarkable fact that wherever the rebels have issued proclamations to deceive and reduce the people, they have only mentioned two things: the one, interference in matters of religion, the other, the resumption of revenue free lands. It seems fair to infer that these were the two chief causes of the public discontent. More especially was it the case with the Muhammadans, on whom this grievance fell far more heavily than on the Hindus.

### **Public sales of Zemindari rights**

Under former rules, and in old times, the system of buying and selling rights in landed property, of mortgage, and of transfer by gift, undoubtedly prevailed. But there was little of it, and what little there was, was due to the consent and wishes of the parties concerned. To arbitrarily compel the sale of these rights in satisfaction of arrears of revenue, or of debt, was a practice in those days unknown. Hindustanee landlords are particularly attached to this kind of property. The loss of their estates has been to them a source of the deepest annoyance. A landed estate in Hindustan is very like a little kingdom. It has always been the practice to elect one man as the head over all. By him, matters requiring discussion are brought forward, and every shareholder in proportion to his holding, has the power of speaking out his mind on the point. The cultivators and the Chowdries of the villages attend on such an occasion, and say whatever they have to say. Any matter of unusual importance is settled by the headmen of some of the larger villages. You have here in fact in great perfection a miniature Kingdom, and Parliament. These landlords were indignant at the loss of their estate, as a king at the loss of his empire. But the Government acted in utter disregard of the state of things formerly existing. Dating from the commencement of English rule to the present time, there is probably not a single village, in which there have not been more or less transfers. In the first days of British rule, sales of landed property were so numerous, that the whole count was turned upside down. To remedy this, Government passed the law which called Regulation 1 of 1821, and appointed a Commission of Enquiry. Th



Commission, however, gave rise to a thousand other evils. After all, the affair was not brought to a satisfactory conclusion, and, at last, the Commission was abolished. I shall not here enter into the question as to how Government could ensure the payment of the land revenue, if it gave up the practice of sales or its right to enforce sales as arising from the fact of the land being pledged for the payment of revenue. All that I now say is, that whether this system of sales was the result of necessity, or of ignorance, it has at all events had a hand in bringing on the rebellion. If any wish to see what my views are on this question, he will find them in my work on the Government of Hindustan.\* I will only mention here that it is open to grave doubt, whether the land is pledged for the payment of revenue. The claim of the Government lies, I take it, upon the produce of the land, not upon the land itself.

So too the practice of sale in satisfaction of debt has been most objectionable. Bankers, and money-lenders have availed themselves of it to advance money to landlords, resorting to every kind of trickery and roguery, to rob them of their property. They have instituted suits without end in the Civil Courts, some fraudulent, some correct enough. The consequence has been that they have very generally ousted the old landlords, and insinuated themselves into their properties.† Troubles of this kind have ruined landlords throughout the length and breadth of the land.

### Heavy assessments of lands

The system of Revenue Settlements, introduced by the English Government does it the greatest credit. But it is heavy compared with former Settlements. Formerly the revenue was realized by sharing the actual crop with the cultivator. Sher Shah claimed for Government one third of the produce of the land, and though this plan had its difficulties, and exposed the Government to some little risk yet the cultivators felt secure, and were little liable to loss. Akbar was the first, regularly to adopt this plan of taking one third of the produce. It was by him that the system was matured as may be seen in Mr. Elphinstone's excellent work upon India, and in the *Ain-i-Akbari*. Akbar divided the land into classes, and changed the payments in kind into money payments. The first class which goes by the name of "Pulich" was cultivated yearly, and the produce of this he divided with the cultivators according to their respective shares. The second class was called "Paroti," and was not kept in constant cultivation, being occasionally allowed to lie fallow in order to strengthen it. The produce of this class of land he shared with the cultivators in such years as it was cultivated. The third class which was called "Chachar" remained uncultivated for 3 or 4 years, and required the expenditure of money in order to make it fertile. In the first year of cultivation, Akbar took two fifths of the produce from this land, increasing his

\* Before this book was put into press, the Government of India was taken by Her Majesty the Queen in her own hands from the East India Company; and as the book chiefly related to the rule of the E. I. Company in Hindustan, it was not published.

† *I*de "the Old Pindari", (in *Appendix III*) a poem published some years ago.



demand yearly, till in the fifth year, he received his full share. The fourth class which was called "Bunjar," and required to lie fallow for more than five years, was treated on still more lenient terms. The way in which the money value of the crops was calculated was as follows. The crop of every *beegah*, and of every different kind of land was reckoned according to the weight of an average amount of grain produced by such land. For example the average crop of a *beegah* would be reckoned at 9 maunds of grain, a third of which, namely, 3 maunds would represent the demand of Government on the Cultivator. The grain would then be valued at the average of the price current; and a money rate fixed on the *beegah* accordingly. The great advantage of this system was, that if the cultivators considered the price fixed by the price tables more than the value of the corn, they had the option of paying in kind. The assessments imposed by the English Government have been fixed without any regard to their various contingencies. Land lying fallow pays in the same proportion as other land. Such lands as are for a time left uncultivated in order that they may acquire strength, are not considered free from assessment. From being cultivated to the same extent year after year land becomes weak and unfruitful, and does not yield an equal amount. It ceases to have the same value as was put upon it at the time of the Settlement. In many districts, every Settlement that was made pressed heavily, and landlords and cultivators were alike reduced to straits. In course of time they were unable to provide themselves with proper implements. These accordingly became scarce. Land was not properly cultivated. The property became scanty. The cultivators were obliged to borrow money in order to pay the revenue. The interest on these loans ran up. Landlords, formerly men of substance, found themselves suddenly ruined. Villages, in which there happened to be land already lying uncultivated, became more than ever neglected. Mr. Thomason; in Paragraph 64 of his directions to Settlement Officers says that the Settlements under Regulation 9 of 1833 were light on good villages, but pressed heavily on poorer ones. The landlords, I admit, can no longer extort rent illegally, or make illicit profits, but they were entitled to more consideration than has been shewn them. Both they and the cultivators have suffered, and hence it is that notwithstanding the security to life and property which they now enjoy, the landlords look back with regret on the dynasties of former days.

### **The abolition of Talookdari rights, particularly in the Oudh provinces**

I will not say that to crush the Talookdars was an unjust measure, but it was one of the chief causes of the Rebellion, and especially of the rebellion in Oudh. The Talookdars had long enjoyed the rank of Rajas. They exercised the rights of sovereignty in the villages composing their Talookdaries: From these villages, their income was derived. All these rights, and all this income alike were suddenly wrested from them. Here, again, I shall not stop to enquire what other steps could have been taken by Government to secure the undertenants from the oppression of the Talookdars. I have elsewhere entered into the matter. I merely say now that the abolition of the Talookdars was among the causes of the

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rebellion.

### **The introduction of stamp paper**

The practice of using stamped papers is peculiar to Europe, where land is scarcely looked upon as a means of revenue. The introduction of this practice into Hindustan, and the gradual rise in the price of stamped paper, which reached its highest amount under Regulation 10 of 1829, were entirely opposed to the spirit of Hindustanee customs. Taking into consideration the general poverty of the Hindustanees, the measure seems to me to have been very unwise. This question of stamped paper has long been an open one, and strong arguments have not been wanting to shew the mischief of the practice, and to prove that it is opposed to all sound rules of Political Economy. This however is a question I shall not discuss here. I would only remark that the question as hitherto argued has had reference to countries, where the people were educated, wealthy, and intelligent. It is easy to see that the Hindustanees, who are becoming more and more impoverished every day, can never hope to bear up under this expense. This system of using stamped paper is one which has been disapproved of by most men of reflection. They argue that to whatever extent it may be unjust to levy a tax on lands, title-deeds, and so on; so much the more is it unwise to levy a tax upon papers intended to aid in the furtherance of justice. Besides the heavy expenses which this system entails, it tends greatly to hinder the actual administration of justice. Mr. Mill, in his book on Political Economy, and Lord Brougham in his work on Political Philosophy have expressed their disapproval of the system, and it must be remembered that all arguments urged against its practice in Europe, carry with them a tenfold force when applied to Hindustan.

### **The system of Civil Administration in the Bengal provinces superior to that in the Punjab, but requires revision in certain points**

The Civil Courts in the Presidencies of Bengal, and Agra, deserve much praise. They have had nothing to do with the late Rebellion. I know that many Government officers will differ from me on this point, and will prefer the system which has been adopted in the Punjab. But this is a matter which is open to a good deal of doubt. The laws in force in the Punjab are very vague and sketchy. There exist in the Punjab no commentaries or constructions, for the purpose of explaining or elucidating the laws or adapting them to practice. Each individual judge is a light to himself; and unfortunately it does not happen that a judge is always right in his interpretation. To what confusion is such a state of things likely to lead in the course of time! The Civil Court is the tribunal in which the most implicit trust should be placed. It is the Civil Court on which depend the internal tranquillity of the kingdom, the safe transport of merchandize, the increase of trade, and the establishment of rights. But Punjab Officers pay very little attention to the Civil Courts. They have not indeed the time to do so. Cases requiring long and patient investigation, regarding transfers of right, and a variety of other matters, such as have sprung up in process of time under the English



Government and are constantly recurring in the Civil Courts of these Provinces, are as yet unknown in the Punjab.\* But when in course of time, such suits are brought into the Civil Courts of the Punjab, the laws by which the judges are at present guided will be found altogether inefficient. The Civil Courts, no doubt, have their share among causes of the rebellion; but only in connection with two subjects. The one, the transfer of rights: the other, the issue of decrees for debt. These led to internal riots, but they gave rise to no opposition against Government. They were sores which festered only in the breasts of the parties concerned. Such a state of things might have been expected. Whenever the reins of Government are loosened, the people always begin fighting with each other. Unjust transfers of land, and debts unjustly adjudged due, increased the confusion. Many men, moreover, had fallen victims to trumped up suits, and the blame of these fell upon the Civil Courts. But the incomplete and summary modes of investigation which prevail in the Punjab Civil Courts, and the wrong headedness of the judges presiding in them, have been productive of no less mischief. Ten years cannot tell us how the Civil Courts work. Fifty years hence, we may compare the administration of the N. W. P. and the working of its Courts with the administration and Courts of the Punjab; at present the comparison cannot hold. I do not deny that the laws which regulate justice in Bengal and the N. W. P. are capable of improvement. Great delays occur in the decision of cases. The price of stamped paper, and various gradations of appeal, render appeal too costly for the people. The powers of judges have been in certain respects unduly restricted. Act 19 of 1853 remedied this to some extent, but there is still room for improvement. However, any one caring to see what I have to say on this subject, can read my book on the Government of Hindustan, in which work my views are given in extenso.

### CAUSE III

*The ignorance of government of the state of the country and their subjects.*

#### **The ignorance of Government of the state of the country, and their subjects**

There is no doubt that Government were but slightly acquainted with the unhappy state of the people. How could it well be otherwise? There was no real communication between the Governors and the governed, no living together or near one another as has always been the custom of the Mahommadans in countries which they subjected to their rule, Government and its officials have never adopted this course without which no real knowledge of the people can be gained. It is however not easy to see how this can be done by the English as they almost all look forward to retirement in their native land and seldom settle for good amongst the natives of India.

The people again having no voice in the government of the country could

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\* It must be borne in mind that this was written in 1858, though not published then.



not well better their condition, and if they did try to make themselves heard by means of petitions, these same petitions were seldom if ever attended to and sometimes never even heard.

**Local authorities generally unacquainted with the condition of their subjects**

Government, it is true, received reports from its subordinate officials but even these officials themselves were ignorant of the real thoughts and opinions of the people, because they had no means of getting at them. The behaviour of these subordinates as a rule, their pride and their treatment of natives is well known. In their presence native gentlemen were afraid, and if they had told these officials of their want of knowledge of the people of their Districts, they would only have been summarily ejected for their pains. All the "Amleh" (readers and clerks) and the civil functionaries as well as wealthy native gentlemen were afraid and consequently did nothing but flatter.

Now Government, although in name only a Government subordinate to a higher Government, was in reality the real Government of this country, and, as such, it ought to have received the complaints and petitions of its people direct and not as it did invariably by reports from its district officers. These are some of the reasons why the real feelings and ways of its people, why the action of new laws passed for that people, their working for good or for bad, for the prosperity or otherwise of the countrymen were unknown or only slightly known to Government. The people were isolated, they had no champion to stand up for their rights and to see justice done to them, and they were constrained to weep in silence.

**Overwhelming poverty of the Indians, particularly of the Muhammadans**

There is nothing wonderful in the fact that the natives were poor and in distress. A native's best profession is service. Now although every one felt the difficulty of getting service, this difficulty pressed most heavily on the Muhammadans. It must be borne in mind that the Hindoos, the original inhabitants of the country, were never in former days in the habit of taking service, but on the contrary they were each engaged in such work as their forefathers had been engaged in before them. The Brahmins never took service, the Vaishyas were always traders and bankers, the Kshatriyas, once lords of the land, never took service, but each kept his own small portion of land, dividing it amongst his kinsmen and preserving a semblance of authority. They had no standing army, but as occasion required they all united either to resist or to invade as the case might be, as was the custom in former days in Russia. There was one caste certainly that did take service and these were the "Kayasths."

**Scarcity of employments, generally the Muhammadans whose profession is commonly service were particularly impoverished**

The Muhammadans are not the aborigines of this country. They came in the train of former conquerors and gradually domesticated themselves in India.



They were therefore all dependent on service, and on account of this increased difficulty in obtaining the same, they, far more than the Hindoos, were put to much inconvenience and misery. An honorable military service, distinct from that eagerly engaged in by the lower classes of the community, was with difficulty procurable under the British Government. The army, which was composed of sepoy, was not looked upon as a favorable field by the higher class of Muhammadans. True, service was obtainable by them in the Cavalry, but the number of posts in that branch of the service was small compared with what it had been in olden days. Formerly, besides Government service, employment was obtainable in the private retinues or households of Officers of State and large landholders, and these posts were well paid.

It is not so now, as the posts which are now filled by Englishmen do not entail upon the holders the necessity of keeping up a retinue, and Englishmen, therefore, only have their own few servants.

**The same causes induced them to serve the rebels on one anna, one and half anna, or one Seer of flour per diem**

The consequence of this was, that when the mutineers wanted recruits, thousands flocked in just as in a famine hungry men rush upon food. Many took service upon one anna or one anna and a half per diem, and many instead of cash, received a couple or perhaps three pounds of grain daily. It is evident, therefore, that however much they might desire service the natives of India were unable to obtain it, the number wanting service being greatly in excess of the number of posts to be filled up.

**The stoppage of charitable pensions and stipends tending in a great measure to the poverty of the Indians**

Under the old regime there was another thing which contributed to the prosperity of the people, viz., the custom of bestowing "Jagirs," (grants of land or presents). At the coronation of the emperor Shah Jehan at Delhi, no less than 400,000, *beegahs*, 120 villages, and tens of thousands pounds of sterling were given away in presents. This is never done now a days, and not only is it not the case now but even "jagirs," (grants of land) bestowed on the recipients in former days have been forfeited. Having thus shewn the unsatisfactory state into which the Zemindars and cultivators have fallen, I must also state that petty artisans have suffered severely by the opening up of the trade with England, as they cannot of course compete with machinery. No one even thinks nowadays of buying country made thread or matches, and the country cloth weavers have been ruined. When by the Divine Will, Hindustan became an appanage of the Crown of Great Britain, it was the duty of Government to enquire into and lessen as much as possible the sufferings of its subjects. By not doing so many who would otherwise have been staunch friends of the British, joined the rebels.



### **The investment of capital in Government loan**

The issue of Government Notes is another cause of injury to India, such as was never the case under any former Government. The interest of the money which Government borrowed, the expense of collecting the money to pay for that interest and the benefit which Government derived from the money borrowed was all taken from the country.

### **Poverty the cause of the subject's rejoicing at the idea of a change of Government, and wishing for it.**

Families who in former years and under the former rulers of this country were great and powerful have, under this Government, been reduced to poverty. This was one great reason of the dissatisfaction felt in India and one great reason in my opinion why they were inclined for a change of rulers. When the British were victorious in Afghanistan, the people mourned. Why was this? Because they thought that they would now be compelled to relinquish the cherished faith of their forefathers and become Christians. When in addition to this Gwalior was conquered and the Punjab and Oudh annexed, this fear gained ground. In these native states, natives were eligible for high public posts, and native wares were always saleable there. When therefore the native Courts of these states were done away with, these openings and aids to the people of India were suddenly cut off. The English Government, had however, many, very many, good points. I do not condemn it entirely. The feeling of security which the subject enjoys under the British rule, of ease and of freedom, the many good roads, the putting down of dacoitee, thuggee and highway robbery; the facilities afforded to travellers, the ease with which merchants could transport their goods to far off localities, the benefit to all, rich and poor alike, which accrued from the extension of the cheap postal system, the decrease of murders and deadly affrays, the protection of the poor from the oppression of the rich, these and many other blessings have never been enjoyed under any former Government, and in all probability never will. But it must be borne in mind that the benefits derived from the above do not efface the feeling that I have above portrayed. Another thing is that this good government benefits more especially merchants and women who have always been loud in their praises of it because it protected them from lawless affrays, dacoitees, from the 'Amils (men formerly put in charge of Districts by the Sovereign and who exercised great oppression) and from many other numerous evils. They therefore, deriving benefit as they did from the government, were not against it.

### **CAUSE IV**

*Neglect in matters which, should have received consideration from Government*

I will now proceed to shew what duties Government ought to have fulfilled and which it did not fulfill.



### **Neglect in matters which should have received consideration of Government**

I feel it most necessary to say that which is in my heart and which I believe to be true even at the risk of its being distasteful to many of the ruling race. What I am now going to treat of is that which if only done in a right way will attract even wild animals, causing them to love instead of to dread, and which therefore will, in a much greater degree, attract men. I cannot here state at length what the benefits of friendship, intercourse and sympathy are, but I maintain that the maintenance of friendly relations between the governors and the governed is far more necessary than between individuals, private friendships only affect a few, friendship and good feeling between a Government and its subjects affects a nation. As in private friendships two persons are united by the bond of a common friendship, so also should a Government and its people be knit together in like manner.

### **Want of cordiality towards the Indians**

*The people and the Government* I may liken to a tree, the latter being the root and the former the growth of that root. As the root is so will the tree be. What! Was such intimacy impossible under this Government? Most certainly not. We have numerous instances in which foreigners and natives of countries have been brought in contact with each other and of their becoming friends, even when their religions and countries were different and widely separated. And why was this? Just because they wished and did their utmost to become so. How often do we not see strifes and enmities between people of the same race, religion and customs. Friendship, intercourse and sympathy are therefore not wholly dependent, for their existence merely on the giver's and recipient's being of the same religion, race or country.

Does not the Apostle Paul admonish us in these beautiful words? "And the Lord make you to increase, and abound in love one toward another, and toward all men, even as we do toward you." 1st Epistle of Paul to the Thessalonians Ch. III verse 12. And does not Jesus admonish us in these? "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them, for this is the law and the Prophets." Matthew, VII 12.

These were meant to inculcate friendship and love to all men, and no one, no wise and thoughtful man will say that the admonition is wrong, that friendship and love to our fellow-men are not beneficial, that their results are nil, and that they do not blot out much that is wicked. As yet, truth compels me to state, Government has not cultivated the friendship of its people as was its duty to do. The Creator has instilled it into the heart of man and the instinct of animals that the strong should be kind to and care for the weak. The father loves his child before the child loves him. The man tries to win the woman, not the woman the man. If a man of low degree try to win the esteem of one in high position, he is liable to be styled a flatterer and not a friend. It was, therefore, for Government to try and win the friendship to its subjects, not for the subjects to try and win that of the Government. If it had done so the results would have been great and the



people would have rejoiced. Alas! that it has not done so. If Government say that what I say is untrue, that they have tried to cultivate friendship and have only been repaid with enmity, I can only say, that if it had gone the right way to work, its subjects would most undoubtedly have been its friend and supporters, instead of, as in many instances, rising up in arms against it. Now friendship is a feeling which springs from the heart and which cannot be kindled by "admonitions." Men may meet on very friendly terms, but it does not therefore follow that they are friends in the real sense of the word, that they are friends at heart as well as in outward signs. This is a link, as it were, between heart, a man instinctively feels that he likes a man or the contrary. Government has hitherto kept itself as isolated from the people of India as if it had been the fire and they the dry grass, as if it thought that were the two brought in contact, the latter would be burnt up. It and its people were like two different sorts of stone, one white and the other black, which stones too were being daily more and more widely separated. Now the relations between them ought to have been close like those between the streaks of white and black in the stone called *Abri* in which we see the former close alongside of the latter, the one blending with the other. Government was of course perfectly right in maintaining special friendly relation with its Christian subjects (the English) but it was at the same time incumbent upon it to show towards its native subjects that brotherly kindness which the Apostle Paul exhorts us to in these words, "And to godliness brotherly kindness and to brotherly kindness charity." II Peter 1. 7. It must be borne in mind, that the blood of the Muhammadan conquerors and that of the people of the country was not the same; that their faith was not the same; their manners and customs not the same; that in their hearts the people did not like them and that at first there was little or no amalgamation of the two. What then was the secret of their becoming friends? Let us glance at the former Indian dynasties.

**In ancient times as long as cordiality was not *observed* by the reigning powers, tranquillity was not established**

First came that of the Muhammadan conquerors. In the reign of the Turks and Pathans, there was no intercourse between the conquerors and the conquered until the Government of the former was made firm and easy. A feeling of cordiality was first established in the reign of the Mogul Emperor Akbar I, and continued till the reign of Shah Jehan. No doubt, owing to many defects in the system of Government the people were subjected to many evils, but these were lightened by the feelings just mentioned. This feeling unfortunately ceased during the reign of Alumgeer, A. D. 1779, when, owing to the rebellion of several Hindoos of note, such as Sewajee, the Mahratta etc., Alumgeer vowed vengeance against them all and sent orders to all his Lieutenants to treat them with rigour and harshness and to exempt none from paying tribute. The injury and disaffection which therefore ensued are well known. Now the English Government has been in existence upwards of a century, and up to the present hour has not secured the affections of the people.



### **Treating the Indians with contempt**

One great source of the stability of a Government is undoubtedly the treating of its subjects with honour and thus gaining their affections. Though a man's income be but small, treat him with honor and he is far more gratified than if he were presented with three or four times the amount than be treated with contempt. Contempt is an ineradicable wrong. Being treated contemptuously sinks deep into a man's heart, and although uninjured by the same as to his worldly goods, he still becomes an enemy. The wound rankles deep and cannot be healed, that given by a sword can be healed, but that inflicted by a contemptuous word can *not*. The results of kindness are different, an enemy even if treated courteously becomes a friend; friends by friendly intercourse, become greater friends, and strangers if treated in a friendly manner are no longer strangers. By kindness we make the brute creature our willing slaves, how much more then would such treatment cement the bonds between a Government and its people? Now in the first years of the British rule in India, the people were heartily in favor of it. This good feeling the Government has now forfeited and the natives very generally say that they are treated with contempt. A native gentleman is in the eyes of any petty Official, as much lower than that Official as that same Official esteems himself lower than a Duke. The opinion of many of these Officials is that no native can be a gentleman.

### **The ill-temper and uncourtly address of local authorities towards the natives**

Now as Government is, throughout India, represented by its officials, it follows as a matter of course that the natives will judge of the temper of Government towards them by what they see of these officials. However good the intention of Government with regard to its subjects may be, unless these same officials give practical proof thereof by kind treatment of the natives, the people will not believe in them. Theory and practice are not one and the same. In these days, or rather within the last few years the feeling of officials towards natives is not nearly so favorable as was formerly the case. In olden days natives were treated with honor and in a friendly manner by these officials and, consequently to use a native expression "they carried their (the natives) hearts in their hands." They sympathized with them in their joys and sorrows, and this too, notwithstanding their high position. They were consequently greatly liked, and the natives used to say "How wonderful is this treatment from men in the highest position, who, though wielding the reign of empire, are still without pride!"

Natives of rank were also treated in a highly honorable manner. They (the officials) really followed the precepts of St. Peter "And to Godliness brotherly kindness to brotherly kindness, charity." II Peter V. 7., the reverse of which is unfortunately the case as regards the greater number of the officials of the present day. Has not their pride and arrogance caused them to esteem the Hindustani as nothing in their eyes, and have not their ill-temper and want of solicitude for the natives, caused them to be looked upon with dread by the



latter? Is it not well-known to Government that even natives of the highest rank never come into the presence of officials, but with an inward fear and trembling? Is it a secret that the "Amlah" (native "court officials") are often addressed harshly and abused by their superiors whilst reading out papers to them? These men, many of them of good birth, often inwardly exclaim "Oh! that I could gain my living otherwise, cutting grass, by the wayside were better than this." I do not say that the behaviour of all English officials is like this. There are many who are well known for their kindness and friendly feeling toward the natives and these are in consequence much beloved by them, are, to use a native expression, as the sun and the moon to them, and are pointed out as types of the old race of officials.

These men truly follow the admonition of Christ Jesus who said to Simon called Peter and Andrew his brother when they were fishing "Follow me and I will make you fishers of men. They, by their good character have drawn the people to them, as it were, in a net, they have not treated them with useless arrogance, without which some think that a high position in the eyes of the natives cannot be kept up. They have earned that blessing which Christ enunciated; "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven;" (Matt. V 5). They have treated the people with gentleness and leniency and have ruled the land according to the precept. "Blessed" are the meek for they shall inherit the earth," Matt. V; 5. They have also let their light shine before men, as Christ enjoined in Matthew, V. 16. "Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works and glorify your father which is in heaven."

Few in number, wherever they are, they are held dear by the natives.

### **The ill-treatment more repugnant to the feelings of the Muhammadans, and its cause**

This treatment before alluded to was most offensive to all the people of India; but most especially so to the Muhammadans. The reasons for this are clear. For centuries the Muhammadan's position in India has been an honorable one. There is an element of shame in his disposition. He has no grasping desire for money, he esteems honor above all other things, and there are many proofs on record, which shew that the Muhammadan is not easily brought to do that, which, under the influence of temptation, other races in India will do without compunction. It may be that this is wrong but God having instilled it into him, his views and feelings cannot easily be changed. It may be unfortunate but, it is inculcated into them by their religion and is no fault of theirs. This ill-treatment then it was which pained them grievously and which caused them heartily to wish for a change of Governors and to hear with joy of anything that was opposed to the present Government. It is much to be regretted that the Muhammadans did not know that Government was doing its utmost to further their interests, their education and to uphold their honor. This they did not know, as the intentions and wishes of Government were never made known by their various officials.



**Exclusion of natives from promotion to high appointments. Lord Bentinck's system of employing natives in high grades of service an inadequate one**

Another great reason for the dissatisfaction of the natives of India, and more especially of the Muhammadans, was the exclusion of natives from high appointments. A few short years ago Muhammadans filled the most honorable posts under their own Government and the desire and hope for such is still in them. Under the English Government they longed for the advancement of their honor in the eyes of the world, but there was no way open to them. In the early days of this Government, natives of rank were certainly singled out to fill high posts, but by degrees this fell into disuse. The assertion by Muhammadans that the practice of holding examinations is a bad one, is a mistaken one. If they have not the qualifications to enable them to pass, they must not blame the system; undoubtedly the examination system goes far towards procuring an efficient staff of public servants, but many natives are appointed to high posts who, in the estimation of their countrymen are very small indeed. In the giving of certificates very little was thought of family and honor. Lord Bentinck did most for the advancement of the natives in this respect, but the high appointments which he bestowed upon a select few were utterly inadequate to the wants of the people. English officers of the highest rank have often admitted this of late years. Now is the passing an examination a *sim qua non* in England? are the best English statesmen invariably those who have passed high examinations? Are high diplomatic posts, not often given to them on account of their birth and practical common sense and sometimes even without the latter qualification?

**The not holding of Durbars by the Governor General of India and not conferring rank and honor due to merit according to the usage of former emperors**

The people of India have from time immemorial been always been in the habit of attending the Durbars, (levees) of their sovereign, and have always enjoyed seeing his pomp and state and influence. This feeling of gladness at the sight of the sovereign is a feeling instinctively felt by every one. Man feels the power of the ruler when thus brought face to face with him and acknowledges himself to be his subject. Now although the Governor General of India was certainly, whilst on tour, in the habit of holding durbars, still the few that he did hold were not sufficient for the wants of the country. Lords Auckland and Ellenborough held right regal durbars. This perhaps may not have been approved of by the Home Government, but it was a most excellent thing for India, although even their durbars were too few in number. May the Almighty always watch over and protect our most gracious sovereign Queen Victoria and Her representation in India, His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General. Let us hope that the heartfelt wants of the natives of this country may be listened to and gradually satisfied.



**The observation of these rules by Lords Auckland and Ellenborough a very proper one**

The only real kingdom is that of the Almighty who created the world. He however, made the kings of this world as a type of what He Himself is in order that man on seeing his sovereign, should recollect that there is the still greater one who made him. For this reason many wise and able men have laid down that the good qualities of the Almighty, such as bounty, kindness etc., should also be found represented in earthly Kings, hence the title "Shadow of God". It is therefore, incumbent on earthly kings to treat their subjects with that bountiful liberality with which the Almighty has treated the whole world. It may appear at first sight bad policy to spend the public money in rewarding slight services, but in my humble opinion this practice is calculated to increase the loyalty of the subject and thus to render the empire more stable. It is a well-known saying that "kindness and beneficence make slaves of men", therefore when the people see those virtues in their ruler, true love towards him and a desire to serve him faithfully and loyally are germinated in their hearts. We know from history that this was the case in olden days and under various dynasties in India, and that the nobles and the people at large had honors and gifts, such as titles, money, land and other valuables, bestowed upon them with no sparing hand. The recipients felt honored and pleased, were held in greater honor by their brethern, and the nation at large liked the practice, as being one which had come down to them from remote ages. Government put a stop to this and no one could expect much in the way of rewards and honors from it. When, therefore, the people heard that the Government of India had been formally assumed by Her Majesty Queen Victoria, they rejoiced as they were longing for a change.

The expenses of former rulers of India were of two sorts, viz., money spent on their own private luxuries and debauches which were undoubtedly wrong and disapproved of by the people, and that spent in rewarding faithful servants, victorious generals, learned men, *faqueers* (men of sanctity), poets, beggars or on the deserving poor, which latter expenditure was very popular. The discontinuance of the same by the British has displeased the people, especially the recipients, who from being always well cared for were unable to work for their bread. Now this system is undoubtedly bad as it makes the people lazy and not induced to help themselves, and much better is it that the rewards be discontinued and freedom be granted to the subject, that thus he may earn his daily bread himself; but this boon of freedom can only be appreciated when the people become educated and contented and not all at once. It is like taking the reins out of a horse's mouth, turning him loose and turning him out into the jungle to find his food for himself. What is the result? He either dies or remains a wild animal all his days giving the rein to his passions. If a man be thus treated he will either rob, murder or rebel.



**The facts of the rebellion in India appeared more serious to the authorities than they in reality were, their causes**

Men's minds under the influence of anger are apt to lose sight of the true causes of any event and to be warped by a desire for vengeance. The events of the year 1857 were no doubt so dreadful as to justify the feelings of anger and desire for vengeance which had full possession of the hearts of the English during that awful year; but at the same time we must find out what, at that time, was the condition of Hindustan, how the rebellion really commenced, why it attained such a height, and why, in certain districts more misled Muhammadans rebelled than in others. It must be borne in mind that for centuries past the condition of India has been unsettled, that from time immemorial, its people have been accustomed to flock in thousands to the standard of any powerful noble (*Ameer*) who attained any success in the field and that they never held their doing so to be criminal accepting responsible posts in the administration of his country for the time being. It is well known in India that the taking of service is no offence. Whoever pays is served. It is thought wrong not to tender allegiance to a king who may have been proclaimed king in the place of another deposed. The various kings and princes of Hindustan have never, on conquering an enemy's country, attached any blame to the servants, whether Civil or Military, of that enemy and the people were aware of this. When the leaders of the rebellion called for recruits, thousands of poor men wanting service, flocked in and took it. They thought there was nothing wrong in doing so, as their livelihood was procured by such service. Many thought that the British rule in Hindustan was at an end and that therefore it was their duty to tender their allegiance to the reigning powers i.e., to the rebels. Many officials also thought that lives would be spared by feigning to be on the rebel side and that when the British rule was re-established, they could throw off the mask. These men were however found guilty, although, undoubtedly many amongst them were true subjects of the British. Many also there were, servants of Government and others who, under compulsion, or through ignorance, or from being merely mortal, committed themselves, and then, thinking that their sin, committed perhaps under great temptation or perhaps under compulsion, would not be pardoned and would meet with severe punishment, cast in their lot entirely with the rebels. Others, there were who had really done nothing; but through fear &c. joined the rebels. Many also as before stated, joined them thinking it no crime to do so. If the whole facts regarding the rebellion be thoroughly sifted, I feel certain that we shall find that just as many Hindoos were concerned therein as Muhammadans, and the proof of this will be found in what took place all over Hindustan. It must not be supposed that the reason why, in some districts, the Muhammadans who rebelled were greater in number than the Hindoos, was that the King of Delhi, who was their head claimed the throne of Delhi or that they were in reality as rebellious as they seemed to be. No! small acts said to have been committed by them were seized upon and magnified by their enemies, and the minds of the officials were worked upon and poisoned against them. The breach was thus widened, the



English becoming more and more angry, and the Muhammadans more and more afraid and hopeless. It was their fate to have their actions misrepresented and to have the minds of their rulers poisoned against them. There were, no doubt, many Muhammadans who did rebel and whose rebellion we must enter in the V Class. These men were delighted at the prospect of a change of Government for reasons already shewn. Nevertheless Government are no doubt well aware what race it was and what men, that proved most faithful even unto death. All men are guilty, in His eyes, who is the only true Ruler.

They are also guilty in the eyes of earthly kings, temporarily put in authority by Him.

The Psalmist has truly said, "Enter not into judgment with thy servant, for in thy sight shall no man living be justified." Psalm cxliii, 2. "Have mercy upon me O God according to Thy loving kindness, according unto the multitude of Thy tender mercies, blot out my transgressions" (2) "Wash me thoroughly from mine iniquity, and cleanse me from my sins." Psalms li, 1 & 2.

The Almighty is the preserver of our Most Gracious Majesty, Queen Victoria. Words of mine cannot sufficiently praise the most merciful and considerate proclamation issued by Her Gracious Majesty.

**The promulgation of Her Majesty's Proclamation highly commendable, indeed may be said to have originated under divine inspiration**

The hand of the Almighty is on Her Gracious head and this proclamation has been inspired by God. There is an ancient custom in Hindustan, which is that whenever a new king ascends the throne, rightly or wrongly, all the nobles of the land present themselves to pay their respects. This was the case in the rebellion. When the people heard that the Emperor of Delhi had ascended the throne, they presented themselves, and when he was deposed and imprisoned, men knew perfectly well that the same people would tender their allegiance to the English. The rebel army itself might perhaps not do this, but the reasons for their not doing so need not be treated of here.

## **CAUSE V**

*The Insubordinate state of the Indian Forces.*

### **The paucity of the English forces**

The English army system in India has always been faulty and one great fault was the paucity of English troops. When Nadir Shah conquered Khurasan and became master of the two kingdoms of Persia and Afghanistan, he invariably kept the two armies at equal strength. The one consisted or rather was composed of Persians and Kizilbashies, and the other was composed of Afghans. When the Persian army attempted to rise, the Afghan army was at hand to quell the rebellion and *vice versa*. The English did not follow this precedent in India. The Sepoy army was no doubt faithful in its day and served the Government well, but how could Government feel certain that it would never act contrary to its orders?



What measures had Government taken for quelling at once on the spot any emeute in that vast army, such as that which happened last year?

**If these castes formed distinct Regiments perhaps the Muhammadans would not have objected to the use of the new cartridges**

Government certainly did put the two antagonistic races into the same regiment, but constant intercourse had done its work and the two races in a regiment had almost become one. It is but natural and to be expected, that a feeling of friendship and brotherhood must spring up between the men of a regiment, constantly brought together as they are.

**The employment of Hindoos and Muhammadans in the same regiment**

They consider themselves as one body and thus it was Hindoos and Muhammadans had, in these regiments, been almost entirely smoothed away.

**The pride of the Indian forces and its causes**

If a portion of the regiment engaged in anything, all the rest joined. If separate regiments of Hindoos and separate regiments of Muhammadans had been raised, this feeling of brotherhood could not have arisen and, in my opinion, the Muhammadan regiments would not have refused to receive the new cartridges. Owing to the paucity of the European element, the people of India only stood in awe of the Sepoys who thus became puffed up with pride and thought that there were none like them in the world. They looked upon the European portion of the army as a myth and thought that the many victories which the English had gained were gained entirely by their own prowess. A common saying of their's was, that they had enabled the English to conquer Hindustan from Burmah to Cabul. This pride of the Sepoys was most marked after the Punjab was conquered. So far had it gone that they made objections to anything which they did not like, and I believe even remonstrated when ordered to march consequent on the yearly reliefs. It was precisely at this time, when the army was imbued with this feeling of pride and the knowledge or rather conjecture that Government would grant anything they stood out for, that the new cartridges were issued, cartridges which they really believed were made up with fat and the using of which would destroy their caste. They refused to bite them. When the regiment at Barrackpore was disbanded and the general order announcing the same was read out to each regiment, the deepest grief was felt throughout the army. They thought that the refusal to bite the cartridges, the biting of which would have destroyed their caste, was no crime at all; that the men of the disbanded regiment were not in the least to blame and that their disbandment was an act utterly devoid of justice on the part of Government. The whole army deeply regretted ever having had anything to do with Government. They felt that they had shed their blood in its cause conquered many countries for it, that in return it wished to take away their caste and had dismissed those who had justly stood out for their rights. There was however, no open rebellion just



then as they had only been disbanded and had not been treated with greater severity; but partly from feeling certain that the cartridges were randed with fat, partly from grief at seeing their comrades disbanded at Barrackpore and still more by reason of their pride, arrogance and vanity, the whole army was determined, come what might, not to bite the cartridges.

#### **The league of the Indian Army against the use of the new cartridges formed after January 1857**

Correspondence was undoubtedly actively carried on in the army after the events at Barrackpore, and messages were sent telling the men not to bite the cartridges. Up to this time there was a strong feeling of indignation and irritation in the army, but in my opinion, there was no intention of rebelling.

#### **The impropriety of punishing the non-commissioned officers at Meerut which touched the vanity of the Indian forces**

The fatal month of May 1857 was now at hand in which the army was punished in a manner which thinking men know to have been most wrong and most inopportune. The anger, which the news of this punishment created in the minds of the Sepoys was intense. The prisoners on seeing their hands and feet manacled, looked at their medals and wept. They remembered their services and thought how they have been recompensed, and their pride, which as I have before said was the feeling of the whole army, caused them to feel the degradation all the more keenly. Then the rest of the troops at Meerut were fully persuaded that they would either be compelled to bite the cartridges or undergo the same punishment. This rage and grief led to the fearful events of the 10th of May which events are unparalleled in the annals of history. After committing themselves thus, the mutineers had no choice left but to continue in their career of rebellion.

#### **Want of confidence in the Indian forces towards Government after the occurrences of Meerut**

When the news of the outbreak became known the irritation of the Sepoys increased. The whole army felt that their confidence in Government was at an end, that Government was only waiting for an opportunity to punish them all and hence it was that their confidence in what their officers did and said was scattered to the winds. They used to say, "Government says this and that just at present, but when all is quiet again it will not do what it says it will do." I state on the best authority that thousands of the Sepoys who composed the rebel army in Delhi, were sorry for the acts that had been committed and for having rebelled so insanely. Whilst the siege was going on they used to say with tears in their eyes that fate had caused them to do this. "What could we do," said they, "except rebel?" We were never sure what punishment was not in store for us as Government had no confidence in us. On an opportunity offering, we should have been compelled to do anything. At the commencement of the rebellion,



when it was known that a force was going to be sent out towards the river Hindan but before any force had gone out, many stated it to be their conviction that when the two opposing forces met, the whole of the native portion would desert from the British. This was verified by the result; and the reason for it was, that when it came to fighting against their brethren, no one would remain true as they said when with our aid the English conquer our comrades, they will then turn their attention to us. All therefore joined in the rebellion, even those who wished to remain faithful to their salt, were carried away by the majority. Now the people were perfectly well aware that the Government were almost entirely dependent on the Sepoy army; when therefore it became known that, that army had revolted, the people also became riotous. They no longer were in awe of the Government.

### **Why the mutiny did not break out in the Punjab and its causes**

Let us now see how these opinions of mine affect the rebellion or "part rebellion" which took place in the Punjab. The Muhammadans there had been greatly oppressed by the Sikhs, and had received no injury at the hands of the British. When the British first took the country, oppression was rife. This was day by day decreasing, whilst the contrary was the case in Hindustan proper. The whole of the Punjab, when first annexed,<sup>3</sup> was disarmed, and thus the weapons necessary for rebellion were not forthcoming. The Sikhs too, though not so wealthy as in former days, had still sufficient to live upon, chiefly from monies which they had inherited. The poverty which was rife in Hindustan had not yet had time to become rife in the Punjab. Besides these there were other cogent reasons, why the Punjab remained tranquil. Firstly, there was a powerful European army on the spot. Secondly, the wisdom shewn by the officials in at once disarming the sepoys. Thirdly, the number of the rivers and the shutting tip of the ferries on them, which rendered the few who did rebel, powerless. Fourthly, all the Sikhs, Punjabees and Pathans, who might otherwise have tried their hand at rebellion, had already taken service or were being formed into corps and the desire for the plunder of Hindustan was strong on them. We thus find that the service which the people of India took in the rebel army under such difficulty and changes was easily obtained in Government service in the Punjab. The circumstances of the Punjab were quite different from those of Hindustan proper.

### **APPENDIX NO. I**

Then the time appears to have come when earnest consideration should be given to the subject, whether or not all men should embrace the same system of Religion. Railways, Steam Vessels, and the Electric Telegraph, are rapidly uniting all the nations of the earth: the more they are brought together, the more certain does the conclusion become, that all have the same wants, the same anxieties, the same hopes, the same fears, and therefore, the same nature and the same origin. It is also very certain that death universally closes the scene.

Is there, then, no means, by which the sorrows and anxieties of life can



be alleviated, and by which comfort can be given to all men in the hour of death? Is it rational to suppose that each nation is to find out a way for itself, by mere guess? or has the one God, who made all, appointed different methods of obtaining present and future happiness to different portions of His family? Surely, this cannot be.

Now Christianity is a system which professes to have come by direct revelation from God Himself, as the only system by which happiness can be secured in this world, or in that other world which it reveals. It has this peculiarity to distinguish it from every other system of religion in the world, that it appeals to the *reason* as well as to the *heart* of man, and it is the *only* system in the world, which has spread by the mere force of argument. The nations which believe in it are the most thoughtful and the most civilised in the earth, so that it has, at all events, a claim to be heard on its own behalf.

Having received the greatest blessings from it ourselves, we are anxious that others also should be induced to receive them, and therefore, this solemn and earnest appeal is made to you to examine this important subject for yourself. The arguments in its favour are very numerous; this paper will dwell only upon one of them, but that one will be quite sufficient to establish the point.

A man called Jesus was born in a place called Bethleham, in the land of Judea, about 1159 years ago. He was a man of low birth, and in poor circumstances, but he professed to be a teacher sent by God to point out the only way which would lead unto God. After going about the country for three years preaching, he was put to death by the Roman Government at the solicitation of the Jewish Priests. So far all is admitted universally: the death of Jesus is a *fact*, as the death of Julius Caesar is a fact, and no person thinks of doubting the one fact more than the other. The Jews, the greatest enemies of Jesus and his doctrine, glory in it, and they are the best witnesses we could desire.

His followers say, that he rose again from the dead. This is the *one great fact* upon which the *whole* system of Christianity depends; if it is true, the Gospel is true—for no person could rise from the dead except by the power of God, and God would not raise from the dead any person whose life and doctrine was not pleasing unto Him; if it is false, the Gospel is false.

We would respectfully and earnestly urge you to direct your whole attention to this *one* point. Did Jesus rise from the dead, or did he not? We must bring witnesses of the fact, here they are: Peter, James, John, Matthew, Matthias, Thomas, Jude, Mary Magdalene, Cleophas and 500 others, whose names are not now known. Many of these persons were the chosen friends, who had been constantly with Jesus for three years before his death; they could not therefore have been mistaken as to his person; they came forward within 50 days of his death and declared that he had risen again, in the very place where, and among the very people by whom, he had been crucified; they had nothing to gain by this declaration, but every thing to lose, not improbably their own lives, and yet they persuaded some thousands of persons that what they said was true—so much so that the name of this despised and hated man was now, by those who had rejected



Him, worshipped and revered; they continued telling the same fact as long as they lived, not only in Judea, but over all the Roman Empire: many of them showed their sincerity by allowing themselves to be put to torture and death for saying so, when they might have escaped, had they only said it was false: though ignorant and unlettered men, they persuaded thousands, all over the Empire, to believe them, to forsake their own religion, and to embrace the one they taught, notwithstanding scorn and death: they held out no promises of earthly comfort and honor to induce men to believe them, but rather the contrary: they were not satisfied with a formal adhesion to their views; but they required self-denial and holiness of life, which all men naturally dislike; they said that even the new religion would not save any man; and yet though they thus gained nothing themselves, and told others that they must not expect to gain anything either, they satisfied men that Jesus *did* rise again! and this so effectually, that from the most obscure corner of the Roman Empire, the doctrine preached by uneducated fishermen, about a poor carpenter's son, spread over the whole Empire even after their death, and overthrew every other system of religion though sanctioned by the consent of ages!

We have likewise the evidence of persons who did not become preachers of the New Doctrine, to prove the fact of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ; the soldiers who were placed as a guard at the grave *saw it*, and told the priests of it, and they found it necessary to invent an absurd story to account for the admitted disappearance of the body!

The only evidence which any person could desire, which we do not possess, is that of the public; it may be said why did He not show Himself publicly to all, especially to those persons who put Him to death? Various reasons may be assigned for this, derived from the nature of the doctrine which He taught; into these it is impossible at present to enter; but it must be observed, that the want of this evidence in no way affects the truth of that which we do possess: if a number of persons who knew Him intimately, *saw* Him and *spoke* to Him, and *ate* with Him upon several occasions, it certainly does not tend to shake their evidence to ask, why did not others see Him also? Whenever He appeared all who were present at that place at that time saw Him, upon one occasion to the number of 500! So that it was not an apparition, but a reality. One person, by name Thomas, said that he would not believe that it was really his old friend, till he had put his hand into the holes caused by the nails in His hands, and into that caused by the spear in His side; but even he was satisfied!

We earnestly entreat you to consider these *facts*; if there is any flaw in the evidence, point it out; but if not, then admit that it is true, that Jesus Christ did rise from the dead,—and embrace the Gospel.

This resurrection of Jesus Christ is an assurance unto all men, that God hath appointed a day in which He will judge the world in righteousness; you will then stand before Him; you will be called upon to answer for the evil thoughts, the evil words, and the evil actions of which you have been guilty. Are you prepared to do so? There is no man living who is. But all guilt is pardoned in the



case of every one who *trust* in Jesus Christ as His Saviour, for holiness is conferred upon him likewise, so that he will be prepared even for that dreadful day.

We urge you, therefore, as you value your own happiness *for ever* to examine this great subject, and to ask God himself to enable you, by His Holy Spirit's teaching, to do so aright. Think over it and examine it in private; do so with others also to whom as well as to yourself, this letter is addressed; confine your attention to *the one* point, whether or not those persons are to be believed who said *they saw* Jesus Christ after He had risen from the dead. If you do so, you will be convinced by all the rules of evidence, that Jesus Christ *did* rise from the dead, and that *therefore* the Gospel is a true and the only Revelation from God.

Then be courageous and embrace it publicly; for He said Himself "whosoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words, in this adulterous and sinful generation, of him also shall the Son of Man be ashamed when He cometh in the Glory of His Father with the Holy Angels." We long to see churches thronged with the natives of this land, in which the glad tidings of the Gospel shall regularly be proclaimed by your own countrymen, and not by strangers only; in which women, as well as men, shall be urged to repent of their sins, and to prepare to meet their God; in which, children shall be taught lessons of morality and truth, to guide their conduct in this world, and, lessons of holiness and peace to fit them for the next, and in which death shall be spoken of as an enemy no longer to be feared, for his sting has been taken away by "Our Saviour Jesus Christ who hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel." That this will yet be the case we are assured by God himself: we long for the time when it shall be fully realized. Why not in this generation? Would it not be an infinite improvement upon the foolish, degrading and wicked idolatry, which now defiles the land? "We speak as to wise men, judge ye what we say."

## APPENDIX NO II

### TRANSLATION OF A PERSIAN NOTICE ISSUED BY H. H. THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF BENGAL

His Honor the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, having heard that the people of the Country are unnecessarily apprehensive and uneasy on account of certain unreasonable and unfounded stories, fabricated and spread by people equally unreasonable and prejudiced, with regard to the religious rites and ceremonies of the Hindoos and Muhammadans, hereby notifies that Government has no intention of interfering in the matters of religion, rites and ceremonies of the country, nor can it ever have such an intention. His Honor is sorry to find that the people of this country are unnecessarily alarmed at stories invented by seditious persons, and that they do not try to ascertain the truth. He hopes that when the facts are made known to them, all suspicions will be removed from



their minds, and that they will rest assured as regards the intentions of the Government towards them. The principal object of the Government is and ever shall be to protect the life, honor, and property of its subjects, to respect their laws and customs and to do what it can to promote their welfare.

Some of the Calcutta Missionaries have, as is their wont, but without the sanction of the Government, published religious discourses and circulated them amongst the natives who have wrongly understood them to have come indirectly from the Government. The Government has however had no hand in the affair. No attempt was ever made on behalf of Government to persuade the natives to embrace the faith professed by the Government. It is evident that the inhabitants of this country belong to different races and profess different creeds and religions, and are governed by different laws. They have now been long living under the protection of the Government, but the Government, instead of interfering in the religious rites and ceremonies of any class of its subjects, always regards them all as equal in its sight. The proceedings of the Christian Ministers above alluded to are part of their ordinary duties. They are in fact lectures of the same kind as are generally delivered in Muhammadan Mosques and Hindoo temples on subjects bearing upon faith. A little consideration will shew that there is nothing new in the matter, that discussions on religious subjects are common amongst the votaries of different faiths, and that the Government has no concern with them.

The reports, spread in some Newspapers that all the Muharram ceremonies, the *parda* system of the Zenana, the rite of circumcision and other rites and ceremonies practised under Muhammadan and Hindoos Laws are soon to be done away with by orders of Government must be considered as false and fabricated stories: These reports have no ground whatever. The Government cannot possibly meddle with these ceremonies.

To distinguish the Jail from the home, certain Jail Superintendents, ignorant of the customs and creeds of the country, divested prisoners of their necessary utensils used in eating and drinking, and of course without the knowledge and consent of the Government. But no sooner was this brought to notice of Government than orders were telegraphed to put a stop to their proceedings.

His Honor has been further given to understand that the inhabitants of this country regard the establishment of Schools and Colleges for the education of the natives in Arts and Sciences and in the English language as a means to mislead them from their faith, and that for this reason they are disinclined to send their children to School. This is undoubtedly a great mistake of theirs. The step has been misunderstood by the people. Knowing that the natives of India are generally ignorant and therefore live in want, the Supreme Government has been pleased to establish Schools and Colleges for their education in Sciences and Arts of life, and for the amelioration of their condition in general, and to appoint Inspectors and native subordinates to superintend the work, so that the people may earn their bread more comfortably and live in a better style.



It is a well known fact that the people of England, by their advancement in learning, are able to do every thing properly, whereas the people of India owing to their ignorance can do nothing. If knowledge be generally diffused among them, all would live much more comfortably than they do now. It is a matter of great regret that the people have misunderstood the policy and the good intentions of Government in matters of education. His Honor however believes that the origin of all these evils is a misapprehension on the part of the natives, and that they do not proceed from prejudices or ill feelings. Be it known that by the spread of English education Government is simply desirous of opening to the people of India a path to all Arts and Sciences, and not to mislead them from their religion and time-honored customs and habits. It must however be well borne in mind that works relating to all Arts and Sciences at present exist only in the English language, and new discoveries and inventions are every day being brought to light. Moreover, English being the language of the rulers of the country it is one of the duties of the subjects, to learn it along with Urdu or Bengali, so that they may rise in honor and live in greater ease and comfort. The native tongue of the country has been adopted as the language of the Court with a view that the common people may be able to understand their proceedings.

His Honor the Lieutenant Governor having seen and heard much about the state of the country and the condition of the people is determined to do his best in their behalf, and to raise all classes of Her majesty's subjects in honor and respectability by means of their education, and H. H. therefore notifies the above to H. Majesty's loyal subjects that they may rest well assured of the good intentions of the Government towards them, and take heart and work contentedly praying to God sincerely for the prosperity of their benign Government.

### APPENDIX NO III THE OLD PINDAREE

Allah is great, my children, and kind to a slave like me,  
The big Saheb's tent has gone from under the Peepul tree,  
With his horde of hungry chuprasees, and oily sons of the quill--  
I paid them the bribe they wanted, and Satan will settle my bill.  
It's not that I care for money, or expect a dog to be clean,  
If I were lord of the Ryots, they'd starve ere I grew lean--  
But I'd sooner be robbed by a tall man, who shew'd me a yard of sted  
Than be fleeced by a smoking Baboo, with a peon and badge at his heel.  
There goes my lord the Firingee, who talks so civil and bland,  
But raves like a soul in Jehannum, if I don't quite understand--  
He begins by calling me Sahib, and ends by calling me fool,  
He has taken my old sword from me, and tells me to set up a school;  
Set up a school in the village, "and my wishes are," says he,  
"That you'll make the boys learn regular, or you'll get a lesson from  
me."



Well—Ram Lall the Telec mocks me, and pounded my cow last rains—  
 He's got three greasy young urchins, and I'll see that they take pains  
 There comes a settlement Hakim to teach me to plough and weed.  
 (I sowed the cotton he gave me, but first I boiled the seed)  
 He likes us humble farmers, and speaks so gracious and wise.  
 As he ask of our manners and customs, I tell him a parcel of lies.  
 "Look," says the school Firingee, "what a silly old man you be,  
 You can't read, write, nor cipher, and your grandsons do all three.  
 They'll check the Mahajan's figures, and reckon the tenant's corn.  
 And read good books about London, and the world afore you were born."  
 Well—I may be old and foolish, for I've seventy years well told,  
 And the Sahibs have governed me forty, so my heart and hands got cold,  
 Good boys they are my grandsons, I know, but they'll never be men,  
 Such as I was at twenty-five, wher the sword was King of the pen,  
 'Ah—I rode a Deccanee charger, with the saddle cloth gold laced,  
 And a Persian sword, and a twelve foot spear, and a pistol at my waist.—  
 My son he keeps a tattoo, and I grieve to see him astride,  
 Jogging away to cutchery, and swaying from side to side.  
 My father was an Afghan, and came from Candahar,  
 He rode with Nawab Amir Khan in the old Mahratta war.  
 From the Deccan to the Himalayas, five hundred of one clan,  
 They asked no leave from king or chief, as they swept o'er Hindostan.  
 My mother was a Brahminee, but held to my father well,  
 She was saved from the sack of Jaleysir, when, a thousand Hindoo fell—  
 Her kindred died in the sally, so she followed where he went.  
 And lived like a bold Pathanee in the shade of a rider's tent.  
 It's many a year gone bye now, but yet I often dream  
 Of a long dark march to the Jumna, and splashing across the stream.  
 The waving moon on the water, and the spears in the dim starlight,  
 As I rode in front of my mother, and wondered at the sight.  
 But the British chased Ameer Khan, and the roving times must cease,  
 My father got this village, and he sowed his crops in peace—  
 But I was young and hot of blood, it was no life for me,  
 So I took to the hills of Malwa, and became a Pindaree.  
 Praise to the name Almighty, there is no God but one.  
 Mahomed is his prophet, and his will shall ever be done—  
 Ye shall take no use for money, nor your faith for lucre sell,  
 Ye shall make no terms with the infidel, but smite his soul to Hell,  
 Tell me, ye men of Islam, who are living in slavish ease,  
 Who wrangle before the Firingee, for a poor man's lost rupees—  
 Are ye better than were your fathers, who plundered with old Chetoo,  
 And squeezed the greedy traders as the traders now squeeze you?  
 Down there a Mahajan lives, my father gave him a bill,  
 I have paid the man thrice over, and here I am paying him still.



He shows me a long stamp paper, and must have my land, must he?  
If I were twenty year younger, he sh'd get six feet by three,  
And if I were forty year younger, and my life before me to choose  
I would'nt be lectured by kafirs, or bullied by fat Hindoos,  
But I'd go to some far off country, where Mussalman still are men,  
Or take to the forest like Chetoo, and die in a tiger's den

(*The Causes of the Indian Revolt*. By Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. Reprinted, Patna 1999 (1<sup>st</sup> ed. Agra 1859). pp. 1-65)









## SYED AHMED KHAN'S LETTER TO JOHN KAYE

Syed Ahmed Khan's views on the Great Revolution of 1857-58 are well-known. He was in the Company's service and posted as a *Sadr Amin* at Bijnor when the War of Independence commenced in May 1857. Without losing any time he took a decision as to his attitude towards the War. He was firmly convinced of the futility of a "Revolt" against the Company's Government which, he thought, was too strong to be overthrown by the Revolutionaries. He sought an interview with the Revolutionary leader in the district of Bijnor (West Rohilkhand), Nawwab Mahmud Khan, and tried to convince him of the futility of the War. But the Nawwab remained firm in his attitude.<sup>1</sup> Syed Ahmed now began to support the British cause actively. The collapse of the Revolution and the indescribable sufferings which the Muslim had to face in the post-1857 period strengthened his view that it was a misguided step. To him it was no more than a "Mutiny", although the responsibility of creating circumstances which enabled the sepoys to rise in revolt and some sections of civil population to join them was on the Company's Government and its authorities. His analysis of the causes of the "Revolt" and his bold and fearless criticism of British policies in the decades preceding it may be read in the pages of his well-known *Risalah Asbab-i-Baghawat-i-Hind*. Ten years after the 'suppression of the Revolt', when Syed Ahmed Khan was on a visit to England, he was again called upon to express his views on the Movement. The request was made by one of the greatest British writers on the "Revolt", Sir John Kaye, who had devoted considerable time and energy to the study of that subject and had ultimately arrived at the conclusion that "it was not mere military mutiny". Syed Ahmed Khan, however, was so firm in his views that he was not at all influenced by Kaye's indication of his opinion.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For details of their discussion see Syed Ahmed Khan, *Sarkashi Zila' Bijnawr* (Agra, 1858) p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Syed Ahmed Khan in his *Review on Dr. Hunter's Indian Musalmans* mentions the name of "Moulawi Mahbub Ali, who died in 1864", among those who were opposed to the view that the war of 1857 was a *Jihad*. "It may interest my readers", he continues, "to learn that the above-named Mahbub Ali was the same man who, in 1857, was summoned by the rebel leader, Bukht Khan, and requested by him to sign the proclamation for a religious war against the English. He refused, and told Bukht Khan that the Mahomedan subjects of the British Government could not, according to the precepts of their religion, rise up in arms against their



Syed Ahmed Khan's reply to Kaye's letter is an important historical document. I found the original letter in Kaye's *Mutiny Papers* in the India Office Records.

*\*Text of the Letter*

21 Meeklenburgh Square W.C.  
14th Dec. 1869

My dear Sir,

With many many thanks I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your favour of the 30th ultimo and at the same time to ask your pardon for the delay which has taken place in answering it. I am sorry to learn you are unwell, but hope that under God's blessing you may ere long be restored to your wonted health.

In yours now under reply you honour me by asking my opinion "as to the extent to which the Mutiny of 1857 grew into a popular rebellion in the N. W. Provinces," and express your opinion that it was not a mere "Military Mutiny". As far as my personal knowledge extends respecting the Sepoy Revolt in 1857, and from all that I have learnt from investigation I find that even the use of the expression 'Military Mutiny' conveys an idea of something more than the real fact. It cannot be denied that the use of the greased cartridges did violence to the superstition of the sepoys, who consequently determined not to bite the same. Almost all the sepoys had unanimously resolved never to bite the cartridge, which determination was the only charge that could be brought against them, till a very severe punishment was inflicted upon them at Meerut, a punishment which produced a strong impression on the minds of those men, that they must either bite the greased cartridges or suffer the punishment of their disobedience. And it was then and not before that the discontent of the sepoys grew into a Military Mutiny. I am strongly of opinion that if before the infliction of punishment the alternative either of biting the cartridges or resigning the service had been offered to them, the sepoys would undoubtedly have peaceably withdrawn themselves from the Company's service.

If the real facts connected with the revolt in the N. W. P. be calmly inquired into, I do not think that the events which happened there can properly be designated as a "popular rebellion".

Undoubtedly the people of the N.W.P. were dissatisfied with the Company's rule, and this, in a great measure was owing to the following causes:—the decay of respectable families, without the void they left being filled up by others—the non-existence of any means by which the native community could procure honoured situations, and, more specially—the forfeiture of the *Muafee* (right of holding lands without paying any rent to Government), which act of the authorities was considered a great injustice by the natives, and lastly to

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rulers." The story goes that Mahbub Ali was later offered *Jagir* by the British Government for his refusal to concede to Bakht Khan's request. He declined to accept the offer because, he said, his attitude towards the Revolution was determined by his convictions alone.

This was in the press when the text of the letter was published in another Journal.



some other causes of less importance. It may also be safely asserted that the Govt.'s exercise of the "right of 'Predominant Power'", a power subject to no regulations and unlimited, and the interference, in a way till then unknown in the cases of adoption and lapse, had created a distrust in the minds of native chiefs who perhaps did no longer think themselves secure. It does, however, by no means appear that even this stimulated them to revolt or take any part in the rebellion, for no native chiefs whatever, who were in possession of the principalities, notwithstanding the distrust with which they looked upon the Company's rule, committed themselves by any act of rebellion against the Government. Quitting the subject of the Military Mutiny I shall now briefly describe the character of the rebellion in N. W. Provinces. The rebellion in the N. W. P. assumed three forms:—

1st. Robbers and dacoits who were kept down by the power and strength of the Government now assembling in numbers, not only attacked many way-fayrers but also plundered villages and even towns.

2nd. Some of the minor chiefs whose families had fallen into decay, endeavoured the resuscitation of their ancestral power. This sort of mutiny occurred in four places: Cawnpore, Bareilly, Bijnaur and Furrukhabad. Some of these parties tried to have themselves restored while others were compelled by the mutineers to make an effort.

3rd. Some of the lower classes, variously employed, entered the service of these rebellious chiefs.

The first kind of rebellion cannot strictly be deemed against the Government. The third sort of rebellion also although undoubtedly a crime cannot be called a regular rebellion, if we take into consideration the then state of India when serving a rebellious chief was not considered equivalent to an act of rebellion.

This notion had taken deep root in the native mind in times previous to the Company's rule, when chiefs fought with each other and when engaging in the military service of either party was not considered as a crime. The second sort of revolt was indeed of a serious nature but this bad feeling was exclusively confined to the above mentioned rebellious chiefs and was never general. As far as I know the population of no part of the N.W.P. tried or even thought of rendering any assistance to the native rebellious chiefs, much less than of subverting the British rule. A great proof of the justice of this assertion lies in the fact that as soon as the mutinous troops and the rebellious chiefs were expelled from a District peace was immediately restored.

I, therefore, think that the mutiny of 1857 was not a popular rebellion. To a European mind unacquainted with the state of India the very name of rebellion at once carries with it an idea that the people of the country must have taken part in it, and the real facts are thus ignored.

With feelings of sincere regard and hoping the above will suffice to give you some idea of my humble opinion.



I remain  
Dear Sir,  
very truly yours  
(Sd) Syed Ahmed

To  
J.W. Kaye Esqr.  
etc. etc. India Office.

(in: *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, Vol. VIII, Pt. III (July, 1960), pp. 227-231; also in: *The Causes of the Indian Revolt* by Sir Syed Ahmad. Patna: Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library 1999, pp. 113-115)



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SYED MUBARAK SHAH

## THE NARRATIVE OF 1857

The author of this previously unpublished narrative, which is now in the India Office Library, London (MS Eur. B 138), was the chief police official in the city of Delhi during its 'siege' by the British. When the city was recaptured, Mubarak Shah fled and remained in hiding until — as part of Queen Victoria's proclamation of November 1858 — an amnesty was declared for certain categories of rebel.

Mubarak Shah's narrative was translated, and rather cursorily edited, in the following year by R. M. Edwards, Magistrate and Collector of the district of Muzaffarnagar (which lies between Saharanpur and Meerut) from July 1857.

Compared with the enormous number of personal narratives of the rebellion written by British participants, very few survive from the rebel side and even fewer have been published. One, which supplies another dimension and some confirmation of Syed Mubarak Shah's, is by Hakim Ahsanullah Khan, the personal physician and trusted advisor of Bahadur Shah, king of Delhi.

The narrative of Syed Mubarak Shah printed here includes R. M. Edwards' footnotes. The spelling of names and places has, however, been modernised. Editorial interpolations by the present author are contained within [square brackets].

*From the preface by R. M. Edwards*

Previous to the outbreak Syed Mubarak Shah, for that was his name, had served under me as a Police Officer in the district of Saharanpur. He was of good family and far better educated than the usual run of Police Officers and his statements may I think be for the most part relied on. He surrendered to me under the amnesty in 1858 and declared himself penniless and almost starving which was probably correct as I had confiscated all his property and the people generally were at that time afraid of assisting noted rebels. I could not employ him under Government—but as there was no evidence of his having been involved in the

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\* Metcalfe, T. C. *Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny at Delhi*. London 1898. Others can be found in Muir, W. *Records of the Intelligence Department of the Government of the North-West Provinces of India during the Mutiny of 1857*, 2 vols. Edinburgh 1902. The manuscript of Ahsanullah Khan's narrative is, with other account, in the India Office Library, London (Home Miscellaneous, vol. 725).



murder of Europeans or loyal Natives, during the outbreak, it struck me that he might be useful in supplying information as to what had taken place in the city of Delhi during the siege. We were well acquainted with what had occurred outside but knew absolutely nothing of events inside the walls. I therefore suggested his compiling a narration of events *in Delhi* and said that while thus employed he might accompany my camp and I would support him. The only proviso I made was that he should record nothing that he did not know to be absolute facts. He agreed and this work is the result. R.M.E.

### *NARRATIVE OF SYED MUBARAK SHAH*

About 9 a.m. on the 11th May 1857, a rumour spread through the city of Delhi that four Troops of Regular Cavalry and two Poorbeah [Bengali] Regiments which had mutinied on the previous day in Meerut and successfully resisted the European troops had arrived at the Bridge of Boats over the Jumna after burning the Toll-house. This report reached Simon Fraser, Commissioner and Governor General's Agent when taking his morning bath and greatly alarmed him. A Telegram had been received by him the night before describing the events at Meerut — but as the city gates had been already closed as usual, he appears to have thought that nothing could happen before morning and no precautionary measures would be necessary until then. Mr. Fraser's house and office were in the building known as Ludlow Castle, a short distance from the Kashmir gate of the city. He had not believed it possible that the mutineers could reach Delhi so quickly, or otherwise than a broken and disorganised body after their encounter with the European troops quartered at Meerut — or he would have made arrangements to prevent their gaining admittance within the city, for he was a sagacious and brave man — but 'it was written and so it came to pass'. The 3rd Cavalry troopers were the first to arrive, seven of their number proceeding in advance accompanied by numerous convicts from the Meerut Jail and Gujars [robbers] and others from the villages round about Delhi. It was these seven troopers who had looted and burnt the Toll-house. As they rode on towards the city gate they killed some servants of European gentlemen whom they happened to meet on the way.

In the meantime the Commissioner determined to go at once into the city, ordered his buggy and called for his gun but the latter could not be brought as the key of the case was not forthcoming. Mr. Le Bar the Judge and Mr. Hutchinson the Officiating Magistrate now arrived and the three gentlemen left in buggies. The Commissioner had the Calcutta gate of the city closed immediately and the Judge and Magistrate drove on to arrange matters at the Delhi gate. At this time the seven troopers, who had come from the Bridge of Boats by the [Rajghat] road, were approaching the Palace at the Delhi gate and Daryaganj, and the two gentlemen saw them riding at speed with their swords drawn. Being unarmed both judge and magistrate turned their horses and tried to escape — the judge's buggy got clear but the [troopers] surrounded that of the



magistrate and cut at him with their swords — wounded and bleeding he jumped from the buggy and ran into the house of Ramji Das [a banker], from which the [troopers] dragged him and put him to death. Shortly before, these men had met Chamanlal, Native Doctor, and being told by some of the city people that he had been educated as an English Doctor one of their number drawing a pistol from his holster shot him dead.

Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, the Joint Magistrate, who had also gone into the city on hearing of the disturbance was wounded in the hand but it is not known by whom. He went to the [Police Headquarters] and desired [the Chief of Police] to be on the alert — then mounting a horse belonging to Muhammad Khan of Jhujhur rode through the Girdon bazaar and escaped to Jhujhur via Pahargun and Zardubpir in the *thana* [police jurisdiction] of Najafgarh.

One of the above mentioned [troopers] went towards the palace and seeing the Commissioner [Simon Fraser] who had not yet entered it, rode at him with the intention of cutting him down. Mr. Fraser seized a musket from a [guard] who was standing by and shot him. The [trooper] wounded in the chest retired, and the Commissioner went into the palace and had the gate closed. The wounded man when passing through the bazaar fell from his horse — one of the shopkeepers brought him water but he soon after died.

The rest of the troopers went to the Calcutta gate but finding it shut passed along the bank of the river and thus got beneath the back windows of the palace where they shouted to the guard on duty to open it. This they at first refused to do, but on the mutineers threatening to kill them and calling on them as true Muhammadans they complied and the whole of the 3rd Cavalry men then passed into the city.

Captain Douglas, Commandant of the Palace Guards and assistant to the Agent to the Governor General, lived with his family in apartments over the Lahore gate of the palace. He was at the time suffering from serious illness, but he went at once to . . . the King, and asked him to remonstrate with the Troopers. The King proceeded in person and in a loud voice ordered all his retainers then present to take no part whatever with the mutineers and ordered the 3rd Cavalry men to leave the city, adding that he would do his utmost to get their crime pardoned and use all his influence to obtain for them whatever they demanded. The mutineers replied: 'We have come with the express intention of putting all the Europeans to death because they have condemned us to bite the cartridges after having smeared them with the fat of swine. We have already commenced a [Holy War] and have come to Delhi considering you the Muhammadan King, but it appears that you are in league with the Christians. You will see what will happen.' They were turning their horses' heads when a trooper rode up and cried out: 'The city gate is open, come along.' They at once left for the Calcutta gate, and the King entered the Hall of Devotion, saying to Captain Douglas: 'Come with me and I'll place you for safety in the *zenana* [women's quarters].' Captain D. replied: 'I could never do such a thing. Do you mean that I should go and hide myself?' On this he came out of the Diwan-i-Khas [Hall of Private Audience]



intending to go up to his quarters where Mr. Fraser the Commissioner had already arrived [but] he was attacked by the King's [attendants] who assaulted him with their sticks of office. He staggered on until he reached his rooms. The Rev. Mr. Jennings and his daughter, Miss Clifford and the Commissioner, were all assembled there with the Douglas family. Mr Fraser seeing the true state of affairs and the lamentable condition of Captain Douglas left the room and went down the stairs, unarmed, and saw one of the 3rd Cavalry troopers standing outside and insisting on the palace gate being opened. He spoke to him in severe terms and began going up the stair to get a musket when an Afghan [attendant] of the King's, Khalihdad Khan, struck him with his sword wounding him severely on the face and as Mr. Fraser fell struck him repeatedly, killing him on the spot. While the Commissioner was being murdered the gate of the palace was opened. Khalihdad Khan accompanied by other [attendants] then went to Captain Douglas's quarters and forcing their way into the room killed every soul they found.

Captain Douglas was cut to pieces when lying in a state of insensibility, then Padre Jennings and the rest were butchered by Khalihdad Khan aided by the other miscreants who were only armed with bludgeons — but Miss Jennings got hold of a large bamboo and defended herself most gallantly, repeatedly striking the [Afghan] and the others but was eventually overpowered and killed by the sword of Khalihdad Khan.

Some hours had now elapsed from the time the 3rd Cavalry men had reached the Bridge of Boats. During this time the waves of revolt and of hell were rolling into the city of Delhi — an enormous amount of property was plundered by the bad characters of the town and by the convicts who had escaped from the Meerut Jail. Every man of the Magistrate's office who had made any show of resistance had been killed along with the guard. Those alone escaped who joined the rioters or who throwing away their weapons succeeded in concealing themselves. Every soul from the oldest man to the youngest infant, who could in any way be regarded as Christian, was put to death by the city [hooligans] and the large mob which by this time had joined the mutineer cavalry. Numbers of people began to point out where Christians lived, or were concealed, and the troopers rushed about slaying every man, woman, or child they could discover.

About this time the three Native Infantry regiments which had been stationed at Delhi, viz. the 74th, the 54th and the 38th were marched down to the Kashmir gate with the object of expelling the Meerut mutineers from the city. When the 54th had gone a short distance within the walls some of the 3rd Cavalry approached and on seeing the regiment their leader rode out in advance and raising his sword above his head reversed it with the point downwards, calling out: "Brother are you with those of the true faith?" on which the 54th halted to a man. From this it would appear that matters had been previously arranged and that both parties were acting on a preconcerted plan. The officers called on their men to fire, but they, one and all, grounded their arms and ran on



one side, leaving their officers alone, three or four of whom were at once shot by the Cavalry while the rest, seeing they could do nothing with their men, fled from the city in various directions. The sepoy then fired their muskets in the air and many embraced the troopers. The three Native Infantry regiments now made common cause with the Cavalry mutineers and accompanied them into the heart of the city.

In a house near the palace of Nawwab Hāmid Ali Khan and close to the Kashmir gate lived Mr. Collins with his family — he was Deputy Collector in charge of the Government Treasury. The 3rd Cavalry men and above mentioned sepoys murdered the entire Collins family, including father, mother, six young children and some grown-up young ladies. One of the Miss Collins was a great beauty — when she saw her relations killed she called out to the trooper who was about to cut her down: 'You will gain nothing by thus killing me. Your religious faith will not spread over the land, nor will your rule succeed; show some pity.' Gummur Khan, son of Gulab Shah, a resident of the Meerut district, a trooper in the 3rd Cavalry, struck her with such violence that she was cleft through the head down to the bosom.

The mutineers then went to the late Colonel Skinner's house and found no one, but in the neighbourhood a European lady and gentleman lived and the troopers and sepoys entered the enclosure and put them also to death. The gentleman was overpowered and killed immediately, but the lady who was in an upper and rather lofty verandah, seeing her husband murdered, leant over and cut down one of the sepoys with a sword wounding him severely on the head and hand. The mutineers however got up to where she was and cut her to pieces.

Another English gentleman escaped from the city by the Ajmir gate and hid himself in one of the [potters'] pits. These men on seeing him told the troopers who came and shot him.

When the Native Infantry regiments had as already described marched into the city, parties of the sepoys and troopers left the main body and went to the Jail where they demanded that the gates should be opened. The guard made a show of resistance at first and fired a few harmless shots but very soon opened the Jail, released all the prisoners and removed their fetters.

In the meantime the 11th and 20th Native Infantry which had mutinied at Meerut arrived in Delhi and the whole five regiments, joined by the convicts released from the Meerut and Delhi jails together with a large number of the city [hooligans] and masses of men from the neighbouring villages roamed about plundering the respectable inhabitants and committing every species of enormity. Several European officers and gentlemen who resided with their families outside the city or in cantonments, after remaining for some hours at the Flagstaff Tower on the Ridge and being abandoned by their men tied to Meerut, Ambala and other stations. During that night the sepoys and rioters enriched themselves with the plunder of gold and silver coin, valuable jewellery, and costly embroidered cloth.



Mr. Galloway the Assistant Magistrate who held office in the early morning was sitting alone in his [court] room, all his [clerks] having disappeared, when a 38th Native Infantry sepoy, one of the Treasury Guard shot him in his chair....the rest of the guard then looted the treasure.

The troopers of the 3rd Cavalry did not join in the general pillage but the Sepoys especially the 74th Native Infantry and 20th Native Infantry from Meerut distinguished themselves in the indiscriminate slaughter of defenceless women and children in a manner that in no other country or under any form of religion or government has ever been equalled — no not from the creation of the world up to the present day. This was especially shameful because from the very commencement of British rule in India the English have respected the faith and religious observances of both Muhammadan and Hindu, have meted out equal justice to all, have treated with honour and distinction the native nobility, have aided in the ceremonies of both religions, have added to the dignity and wealth of the people and have invariably treated them with that consideration and kindness which is said to have been the practice of those ancient Kings who are now always spoken of as the protectors and benefactors of their people. They have also always respected the sanctity of the *zenana* and the honour of native women of all classes and ranks, in the same manner as they respect their own. What then must we the people of India think when after such basic ingratitude, foul treachery and massacre, the Queen — whom may Heaven reward, with a magnanimity which no language can describe, has returned good for evil and forgotten and forgiven such black offences. All the local officers in accordance with the spirit of Her Majesty's instructions have dealt leniently with the people so that those who had abandoned their homes are returning and settling to their former peaceful pursuits. Why should not the Almighty strengthen the roots of such a Government and preserve it forever?

It must always be a matter of surprise and astonishment why or from what special causes these heinous crimes were committed. All that can be said is, that it was decreed by the Supreme Being, the Creator of the world, and that man is powerless to resist God's will.

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The above account is incorrect and injustice to Arthur Galloway. I give the true one—

On hearing of the disturbances in the city on the early morning of Monday 11th May 1857, Galloway went to his post at the Treasury and only quitted it for a time to procure aid from the main guard at the Kashmir gate as the Sepoys of the Treasury guard were in almost open mutiny though up to that time they had not attacked him or broken into the strong room. The officers deserted by their men and many of them wounded could give no assistance and Galloway was repeatedly urged to remain and take his chance with them as by returning to the Treasury he could do no good and would certainly lose his life. He said he was well aware what the result must be but it was his duty to stick to his post — he did so, and stood on guard at the door of the Treasury with a drawn sword — our solitary Englishman, among a seething mass of armed and excited Sepoys who soon attacked and overpowered him resisting to the death.

I received this information from officers who had seen and spoken with Galloway at the Kashmir gate on that occasion - and the scene at the Treasury was told me by respectable natives of Delhi who had heard it from the Sepoys and others.



In the very midst of the outbreak in the city a European lady disguised in native clothes, entered the Palace unobserved. The King's favourite wife Zinat Mahal Begum, placed her for safety in the *zenana*, but some of the [attendants] discovering the fact told the sepoys, about a hundred of whom forced their way into the Diwan-i-khas and shouted to the King 'Deliver up immediately the *memsahib* whom you have concealed in the Palace or we will break into your zenana, drag her out and dishonour you forever.' On this the King handed her over to the sepoys but made them promise not to kill her. They took her outside the Palace and when they had reached the main bazaar they began beating her with the butt-end of their muskets. She lost her temper and reproached them saying: 'You are treating me as you would a poor coolie — if you want to kill me why don't you shoot me at once instead of subjecting me to these indignities?' On this one of their number shot her dead.

Numerous bodies of sepoys, Cavalry troopers and others went through the streets, alleys and lanes of the city plundering and maltreating respectable citizens, while many others proceeded to the Government Magazine. The several gates of the walled enclosure had been made fast by the four or five European sergeants who were inside. These men seeing that they could not resist for any length of time the vast hordes of assailants by which they were surrounded, collected a quantity of small arms ammunition and fired it. One of their number was blown to pieces and one of the Magazine buildings blown into the air at the same time — upwards of two hundred men including sepoys, troopers and lookers on . . . were killed by the explosion and a vast number wounded. The bullets from the exploded cartridges reached the Palace, some falling in the King's private apartments. The rest of the Europeans were, it is believed, all killed, by the mutineers and town rabble who soon effected an entrance. In the height of their insane exultation they took no measures to prevent a general plunder of the magazine stores, the result being that enormous quantities of gunpowder and ordnance supplies of every description were carried off not only by the mutineers but by the townspeople and the men of the surrounding villages. This looting of the Magazine continued for several days, but was at length stopped and a sepoy guard stationed at the main gate. Orders were also issued requiring the people to give up what they had taken but these had little effect. The residences of the European officers situated in Cantonments were burnt or otherwise destroyed.

Mr. and Mrs. Beresford with three grown-up daughters and some European clerks lived in the Delhi Bank House situated in the Begum Sumru's garden in the heart of the city close to the Chandni Chowk. The gentlemen had armed themselves with guns, the ladies with pistols, and they kept up a heavy fire from the roof killing and wounding several of the sepoys and city blackguards who had come to loot the Bank. Some of their assailants, however, managed to effect an entrance where they collected the books and papers in a large pile and

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\* This is incorrect.



set fire to the mass. The house speedily caught and the Europeans were forced to descend when one and all were butchered.

In the general confusion caused by the riotous proceedings in the city, a party of eight [Muslim Rajputs] assembled a body of dacoits and sometimes along with and sometimes apart from them gutted one portion of the town, loaded their camels with gold coins, jewellery and other valuables and started for their native village . . . The plundering of the city continued for the whole of that day and night. On the following day a European sergeant who had up to that time remained concealed . . . was betrayed to the sepoy, dragged to the Fatehpur Masjid [one of the city's mosques] and there put to death.

The landowners and Native gentlemen of respectability and position remained during these days within their houses, in the hope, vain in most instances, of being able to protect their property, but in constant dread of an attack by the mob. Some 80 or 100 sepoy went to the house of Ram Surrun Das, Deputy Collector, who had died a few weeks before and who had been a very able and trusted servant of the British government, but between whom and the townspeople feelings of animosity had long existed, and then and there disgraced and maltreated the women of the family some of whom did not recover from the violent treatment to which they were subjected.

The troopers of the 3rd Cavalry were picketed in the Mehtab Bagh adjacent to the Hyat Bagh while the infantry regiments were distributed in the shops in the several bazaars.

The city was being rapidly ruined by the indiscriminate pillage which was carried on. The bodies of the English officers and other European residents along with many native corpses were lying about in the streets and the large and up to then nourishing city became the abode of fear, dismay and pestilence.

On the third day several European ladies married and unmarried with children of various ages from one to seven, one lady far advanced in pregnancy and one European gentleman, in all about forty souls, were betrayed to the sepoy by the townspeople, taken out of a house in Daryaganj belonging to the Nawab Wazir of Lucknow where they had hitherto remained concealed, and removed to the Palace where they were all imprisoned together near the Lahor gate. For four days the King fed them . . . from his own table. Hakim Ahsanullah Khan [the king's physician] and Mirza Alahi Baksh [a relative of the king's] together with Husain Mirza, the King's minister, constantly besought the King to issue injunctions to the sepoy forbidding them on any account to kill these Europeans, but to detain them in confinement, urging 'these are all women and children — What harm have they done and what advantage can their death be to you?' The King acted on the representations and issued orders to the mutineer but when these last learnt that he had fed them during their detention they suspected he was in league with the English and determined to involve him in their death. Consequently on the fourth or fifth day of their imprisonment the whole party was taken out . . . in front of a shallow tank by a *pipal* tree and surrounded by sepoy and troopers. The King wept and besought the mutineer



not to take the lives of the women and children, saying to them: 'Take care — for if you commit such a deed the vengeance and anger of God will fall on me. Why slay the innocent?' The mutineers refused to listen and replied: 'We'll kill them and in your Palace so whatever be the result you too shall be considered *one* in this business and you will be thought equally guilty by the English. At length the King's [attendants], the chief of whom was Jemadar Hamid Khan of Rampur, and the 3rd Cavalry men slaughtered the women and children with their swords but the [attendants] were the most active in the massacre and killed by far the greater number. *The instigators of this massacre were Talwar Khan, subadar [native officer] of the 3rd Cavalry from Meerut, and Mirza Moghul, the King's son.*

News of the occurrences at Delhi had by this time spread east, west, north, and south. The country roads were no longer safe and those who attempted to travel along them were waylaid. Lines of communications were closed. Village attacked village. The strong preyed upon the weak — crime reigned supreme and weapons of every description were prepared in large quantities — 14,000 battleaxes and 8,000 matchlocks [in three regions] in eleven days. Agriculture was to a great extent abandoned and the country people soon became even worse [off] during the time of the Marathas or the Sikhs. Peace, confidence and safety deserted the land and a very different regime took their place. Thousands of lives were sacrificed. Those who had been ruined by the resumption of *jagirs* [grants of land], or beggared by Civil Court decrees, or ousted by moneylenders, joined heart and soul in the disturbances so that large numbers were killed. The assailants were in their turn the victims of the rapacity of others and property which had escaped the fangs of the law was frequently destroyed in these raids. It must however be stated that the warlike preparations made by the people were not against the British government but with a view to protect themselves against their neighbours, with whom in most instances feuds of long standing were renewed — feuds which were not forgotten though they had for years been suppressed by the strong hand of government. Moreover a general plunder of the amassed gains of the moneylenders was set on foot and spread like fire in a forest. Great numbers of the Muhammadan population repaired to Delhi to take part in the war of extermination against the English. As far as in them lay, the mutineers did not leave a Christian alive in the capital. The sepoys now began to add murder to indiscriminate robbery and killed many highly respectable people on pretence that they were in collusion with the British, but really because they would not accede to their demands.

At length the mutinied regiments in Delhi assembled in council and determined to get reinforcements from other stations. The King, too, with a view to restore order in the city and curb the excesses of the escaped convicts and [hooligans] after consulting the officers of the Cavalry and Infantry, appointed

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\* Afterwards shot by William Hodson.



Mir Nawab . . . [Chief of Police] in the room of {the previous holder} who had fled on the commencement of the outbreak.

Some four or five European gentlemen including one known as the 'Captain Sahib' had succeeded in concealing themselves for four days in the [cellars] of the house of the Wazir of Lucknow — but unable to stand the intense thirst any longer one of their number crept out to procure water. Unfortunately he was seen by one of the neighbours who went and told the sepoys that Europeans were in hiding . . . Upwards of a hundred mutineers went to the house at once — one party surrounding it while another went down to the basement. The Captain Sahib, who alone had a gun, shot one of the sepoys, when the rest retired for a time but soon returned in force, effected an entrance, and killing all the others took the Captain Sahib away with them. He was a man of Herculean strength, tried courage, and noble appearance. They dragged him to the [Police Headquarters] and murdered him in front of that building.

Two days after this, young Skinner, son of Joseph Skinner and grandson of the celebrated Colonel Skinner, was passing along by the Sahiba Bagh disguised in native costume when some of the townspeople recognised him and informed the sepoys who came and seized him and intended shooting him then and there but a Cavalry man remonstrated<sup>p</sup> and proposed they should take him to the Palace and there put him to death — they started with this intention but had only reached the [Police Headquarters] when one of the party shot him. He received the ball in the body but had not fallen when a trooper dealt him a blow separating his head from his body.

Another European known as the *hajawala* [bandmaster] — who played the Church organ and whose young son was very intimate with Jawan Bakht [one of the King's sons] had at the commencement of the outbreak sought shelter of Zinat Mahal, hoping thereby to save his own and his boy's life. She concealed them in her apartment for five days but told them on the sixth that if they remained they would certainly be killed, so after disguising themselves father and son left the palace, barefoot. On their arriving at the Fatehpur Masjid they were recognised by the people who after beating them severely took them to the sepoys and had them shot.

The people of Delhi complained so bitterly at this time of the plundering and violence to which they were daily and almost hourly subjected that their accusations reached the King who dismissed the [Chief of Police] as incompetent and placed Muizuddin Husain, *Thanadar* [senior police officer] of Paharganj, in the vacancy, but he was unable to stop the general robbery and pillage and after a few days was also discharged . . .

All who were seized as Christians, were kept in close custody either in the Palace or city [Police Headquarters] until the facts were enquired into when their release or execution solely depended on the will of the sepoys whose power was supreme. Few indeed ever reached either of these [places] as in most instances the sepoys who had seized them, either believing them to be really



Christians, or for ends of their own, or at the instigation of others murdered them at once.

The following arrangements for the defence of the city were now made

Four hundred sepoy and two guns were stationed at each gate. Large parties of Cavalry were kept inside the Palace — a troop being placed at the main gate and another by the Diwan-i-khas. Six Horse Artillery guns fully equipped were in front of the Diwan-i-am (Hall of Public Audience). Mir Nawwab who was [now] head and chief of the city rebels after consulting with the mutineer officers determined to seize the district of Gurgaon and capture the Civil Officers at that station. He left with a strong force for that purpose but Mr Ford the Magistrate managed to escape. . . . The Mir's party then made common cause with the villagers and after burning the houses and public offices returned to Delhi. The Deputy Collector and most of the native officials of Gurgaon succeeded in concealing themselves and escaped the grasp of the oppressors.

The mutineer army despatched a single sepoy with a letter to Abdul Rahman Khan, Nawwab [ruler] of Jhujhur requiring him to join and aid their cause and in the event of his refusal threatening to march against him. He sent fifty horsemen, nominally to assist but really to mislead the mutineers and prevent their attacking him, saying that he sent this party at once as an advance guard but was preparing a much larger force for them. He at the same time presented the sepoy-messenger with two hundred rupees. The movement against Jhujhur was consequently postponed and a force assembled for Rohtak instead, the command of which was given to Mirza Abu Bakr, grandson of the King, Mir Nawwab being associated with him.

About this period news reached Delhi that Rao Tula Ram of Rewari had seized that part of the country, proclaimed himself *raja*, and was looting in every direction. The King was much enraged as this same Tula Ram had a short time before sent [petitions] to him tendering his allegiance. The *raja* of Ballabhgarh had sent a similar [petition] on which the mutineers ordered him to join them at once or take the consequences. On receiving their communication the *raja* left for Delhi with an escort of one hundred horse and arriving near the city before dawn sent notice of his arrival to Hakim Ahsanullah Khan, who, being a man of experience and rare sagacity and moreover a well-wisher of the British, replied, telling him on no account to come into the city, but to return at once and if the mutineer army threatened to attack him to collect his vassals and defy them. On this the *raja* retraced his steps.

Rawalji, an influential and very wealthy landholder in Jaipur, had been living in Delhi for some time having left his own country in a huff at being dismissed from the *maharaja's* service. He had a body of Horse and Foot with him and was in like manner required by the mutineers to join them. Being an astute individual he replied that he was ready and willing to do so, that he had indeed been rather impatiently waiting for such an invitation but that as the force with him was small he would march back at once to Jaipur, collect a formidable body of troops and speedily return and ally himself with them and their cause.



The leading mutineer officers highly approved and Rawalji departed in great pomp for Jaipur and never returned ...

The Ramadan [a Muslim festival and feast] was now over and the first of the 'Id [a festival which followed Ramadan] had arrived — a rumour prevailed throughout the city that the English troops would assault and enter Delhi on the Meerut side when the King and his followers had gone in procession to the 'Idgah [a place for celebrating festivals] for prayer. The old King, on account of his great age or from fear of an attack did not accompany the party, but his sons Mirza Moghul, Mirza Khizr Sultan, and his grandson Abu Bakr went in great pomp with drums beating and banners flying, escorted by 250 Cavalry — a regiment of Infantry and three guns. Now it so happened that Bishen Singh and Bhagwat Singh of Ghaziabad, influential *zamindars* [landowners] were coming at the same time to Delhi to pay homage and present a *nazar* [ceremonial gift] to the King and a large mass of Muhammadans were also on their way to the city for the 'Id. The King was sitting in [a tower room] which overlooks the river and seeing this vast assemblage of people at once concluded that the report above alluded to was correct and that the English army had really arrived, so he despatched a [camel-rider] in hot haste to the 'Idgah ordering his son to leave the troops to their fate and instantly return to the palace, as from the great clouds of dust an army was evidently approaching and was already near the Jumna bridge. On receipt of this order the princes sprang on their horses and fled in a state of terror such as no language can adequately describe. The troops followed helter skelter, a confused, panic-stricken mob, leaving their guns, most of the Cavalry chargers, and even many of their weapons behind at the 'Idgah. On reaching the city they learned that the Ghaziabad *zamindars* had been the sole cause of the panic.

Hakim Ahsanullah Khan contrived to send a secret messenger to the representative of the British government at Meerut with a letter as if from the King detailing these facts and saying: 'I am powerless to strike — you have left me so. The mutinied portion of your army of their own will and pleasure, entered this city and murdered your people and your women and children. Up to the present moment the pillage of the place continues. I am really under surveillance. In the manner which may seem best to you take or send for your army, and turn them out of Delhi.'

Up to this point the King appears to have remained true and upright as far as the British government was concerned, but that very evening by the advice and guile of Mir Nawwab and Mirza Abu Bakr, the King's grandson, two infantry regiments with three guns and some regular cavalry were despatched to Rohtak.

On the Rohtak road about [twelve miles] from Delhi in the Police Thana [station] of Mundh, the Thanadar was Syed Mubarak Shah.\* This officer had remained at his post from the commencement of the outbreak, although

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\* The compiler of this narration.



constantly threatened with death or expulsion. Daily expecting the arrival of a British force he had maintained order to the best of his ability and restrained the villagers from crime, assuring them that the suspension of governmental authority was but for a day and that all would shortly be restored as before. As long as Mubarak Shah remained the men of Mundh committed no excesses but those of the surrounding villages were mixed up in numerous dacoities and murders.

When the Thanadar found that he was the only government official left in the Delhi division he sent a petition to the Magistrate of Rohtak describing the state of the country round and begging for a reinforcement of two hundred horsemen to enable him to resist the rebels. A reply arrived to the effect that no troops could be sent as those who should have composed the party had mutinied - but that if unable to hold on where he was the [police station] of Samplah was at his disposal. On the arrival of the Delhi rebels at Mundh they called up the Thanadar and asked whose Thana it was. He replied: 'The King's' - on this they said: 'On whose side are you?' He answered: 'On that of the true faith.' Then the detachment passed on towards Rohtak - and the Thanadar by these answers saved his own life. It halted at Samplah and from there communicated by letter with the Rohtak Treasury Guard who told them to approach without fear as they were 'with them'. Mr Locke the Magistrate, finding that the sepoy would not obey orders and that they had practically taken possession of the Treasury, left the station with four or five faithful natives and escaped in safety to Panipat. The following day the rebel force entered Rohtak, plundered and burnt every house in the civil lines; looted the city, maltreated the males and outraged the women - Mir Nawwab himself carried off three fair Hindu girls loaded with costly ornaments. Mirza Abu Bakr and his army of oppressors then returned to Delhi bringing the whole of the government treasure and accompanied by the traitorous sepoy guard, When passing Mundh they seized the Thanadar Mubarak Shah and took him along with them as they suspected him to be a friend of the English.\*

The Thanadar was threatened with instant death if he ventured outside Delhi city, so he remained with an old friend Abdul Wahud,<sup>†</sup> a resident of Saharanpur who had been employed in Mr Fraser the Commissioner's office. Both eagerly looked for an opportunity to escape but were unable to venture in consequence of the strict watch kept night and day at all the gates.

As already stated the Magistrate of Rohtak reached Panipat safely and halted there in hopes of obtaining troops to take back to his station. The 60th Native Infantry was eventually ordered to go, but on arrival at Rohtak heard all particulars of the Delhi force which had preceded them and themselves broke

\* The compiler of this narration makes out a good story for himself - but there is no doubt that he threw in his lot with the rebels and mutineers and took an active part against the British.

† This man had been head of my vernacular office at Saharanpur and was an exceptionally clever but unscrupulous fellow. He joined the rebels in Delhi - of his ultimate fate I know nothing.



into open mutiny but did not raise their hands against their officers. They simply told them to 'be off' so they and the Magistrate left while the 60<sup>th</sup> started for Delhi.

The treasury guard at Hissar consisted of a company of the Haryana Light Infantry stationed at Hansi. When news of the mutineer troops being in Delhi reached the former place the cavalry of Bahadur Jang Khan [ruler of Hissar] who were on duty with the Magistrate began a system of highway robbery. Mr. Wedderburn sent for Shah Nur Khan the [cavalry officer] and enjoined him to maintain order as disturbances were rife throughout the country. On this the [officer] wrote to his master the *raja* for a hundred additional men who arrived in due course . . . and encamped in a garden outside the Fort, altogether separate from Shah Nur Khan and his men.

The Haryana Infantry Regiment and the detachment of the 4th Irregular Cavalry which had been left at Hansi by Major Martin when he marched with the main body to Karnal determined to mutiny and sent five troopers to Hissar with instructions to their comrades to rise, murder the Europeans and seize the treasure as they intended doing at Hansi. The officers at the latter place on learning of these plots resolved to blow up the magazine but were prevented by the sepoys who were on the alert and had taken possession of the place. Captain Stafford commanding the regiment, Tapsill the Collector of Customs, Dr Rich and all the ladies and children escaped in the Jind direction, but the doctor and three or four Europeans fell into the hands of the sepoys and were put to death.

A European [landowner] named Paul, on seeing the critical state of things at Hansi left for Hissar with his wife and nine children and on the way met the five troopers (who had been sent to that place as already stated) and the company of the Haryanas which after mutinying at Hissar was proceeding to join the headquarters of the regiment. They seized the helpless Paul and his family and though he repeatedly assured them that he was unconnected with the government and their grievances, his remonstrances were of no avail and he with his entire family were butchered. The company of sepoys had possessed themselves of the Rs. 19,000 of government treasure besides seizing all the money in the several stations along the Customs line.

The five troopers of the 4th Irregulars who had been deputed to Hissar, rode up to the Fort on arrival and ordered the gates to be opened as the Russian army had arrived. All the European residents as well as sepoys forming the Treasury Guard were inside the Fort. When the latter heard details of the events at Hansi they sounded the alarm and [Lieutenant] Barwell the Adjutant going to the spot was shot down. Mrs. Barwell, Mrs Wedderburn and her infant were taken prisoner by the sepoys and eventually handed over by the [commander] of the regiment to a party of Muhammadans who had joined the outbreak, the chief of whom was a relation of the Muhammadan Deputy Magistrate. This fiend took the ladies into one of the [bath-houses] and there murdered them, the infant sharing the fate of its mother. It is said that Mrs Wedderburn's long hair had fallen down and she asked permission to put it up so that it should not interfere



with the effect of the sword blow and so delay death. Mr Smith escaped from the [courthouse] into the high grass jungle. Mrs Smith and her children hid for some time in their garden but as they were suffering agony from thirst she ventured to the canal to procure a little water and was seen and murdered — the poor children were pointed out by their Muhammadan servant and all butchered. Mr Wedderburn was the first person killed having been shot in the [courthouse] by the sepoys on duty at the Treasury. Mr Jeffrey, the Collectorate Clerk, was sheltered and concealed by a son of Dhian Singh.

When the company of Haryana sepoys had thus disposed of all the Europeans they could find they took possession of the treasure amounting to one lakh and fifty-six thousand rupees [156,000] and placing it in commissariat carts which they seized for the purpose, brought it with them to Hansi. The public offices at Hissar and Hansi were burnt and totally destroyed. The whole of the Haryana Light Infantry with 100 men of the 4th Irregulars then set out for Delhi taking the treasure and magazine stores along with them and marching via Najafgarh but avoiding the main road. While en route they divided the greater part of the spoil but laid aside a portion for the King.

Three companies of the Haryana corps and 200 of the 4th Irregular Cavalry were stationed at Lirza under Imam Khan. When information of the mutiny of the headquarters of their regiment at Hansi reached this detachment they determined to follow the example and persuaded the troopers to join them. On learning their intentions Captain Robertson, the Superintendent, wanted the people of the town and villages to disarm the troops but they refused professing their inability to cope with the sepoys. Both Cavalry and Infantry soon broke into open mutiny, the [commanding officer of the Infantry] telling his men to slaughter all the Europeans, while the [Cavalry commander] refused to join or permit any bloodshed saying that the gentlemen had never done them any harm but on the contrary had invariably treated them with consideration. Both Horse and Foot took possession of the money in the Treasury, thirty-six thousand rupees, and marched direct for Delhi. They did not keep any of the treasure but took it entire to the King.

So large a force of mutineer troops had now arrived in Delhi that Mirza Moghul the King's son and the chief officers of the rebel army, after holding a council determined to occupy the Ridge at the Flagstaff tower and for this purpose detached two infantry regiments, two hundred Regular Cavalry — one hundred of the 4th Irregular — two guns of a Bullock Battery and one Field Battery — but of this number fully one half, sometimes two thirds were in the habit of leaving their posts and coming into the city during the night. On more than one occasion the guns were left quite deserted.

Although enormous supplies of military stores had been plundered from the government Magazine a vast amount still remained, as can be well imagined when we recollect that five crores of rupees [50 million] had been expended on them. All this had now fallen into the hands of the mutineers so they began to



erect bastions and mount guns at the points they considered the strongest and most tenable.

A British force of about two thousand men of all arms, European and Native, which had come by forced marches from Meerut arrived at the Hindan river about [ten miles] east of Delhi and encamped on its bank. The system of plunder and robbery which [landowners] had since the commencement of the disturbances carried on along their line of road was at once stopped by the approach of this column. Reprisals were taken as the troops advanced and hundreds of innocent travellers as well as dacoits [bandits] and highway robbers, were seized and hanged.

When the mutineer forces learned of the approach of the British they arranged to march on [Ghazi-ud-din Nāgar] and give them battle; and the leading officers deemed it advisable so to act that the people of the country generally should believe that the King was . . . with them in all they had done or were about to do. They thought this the more necessary as from the delay in the arrival of the British . . . and the great number of regiments which had mutinied throughout the length and breadth of the land, a belief existed in the rebel army and indeed among the [Delhi princes] themselves that with the exception of the force at the Hindan river the whole of Hindustan was now clear of the English — as without any real cause of grievance, or any inducement offered by King or prince, the Company's army, its own sworn servants, had turned upon, their masters and driven them from the country. The regimental officers went in consequence to the King in a body and besought His Majesty to mount and accompany them to the first battle . . . 'You will thus see how we will fight for you.' The King replied that he was old and infirm, could with difficulty move about and had been unable to go even as far as the 'Idgah on the great day of prayer though it was close outside the city walls. Nor had he or his ancestors from the time of [the emperor Farrukhsiyar] a period of [138] years, ever seen a battle — adding: 'I know nothing whatever of military tactics but you do.' The officers replied that if unable to go himself he must send one or more of his sons. The King thus importuned told them to consult with Mirza Moghul, Mirza Khizr Sultan and Abu Bakr. The two last prepared to accompany the rebel army which was to march before daybreak the next morning. The force consisted of three regiments, four Horse Artillery guns, one gun of a Bullock Battery and four hundred Cavalry. Mir Nawwab, the same man who had gone to Rohtak, accompanied the princes.

The British column was smaller than that of the mutineers and their information was bad so they were not aware of the near approach of their enemies, but they had a strong picket of the 9th Lancers thrown out on both flanks and their troops were hidden from view by rising ground. The mutineers advanced and fired their heavy guns which were immediately replied to by the British. Both parties of Lancers advanced slowly to the rebel troops shaking their lances and making them glisten in the sun. The mutineers did not like the look of the Lancers and their artillerymen losing nerve withdrew one of the guns. The



rebels advanced tiring slowly and irregularly while the British guns were discharged with great rapidity. Mirza Khizr Sultan not liking the turn matters were taking got out of his buggy and mounted his horse, and the British fire becoming each moment heavier while that of the rebels got weaker, he turned to Mir Nawwab and said: 'What is to be done now?' to which the latter replied: 'Come along, your Highness — look the English are advancing along the line and the Lancers are coming on with those fearful lances.' On hearing these words the Mirza turned his horse's head and the mutineers seeing him retreating, first by twos and three, but soon in one mass fled panic-stricken from the field. The European cavalry followed for a short distance and captured one heavy gun and three Horse Artillery guns. The rebel troops threw away their arms in their flight and in sore straits and inconceivable confusion reached the Jumna late in the afternoon.

The narrow bridge could not hold the crowds pressing over it so that hundreds from sheer terror and believing that the dreaded lances of the 9th were close to their backs rushed into the river and perished. The English did not pursue for any distance. If even a small portion of their troops had followed closely their first battery might have been at the gates of Delhi and they would assuredly have got into the city, as the beaten army had communicated their fears to the entire rebel force which had remained in the city and one and all had become incapacitated from fear and were helpless as far as fighting was concerned. The English commander however did not deem it expedient to carry on the pursuit.

Next day the rebel army, trying to look very valorous, made arrangements for the defence of the city and recommended oppressing the townspeople on the pretence that they were conveying information to the advancing column. Shamelessly forgetful of their own utter discomfiture they continued to bully the respectable citizens and to disgrace them in every possible way.

The officers of the regiments which had been engaged the previous day laid the blame for the defeat on Mirza Khizr Sultan and Mirza Abu Bakr and finding it necessary to do something to retrieve their name and prestige, left again for [Ghiza-ud-din Nagar] with two additional guns under Mir Nawwab. Artillery fire was carried on for some time with the English forces, in which [Colonel Chester] on the British side, an officer of great prowess, was killed, and a grapeshot struck Mir Nawwab on the hand. [This action took place at Badli-ke-serai.] At 4 p.m. the rebel force retired and re-entered Delhi. On that day they were not attacked by the English so they escaped in safety with their guns.

At this time the British commanders deemed it advisable to move from [Badli-ke-serai], join the column which had marched from Ambala under General Anson [actually, Sir Henry Barnard] and if possible take up a position on the Ridge between Delhi city and the cantonments. Their route was by the Bajpat ferry.

As the column left [Badli-ke-serai] Mr Greathed, Commissioner of Meerut and Civil Commissioner with the force, remarked: 'If we can seize the



Ridge we may consider we have possession of Delhi, because in the first place we shall have the benefit of the old cantonment and secondly, the city will be within range of our guns, while the Ridge will protect us from those of the enemy.'

[From the Jumna ferry] the column moved to Alipur. On the rebel leaders learning this they sent three infantry regiments — five hundred Horse, composed of Regulars and Irregulars — four heavy guns, Bullock Battery and two troops of Horse Artillery under command of Mirza Khizr Sultan and Mir Nawwab. On that night a spy of the British disguised as a *maulvi* [Muslim divine] came into Delhi and informed the ... Native Officers that four hundred of the 4th Irregular Cavalry then with the British would during the fight come over and join them — they must not interfere with them in any way as they were friends and easily recognisable being dressed in green tunics and green turbans and that he had been sent secretly with the information. As proposals for mutiny and desertion had been going on for some time between this regiment and the troops in Delhi the latter believed the story and were greatly elated at this accession to their strength which coming at so favourable a moment would ensure them victory. The rebel army marched that night taking the *maulvi* with them and arrived at [Badli-ke-serai]. Before sunrise the artillery opened from both sides. Mirza Khizr Sultan was distinguished by a very brilliant [helmet] which glistened and sparkled in the sun. The English guns commenced a heavy fire of round shot some falling on the prince's right others on his left and so close that he was greatly alarmed and said to [one] who was close by: 'What shall I do now?', who replied: 'Fly, your Highness, for you have come out today without asking leave of your dear Mother.' On this Mirza Khizr Sultan on the pretence of bringing up magazine stores, separated from the main body and was the first to fly. He and the chief officers of the rebels saw the four hundred Horse as described by the *maulvi* and fully satisfied, allowed them to advance unmolested but when close to the guns they began with sword and lance to cut down and kill the artillerymen. The 3rd Cavalry advanced to oppose them and they met in the melee. The fight was well contested, both sides losing some 200 or 250 men, when it became apparent to the rebels that their opponents were Europeans not [Indian] horsemen, and as they had captured the guns in the first onslaught, the infantry commenced retreating followed by the remaining artillery and 3rd Cavalry on which a general flight ensued. Numbers of the European troopers fell from sunstroke and were put to death. Four heavy guns fell into the hands of the British.

When news of the defeat reached the King he summoned the 4 Troops of [the] Irregulars and after consulting the native officers who happened to be with him . . . ordered them to go and reinforce the beaten army. They obeyed and outside the city walls met the flying troops and did their utmost to encourage and reassure them. [The] Cavalry went [six miles] beyond the Ridge and saw that the entire British column was advancing. On the English observing this body of Horse they sent some round shot among them. The Irregulars had no guns and



when the wind of a shot slightly injured their commander ... they commenced retiring feeling quite unequal to the task of opposing the Europeans ... some separating fled to Delhi by the Chaudur bridge, a few only making a show of resistance at Rohilla Khan Serai. The British advanced along with their body of cavalry and fighting as they came reached the Ridge which the mutineer troops had abandoned on hearing of the disaster at [Badli-ke-serai]. A few sepoys it is true remained by the Flag-staff and met the Europeans with a withering volley which killed many and wounded a great number but nothing could stand against the bold spirit and bravery of the British who gained possession of the entire Ridge. Vast numbers of the mutineers, Horse, Foot and Artillery, were killed and still more wounded that day. Heaps of dead were scattered over the battlefield - but most of the wounded either by their own exertions or assisted by their friends managed to reach the city. The false *maulvi* was taken back a close prisoner and being proved to be a spy was put to death ...

It has been already stated that strong guards had been stationed at the city gates and the wall manned throughout, guns being laid at the most commanding points. From these ... the rebels poured a heavy fire of shot and shell on to the Ridge. In this an old Company's artilleryman named Kalah Khan greatly distinguished himself keeping up so hot a fire day and night that even the mounted orderlies on the Ridge found great difficulty in carrying orders and as their only chance of safety had to gallop at top speed from one position to another.

Three or four days after taking the heights the British commenced a desultory fire of heavy guns on the city but were chiefly occupied in strengthening their position to the right and making arrangements for a regular siege. If they had followed up the victory at [Badli-ke-serai] and after seizing the Ridge had immediately pushed on with artillery, cavalry and infantry and at once assaulted the city they would no doubt have lost a large number of men but they would to a certainty have battered in the Kashmir and Lahore gates and entered the city with all the courage and dash which had up to that time distinguished their advances. The rebel troops would have been quite unable to drive them back being few in number and so thoroughly panic-stricken from their defeat as to be incapable of forming any plans or taking advantage of any opportunity.

In the city of Delhi there lived one Mahbub Ali Khan — he was high ... in the royal confidence but had for a long time been a great invalid. He now determined to check if possible the system of plunder daily carried on by the sepoys and believed that if he could induce them to go and fight the English they would soon lose all heart and energy and their numbers diminish daily. He therefore offered to supply rations if they would go and exterminate the unbelievers. They readily agreed to his proposal, and at noon when the sun was at its strongest, and the heat intense, two or three regiments of infantry, three or four hundred cavalry, and four guns, moved out with the avowed intention of attacking the British batteries, under the impression that the Europeans would not leave their camp on account of the excessive heat. They advanced for a short



distance beyond the walls and opened fire with round shot against the Ridge while the sepoys discharged volleys of musketry which were perfectly harmless, the bullets never even reaching the British position, while the Europeans did great execution with a new description of rifle and their artillery fire from the heights was rapid and well directed. The British besides fought under cover while the sepoys had little or none. Numbers fell on both sides but in this and subsequent action the greater loss was on the rebel side. Daily did a mutineer force move out to battle and daily did it return foiled in every attempt to capture the British position. Mahbub Ali Khan did once, for the sake of appearances, send out rations to the troops but subsequently on the plea of illness failed to carry out his promise. While the rebel army invariably returned to the city after sunset the British remained alert with pickets, vedettes, etc., thrown out.

Two or three companies of Europeans were frequently sent from the British entrenchments to oppose and check the advanced ... rebel troops, and these, sometimes in skirmishing order concealing their advance and so avoiding the artillery and sometimes in close column would start up in their front and charge them. On the mutineers returning to the city some such dialogues as this would be heard among the Cavalry — 'We have carefully examined every portion of the Ridge and are convinced that those who opposed us today form the sole remnant of the British army — not more than 80 or 100 Europeans are now left. Ah, my brother, where can the *kafirs* [Unbelievers] have gone? They had an army complete in every respect — where is it now? Nowhere! Listen, brothers and reflect — If they had more troops, would they not have come and attacked us? Certainly they would.' How marvellous was this, and how completely did the Almighty for His own wise ends pervert their understanding — so that men of forty years' service and upwards, nurtured and trained by the government, who had fought and conquered on many a battlefield and who were well acquainted with the power, boldness and invincible courage of the British yet accepted, and in their hearts believed, such utter nonsense.

The fact was that the rebel army possessed no really trustworthy information as to the number and position of the British troops — nor had they a single spy on whose word they could rely. On the contrary the Native officers who had not accompanied the troops usually sat in the Diwan-i-khas of the Palace and at intervals sent the King's *harkaras* [spies] for news of the fight. Those fellows went only a short distance beyond the gates and on their return to the Palace reported: 'Your Highness's army of *ghazis* [Muslims engaged in religious war] have nearly surmounted the heights and will very shortly return as conquerors.' On this congratulations passed among the assembled officers and they sent congratulatory messages to the King in the *zenana* to the effect that in a very brief period he might consider himself really a King.

This sort of thing went on daily in the rebel army.

The British now pushed on their batteries and advanced them in front of and below the Ridge, fastening the guns with chains buried deep in the earth, thus effectively preventing them being carried off by any *coup de main*. In this



manner they constructed a battery towards Alipur and another at ['] while the mutineers had none outside the walls of the city.

About this period two native infantry corps, the 'Doo' and 'Macdonald' with a park of artillery arrived from Nasirabad and encamped near the Kashmir gate in the houses and grounds of the late Colonel Skinner and were soon followed by the Mehidpur Contingent. This large addition to the rebel troops greatly elated Mirza Moghul and Mirza Khizr Sultan, the King's sons, but proportionately troubled Hakim Ahsanullah Khan who was anxious to discover some means of preventing the mutineer regiments coming to Delhi. But had he made his wishes known he would have been instantly put to death. On one occasion he flew into a passion and abused the sepoys calling out to them, 'Why do you come here making mischief? If you want to fight why don't you go out and do so?' From this the whole of the Delhi people suspected the Hakim to be at heart a friend of the English. Similarly Nawwab Amir-ud-din Khan and Zia-ud-din Khan, sons of Nawwab Ahmad Baksh, an old *jagirdar* [holder of a grant of land] of Lord Lake's [commander-in-chief in India 1801-7] were really well-wishers of the British government but how could their inmost thoughts and feelings be known? People could only judge by outward acts. These men did not take any part with the rebels or join the King's sons — and their loyalty was, on the occupation of Delhi by the British army, clearly established. In the same category may be placed Mufti Sudr-ud-din, principal [native judge] of the city, who was repeatedly, both by princes and troops, called on for a *fatwa* [legal decision or decree] that the crusade they were engaged in was lawful and right and pleasing to the Deity. The Mufti always avoided doing so — indeed no such *fatwa* was possible as no declaration of the kind is to be found in the Koran or anywhere in the Muhammadan religion. A report was indeed current in the army that [two of the royal family] were also friendly to the British and there is no doubt that they earnestly desired the overthrow of ... the mutineers, but the story was only partially believed. Had the princes or the troops really believed it during the siege they would have destroyed them root and branch and spared neither age or sex — wives and infants, every one belonging to them would have been slaughtered. Subsequent to the capture of the city the conduct of these men became known.

The well disposed in the city found themselves powerless. As far as they could they had intelligence of the rebel plans conveyed to the English on the [Ridgel] — but the only means of getting rid of the sepoys was by killing them; and that was clearly impossible as they had possession of every street and lane and did just as they pleased, being supreme. No citizen or outsider who had taken refuge in the capital had any power whatever and if any Europeans fell into the sepoys' hands they were killed on the spot. The truth of all this would have been clearly established if any European officer, Civil or Military, had left Delhi alive. The English would have credited his statements, but who would place reliance on [an Indian's] tale? — For a trifling and perhaps imaginary benefit to himself he lies before [the magistrate] and by so doing brings about the unjust punishment



of thousands. As a general rule [Indians] consider it a very trivial offence to cause by false evidence the punishment of an innocent man but as Firdausi [Persian poet, A.D. 930-1020] writes: 'Every man is not a real man, or woman a perfect woman. All are unlike — God has made all five fingers different.' All [Indians] are not alike — The good are few, the evil many. Moreover quarrels, contention, bitter animosities, prevail among all gentle or simple, relatives or strangers.

The mutineer chiefs now sent a second [order] to [the] Nawwab of Jhujhur on the part of the King couched in these terms: 'Come and join in the plot and be a chief and leader in our army.' The nawwab by way of reply sent a hundred troopers to the King under the command of his father-in-law . . . nominally to aid the rebels but in reality for the protection of his grandfather . . . who was in Delhi and was also well disposed to the British.

Four days after the arrival of the Nasirabad brigade their leaders determined to assume the offensive and after sunset the 'Doo' and 'Macdonald' regiments with all their guns left the city, and passing round to the rear of the Ridge held by the Europeans, got close to the old cantonment parade ground and placed their guns there. A heavy artillery fire was kept up between both forces all night and the infantry were engaged almost hand to hand, the men being now and then actually mixed together so that abuse was heaped by the combatants on each other. Great numbers fell upon both sides, the British loss being heaviest. Several of the Europeans' tents were set on fire by the Nasirabad artillery. Day at length dawned and the mutineers began to run out of ammunition. Hakim Ahsanullah Khan had purposely delayed sending further supplies. The result was that the Nasirabad troops were forced to retire and re-entered the city. Had they received it they would very probably have advanced their batteries and righting with still greater ferocity have cut their way into the British lines. The fire from Selimgarh and from the city walls was incessant against the Ridge which replied with shell and round shot. The former did considerable damage to the buildings but caused little loss of life — several women were however wounded by them.

The people of Delhi were subjected to two special sources of molestation and distress —

1st. The general pillage by the rebel troops:

2nd. The shot and shell from the British batteries on the Ridge. All without exception whether bad or good, well disposed or hostile to the English, felt that they were shut as it were in a cage from which there was no escape.

The sepoys at the instigation of some citizens seized a man whose brother, Lachman Singh, was in the European camp, accused him of conveying intelligence to the besiegers and without further enquiry struck off his head, and hung up his body in front of the [police headquarters].

The British now further strengthened their advanced batteries by placing three guns a short distance in rear of each so that in the event of the foremost being taken those behind could pour in grape upon the captors. The mutineers on seeing this adopted a similar course and sent two guns to [?] supported by an



infantry regiment, and constructed batteries on right and left with an entire regiment at each.

About this period [the chief of police] fell sick and the King hearing that the Thanadar of Mundh [Syed Mubarak Shah] had arrived in the town, summoned him to his presence and ordered him to carry on the duties of [police chief]. This the Thanadar declined on the plea that he was unfit for so exalted a position, but the King replied: 'You will have the title of [chief] but Khadr Baksh Khan whose mother-in-law receives a monthly pension of two hundred rupees from the British government will be your deputy and he will do all the office work. Moreover the other Thanadars retain their positions and carry on the regular duties. Do not therefore refuse the post.' On the Thanadar a second time refusing, the King became displeased saying: 'You must and shall obey', so he was appointed with Khadr Baksh Khan as his deputy. On the sepoys hearing of the above interview they suspected the Thanadar to be in league with the British and by the advice of Mirza Moghul stationed a company of sepoys in the [police headquarters] nominally to keep order but really to watch the [police chief].

So great a number of troops had by this time assembled in the imperial city that the army officers determined to crave [audience of] the King and communicated their intentions and wishes to him. In general he paid little attention to what they said, but in this instance made no objection and on a certain day the entire body of officers met in the Diwan-i-khas and placed the old monarch on the throne. A royal durbar [audience] was held and the chief rebels desired that the King should take an active part in both the civil and military administration. Hakim Ahsanullah Khan perceiving this state of things, did his utmost to stop it, urging the age, bad health and infirmities of the King. On that Mirza Moghul and Mirza Khizr Sultan with a view to the increase of their own power and dignity took the military arrangements into their own hands and declared themselves the chiefs and leaders of the rebel army.

One day a Hindu, apparently a sepoy, but armed with sword and shield and carrying a large bunch of keys went to Hakim Ahsanullah's residence in the Palace, and addressing the old man said: 'These are the keys of the Bareilly Jail. It has been broken up and destroyed. Four regiments of Native Infantry, the 8th Irregular Cavalry and a troop of Horse Artillery stationed there mutinied and killed all the European officers and residents of the place. They have also appointed Khan Bahadur Khan ... to be ruler of Bareilly and its dependencies ... Besides the military head of this force Muhammad Bakht Khan has had a great seal engaved: "*Al hukum l'illah wa mulk l'illah*."\* The entire body, Horse, Foot and Artillery with Magazine, Treasure, etc., is marching here accompanied by three or four thousand *ghazis* under Sarfaraz Ali. The column has already visited Rampur and Moradabad, destroyed the jail at the latter station and released the prisoners. The keys of that jail also are here. Muhammad Bakht Khan commands and it is the intention of the whole body, military and *ghazis*, to come to Delhi

\* 'The supreme authority is the Lord's and the country is the Lord's.'



and die at the feet of the King.' On hearing this speech Hakim Ahsanullah Khan was greatly disturbed in mind and replied: 'My brother, I am but a poor hakim and practise the art of healing. I claim neither country or King — go and tell your news to the King or to the royal princes.'

In the meanwhile a further reinforcement of about three hundred of the Sappers and Miners arrived. They had been stationed at Roorki and on hearing of mutinies elsewhere had become greatly excited and eventually had themselves mutinied. Mirza Khizr Sultan recognising the importance of this event kept the men near himself in Selimgarh. Both he and Mirza Moghul were highly elated at the position of affairs and convinced that by the arrival of the great Bareilly column the sovereignty of Hindustan was as good as won - whereas it was the will of the Almighty that every sign and symbol of royalty in Hindustan should henceforth be expunged for ever.

There was great rejoicing over the Sappers and Miners on account of the material aid they would give in mining operations and the erection of batteries and this special work was made over to them — also the strengthening of the defences at the Kashmir gate and the Kala Burj which had been literally ground to dust by the fire of the British batteries. They were also directed to prepare a mine running from the Kashmir gate to the Ridge by means of which the rebels might, without any open fighting, blow all the European troops into the air. This mine was placed in charge of Jemadar Munir Khan. The work had been in progress for some days when a party of mutineers went to examine it and perceived that its direction was not to the Ridge but to the Shah Burj. The fact was reported to the King and Mirza Moghul who asserted that the Jemadar had so constructed the mine that he could any night destroy the Shah Burj and he must be in collusion with the British and suffer death. On that the two princes had him seized and publicly executed and the idea of constructing a mine to the Ridge was for the time abandoned. On the same day a sepoy of [a Native Infantry Regiment] stationed at Ferozepur reported to Mirza Khizr Sultan that his corps would shortly arrive to join the royal forces. It and the 'Lord Moira' Regiment were in the same cantonment and the recruits of both in consequence of the general disturbance and mutiny had refused to receive or bite the new cartridges on the plea that they had been smeared with bullock's fat and hog's lard. On this the Native officers of both corps met and agreed to mutiny, feeling certain they would sooner or later be required to use these cartridges. Their intentions were suspected by the European officers who very cleverly managed to remove the Native guard from the Fort and replace it by a company of the European regiment. The two Native infantry corps were ordered to encamp on different sides of the cantonment. The 'Lord Moira' took up the position directed by the [other] unaware that the old garrison composed of their own men had been replaced in the Fort by Europeans, made a rush for the gates, but were repulsed with heavy loss, and during the night they burnt the Church, the officers' bungalows, and committed every kind of violence. The next day they returned to



their lines and began to cook their food, but were fired on by the Europeans when they fled from the station proceeding to Delhi via Ludhiana.

A Camel [corps trooper] now arrived with a letter to the King from Bakht Khan telling of the approach of the Bareilly brigade, and a petition from Muhammad Shafi of the 8th Irregular Cavalry requesting that the [Bridge of Boats] over the Jumna should be strengthened. These were passed on to Mirza Khizr Sultan and Moghul who deputed Kadir Baksh Khan of the Sappers to see to the bridge. The Camel [trooper] further reported that thousands of *ghazis* as well as a large portion of the brigade, intended to attack and capture the Ridge immediately on crossing the river — after which they would present themselves before the King.

When the British learnt that the Bareilly mutineers were near at hand they tilled a barrel with gunpowder and floated it towards the bridge intending it to reach at the time the brigade was crossing when it should explode and destroy the bridge with all upon it. The [boatmen] observed it and brought it to the bank, carrying it afterwards to Mirza Khizr Sultan who gave 5 rupees to each man. At 7 a.m. the Bareilly force entered the city and Bakht Khan with the other officers of the brigade sent to the King requesting him to hold a royal durbar when all would do homage.

There was no open space in the city sufficient for this vast assembly so the brigade encamped outside the Delhi gate near the jail. This was found necessary as the crowds of sepoys already in the town were occupying the houses and most of the shops - the entire 73rd Native Infantry being in the Ajmir Bazaar — five or seven sepoys in every shop. These scoundrels had . . . defiled the buildings and looted all they could find. They had stained themselves with the blood of European gentlemen, ladies and children and were enjoying their ease and passing their time in every species of debauchery.

A European sergeant whom they called Abdullah was with the Bareilly brigade, as well as two or three Christians, half castes of the poorest class. Mr. John Powell, son of Mr Powell of Saharanpur, whom they had seized and brought from Moradabad, was also with them but under surveillance. The 29th Native Infantry were favourably disposed to these persons and would let no one molest them, saying that they had made them Muslims.\* The regiment indeed took considerable care of them, provided for their wants and would not permit the sepoys of other corps or the townspeople to approach them.

A few hours later Bakht Khan in his uniform as [an officer] of Artillery, and the rest of the officers, also in full dress, to the number of about two hundred and fifty, all mounted, repaired to the Palace, to present [gifts] to the King. Bakht Khan sent a Camel trooper to summon [Syed Mubarak Shah] to give immediate information regarding the state of the city . . .

On the Camel [trooper] announcing the police officers arrival he was called up and dismounting awaited orders — Bakht Khan addressed him in these

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\* A company of the 29th N.I. had formed the Treasury Guard at Saharanpur.



words: 'I have been informed that you were in the British service so no dependence can be placed on you.' The [chief of police] replied: 'I have been in service for only one year on Rs. 30 a month. Your Excellency was [an officer] receiving Rs. 80 a month and have been 40 or 45 years a servant of the English.' On which Bakht Khan called out: 'Shut your mouth or it shall be filled up with musket balls.' [Syed Mubarak Shah] then said: 'I am not fit for the position of [police chief]. In opposition to my own wish but by the desire of the King I remain . . . but am powerless to protect the city.' Bakht Khan replied: 'I am convinced you want to get out of the city so that you may go and tell the English the state of things inside Delhi.' At that moment [one of the attendants] of the King's said: 'General Sahib, there is a company of sepoy's stationed at [police headquarters].' Bakht Khan answered: 'It is well. I will place 25 [troopers] there also that they may carry out the business of my camp and watch the conduct of the [chief of police] and report the same to me.' Then turning to [Syed Mubarak Shah] he said: 'Be present morning and evening at my tent and carry out my orders in every respect — you may now go.' He and the rest of the assemblage then entered the Palace.

The King seated on the throne held a royal durbar that day. All offered [gifts], kissing the throne and crying out: 'After the lapse of centuries our wishes are accomplished. God has restored the [empire] to Hindustan. Reign undisturbed and without anxiety. We will do all that is needful.'

Bakht Khan then begged the King to have all the military officers assembled to enable him to issue orders to each, remarking at the same time: 'This system of going out daily fighting and retiring is utterly useless. The troops will move out on this day and hour appointed by me and without my sanction must not move a step. If any other chief or leader claims supreme command let him take all the responsibilities of the army on his head or I do now.'

The King answered: 'I have heard all you have said, but alas, in my opinion the last days of the house of Timur [the Moghul dynasty] have arrived — though it is just possible that the time for the elevation of my throne and Kingdom has now come. The truth is that whereas I was before in ease and comfort and in no way harassed by anxiety — I am now in my old age subjected to all manner of discomfort and annoyance since the arrival of this vast collection of troops. Not only am I in constant trouble of mind, but my very life is uncertain for I have no confidence in you, as up to the present hour your men are engaged in pillage, murder, and all manner of oppression, maltreating the people of my capital. On this account I have written [a list of grievances] and will have it read to all your officers tomorrow in full durbar — you will then perchance feel some pity for the people and put a stop to the tyranny and oppression with which they are now burdened.'

On hearing the King's speech, Bakht Khan, Muhammad Shafi and Nurdad Ali sent for a Koran and taking up the book swore an oath saying: 'May God desert us if we desert this throne and forsake your Highness. Your Highness



is our King. This is our solemn oath which we swear on the Koran the symbol of our faith.'

The King remained silent. All then took leave and retired to their several quarters.

On that same evening, Bakht Khan and Muhammad Shafi unaccompanied by any escort went to the King . . . and the former said: 'If your Highness will appoint me commander-in-chief of the whole army and direct all the troops to carry out my orders and have a commander-in-chief's seal engraved for me I will on my part appoint Muhammad Shafi, General, and Nurdad Ali, Captain, and your Highness will confirm them in these posts.' To this the King consented.

Soon after this Maulvi Sarfaraz Ali, chief of the *ghazis*, by the advice of Bakht Khan came and met the King . . . [and] the King, because he was a high Maulvi, desired him to be seated. Sarfaraz Ali then said: 'Your Highness, I see no one here deserving of being taken into your confidence and counsel. If you consider it expedient nominate me as [chief minister]. After that you will have no anxiety or trouble — and I will keep you acquainted with the affairs of the kingdom. Be pleased also to confer some title on me which will add to my dignity.' The King remained silent for some time and then merely remarked: 'We shall see about it.' Upon this those two individuals departed.

Mirza Moghul and Mirza Khizr Sultan who had for some time regarded the empire as virtually their own, and ever since the arrival of the Bareilly brigade had considered themselves masters of Hindustan were greatly displeased at Bakht Khan and Maulvi Sarfaraz Ali having thus interviewed the King. They determined that their authority, not that of the Bareilly leaders, should be paramount, and to this end, and that the people should look up to them as the real heads of the state, they conspired with the officers of the regiments which had been first to Delhi and without the sanction or even knowledge of the King had seals engraved. Mirza Khizr Sultan's seal bore the inscription 'Colonel of the Army' while Mirza Moghul was . . . commander-in-chief. Both princes were anxious to prevent either Bakht Khan or Sarfaraz Ali being raised to high position or special honour by the King — indeed Mirza Moghul conspired against the life of the former and plotted with certain sepoys to waylay and kill him. But Bakht Khan's position was too strong, surrounded as he was by so large a force of Horse, Foot and Artillery so that the intention was never carried out.

Quarrels and dissensions daily increased among the leaders of the mutineers who were all more or less jealous of each other. Two days after the above-mentioned interview between Bakht Khan and the King a great durbar was held by the King at whose express desire all the [leading men] of the city and the officers of the army were present. The King was seated on the [throne] in the Diwan-i-am and produced the [list of grievances] which he had been preparing for several days. It was written in a fair and legible hand, was at least [eighteen inches] in length and nearly as broad. The monarch handed it to Hakim



Ahsanullah Khan and desired him to read it in an audible voice. He did so. The following were the contents.

'When Nadir Shah [of Persia] in accordance with the summons of the Nizam-ul-mulk [chief minister] to Muhammad Shah, King of Delhi, came from Ispahan to the capital [in 1739] and ordered a general massacre of the people and pillage of the place he stopped it after a few hours.

'Again in the time of [the emperor] Shah Alam, when Ghulam Kadir Khan . . . put out the King's eyes [1788], he permitted the plunder of the city for only a short time and then imperatively put a stop to all violence on the part of the Rohillas and Pathans.

'Again during the reign of Farrukhsiyar when Husain Ali Khan . . . strangled the King [1719] when pretending to put an amulet round his neck, the pillage of the city was carried on for only a brief period. Moreover when Ahmad Shah Durrani came from Ispahan and some three [hundred thousand] Maratha Horse arrived from the Deccan and gained a footing in the city the plunder was not continued for long. All over the world during a change of dynasty, although rulers have, either by way of example or to instil fear, permitted pillage and bloodshed to exist for a time — still there was an earnest desire to stop it as soon as practicable and restore quiet and order. But this has not been so here. It is a matter of surprise, indeed amazement, that murder and robbery are still carried on by you although upwards of two months have now elapsed and though you profess to be fighting for the faith and to have come to do me homage as sovereign of Islam — mercy and pity have no place among you. Robbery and murder prevail in every bazaar in this city.'

The King had prepared a very lengthy document much to the above effect — all of which he caused to be read to the assembled [audience]. On hearing it, all bowed their heads from shame and left the presence. But the sepoys continued to carry on the same system of robbery, and to such an extent that when one of them went to a shop for supplies he would call out: 'Give me a seer [about 2½ lb] of sweetmeats for a pice [copper coin of low value]', on which the poor merchant would answer: 'Ah, Maharaj [Lord] — a seer of sweetmeats for one pice! No one has ever asked for so much — Jemadar Sahib, such a thing would be quite improper in Your Excellency.' On which the sepoy by way of reply generally raised his musket and shot the poor man. No one asked who had done the deed — no one listened to any complaint. Each sepoy was then a king in his own estimation, each [trooper] a [chief minister].

[Two landowners of Ghazi-ud-din Nagar] were in high favour with the King who made over [that] district to them on the understanding that no ordnance stores or provisions of any description should pass through their country to the British camp.

A jagirdar of Lord Lake's was ordered to arrange matters on behalf of his Majesty in Ferozepur Lahari — but he excused himself saying he was unequal to so difficult a duty being a great invalid and subject to epileptic fits . . .



Maulvi Fazl Huq of Khairabad who was in the Alwar raja's service on a monthly salary of Rs. 450 now arrived in Delhi. As the Maulvi was celebrated throughout Hindustan for his wisdom and sagacity the King made him one of his aides-de-camp. His arrival was highly displeasing to Hakim Ahsanullah Khan as so well known a Maulvi would certainly influence the King. But Fazl Huq did not pronounce a [judgement] in favour of a [holy war] or in any way mislead the King, though he was known to be in his counsels.

Bakht Khan had now command of the army in the field, but Mirza Moghul, Mirza Khizr Sultan . . . and Mirza Abu Bakr all in their several ways took a lead in military arrangements. The King's council was composed of Bakht Khan and Sarfaraz Ali, and in a lesser degree of Fazl Huq, but though the King wished it, the last was not permitted to be present in the council.

For some time Bakht Khan and the leading officers met in a tent pitched in front of the former [military] quarters and arranged all military matters, but the majority finding this unsatisfactory shifted to premises near the Delhi Gate. But neither Bakht Khan nor Mirza Moghul would attend though summoned by the others. Bakht Khan was displeased at their having left the vicinity of his camp and Mirza Moghul considered it derogatory to his rank to sit in any house in the city and wanted the assembly to meet in his own palace.

About this period Bakht Khan and some Cavalry and Infantry officers when attending the royal durbar recommended the King to send [a royal letter] to the several rajas of Hindustan to the following effect. 'It has pleased the most high God, after the lapse of a hundred years to restore the sovereignty to Hindustan [*i.e.* the Moghul empire]. It is your duty therefore to rule your several territories with circumspection — and in accordance with ancient usage to present [ceremonial gifts] and pay tribute to the Emperor and to send aid in men and money until the royal forces have defeated the British and driven them from the Ridge. Consider yourselves allies in this army of *ghazis* and ready to give even your lives for the establishment of the emperor's throne. Remain therefore no longer supine, and as if asleep, but awake and rouse yourselves.'

One of these [letters] was sent to Raja Gulab Singh of Kashmir and Jammu another to the Maharaja of Patiala — a third to the Maharaja Sindhia at Gwalior — a fourth to the [deposed ruler of Oudh] . . . [and others to] the nawwab of Tonk and . . . the *raja* of Jaipur. All were despatched by Camel [troopers] belonging to the rebel army or by the King's [messengers]. Those for Jammu, Patiala and Jaipur fell into Hakim Ahsanullah's hands who tore them up and said he had forwarded them. It was at this time that Muhammad Yusuf Khan, nawwab of Rampur, after consulting with the Commissioner of Bareilly, sent a petition to the King through his [agent], tendering his allegiance and presenting a [ceremonial gift] of one gold *mohur* [coin]. The King was pleased and highly complimented the bearer of the petition. [The nawwab was, in fact, loyal to the British.]

About three weeks after the arrival of the Bareilly brigade an attack on the British lines was determined on and the rebel troops advanced beyond their



battery in Taliwara [just outside the Kabul gate] with two heavy guns drawn by bullocks. Fire commenced from the British batteries and some companies of Gurkhas led by the Adjutant of the regiment advanced to oppose the mutineers.

An exceptionally heavy fire of musketry was maintained on both sides with severe loss, when the Adjutant with his Gurkhas made a sudden rush on the guns, the officer with great bravery going in front laid his sword on one of the rebel guns but received a severe wound . . . The Gurkhas however followed no their advantage, seized the guns and dispersed the rebel troops who tied in utter confusion, some back to their own batteries, others inside the city, while the victors withdrew the captured guns into their own lines. The following day Bakht Khan and the other chief officers waited on the Emperor, and concealing the loss of the guns pointed out that disaster and defeat had resulted in consequence of the troops having left without his [Bakht Khan's] permission.

The fire of round shot, shell and shrapnel from the batteries on the Ridge greatly increased. Shells of very large calibre were fired by the rebels also, but with an inferior aim to that of the English, though the ammunition was the same. Considerable loss in killed and wounded resulted from this artillery fire.

Sometimes Muhammad Shafi of the 8th Irregulars or Nurdad Ali would take out a party of cavalry, and proceeding beyond their own batteries would advance close to those of the British. On one occasion . . . with about 150 [troopers they] managed to get up to the British batteries and surprised the Europeans who were scattered about off duty, drinking tea. The English sprang up and rushed to their guns when one or two hand to hand encounters took place, but the majority of Muhammad Shafi's men occupied themselves with looting, and when a party of officers and a few mounted Europeans came against them they fled. During their flight, Nurdad Ali had an encounter with an English officer [Lieutenant James Hill] who attempted to use his pistol but it missed fire, then he threw it at Nurdad Ali striking him on the face. On this Nurdad Ali fled and when he got back to his camp proclaimed his own prowess and pointing to his black eye said: 'Look — my face bears witness to my having been in the thick of the fight. If the troopers had not commenced looting, the heights were as good as won, but what can be done when troops will not obey orders.'

A few days after this, a man dressed as a *fakir* [religious beggar] was seen to go two or three times back and forth between the Magazine and the Palace. He appeared to be insane. He was seized as a spy and brought into the Palace and large numbers of sepoy were sent to recognise him if possible as he was believed to be a European officer. A sepoy among the crowd cried out: 'I know him — I was with him for years in Afghanistan — look if he has the mark of a wound near the waist.' Such a mark being found, the sepoy said: 'This is Lawrence Sahib — I recognise him perfectly.' On this they took the *fakir* to the Lahore gate of the Palace and cut him to pieces. Nothing further was ever known about the man but the sepoy spread a report that they had washed a portion of the body when the colouring matter disappeared and showed the white skin of a European. Many however wholly disbelieved this story.



A scarcity of gunpowder and percussion caps began to be felt, the natural result of the indiscriminate plunder of the Magazine at the commencement of the disturbance - besides vast quantities had been expended in the engagements which had been going on daily since the arrival of the British on the Ridge. Many sepoys would take a quantity of cartridges and go beyond the walls in the direction of the batteries, sit down and bury them in the sand, then return and their comrades would say: 'My brothers, my ammunition is all expended, I am going back to the city for more and will return immediately.' Hundreds of thousands of sepoys acted in this way - so how was it possible that the supply could last?

Mirza Moghul and Mirza Khizr Sultan represented to the army chiefs that Magazine stores were running short and that arrangements should be made without delay for further supplies. Those two princes then selected a suitable house in Taliwara for a powder manufactory. Thirty maunds [about 3,000 lb] were made daily with about a quarter of a maund [about 25 lb] of percussion caps and duly stored or distributed to the several regiments.

Akbar Khan, then a resident of Meerut, went to the princes and offered to make a projectile of such size and power that it would destroy a whole section of men. Convinced of his ability to do so, they advanced him Rs. 4,000 for expenses and ordered him to commence the work at once in the Palace. Thousands of rockets were already in the Magazine and men were busy manufacturing others.

At this period the mutineer army began to clamour for pay and loudly abused the King, Hakim Ahsanullah, Zinat Mahal, Bakht Khan and Mirza Moghul, saying: 'How can we fight when we are starving?' A small quantity of old *mohurs* and rupees were consequently distributed to the officers and men, with the exception of the Bareilly brigade, and an urgent order issued to [the revenue official] of Kote Kasim, directing him to remit treasure immediately to the King. The revenue of the [district] of Kote Kasim had been made over in perpetuity to the King by the British in addition to His Highness' monthly pension of one lac and 25,000 rupees [Rs. 125,000]. The [revenue official] reported his inability to collect the revenue owing to the disturbances, but renewed orders were sent, and Bakht Khan promised to despatch some men and officers to aid in the work. Eventually, Sher Khan, a resident of Kairana in [the Muzaffarnagar district] was deputed with twenty-five [troopers]. On arrival at Bataudi the party was feasted by the nawwab and Jagirdar Abdul Ali Khan, whose father . . . had received the *jagir* for distinguished service in the field with Lord Lake. Sher Khan refused the dinner and detained the sons who had been sent by the nawwab to present it, and demanded a large sum of money and in case of refusal threatened to kill the sons there in his camp. The nawwab sent Rs. 20,000 but they were not released, on which he collected his retainers telling them to kill the [troopers] if necessary, but anyhow to rescue his sons. They did their utmost to effect their object peacefully but in vain--on which they rushed on the troopers, got hold of the sons, and sent them to their father. Only two of the whole number of [troopers] escaped to Delhi and they were severely wounded.



When this news reached the city there was a great stir among the rebel chiefs. The nawwab was declared to be a friend of the British, to be destroyed. It was further determined that a force should be sent against him without delay but Hakim Ahsanullah prevailed on the King to use his influence against such a course and it was at length abandoned.

The approach of the Nimach brigade was now reported. At that place the 72nd Native Infantry, the Artillery, a regiment of Regular Cavalry, as well as [outlying] detachments . . . and the 7th regiment Gwalior contingent had mutinied on hearing of the events at Meerut and Delhi . . . This force commenced operations by seizing the guns, they then plundered the Treasury, and after breaking into the jail and releasing the convicts, marched for the capital.

The [British] officer commanding at the neighbouring cantonment of Mahidpur sent his Hindustani regiments against the Nimach men with orders to capture the guns, but these troops on arrival fraternised with the mutineers. Their next move was to have been Ajmir which they intended to plunder but were dissuaded by [a man from Deoli] who told them they would find [at Deoli] two guns, a large Magazine and considerable treasure, and only twenty-five troopers to oppose them.

When Lawrence Sahib [Colonel George Lawrence], Resident at Ajmir, heard of the mutineers' intentions he deputed a party of Johdpur cavalry to bring away the [British] women and children. These men conducted them in safety to the village of [?] and made them over to the [local landowners]. When they entered Deoli they . . . found a company of recruits stationed there and proceeded by regular marches to Fatehpur Sikri.

One of the Alwar raja's regiments and four guns were also sent by the Resident at Ajmir to surprise the Nimach troops, but they, hearing of its approach, turned the tables and surprised their pursuers when the entire regiment with the guns joined the mutineers, who were soon after reinforced by a regiment of the Kotah contingent with 240 Horse.

The Nimach brigade strengthened as above mentioned arrived at [a place] about seven-and-a-half miles from Agra where five companies of the 3rd Europeans and a troop of Horse Artillery moved out to oppose them. The action commenced with a very heavy artillery and musketry fire. The Europeans and artillery soon began to retire and the mutineers to pursue. At length the Europeans reached Agra and by degrees entered the Fort — the mutineers following them up through the city and even to the Fort gates. When the lower classes heard of the defeat of the English, they began to slaughter the Christians in the city.

Faiz Ahmad [head clerk] of the Board of Revenue was in a mosque close to the gate of the Fort and called out to the Nimach troops: 'Go slowly and cautiously, take great care, the ground in front is mined.' The pursuing mutineers stopped at once. Had they not done so the Fort gates could not have been closed, so great was the rush of people, and they would have gained possession of the place though it would no doubt have been with heavy loss.



A shot from one of the British guns took off one of the hands of [the leader of the mutineers] and four fingers of the other, causing him to drop his reins. The mutineer army, seeing their [leader] wounded and helpless, was seized with panic and retired to the old encampment — but hearing that the Europeans were advancing with fresh guns they moved out towards Mathura being short of ammunition.

After the Nimach brigade had disappeared from the neighbourhood of [Agra] the Europeans sallied out and inflicted severe punishment on the [rebel] people, executing many. The magistrate, whose temper had been excessively crusty since the proclamation of martial law, recommended all government servants to fly while they could. The majority did so and joining the mutineers accompanied them to Delhi. Among them was old Faiz Ahmad. He reached the capital along with the Nimach brigade and was at once appointed Chief Criminal Judge by the King, the [chief of police and his subordinates] being directed to send their reports to him for orders. Faiz Ahmad though of great age retained his courage to the last.

The magistrate of Mathura on hearing of the approach of the Nimach troops left for Agra with an escort of four [troopers] and arrived in safety. He gave each man a present of Rs. 100 with a promise of promotion on the cessation of hostilities and let them depart. The Nimach men found forty government elephants at Mathura and took possession of them. During their halt of seven days they mulcted [the bankers and merchants] of [one hundred] and seventy-five thousand rupees and then marched for Delhi on receipt of urgent orders from the King, going via Ballabgarh but not interfering with the *raja* as he had sent a contingent of a hundred Horse to the royal army.

The Nimach brigade encamped to the south of that of Bareilly and on the following day the leaders, viz. Sirdhana Singh, Hira Singh, and Ghaus Muhammad Khan accompanied by all the other officers went to the Palace to do homage to the King and present the usual [ceremonial gifts]. Sirdhana Singh was a stupid and ignorant fellow, but the other two were able men and the real leaders and instigators of the meeting.

His Majesty complimented them on their brilliant deeds at Agra — but these officers unlike those of the Bareilly brigade did not kiss the throne or swear to support it. The entire Nimach column was estimated at eight thousand men of all arms.

Bakht Khan, since his appointment as commander-in-chief, had daily issued orders to the other officers of the rebel army and to the [chief of police] and city police officers. He had also, in conjunction with Maulvi Sarfaraz Ali, who was styled [chief minister], been carrying on the affairs of the country generally, and the two had nominated Fazl Huq to be [governor] of the Doab [the country lying between the Jumna and the Ganges rivers]. The latter however declined the appointment and the King who had not been consulted represented that he had given the post at the beginning of the outbreak to Walidad Khan of Malaghur . . . who had been carrying on the duties ever since. From this



statement which was undoubtedly correct, it is manifest that the King had designs on the empire very soon after the arrival of the Meerut mutineers in Delhi . . .

Bakht Khan and Sarfaraz Ali having obtained the royal permission to nominate the [governors] of Banaras and Allahabad appointed two illiterate mean-looking [men from Oudh] who during a durbar quarrelled and fought in the royal presence to the great scandal of the assembled nobles, calling for the sarcastic remarks of [one of the latter] who pointed them out as the distinguished individuals whom Bakht Khan and Co. had made *nazims* [governors] . . .

Information reached Bakht Khan that the British siege train numbering nine hundred carts was in progress to the Ridge via Bajputad and from another source that it was coming by Ambala and Karnaul and had already reached Rao Serai. On this he sent three separate notices to the King but receiving no reply went in person to His Majesty and said: 'Give me a thousand volunteer Horse and I'll go and either blow up or loot the [siege train].' No one listened to him, for though he was nominally commander-in-chief by the King's orders, the King never treated him as such, because his sons Mirza Moghul and Mirza Khizr Sultan were so violently opposed to him. The consequence was that the [siege train] arrived in safety in the British camp.

The artillery combat between the British and rebel batteries continued without cessation day or night. Sometimes the rebels would advance close to the English batteries — on others the Europeans would rush down from the Ridge and the fight be near the rebel guns. On most days Bakht Khan inspected the several batteries escorted by a body of horse and once had a narrow escape, a piece of shell striking his [turban] and setting it on fire — an inch or two lower and that day would have been his last.

It was now within a few days of the Bakr-'Id festival. Bakht Khan therefore sent orders to the [chief of police] and other city officials directing them to assemble the entire Muhammadan and Hindu population of the capital as he wished to address them. This was done and Bakht Khan came as he had promised and spoke as follows: 'Listen to me, my brothers — I regard the Hindu and Muslim religions alike. There are great numbers of Hindus in the several regiments in this city — so let no Muslim sacrifice [a cow or bullock] on the approaching 'Id — whoever does shall be put to death. Speak my Hindu brethren. Does this order meet with your approval?' All replied: 'We are much gratified — your Highness' policy is excellent and you are a person of exalted wisdom.' All then departed quietly to their homes.

The company of sepoy's stationed in the [police headquarters] were mustered and [Syed Mubarak Shah] was informed in their presence that if a single bullock or goat was sacrificed in the city he should be put to death. Bakht Khan further ordered a guard to be supplied to the [chief of police and his deputy] and sent four of the town criers to publish the following order by beat of drum in every lane, street and alley of the city.



'The people are the Lord's — the country is the King's — the decree is that of Bakht Khan, Chief of the Army. If any man high or low sacrifice bullock or goat he shall suffer death.'

The result was that not even a kid was sacrificed on the 'Id. Indeed these precautions were absolutely necessary because the sepoys had already murdered certain [Muslim] butchers who had been rash enough to expose their meat [beef] for sale.

It was about this time that Itaf Husain arrived with an imposing retinue bearing presents for the King from the Begum [Hazrat Mahal] of Lucknow who had commenced a general massacre of the English throughout Oudh and was then fighting with them in Lucknow itself. The gift for Zinat Mahal consisted of a jewelled necklace of great length — a pair of jewelled armlets and another smaller necklace. For the King there was a jewelled headpiece worth about [100,000] rupees, a magnificent Koran, and 101 gold *mohurs*. The King was greatly pleased on being informed of the arrival of the [emissary] from the Begum whose kingdom had for ages paid fealty and allegiance to the throne of Delhi, and directed that he should be presented on the following day in full durbar. As it had been arranged the King came forth next day and after seating himself on the throne of his ancestors became impatient for the [emissary's] arrival and sent to hasten him. The King's attendants then represented to his Highness that Nawwab Ali Khan, a [provincial governor] in Oudh and a very powerful noble of that state, was coming with the [emissary]. On hearing this the monarch was so elated that he promptly composed [a poem] . . . and had it read out by Mirza Khizr Sultan and Ahmad Kuli Khan, the father of the queen, Zinat Mahal. Ahmad Kuli Khan loudly praised it on which Mirza Khizr Sultan added three verses of his own and read them out to the King.

In this manner the time passed but still the [emissary] did not appear. The monarch became angry and said pettishly: 'Why does he not come?' and summarily dismissed the durbar. On the following day Nawwab Hamid Ali Khan brought the [emissary] to the King, when the former made obeisance and presented the [ceremonial gifts] in the [hall of audience]. It subsequently transpired that the delay of the previous day was caused by Hamid Ali Khan who was anxious to exchange the jewelled ornaments of immense value for others of a greatly inferior description which he intended to make over to the King — but the contemplated exchange could not be effected in time . . .

Soon after the departure of the Begum's [emissary], Bala Rao brother of Nana Sahib, the murderer of the English, arrived via Malaghur where he had been detained for some days by Walidad Khan, son-in-law of the King, who had feasted him in his fort near Bulandshahar.

Towards the latter end of July a man of mean appearance, in sorry plight and resembling a [robber], came to the [police headquarters] and enquired for the [chief of police]. The sepoys on guard asked who he was and why he wanted the [chief of police]. On this he became so frightened only stammering out unintelligible replies that they suspected and imprisoned him and on [Syed



Mubarak Shah's] arrival said they believed him to be a spy from the British camp — but after a careful search they had found no letter or paper about him. The [chief of police] going privately to the fellow enquired whence he had come and was told he had been sent to . . . the King's confidential priest by Inayet Ali Khan, nephew of Mahbub Ali Khan [a judge] in the Muzaffarnagar district but that he had failed to find him and hearing that the [chief of police] was a [man from the same district] had come to obtain the requisite information. On this the [chief of police] whispered: 'Have you any letter?' — He replied: 'Yes, in my stick — one for the King, one for [his priest] and Muhammad Naki, and I would no doubt have been given one for you also had the writers known of your being [chief of police] here.' On this [Syed Mubarak Shah] told the sepoys that the man had been sent by [Mahbub Ali Khan to the King's priest] which satisfied them and they let him depart — at the same time telling the [chief of police] that his head should answer for it if they afterwards found he had deceived them. On the sepoys going below the [chief of police] cut the stick open in a private room and found the letters as stated.

The petition to the King asked for aid in men, describing the writer's readiness to arm in his cause. The letters to the other two men begged them to use their influence to have his prayer to the King granted. The [chief of police] tore up the papers and told the bearer he had found only one in the stick. The man was in great fear of the sepoys and on obtaining their permission to go and see some . . . men in the Bareilly camp took the opportunity of escaping from the city. . .

On one occasion the rain fell in torrents and about two hundred sepoys at the Taliwara battery in the Subzimundi were lying in the sheds for shelter from the wet, the rest of the men being in the battery, when the Europeans believing it was empty or nearly so advanced against it with a company firing as they came on. About eighty sepoys were sent to Hades by a volley and the others left their guns and fled. The Europeans pursued when the mutineers who were inside the sheds and had escaped notice came out and fired a volley knocking over between thirty and forty men and officers, on which the English reared to their own batteries.

The lower classes of the city people, Hindus, Muhammadans and *ghazis*, who generally hung about the batteries in considerable numbers, now rushed forward and beheaded some of the dead Europeans, and after fixing the heads on poles took them into the city, followed by enormous crowds. The bearer of every head brought to the King received five rupees. Those who took them to Mirza Moghul three or four — Mirza Khizr Sultan also rewarded those who brought any heads to him . . .

After consultation with the principal officers of the Nimach brigade and those leaders who had been in Delhi previous to the arrival of that column, it was settled that it should be placed under the command of Mirza Kobash, heir presumptive to the throne, and he stated his intention of accompanying it on all expeditions against the British — as the failure of the royal troops was very



generally attributed by both people and army to the fact that no prince of the Royal House had ever led them or been present during the engagements. Mirza Kobash kept to his agreement and frequently went out with the column to attack the British batteries and returned to the city in the evening — a desultory fire having been kept up for hours but with no decisive result.

About five hundred men arrived about this period from Tonk, the [ruler] of that place having been unable to restrain them. Their stated object was a crusade against the infidel, their real one plunder. In this manner fully five thousand men from various quarters poured into Delhi as *ghazis*, the majority armed merely with [battle-axes] — dressed in blue tunics and green turbans. All these *ghazis* including the Tonk men received two annas a day from the King. They usually joined in the attacks on the British lines, returning with the troops. Several of these fanatics engaged in hand to hand combat and great numbers were killed by the Europeans.

Frequently two old withered Muslim women from Rampur led the rebels, going far in advance with naked swords and bitterly taunting the sepoys when they held back, calling them cowards and shouting to them to see how women went in front where they dared not follow — 'We go on without flinching among the showers of grape while you flee away.' The sepoys would excuse themselves saying: 'We go to fetch ammunition', but the women would reply: 'You stop and fight and we will get your ammunition for you.' These women frequently did bring supplies of cartridges to the men in the batteries and walked fearlessly in perfect showers of grape, but by the will of God were never hit. At length one of the two was taken prisoner and brought before Mr. Greathed, Civil Commissioner, who after enquiring into the state of the city and the rebel army gave her five rupees and released her, at the same time issuing strict orders that no man should molest her. As she never returned to the mutineers she was considered by many to have been a British spy. When the band of *ghazis* moved off to the assault the women invariably went in advance of all.

It was about this time that the officers of the Nasirabad, Nimach and Bareilly brigades held a council of war when it was determined to erect a battery in the Kudsia Bagh, such an arrangement being considered necessary as the British batteries had now reached the Racket Court. A large body of *ghazis*, a regiment of Cavalry, two regiments of the Nasirabad Infantry — about 250 men of the 20th Native Infantry from Meerut, a like number of the 72nd Native Infantry, with five guns were stationed there. The shower of shell, case and round shot which now poured into the city from the British batteries terrified both the people and the rebel army. Large numbers were killed and so great was the force of the shells that they passed through and utterly destroyed the old . . . buildings which were of great strength, with roofs of three layers of stone.

About 8 o'clock one morning, before the King had come out of his apartments, thirty or forty of the nobles were seated round the ornamental Tank [pool] in the Palace square, waiting his arrival. Just as the monarch emerged from his private room three shells fell directly in front and behind him and burst, but



without injury to any one. The King immediately retired and all the others who had been seated there got up and left. That same evening the King called up the chief officers of the army and thus addressed them: 'My brothers — there is no longer any safe place for you, or the citizens, or even for me to sit — the ceaseless showers of shot and shell have already prevented that — for, as you see, by the very [pool] where I was in the habit of sitting every day, the round shot and shell are now falling. You say you came here to fight — can you not do so even so far as to stop this rain of shot and shell pouring into the Palace?'

On hearing this the Nimach, Nasirabad and Bareilly brigade commanders held a second council of war and settled that when the rains had to some extent abated a force should be despatched to Najafgarh to attack the enemy in the rear, while another strong column should assault and carry the Ridge where it was believed only a small number of European troops would be left, the main body having previously left to oppose the advance from Najafgarh.

These plans having been agreed on, a party of officers waited on the King and asked His Highness to wait for a week or ten days and he would then see what gallant deeds would be done by his faithful army to advance his cause.

It was at this period that the following incident took place at the Kudsia Bagh battery. About midnight the majority of the men with the guns were asleep while the rest were lying about in scattered groups without their arms or accoutrements — in fact so careless and off their guard that they might as well have been asleep — and the troops on picket were in the same condition. A servant of one of the English officers observing this state of things, gave information to the English on which a Captain sahib took a party of Europeans and Ghurkas from the Racket Court battery and massing them on the road advanced with light and noiseless footsteps to the Kudsia Bagh. Some of the Gurkhas running on in advance came upon the sleeping sepoy and attacked them with their *kukris* [knives]. On opening their eyes the sepoy found themselves in the claws of death and fate and pretended to be asleep on which the Gurkhas commenced to behead them and killed nearly one hundred. When the other mutineers in the battery were roused and stood to their arms the Gurkhas rejoined their own party and the Europeans fired a volley killing about one hundred and fifty more of the mutineers, while none of the British received a scratch. The latter then carried off three out of the five guns in the battery, but the rebels replaced them a few days after and planned an ambuscade. With this object they lay in concealment on both sides of the road, the battery appearing empty. Again the British were informed that though the captured guns had been replaced, the men were again all [off their guard] — so two companies of Europeans and one of Gurkhas started at once from the Racket Court post but when close to the Kudsia Bagh the sepoy fired a deadly volley killing or wounding about forty, on which the party retired removing their dead.

The plan of engaging the British at Najafgarh was repeatedly debated but nothing was done.



Abdul Wahid [chief clerk] of Mr. Fraser, the Chief Commissioner's Court, came one day to [Syed Mubarak Shah] and told him that Mr Powell, Postmaster of Moradabad, son of old Mr Powell of Saharanpur, with three other Christians and a European sergeant, had been brought to Delhi by the 29th Native Infantry and though prisoners were protected by the corps, at the same time asking if he could devise any plan for obtaining Mr Powell's release. After deliberating together they determined to offer a sum of money to Bakht Khan to liberate him. That officer however demanded a sum of Rs. 10,000 to be paid beforehand, which he would, he said, share with the officers and men of the 29th — but added that Mr P.'s life was in no danger and they need not imagine it was as the regiment had made him a Muslim and would no doubt eventually release him, the corps having protected him hitherto from the men of other regiments who would otherwise have to a certainty murdered him.

Some days later the officers of the 29th represented to Bakht Khan that the sahibs who were in their lines were much inconvenienced owing to its being the rainy season and asked him to arrange for their removal to a house in the city as all had embraced the Muslim faith. Bakht Khan on this spoke to Shaib-ud-din, who had been stationed in the [police headquarters] to attend to the requirements of the Bareilly brigade, and he had them placed in an unoccupied room under a strong guard of *ghazis*, the sepoy's remaining in the lower storey of the building. Only the men of the 29th and these *ghazis* were permitted to hold any communication with the prisoners — but both Abdul Wahid and me [chief of police] managed now and then by bribing the guard to pass sweetmeats and other comforts to them but were never allowed to approach near enough to admit of conversation. One day however Mirza Moghul came to the [police headquarters] and through his servant directed the [chief of police] to present a gift to him as the King's son. The [chief of police] having received no pay had to borrow Rs. 2 from one of the [militiamen] and presented them to the prince accompanying him afterwards to see the sahibs. As the [prince] was seated on one side, the [chief of police] managed to get close to Mr Powell who whispered: 'Mubarak Shah, shall I live to see Saharanpur again?' on which [he] replied in the same low tones: 'God alone knows, but keep up your heart, for Abdul Wahid and I have been scheming for your return there and the release of these other sahibs also.' The *ghazis* perceiving what was going on peremptorily stopped it saying all talking was forbidden and that the [chief of police] had been allowed to approach the prisoners only on account of his having accompanied the prince.

When the sepoy's of the other mutineer regiments heard of the Europeans being in the [police headquarters] they charged the [chief of police] with being in league with the English and of being a Christian, threatening to attack the place and put him and the prisoners to death. They came several times to put these threats into execution but were told that the men were under the protection of the 29th and the [troopers] and others stationed at the police office prevailed on them to depart.



About the 26th August it was finally settled in council that a column should be sent round to Najafgarh consisting of the entire Nimach brigade with its guns and the Nasirabad brigade and its artillery, while a reserve under the immediate command of Bakht Khan should bring up the rear composed of two Infantry Regiments, four hundred Cavalry and four guns. This force marched on the 27th. On reaching the Jumna canal the bridge was found to have been destroyed by the British but Bakht Khan had it repaired so inefficiently that it again gave way on the troops attempting to cross. During the time it was being made serviceable the rebel troops were exposed for a whole day and night to the inclemency of the season and thoroughly drenched with rain. At length the bridge being reported safe, the column moved on to [a] village . . . about [12 miles] from the city and along the bank of an extensive swamp, the Bareilly brigade as reserve bringing up the rear.

Previous to the arrival of the rebel army at Najafgarh, intelligence of the movement had reached the British who without delay dispatched a comparatively small column consisting of two troops of artillery and a body of infantry who proceeding along the dry side of the swamp were ready to oppose the mutineers.

The Nimach troops arrived greatly fatigued at the swamp . . . but had no time to rest and refresh themselves. Besides the wheels of the gun carriages sunk so continually in the swamp that the progress was very slow and the sepoy had to wade through water which was above their knees. While thus struggling in the morass the British guns opened upon them and Bakht Khan hearing them halted the reserve. The real fact was that he and the officers of the Nimach force were not on good terms. They had been displeased at his having been given the chief command and he was angry with them for having openly shown their dissatisfaction. On this account one party desired the ruin and degradation of the other. Each leader wanted his own name alone to be famous, and himself hailed as victor.

The grape from twelve guns now poured into the Nimach troops and infantry and artillery became helplessly fixed in the marsh — they could neither advance or retreat and numbers began to fall. To make matters worse they were unable to see the British guns which were dealing such destruction in their ranks, as they were hidden by trees and high standing crops, but notwithstanding the extreme difficulty of their position the rebel artillery fired repeatedly and the sepoy also.

When men can neither advance or retire there is no help for them — the brave man and the coward have nothing for it but to stop and die. On that day 470 of the Nimach brigade, Horse, Foot and Artillery, were killed by grape alone.

The Nasirabad brigade had in the meantime advanced on the right and their fire proved fatal to upwards of a hundred of the British thereby enabling the remaining portion of the Nimach men to get out of the swamp. Had it not been for this not a man, not even an animal belonging to that brigade would have escaped alive. Their six guns fell into the hands of the British and the mutineer army fled in utter disorder while the round shot increasingly harassed them in



their flight. At length staggering along exhausted and totally disorganised they reached Bakht Khan's fresh troops and retired along with them while the Europeans took the captured guns to pieces, placed them on elephants and carried them to their camp on the Ridge.

The rebel troops had been practically starving for three days on this expedition. Bakht Khan therefore sent a company in advance to Mirza Moghul and Jemadar Shahbahadur urging them to send parched grain, sweetmeats, etc. for the men with all possible haste. The [prince] told the Jemadar to see to it. The latter suggested that orders be issued to the [chief of police] and the [parchers of grain] but the city Thanadars refused point blank to execute the orders saying it was not their duty to arrange for supplies. . . . While matters were in this state the near approach of the troops was announced, when Mirza Moghul . . . warned the Thanadars that in the present temper and hunger of the troops, they would in all probability be killed if the supplies were not forthcoming. The prince further declared that the [chief of police] was the person really in fault and deserved to be killed. Consequently the [commander] of the Hariana Regiment . . . took a company to the [police headquarters] for that purpose. The [chief of police] suddenly discovering the plot against his life escaped through a dark passage in [the] rear of the [police headquarters] and eventually arrived safely at the home of Abdul Wahid who has already been mentioned. The sepoy's after searching in vain for the [chief of police] left for the Palace taking the [deputy chief] along with them after giving him a severe beating - - they would have killed him but Shahbahadur prevented them. Fazl Huq then collected sweetmeats and other supplies and despatched them to the troops outside the walls of the city. The beaten army at last reached their own tents, but so great had been their panic, so complete their defeat that they did not fully recover their senses for three days. The prestige of the rebel army had waned materially previous to their defeat at Najafgarh but after that it was completely and for ever lost.

The sepoy's began to renew their charge against the [chief of police] declaring he was injuring the cause and in collusion with the British, so he left his office and took shelter with Hakim Ahsanullah Khan who recommended his keeping out of the way for a few days until the matter blew over, saying that he would report his being indisposed. On Bakht Khan hearing this he sent a guard to bring him, as from his remaining in hiding he suspected he was tampering with the enemy, and at the same time telling him that if really was ill he could live just as well at the [police headquarters] as elsewhere and if he died he, Bakht Khan, would have him decently buried. The [chief of police] was therefore taken back to [police headquarters] by the guard.

Four days after the fight at Najafgarh some [robbers] informed Bakht Khan that a number of carts containing supplies for the British camp were halted [at a travellers' resting place] near Alipur. He, in consequence, despatched a force consisting of 500 Volunteer Horse, in addition to the Nimach Cavalry, two regiments of infantry and three guns, to Alipur. These troops arrived during the night and after having killed and wounded several of the escort and dispersed the



rest, looted the supplies, and seeing no enemy, determined to halt for the night and take the carts next morning to Delhi. One of the escort however who had escaped conveyed intelligence of the disaster to the British camp when two troops of European Cavalry, a battery of guns, and a regiment of Gurkhas marched at once for [Alipur] and arriving before sunrise opened fire. The rebels who had a village between them and the English kept up a heavy fire until their ammunition was expended — but the mutineer Horse had commenced to retire immediately the British guns opened and were loudly abused by their infantry who kept shouting: 'You infernal cowards and pigs. Where are you going to — what can the [Europeans] do to you? You brutes, look at us — we will not retreat one step until the last breath comes into our throats.' No one paid any attention and the Foot soon followed the Horse. The British advanced and took possession of the [travellers' resting place] which they found deserted and made immediate arrangements for the removal of the carts with the supplies to their own camp on the Ridge. The rebel force, though their loss had been small, re-entered Delhi in a state of complete panic. The Europeans had only three or four killed, all by the enemy's round shot. On the return of the successful force into camp the British advanced the Racket Court battery to the Kudsia Bagh and held that position. On this the rebel army lost all heart for whenever the British had captured any position no efforts on the part of the mutineers had ever succeeded in retaking it. Moreover the Kudsia Bagh battery was close to the city wall.

The simultaneous discharge of six guns from [the Kudsia Bagh] quickly spread terror among the rebel artillerymen on the walls and their condition rendered them unable to work their guns: indeed it became evident to the mutineers generally that the British troops would very shortly enter the capital. Hakim Ahsanullah Khan seeing their state of panic bribed a [woman], through one of his own servants, to mix some percussion powder with the sulphur and other ingredients which she was grinding in the manufacture of gunpowder. This woman was one of a large number employed making powder for the troops. She carried out his instructions towards sunset when the powder made during the day was collected in a large heap. A spark from her millstone fell on it and the whole exploded killing about four hundred and fifty persons and utterly destroying the houses in the neighbourhood.

Mirza Moghul led the sepoys to believe that Hakim Ahsanullah Khan was at the bottom of the business and recommended their putting him to death. The rumour spread like wildfire through the city and the sepoys pouring out of every street, lane and alley rushed fully armed to the Palace. The King was at the time returning from Lelunghur and Ahsanullah Khan with him, but the majority of the sepoys did not know the Hakim by sight. They surrounded the royal palanquin, which was a kind of throne borne on men's shoulders, and one of their number recognising Ahsanullah was about to cut him down when the King stretched out his arm and prevented on which Shah Samad Khan, one of the King's orderlies, seized the Hakim by the hand and drawing him out of the crowd one of the royal apartments from which he was transferred into one of the private



rooms, while the infuriated sepoys rushed into the [Royal Treasury] with their muskets and pressing on the royal palanquin shouted: 'We will leave when you deliver Ahsanullah Khan into our hands - until then we don't budge.'

Other parties of sepoys ran to the Hakim's residence, set the buildings on fire and destroyed or looted an immense amount of property. The women of the family escaped and concealed themselves in the neighbours' houses.

As soon as the King heard of the plunder and burning of his friend's house he sent his bodyguard consisting of four hundred Afghan Horse, in whom he placed implicit reliance, to suppress the fire and stop the plunder. These men went as directed but on arrival joined the sepoys and townspeople in the general pillage. In the meantime Mirza Moghul had sent a trooper to bring the [chief of police] to the palace and kept him there under surveillance asserting that he was an accomplice in the explosion of the [gunpowder].

When 8 o'clock had struck the King saw that there was no chance of the sepoys leaving the Palace until the Hakim was made over to them so he earnestly implored both Mirza Moghul and Mirza Khan Sultan to make them swear not to put the old man to death. As it was Mirza Moghul who had originated the accusation . . . his heart relented when thus supplicated by the King his father, and he induced the sepoys to take the oath, after which he, accompanied by Mirza Khizr Sultan and Mirza Abu Bakr, took Ahsanullah Khan and handed him over to the troops at the same time sending the [chief of police] back to [police headquarters] under an escort.

The mutineers placed the Hakim in the room he usually occupied in the Palace and stationed a guard over him. For four days he was thus confined and during the whole of that time the King never once left his private apartments, replying to all remonstrances on the part of the rebel officers: 'I am sick and ill — Ahsanullah Khan was my medical man. You have imprisoned him — henceforward it will be very difficult for me to live.' On this the chief military officers consulted together and eventually took the Hakim from the sepoys and brought him to the King, who placing his hand on his friend's shoulder remained weeping for some time. Then in accordance with his usual practice he left his apartments and held a state durbar. After it was over Mirza Moghul and Mirza Abu Bakr placing Ahsanullah Khan [on their own elephant] escorted him to his burnt dwelling where they left him on receiving a gift of two gold mohurs.

The sepoys also attacked and plundered the house of Raja Jait Singh, uncle of the [ruler] of Patiala, believing that he conveyed intelligence of city affairs to the *maharaja*. Not content with plundering his palace they disgraced him and led him with bare feet through the main bazaars to the royal Palace. The King, who was sitting in the Diwan-i-khas, saw the *raja* being thus hurried along by the sepoys and rose up at once, [clasping] him to his bosom and consoling him to the best of his ability and expressing regret at the treatment he had met with. He bemoaned also his own helpless position and the power and unbridled licence of the soldiery. The King then sent Mirza Moghul and Mirza Abu Bakr with the



*raja* and had him taken with all respect and honour to the Akla Mahal within the Palace.

On the following day the sepoy seized a Christian, name unknown, and took him to the Fort with the intention of killing him. The [chief of police] hoping that if he could get him from them in their excited and bloodthirsty state he might eventually be able to save his life begged that they would spare him for the moment so as to obtain from him all particulars of the enemy on the Ridge — adding: 'Although I am well aware that you regard me as an enemy, I still consider the course I propose the best. It is in your power to act on the advice or reject it.' Hyat Muhammad Khan, Daffadar [corporal] of Gall's Irregulars who happened to be standing near remarked: 'Yes, my brothers, leave him here and we'll make a Muslim of him. Keep him in the [police headquarters] where everything is under your own eye.' The sepoy agreed to this proposal. Parties of them came every second or third day saying: 'You ought to kill that man' — when the [chief of police] and the Daffadar would reply: 'We are instructing him in the Muhammadan faith, and he will soon recant.' They would then send for the man and tell him he must turn Muslim without delay, but he invariably refused and was sent back to [one of the city jails] along with the thieves and pickpockets of the city who were confined there — both [chief of police] and Daffadar asserting 10 or 15 days more would see him a Muhammadan while at heart they hoped that in the meantime the city would be assaulted and the prisoner escape in the confusion. It was the will of the most high God that such should be the case and he escaped on that day. His name is not known but if he ever turns up he will confirm the above statement.

By this time the British battery at the Kudsia Bagh had greatly damaged the city wall and damaged the muzzles of most of the mutineers' guns rendering them wholly unserviceable and killed nearly all the artillerymen. The guns on the Kala Burj were completely silenced. The gunners dared not raise their heads above the parapet, indeed the fire was so incessant that the disabled guns could not be removed and replaced by others.

On that same day, Friday, the *ghazis* collected in great numbers, prepared for action and took the most solemn oath that they would go out and fight and if necessary die, but would never retreat. This large assemblage made a brave show and when passing the [police headquarters] called out: 'If the [chief of police] is a true Muslim let him come with us. We go to die.' [Syed Mubarak Shah] tried to excuse himself saying his duties lay in the city and he had no call to go out to battle — but they replied: 'No — today we will put you to the proof and if you do not join our crusade against the unbelievers we shall include you in the [holy war] and put you to death.' As a last resource he agreed to go, saying: 'I will bathe and dress. Proceed and I will follow immediately.' Deceiving them in this way he induced them to depart, saying to himself: 'Most of these fellows will be killed and those who survive will not remember to come for me.'

The *ghazis* marched along the Chandni Chowk shouting out: 'Citizens, citizens, all who would be martyrs for the faith, come, follow us.' Several of the



townspeople, just for the name of the thing, accompanied them but returned from the main gate. By the grace and power of God two hours had barely passed when the entire body of *ghazis* returned and on the people enquiring the reason, said: 'The hour of prayer had arrived and evening approached hence our return.' But the real cause was that the fire from the batteries and the ceaseless volleys of musketry prevented any advance. Only a few sepoys attempted to go on — none of the others dared raise their heads — and if out of a thousand men only ten are willing to fight, what good can they do — they will not be even noticed.

The King became greatly depressed when he heard that the guns of the city walls had been silenced and taking up a Koran opened it to see what it would declare. The first passage his eye fell on was to the following effect: 'Neither you nor your army but those who were before.' The old King remained silent but Hakim Ahsanullah Khan tried to persuade him that it really meant he would conquer in the [end]. The fact being that he dared not give the real interpretation from fear of Bakht Khan, Maulvi Sarfaraz Ali and Fazl Huq.

Now that the rebel army had become panic-stricken and knew that the British would soon gain an entrance into the city they publicly declared their intention of evacuating it and plundering the neighbouring districts on the plea that they had received neither pay or means of subsistence from the King and were starving. A sum of Rs. 32,000 received from Tuli Ram of Rewari was in consequence distributed among the troops and it was resolved in council that the balance necessary to pay up the arrears to the troops should be raised by a house tax and by contributions from the [landowners] and well-to-do residents — but no violence or undue pressure to be allowed in the collection of the cess. From men known to own upwards of [100,000 rupees], a contribution of Rs. 25,000 was demanded — but those assessed at this amount went to Mirza Moghul and giving him a present of five or six hundred rupees succeeded in having the call reduced to Rs. 1500 or even Rs. 1,000. The result was that only about Rs. 6,000 were levied under the general tax and a similar amount from the [richer residents] of the city.

The mutineers now began to construct a large [earthwork] inside the Kashmir gate with the view of intercepting the fire from the Kudsia Bagh and other batteries — but it was of little effect as the British fire was so fearful and continuous that the very earth shook.

The sepoys of the 29th Native Infantry recollecting the sergeant whom they had brought with them from Muradabad and hoping to benefit by any skill he might possess, took him in a [litter] to the Taliwara battery and after flattering his courage and ability asked how the effect of their artillery fire could be increased. He in consequence laid and fired the guns against the English batteries. The shot struck fair and true and so delighted the sepoys that they presented gifts to the sergeant who replied: 'It is too late — I can do nothing now — if you had acted on my advice at the commencement, the British batteries could not have advanced a foot. Now that matters are hopeless you want me to stop their further progress — it is impossible but I will die along with you.'



Only three rebel batteries remained at Taliwara. The fire from the city walls had ceased and the English now chiefly concentrated their fire on the Kashmir gate and its immediate neighbourhood. They also placed a couple of guns close to the wall, in advance of those at the Kudsia Bagh and completed and strengthened this new battery notwithstanding the most strenuous opposition on the part of the mutineers who made repeated sallies from the Kashmir gate.

When the English were satisfied that the proper time for assault had arrived they determined that it should take place at 4 a.m. on the 14th September . . . At that hour one division marched against the rebel battery at Taliwara which it succeeded in capturing though met with a terrible fire of round shot, shell, grape and musketry. All the heavy field guns fell into the hands of the British - but the rebels managed to remove all the Horse Artillery pieces. A mass of *ghazis* from the Bareilly and Nimach camps hastened to Taliwara and hurled themselves upon the British who, overmatched, fell back with the loss of two guns and their ammunition waggons. In this engagement about three hundred men fell on either side. On retiring the British made for the Kala Burj and took it by assault when the rebels evacuated the position at Taliwara.

The attack on the Kala Burj [a fortified tower] was as follows:

The troops placed a ladder against it and a European officer mounted first. He was killed instantly, his body falling back into the ditch. Ten or a dozen ladders were then planted against both sides of the Burj when several other officers, European soldiers and Gurkhas mounted them and rushing on the defenders and singling out the gunners and killing them, captured the guns, on which the sepoys fled leaving the Burj in the hands of the British.

The other division of the English which had advanced from the Kudsia Bagh had by this time entered the city by means of scaling ladders — while the third division which had moved on the Kashmir gate found it closed and barricaded — on which some European officers fastened bags of gunpowder against it and blew up the entire gate with its defenders when the troops rushed in and thus penetrated into the city.

[Two] regiments of the Nasirabad brigade with part of the 20th Native Infantry and two guns were in Colonel Skinner's house near the Kashmir gate and met the advancing British column with such a deadly fire of grape, and musketry that between three and four hundred men were killed or wounded including over sixty officers. The column wavered and partially retired but the officers with wonderful gallantry stood their ground and in the midst of that deadly fire took counsel together what should be the next move.

After a short time the officers prevailed on their men to advance and they proceeded to clear the way by firing every now and then from two guns of a field battery which they had procured. On seeing the bold advance of the British column the Nasirabad troops retired with their guns, many flying in such panic that they mistook the way and rushing madly through several houses leapt over the city walls. The English then occupied the vacated position in Colonel Skinner's house and grounds and planted a battery there.



A party of European cavalry with indomitable courage advanced as far as Nawwab Khan's gateway but encountered a heavy volley from sepoy's concealed in the adjoining houses. Several of the troopers fell dead and the rest retired, ten or twelve passing through the ruined gateway of [a] house whence they galloped into the Chandni Chowk where the mutineer cavalry had picketed a large number of their horses. These they hamstrung and then retired. In the meantime a party of European infantry led by a Captain advanced with invincible bravery to the Palace, determined to get possession of the King or perish in the attempt — while another party went to the [police headquarters] — a third into the gardens surrounding the Begum Sumru's palace — and a fourth worked their way through every difficulty to the Jama Masjid. This last party which had, in addition to their regular arms, a small mortar with plenty of ammunition was attacked with great ferocity by the sepoy's, *ghazis* and city people and being without support was forced to retire with a loss of about forty Europeans. The party in the [Begum Sumru's gardens] had about fifteen killed. Those who had gone to the [police headquarters] gained entrance by means of ladders planted against the walls. The three Eurasian clerks who had as already mentioned been brought from Moradabad by the 29th Native Infantry were still in confinement under a *ghazi* guard. Or, entering the place two of the townspeople who were in [the cells] were shot by the Europeans who spared all the others on their praying for mercy. The three Christian clerks were also killed but it is not known by whom — one account stating that the *ghazis* put them to death before their own flight — the other that they were shot by the European soldiery in mistake for ... rebels. [Syed Mubarak Shah] was fortunately absent that day having gone to Bakht Khan's camp to enquire for a friend who was sick. A large body of *ghazis* assembling from various points advanced on the [police headquarters] on which the Europeans came down and engaged them but were so greatly outnumbered that they were obliged to fall back on their main body at the Kashmir gate after sustaining considerable loss. The Christian who, it will be remembered, had been seized by the sepoy's at the batteries and whose life had been spared by the intervention of the [chief of police] and the Daffadar Hyat Muhammad Khan, managed to escape uninjured in the confusion.

The rebels and mutineers had by this time become thoroughly disorganised and with the exception of the Nasirabad brigade began to evacuate the city. The rest of the sepoy's closed the gates, but were in many instances attacked by the townspeople, who in return for the bad treatment to which they had been subjected at their hands deprived them of their arms, beat them with shoes and disgraced them in every possible way, crying out: 'Where is your boasted courage? What has become of your power that you can no longer oppress and tyrannise over us?'

The British had now entire possession of the block of houses in the vicinity of the Kashmir gate and had erected a battery there. The Shah Burj was also in their hands. One side of the city extending from the Kashmir gate to the Magazine on one side and to the Shah Burj on the other, was occupied by them



while abundant stores of all kinds were constantly being brought in from their old camp on the Ridge.

When news of the assault reached the Palace the main gates were closed and two large guns charged with grape placed in front of the principal entrance. It is beyond the power of words to express or describe the courage and dash of the party of Europeans who went first to the Palace and who were nearly all killed nor indeed is a correct account possible of those who went to the Jama Masjid — the pen of a man is unable to record it — for there were at least sixty thousand mutineers, *ghazi* and rebel troops in Delhi and about an equal number of city people. The last it is true were not all enemies but the British at the time believed them to be so. Officers and men pressed on regardless of the numbers opposed to them, thinking only of gaining entrance into the Palace and if necessary sacrificing their lives within it. About three hundred sepoy and *ghazis* fell that day in the city. After the Europeans had made good their entry they were followed by Sikhs and Gurkhas whose loss amounted to over 150 men. A company of Europeans and one of Gurkhas held the Shah Burj, a detachment of Sikhs being placed in support with a couple of guns. Three thousand rebel troops with two guns attempted to retake it but were met with so terrible a fire that they hurriedly retired.

By 12 o'clock on the day most of the rebel army reached their tents but the two Nasirabad regiments . . . took up a strong position in the Magazine. Up to this time the King had been led to believe that the fighting was confined to the quarter of the city in the vicinity of the Kashmir gate.

Despair now fell on the rebel army in Delhi and elsewhere. They had no longer any hope of success or of driving the English out of the country and only thought how they could save their own lives.

The Europeans held a council of war to determine how the Magazine should be assaulted.

About 1 p.m. a mixed crowd of sepoy [troopers] of various regiments and *ghazis* assembled but finding it impossible to proceed along any of the streets as all the approaches were held by the British who shot down all who dared to show themselves, they commenced a sharp fire from the tops of the houses which they maintained until dusk but it was all to no purpose — they had effected nothing when night came on. Only two guns now remained with the mutineers and along the whole of the Chandni Chowk to the Palace and even to the Lahore gate only scattered parties of sepoy and *ghazis* were to be seen — all the rest had fled.

The greater part of the [two Nasirabad] regiments occupying the Magazine, believing that the Europeans had got into their rear would assault during the night when no support could possibly reach them evacuated the position and dispersed.

The same sort of thing already described continued the following day. Whenever the Europeans saw an opportunity they made their way into the main streets and bazaars and shot all who opposed them. The spirit of the mutineers now completely deserted them and they contemplated entire evacuation of the capital.



On the third day the English effected a break in the Magazine wall through which they managed to enter and overcoming the sepoys took possession of the place after which they raised batteries in commanding positions outside.

As a last resource several of the principal officers of the mutineer army accompanied by Sarfaraz Ali and Maulvi Faiz Ahmad went to the King and besought him to mount and lead the troops assuring him that the entire army, the citizens of Delhi and the people of the surrounding country would all follow, fight and die for him, and expel the British. The King, afraid of his life, hesitated. On which they more earnestly entreated him saying: 'Your end is now approaching — you will be captured — why die a shameful dishonourable death? Why not die fighting and leave an imperishable name?' The King replied that he would place himself at the head of the troops at 12 o'clock that day.

As soon as the Royal intention of leading the army to battle was known, masses of mutineers, *ghazis* and townsmen collected in front of the Palace, not less than seventy thousand men. Presently the royal [sedan chair] was seen slowly issuing forth from the great gates — on which the troops and citizens advanced towards the Magazine but halted about two hundred yards from it as all who went further fell by the British bullets which poured down the street like rain. The King's [sedan chair] had by this time almost reached another of the gates of the Palace and he sent continually to ascertain how far his army had advanced, but they were no nearer the Magazine — when Hakim Ahsanullah Khan, forcing his way to his royal master, told him that if he went any further he would to a certainty be shot as European riflemen were concealed in the different houses. 'Moreover,' added the Hakim, 'if you go out with the army to fight how can I possibly explain your conduct tomorrow to the British. What excuse can I advance for you after you have joined the mutineers in battle?' On hearing these words the King left the procession and re-entered the Palace on the plea of going to the evening prayer. The mass of the people and troops now became confused, then alarmed, and eventually dispersed.

During the night the English shelled the Palace and the rebel encampments outside the walls. That same night the King left the Palace by the back entrance to the river, crossed in a boat and went to Humayun's tomb about two miles from the city and there remained. The mass of the people, Hindu and Muslim, began to leave the city but the rebel officers alone knew of the King's flight. A party of European soldiers more or less intoxicated entered the house of Ramji Das Mahajur on pretence of protecting the women of the family but treated them in a shameful manner.

During the night the King sent to Bakht Khan for two hundred [cavalrymen] as a personal guard and at 3 a.m. on the morning of the 20th September 1857 . . . they were about to start under the command of Maulvi Nurdad Ali, when the rest of the regiment seeing the horse saddled suspected that all was not right and got ready also. The infantry observing the cavalry prepared for a move, followed suit — while the artillery on hearing that the sepoys were fully accoutred and ready to march made immediate arrangements for flight, remarking: 'God knows what's in the wind now.' When the Nimach brigade saw



that of Bareilly about to start they followed their example — so did the Nasirabad column — the result being that when the 200 troopers moved off in front intending to proceed to the King, the entire rebel army's Horse, Foot and Artillery commenced their retreat in a confused broken mass, leaving all their tents and baggage behind. No one attempted to stop them — not a man even asked his neighbour where they were going — all were alike broken in spirit and apathetic, because flight had for some time been the uppermost thought in each man's heart. The rebel army proceeded by the direct road to Balabgarh and Farukhabad. On arrival at Humayun's tomb Bakht Khan and Muhammad Shafi went to [the King] and asked him to accompany them. He prepared to do so but was stopped by Hakim Ahsanullah Khan who said: 'Recollect that you are the King. It is not right for you to go. The army of the English mutinied against their masters, fought with them and have been utterly routed and dispersed. What has your Highness to do with them? Be of good courage. The English will not regard you as guilty.' With such words he restrained the King from accompanying the army in its flight, on which Bakht Khan and Muhammad Shafi left and rejoined it on the march to Balabgarh. It went via Mathura and crossing the river Jumna reached a place not far from Aligarh. There it separated into two divisions, the Cavalry going towards Bareilly, the Infantry moving to the eastward but wherever the army went it was defeated and scattered and sent to Hades as the object of God's displeasure.

When the English on the Ridge saw that the entire mutineer army had abandoned their baggage and were flying in panic and confusion thinking solely of saving their own worthless lives, and in disorderly and disgraceful retreat were hurrying along the road to hell, they assumed the entire government of the city and without fear or favour proceeded to reward the friends and well wishers of the British government and to punish the evil doers.


The following day Mirza Alahi Baksh . . . father-in-law of the late Heir Apparent, after an interview with Hodson Sahib went to the King at Humayun's tomb with the intention of bringing [him] back into Delhi. Outside the tomb he was met by Hodson Sahib, who took charge of the King and placed him under surveillance in the Palace.

Hodson Sahib subsequently brought the princes Mirza Moghul, Mirza Abu Bakr and Mirza Khizr Sultan in a [bullock cart] as prisoners and when near the jail shot all three and had their bodies taken to the [police headquarters].

After the lapse of a year and a half when the contract of the Company Bahadur [East India Company] was broken and the Queen of England took the country under her own rule, she proclaimed a general amnesty and forgiveness for all past offences.

May the High God ever protect and shield so great and merciful a Sovereign and preserve her people in the East from all tyranny and oppression.

(in: *Red Year: The Indian Rebellion of 1857*. By Michael Edwards. London: Hamish Hamilton 1973, pp. 185-235, Appendix)





**MU'INUDDIN HASAN KHAN**

Translated by **CHARLES TH. METCALFE**

## **NARRATIVE OF MAINODIN**

In the name of the most merciful God

Praise to the Almighty Creator of earth and Heaven, who at His first command created the heavens, and the tablets on which the decrees of mortals' fates are written, who brought into existence the universe, and invested it with divers forms of man and animal, with objects animate and inanimate, and devised means for their support.

And among these He gave excellence to mankind, and endowed him with wisdom and intelligence.

Man's very language in His glory fails.

Wisdom fails in proving His unity.

His Benevolence defies all description.

Praise to Mahommed Mustapha, the most excellent and chosen of mankind. Blessings on him, his friends and his children, him of whom God had said: "I would not have created the world but for you."

And now it is necessary that I should relate my story, and the reasons which have led me to write this narrative.

I, the writer, am the descendant of Mu-in-uddin Hassan Khan, son of Nawab Ashruf-ulla Dowlah Kudmit-ulla-beg-Khan Bahadur, son of Nawab Shurruf-ul-Dowlah Cossim Khan Bahadur, a general, and sometime Kotwal of the province of Delhi, during the Mahommedan Dynasty. The real birthplace of my ancestors was Samarcand and Bokhara. My ancestor Nawab Shurruf-ul-Dowlah, together with his two brothers, Kochuh Mirza and Arif Khan, died, and Aruni Beg Khan made his home in the Punjab in the time of Shah Ahmed Allum Padshah, Emperor of Hindustan. After the decease of my ancestors, when English sovereignty was established and the Mahratta rule was declining, I took service under the English Government.

In the year 1848 I took up my residence in the province of Delhi, in Perghunah Hill, and was appointed a police-officer, carrying out loyally all the orders that I received, and receiving kindness and encouragement at the hands of those in power, above all, from Sir Thomas Metcalfe, then Commissioner and Agent at the Court of Delhi. He was well acquainted with the nobility of my ancestors, and showed me great kindness, as also did his son, Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, at the time Joint Magistrate at Delhi; and after the events to which this



history belongs, I received much kindness and protection from his younger brother, Mr. Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, of the Bengal Civil Service, at a time when I was helpless and friendless. And here I may say that I have always received much kindness at the hands of European gentlemen.

Of the mutiny of the Native Army in 1857 I was more than a witness, and by the force of circumstances I became acquainted with all that passed at the outbreak of the rebellion. I was in charge of the police division of Pahargunge, and it is through loyalty and faithfulness to Sir Theophilus Metcalfe that I am about to record the real circumstances of the mutiny as they came to my knowledge.

It has been said that I was an active participator in the mutiny. It is true that, after the capture of Delhi, through the evil machinations and falsehoods of a Chuprassie, by name Chunerri, and on account of my own evil fate, I dared not present myself before Sir Theophilus Metcalfe. After the assault, my house and all my goods were plundered. I was dejected and in terror of my life. It seemed to me that I had neither bravery nor sense left. I believed at the time that my younger brother had gone, with all the members of his family, to Bombay, and thither I made my way in disguise.

There I lived as a merchant as best I could, and there I was joined by my younger brother. From Bombay we wrote to Sir Theophilus, asking him for certificates of character, and proofs of my loyalty and devotedness to him.

Sir Theophilus had gone to England, but from him I received both money and the proofs I wanted. But I was in such a distressed state of mind at all that had occurred, that I could determine on no course for the future.

Ever haunted by the fear of the extreme penalty of the law, I fled to Arabia, and there I remained for more than three years, sending my younger brother back to Delhi to ascertain all that was happening, as he was guiltless of any participation in the mutiny.

A weary time passed, during which I was separated from all dear to me. In 1863 I heard from my brother that he was then on a journey with Sir Theophilus Metcalfe through Kohistan. In 1864 I returned from Arabia, but still remained in concealment at Bombay. At this time Sir Edward Bayley<sup>1</sup> had been appointed Secretary to the Government of India, and knowing his generosity and nobleness, I determined to give myself up through him to the British Government. I presented myself before him, and under his instructions I gave myself up to Colonel McNeil, then Commissioner of the Delhi Division. I found, to my sorrow, that I was regarded with suspicion by the Commissioner, to whom I was personally unknown. He looked upon me as an enemy to the British Government. I was put on my trial, and through the justice of the English, and on the proofs I was able to produce of my devotedness to Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, I was acquitted.

<sup>1</sup> Brother-in-law to Sir Theophilus Metcalfe.



I remained three days in Delhi, and then returned to Bombay, and thence went to Hyderabad, whence, being attacked by severe illness, I returned to Delhi, a restless wanderer. After remaining a few days in Delhi, I desired to return to Bombay, but, penniless and ruined, I threw myself on the generosity of the Nawab of Rampur, who with noble liberality gave me a home and an income. On the 1st of January, 1877, when the great assemblage of the Kings of Hindustan was held at Delhi, by order of H.E. Lord Lytton, Governor-General of India, my poor circumstances (through the disinterested kindness of Sir Edward Bayley) were pointed out to his Lordship, who was pleased in the generosity of his heart to confer on me a sum of money to be settled upon me and my heirs. During the time that the deeds connected with this money were being drawn up I was constantly in communication with Mr. Charles Metcalfe, then Commissioner of Police in Calcutta. Mr. Metcalfe one day asked me if I had any papers in my possession connected with the occurrences at Delhi in 1857. I replied that as police-officer I had been accustomed to keep a "Roznamcha," or diary of daily occurrences, and so through the troublous time I had kept a record of daily events, but as the hand of destiny had been against me, it would be better to leave unwritten this page of my own life-history.

I was assured there were no grounds for further proceedings being taken against me, and I was encouraged to write of events in which I had been personally concerned, or which had come under my immediate knowledge.

My answer was that I would comply with whatsoever Mr. Metcalfe might desire, but that I was afraid to write of the events with which I was acquainted, for fear I might commit some blunder. I said it is a general defect with writers that instead of putting down the true and actual occurrences they may have witnessed, they fill their books with false statements and high compliments, colouring them as real facts. How could I write of the true events without implicating myself? for I had been an actor myself in these great occurrences as well as an eye-witness.

My patron comforted me, saying that time had smoothed away many obstacles to writing a true history, and that I need no longer fear personal consequences. Paying my respects, I promised to write of every true occurrence of which I had been an eye-witness, and of every fact with which I was acquainted. Sir Edward Bayley, too, gave me encouragement in this.

Now the duty devolves upon me to write in detail. Though many have written about the Mutiny of 1857 in forms of memoranda, histories, and diaries, yet I consider all of them mere hearsay. I will not write of rumours and of unauthenticated stories, but of such events as have happened in my presence, and that which has been reported to me by reliable persons.

I will commence my narrative with the statement that, however the English may regard themselves, they are regarded by the natives as trespassers, and this feeling was intensified on the annexation of the province of Oude. Thence first arose dissatisfaction among the native troops, most of whom were



natives of that province. Then followed the events of the mutiny and the arrangements made for its suppression, the calamities of the Ryots, the destruction of many native estates, the final ruin of several noted families and large cities; the penalties inflicted on rebels and "Budmashes" who received the proper punishment for their misdeeds, and in consequence of whose acts many innocent persons were hanged and disaster hurled down upon the country. Their behaviour, instead of bearing any fruit, ended in the destruction of their own families. Now after a great revolution and fatal agitation, peace has been restored, and the former state of public tranquillity again enjoyed by every subject. I call this book the "Khodang godur." May God bring prosperity and long life to those through whose accomplishment of purpose and effort the compiler of this book has come among the list of authors! It is my earnest request to my readers that if they come across any mistakes in the language or in the usage of idioms, that they will pass them over indulgently, because man is born to err; besides, I am not a man of letters, but a soldier by profession, therefore it is absolutely necessary to overlook my shortcomings.

The English are familiar with the views of English writers on the causes of the mutiny of the Indian Army. These views differ in some respects from those held by natives, who trace the outbreak to a different source.

When Amjad Ali Shah Padshah, King of Lucknow, died in 1847, he was succeeded by Shah Wajid Ali, who devoted himself to the organization of the Army. Orders were issued that after morning prayer all the regiments in Lucknow were to parade daily at 5 a.m. The King was in the habit of taking command at the parade, dressed in the uniform of a general; he used to drill the troops for four or five hours daily. Furthermore, he issued an order that if he were absent from parade, except through necessities of the State, he was to be fined 2,000 rupees, to be distributed among the regiments in garrison. An equivalent fine was to be levied if any of the regiments were late on parade, and as a further punishment two regiments of infantry and a *resalah* of cavalry were to remain under arms the whole day.

This activity of the King created suspicion. The British Resident inquired the cause of his exertions in creating an army, and suggested to him that if he required forces for the protection of his province he should employ British troops, to be paid out of the revenues of Oude. The courtiers of his Court also advised him not to raise suspicion by his personal activity. The King, discouraged by these remonstrances, replied that he would employ himself in future with some other occupation, as his interest in his army was not approved of. Henceforward he began to neglect the affairs of the State, and took pleasure in debauchery. The former Minister, Findad Hossim Khan, was removed from his post, and Ali Tuki Khan, a man of good family, was appointed to succeed him. The King married the niece of his new Minister, and then his daughter. He left the management of all the affairs of State to Ali Tuki Khan.

From the neglect of his kingdom there arose results which man's wisdom could not foresee. There was a Rajah, Dursham Sing by name, a nobleman of old



family, the son of a Brahmin, Mahender Sing, a soldier by profession. His Dursham Sing had three sons—Buktour Sing, Durshin Sing, and Cholauka Sing. The eldest obtained the King's favour and a title of nobility, as did also Durshin Sing. They also obtained appointments as "Chakladars."

Durshin Sing next proceeded to force defaulting zemindars to draw out bills of sale of their property in his name. Thus he gradually formed for himself a large estate. His *talook* (property) adjoined a place called Hanumanjari, in the vicinity of Fyzabad, where there was a Mahommedan mosque which Durshin Sing annexed, together with its endowment.

Durshin had two sons, Hanuman Dull and Man Sing. These two men refused to allow the "Azan" (call to prayer) to be sounded from the mosque. A few days later a travelling Moulvie, Fakir Hossein Shah, came to the mosque to pray, and not knowing of the prohibition, sounded the Azan. The Brahmins of a neighbouring temple, hearing this, came to the mosque, assaulted the Moulvie, and taking from him the Koran which he held in his hands, threw it into a fire and burned it, and then drove the Moulvie out of the mosque.

The traveller went on his way to Lucknow, and told in the bazaars what had happened. It so happened that in the Hyderabad Mehalla ward of the city, the story interested a man called Hyder Khan, who lived there with his four brothers. All were soldiers in the service of the King. On hearing of the outrage, the two younger brothers offered to assist the Moulvie to obtain retribution for the insult to the Prophet. The three, in pursuance of their plan, returned to Hanumanjari, and the next day at the usual hour of prayer, they sounded the Azan loudly and repeatedly. Brahmins came running to the mosque; an altercation followed; then a fight, in which the two soldiers were killed; Hossein escaped, and returning to Lucknow, laid a complaint before the criminal court. The native judge, seeing that the case was likely to prove troublesome, put it aside. The Moulvie then appealed to one Syud Amir-Ali, Resident of Kasbeh Intaband, who bore a great reputation in the city as a holy and just man, and who had lived for many years as a recluse in a corner of the mosque at Kusbeh Amaitie. On hearing the story, he took up the Moulvie's cause. He first called a public meeting at the mosque, and issued a Futwa (law decision) on the consequences of burning the Koran, and the murder of two zealous Mahommedans, who had fallen in defence of their religion. He then began to preach a *jehad* (holy war) in the streets of Lucknow, and in the adjoining country. He pointed out that there was a danger to the Mahommedan religion, and this excited and inflamed the public mind. Eventually he started for Hanumanjari with a large following of persons burning to revenge the insult offered to their religion. The matter came to the ears of the British Resident, who hastened to the King, and urged him to take immediate measures to allay the excitement. The King sent for Kadum Hossein, and urged him to use his influence to settle the matter amicably.

Hossein Bux and Mahommed Tyer Khan were deputed to bring back the Moulvie, who, however, refused to return, Nawwab Ali Tuki Khan then suggested to the King that Bashir-ul-Dowlah should be sent to bring back the



Moulvie. He agreed to go if justice were done, and threatened if it were not that he would join the Moulvie. The British Resident again urged the King to prevent widespread bloodshed, and impressed on him his responsibility.

Both the King and his Minister for the time forgot their anger with the Resident for his interference with the King's military ardour, and consulted upon the measures necessary to suppress the impending trouble. They sent for Moulvie Kadim Hossein, a resident of Feringhee Mehal in Lucknow, a man of ability and position, and asked him to publish a contradictory Futwa, so as to cut away the ground from beneath the feet of those who desired war. The King also summoned Shah Hossein Bux and Mahommed Fakir Khan, and urged them to do all in their power to quiet the Moulvie; but their efforts were fruitless. The Moulvie would listen to no terms other than that the Brahmins should be expelled from the Hanumanjari mosque, and the Mahommedans protected in the exercise of their ceremonials and prayers, and offenders punished in accordance with the laws of the Koran. Promises were made, but no steps were taken to fulfil them. The Moulvie remained at Lucknow for eight or ten days as the guest of Bashir-ul-Dowlah, who repeatedly urged upon the Vizier the fulfilment of his promise. The Moulvie then sent a message to the King that he would take the enforcement of justice into his own hands, and he returned to Hanumanjari after quarrelling with Bashir-ul-Dowlah for non-fulfilment of his promises. On this, the King ordered Colonel Barlow, who commanded the King's troops, to take a regiment of Hindus only, and to stop the Moulvie by force, and if necessary he was to blow the Moulvie from a gun in case resistance was offered. The King's soldiers were encamped four miles from the Moulvie's camp. When the Moulvie attempted to march from Radli Maidan, Colonel Barton forbade his doing so and surrounded his camp.

Attacked by the Moulvie's followers, the guns opened fire, and killed 111 of the assailants, many of the King's troops falling also. The news of this engagement spread throughout Hindustan and was the forerunner of still greater events. Little by little evil thoughts were generated. The British Resident, impressed by numerous petitions against the grave oppressions to which the people were subjected, and convinced of the inability of the King to rule the province in the interests of his people, recommended annexation. It is singular to record that under a Mahommedan sovereign injustice should have been perpetrated in the matter of a mosque, and that the people should subsequently have arisen in rebellion against the British, to whom they appealed for justice and protection. On the 17th of February, 1856, the British annexed Oude. They little anticipated the result. Thousands of men in the service of the King were thereby thrown out of employment, and were deprived of the means of livelihood. The worse the administration had been, the greater was the multitude of soldiers, courtiers, police, and landholders, who had fattened on it.

Those who had petitioned the English for redress were the poor and the oppressed. But the oppressors saw in British rule their own suppression. Oude was the birthplace of the Purbeah race, and these feelings of dissatisfaction



affected the whole Purbeah race in the service of the British Government. To the native mind the act of annexation was one of gross injustice, and provoked a universal desire for resistance.

The King, and all those connected with him, although bowing to the hand of fate, became henceforward the bitter enemies of the English. At this time there were stationed at Lucknow two regiments, the 19th and the 34th, which were in the pay of the English Government. They had frequent consultations together on the injustice of the step which had been taken, and on the resistance which should be offered, and the attempts which should be made to create a rebellion for the purpose of overthrowing the British authority. It so happened that at the time of the annual change of regiments in 1857 one of these two regiments was sent to Berampur, the other to Barrackpur. Both these regiments were full of bitterness towards the English Government, and from them letters were written to other Purbeah regiments. The 34th took the lead. These letters reminded every regiment of the ancient dynasties of Hindustan; pointed out that the annexation of Oude had been followed by the disbandment of the Oude army, for the second time since the connection of the English with Oude; and showed that their place was being filled by the enlistment of Punjabis and Sikhs, and the formation of a Punjab army. The very bread had been torn out of the mouths of men who knew no other profession than that of the sword. The letters went on to say that further annexations might be expected, with little or no use for the native army. Thus was it pressed upon the Sepoys that they must rebel to reseat the ancient kings on their thrones, and drive the trespassers away. The welfare of the soldier caste required this; the honour of their chiefs was at stake.

The proximity of these two regiments to each other enabled the conspirators to carry on a constant correspondence (the circulation of these letters being conducted with great secrecy), and frequent consultations ensued. By degrees it became known in native society which regiments were disaffected, and it began to be inculcated as a creed that every Purbeah must withdraw his friendship from the foreigner; must ignore his authority, and overthrow his rule. Although these sentiments had become national, the methods to be employed in carrying them into action were but indistinctly known when the actual outbreak occurred. When the rebellion had begun, the full force and significance of all that had preceded it became apparent, and men understood what it meant.

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In the month of January, 1857, the house of a European gentleman and the Telegraph Office at Ranigunge were burned down. This was a concerted signal; it was calculated that the burning of a telegraph office would immediately be communicated along the line from Calcutta to the Punjab, and that those in the secret would understand on hearing of it that they too must fire houses. Information of these incendiaries was widely circulated in all directions, and it is



said that letters were sent from regiment to regiment inciting them to commit similar acts.

In the following month, February, another signal was given by the widespread distribution of chupattis (flat unleavened cakes), an ominous sign. At the time I was "Thanadar" (Head Police Officer) of the Pahargunge Police Station just outside the city of Delhi. Early one morning the village watchman of Indraput came and reported that the watchman of Seraie Faruck Khan had brought him a chupatti (which he showed me) and had instructed him to cook five similar chupattis, and send them to the five nearest villages of the neighbourhood, with orders that each village *chowkider* was to make five similar ones for distribution. Each chupatti was to be made of barley and wheat flour, about the size of the palm of a man's hand, and was to weigh two *tolahs*. I was astonished, yet I felt that the statement of the watchman was true, and that there was importance in an event which undoubtedly created a feeling of great alarm in the native mind throughout Hindustan. No extraordinary incident occurred until it was rumoured that on February 26 the 19th Regiment of Foot at Berampur had refused to take<sup>2</sup> cartridges served out to them, and that the 34th Regiment had behaved in a similar manner, and that seven companies of that regiment had been dismissed. When I heard this I suspected it was the beginning of a time of trouble. Information of the behaviour of the different regiments was widely circulated by the Press, in a native newspaper published at Umballa. Suspecting some significance in all this I deputed men at once to visit the whole of my police jurisdiction, and, after ascertaining whether chupattis had already reached other villages, to forbid their circulation.

My younger brother, Mirza Mahommed Hossein Khan, was Thanadar of the police jurisdiction of Buddapur, about sixteen miles from Delhi. The same day that I received information about the circulation of chupattis in Pahargunge I heard from my brother, by a mounted messenger, that chupattis were passing from village to village throughout his jurisdiction; that pieces of goat's flesh were also being distributed; and he asked me what was to be done. I wrote to him at once to use all his influence to prevent the circulation, and immediately sent word to the authorities.

For some days I received no orders: subsequently an order came to inquire and report what was intended by this circulation. Other letters now came to me from Thanadars of Alipur and Shepur, who asked for advice what to do.

<sup>2</sup> There were two men of the British Army cashiered from their regiments at Meerut (see p. 1 of Narrative). One of these became a Mahommedan and took the name of Abdulla Beg. From Meerut he visited Umballa, Ludiana, and Ferozepur, and, again returning to Meerut, took up his quarters near the Cantonments, daily receiving visits from men of the native regiments, and gradually ingratiating himself. Consultations were daily held on the burning question of the greased cartridges. On one occasion, addressing a number of the Sepoys, he said: "I know these cartridges are smeared with the fat of pigs and cows, and the Government intends to take your caste. Even if you smear them with ghee and oil, as soon as you use them your example will be cited, and other regiments will use them."



I then received orders to stop the circulation. In the meantime my brother was deputed to go both to Allyghur and Muttra and inquire whether this circulation was general throughout the country. From him I learned that he had travelled over a large part of the Delhi division, and wherever he had gone he found the chupatti had been received from some place still further east. He was beset with questions, but whence the sign had come no one could tell, neither its origin, nor its intention, were known.

My brother suggested that letters should be sent to the civil authorities of other districts to trace this matter, or else that he should be allowed to trace it to its very source; but no permission was given. Next I received an order from Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, then Joint Magistrate at Delhi, to report privately what I believed to be the origin of the matter. I wrote that I had heard from my father how, in the downfall of the Mahratta power, a sprig of china (or millet),<sup>1</sup> and a morsel of bread, had passed from village to village, and that it was more than probable that the distribution of this bread was significant of some great disturbance, which would follow immediately. I had no further official communications or orders on this matter.

Following on this circumstance, there arose a hue and cry that the English were plotting to destroy the "caste" of the native Sepoys, by causing them to use a cartridge dipped in the fat of cows and pigs. The officers of the Government seemed to attach no importance to the matter, and paid no heed to what we regarded as significant warnings of a serious spirit of disaffection, which was spreading far and wide over the country.

On the morning of the 11th May I was engaged in a case in the Criminal Court of the Magistrate and Collector, Mr. Hutchinson. Shortly afterwards Buldeo Sing, Darogah in charge of the Jumna Bridge, came and said that he had just received information that there had been a fight between the European and native troops in Meerut, and that the latter were marching straight upon Delhi, burning all the bungalows, and killing all the Europeans and Christians along their route. The mutineers were reported to be close to Delhi. The Collector at once ordered Buldeo Sing to hasten to his post and make arrangements for closing at once the city gate leading to the bridge. The Collector then drove off in his buggy in the direction of the Commissioner's house. Mr. Fraser, being asleep, was aroused and informed of all that was happening. Among the natives it is said that late the night before a sowar had arrived from Meerut with a letter for Mr. Simon Fraser, the Commissioner, which the Jemadar took to him; he was sitting in his chair asleep after dinner, and the Jemadar had to call several times to his master before he awoke. The Jemadar then told him that a sowar had brought an urgent letter from Meerut. The Commissioner, however, rebuffed him, and taking the letter from the servant's hands mechanically put it into his pocket, falling asleep again afterwards. The servants were afraid to awaken the Commissioner

<sup>1</sup> The Sonthals send round a sprig of the sál-tree (*Shorea robusta*) if they desire to attract public attention.



again, and all that they gathered from the sowar was that he had learned from the patrol who had given him the letter that there was a great *goolmal* (confusion) at Meerut, and he had been urged to gallop at speed with the letter. I learned all this from the chuprassis while awaiting Mr. Hutchinson's return to the Cutcherry. While I was thus speculating on what had happened at Meerut, Mr. Hutchinson arrived. Seeing me, he ordered me to go off at once to the city and warn the Kotwal (or chief police-officer); then I was to return to my station in Pahargunge, and do my utmost to preserve order. Leaving him I rode through the city, and on my way met the Kotwal and gave him the magistrate's orders. He rode with me part of the way. According to him the city was quite quiet. While we were riding along a watchman from the Rajghaut city gate ran up, and reported that a number of native cavalry had reached the city walls from Meerut, and he had seen a still larger body approaching in the distance.

He said, in reply to a question, that the gates had been closed, but that when he left there was a great disturbance outside to have the gates opened. Leaving the Kotwal, to go to the city gate, I galloped back to report to Mr. Hutchinson that the mutineers were already at the Rajghaut Gate. He quietly told me to go off to my own post. He asked a chuprassi if anyone had seen Mr. Le Bas, and then drove off as if in search of him.<sup>4</sup> I mounted my horse and galloped off to Pahargunge, through the Ajmere Gate of the city. Arriving there I turned out all the police "Burkundazies" and ordered them to look to their arms.

Whilst I was talking to my Burkundazies I suddenly saw a horse ridden by a European galloping towards the police station. As soon as I saw the rider I recognized him as the Joint Magistrate, Sir Theophilus Metcalfe. I rose from my seat, and coming forward to meet him, called out the guard, and gave him a salute. At this time he was without any clothes save his shirt and underdrawers. I asked him what had happened. He replied: "The mutineers have got into the city and are killing all the Europeans. I have escaped by seizing this horse and have been pursued through the city." He then said to me, "Are you willing to do me a service?" I replied: "All that I have is yours: what service can I perform?" He then dismounted from his horse, and asked me for some clothes to put on. I took him to the police station and opened my box. He selected a suit of native dress and a good sword of the kind known as Jari Ghaut. He then ordered his horse with the view of returning to his own house. I begged of him not to go. He then said: "I have left in my bedroom, in my house, a box containing 13,000 rupees in notes and some gold in coins." He desired me to send two trustworthy persons to

<sup>4</sup> From inquiry, I afterwards learned that Mr. Hutchinson had driven round to see that all his orders had been carried out, and had driven to the Kotwali, with Mr. Le Bas, the Judge. From Mr. Fraser's chuprassi I also learned that when he had carefully read the letter, which he had received the night before, he sent orders to secure the safety of his office, and ordered his carriage and gun to be sent after him into the city. Then taking with him Karim Bux Khan, the Jujjur Rajah's Resaldar, he went towards the city. He does not appear to have issued any orders to employ his Bodyguard.



bring the box. I at once deputed Kaluja Sing Mohurur and Omrao Mirza for this purpose.

I then questioned Sir Theophilus as to how he had escaped, for it seemed to me an all but impossible feat. I learned from him that he had arrived rather late at the Court House. He had found the Courts all empty, and only the Assistant Magistrate present, who was waiting, not knowing what to do. Nazir Rani Chand Dass then reported to him that the Treasury Guard had been overheard the night before saying that the Government was tampering with their religion, and "What would be, would be." This report was followed by one from the Darogah of the Jumna Bridge, that the mutineers were hastening towards the city; he was warned that they were already under the city wall. He then drove with the Assistant Magistrate to the Magazine, where he turned out the guard of twenty-four Nujibs, and sent them to guard the city gates. The men pointed out that they had no cartridges. They were sent off, and Sir Theophilus then drove by himself towards the Calcutta Gate. He was met by a crowd hurrying towards him; from them he learned that the mutineers had already entered the city. Sending the Kotwal<sup>5</sup> who was with him to guard the Kotwali, he drove on. On reaching Dariagunge he was met by three sowars, who, pulling out their pistols, fired at him. As each man met the buggy, and raised his pistol, Sir Theophilus lashed him across the face with the buggy whip. Flinching from the lash, each sowar missed him. He galloped on until he became separated by a crowd from his assailants, but another crowd ahead barred his progress. Jumping out of the buggy, he threw off his coat, pulled off his trousers, and ran down one of the many lanes of the city towards the garden house of Madub Dass. On his way he had suddenly come across the Resaldar of the Rajah of Jujjur's Cavalry, Mahommed Khan by name. He called on this man to give up his horse, but he refused. On this Sir Theophilus suddenly seized him by the leg, tilted him out of the saddle, wrenched the reins from his hands, and jumping on the horse rode hard for the Choree Bazaar. Again he was headed by sowars. He turned, and was pursued by them in the direction of the Ajmere Gate, through which he passed and reached Pahargunge.

Whilst he was relating these adventures, two policemen came and reported that the road to Sir Theophilus's house was completely blocked by bodies of mutinous soldiers and ruffians, who were past all control and bent on murder and rapine. The men betrayed by their faces the fear they felt, but Sir Theophilus was not to be scared by such a tale, and he still declared he would ride back to cantonments where the troops were quartered. I warned him of the danger of such a step. How would he escape if the native troops at Delhi mutinied also? I begged him to go and take refuge in my family house in the city, where my eldest brother, Amir-u-din Khan and his tribesmen would answer for his life. I offered to conduct him myself to the house, suggesting also that his

<sup>5</sup> I was informed afterwards that this "Kotwal," Buldeo Dass by name, on arriving at the Kotwali, learned that Mr. Hutchinson had been already murdered. He galloped back to warn Sir Theophilus, but met his buggy, with the horse galloping, without a driver, or a "syce" (groom).



presence in the city might possibly benefit the English Government. But he replied: "My duty is with the troops. It may be that by this time I am the only civil officer alive; it is not fitting that I should think of personal safety, while there is a military force near at hand to restore order." He then mounted, and we rode towards the Farashkhana Bridge. On our way we saw a large body of mutineers marching out from the Lahore Gate, and coming towards us. We met Kallian Mohurur and Omrao Mirza, who had been sent to try and save the money-chest from Sir Theophilus Metcalfe's house. They had been terrified by what they had seen. They reported the whole road as occupied by Bazis and Budmashes. They were so frightened that they returned with their mission unaccomplished. We consulted, and it was thought madness to proceed by the straight road. We determined to go back and ascertain what the troops at the cantonments were doing. I again proposed that Sir Theophilus should go to my house. He refused, on the ground that his presence would become known and lead to the destruction of my family and all my property. We cautioned our companions against revealing Sir Theophilus's presence, and we rode off to the Durza of Kadim Shurif; passing it, we went through Molea Khand, Mullam Dhanda, Buki Sahian, until we reached Bagh Kutapi in the suburbs, some three miles from the city. Stopping our horses<sup>3</sup> before the house of Bhura Khan Mewatti, we dismounted. The man was not known to me personally, but he bore the character of being a fearless, upright man. He held the position of a "Lumberdar." On inquiry, I learned he was absent; but his son came out to inquire what we wanted. I sent him to look for his father, and we waited quietly near the house. In a short time Bhura Khan came, and, after salutations, I said: "Do you know who this is?" pointing to my companion. He looked earnestly at him; recognizing him he said: "It is *Mutculub*<sup>6</sup> Saheb." I related to him the occurrences of the morning. He recognized my companion's danger, and of his own accord offered his services. Sir Theophilus Metcalfe was anxious to learn the fate of the other European officers, and bade me go into the city and try to save any European lives I could. But it was too late to avert evil. It is probable if earlier steps had been taken to rouse the leading men of the city, many human lives might have been saved. When as yet comparatively few mutineers had entered the city, the personal retainers of the nobles might have been sufficient to deal with the handful of marauders. The Rajah of Bulubghur was, at the time, in the city with his followers. He, together with Nawab Amir-u-din Khan and Zia-u-din Khan, who were men of great influence and loyal to the British — these, I say, could easily have raised a sufficient force, on the spur of the moment, to attack the Meerut sowars. The sowars were mounted on horses, and they would have been helpless in the narrow lanes of the city, crowded as it was with people. Alas! the suddenness of the inroad of a handful of men created a panic. Ignorance

<sup>6</sup> Corruption of "Metcalfe." Illiterate natives of India have a ready aptitude for corrupting Saxon names: thus "Abercromby" becomes "Bikrom"; "Alexander," "Seconder"; "Hastings," "Istink."



of the strength of the mutineers, and exaggerated reports of their number, quite paralyzed the better disposed part of the inhabitants.

In the mind of the natives, blame is attributed to the unfortunate inaction of the Commissioner, due to his neglect of the very important information which reached him the day before. By nine o'clock of that fatal morning the principal executive officers of the Government were dead. Then there ensued a panic. Every man thought of his own safety and that of his family and property.

But to get back to my narrative, I returned first to Pahargunge police station. I was questioned where the magistrate had gone. I replied that he had outpaced me, and had ridden I knew not where. Changing my costume, and adopting the habit generally worn by natives, I rode towards the city. I found the gate open and unguarded. I rode to my family house, where the terrified inmates were closing the doors. I rode on to the fort, finding all the shops on the road closed, both those of artizans and those of the Bunyahs or provision merchants. On every side the scum of the population was hurrying to and fro, laden with the plunder of European houses. Arriving at the central police station I found it plundered even to the doors, which had been carried off. The place was apparently deserted. Calling aloud I was answered by two policemen; from them I learned that the convicts who had been working on the roads had been taken to the station-house that morning for custody as soon as the disturbance had commenced. Shortly afterwards two Mahommedan sowars had ridden up, and called out, "Are you all here for your religion or against it?" The Kotwal had replied, "We are all for our religion." The convicts then made a rush for a blacksmith's shop, and assisted each other to cut off their irons. After this, two men mounted on camels and dressed in green with red turbans rode by at a trot, calling out, "Hear, ye people, the drum of religion has sounded." Whence they had come or whither they went, my informant knew not, but the excited and terrified crowds in the streets believed they were heavenly messengers. The convicts, freed from their fetters, returned and stormed the police station. The doors had been closed, but they forced them open with the assistance of some Sepoys. The Kotwal saved his life by jumping down at the back of the premises from the roof, and escaped in the direction of Roson-ud-Dowlah. The Naib Kotwal similarly got away. Foiled of their victims, the convicts plundered the house and destroyed all they could lay their hands on. My informants, who were natives of Lower Hindustan, not knowing what to do or where to go, still hung about the premises for shelter.

I learned that the mutineers had all gone in the direction of the Cashmere Gate to plunder, and to kill the Europeans who lived there. Still hoping to prevent some butchery, I ordered the two policemen to go and collect as many of the police as they could find. I told them to say I had been appointed City Kotwal by the King. To reassure them I gave them five rupees to purchase sugar, and instructed them if any mutineers came to the place to mention my name as having been appointed Kotwal. If any Sepoys came there, they were to be welcomed and offered sugar to mix with water. I then rode on to the Palace to ask for an



interview with the King, in hopes that I might get some appointment to give me influence to stop the butchery of Europeans, and ensure the protection of my own family.

As I passed the Lahore Gate of the city I found the Volunteer Company of Native Infantry standing in line, ready for action. They, however, took no notice of me. Leaving my horse outside the "Red Purdah," I entered the Palace on foot. The place was untenanted and deserted. On reaching the Taswir Khana I found four head servants and two eunuchs in attendance. One of the servants, whom I knew, asked me why I had come. I replied, "I must see the King," and inquired where he was; I induced him to seek the King. I was summoned, and, prostrating myself, replied to his questions that my object in seeking an audience was, that plunder and butchery were going on; and all the bad characters were searching for European and Christian women and children to destroy them. I begged the King to stop this, and to arrange for the restoration of order. The King replied: "I am helpless; all my attendants have lost their heads or fled. I remain here alone. I have no force to obey my orders: what can I do?" I replied: "If your Majesty will tell me the desire of your heart, possibly I may be able to carry out your commands." I described my proposed line of action. The King replied: "My son, this duty will I expect from you; you have come to me in a moment of difficulty and danger; do whatever seemeth good to you: I command you." I then said to the King: "If anyone should speak evil of me, charging me with occupying myself in suppressing disorders, be pleased to say, 'He is acting under my orders.' If your Majesty will give me the services of one or two of your Chobdars,<sup>7</sup> and let them come with me to the scene of the massacre and butchery, giving them orders to support me with your authority, the slaughter of the helpless ones may be stayed. They could be brought here in custody to await your Majesty's pleasure. If their lives are saved, such an act of benevolence will benefit your Majesty above everything, if it be possible to carry out this scheme." I asked also that one of the Royal Princes should be sent to ride through the city and order the shops to be opened. The King approved of this proposal, and sent for Hakim Ahsanullah Khan. He came, and was ordered to listen to my proposals. He replied: "What necessity is there for Chobdars to accompany you? The *bagheelog* (runaways) will never abandon, the slaughter of Christians. If they are interfered with, yet worse things may happen. When satiated with the blood of Christians, they will direct their attention to us and to our property. Let us take care of ourselves." I replied: "Hakimjee, your judgment is not good. The massacre of innocent women and children is not a good work in the eyes of the Most High God. When this insurrection is suppressed, and the English power re-established, the saving of these lives will stand you in good stead. Even if you incline to the opinion that the English power is gone for ever, these lives you have saved will redound to your glory and honour." I told him it was my opinion

<sup>7</sup> Bearers of the Mace.



that the insurrection would continue only a short while, and besought him to act on my advice. Hakim Ahsanullah remained silent as if lost in deep thought.

The King, inclining to my advice, ordered the Chobdars to accompany me. I hurried with them to Dariagunge, where the greater number of Europeans lived. Here was a sad scene, for the wicked and miserable murderers were employed in burning bungalows and killing the women and children. May God be merciful, and not lay to my charge the terrible sights I witnessed! I and the Chobdars loudly proclaimed the orders of the King. Our interference was so far effectual, that the lives of some dozen persons were spared. They were sent to the Palace, and confined in the *chota kasa* apartments, and orders were given to feed them. Until late in the afternoon I laboured, going from bungalow to bungalow, hoping to find some one still living whom I might rescue. A few Christians only were found alive and taken to the Palace.

Later on I met a large number of Christians, men, women, and children, closely guarded. Using my authority I ordered them to be sent to the Palace or to the Kotwáli for trial, to prove if they were or were not Christians. I said: "If they be found hereafter to be Christians let them be slaughtered; but if they are falsely accused, the King's orders are, they must be set free. These are not Europeans, but men of the country." I said all this to save their lives. Nineteen of them were given up to me and sent to the Kotwáli. About four o'clock I was startled by the report as of a hundred cannon fired together. Astonished, I went towards the Cashmere Gate, and learned from some persons running towards me that the Magazine had been blown up. I then went on to the Magazine. The wall facing the river was blown down, and some of the inmates escaped that way. When the smoke had blown away, I entered the place: six wounded Europeans were found after the explosion. I had them sent away to the Palace, saving them from immediate slaughter. It was now towards evening. The Treasury was still untouched, and the guard on duty present as usual. I learned that early that morning, when the mutineers entered the city, the officers in charge of the Magazine had closed the gates. They pointed the cannon at the gates and surrounded the place with prickly shrubs. Several Europeans from Dariagunge had taken refuge there. Working hard, they heaped up bundles of cartridges and barrels of powder in such a position, that on a match being applied the whole place could be blown to pieces. All natives were turned out of the place. When the mutineers attempted the assault, they were driven back by the guns being fired at them. They reassembled, this time with scaling-ladders. The Magazine was then fired. Only twenty-five Sepoys were killed by the explosion, but a mob of 400 onlookers perished. Indeed, many of the bodies were blown far into the city. After sending away the six wounded Europeans, I went towards the Kotwáli. On my way I saw the bodies of many Europeans lying about the roads, some near the Church, and many in front of the Assistant-Magistrate's Cutcherry. I passed the bodies of Kalla Saheb, Deputy-Collector in charge of the Treasury, and of his son. I saw sights that unmanned me. I dared not look. As I passed the Treasury the sentinel was still pacing on his accustomed beat.



On reaching the Kotwáli I assumed great severity of manner, and ordered the native Christians sent there to be carefully guarded. I found the two policemen had carried out my orders, and in the course of the day had collected the main body of the police, who were again in attendance at the Kotwáli. As soon as it was night, the native Christians were passed out of the city, and thus escaped. I did not reach my home until about midnight, when I heard the firing of heavy guns. Mounting my horse, I rode towards one of the bastions. There I learned that another regiment from Meerut had arrived to join the mutineers, and a salute had been fired.

On the morning of May 12th I rode up to the cantonments, and found the whole place in disorder; ruins of burning bungalows, and remains of property scattered here and there. The three regiments stationed here, the 38th, 54th, and 74th, had all moved off into the city, together with a battery of artillery. I learned that on the previous morning, about nine o'clock, information had reached the cantonment that a body of mutineers had arrived in Delhi from Meerut. The Brigadier at once ordered off two guns and a force of infantry to protect the city. The force detached joined the mutineers. As soon as the news of this fact reached the cantonment, and it became known that the officers had been killed, the 38th broke out in a body, killing their officers and such Europeans as they came across. The men of the 54th behaved better; a few joined the mutineers, but the greater part refrained from joining the insurrection. The 74th assisted their officers to escape, and committed no murders. The men of the 38th fired the cantonment bungalows, and did as much mischief as they could.

Many ladies in the cantonments made their way to the Flag Staff Bastion, and were there joined by a number of Christians and half-castes of both sexes. The 54th and 74th had refused to attack the mutineers of the 38th, and had refused to help their officers to drag guns to the bastion to defend it. All the murders were committed by the 38th, and that regiment was answerable for the trouble and terror to which the ladies and children had been subjected.

All the officers who escaped assembled with their wives and children at the Flag Staff Bastion. About five o'clock in the afternoon, when it became evident that no help was at hand, they began to make arrangements for flight. In this they were assisted by the servants, as well as by the Sepoys of the regiments. Some in carriages, some in buggies, they started for Kurnoul. By that time, the city and cantonments being without officers, they were given over to lawlessness, and were beyond control. The battery of artillery did not leave the cantonments until after the Europeans had left, and so it was night before they marched into the city, and encamped at the Dewan Aam. The infantry did not march into the city until the next morning.

The Gujurs (a tribe of robbers) had not been slow to appear. Bands from Wuzirabad and Chandraul were plundering right and left. Metcalfe House was plundered by the Zemindar of Chandraul, and then burned. Every house belonging to a European or a Christian had been first plundered, then burned. After seeing the condition of Metcalfe House and the cantonments, I returned to



the city. I appointed Mahommed Khan "burkundaz" and Gopal "chowkidar," and sent them to convey to Sir Theophilus Metcalfe information of all that had occurred. I despatched them on this errand, for though I wished to go myself there was no opportunity, since my duties occupied every minute of the day. Outrage and murder were of hourly occurrence. Thirty Europeans, of both sexes, who had taken refuge in the Rajah of Kishenghur's house, had been attacked and butchered in cold blood. On the third day I was warned that I was thought to have concealed some Europeans. I felt that the mutineers suspected me, and regarded me with hostility.

On the fourth day I determined, at all hazards, to visit Sir Theophilus Metcalfe. Taking a brave and trustworthy man, by name Imam Khan, with me, I started. I had already passed out of the city, by the Ajmere Gate, when he drew my attention to two men who seemed to be following us. They had water-vessels in their hands, and were pretending that they were going out into the country to answer a call of nature. Believing that I was the object of their suspicions, I stopped at the rest-house used by travellers in Pahargunge. I rested there some time as if weaned, and then went on to the shop of a man who sold lime. I entered into a conversation with him for a supply of lime for the repairs of the Kotwali. To lead them off the scent I leisurely returned to the city by the Delhi Gate, *via* Kundrat. The two spies entered the city with me, and I then watched them until they joined their comrades. This occurrence determined my plan of action. I felt I had incurred suspicion, that my life and my family were in danger. It was necessary to take some decided measure. In all hours of difficulty and danger, action is better than inaction—a golden rule. It struck me that if I were to maintain my influence and position in the city, I too must become a mutineer, and checkmate the designs of those who would destroy me. When two men are contending, the one who is the less energetic must be worsted. I determined to go at once to the Palace, and offer my services to the King. At the gate I found a company of the Volunteer Regiment of Native Infantry. I called for the Subahdar, and speaking as if I had some authority, I inquired if they had received their pay. A knot of non-commissioned officers surrounded me, and began most eagerly to discuss their difficulties. No officer had been appointed to command them, and they were without pay. I suggested to them that they should ask the King to appoint me. I told them my name, and offered to get them their pay. They readily assented. I then wrote a petition on their behalf, which they were to present to the King. In an interview with Prince Mirza Mogul I proposed to him that he should take this regiment as a bodyguard, and be appointed their Colonel, as his brothers had been appointed to the commands of other regiments. He accepted the proposal, and at an interview with the King obtained the issue of the necessary orders. These steps, no doubt, implicated me in the rebellion; but I was actuated by no feeling of opposition to the English, against whom I knew the struggle was hopeless.

If I had remained a passive spectator of this rebellion my life would certainly have been taken, while if I had left the city, and joined the English, the



honour of my family would have been destroyed, and the rebels would have wreaked their vengeance upon them, for I was not an obscure man. I knew the position of the English, and how it would be, before the English Government could again reassert its authority and sovereignty; so in my inmost heart I thought I was doing the best I could during this interval. To procure influence over the men of the regiment I advanced 5,000 rupees out of my own purse and personally distributed the money. That night I took up my quarters with the regiment. Next morning (May 15th) I was informed that the Sepoys who held the Ajmere Gate of the city, had come to search for me. I took my sword and went down among my men, who were falling in for morning parade. I recognized the two men who had followed me the day before. As the men did not salute me, I turned to the men of my company and pointed out to them the disrespect shown me by these two. An altercation ensued; the Ajmere Gate Sepoys then openly charged me with concealing some Europeans. My men retorted with abuse, on which my two accusers retired. On this day I again communicated with Sir Theophilus, informing him that matters were not mending, and that I saw no hopes of speedy succour; but, "Whatever must be, would be." After despatching my messenger, I was filled with the greatest anxiety for the safety of Sir Theophilus, the King having issued a proclamation offering a reward of 10,000 rupees for his capture. While debating with myself how to act, I received a verbal message from Sir Theophilus, asking for assistance to travel to Jujjur. The same evening I sent him a good horse, and some money, to Bura Khan's house, with advice how to travel. I felt I was in great difficulty, for if I myself went, and if my purpose became known, all my labour would be lost. It was arranged that Sir Theophilus should be dressed as a native soldier, and should be called Shere Khan,<sup>8</sup> by which name henceforward he passed in all our communications. Next day I received a formal receipt for the money from Jujjur. My anxiety was much lessened by learning that Sir Theophilus had safely reached Jujjur, in company with Bura Khan and two of his brothers.

I placed myself from that day on the sick list, and remained at home, at the same time confining my military duties to attendance on the King. This line of conduct satisfied the men, for the Subahdars retained command without interference, while my position as Colonel protected me from immediate danger from my foes.

A man called Mir Nawab had taken charge of the Kotwáli with my consent and my connivance. Subsequently, one Farg-ulla Khan was appointed Kotwál, and Abdul Hakim was appointed his assistant. My position was better than that of the Kotwál, for the city was in the hands of the Sepoys, and these recognized no authority that was not military. The following Princes were appointed as Colonels to Regiments: Mirza Jewan Bukt, Mirza Mogul, Mirza Kider Sultan, Mirza Surub Hindi, Mirza Sidu Beg, Mirza Buktour Shah, Mirza Abdulla, son of Mirza Shali Ruk, Mirza Abu Bakr.

<sup>8</sup> *Shere* means "Lion."



One of the first native houses plundered was that of Mohun Lall, who was said to be a Christian. I was informed that he had been arrested and placed in confinement, and was awaiting sentence of death. Now, Munshi Mohun Lall had during the Cabul War done good service to the English. He fell into the hands of the Afghans, and to save his life had passed himself off as a Mahomedan, under the name of Aza Khan. He was a man of good family, and was thoroughly loyal to the English . . . . . Learning that he was to be executed, I went to the house where he was confined, and using my authority ordered his release. I took him, after some difficulty, to my own house, and then sent him off to Ballaghur, under the protection of Nawab Wali Dad Khan, Talukdar, who was related to the King's family, and had been in Delhi for some days. The King had<sup>9</sup> appointed him to be a Subahdar of the Province of the Punjab, giving him a retinue of fifty Sepoys. Mohun Lall, in company with Mirza Agham Hossein Khan and Wali Dad Khan, reached Ballaghur in safety, and thence escaped to Meerut.

The houses of the following men were plundered, as they were reported to be friendly to the English, viz., Munshi Rudur Mull, Golam Mirza, Juh Begum, all situated in Mehalla Buri, Baran. The house of Hamid Ali was next plundered on the accusation, that he had given shelter to Europeans. To put a stop to this wholesale destruction of property a meeting was held of the better-disposed classes. It was agreed to buy up a regiment by a monthly payment, to protect their lives and property. The plan succeeded, and for a time at least they lived in security. Soon, however, the Princes, who had been placed in command of the different regiments, resented this arrangement, and calling together the Committee who had hired the regiment, fined and imprisoned them, appropriating the fines to their own purposes.

Even the leaders of the rebellion were not safe, for some enemy, in order to get Mahbub Ali Khan and Hakim Ahsanullah Khan into trouble, wrote a letter in their names, addressed to the Lieutenant-Governor at Agra, which was allowed to fall into the hands of the mutineers who guarded the gates. The letter was taken to the King, and the immediate execution of the writers demanded. Mahbub Ali Khan was very ill at home, and was taken in his *palki* to the Dewan-i-Khas. He fell into the hands of the mutineers. Hakim Ahsanullah managed to escape from his house and take refuge in the Palace. The King saw through the treachery and acquitted Mahbub Ali Khan. Nevertheless, the mutineers, in anger, plundered his house. Frightened at the turn affairs had taken, Hakim Ahsanullah treacherously gave up a number of European women and children, whom he had placed in security. The unfortunates were taken to the Dewan Aam and seated in the reservoir. A sowar first fired a carbine, then all were mercilessly massacred, to the horror of the whole city. In other parts of the city, fugitives were found and massacred at the order of native officers in command of detached parties.

Day by day *perwanahs* were extorted from the King, addressed to particular regiments of the British Indian Army, promising monthly salaries of

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<sup>9</sup> The appointment was somewhat premature, as John Lawrence still held that Province.



thirty rupees to infantry soldiers and fifty to cavalry, if they would join the King's Army. In every instance the King's *perwanah* had the effect of causing the soldiers to mutiny and make their way to Delhi. At the sight of the King's *perwanah* the men who had fought for the English forgot the past, in the desire to be re-established under a native Sovereign; thus, daily, the city became more and more the centre of the rebellion. The English never thought of the truism expressed in these lines:

"Dushman natawan, hakir bechara shamurd."

("You should consider a weak man a despicable enemy.")

In the false security of their position, the English had long lived. As in nature, so in politics, a cloud the size of a man's hand often passes into a hurricane. It is quite true that the rebellion actually broke out on the excitement caused by the use of the new cartridges; but the real cause of the rebellion was an old enemy who, long vanquished, still existed.

But the enemies were not all natives: one of the most active of the mutineers was a European — a discharged soldier of the 17th Foot—who had resided at Meerut. This man turned Mahommedan, and assumed the name of Abdulla Beg. He became a resident at Delhi on the arrival of the mutineers, and immediately identified himself with them, and became virtually a leader and adviser. It was under his advice that the King issued *perwanahs* calling on regiments to join the King's forces. Since the 12th May the mutineers had taken possession of the King's private office, and had placed a guard over the Dewan Khan. They also insisted on the King holding a *darbar* daily, at which they could be present, and, ensure a hearing. In place of the usual staff in attendance on the King's person, the mutineers substituted their own men, who were most violent, and quite wanting in ordinary respect to the King.

The force of mutineers in the city on the 12th May was as follows:—

5 Regiments Native Infantry	...	...	2,000
1 " Cavalry	...	...	350
1 Battery Artillery	...	...	180
Total	...	...	2,530

Of these, two Infantry and one Cavalry regiment were from Meerut, and three Infantry regiments and one battery of Artillery from Delhi. They were stationed thus:—one Infantry regiment to each of the following posts: Selimghur, Lahore Gate (Fort), Lahore Gate (City), and Ajmere Gate (City), and Delhi Gate. The battery of Artillery remained at the Dewan Aam. The Cavalry encamped at Mahatub Bagh.

The period between the 11th and the 25th was occupied in restoring order and discipline in the city. An attack from the English was expected, and there was great want of powder. The powder magazine was situated outside the city at Wuzirabad, which had been plundered of its contents by the zemindars, who had made away with the powder. Upwards of one lakh of rupees' worth of arms had been found in the magazine, which had fallen into the King's possession, but there was no powder. Orders were early issued for its



manufacture, and towards the end of May a supply was ready. The King repeatedly urged an attack upon Meerut, but the mutineers delayed, first on one pretext, then upon another. At last, under pressure from the King, Mirza Abu Bakr, as Commander-in-Chief, started with a force on the 25th of May to attack the English at the Hindun River. The force consisted of Cavalry and of Field and Horse Artillery. The battle began with artillery fire. The Commander-in-Chief mounted on to the roof of a house near the River Hindun close to a bridge across the river and watched the battle. From time to time he sent messages to his Artillery to tell them of the havoc their fire was creating in the English ranks. Near the bridge he placed a battery with which he carried on an exchange of fire with the English, which became like a conversation of question and answer. Presently a shell burst near the battery, covering the gunner with dust. The Commander-in-Chief, experiencing for the first time in his life the effects of a bursting shell, hastily descended from the roof of the house, mounted his horse, and galloped off with his escort of sowars far into the rear of the position, not heeding the cries of his troops. A general stampede then took place. When the news reached Delhi that the troops had been defeated, orders were issued to close the gates and exclude the Sepoys. When these arrived they found the Jumna Bridge had been broken down. In a hurried attempt to cross it the bridge gave way, and about 200 were drowned. The English did not follow up the victory; they were not to be seen, and gradually the Sepoys forgot their fright.

The next morning (May 26) the English army crossed the Hindun and took the guns which the mutineers abandoned; then they returned to Meerut. The Sepoys had now contended with the English on the open field. They had felt certain of success, but they had been worsted, and were filled with grave apprehensions for the future.

In the city there was rest for a time. News came of the assembling of the troops in the Punjab, and of their march upon Delhi. Four days before the arrival of the English, Ahmed Khan, Resaldar of the 4th Cavalry, made his way into the city. He sought an interview with the King, expressed his loyalty, and said his regiment was prepared to join the mutineers. He stated that the day the forces could meet, he would lead his men away to the right and join the mutineers. Ahmed Khan was received and treated with great courtesy. On the third day he took leave of the King, and returned to the English force. This man proved to be no rebel, but loyal to the English! On the same day the whole of the rebel force was paraded, under the command of Mirza Kizr Sultan, and marched to Alipur, where they entrenched themselves and rested.

On Monday, June 9th, the English arrived at Alipur. A regiment dressed in the uniform of the 4th Bengal Cavalry led the way on the right flank. The mutineers, seeing the advance-guard approaching, naturally believed them to be the regiment of Ahmed Khan coming to join the rebel army. A cry of "Deen Deen!" was raised, to welcome this addition to their forces. When the cavalry had approached near to the native army their squadrons suddenly wheeled, and immediately their front was cleared a battery opened fire from the centre of the



column. The shells tearing through the ranks of the mutineers created great havoc, and immediately the Sepoys fled. The first to run was the Commander-in-Chief. He was met by Nawab Mahbub Ali Khan near the garden house of Mehalدار Khan. Explaining that he was hurrying back to the city for more artillery and ammunition, Mirza Kizr Sultan, in spite of all remonstrances, galloped away. The Nawab used every effort to stop the retreat, but nothing could stay the Sepoys as they hurried towards the city, into which they poured through the Cashmere, Lahore, and Cabul Gates, leaving these gates open behind them.

The English halted at Subzi Mundi, and then marched towards the Rajpur Cantonments. If they had instantly marched on the city, the place would have fallen easily into their power. On reaching the cantonments, the English force proceeded to take up position. Many of the guns which had been loaded to stop the English advance, were abandoned and taken by the English. The hesitation on the part of the English inspired the Sepoys with confidence, and, arming the city walls with guns, they soon began to fire shots in the direction of the cantonments. The English advanced to Mr. Fraser's house, where they erected a battery, as also at the place known as Futtehghur, and replied to the rebel fire. The din of the artillery fire lasted night and day. The rebels had four batteries at work—one at Selimghur, two at the Cashmere Gates, and the fourth at the bastion at the Cabul Gate. The English replied from only two batteries. Very little was done by the English fire, the shot falling on unoccupied land and hurting no one.

The rebels were daily receiving additions to their ranks. The manufacture of gunpowder was begun in the house of Begum Simru, being removed from the Dewan-Aam for fear of an explosion. In this some two hundred to two hundred and fifty men were daily employed. News was received of the death of Nasir-ul-Dowlah, Nizam of Hyderabad, and that he had been succeeded by Afzul-ul-Dowlah. The King ordered a *killut* and honorary titles to be sent to the Nizam. Every morning a *darbar* was held, the King seated on his throne.

The rebel forces assembled daily on parade early in the morning, and marched to Mithar Bridge, where they halted, and, spreading into skirmishing parties, fired at random (*bad-hawai*), till 4 p.m., when they were withdrawn into their own lines. The casualties were about four killed and half a dozen wounded. The new arrivals were the most energetic and anxious to fight, but gradually their energy and bravery wavered, and they became more ready for retreat than for advance. The Sepoys were laden with rupees; they thought more of their plunder than of fighting.

Omrao Bahadur, ■ Talukdar of Alighur, with fifty stalwart sowars, and Umur Shobab, presented themselves before the King. Their names were entered as sirdars in the King's Army.

The rebels were becoming clamorous for pay. They were really laden with money, but they wished to extort as much more as they could. They threatened to leave the King's service unless paid, and they proposed that the wealthy men of the city should be ordered to subscribe for their maintenance. A



Committee was formed of Nawab Hamud Ali Khan, Raja Deby Sing Saligram, Nawab Musa Khan, Nawab Ahmed Mirza Khan, and Hakim Abdul Hug. Some money was extorted, but too little to satisfy the rebels. Another device was then attempted: Nawab Amin-u-din Ahmed Khan and Nawab Zia-u-din Ahmed Khan were deemed wealthy men, and pressure was brought to bear upon the King to extort money from them. Gangs of armed men were collected in Rasim Khan's *mohilla*, to stop Sepoys from plundering. Orders, sealed with the King's seal, were then sent to these two men commanding their attendance at the Palace. Collecting their relatives and retainers, they consulted on the best means of escaping from this extortion. After putting their houses in a state of defence, they rode to the Palace, with a retinue of a few armed men. On reaching the Lal Purdah Gate, they were stopped by the sentries, as no armed men were allowed to enter the interior of the Palace. Nawab Amin-u-din at once knocked the sentries over, and pushing through the gate, passed into the Palace. On this occasion I was present. An audience was demanded of the King, who was at that time surrounded by the rebel Subahdars. Elbowing his way through the crowd of rebels, Amin-u-din Ahmed Khan presented himself before the King, together with his relatives. The King seemed pleased to see them, but the rebels seemed to be nonplussed, and scowled at them. A further attempt was thereupon made to extort money from Amin-u-din. By the advice of one of the rebels it was suggested to Mirza Mogul to feign pleasure at seeing Amin-u-din, and to invite him to his house; the others would take care to go there at the same time, to extort money from him. Accordingly, Mirza Mogul begged the King to request Amin-u-din to go to Mirza Mogul's house, as Mirza Mogul wished to consult him on an important matter. The King conveyed this invitation to Amin-u-din, and Mirza Mogul repeated it himself. Being pressed by the King to accept, Amin-u-din rode with his relatives to the Mirza's house. There he found large numbers of the rebels, and with difficulty obtained a seat. The rebels were ordered to be seated, but excused themselves. In the course of the conversation one of the rebels taunted Amin-u-din with living at his ease and in safety, while they were starving for want of food. This was followed by abuse. At once those who had accompanied Amin-u-din raised their carbines, and, covering the spokesman, challenged him at the peril of his life to repeat what he had said. The rebels were for the moment awed. Information of what was going on was carried to the King, who at once hurried to Mirza Mogul's house with his attendants, to prevent bloodshed. Bukt Khan, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief, rode to the place, taking an escort of fifty soldiers with him, and severely reprimanded the rebels. Under the care of Bukt Khan and the soldiers who were with him, Amin-u-din Khan left the Prince's house, and reached his own in safety. He determined to leave the city: of course he was at once suspected of deserting to the English. On reaching the Cashmere Gate he was stopped by the rebel guard, threatened with immediate death, and detained. Unable to get out of the city, he returned to his own house.



A rebel regiment from Nusserabad arrived this day, and importuned the King for money. After taking up their quarters in Mobarah Bagh, they marched out at once to fight the English. The fighting commenced at three o'clock, and "tutors" and "pupils" met face to face. From firing the troops came to close quarters and crossed bayonets. The fight lasted for three hours; the ammunition was entirely expended. Towards sunset the Nusserabad regiment was withdrawn. In the morning the English took possession of the battlefield.

Buldeo Sing, the Darogah of the Jumna Bridge, was secretly conveying provisions this day to Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, when an informer pointed him out to the mutineers at the gate. He was stopped and searched; attempting to run away, he was caught and taken to the Kotwáli; there he was killed, and his body suspended by the leg to a Neem-tree.

A force arrived that day consisting of part of the Rajah of Ulwar's troops, and a regiment from Nimuch, after a fight at Akbarabad, under the command of Herra Sing. Immediately after arrival they too proposed to go out and fight the English. The bridge over the Canal had been destroyed by the English, so it was planned they should march *via* Nazufghur and engage the English from that side, while a counter attack was made from the city. The force therefore marched to Nazufghur. The English were aware of the movement, and arranged an ambuscade on the road, where the rebels, falling under a heavy artillery fire, fled, abandoning their guns. The force never again attempted an offensive movement.

The butchers accused of supplying the English with meat were decapitated. There were daily accessions to the ranks of the rebels, and daily attacks on the English position; daily the rebels were driven back until this became the recognized rule. The gunpowder manufactory was blown up, whether by accident or design it was not known; two hundred artificers were blown up with it.<sup>10</sup>

An attempt was made to plunder the house of the Kazi. The inmates defended the house, and killed several of the assailants with arrows. Mirza Mogul ordered a general review of the troops outside the Delhi Gate; they were extended to the Cashmere Gate. Seventeen regiments of foot, twenty-two regiments of cavalry, in all about 9,000 men, appeared at this parade. A quarrel between the sixth regiment and a regiment of infantry was excited by jealousy. The sixth, leaving their horses, issued by the Cashmere Gate, and attacking one of the English batteries, took the guns, and began to plunder the camp. When the infantry regiment arrived they found the plundering going on, and set to plunder too. Reserves coming up, the English attacked the mutineers and killed some two hundred of them, whereupon the force fled back to the city.

<sup>10</sup> Hudson, who commanded the guides, used to send his spies daily into Delhi. They reported to him that the manufacture of powder was going on, and eventually on their saying that the factory could be blown up, he promised the men 1,000 rupees reward if they could succeed in doing it. It was blown up as stated in this diary, but the reward was never claimed, nor did the men ever return. No doubt they were blown up.



The mutineers represented to the King that the Sepoys were reluctant to attack the English, and demanded his presence in the field. This he promised to give. A large force was ordered to assemble in the evening. The King headed the force and passed by the Delhi Gate, and showed himself to the assembled troops. Passing by the Lal Dighi Tank he went on towards the Lahore Gate. One of the Palace dependants was substituted for the King, who secretly retired to the city by a back way. This show of force ended in nothing. The troops gradually moved back to their own quarters, and the threatened attack ended in smoke.

Three months had now passed, and the whole city had become accustomed to the sound of cannon being fired at all hours. A *nuzzar* was received from Bareilly from Khan Bahadur Khan. From Lucknow a *nuzzar* was brought from Mirza Abbas, consisting of gold mohurs of Badshah which bore the inscription—

“Ba-zar-zad-sicca-eh-nasrut-tarazi

Suraj-u-din Bahadur Shah gazi.”

The bearer of this *nuzzar* was lodged at the house of Mozuffer-ul-dowlah. The *nuzzar* was presented to the King.

A letter was written to Hakim Ahsanullah Khan by Rajub Ali Khan Mohussim, asking why the Standard of the Prophet had been erected in the city, since there were no English left in the city. He had forbidden its remaining there, and he had directed Mufti Mahommed Sadan-u-din Bahadur, Judge of the City, to instruct the people and explain to them that it was folly to raise the Standard. Soon afterwards a warning proclamation was issued that the city was about to be attacked, and that the batteries of the English were ready to fire upon the town. They commenced a cannonade upon the Cashmere Bastion. For eight days such a fire was kept up that the walls began to crumble away, and the shot began to fall inside the city. All the inhabitants of the quarter near the Cashmere Gate abandoned their houses and took refuge in more sheltered parts. Before the 14th of September the bastions upon which the English concentrated their fire, had become dust.

On this day, Monday, September 14th, the English made the attack on the Cashmere Gates, by which they entered and took possession of the city. The mutineers, abandoning the guns on the bastions, fled in every direction. The English penetrated as far as the Kotwáli and Jumma Musjid in their assault. At the Kotwáli a gun had been planted and was fired by some sowars and bad characters. This fire fell in the midst of the English advancing column, killing and wounding upwards of fifty of them. The mutineers defended the Jumma Musjid and checked the English advance. The English fell back on the Cashmere Gate. A further stand was made by the mutineers at Pulbin Bund and at the Calcutta Gate. The fighting continued for five days through the city. The Princes fled to the Tomb of Humaon at four o'clock in the morning—a bad omen. The mutineers then began to leave the city in every direction, as did also the inhabitants. The fugitives were attacked by the Gujurs (robber tribes), who plundered them of their arms and money. Nawab Yakub Khan, who had lived



shut up in his house in the city throughout the siege, left the city secretly with his family. He was attacked by Gujurs, plundered, and killed.

General Mahommed Bukt Khan, collecting a force, went to the King, and begged him to fly to Lucknow with him. He also offered to collect the scattered rebel forces outside the city and again fight the English. But the old King refused his help. Bukt Khan then marched for Lucknow with all the forces he could collect.

Mirza Abbas Khan, the *vakil* of the King of Oude, who had arrived four days before the assault with the *nuzzar*, now fled with his escort in the direction of Rajputana. The King fled to the old fort Killa Kahoma. The whole city once more came under the dominion of the English. When the English learned where the King had fled they sent orders to Mirza Elahi Bux and Hakim Ahsanullah to prevent the King from leaving the city, and directed them to bring him to the English camp. A force was sent with them of 100 cavalry, with the complement of officers, and proceeded to the old fort.

Mirza Elahi Bux and Hakim Ahsanullah went to the King, who was in great terror, but was reassured by those about him, who told him that a dish of *pillau* alone was in store for him. Four of the Princes were in company with the King, viz., Mirza Mogul, Mirza Abu Bakr, Mirza Kizr Sultan, Mirza Meddu. The party, on leaving the fort, was surrounded by the English escort. The King was placed in a *palki*, the Princes in a bullock-cart, and taken towards the Palace. When the Princes reached the place in front of the Dewan-i-Aam, where the English women and children had been butchered, they were shot. The city was plundered, from the Lahore to the Cashmere Gate. Mirza Buktour Shah, who was subsequently caught, was also executed. The King was placed in custody. Shah Samund Khan, the commander of the King's Bodyguard, was caught leaving the city by the Cashmere Gate. He was identified as General of the Rajah of Jujjur's forces, and was summarily shot. In the city no one's life was safe. All able-bodied men who were seen were taken for rebels and shot.

Mahommed Ali, son of Nawab Jung Khan, nephew of the Rajah of Dadra, had closed his doors for safety. Some Gurkhas and Europeans who were plundering the city tried to force the doors. Baffled in the attempt, they mounted the wall. A wet-nurse seeing them was so terrified that she threw herself and the child she was carrying into a well; the other ladies of the house, panic-struck, followed her example, and threw themselves into the same well and perished.

Mahommed Ali from the centre of the house fired his gun and killed three Europeans. The house was immediately attacked by a large force and the inmates killed, Mahommed Ali among the number, fighting to the last. Some sixty men found with weapons were killed, including Sheik Imam Bux and his son, masters of the Mahommedan College, who were mistaken for mutineers. Among those slain was Falla-ulla Khan, a well-known native physician, and others who were innocent of all participation in the mutiny. In Bhojla Pahari, Meah Amin Saheb, a well-known scribe, foolishly interposed to prevent soldiers



from entering his house. He killed the first English soldier who entered, but was himself immediately bayoneted; still, he died taking his murderer with him.

Moulvie Furid-u-din was on his way from his morning prayers, when he was met by the advancing column of English and fell in the rush, with which the English burst like a pent-up river through the city. Hakim Ahmed Hossein Khan and Hakim Razi-u-din Khan fell in the same way. Mirza Fusuf Khan, brother of Mirza Asadulla Khan, who had long been out of his mind, attracted by the noise of the firing, wandered out into the street to see what was going on, he was killed. Many other well-known men of the city were killed, being mistaken for rebels. In this way God showed His anger: the green as well as the dry trees were consumed; the guiltless shared the same fate as the guilty. As innocent Christians fell victims on the 11th of May, so the same evil fate befel Mahommedans on the 20th September, 1857. The gallows slew those who had escaped the sword. Among them were Nawab Mozuffer-ul-dowlah, Mahommed Hossein Khan, Mirza Ahmed Khan, Mir Mahommed Hossein Khan, Akbar Khan, Mir Khan, Nowshir Khan, Hakim Abdul Hug, Kalifa Ismail, Mahommed Khan, Resaldar Safdar Beg Khan, Asjur Yar Khan, besides Princes of the King's family. Many died in jail. Numbers perished, until Sir John Lawrence re-established order, and Courts were once more opened for the trial of the guilty; every man who had an enemy declared against him. False witnesses abounded on every side. On one side a man feared the rebels; on the other he dreaded the false accusations of relatives and compatriots. The slaughter of innocent, helpless women and children was revenged in a manner that no one ever anticipated.

There were several ancient and noble families in the vicinity of Delhi: Jujjur, with a revenue of fourteen lakhs, Dadra, Patuli, Bulubghur, with two lakhs subsidy from Government, Dogana, Faraknujjur, Loharu. Mention has already been made of Jujjur and the part he played. Dadra became disloyal to the English. Patuli opposed the rebellion; he was attacked by the mutineers, defeated, and his palace looted. The Rajah, however, joined the English. Dogana remained loyal to the English throughout. Bulubghur was virtually Governor of the city during the siege. He, together with Jujjur and Faraknujjur, were hanged for rebellion. The death of Mr. Munder was brought home to the Rajah of Bulubghur. Loharu was virtually a prisoner in Delhi during the siege. His house and property at Loharu were plundered by the neighbouring zemindars. The bodies of the three Rajahs were buried in the same grave with the Delhi Princes, in the Durga of Kazi Bakibulla. Their estates were also attached. Perghanah Narnal, which yielded a revenue of 200,000 rupees, was given to Puttiala. Perghanah Karonda was sold by public auction, and was allowed to be purchased by the Rajah of Puttiala, on account of his steadfast loyalty. Perghanah Kauli was given to the Rajah of Nabha. As a reward for his disloyalty Dadra was confiscated and made over to the Maharajah of Jeend. The Rajah of Dadra was banished to Lahore. The officers of the Rajah of Jujjur were banished to Ludiana. No action was taken by the English Government against the properties of Dogana, Patuli, and Loharu. The King, with his Begums, and Joan Bukt and his wife, with certain Princes,



were banished to Rangoon, and sent there under a European guard. A suitable allowance for their maintenance was sanctioned by the English Government, and the King was allowed to take with him four of his old retainers as servants.

(in: *Two Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi*. Translated from the Originals by the late Charles Theophilus Metcalfe. Westminster 1898, pp. 27-74)





## THE LAHORE CHRONICLE

During the period under study there were two English-language newspapers, published in Lahore, namely the "Lahore Chronicle", which was started in 1849 and the "Punjabee", started in 1857. Besides the "Lahore Chronicle" published the "Overland Summary" which was not meant for people living in the Indo-Pak subcontinent. This journal gave a fortnightly digest of all important events recorded in the paper for the information of those living abroad, who were desirous of keeping themselves aware of the developments in this part of the Empire.

"Lahore Chronicle" was the earliest paper in Lahore. It was founded by Muhammad Asim, a skilful printer. During the days when the Punjab was annexed by the British, Muhammad Asim first nurtured the idea of starting a newspaper and establishing a printing plant at Lahore. The newspaper, originally a weekly, was named "Lahore Chronicle" and the printing establishment as "Lahore Chronicle Press". The finance for the establishment was secured from a number of friendly Englishmen and others. The paper had the blessings of senior British officials and aimed at strengthening the patriarchal rule. It was particularly keen to preserve the rights of the Punjab and "regarded with jealous eyes any interference from the Supreme Government which unduly conflicted with local wants and aspirations."

Mr. Henry Cope was the first editor of "Lahore Chronicle". In 1856, however, he was ousted and replaced by his erstwhile rival, Welby. Meanwhile Muhammad Asim, the founder of the paper, was also dislodged from his position and became an ardent supporter of Mr. Cope. The same year he launched another newspaper and named it "Punjabee."

Scanning through the only file of this paper available in Pakistan we learn that "Lahore Chronicle" was a bi-weekly appearing every Wednesday and Saturday, but practically speaking it was a daily because extras were issued in great number during the War of Independence. Sometimes besides the regular issue, two extras or supplements appeared on the same day.

The annual subscription was Rs. 36 and surprisingly the price per issue was rupee one. This prohibitive price was fixed deliberately because the management was keen to have more and more regular subscribers instead of casual buyers. Perhaps it was also due to the reason that the system of street sales did not exist.



The Press was a big establishment. It undertook both typographic and lithographic printing and book-binding. Persian and Nagree types were available for printing in Persian, Oordoo (Urdu) and Sanscrit. A number of firms worked as Chronicle agents at Madras, Bombay, Kurrachee (Karachi), Agra and London.

Out of eight pages of the original size of the "Civil and Military Gazette", three were devoted to advertisements. These usually related to books, banks, houses on rent in Simla and Murree, wines, horses, lemonade, soda water, dress-making, medicines, hydrostatic beds and cushions, tunics, waterproof overcoats, shipping, auction, official notices, postal notices, etc. Perhaps the most interesting was the advertisement of something like a secret weapon for ladies as a defence against the unchivalrous mutineers. A sharp explosive gas was compressed in an ordinary smelling-salt bottle. On touching a spring, the stopper and contents were thrown out with great violence, which in some cases could result in the blindness of the victim.

The news, given in the "Lahore Chronicle", were not in the form of modern news but in the form of newsletters and written in chronological style. News, in the form of lengthy messages were sent by regular and casual correspondents, always incognito, from practically every town of importance. A war correspondent was also especially appointed. Only those news were brief and to the point, which were sent by the Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner. These news were written in the style of communiqués and Press notes. The Chief Commissioner received these news telegraphically from the war fronts. Besides General Orders, both civil and military, found place in this paper.

News agencies, at that time, did not exist but there was in vogue a system of voluntary exchange of news. Each newspaper lifted stories of interest from its contemporaries but invariably quoted the source. "Lahore Chronicle" was no exception. At one place it complains against a paper for not having acknowledged it after picking a news-item from it. The paper wrote:

"The "Telegraph and Courier" copies some news from the "Lahore Chronicle" but gives credit to the Mofussilite."

The "Lahore Chronicle" gave very few headlines. To play up news of importance, it was begun with "We give prominent insertion to the following."

The contents of "Lahore Chronicle" include items on a variety of subjects. There was a permanent feature headed "Europe", that contained extracts from foreign papers such as *Morning Post*, *Home News*, *Standard*, *Saturday Review*, *Herald*, *Globe*, *Sun* etc. These news were about Indian affairs, European political affairs, East Indies, etc. Under the head "Indian Press" comments of leading contemporaries on current affairs and on problems relating to Press were given. These contemporaries included *Bengal Harkaru*, *Phoenix*, *Englishman* (Calcutta), *Dacca News*, *Poona Observer*, *Bombay Times*, *Bombay Gazette*, *Bombay Guardian*, *Friend of India*, *Telegraph and Courier*, *Sindian*, *Sind Kosid*, etc. The "Epitome of News" was another feature that consisted of news stories lifted from other newspapers. The news collected from its own sources were scattered all over the paper. Under the title "Correspondence" appeared letters to



the editor. One read of births, deaths and marriages in the European community under the title "Domestic Occurences". The social and cultural activities of the Europeans were given due coverage as against local inhabitants, who hardly found any place in the paper. There was another feature headed "Literature", in which books were introduced and also general articles on literary subjects were given. "Original poetry" was another important feature. The editorials were never given separately. Each news item contained comments. Editorial comments were mixed up with other news items and articles and one could only distinguish them by the editorial "we." "Latest Intelligence" was sometimes given when an important news arrived after the whole matter had been composed.

As regards arrangement of the matter the front page was wholly devoted to advertisements. The second page contained advertisements, "Correspondence" and occasionally "Domestic Occurences". Somewhere on the third page, official summaries were followed by newsletters, editorials, articles, all given in a disordered manner. It looked like a solid mass of type for there were no heads and white space was only provided by the ruler that separated these times from each other. "Indian Press" and "Europe" were given after that. The last page sometimes contained only advertisements and at other times some matter too. In extras no advertisements were given although sometimes space was left vacant.

The "Lahore Chronicle" was definitely an anti-Muslim paper. It conducted a systematic propaganda aiming at total elimination of Islam from the sub-continent. Letters after letters followed saying that the Muslims were incorrigible. Whenever Muslims took part in any activity against the established order, it was disproportionately exaggerated. Editorials too appeared asking for severe action against them.

Ousted from the "Lahore Chronicle" of which he was the founder and co-sharer, Syed Muhammad Asim, established a new printing press named the Punjabee Press at Lahore and started *Punjabee Akhbar*, an Urdu weekly, in March 1856. Within a year, machinery for printing English-language publications arrive and he floated "The Punjabee", an English weekly whose motto was "The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number."

The "Lahore Chronicle" was bitterly opposed to "The Punjabee" mainly because the latter had encroached upon the market of the former. Due to its coverage of local news, more comments on local affairs, better editing of news, more light items, variety of features and a handy size, "The Punjabee" became very popular and within six months of its inception succeeded in securing as many as five hundred subscribers. This annoyed the "Lahore Chronicle" and it started a campaign against its contemporary by publishing letters against it and by reproducing articles from other papers in opposition to "The Punjabee."

### SOURCES OF NEWS

The "Lahore Chronicle" and its contemporaries devoted most of their space to coverage of events. From where did all these news come? Getting news in those days was not as easy and systematic as it is today. There were no news



agencies. Each newspaper maintained a number of correspondents at important places. The material sent by them was supplemented by the lifting of selected stories from contemporaries. Thus there existed a voluntary exchange of information among newspapers at the understanding that the source of all lifted stories would be quoted. Besides each newspaper received official summaries, in the form of telegraphic messages, from the Chief Commissioner's office. The "Lahore Chronicle" obtained news using all these sources.

First we would deal with news, which were received in the form of official summaries. These were published immediately after they were received. Sometimes if there was a day or two for the paper to come out, extras and supplements were published in order to convey the news officially received. Here are a few examples of official summaries published in the "Lahore Chronicle".

### CHIEF COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE, LAHORE

3rd September, 1857.

There is nothing further from Delhi, most probably owing to the heavy rain.

A report received through Mr. Frère, the Commissioner of Sui, from Kolapore, of the 18th ultimo, states that 24 of the mutinous sepoys of the 27th Regiment Bombay, N.I., who had returned, or were lurking about that cantonment, were all seized, or killed by men of their own Regiment.

The 27th Regiment had volunteered for service.

The reinforcements despatched from Bombay and Poonah, were still some marches distant; but confidence appears to have been completely restored at the station of Kolapore.

There is a report from Delhi, that on the 31st ultimo, 22 carts, laden with the families of the residents, had left for Rewarree, and that numbers were daily leaving the city.

(September 5, 1857, p. 567)

Telegraph Office, Lahore. 18th November, 1857.

From Officiating Commissioner, Delhi.

to Chief Commissioner, Lahore.

It is 6 a.m., 18th November. Letters from Ford at Narnoul, and from Captain Dwyer at Kanoud of 16th, have just been received by Express, forwarded from Jhujjar by Captain Lawrence. They report the defeat of the Jodhpur Legion on that date, from Narnoul after a severe fight, with the capture of all their guns, six in number. Our troops arrived on their ground about a koss from Narnoul, at about 11 a.m. The fight continued until sunset. The enemy came out to meet our force in advance of Narnoul, and the Carbineers and Guides made a splendid charge against the rebel guns and Cavalry, the latter fought well. We took the serai, occupied by them towards sunset and now occupy it. The enemy had about 3000 in the fight. All our men did well, the 1st Fusiliers, as usual, splendid. Ford writes that we have lost, he fancies, about 70 killed and wounded. I regret to say



that poor Colonel Gerard was mortally wounded and has since died. Among the wounded, the only names mentioned are — Pearce, doing well; . . . The amount of the enemy's loss not yet ascertained. We occupy the Serai, where they had entrenched their guns. Capt. Dwyer writes that the enemy, after having been driven back, had, as far as he could ascertain, bolted southwards. Further particulars will be communicated.

(Extra November 19, 1857)

Now we come to the news which were lifted from contemporaries. In each issue of the "Lahore Chronicle" we find a number of items which were taken from some other papers. These usually headed under the caption "Epitome of News". Some of the papers from which the "Lahore Chronicle" lifted news items are: *Koorkee Garrison Gazette*, *Bombay Gazette*, *Bombay Times*, *Telegraph and Courier*, *Sindian*, *Sind Kosid*, *Calcutta Journal*, *Bengal Harkaru*, *Phoenix*, *Englishman*, *Mofussilite*, *Poona Observer*, *Delhi Gazette*, *Friend of India*, etc.

The following are the news items lifted from the contemporary newspapers:

"At an early hour this morning the Government intelligence from Major General Hearsay, Commanding the Presidency Division, that he had good reason to apprehend a rising of the Native Troops at Barrackpore and had in consequence taken every precaution to prevent it, which he could do with the means at his command, and had sent for the 78th Highlanders from Chinsurah.

"Orders were instantly issued, in pursuance of which a large European force was concentrated on Barrackpore, and the safety of Dum Dum amply secured." — *Bombay Gazette*, June 24.

(Supplement July 11, 1857)

We learn that several of the disarmed sepoy's belonging to the Fort and other Guards in Calcutta, have deemed it 'infrading' to perform their duty with ramrods, and have consequently taken French leave. This is not at all to be regretted. Those who are not with us, and it is far better that they should avow their true feelings . . ." — *Harkaru*, 17th June.

(Supplement July 15, 1857)

The "Lahore Chronicle", which was an important newspaper of its time, had its own correspondents stationed at the main cities, particularly war fronts. Here we give some of the news appeared in the following form:—

The following from Umbala is from our War Correspondent en route to the Camp before Delhi:—

"Jullunder, which I left yesterday, and Umbala, are both guarded with much ferocity. At the former station, the residents are congregated in a large hoop-holed barrack, mount guard every night, drink their beer (5 pice a pint, and no money returned) and wish the Pandies may be something unpleasant, in the regular orthodox fashion . . . A Subahdar of the 33rd was blown away from a gun a short time ago, on the 1st instant, I believe. The Volunteers were, of course, drawn up alongside to witness the execution, and a piece of the unfortunate man



fell right to the mouth of one of them, who was, however, by no means disconcerted at the windfall, but merely wiped his mouth . . . .”  
(Sept. 16, 1857, p. 593)

A Correspondent at Nynsee Tal writes on the 31st October:—

“We have been complete prisoners here for the last six months, surrounded by thousands of rebels who infest the forests round the foot of the Hills; we have had two engagements with the rascals. Now we have just received information that 7 or 8000 of them are within three marches of Huldwanee, at the foot of the Hills, on the Bareilly side of course, they are sent by Khan Bahadoor to cut us up, if possible, so we are preparing to give them a warm reception? Major Ramsay, our good Commissioner here met with a sad incident . . .

We had a heavy storm of hail two days ago, which lasted an hour and half, the place was quite white. This shows the approach of winter, and it had caused the weather to set in very cold.”

(November 11, 1857, p. 721)

Occasionally the paper, under study, received private letters, which either narrated some event or commented on some step taken by the Government or some act of the mutineers. Here are two letters which were sent by private individuals.

A Private Letter from Agra dated 23rd June says:—

We are completely boxed up here now, the only daks received are an occasional one from Bombay, which sometimes succeeds in coming in.

News from Calcutta up to 3th, troops at Benares mutineed, results not known, report says the Sikhs there stood and assisted to turn out the 6th Native Infantry, and about 2000 men that came over from Oudh. Gwalior contingent gone on the 14th, killing 6 or 7 officers, escorted the ladies safely out of station but insulted them in every way they could.

10th N.I., at Futtehgurh, mutinied on the 17th, one company remained, fired and protected the treasury and Civilians in the fort, afterwards they attacked Mynpooree with some Oudh men and hung what Europeans they could take alive. Sir H. Wheeler is surrounded and we can get no information from him. They say he had had four days hard fighting, at his entrenched camp, and, is hard up for water. We are all prepared here to go into the fort at a moment's notice. Four months' provisions have been put in for all hands, women and children of schools and Unconvented servants who have no conveyances have been put in. We collect at night at houses fortified to stand a seige for some days, if guns are not bought against us. All well and anxiously praying for more European Troops to come up country.

(July, 11, 1857, p. 435)

A letter from Peshawar says:—

“All quiet here, and the mutiny of the 51st N.I., has not affected the other Native Troops. There are only 50 men of the Regiment unaccounted for and about 30 of these, it is supposed, ran into the Khyber.”



(September 5, 1857, p. 567)

About the sources of the news, the following facts emerge very clearly.

1. The paper never gave any news of the activities of the natives unrelated to the Struggle.
2. There was not a single Muslim or Hindu or in fact any native correspondent on the staff. Therefore the question of presenting native version of events never arose.
3. News and comments were never lifted from any newspaper appearing in a native language.

### NEWS COVERAGE

Every newspaper devotes its major space to news i.e. reports of current events, which finally make history. That is why it is sometimes said "news is tomorrow's history done up in today's neat package." The "Lahore Chronicle" also, with which at present we are mainly concerned, set aside much of its space for the coverage of events. Therefore the national struggle of 1857, which was perhaps the most important and consequential event of the century, was also amply covered in this particular paper. The only file of the "Lahore Chronicle" is for the period July to December, 1857. During this period obviously most of the matter, published in this paper, pertains to the mutiny in one way or the other because it was only when the fiercest fighting was taking place all over the sub-continent. The major events that took place during this particular period were the siege of Cawnpore, siege of Lucknow and Capture of Delhi. Besides fighting continued on the war fronts like Meerut, Bundelkhand, which had opened earlier the same year.

For each of the important and significant events of the National Struggle of 1857, we will give extracts from the "Lahore Chronicle" in order to give a fair idea to the readers as to the way the fighting took place.

Here is a news item stating something of the scuffle at Meerut.

A letter from Meerut dated 10th July says:—

"The Volunteer horse is now fairly in the field, and likely to do good service. On Saturday, an attack was made on four Goojur villages, which were burnt. In this Volunteers were employed.

"Yesterday they went by themselves, and carried a Goojur village that had just looted a Jat village; they killed nearly 200 men, among whom were two peoys of the 20th N.I., and one of the 3rd Cavalry. In this affair some Sikhs did good service. A reinforcement of the Rifles will march immediately to the Camp before Delhi. The direct communication with the Camp has been cut off by the destruction of the bridges over the Hindon and the Jumna . . . ."

(July 18, 1857, p. 453)

Following are the accounts of the events that took place at Cawnpore between the mutineers and the British forces.

Judicial Commissioner's Office, Lahore, 8th July, 1857.



.... Authentic Intelligence has now been received, for the first time, that the troops at Cawnpore mutinied and were well-beaten by the force under Sir High Sheeler. It is further stated that one Company of the 10th N.I. remain staunch, and we hold the Fort of Futtehgurh.

(July 8, 1857, p. 427)

“Cawnpore — The following account of the awful catastrophe at Cawnpore, corroborated as it is by the Government intelligence may, we think, be depended upon:—

“On Sunday, the 28th June, the Nana Sahib sent to our beleaguered countrymen, and swore upon the Gunga and all the oaths most binding on a Hindoo, that if the garrison would trust to him and surrender, the lives of all should be spared, and they should be put into boats sent down to Allahabad. On these terms the garrison trusted him and surrendered. They were put into boats according to the wording of the treaty so far, but when they had got into the middle of the river, the fiend gave a preconcerted signal and guns which had been laid for the purpose were opened upon them from the Cawnpore bank. When our poor wretched countrymen tried to escape by crossing to the Oudh side of the river, they found that arrangements had been made there too for their reception, and they were cut to pieces by Cavalry sent across for the purpose. — *Harkaru*, June 8.

(August 5, 1857 (Supplement))

Now we come to the events that took place at Lucknow, where fighting continued from July to November.

“Later news from Lucknow — our readers may place full reliance on the following authentic intelligence from that city, up to the 16th instant:—

“Sir Henry Lawrence has completed his arrangements for the defence of the Residency, and Muchee Bawun. Three of the roads leading to the residency have been closed, and strongly barricaded. A number of guns are mounted on each side all round, and the place is otherwise well protected, the ladies and children occupying the houses of Messrs. Gubbins and Ommaney, inside the Residency . . .

“There has been no disturbance in the city since the night of the mutiny in cantonments. On or about the 5th, the Regiment of Syed Hossain, formerly in the service of the King, on being ordered to lay down their arms, refused to do so until the guns were brought to bear upon them. They were afterwards turned out of the city, where all continues right. —

— *Englishman*, June 26.  
(Supplement, July 22, 1857)

A letter from Meerut dated the 27th ultimo states that a Cossid had arrived from Allyghur, bringing a few letters from Lucknow dated the 12th June. The writers give an account of the Seetapore mutiny, and they talk of having



arrived safely at Lucknow, as we may infer that all was quiet there at that time. Most of the ladies and officers of the 41st N.I. have managed to escape. Colonel Birch, and Captain and Mrs. Cowan are mentioned as killed, and great fears are entertained for the safety of the Civilians. . . .

(July 8, 1857, p. 120)

However the most important event that took place during the Revolt of 1857 was the fall of Delhi, its occupation by the rebels in May 1857 and its recapture in the middle of September by the British. During the struggle at Delhi, much blood-shed took place both of the natives as well as the British. Here are two news items, which deal with fighting at Delhi:

Chief Commissioner's Office, Lahore

11th September, 1857.

From Delhi, 4.30 p.m., 10th September, 1857.

"We have now two batteries for heavy guns constructed in front of Ludlow Castle and ready to open tomorrow morning. We have also a heavy mortar battery completed in the Koodsia Bagh, and have possession of the Custom House, in the compound of which another heavy battery is being constructed about 200 yards from the city wall. The enemy keep up a heavy fire of Artillery and musketry and have made some unsuccessful demonstrations with their Cavalry. Our loss during the last 24 hours had been 50 killed and wounded, including Lieut. Eaton 60th Rifles, wounded. One of our recently erected heavy batteries caught fire today, and was rendered unserviceable, but this is of no consequence, as the Guns were to be withdrawn and taken elsewhere tonight.

(September 12, 1857, p. 583)

"The following is from our Correspondent at Delhi,

19th September, 1857 :—

"I have nothing of importance to communicate today. Our batteries still keep brazing away without intermission, and the enemy continue their fire likewise. Do you remember it being reported some time ago, that the enemy had run out of caps? Why there was a great quantity of them in the magazine . . . There is a great heap of old pots, pans and clothes at the Cashmeree Gate, which have been taken from our native soldiery and others; a proceeding not at all to the taste of Baloches, Afreedis and other sons of plunder. I really do not see that such paltry loot can swell the amount of prize money to any extraordinary degree, or that, allowing the men to retain it, can bring about any extensive calamity, especially as articles of real value have been taken, and "no question asked" but this of course only by the favoured few."

(September 23, 1857, p. 611)

Seemingly, the events of the national struggle of 1857, reported in the "Lahore Chronicle", appear to be quite unbiased. But in reality this was not so.



The news about the victories won by the Indians as well as the atrocities inflicted upon them by the British Government, were either blacked-out or completely distorted.

### **DISTORTION AND BLACKOUT OF NEWS**

During the National Struggle for Independence of 1857 "that sink of ferocity, the Anglo-Indian Press" conducted a poisonous campaign against Indians, particularly the Muslims with the aim of their total annihilation. This wicked propaganda was one-sided. There was no Muslim-owned newspaper left to answer that campaign. Therefore the Muslim case could not be represented and opinion of the European community about Muslims was moulded as presented by the English-language Press. The "Lahore Chronicle" was no exception and it helped in bringing about suffering and oppression for the Muslims. The news that appeared in this paper were totally biased. The darker side of the mutiny never came to light in this paper nor any other European paper was honest enough to disclose the bitter truths. One of the very few who felt the necessity of taking up of the mud of atrocities committed by the Britishers is Edward Thompson who in his book "The Other Side of the Medal" brings into limelight, the fact that his people behaved like savages in India during that war. He has done so for the simple reason that "the deeds, unfortunately, cannot be passed over in silence, for their memory has been burnt into a people's mind."

In this book "The Other Side of the Medal" Edward Thompson writes "Wars there have been in India since the days of Clive and Wellington; but never has there been a war, stained, on the one side as on the other by such wanton cruelty and crime as in 1857 . . . ." Further it is written "The mutineers, rising as they believed in defence of their caste and religion, disgraced and blackened their cause by the inhuman, brutal and barbarous massacre of defenceless women and children. On the other hand, British troops burnt down villages along their route of many hundreds of miles, turning the country into a "desert"; British conquerors massacred the inhabitants of Delhi after the mutineers had escaped; and British Special Commissioners executed thousands of citizens in Northern India, guiltless of the Mutiny."

The "Lahore Chronicle" never took notice of the barbarous activities of the British or did not care to publish them. On the other hand it adopted a policy of encouraging the rulers in shedding blood of the rebellions as well as the innocent natives. An editorial note once said:

"Delhi must be razed to the ground. Its inhabitants passing into distant provinces would fall of the destruction of their city, and how the fair palaces had been reduced to mounds of earth, because the blood of English women and children polluted its streets." (July 4)

The above extract shows how conceived was the "Lahore Chronicle" about the blood of the English people but it never gave a thought to the huge numbers of Indians who were ruthlessly butchered for no fault of theirs.



Scanning through the only file of the "Lahore Chronicle" available we find no mention of the horrible deeds and barbarous cruelties committed by the British. The very few, very kindly published in it are given in a distorted form. Here is an example of the distortion of news done by the "Lahore Chronicle". The following news item appeared in the Extra Issue of August 2, 1857, and was released from the Chief Commissioner Office, Lahore.

"Accounts were received yesterday afternoon from Mr. L. Cooper, Deputy Commissioner of Umritsar, of the total destruction of the 26th Regt N I. They appear to have pursued their flight without ceasing, for a distance of 40 miles upto left bank of the Ravee, which they in vain tried to cross opposite Ujnala. On Mr. Cooper's reaching the place, about 4 p.m. of the 31st ultimo, he found that about 150 men had been shot or drowned by his Police, aided by the villagers; 160 were captured on the Island in the River; 35 were counted drowning in trying to get off. Numerous fugitives were brought in from all quarters during the night; 237 were summarily executed yesterday; forty-one died from fatigue; and about twenty-one more had been apprehended in neighbouring villages."

This news item about the rising of the sepoys in Lahore, one of them whom, during a violent dust-storm on 30th July, killed Major Spencer, the commanding officer. "He cut down the Major, whereupon the 26th Native Infantry fled under cover of the storm, the few who remained being killed in a furious cannonade which the Sikhs and Europeans put down on their lives. They tried to cross the Ravi next day, but were opposed by some police. Mr. Cooper pursued them from Amritsar, and found this situation:

"The villages were assembled on the bank, flushed with their easy triumph over the mutineers, of whom some 150 had been shot, webbed backwards into the river, and drowned inevitably; too weakened and famished as they must have been after their forty miles' flight to battle with the flood . . . .

". . . The sun was setting in Golden splendour; and as the doomed men, with joined palms (begging for mercy), crowded down to the shore on the approach of the boats, one side of which bristled with about sixty muskets, besides sundry revolvers and pistols their long shadows were flung for athwart the gleaming waters. In utter despair, forty or fifty dashed into the stream . . ."

The sepoys, being silly folk, jumped to the conclusion that Mr. Cooper intended to give them a trial.

"They evidently were possessed of a sudden and insane idea that they were going to be tried by day court-martial, after some luxurious refreshment . . ."

By midnight he had 282 prisoners in a bastion at the police station. There were also "numbers of camp-followers, who were left to be taken care of by the villagers." "They pass out of the story, and no inquiry was ever made as to what happened to them."

The next day, Edward Thomson writes, the Mussalman troopers were sent to Amritsar to celebrate their "Bukra Eid", in whose absence "a ceremonial sacrifice of a different nature" was to be performed.



Further, it is written in the same book "The prisoners were pinioned, tied together, and brought out thus, in batches of ten, to be shot. They were filled with astonishment and rage when they learned their fate.

"About 150 having been thus executed, one of the executioners swooned away (he was the oldest of the swooning party) and a little respite was allowed. Then proceeding, the number had arrived at 237; when the district officer was informed that the remainder refused to come out of the bastion, where they had been imprisoned temporarily, a few hours before . . . . The doors were opened, and, behold! Unconsciously the tragedy of Holwell's Black Hole had been re-enacted . . . . Forty-five bodies, dead from fright, exhaustion, fatigue, heat, and partial suffocation, were dragged into light."

These, dead and dying, along with their murdered comrades, were thrown by the village sweepers into the "deep dry well" found for the purpose.

In the same book we come across a meaningful remark, which was made by a British official on this inhuman incident. It says:

"The sacrifice of five hundred villainous lives for the "murder of two English is a retribution that will be remembered."

Now we come to the recapture of Delhi and the cruelties and inhuman act inflicted upon the inhabitants.

The "Lahore Chronicle" announces the capture of Delhi in such words as follows:—

A Correspondent writes "This morning, the 16th, the whole of Delhi, I believe, is entirely in the hands of the British."

(September 19, 1857, p. 600)

According to an editorial "The Wire has silently flashed the intelligence of the capture of the Imperial City, and the canon has belched forth its noisy announcement of the fact, in fire and smoke."

(September 23 1857, p. 609)

In the words of an official news "The capture of the city of Delhi, of the Palace, and the Port of Selimgurh, was completed yesterday. All honour to the noble Army, which under command of Major General Wilson, has effected this most important conquest, by which the widespread rebellion of the mutinous Bengal has received a complete defeat in Upper India."

(September 23, 1857, p. 606)

"Lahore Chronicle" never reported that within a week after the siege of Delhi between four hundred and five hundred people were executed. We learn from "The Other Side of the Medal" that "The soldiers, inured to sights of horror, and inveterate against the sepoys, were said to have bullied the executioner to keep them along time hanging, as they liked to see the criminals dance a 'Panadies' hornpipe', as they termed the dying struggles of the wretches."



Further a letter is quoted in the same issue written by Theophilus Metcalfe the other day. He is now in great dread here for the future and he is every day trying and hanging a revolver round his neck.

The misery prevailing in Delhi is described in another place. It is quoted in the same issue which states "These judges were of the most unfeeling mercy. Almost all who were tried were condemned to death. A few were given a conspicuous place in the city and five or six were kept by the English officers used to be by putting up their hands and feet in the convulsive struggles of the patients."

"The very regrettable sentences at Delhi," says another writer, "I do not know particulars, but my impression is that many of the sentences were unjustifiable," says another contributor.

In the same issue the following is quoted from the *Bombay Telegraph*:

"All the city people at Delhi found among the rebels a few who had entered were captured in the spot, and the number was, I am sure, as you may suppose, when I tell you that a whole house full of them were found hiding. These were not mutineers, but residents of the city who had been a well-known mild rule for pardon. I am glad to say that they were spared."

"Harmless citizens were shot, causing the most terrible suffering. Even old men were cut down. But it is justice to the soldiers who committed these cruelties, it should be said that they had received great provocation. Many of their comrades, rashly wandering from their posts, had been driven by angry fanatics and badmashies into dark alleys and there they were murdered."

Another letter published in *The Times*, quoted in the same issue, tells us that one night in the back streets of Delhi fourteen women were found with their throats cut from ear to ear by their own husbands, lest they should fall in the hands of the British. After killing their wives, they had killed themselves too. The "Lahore Chronicle" tells us nothing of this ghastly incident.

Such cruelties were committed all over India but the *Lahore Chronicle* never wrote even a word against this gross injustice. Speaking of the brutal incidents which took place at Benares and Allahabad "The Inner Side of the Medal" tells us that "On one occasion, some young boys, who, perhaps as mere sport, had flaunted rebel colours and gone about beating tom-toms, were tried and sentenced to death. . . . One of the officers, composing the court, . . . went with tears in his eyes to the commanding officer, imploring him to remit the sentence passed against these juvenile offenders, but with little effect on the side of mercy."

Volunteer hanging parties went out into the districts, and amateur executioners were not wanting to the occasion."

At Agra it is told, "A great many of the villagers in revolt were brought in and hanged, and also some mutinous sepoys who were found lurking in the neighbourhood. When they were being tried, some used to feign madness, and



not in the most absurd way, catching flies and jabbering; others would say the most insolent and revolting things to the officers on the court-martial."

Edward Thompson further in his book tells us that this "government by gallows," "supplemented by government by massacre . . . . was abundantly put into practice in the Mutiny, at Jhansi, Cawnpore, and Delhi with the justification of massacres to avenge and at Lucknow without this justification."

"At the time of the capture of Lucknow — a season of indiscriminate massacre — such distinction was not made, and the unfortunate who fell into the hands of our troops was made short work of — sepoy or Oude villager, it mattered not — no questions were asked; his skin was black, and did not that suffice? A piece of rope and the branch of a tree, or a rifle bullet through his brain, soon terminated the poor devil's existence."

Here are a few other examples of the tortures the Indians especially the Muslims suffered at the hands of the "civilized" British. These are again taken from the book "The Other Side of the Medal". On page 46, a military official says, "Late in the evening a Sikh orderly came to his tent, and, saluting said: "I think, sir, you would like to see what we have done to the prisoners." Suspecting the worse, he sprang up and rushed to the guard-room, and there witnessed the spectacle of these wretched Mohammadans at their last gasp, tied to the ground stripped of their clothing, and deeply branded over every part of their bodies from head to foot with red-hot coppers. With his own hands he put an end to their agony by blowing out their brains."

In the same book "An eye-witness" tells how Sikhs and Europeans together, after repeatedly bayonetting a wounded prisoner in the face, burnt him alive over a slow fire :—

"... the horrible smell of his burning flesh as it cracked and blackened in the flames, rising up and poisoning the air — so in this nineteenth century, with its boasted civilisation and humanity, a human-being should be roasting and consuming to death, while Englishmen and Sikhs gathered in little knots around, looking calmly on. No one will deny, I think, that this man, at least, adequately expiated, by his frightful and cruel death, any crimes of which he may have been guilty."

Commenting upon the horrifying miseries inflicted upon the Indians, Russel is quoted in the same book spying:

"All these kinds of vindictive, unchristian, Indian torture, such as sewing Mohammadans in pig-skins, swearing them with pork-fat before execution, and burning their bodies, and forcing Hindoos to defile themselves, are disgraceful, and ultimately recoil in ourselves. They are spiritual and mental tortures to which we have no right to resort, and which we dare not perpetrate in the face of Europe".

A letter written by Lieutenant Roberts, later Lord Roberts of Kandahar, to his mother, quoted by Edward Thompson, says:

"Well, the troops assembled at Jhelum, and we have come along this far, doing a little business on the road such as disarming Regiments and executing



mutineers. The death that seems to have the most effect is being blown from a gun. It is rather a horrible sight, but in these times we cannot be particular. Drum Head Courts-Martial are the order of the day in every station."

The purpose of this "business", Roberts says, is to "show these rascally Mussalmans that, with God's help, Englishmen will still be masters of India."

The "Lahore Chronicle" never reported such shameful instances and completely blacked-out and thus showed that it was a spokesman of the imperialist tyrants alone. It had no sympathy for the miserable or love for justice. It never appealed to the authorities to deal with the masses with justice if not with mercy. On the other hand it voiced the opinion of those who were in favour of greater cruelty, burning of cities, murder of the masses and exclusion of Indians, especially Muslims, from all services.

### EDITORIAL COMMENTS

The "Lahore Chronicle", just like an ordinary newspaper, recorded events, and also expressed views on significant events. It also gave place to opinions expressed by its correspondents, which mostly mirrored the feelings of the entire British community residing in India. These editorial contents clearly reveal the fact that the "Lahore Chronicle" was an Anti-Muslim paper. Just like the entire British community, it blamed the Muslims for the bloodshed and chaos caused by the mutineers. This paper held the Muslims entirely responsible for the War of 1857. Accordingly, it occasionally expressed vile opinions about the Muslims and suggested ways and means by which Islam could be totally eliminated from the sub-continent and by which Muslim could be suppressed in every possible manner.

Here are a few examples of the editorial comments and letters to the editor, which are very interesting to read.

A correspondent named "No Quarter" wrote the following, suggesting that Delhi be raised to the ground. He says:

"The time has come when an example should be made, the effects of which will remain for ages before the eyes of the natives; Delhi, that sink of all that is vile and treacherous and bad, should be razed to the ground and, as a city, swept from the face of the earth; its ruins being left as a lasting memorial to generations yet to come . . . . Establish Martial Law throughout Bengal and its dependencies, and crush for ever, by the effectual example now made, the spirit of mutiny, which is so generally diffused. Of what importance to us in Delhi? We do not regard it as the capital of India. But the people do: Delhi and its puppets King is, and has even been, the rallying point for all the disaffected in the land. All eyes are turned to it even now, and our very servants do not hesitate to say that the English Rule is past, and that Delhi never will be retaken. By razing the city to the ground, and blotting Delhi from the map, the idea will at once go forth that the dynasty of the Mogul can never again, and that henceforth it had been decreed that the British shall rule supreme. As to the miscreant King and his



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dissolute dependants, — string them up and terminate the force of Mahomedan Royalty for ever.”

(July 4, 1857, p. 419)

Another correspondent, condemning Muslims, says “The Mahomedans, there is no shade of a doubt, are at the bottom of the whole business. They ought not to escape most severe punishment. They never can nor will change as long as they are Mahomedans . . . . This is the way how they express their gratitude, towards Great Britain for all sacrifices cheerfully made in supporting their rotten and cursed empire in Turkey which cannot stand, but must fall . . . What a loss of the flower of Britain’s nobility, strength, and what an expenditure of Britain’s wealth . . . . having hitherto expended the money voted in Parliament by the strenuous efforts of a Wilberforce for education of the natives in India in instructing the Mahomedans in their own false demonical religion, an infernal faith of the dark bottomless pit . . . . Allow Christianity to raise her hand “which Government has not allowed her” to do hitherto. Tolerate no barbarian in whatever shape or form it may present itself, and put no hindrance into the way of native Christians, but remove all obstacles and precautions which are still going on today to an astonishing degree and extent.”

(July 8, 1857, p. 427)

Still another correspondent expressed his opinion on appointments to high offices:

He writes “. . . . Our Government should take warning, and as there will no more be Native Comissioned Officers, so there should no native be placed in posts of such responsibility. None but Christians should be promoted to high situations. He may be a Native, or he may be an European, but I would give a preference to the latter, especially to one born and educated in India”.

“. . . . while we govern the country by the power of the sword, it is absurd to carry on projects which will conduce to our destruction. We should remember that the musket with which we armed the sepoy has been used in the attempt to subvert the Government. I would vote that colleges and schools be abolished. The Teachers should be absorbed in the Army, or provided for by Civil Appointnents, either as Deputy Collectors, Civil Judges of the lower grades or clerks, according to their qualifications. The saving effected would be useful in augmenting the fund for the payment of European Troops.”

“P.S. — The missionaries should be compelled to banish English from their schools. The truths of the gospel, which alone they should be permitted to teach, can be as easily communicated by means of the vernaculars as any other language.”

(July 22, 1857, p. 459)

This correspondent appears to be deadly against the Muslims be given any employment and expresses his wrath and indignation against this particular section of the community.



"... Perhaps if the legislator issued a preemptory Regulation, prohibiting in future the employment of MAHOMEDANS... the object of the Government would be attained... OUR MOST BITTER ENEMIES, now in the present disaster, are those MAHOMEDANS whom we have patronized with the highest pay, pensions, appointments of trust, and responsibility... No one who has the intimate knowledge of the prejudices of the ANTICHRIST MAHOMEDAN could ever place confidence in him."

"The intriguing Mahomedan joins the cry with the Hindoo that Government wishes to interfere in their religion and prejudices by the grease on the cartridge, this is only to delude the fanatic Hindoo to violence and mutiny; the Mahomedan is perfectly aware that his caste and religion are not to be violated by grease... The fanatic Hindoo believes that his caste and religion are assailed by his employers. The scheming Mahomedan watching his weakness, tells him that he has to choose of two evils. To bite the cartridge and become a Christian or be blown away from the cannon's mouth, or end his days in jail with vions... He is blind to the Mahomedan intrigue and scheme, and flights as a martyr, he fancies he is fighting for his soul, whereas in reality, he is assisting the Mahomedan to recover his empire; could the Hindoo only discover the Mahomedan scheme... CEASE TO EMPLOY MAHOMEDANS and by removing the CAUSE the effects must cease."

(August 1, 1857, p. 483)

The sepoys, who were disarmed before they could take part in the revolution, were equally punishable in the eyes of the Europeans. Speaking about them a correspondent named "A Constant Reader" said:

"Brand them by all means, but on the forehead, so that Englishmen, and the native alike may know these men, and by this means let them suffer... Brand them M : 57 on the forehead..."

"... brand them, transport them, shoot them if you will, but never allow these men to live peaceably in the land they have irrevocably disgraced, but proving themselves possessed of the worst qualities of man and brute. At Delhi, in the coming assault, let "death to the sepoy by the cry."

(August, 15, 1857, p. 521)

Another correspondent, writing under the name "Fuqueer" expresses his thoughts thus:

"... the MAHOMEDANS are the chief instigators and PERPETRATORS. No one, I am sure, would now question that the present crisis, is a Mahomedan struggle for Empire, and not the grease on the CARTRIDGE. That Hindoos are participating in the mutiny no one denies, or justifies; but I would again repeat "let not the CAUSE be mistaken." If Mahomedans are at the bottom of the plot, they are the CAUSE, and surely justice should visit them more severely, than those they have so cleverly gulled into the belief, that a kind, merciful, and honourable Government intended to outrage their religion and caste."

-(August, 19, 1857, p. 523)



The same correspondent, that is "A Fuqueer", a few days later writes:

" . . . . can it for a moment now be doubted or questioned, that the Mahomedans are the instigators and secret designers of this awful crisis: Can the authorities after such unequivocal proof manifested in the length and breadth of India ever venture to employ these ANTI-CHRISTS at the risk of the Empire? It is rumoured that the Lieut-Governor at Agra has prohibited Mahomedans being employed in the Public Offices, even in menial capacities. Would to God that the Highest Ruling Power in India, aided by the Council, would legislate the same for all India."

(August 26, 1857, p. 543)

A month later we come across a very powerful editorial note under the heading "Our Policy". Here are some extracts from it:—

"We have had the neutrality policy in religion, and our wise men relied upon that as the security of our rule. Practically, this policy . . . . has proved a total failure. The fanatic and Christian-hating Mussalman has succeeded in rousing the bigoted Brahmin into a religious fury against us, and in uniting the Hindoo sepoy with the Faithful into a bloody conspiracy, utterly to root out the hated Feringees from the land . . . This old neutrality policy must be given up for good, and no hankering, after it must be allowed to sway our councils for the future."

"Then there is the balancing policy. Nicely and cleverly to balance Hindoos against Mahomedans, and Mahomedans against Hindoos, was considered the security of the army and the safety of the empire. But this has also proved a broken reed."

"To these may be added the educational policy . . . . It was thought sufficient to teach the Natives some of the Western learning in order to befriend and write them to us; and to make them useful and trustworthy officials. But this has also failed."

"There remains therefore no other but the Christian Policy, the country must be held by a Christian army and must be governed by Christians. All reliance upon the natives, Hindoos or Mussalmans, for one or the other of these functions must be given up for ever; helps they may be, but never again rulers in any form . . . . They (the Government) should discontinue every countenance and support of idolatry and Mahomedanism, given hitherto but too willingly, both directly and indirectly; they should remove every obstacle, standing in the way of the spread of Christianity and of the conversion of the natives; introduce the Bible into their schools and colleges and allow Christian instruction to be given to allow those pupils who are inclined to receive it."

This is followed by a suggestion to make the cities, where the main battles were fought, and even those, which were guilty of sympathising with the mutineers, to pay for the damages done to public and private property during the rebellion. In this connection the same editorial says, "and as the Mahomedans



appear to have been the principal instigators and actors, they should be made to pay the heavier penalty and bear the greater share of the contribution.”

“... punish the whole of the Mussalman population of the North West and Bengal Provinces. This could be done by laying a tax upon them for the next ten years, called the Mutiny Tax. It should be a capitation tax, levied from every male.”

“... all the mutinous sepoys, together with the other rebels, should be sold into slavery. Now this is not a bad idea. . . . The West Indian and other colonies are much in want of labourers, and have been constantly trying to get those from the surplus population of India. It would be a kind of transportation for life, with hard labour, only with this difference that such a measure would save the country all expenses and might perhaps even yield a balance in favour of the state. . . .”

(Our Policy — Sept. 26, 1857, p. 617)

On appointment (made by Mr. Halliday) of Ameer Ali as Assistant to the Special Commissioner, with the power of a Deputy Commissioner, the “Lahore Chronicle” wrote:—

“... Now Mr. Halliday must have been aware of many of these cases; he must have been aware that this rebellion is of Mahomedan growth; he must surely, with his 32 years’ service, have learnt something of the Native character; he must, unless he wilfully shut his eyes, have seen the never dying fanatical spirit of the followers of the Prophet; he must have known that it is not safe to trust them. Then in the name of common sense, why has he bestowed a post of much power and responsibility on one of the race . . . . The Mahomedan population of Hindoostan has thrown off the mask so long worn; the disguise has fallen off from them, and they stand declared in all their cruel hideousness. “Mahomedan” in Hindoostan ought to be a synonyme for parish — outcast, and as such, should cause the rejection of all holding the creed. As a body, they are implicated in the rebellion, and a body, let them suffer.”

(September 30, 1857, p. 624)

The Europeans in India continued to express opinions for the total elimination of Islam and imposition of Christianity. They also kept on condemning Muslims for the rebellion of 1857. One of them wrote a very long letter, which contained insulting, hideous remarks about the Holy Quran. Apart from this he said:

“... In respect to education, my opinion is that under existing circumstances to continue educating a native without ingrafting in him the principle of our religion is simply absurd and opposed to Christianity, for if our tenets be not imbibed by him the inveteracy, which exists, I again reiterate, will never cease. A Moslem clings to his faith with an extraordinary degree of superstition and bigotry, and to war against every *Kafir*, an injunction, unanimously imbibed under the solemn belief of securing an immediate introduction to the ineffable delights of paradise, is not shunned or dreaded as an evil; but is considered as the supermost possible *moral act* which can be



performed in strict obedience to the TENETS of HIS FAITH: and alas! has not this been too plainly verified, to our cost, in the never-to-be-forgotten MUSLIM REBELLION of 1857?"

(November, 11, 1857, p. 720)

That the "Lahore Chronicle" was in favour of annihilation of the natives is evident from the following editorial comment:

"Why has every village not been scoured and cleansed of their vile population? . . . . The head of every house, where English property is found, should be hanged and the head-man of the village also; unless some systematic and stern policy be carried out, no real punishment will be inflicted.:

(November 14, 1857, p. 728)

Another editorial says:

"But Delhi must be razed to the ground . . . . The great city reduced to a wilderness would form a striking monument . . . Delhi will again be a place where Mahomedans may live and the memorials of their former splendour being all round them, they may once more plot and scheme for its revival."

"Considering all these we cry again "A bloody revenge". The village at which a single gibe has been cast at a fugitive Englishmen, no matter how humble his situation, to be burnt to the ground and all found within it destroyed. Say and spare not. Let our bayonets now run more so it shall be ages before an English woman's blood again stains the murderer's knife."

(November 18, 1857, p. 738)

All this shows that the "Lahore Chronicle" was a rabidly anti-Muslim paper. Its editorial consents as well as the letters which appeared in its issues — all aimed at total elimination of Islam from the sub-continent and demanded severe action against the Muslims. Though the Europeans knew that the Hindus had also taken part in the rebellion, they still condemned Muslims a great deal more than the Hindus.

### GAGGING ACT OF 1857

After the annexation of Oudh in 1856, the widespread unemployment made the national press adept a bitter tone. The *Kohinoor* of Lahore though following a very cautious policy indulged in strong criticism. Elsewhere particularly in Delhi, Lucknow and Calcutta, the national press expressed open resentment against some of the steps taken by the administration. The English language press demanded action against the "native press." The "Mofussilite" of Agra urged upon the authorities to impose pre-censorship. The "Bengal Harkaru" also demanded some check on these papers saying that their influence among natives was great.

When the 1857 Revolt began, the entire English Press was unanimous in demanding action against the national language press and as a result was promulgated the Act of June 1857 to regulate the establishment of printing presses and to restrain the circulation of printed books and papers. Popularly



known as the Gagging Act, it re-introduced the main features of the Adam Licensing Regulation of 1823. The Act prohibited the keeping or using of printing press without a licence from the Government, which assumed the discretionary powers to grant and revoke licenses at its pleasure. It conferred on Government the power to ban the publication or circulation of any newspaper, book or other printed matter. The act remained in force for a year and it covered all publications throughout India without distinction of language.

The reason given for imposing the Gagging Act, which was directed against the native press, was in the words of Lord Canning, the Governor General of British India:

"I doubt whether it is fully understood or known to what audacious extent sedition has been poured into the hearts of the native population of India within the last few weeks under the guise of intelligence supplied to them by the native newspapers.

"It has been done sedulously, cleverly, artfully. Facts have been grossly misrepresented — so greatly, that, with educated and informed minds, the very extravagance of the misrepresentation must compel discredit . . . ."

"In addition to perversion of facts, there are constant villifications of the Government, false assertions of its purposes and unceasing attempts to sow discontent and hatred between it and its subjects . . . ."

However, the European Press was not exempted from the operation of the new legislation because, according to Lord Canning, certain things appear in the European newspapers "which, though perfectly innocuous so far as European readers are concerned, may, at times like the present, be turned to the most mischievous purposes in the hands of people capable of dressing them up for the native ear."

The entire English-language press protested against the legislation not because it impinged upon the freedom of the press but because it covered the English-language press as well. They believed in freedom of the press *for the Englishman*.

The conditions imposed under the Act by the Judicial Commissioner of Punjab were as follows :—

"That no seditious articles shall be published, whether original or copied from other papers; likewise disastrous reports not known to be authentic, which are calculated to cause alarm or excitement, and that even when the truth of these may be established, if they be of a character likely to stimulate disaffection or create distrust among the native community, that a reference be made to the local Authorities before committing them to print."

Just like the rest of the Anglo-Indian Press, the "Lahore Chronicle" expressed wrath at this step of the Government. In the issue dated July 11, 1857, there is an editorial, in which the Gagging Act has been criticized as "a rash step" and "a very ill-judged one." Dwelling upon the voluntary self-restriction on the part of the Press, "Lahore Chronicle" says:



"That a large portion of the native press has been actively engaged in promoting conspiracy and rebellion, we have proof; but it is very shallow reasoning to argue that, because the Native Press, or a portion of it, is seditious, therefore the Anglo-Indian Press should be gagged."

Further the editorial says: "News — that journals may refrain from publishing, under the fear of the 5000 rupees and two years' imprisonment Clause — will be circulated in every Bazar with the most absurd exaggerations. This we know from experience. Further, the Natives, — who doubtless seek to know what news is published in the free English journals in the country — will cease to put any faith in the intelligence they may circulate, knowing they are indirectly controlled by the authorities. Consequently Bazar reports will look up in public estimation, and we all know how mischievous they often are."

"Lahore Chronicle" objected to giving absolute power to "captious" officials and concluded by expecting of the authorities in the Punjab "blessed with liberal and far-seeing ideas" to allow this paper a continued life.

(in: *Coverage of the National Struggle of 1857 in the Lahore Chronicle*. By Rukhsana Khurshid. Typescript copy. Journalism Department, University of the Punjab, 1970)





‘ALLAMA FAZL-I-HAQQ

## THE STORY OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1857-58

*The Story of the War of Independence*<sup>1</sup> by ‘Allamah Fazl-i-Haqq is a short but extremely interesting and authentic account of one of the most important problems of our history. Besides being an eye-witness and a participator in some of the events related by him the author belonged to the elite of the Dihli society in the last days of the Mughul Empire. He was widely respected for his learning and scholarship and had attained eminence as a teacher. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan’s seemingly fulsome eulogy<sup>2</sup> of the ‘Allamah is not devoid of truth. The *Story* and two *Qasidahs* relating to the War of Independence were composed during the imprisonment of the ‘Allamah in the Andaman Islands. There were no books to study or refer to and every word had to be written from memory. He had no paper to write upon and had to scribble down his sentences on loose and small chits or torn pieces of cloth. Nevertheless he could manage to send these compositions to his son, Mawlana ‘Abd-al-Haqq, through a co-prisoner, Mufti ‘Inayat Ahmad of Kakuri, who was fortunate enough to have been released at the recommendation of a European officer.

The style of the ‘Allamah is unique and is characterized by a frequent and abundant use of synonyms and antonyms on the one hand and the crowding together in the same sentence of the various derivatives of the same root.’ In fact the *Story* like other works of the ‘Allamah is an excellent piece of Arabic literature and cannot be easily subjected to a faithful translation in another language. It has not therefore been possible to import into this rendering the beauty and the elegance of the original, but an effort has been made to remain as near the text as was practicable. The reader will not only know the thoughts and ideas of the author but will also be able to appreciate the extent of emphasis which he wants to lay on a particular fact or aspect of the problem. Besides

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The Arabic text with Urdu translation and an account of the author’s life was published by Mauulana Muhammad ‘Abd-al Shāhid Khan Shirwani in 1947, under the title *Baghu Hindustan*. The author has not given any title to his work. It has been referred to as *Risalah-i-Ghadriyah* or *Fitnat-al-Hindiyah*. I have called it *The Story of the War* because the author refers to his account as *qissah*.

See *Athar-al-Sanadid*.

I am grateful to Mr. Zikriya Mail for his help in the translation of the Arabic text.



tendencies peculiar to writers primarily interested in literary style the 'Allamah was faced with another consideration. In the post-1857 period no Indian could afford to write on the War of Independence unless it was with the object of presenting the movement as a mutiny against the Government, and much less a 'war-criminal' who had been condemned to transportation for life for signing the *fatwa* for *jihad*. The 'Allamah has therefore resorted to writing his history in almost an enigmatic style, avoiding actual names of places and persons. When mentioning, for instance, Mawlana Ahmad-allah, the great organizer of the movement he refers to him as the person having the same name as the Prophet.

The 'Allamah's account of the War is brief, but it is a masterly survey of the fight for freedom in the Delhi - Lucknow area. An eminent scholar, gifted with penetrating judgment and a keen power of observation his criticism on the actions and behaviour of persons involved in the movement is judicious and convincing. His remarkable analysis of the circumstances which led to the capture of Dihli by the British needs careful examination in the light of the details of facts and events. It is difficult not to agree with him that the hasty, almost sudden, collapse of resistance in the capital was the result of the Emperor's flight to the tomb of Humayun. Many a movement has collapsed as a result of one wrong step taken by the leader: Bahadur Shah and his countrymen had to pay a heavy penalty for his refusal to accept Bakht Khan's advice.<sup>3</sup> Equally important is the 'Allamah's reference to the attitude of the Hindus, who began withdrawing from the struggle as soon as they saw that the fortunes of war were changing in favour of the British.

The importance of the *Story* is obvious. It is not only an eyewitness account of the war but is one of the few contemporary documents which present the movement in its true perspective. The desire—in fact the need—of launching a movement for regaining independence was born of two sets of causes—politico-religious and socio-economic.<sup>4</sup> 'Allamah Fazl-i-Haqq makes a reference to both. His references are undoubtedly brief but for students of history they are useful and interesting. It is a pity he did not have an opportunity of writing the history of the movement in detail.

\* \* \* \* \*

*In the name of Allah the Benevolent, the Merciful*

All praises are due to Allah from Whom can we have great expectations for deliverance without delay from calamities, frustration and afflictions, and hopes for rewards to those who emerge successful from trial through the bestowal of His blessings and to those who call Him by His most gracious

<sup>3</sup> Bakht Khan had advised the old Emperor to leave the Capital and reassemble his forces and reorganize them in the open country.

<sup>4</sup> The western writers have emphasized the military causes, but in fact they were covered by one or the other of these two groups.



names, particularly the oppressed and the distressed ones while being tested through misfortunes and maladies.

And may peace be upon that excellent person (Holy Prophet), the announcer of good news and the giver of warning, whose prophethood was prophesied by the earlier prophets and whose recommendation is hoped for ending the calamities and epidemics, the removal of the darkness of the tyranny of the enemies and protection against fatal diseases and the curse of bad luck!

May peace be upon his descendants who were noble and generous chiefs and leaders and upon his great companions who were strong (against the infidel) and gentle-hearted towards their own people particularly upon his true caliph! May the blessings of God be upon him (Prophet) and upon them for as long as the angels remain busy in praising the Almighty in the heavens and the orbits and the ships continue sailing on the waves and the seas!

This book of mine is no doubt the work of a heart-broken and suffering prisoner<sup>5</sup> who is sighing for what has been lost to him, who is afflicted with every kind of injury, who has no power of bearing hardship even for a short time, and who is entertaining hopes of deliverance through (the grace of) his God for Whom it is very easy. He, in spite of his having lived in plenty and ease from the time of his birth, is now in fetters and in preplexity and trapped in a snare, but he expects his God, through prayers which are accepted, afflicts him. He is in the grip of great misfortunes and bad luck and is in the custody of a frowning tyrant who has deprived him of all that he had of beauty and style in fashion and dress, and has put him to test by forcing him to live in the valleys of sorrows and in the narrow prisons which are places where dark sufferings assemble.

Considering the domineering ways of the jailor, the harsh and hard-hearted usurper, he is despaired of his deliverance, but he has not lost hope in the grace of his God. He is humble and compliant, sick and dejected, and is in the prison of a mischievous and fiendish (person). He is perplexed, and has become incapable of acting by his own power and miserable on account of the tyranny of a cruel, arrogant, quarrelsome and ill-natured person. He is needy and disappointed and is put to so severe a trial through adversities as is beyond the guess of one who guesses. He has been deceived and cannot ask for what he wants, is in embarrassment due to the severest imprisonment and blood-pouring misery. He is in the detention of a white-faced, black-hearted, blue-eyed, stern-looking, red-haired, inconstant and dissimulating person. This fellow has deprived him (author) of what he had from clothes and has clad him in the coarsest garments and the roughest possible dress. Therefore, he (author) is helpless, uneasy and terrified, and has thrown himself on the mercy of his God. He has been separated completely from his family by imprisonment and is yearning for them. He is a litigant whose case was decided without a prosecutor or accuser. He is ashamed before and helpless for all his friends or servants. His

<sup>5</sup>

This brief account was written by the 'Allamah when he was undergoing imprisonment in the Andamans.



arms have been weakened by the severest blows. He is dejected, lonely and forlorn and subjected to drudgery; he has been exiled from his country and town. He is distressed, afflicted, and in banishment; he has been made to suffer, and separated from his family and children. The tyrant oppresses him and maltreats him and has kept his family and neighbours away from him; he has been isolated from them. He (the tyrant) has imprisoned him, coerced him and depressed him by putting him to all sorts of hardships because of his staunchness and zeal for his faith (*iman*) and Islam and for his having the reputation of being one of the most learned and famous scholars. By this the tyrant aimed at removing the traces of learning and destroying the banner of knowledge, even from the pages of paper.<sup>6</sup>

This was due to the painful event,<sup>7</sup> which has rendered the cities and towns desolate and made them the targets of the aims of disasters and which has brought lightning and thunderbolts from the clouds of misfortunes on their residents. It was a calamity which turned the nobles into beggars and destitutes, and the kings<sup>8</sup> into prisoners and slaves.

The story of this event is now related.

The early British Christians having seized the territories, the countries and the towns and villages of India, (Hind-Pakistan) had filled their hearts with hidden grudge. They captured her borders and frontiers and encircled her rear and front parts completely; they humiliated thoroughly all her respected chiefs, not leaving even one who could raise his head in defiance. They decided upon converting to Christianity all her people and inhabitants, including her nobles and chiefs, leaders and prominent persons and servants, as well as her noted and common people, thinking that helpless as they had become they would find no friend or helper and would have no way of escape or goal other than submission.<sup>9</sup>

This was being done with one object only; (it was) that all the people should become infidels like them, following the same religion, and there should remain no difference between sections of the population belonging to separate faiths; because on account of their political ideas they thought that the differences between followers of various religions and communities would be the strongest

<sup>6</sup> The 'Allamah refers to his case only but he is in fact trying to make out the point that the 'ulama were particularly victimized. To appreciate this point one has to bear in mind that the first half of the nineteenth century was a period of brisk missionary activity. The 'ulama had to meet the challenge of the Christian missionaries. Some of them placed a prominent role in the War of Independence. For the activities of some of the leading Christian missionaries, particularly Pfander, see Sir William Muir, *The Mohammedan Controversy* (Edinburgh, 1897), pp. 13, 20, 32, et. seq. It is obvious that jailor, usurper, tyrant and other terms of a similar nature are used for the Company's Government.

<sup>7</sup> واقعة قازعه

<sup>8</sup> Obviously this refers to Bahadur Shah.

<sup>9</sup> This view is correct. We have contemporary and recorded evidence to show what the trends of the ideas and expectations of the British officers and other servants of the Company on this question were in the pre-1857 period. Macaulay, for instance, betrays these feelings in a letter: "if our plans of education are followed up, there will not be a single idolator among the respectable classes in Bengal thirty years hence."



of the causes of disruption of the continuance of their domination and government and that they would become a source of revolution in the countries and states. They left no stone unturned and tried their utmost to bring to an end the various religious (excepting Christianity) by inventing devices. They established schools in towns and cities in order to teach books of their language and faith to the children and illiterate adults. They wiped out of existence the centres of knowledge and learning and *madrasahs* and institutions which had been established in earlier days.<sup>10</sup>

Having seized power they decided to bring under their hold the various sections of the people by controlling eatables, by taking possession of the ears of corn and grain and giving the peasants and cultivators cash in lieu of their rights of farming. Their object was not to allow the poor men and villagers a free hand in buying and selling grain. By giving preference to their own people they wanted to control the cheapening or raising of the rates so that the people of God might submit to their (Christian's) policy of monopolies, and their dependence on them (Christians) for their requirements might force them to meet the purpose of the Christians and their supporters, and the desires and ambitions which they had in their hearts and the mischiefs and evils which they had concealed in their minds, as for instance, forbidding the Muslims to circumcize their boys and remove *pardah* from among their ladies and wives and the abolition of the observance of the commands of the firm Faith.

They started their machinations by making the Hindu and Muslim sepoys give up their (religious) rites and practices and leading them astray from the path of their religions and faiths, because they were under the impression that if the brave sepoys would agree to denouncing and changing their religion and obeying their orders then the others (civil population) would not dare to recoil (disobey) because of the fear of chastisement and punishment.

(Accordingly) they forced Hindu soldiers, who were in overwhelming majority to taste the fat of the cow and the Muslims who were in a minority to taste the fat of the pig. Thus each of the two peoples (*fariqayn*), in order to

<sup>10</sup> Besides the account given by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan in his well-known *Causes of the Indian Revolt* we have a vast amount of contemporary and nearly contemporary evidence in support of the argument of the 'Allamah. Of the activities of the pioneer Christian missionaries, Carey, Marshman and Ward the Literary Secretary of the Y.M.C.A. (India and Ceylon) writes: "They laid great stress on education, and opened numerous schools around them for both boys and girls..... They were most eager to send out native missionaries to preach throughout the country....." Again he says, "In missions these decades (1828-70) are marked chiefly by great activity in education, especially in English education, and by a brilliant development of missionary method in many directions." (Farquhar: *Modern Religious Movements in India*, pp. (14-19).

It is interesting to note that "certain British officers, indeed, preached the Gospel to their men with the enthusiasm of Cromwell's Ironsides....." (CHI., vol. VI, p. 173.)

Sir Sayyid Ahmad has referred to and given *in extenso* the Urdu translation of E. Edmund's circular letter containing an appeal to the people of the sub-continent to accept Christianity. See *Risalah-i-Asbab-i-Baghawat-i-Hind* (edited by Dr. Mahmud Husain, Karachi), pp. 45-49.



safeguard their faith and religion left the path of obedience. They began to murder, loot and kill their officers (*tarkhan*) and chiefs. Amongst these were those who did evil things and went beyond limits and committed excesses and cruelties. The children and women were also killed. They earned degradation and disgrace by murdering women and disrepute and dishonour by killing children.

The forces who had risen in revolt set out from their cantonments after murdering their commanders and officers. Laxity and chaos found their way into the functioning of the government officers, and disturbance and disorder spread along the roads; law and order broke down; mischief resulting from mutual enmities between the people became rampant, and ruin began to spread over cities and countryside.

Many of these troops reached Dihli, the capital, which was a famous and thickly populated city and had been the home of the majority of Timur's descendants. They made their *Amir* (Emperor) the person who had been their ruler formerly.<sup>11</sup> He had his own *wazir*<sup>12</sup> and staff; he was advanced in years but was inexperienced; he was very old and was, in reality, governed by his wife and *wazir*. The said *wazir* was a high authority but in fact he was a friend of the Christians and had excessive love for them and was a bitter enemy of their opponents. The same was the case with some of the members of his (Emperor's) family; some of these were near to him and his throne and were in his confidence. They did as they liked, and acted according to their own views, making at the same time a show of obedience to him. He was so completely devoid of experience that he knew nothing and did not do but strange things. He issued no orders according to his independent opinion and could not understand (what was) good and (what was) evil. He could not decide anything openly or in secret, and had no power of doing harm or good to any one.<sup>13</sup>

This was the state of affairs when there arose a party of strong and brave Muslims for *jihad* and fighting after having asked for a *fatwa* from the pious *'ulama* and their (*'ulama's*) declaration that *jihad* had become obligatory in accordance with the *fatwas* of the authoritative *imams*.

In the meanwhile this inexperienced *Amir* appointed as officers of the army some of his sons<sup>14</sup> and grandsons who were stupid, dishonest and coward. They hated honest and wise persons. They had never witnessed a battle nor had they any experience of the blows of swords and lances. They selected men from the gutter for their society and consultation. These inexperienced fellows drowned themselves in the ocean of luxuries and extravagance and submerged themselves in the flood of debauchery. They were poverty-stricken and

<sup>11</sup> The revolutionary forces entered Dehli on 11 May, 1857. Bahadur Shah was proclaimed Emperor on the same day.

<sup>12</sup> This refers to Ahsanullah Khan.

<sup>13</sup> The *'Allamah's* verdict is to be accepted as incontrovertible because he was closely associated with the Emperor and his court.

<sup>14</sup> Mirza Mughul was the commander-in-chief of the revolutionary forces, see Kaye and Malleon, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, (London, 1899), vol. V, p. 327.



(suddenly) they became opulent; when they became opulent they took to a life of dissipation. They obtained enormous sums from the people under the pretext of securing provisions for the army but did not give anything to any one belonging to the army and ate themselves all that they got. The leading-most of the prostitutes made them negligent in the matter of leading the rebel forces and their association with mistresses kept them from marching in the night with the army. The abundance of luxuries and enjoyments rendered them neglectful and made them stay behind the vanguard; their cowardliness and mean anxieties, hidden in their hearts, made them withdraw from taking a firm position in the centre of the army; misfortune kept them away from the right wing, while gambling and luxury kept them from remaining in the right wing, and their vulgar companions prevented them from marching along with the rear guard. Such is always the case of a person who is given the charge of a great campaign in spite of his incapacity and on whom is placed a heavy burden despite his being devoid of strength. They passed their nights in sleeping and their days in intoxication. When they woke up and came to their senses they felt embarrassed and amazed.

(Ultimately) the forces of the Christians attacked them and climbing over a lofty hill<sup>15</sup> they turned their faces towards the city. They surrounded it, dug trenches around it and set up ballistas over it. They threw balls from them towards the city on its wall and its houses and buildings, which fell as if they were meteors and thunderbolts.

The forces of the rebels were in different groups and had adopted different ways. Some of them obeyed no one, while others had no place of refuge; some had their strength reduced because poverty and starvation had kept them from active service in the war; some had been prevented from fighting by their loot; some of them fled because their hearts were full of fear; some of them exceeded all bounds in wickedness and committed adultery, selecting from the prostitutes as they liked; some of them felt ashamed of putting on red woolen uniform to join the ranks of soldiers. Nevertheless there was one section among them which exhibited courage and fought the Christians, met and attacked them.

The Christians becoming enfeebled and humiliated, requested the Hindus of the west for help and begged their assistance in war.<sup>16</sup> They sent large numbers of soldiers and considerable supplies of war in successive batches within the minimum period. So, the Christians assembled in large numbers their own forces and those of their allies on the said hill for a fierce onslaught. Among their forces were their white-faced soldiers and their mercenaries who were drawn from the base and mean Hindus and from those Muslims who had turned apostates on account of their friendship with the Christians in spite of their faith and had sold their *din* for a very low price.

<sup>15</sup> The famous Ridge on which the British forces had encamped. For its description and military operations during the War of Independence, see Fanshawe: *Delhi—Past and Present*, pp. 77-85.

<sup>16</sup> This seems to refer to the Sikhs States.



Thousands of the residents of the city also were in sympathy with the Christians. The entire Hindu population was with them. But the Muslims were divided; some of them detested the Christians and some were their supporters, being very firm in their sympathy for them. They tried their utmost to break the revolutionary forces by their tricks and deceptive devices, make ineffective the power of the *Mujahidin* and uproot them, and then scatter and disrupt them. No stone was left unturned by them in this respect.

The Christians then started assaulting the city and its gates and attacked their keepers and guards. The *Mujahids* who were present there and a section of the forces were stopping them from entering in the city. They encountered the Christian attacks and stood between themselves and their (enemy's) efforts. Both the parties were busy day and night fighting bravely, on horse and on foot. Fighting with varying fortunes continued for four months successively.<sup>17</sup>

The enemy, in spite of his great strength, vast numbers and extensive preparations could find no way and had no power to enter the city. Whenever the besieging forces attacked they were repulsed and whenever they advanced they were pushed back. The strong and brave *Ghazi-Mujahids* offered severe resistance and put up a strong fight against them. They kept their feet firm even in hot encounters and met every body who tried to advance forward. Many of them tasted the honey of martyrdom and attained high ranks of good fortune (*Sa'adat*). "And for those who do good is good (reward) and more than this."<sup>18</sup>

Ultimately there remained only a small party of *Mujahidin* who passed the nights in hunger, but rushed to fight at dawn, and waged war against the enemy. They together with a company of the forces guarded the wall of the city and stopped the enemy's entry through breaches until one night a party of soldiers was appointed to stay in an ambush and watch, in front of the hill. These fellows were born cowards and were timid, accustomed to living in ease and lethargy. They disarmed themselves and fell asleep. The enemy launched a night attack, seized their arms and killed them and made these sleepers sleep in a way that they could never rise.

When the Christians captured this ambush and entered therein they set up ballistas in a large number for pulling down the wall close to it, demolishing the ramparts and opening the gate in its front. They showered continuously heavy balls throughout the day and night. The wall of the city was breached and cracked, and openings became apparent in the wall and the ramparts. The gate was demolished and sources (of defence) were cut short; the curtain rose. None from among the soldiers was able to stand or sit there, nor could anyone peep from or ascend over the wall. Any one who tried to peep from it was shot and fell into the ditch.

<sup>17</sup> The revolutionary forces had entered the capital in May, but the siege and assaults commenced in June. The imperial palace was captured by the British on September 20.

<sup>18</sup> *Holy Qur'an*, 10:26.



After this the Christians deceived the defenders and played a trick. They sent a division of their forces in front of another gate, so that (their opponents) should think that the other gate was being attacked. The *Mughals* and a section of the forces, therefore, busied themselves in fighting and resisting them; they were thus deceived by this trick and the device of the Christians. A party of the Christians and their forces then entered through the gate they had broken and the wall and the rampart which they had demolished. They found there none of the defenders, or fighters nor those who could resist, check, stop or fight them. They entered the houses of those who had already become the supporters of the Christians. They (the supporters) raised walls in their houses for their protection and hurried to entertain them with whatever food they had prepared for them. They fed them to satisfaction with meat and milk and supplied them with all they needed. They opened holes in the walls and shut the doors to enable them to fire guns and guard themselves against those who were likely to attack them. Whenever any citizen or soldier was sighted by them they shot him dead and their opponents found no way to strike at them. They would wait for an opportunity to enter the other houses as well, so that they might utilise them like the houses of their friends for rest during the night and day. But whenever these cursed ones appeared or were found anywhere they were caught and killed. So wherever they feared they would meet any fighter or opponent they did not come out but rarely. Nevertheless, they were receiving continuous help from the ridge, which was coming to them through every Christian-loving Hindu.

Thus there remained no place for protection in the city, nor was there any ruler, because the King along with his sons and family had gone to a tomb situated at a distance of three miles from the city.<sup>19</sup> He was obedient to his wife and his treacherous '*amil* (*wazir*)'<sup>20</sup> who had completely deluded him by his falsehoods and calumnies. He used to entice him by saying that the Christians after having gained victory would treat him well and would restore him to power

<sup>19</sup> Humayun's Tomb.

<sup>20</sup> "When at last, on the 19th, the Burn bastion had been captured, the Commander-in-Chief, the old artillery Subahdar, Bakht Khan, represented to the King that his only way of safety lay in flight; he begged him to accompany the sipahi army, which still remained intact, and with it to renew the war in the open country. That was the course which the descendant of Babur, had he been young, would have undoubtedly followed. But.....the King was persuaded to reject the bold counsels of his general and to accept those of his Queen and courtiers." G. B. Malleson, *The Indian Mutiny*, 309. Of course Malleson has suppressed the very important fact that the Queen and this chief courtier, whom the '*Allamah* describes as the treacherous '*amil*, were in league with the British and were acting as their agents and spies.

Of the perfidious acts of Ahsanullah Khan one may be mentioned by way of illustration. "At three o'clock," writes Munshi Jeewan Lal under May 20, "Hakim Ahsanullah represented that the soldiers were looting in the city, and requested that they should be expelled. To get rid of them, orders were this day issued to Mirza Mogul to proceed with a strong force towards Meerut to attack any English force assembled there.....It became known that the dispatch of troops to Meerut to fight the English was a device of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan to rid the city of the mutineers and soldiers, who were beyond all discipline." *Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny*, (Tr. by C.T. Metcalfe, 1898), p. 99.



and greatness in the Empire. Thus he was kept under delusion and was happy, with the promises and ambitions that Satan put in his mind.<sup>21</sup> The courtiers and servants of the King also went with him along with their families and children, leaving behind their property and belongings in the mansions and houses which they had evacuated. Many of the citizens became frightened by their departure from the city, and every one of them left his house. When the houses were evacuated by their occupants the Christians and their forces entered them and fell upon whatever they found there from wealth and riches. They butchered all women, children and invalids who had stayed in the houses. Thus none from amongst the brave citizens remained there to fight and resist them.<sup>22</sup>

Of the revolutionary forces some had escaped before the entry of the Christians while some remained firm. There were others who fought with them again and again. The money-changers and other Hindus who were in alliance with the Christians<sup>23</sup> and the late servants of the King who were enemies of the fighters (*Mujahidin*) devised a scheme of destroying them and severely restricting their supplies. They concealed all the grain and cereals which were available in the city and stopped all supplies which used to come from the towns and villages until they were forced to pass their days and nights in hunger, thirst, excessive heat and anxiety. Their perplexity was extremely great, and so they fled in a helpless manner. The Christians took possession of the city and its gates, its wall, its fort, its markets and its houses and mansions.

Many of the members of my family and children were in Dihli at the time and I had been invited there. And as there were hopes for betterment and success and victory and prosperity were expected, and as whatever had been destined for us was hidden in the womb of futurity, I set out for Dihli where my place of residence was. Having reached there I unpacked my luggage and met the members of my family. I advised the people according to the dictates of my judgement and understanding, but they did not act on my advice and did not

<sup>21</sup> For the intrigues of Mirza Ilahi Bakhsh, see Kaye and Malleon, vol. IV, pp. 50-52.

<sup>22</sup> The details of the references made by the 'Allamah to the atrocities committed by the British soldiers can be easily substantiated by the incidents mentioned by the western writers themselves. Giving a resume of the history of the war until the fall of Dihli Charles Ball refers to the condition of the city after the entry of the British soldiers in these words: "Streams of people and cattle also poured out of the Ajmere Gate; and, a few days later, the city was described as void of inhabitants. Houses, mosques, bazaars were tenantless; and large districts of the capital of Mohammadan India, with its 200,000 inhabitants, were changed to the desolateness of Pompeii." (*The History of the Indian Mutiny*, vol. I, p. 528).

The horrible conduct of Hodson in sending the severed heads of the princes to the King has been suppressed by the western historians. But the 'Allamah's statement cannot be ignored because he was in Dihli on 21 September when this took place.

<sup>23</sup> Jeewan Lal says under date 14 September:

"About midday the Mahomedans ceased to oppose the English. They, together with the Sepoys, began to take refuge in the houses of the Hindus, whom they upbraided for not cooperating with them."



accept my council.<sup>24</sup>

When the Christians took possession of the city and there was left none from among the (defending) forces and the residents, a severe need of the supply of grain and sweet water was felt because these had been stopped by the enemies. I stayed there for five days and nights.<sup>25</sup> Then having no means of carrying my luggage I left my property comprising my books, money and effects, and placing reliance on the Almighty God I adopted a suitable course for my safety. "Allah is sufficient as a protector."<sup>26</sup>

The Christians after having captured the city and its suburbs with the help of a large force of white-faced (soldiers) directed their whole attention to arresting the King, his sons and grandsons. They had not even left their place of staying,<sup>27</sup> and (in reality) Fate had kept them in that place and settled them there. They had placed their confidence in the person who had deceived them and made them happy by his lies. He (King) was in the tomb living under delusion and happiness, surrounded by a crowd and served by many. (The result was that) he was made a prisoner, regretful and heavy at heart and was put in chains. They captured his sons and grandsons who were with him and put them in chains. Then they carried him to the city along with his wife and children. On the way one of their officers who was *tarkhan* or *bitriq* murdered the sons and grandsons of the King with his gun. Then they sent their severed heads in a tray to the King as a present.<sup>28</sup> Their bodies were thrown away and (later) also their heads which had been cut off. They imprisoned him (the King) in a cell which was narrower than the hole of a needle. He was put under the guard of white-faced, black-hearted, red-haired and blue-eyed watchmen. They exiled him from these vast territories to some distant islands with his wife who had been for them and was their friend even when she was a queen. She failed in obtaining what she had coveted and all she had collected was looted. She became disfigured although she was *Zinat* (meaning decoration) and was dishonoured although she had always been kept in protection.

<sup>24</sup> It is difficult to determine the exact date of the 'Allamah's arrival in Dihli. He is, however, reported by Jeewan Lal, to have attended the *darbar* and "conversed with the King upon the situation" on August 16. Three weeks later (on September 6) he "reported that the force from Muttra had gone to Agra, and after defeating the English had advanced against the city."

<sup>25</sup> Thus he must have left Dihli on 24 or 25 September, as the city was captured on the 20th.

<sup>26</sup> *Holy Qur'an*, 4:81.

<sup>27</sup> *مستقر* refers to Humayun's Tomb.

<sup>28</sup> In a letter written by an Engineer officer who was a participant in the operations we read: "September 23—we have all moved down to a capital house on the banks of the river in the city; the breeze is delightful, and we are all getting as fat and jolly as if we were at home. We are getting on capitally; we have got the King (the Great Mogul) prisoner, and are only waiting for leave from Calcutta to hang him. His eldest son and heir, Mirza Moghul Beg, a most infernal scoundrel, who set the example of murdering the Europeans, was caught and shot like a dog; and his son, a man about twenty years old; as well as the King's eldest son Mirza's brother. I saw all the three bodies exposed in the Khotwalee this morning. I am happy to say we are not so lenient as we were." (Quoted by Ball, vol. I, p. 516)



They (Christians) killed, shooting and hanging, every body whom they found from his (King's) people as they did (shoot or hang) many of the other inhabitants besides these. No one was saved from these feeble persons except those who took to flight secretly, leaving in concealment during the night or those who escaped with promptitude, stealthily marching in the day time. But the number of these was small.

Then the Christians killed the great officials and notables living in the vicinity and the suburbs of the city; (they) usurped their lands and property, houses and mansions, chattels and wealth and their arms and goods, horses and elephants and their he-camels and she-camels; (they) annihilated them with all their families and children although they had become their subjects and had submitted to them because of fear and expectations. Then they stationed their forces on every route so that they might seize those who were trying to escape and torture them. They captured many of these fugitives and none could escape but a few. They looted first whatever from gold and silver was found with the captives, and also plundered their covering sheets, clothes, *tah-bands* and trousers. Then they sent them to their officers who sentenced them to death by hanging or beheading. None escaped these killings, neither the young nor the invalids, nor the nobles, nor the low-born. Thus the number of those who were beheaded or hanged reached upto thousands.<sup>29</sup> Most of the persons who suffered these tyrannies of the tyrant were the believers in Islam. As far as the Hindus were concerned they remained safe with the exception of those who were regarded as hostiles. From amongst the Muslims none survived except those who had left their houses as *muhajirs* or those who had supported the Christians and were lax in their faith (*iman*) or those who were their spies and had not pinned their hopes in the mercy of the beneficent and merciful God, as for instance that *'amil* of the ex-king, who was in friendship with them and in fact had enabled them to seize power and become the rulers. But he suffered grievously because he could not get what he had coveted and had to remain distressed for his losses. His position underwent a change and his power was lost. He had to pass his days in a state of contemptible disrepute. "He loses this world as well as the hereafter; that is the great straying".<sup>30</sup>

Then the Christians sent messages to those Hindu chiefs, who were owners of the lands and estates and had submitted to them, to the effect that they should capture all those who entered their lands as fugitives or were found passing through them. They captured large numbers of these poor travellers,

<sup>29</sup> According to the author of the *Qaysar-al- Tawarikh* the number of persons executed in Dihli was twenty-seven thousand, vol. II, p. 454.

The figure is by no means an exaggerated one. Lord Elphinstone refers to the massacre at Dihli. He writes to Sir John Lawrence, "After the siege was over, the outrages committed by our army are simply heart-rending. A wholesale vengeance is being taken without distinction of friend or foe. As regards the looting, we have indeed surpassed Nadir Shah". *Life of Lawrence*, vol. II, p. 262.

<sup>30</sup> *Holy Qur'an*, 22: 11.



made them prisoners and sent them in chains to the officers of the Christians. The latter killed them all, sparing neither a noble man nor the low-born. Then they (Christians) assembled their forces and supporters and scattered them in the various parts of the country; these (forces) tried to capture the people and destroyed those whom they seized.<sup>31</sup>

During this great calamity the noble and chaste women had come out of their houses and were helpless; among them were old women and those who were unable to escape because of fatigue; and among them were those who died of excess of fear and those who committed suicide by drowning themselves in order to protect their honour and position and their chastity and modesty. Many of them were made captive, subjected to tortures and were made victims of hardships; some of them were made concubines by despicable fellows and some were sold for low prices. A large number of them perished on account of hunger and thirst and many of them disappeared and could not return, nor was any trace found of them, nor any news heard. Most of the women were separated from their guardians, husbands, fathers, brothers and sons. Every day of this calamitous period had become "the day on which a man shall fly from his brothers, and his mother, and his father, and his spouse, and his sons." Many a woman became widowed in the evening, many a children rose an orphan in the morning; many a mother rendered childless was (seen) weeping and wailing, and many a father bereaved of his children was (found) shedding tears from sorrow and betraying his hidden (grief). The city was changed into a desert and waste land and was turned into a jungle, and its inhabitants were scattered and dispersed.<sup>32</sup>

The Christians then directed their attention towards the east and the villages and cities situated therein. They created horrible conditions there. They committed a general massacre, hanging and shooting the people. Death overtook many men and many *purdah*-observing ladies, and a large number of people were annihilated. Hundreds and thousands of persons were made the victims of death and destruction.

As to myself, I was now on my way to my beloved home. The route was full of dangers and the traveller suffering afflictions. Between me and my homeland there lay many a region, full of risks and dangers. The Christians and

<sup>31</sup> "Before closing the present chapter, it will be proper to refer briefly to the operations of the troops, dispatched in various directions from Delhi, in pursuit of the discomfited and fugitive rebels." Charles Ball, *The History of Indian Mutiny*, vol. II, p. 185.

<sup>32</sup> *Holy Qur'an*, 80: 34, 35, 36.  
Of the devastation wrought by the British in Dihli we have considerable evidence in contemporary records. A few sentences from the work quoted above would give the reader some idea of the terrible fate of the capital. "The city of the Moguls was now, indeed, but little better than a vast and hideous ruin—its houses and streets deserted; its defences unmanned; and the sentence of utter demolition suspended over its shattered gates and once defiant towers, the carcasses of some thousands of its defenders, who had fallen in their insane struggle..... had been necessarily gathered by the sweepers and camp followers into deep pits, and were so hidden from mortal sight....." (*Ibid.*, p. 167).



their forces were busy in seeking and searching the travellers. They had issued orders to the Jats, their clansmen and their parties to kill the passengers, frighten them, rob them and plunder them. They (Jats) had left no way for the travellers nor any boat at the ferries. They had seized the boats and made holes in them; in fact they had burnt them, rendered them unserviceable or had sunk them. They had ordered the boat-men not to allow the travellers or swimmers to cross (the rivers) at any time.<sup>33</sup> The Holder of Power (God) saved me and my companions from each calamity and misery and enabled them and me to cross the big and small rivers without resorting to (the use of) bridge or boats. Thus we survived all the hardships of these routes and dangerous places and the accidents and mishaps of the roads and ways. We reached our home and neighbours, and (joined our) family and friends under His (God's) perfect protection, effective help, over-flowing blessings and comfort-giving mercy. He saved us, undoubtedly, from the risks of this journey and graced us by granting us safety from all sorts of calamities. We, therefore, offered profuse praises to our Lord for this.

A number of those who had risen against the Christians and the soldiers and fighting forces who were in our land had, after their revolt, made their ruler a woman<sup>34</sup> from amongst the wives of their previous King who had abdicated and her son who had not even attained the age of puberty. The Christians had taken over this country from the said ruler who was a weak man and used to waste his time in worthless amusements and neglected the business of the government. He was neither prudent nor wise; he was an expert in violating his agreements and promises. When the authority of the Christians broke down and their government was overthrown the country passed into her hands; her son was young, conceited, delicate and vain, and was given to playing with boys of his own age, absolutely neglectful of his enemies. He was incapable of managing and administering the affairs of the government and executing its projects, and he could not issue orders or have them acted upon, nor could he lead the forces or secure necessary equipment for them. All the officers of his government and the ministers of the state were worthless, timid and cowardly, and were foolish and dishonest; they were neither wise nor trustworthy. They were all mean fellows and some of them

<sup>33</sup> Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, had succeeded in persuading Sindhia and the Jat *rajah* of Bharatpur to give the British "material assistance". Plundering and highway robbery had long been the favourite pursuits of the Jats; and with active encouragement from the Company authorities they must have ruthlessly indulged in their semi-barbarous activities referred to here; undoubtedly the 'Allamah is telling us the bare truth about what he actually saw and experienced. The editor of the Arabic text of this short pamphlet says on the authority of the late Sadr Yar Jang Habib-al-Rahman Khan of Bhikanpur that the latter's father and uncle had played the host to the 'Allamah when he was on his way to Lucknow. He is stated to have stayed with his family and companions at Bhikanpur for 18 days and then arrangements were made for their safely crossing the Ganges at the Sankrah ferry.

<sup>34</sup> Hazrat Mahal, the wife of Wajid 'Ali Shah, was the regent of her minor son, Birjis Qadr. Even the British writers admit that the Queen was a "woman of much energy of character."



had been slaves. Amongst them were illiterate, ease-loving, impertinent, noise-making, lazy and feeble fellows and flatterers, hangers on, and sycophants. They were mean and of undetermined parentage, low-born and rascals, irresolute and incapable of acting, dishonest and tyrannical, cruel, deceitful, treacherous and scheming. Among them were slaves of gold, and chiefs who were hypocritical some of them were administrators but they were wretched and their policy led the administration to misfortune, destruction and ruin, providing the discerning people with opportunities for taking lessons; most of them were allies of the Christians and advocates of their friendship. All of them were helpless against the mortal devices of the enemy and they were negligent, slow and careless. The Christians, with their families and children, had been besieged in the palaces in the city,<sup>35</sup> but they were in safety because of the defects in the arrangements and the management of (the affairs of) their opponents. They had fortified these palaces by trenches and ramparts. The rebel forces attacked them again and again but were repulsed. They "say that which they do not do."<sup>36</sup> Then, there arrived a force of white-faced soldiers to help the besieged and entered the city. The brave *ghazis* fought against them and many of the white-faced people were killed; those among them who survived managed to join the besieged, broken-hearted and weary. After this, all those who were in the palaces came out but no one offered them resistance because of cowardliness and weakness. The Christians now shut themselves up behind the walls of a garden,<sup>37</sup> situated at a distance of two miles from the city. With courage and bravery they fortified it and continued asking for help, collecting in the meanwhile supplies in large quantities.

The troops who were already present in the city and the forces who after having escaped from Dihli had come to the Queen (Hazrat Mahal) and had received protection and honour from her and on whom she had conferred counties as well as the mercenaries of the earlier days, who had never witnessed a battle, nor seen fighting or the piercing of the lance, nor had any idea as to what was advantageous, nor had used arms and taken an active part in a battle or faced a danger, gathered in front of this garden and dug trenches and ambushes. Now fighting was on and the flinging of arrows and playing of lances continued for a long time between the two forces. The struggle between them was long-drawn. The Christians asked the chief of the mountainous region to help them. He gave them help according to their desire and hopes, sending regiments of hill-men who numbered more than thirty thousand. Then the Christians, their white forces and their mercenaries and supporters launched severe and successive attacks which uprooted their opponents from their positions and shook them. They fled from their ambushes so badly that they could not stop anywhere even in the city and its

The 'Allamah's reference to palaces (*qusur*) is of course to the various buildings and houses in the Residency, which has been rightly described as "a small town, rather than a mere single building, occupied by the chief commissioner." Machhi-bhawan was another fortified building.

*Holy Qur'an*, 26: 226.

\*Alam-bagh.



neighbourhood. Thus they left the Queen and her son alone in her palace. Many of their supporters, officials of the state, servants of, their government and the villagers of their territories betrayed them, although they had come to help, aid and support them and to protect and maintain their property and honour. They broke their pledges and promises and exchanged *kufr* for *iman*. They acted as hypocrites, began to favour the Christians, joined them and helped them to achieve victory.

The Christians and their supporters entered the city. The citizens left their houses and dwellings empty and went away. Ultimately the Christians, their white-faced soldiers and their forces and supporters besieged the palace in which the Queen was living. Consequently, accompanied by her son and two female attendants, she came out of the besieged palace, barefooted, from its backdoor and hurriedly went to another part of the city (*mahallah*). She stayed for three days in the city, reassembling and recalling her fugitive forces and appealing to them to help and support her. These soldiers, however, had become terror-stricken and therefore shrank from and shirked their duty of facing the extremely dangerous situation. None of them returned to her and there remained no place of safety for her in the city. Thus, disappointed of all help from her supporters, she took to flight, accompanied by her son and a few attendants, and proceeded towards the desolate and deserted plains. At that time parties of terror-stricken horsemen, a large crowd of barefooted persons and groups of citizens, including veiled women, crowded round her. They were all barefooted and almost without clothes, although they had been amongst the leading persons. The women were without veils and were barefooted, although they were *pardah*-observing ladies of rank and used to live in palatial houses. They had been thrown out of their palaces into the open fields and had to content themselves with patched clothes. They were thrown from one desolate place to another and their veils and *burq'ahs* had been removed (from their bodies). They had been living in comfort and luxury but had now to wander in the jungles and deserts.

These people had to leave their mansions and estates as well as their ranks and positions although they did not want to part with them. Thus the conditions had changed; evil had befallen and confusion had spread. This misfortune was ruinous; it converted the cities into wildernesses, the freemen into slaves, the wealthy into destitutes and the nobles into lowly persons. They had been living in ease and comfort with their families and children but now they were forced to come out; they had been enjoying happiness and prosperity and were satisfied, but now they were reduced to a state of perplexity. Destitution and poverty had dissociated them from the company of their friends and misfortune had forced them to abandon the society of their equals.

Among the weepers were those who had suffered, among the lamentors were those who had been hurt, among the tender-hearted were those who were crying in prayers; the aggrieved ones were reciting *Inna Lillahi-wa-inna ilaihi raji'un* (We belong to Allah and verily we shall return towards Him). The babies were deprived before time of sucking milk from the breasts of their mothers and



the old and young had lost all hopes of the fulfilment of their desires and requirements. There was no dwelling-place or abode left for them, nor was there any remedy for their malady; and their hearts were completely depressed. They liked no pleasure and had no desires; for them life and death were equal. They used to live in happiness and in regal styles, and rolled in silks and satins, in fruits and pleasures, in cleanliness and prosperity, ease and comforts, wealth and riches, songs and happiness, and had possessed property, palaces and plenitude; but now thorns were spread under their feet. They had no more army provisions left with them; their clothes were worn out and ragged.<sup>38</sup> They had no share in comfort. May God forgive them in His mercy and take the tyrants into the grip of His severe punishment.

Then the Queen, Hazrat-al-'Aliyah, with parties of the former fugitive forces who had come under her protection and many others who had decided to migrate, went across the rivers, large and small, which could not be crossed without boats. She stopped in a village on the bank of a river in the northern parts of the country. From here she posted horsemen and foot soldiers at the ferries so that they might seize the boats and stop the enemy from crossing the rivers. She also sent her *'amils* to the village and the towns to collect revenues and reclaim the people. She now equipped the forces and sent them to take positions in the ambushes, lying near her capital, which the Christians had taken, so that they might offer them resistance, fight them and stop them in case they attempted aggression in the country around it. But she entrusted the execution of this entire task and major and minor questions connected with it to a contemptible, negligent *'amil* whose ideas were confused and who was absolutely unfit for it. He did not consult any one except (his) ignorance and considered every simple matter to be difficult and every complicated affair to be easy. He was stupid, a coward and a liar. He chose none for his companionship, consultation, society and conversation except foolish, illiterate and mean fellows. He avoided the company of the noble, the sagacious and the wise leaders on account of his vanity. He did not make friends with, nor consulted, nor gave authority to, nor appointed as officers except those mean and ignorant persons who belonged to his family and his kinsmen. This inexperienced fellow appointed officers for these forces from amongst the mean, coward, wretched, weak-hearted worthless and despicable persons who were greedy and would eat themselves whatever was given to the forces as rations. They committed perfidy because of malice hidden in their hearts; they stole the grain and then sold it for higher price. Every cry that reached them was considered by them to have been raised by the enemy; they

<sup>38</sup> How the guilty and the innocent alike were butchered by the victor is indicated by recorded evidence. "At the time of the capture of Lucknow — a season of indiscriminate massacre — such distinction was not made and the unfortunate who fell into the hands of our troops was made short work of sepoy of Oudh villager, it mattered not; no questions were said: his skin was black and did not that suffice. A piece to rope and the branch of a tree, or a rifle bullet through his brain, soon terminated the poor devils existence." (Majendie, *Up among the Pandies*, pp. 1956).



always trembled with fear and had no tranquility or peace of mind. On account of extreme fear they took every cry to be their death-knell; every sound was to them the harbinger of death. It appeared as if they were going to meet the mean enemy in a friendly and apologetic manner.<sup>39</sup>

The Christians after capturing the capital stayed there and did not go to the suburbs or the neighbouring places. They began to win over the infidels and the leading persons of the countryside as well as the farmers and the villagers by pardoning their misdeeds and crimes and granting reductions in the revenues and taxes. The Christians advanced them loans and they offered their support to them; they (Christians) helped them and the latter became their hands and arms. The Christians then went out into the suburbs and neighbouring territories in order to establish their control on the villages and towns.

The Christians now repaired to an ambush which lay eighteen miles<sup>40</sup> from the capital towards the north and where were posted horsemen and foot soldiers, commanded by an officer of high rank who, however, belonged to the mean and low classes of people. On hearing the news of the arrival of the Christians this low-born commander took to heels even before seeing any sign of them, along with his companions who also belonged to the same class. But a small party of the fighting Hindus, under a reliable officer, who was one of the gallant heroes, remained firm in their position. They were not more than one hundred in number; but they fought with them, killed them and were killed, until not one of them was left alive, because they hated a shameful flight and because they received no reinforcements from their fugitive leader in spite of the fact that he had a large number of soldiers and plentiful supplies. When the Christians found the village, in which that coward and treacherous leader was posted to keep watch, evacuated and deserted, they took possession of it and made it their great and well-defended stronghold. Then having collected the forces they remained there for a long time. During this period they did not advance (from their positions) even a mile. It seemed as if they were waiting for something which they expected from the commanders of the forces and for the fulfilment of the promises which had been made to them by those perfidious people, and in satisfying which they were making delay.

Then they (Christians) turned and marched towards the west of the city and proceeded to those regions where all the farmers and residents had submitted to them and were helping them against their enemies. In this region was posted an officer of the Queen (Hazrat Mahal), who was worthless and lacked resolution and was neither experienced nor sagacious. He turned his back towards them, made a retreat and fled away, leaving his men there. He escaped without fighting or combating the enemy, making his way through a subterranean passage, because the number of his horsemen and foot-soldiers was small and the villagers

<sup>39</sup> For a brief but informative account of the Queen's activities see Mirza Ali Azhar's article: *Hazrat Mahal's Role in the War of Independence*, in *JPHS*, vol. I, part III.

<sup>40</sup> Eight miles in *Baghi Hindustan*, p. 404. This refers to Nawabganj on the Fyzabad road. It had become a stronghold of the fighters for independence.



and the infidels had revolted against him, although they had pledged themselves to support him. They betrayed him although they had become his allies, and committed treachery and perfidy and became ungrateful despite the blessings which they had been enjoying and the comfort in which they had been living happily for a long time; thus they added to their disbelief and infidelity by violating their pledges and breaking their agreements in a most thankless manner.

Now there arose an '*amil*'<sup>41</sup> of another district, who had piled up a treasure of virtues, charitable actions and good deeds. He was a righteous, God-fearing, devoted, pure, brave and gallant person. He was named after the Prophet, the hero of great battles and a messenger of mercies. He attacked the Christians and their forces and put them to rout in his first charge. They made a determined effort and the party shut itself up in the house of a Hindu in the town. This house was well-protected and strongly-guarded. Then they sent a message to the Christian chiefs who were in the city, to help them by sending battalions of troops. The Christian chiefs sent a battalion for their help from their army corps and large numbers of those villagers and hypocrites who had broken their pledges and had rendered themselves guilty of infidelity by violating their promises. Some from amongst the infidel landlords deceived the said pious and brave '*amil*'.<sup>42</sup> He had given him assurance on oaths that he would help him with four thousand brave soldiers at the time when the two armies would meet in battle. However, when the parties came face to face with each other this efficient and honest '*amil*' had to attack the Christian forces with a number of youthful followers, deceived as he had been by the promises of help given by this infidel landlord. The Christian forces showered bullets by their guns and canon on their forces and chests from their front and the party of that treacherous and perfidious infidel fired at their backs from the rear. This party was in reality a supporter of the Christians and their allies and the helpers of Satan and his brethren. This perfect and righteous '*amil*' sought for and got martyrdom in an action and all those who accompanied him also gained martyrdom in this attack. After this pious and brave person and his good comrades were martyred those wretched ones who had followed them turned their backs and took to flight. They fled in such confusion and anxiety that they did not see what lay behind them, because they had been overwhelmed by failure and defeat and the Christians were

<sup>41</sup> Mawlana Ahmad-allah Shah who, in fact, was the supreme organizer of the movement. Even his enemies have testified to his greatness as a fighter in the cause of freedom. "Of this conspiracy," write Kaye and Malleon, "the Maulvi was undoubtedly a leader. It had its ramifications all over India....." *History of the Indian Mutiny*, vol. V, p. 292.

<sup>42</sup> This refers to Jagannath Singh, the perfidious *zamindar* of Powain. He invited the Mawlana and had him shot dead when he was entering his house. The British Government rewarded his treachery by a gift of Rupees fifty thousand. "The Maulvi was a very remarkable person .....In person he was tall, lean, and muscular, with large deep-set eyes, beetle brows, a high aquiline nose, and lantern jaws. Sir Thomas Seaton, who enjoyed, during the suppression of the revolt, the best means of judging him, described him as a man of great abilities, of undaunted courage, of stern determination and by far the best soldier among the rebels." (Malleon, *The Indian Mutiny of 1857*, p. 17).



pursuing them and slaughtering them. Only a few of them could manage to escape as they had resorted to great haste and speed in their flight. The landlords, the leading persons, the ryots, the villagers and others who lived in these regions—all offered submission and allegiance to the Christian forces except two brave, gallant and warlike persons who were jealous of their honour. They fought against the Christians fiercely and in spite of the inadequacy of equipment and soldiers they killed through their zeal and courage a large number of the horsemen and foot soldiers of the enemy. By dint of sheer dauntlessness they were able to save themselves from them. The Christians did not take steps to pursue them. Thus the territory was cleared of the opponents of the Christians, but this unfortunate incident terrified the people who were opposed to the Christians. This was one of the most calamitous events of the struggle and became the cause of considerable grief. It appeared to be the end of the long series of battles and combats (of the war). After their victory in this region the Christians spread themselves over other territories also. Nevertheless, whenever they thought of entering any place and took steps to capture it their opponents living there decided to offer resistance and make every possible effort for it. But they dispersed before actually meeting them.

In spite of this the Queen of the Christians played a trick which considerably added to their strength and power. She had a large number of printed posters distributed and published in towns and villages in every part of the country, through which it became widely known that she had forgiven all the rebel forces and all her subjects who had revolted against her, except those who had been guilty of murdering women, children and the Christians who were forced to seek shelter in the earlier stages (of the war) and had been killed by them out of enmity and hostility, and those who had set up (independent) governments and states, and those who had instigated the people to rebellion and hostility.<sup>43</sup>

The rebel forces and other people who had supported and agreed with the Queen (Hazrat Mahal) had in fact joined her because they had no means of livelihood. With the shortage of food and stoppage of the payment of their salaries in consequence of her inability to collect revenues which were paid to her, because of the spreading of Christian forces in the various parts of the region and their hold on them, the land (world) in spite of its expanse became narrow for them. Their lives became afflicted with severe distress and long-drawn tortures. Every one of them was empty-handed and devoid of rest and comfort. Being at a distance from their children and families, their thoughts had become confused on account of worries. Therefore many of them turned to the Christians and their followers and offered submission to them, accepting their authority. The

<sup>43</sup> The exact words of the relevant paragraph in the Queen's Proclamation are: "Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except those who have been or shall be convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects. With regard to such, the demands of justice forbid the exercise of mercy." The Proclamation was issued on November 1, 1858.



Christians seized their horses and arms and gave them *parwanahs* of security. Then they returned to their families and homes, disappointed and having suffered losses. Now the Christians got full control over the country, as there was no one left to dispute their authority; they were rid of fighting and could now take rest. The Queen, after these embarrassments and troubles, sought shelter in the hills.<sup>44</sup>

As my travels had extended over a long period and my detection and anxiety had been long-drawn, my desire to return to my home, family, neighbours and friends had become very intense. When, therefore, I saw the charter (Proclamation of Victoria) which had been strengthened by oath, I returned to my family, home and dwelling-place because I was satisfied with its authenticity, neglecting, however, the truth that the oath of a person having no *iman* (faith) is meaningless, and that the oath of a man who follows no faith and does not fear the Day of Judgment should not be relied upon. After a few days a Christian officer sent for me from my house, put me in prison and subjected me to torture, causing me great pain. Then putting me in chains he sent me to the capital of the Kingdom which had become by then the home of ruin and destruction. He entrusted my case to a cruel officer of dominating personality, who had no sympathy with those who sought justice. Two apostates, who were by nature quarrelsome and had had religious disputations with me in regard to a Quranic verse, meaning that one who befriends the Christian is a Christian himself, had supplied information about me. They used to insist on friendship with the Christians and had ultimately turned apostate, exchanging *iman* with *kufr*.

That officer passed an order for my life-long imprisonment, punishment, exile and banishment as well as the confiscation of my entire property, comprising my books, effects and wealth. He forcibly seized the house that belonged to my family and my children.

I was not the only victim of this shameless breach of faith: a large number of people were generally meted out treatment that was far more hideous than this. They (British Government) violated all the pledges that they had given and massacred a large number of persons by shooting and hanging them; many of them were caught and thrown into imprisonment and sent in exile without delay. They completely broke every promise that they had made and destroyed numerous lives and precious articles. The number of persons whose blood was shed was beyond counting even by hundreds and thousands. Beyond enumeration was also the number of those who were arrested from amongst the nobles and common people, particularly those living in the vast territories between Dehli and our land which had many cities, villages and towns and was the homeland of many respected and noble families.

<sup>44</sup> She was driven by the British forces to the hills of Nepal and lived there till her death in 1879. The chronogram of her flight towards Nepal may be found in the couplet.

تاریخ روانگی جوجستم      نیپال شتافت آمد آواز  
This will yield 1274 Hijrah.



In the meanwhile a chief professing Islam and the Faith sent parties of those who had sought protection in his state to these people (offering security) and then arrested them and made them helpless, after having promised them safety. To win over the Christians he betrayed them in a way which is condemned by all religions. In his attempt to please them (Christians) he did not even fear the wrath of the Almighty God. The Christians imprisoned these people who were sent to them in chains and fetters and subjected many of the nobles to imprisonment, exile and other tortures. Thus, this chief also shared with the Christians the consequences of inflicting upon the servants of God the most severe tortures. This is the story of the War.

Thus the Christians' punished me with imprisonment by fabricating falsehoods and deceptive devices against me; they shifted me from one jail to another and inflicted on me one injury after another. They continuously added to my grief and pain, deprived me of my shoes and dress and clad me in coarse and rough clothes. They snatched from me my good and soft bedding and gave me a coarse and highly uncomfortable one, which looked as if it was a thorn-bush or a burning ember. They left with me neither a pitcher or a bowl nor any other pot and gave me insufficient meals to eat. They made me drink hot water and I was thus given hot drinks instead of the love of bosom friends. In spite of old age and weakness every moment I was subjected to humiliation and insults.

The excesses of the hard-hearted enemy cast me on the shores of a great saltish sea in a plateau which has a cape (*ras*), also named *ras*. Here the sun always shines straight upon my head. It has difficult mountain passes and hilly roads full of troubles. There are passes in the hills, enveloped by waves of the tumultuous sea whose water is bitter; its breeze is hotter than *simum* and its comforts are more dangerous than poison; its eatables are more bitter than the taste of colocynths and its water was more harmful than snake poison. Its sky is a cloud which rains sorrows and its raining clouds shower afflictions and miseries. The ground is spread over with stones like measles and small pox (on the diseased body). Its air, because of calamities, is full of disasters. Every house in this place, built with grass and weeds, is infested with lasting illness and misery; from its roof always drizzle drops like the tears of my eyes which never stop. Its air is contaminated and therefore a source of diseases. Illness is cheap, but medicines are dear. Epidemics are frequent and scabies and ring-worms very common. For the wounded there is no cure, for the healthy no security, and for the sick no treatment. The one who treats the sick brings back the disease, and the one who is treated is sure to meet death; the one who attends the sick ill-treats them and enhances their trouble. The aggrieved is not sympathized with, nor does anyone feel sorry for him. No anxiety in the world could be guessed upon the pains that one has to bear in this place. No disease is found here which is not fatal: fever brings the message of death and even ordinary types of hypochondria and pleurisy are sure causes of death. Besides, many diseases prevail here whose names or symptoms are not to be found in medical works. The physician makes the bowels of the patient burn like a furnace and instead of helping him raises a



dome of fire on him. He cannot diagnose the disease but makes the patient take medicines which bring him near death. When any one from amongst the people breathes his last an unclean person from the impure ones, who is a sweeper and is like a devil or a monster, drags the dead body by catching the leg and after removing the clothes buries it in a sand hill without a coffin or funeral bath. He does not dig a grave, nor is funeral prayer performed for him. If the dead were not subjected to this abject treatment then dying would have been a thing keenly desired, and a sudden death would have been something longingly hoped for, if suicide had not been unlawful in the eyes of the Faith and people had not feared its punishment on the Day of Judgment no one who was brought here as a prisoner and put in trouble would have remained alive to bear these hardships. Deliverance from the afflictions which one has to suffer here would have been easy.

It was in this environment that I became a victim of several diseases and severe illness. These made me lose my patience; my heart became melancholy, my full moon was dimmed and my honour was lost. I do not know how can deliverance and emancipation be effected from this condition which has made me sorrowful, so that I might be compensated for. In addition to the grief caused by these hardships I had a severe attack of scabies and ringworms. I am made to move about in the morning and evening while my whole body is suffering with wounds. Along with soul-breaking pains, my wounds and injuries are increasing. The time is near when my boils would take me to the verge of destruction and death, after a long life of ease, comfort, enjoyment and happiness. Before this I was healthy and had never had smallpox; today I am disabled, wounded and ulcerated, I am undergoing severe hardships and struggling against difficulties and oppression.

“We have suffered at the hands of Time what we have no strength to bear. Our forbearance for them is like that of a fractured bone which has to bear the load of bandage.”

In spite of all this I praise the Glorious and Almighty God and thank Him for His favour and kindness, for I see other prisoners, besides me, heavily fettered and suffering with diseases, being dragged in chains and fetters. A harsh, stern hard-hearted man drives and drags them along with their iron fetters and imposes upon them every type of hard and laborious work. He exhibits every kind of malice and enmity against them and tries to intensify their hardships. He shows no sympathy with them when they are thirsty or hungry. I thank God, therefore, for remaining safe against these miseries and offer my gratitude for His favours on me and for saving me from these troubles. Looking at the apparent means, I am completely disappointed as to my deliverance and have given up all hopes, because my enemies are endeavouring to harm me and are anxious to bring about my ruin, while my friends have no power to cure my disease, and hostility and malice against me have become as deep-seated in the hearts of my opponents as religious beliefs are in the hearts of the people; their wretched hearts are full of grudge and rancour. Nevertheless I have hopes of mercy from



my God, the Strong, the Merciful, the Righteous, the Kind, the Benevolent, Who delivers the weak and the disabled from the clutches of the cruel Pharaohs and heals the wounds of the oppressed and the wounded by the ointment of His healing mercies. He is the repairer of every broken heart and compensator for the needy and sufferers: He is the deliverer of every prisoner who is neglected, and He makes difficult things easy. It was He who saved Noah from being drowned, Abraham from being burnt, Job from what he suffered of the diseases and miseries, Jonah from the belly of the fish and children of Israel from their hardships. He saved Moses and Aaron from Pharaoh, Haman and Korah and saved the Messiah from the evil designs of the crafty and saved His friend, Mustafa (Muhammad) from the machinations of the infidels. If therefore misfortune has specifically fixed its eyes on me, and looks at me fixedly, incidents and calamities have befallen me, hardships have surrounded me and sins have encircled me, I am not disappointed from His favour nor from His mercy. It is my Lord who is the true Curer, the Perfect, the Comforter and the Forgiver. Many a sick person, on the verge of death, recovers when he prays to Him; many an apologist is forgiven when he apologizes to Him and begs His forgiveness; many an aggrieved one is relieved of griefs when he prays to Him; a traveller receives succour when he approaches Him directly with prayer, and on many a prisoner, tied in chains the Greater who creates without limits places His obligation without the mediation of any helper or redeemer by giving him deliverance and emancipation from imprisonment and fetters.

I am an oppressed, injured, anxious, dejected, humble and needy person and I call to Him in secret prayer and supplicate before Him with great hopes and pray to Him, through the mediation of His friend (Muhammad). He verily has promised and would not go back on His words about responding to the prayers of the perplexed ones, removing their miseries and helping the oppressed while they pray and call him, crying bitterly. He will rescue me from what makes me aggrieved, deliver me from what makes me perplexed, respond to my request against what renders me petitioner, cure me from what keeps me uneasy, save me from the person who has taken me in his grip, and from one who oppresses me. He will have mercy upon my weeping and crying. He will remedy my complaint, and will bring to an end my misfortune and misery. Surely He is a listener to prayers, bestower of great bounties, a remover of calamities. It is He from whom I have hopes of relief from the hardships of exile and the end of the best trials about the gifts.

Oh Lord! save me from the condition in which I am. Oh Supporter of those who hope, Protector of the seekers of protection for the sake of the honour of your friend, the most trustworthy and the greatest giver of security and his blessed descendants and his supporting companions, Oh! the most Merciful, the most Powerful Ruler, the Avenger of the oppressions of the tyrants! And our last prayer is that all praises are due to Allah, the Sustainer of all the worlds.



I have mentioned some calamities that befell me and some of the misfortunes which struck me in (my) two *qasidahs*, one of them is *hamziyyah*<sup>15</sup> and refers to instigations of Satan, and the other is *zaliyyah*<sup>16</sup> which mentions the hardships that this sad and disabled person has suffered. I have ended them both with the eulogy of the leader of the prophets, who was a steadfast and trustworthy messenger (of God). May the purest blessings of those who send their blessings on him be upon him and may the salutations of the Muslims be upon him! Prior to the said poems I had composed a *qasidah* with rhymes of NUN (ن) which was peerless like the concealed pearl. Each of its verses was as stable as a strong mansion or a lofty palace. The number of its verses was three hundred or more. However it could not be completed. The onslaughts of misfortunes and their accumulation kept me from its completion. Its opening verse is:

There bemoaned no leaves from amongst the leaves of (the tree of) pathos, which did not excite my sorrows and did not move my tender emotions.

If God Almighty favours me with deliverance and emancipation I shall supplement it with the eulogy of one who has been distinguished by the nobility of his morals and his most perfect share from them. May the choicest of blessings be upon him, and his descendants up to the Day of Judgement!

The Glorious Almighty is the only Lord of the favourable circumstances and their realities.

(in: *Journal of the Historical Society of Pakistan* (Karachi), v.i (January 1957), pp. 23-57)



<sup>15</sup> *Hamziyyah*. The last letter of the rhyme in each verse of the *qasidah* is *hamzah* (ه). By instigation of Satan (*homazat-al-Shayatin*) the writer means the wild ideas which overwhelm the mind of an aggrieved person.

<sup>16</sup> *Zaliyyah*. The last letter of the rhyme in each verse is *zal* (ز).







## MAULVI FAZL HAQ AND THE “MUQADDAMATU-S SAURATU-L HINDIYA”

At the Raza Library, Rampur I lighted upon an anonymous Arabic manuscript<sup>1</sup> which, on reading the contents, I was able to identify. It was a copy from a manuscript prepared on the basis of an autograph of Maulvi Fazl Haq. As he himself says he wrote it in a state of mental anguish and under tortures of rigorous imprisonment<sup>2</sup> in the Andaman Islands. A little before his death which took place in 1861 he managed to send it to his son Abdul Haq Khairabadi<sup>3</sup> who arranged the scattered pieces of the autograph<sup>4</sup> and produced a fair copy from which several other copies were made by the scribes. One of these went to Rampur, another to Habibganj, another to Aligarh and another to Mecca. But everywhere the contents were kept strictly private until 1947 when Maulvi Abdul Shāhid Khan Sherwani of Aligarh published the text of the Aligarh copy together with an Urdu translation; and finding that the author had given no name to it he named it *Baghi Hindustan*<sup>5</sup> (Rebel India) which was improved upon by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. He had received the Meccan copy and named it *Sauratu-l Hindiya* (Indian Revolution). Since it does not give the complete story of the Indian Revolution and is but a kind of introduction, a suitable name in my opinion would be *Muqaddamatu-s Sauratu-l Hindiya* (Preamble to the Indian Revolution) for it was intended by the author for the sake of his friends and relations in India who were busy preparing a protest<sup>6</sup> against the unfavourable

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MS. 129 Raza Library, Rampur.

*I'de pp. 373, 381, 390 infra*

*I.e.* a resident of Khairabad in the Sitapur district of Uttar Pradesh.

It is said that Maulvi Fazl Haq wrote it on rags and irregular scraps. *I'de Baghi Hindustan*, Preface.

Abdul Shāhid Khan Sherwani—*Baghi Hindustan*. Madina Press, Bijnor (1947).

It should be noted that on being sentenced to transportation for life Maulvi Fazl Haq contested the prosecution charges against him. In a memorial written in Urdu, duly sealed and signed by him, and addressed to the Lt.-Governor of North-Western Provinces he denied the Government's charge that he was one of the leaders of the revolt. He submitted that he was Fazl Haq of Khairabad and that the Commission had made a mistake in punishing him in place of the rebel Fazl Haq who was a resident of Shahjahanpur. But the Government could not be convinced of his innocence and his conviction was upheld. He again addressed an appeal on



verdict of the British Court, 'exiling Maulvi Fazl Haq as a life prisoner to the Andaman Islands'<sup>7</sup>. Consequently those of his associations and deeds which (were likely to prove him a criminal in the eyes of the British were either suppressed or presented in a lurid light. For example, Bahadur Shah with whom he had previously identified himself<sup>8</sup>—attending his court, presenting *nazr*, giving advice and promoting the war—was now disowned and even disparaged<sup>9</sup>; some misleading information was also given about him.<sup>10</sup>

9th February 1860 to the Secretary of State for India, but this also met the same fate as that of his first endeavour. Then the prominent Muslim citizens of Calcutta made efforts to get his release by submitting a memorial to the Governor-General, but the Government refused to rescind the order. *Ide For. Pol. Sept. 1860; Sec. Cons. Nos. 556-558.*

*Ide Memorial of Calcutta Muslims to the Governor-General. N. A. For. Pol. Sept. 1860. Cons. Nos. 556-558*

<sup>8</sup> *Ide* (i) Metcalfe—*I. N. N.* pp. 196, 217, 223, 224

(ii) *Delhi News*, September 1, 1857

<sup>9</sup> Fazl Haq's opinion regarding Bahadur Shah's ignorance about the affairs of the world (*vide p. 384 infra*) cannot be taken literally. There are many documents in the National Archives which show that Bahadur Shah was alert and well-informed. He was fully conscious of his responsibilities and never shirked his duty and did not fear dangers and opposition that threatened him. As a result he was trusted by all classes of people: even the weakest person in the State looked up to him for the redress of wrongs. Sahu, a gardener, applied to him for the redress of his grievances stating that his brother Mamraj had been killed by the English and prayed for the maintenance of his children (Mutiny Paper, Box No. 259). Again Kidar Nath and Man Singh, grocers of Ghaziabad, applied to him seeking redress against the extortions practised on them by Khwaja Muhammad Ahsan, Governor (*Amil*) of Ghaziabad and Ahmad Khan, *Risaldar* at Ghaziabad. The Emperor immediately redressed the grievance making Khwaja Muhammad Ahsan and Ahmad Khan deposit in the Royal Treasury the sum that they had taken from the complainant and he also demanded an explanation of their conduct. (Mutiny Paper, Box 94, No. 4). See also Box 16, No. 20; Box 33, Nos. 9, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, Box 43, Nos. 31, 35, 36, 37; Box 37, Nos. 179, 186, 203, 211-212, 352, 426-427, 446; Box 58, No. 76; Box 59, Nos. 215, 318; Box 60, Nos. 8, 9, 566; Box 62, Nos. 137, 144; Box 63, Nos. 12, 57; Box 67, Nos. 3, 21, 91, 140; Box 68, No. 26; Box 69, Nos. 7, 8, 9, 11; Box 71, No. 110; Box 85, No. 2; Box 102, No. 36; Box 103, No. 259; Box 110, Nos. 214, 215, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234-35, 241, 242, 243-45.

<sup>10</sup> According to Maulvi Fazl Haq (Rampur MS. 129, F. 16a, 18a; also see p. 386 *infra*) the Emperor had moved with all his family much before the close of the war to 'a tomb at a distance of 3 miles ... Along with him had gone his amirs and camp followers, each with his family and dependents ... As soon as they had left the city ... the English and their troops dashed into it'. This has remained unconfirmed. In fact all available evidence is to the contrary. It has been conclusively proved that on or about the 20th of September 1857 Bahadur Shah fled from the Fort to the shrine of Nizamu'ddin Auliya. This is also attested by Sir Richard Temple who saw Bahadur Shah after the fall of Dehli. The italicised part in the following note from his pen will help to clarify the point at issue. 'I visited: him' says he 'in his place of confinement ... It was a strange sight, to see the aged man seated in a darkened chamber of his palace. The finely chiselled features, arched eyebrow, aquiline profile, sickly pallor of the olive complexion, nervous twitching of the face; delicate fingers counting beads, muttering speech, incoherent language, irritable self-consciousness, demeanour indicating febrile excitability—altogether made up a curious picture, upon which no spectator could look unmoved who was acquainted with Asiatic history. Here sat the last of the Great Moguls, the descendant of emperors two centuries ago ruling the second largest population in the world, who had himself ... been treated with regal honours. He was now to be tried for his life by



It must be remembered that the Arabic manuscript namely the *Muqaddamatu-s Sauratu-l Hindiya* was a continuation of the defence campaign of Maulvi Fazl Haq who had not lost hope of his release and had intended thus to obtain it. To understand the said *Muqaddamatu-s Sauratu-l Hindiya* aught it would be necessary now to glance at the following proceedings of the British Court which had convicted Maulvi Fazl Haq.

Maulvi Fazl Haq was charged as follows:

Charge: Rebellion and instigation of murder.

1st Court: In having during the years 1857 and 1858 been a leader in the Rebellion and instigator to revolt and murder at Delhi, in Oude and in other places.

2nd Court: In having at Bondee, during the month of May 1858 taken a prominent part in the councils of the rebel chief, Mammoo Khan.

3rd Court: In having at Bondee, during the month of May 1858 been an instigator to murder in the instance of one Abdool Hakeem, a Government servant.

The Prisoner pleaded not guilty, and the Trial proceeded. The Court found the Prisoner guilty as follows:

1st: Having during the years 1857 and 1858 been an instigator of Rebellion and a propounder of Doctrines, calculated to encourage murder.

2nd: Having at Bondee in year 1858 taken a prominent part in the Councils of the Rebels assembled there and specially of the Rebel Chief Mummoo Khan, and having then propounded doctrines calculated to encourage murders.

And on March 4th 1859 sentenced him to detention as a State Prisoner in transportation beyond seas for the term of his natural life and to confiscation of the whole of his property.

#### Remarks

This man's case may be considered to have two phases. He was known to be a leading adviser of the rebel Chiefs in Oude in 1858, and after his seizure on account of his former connections in Delhi, reference was made to that place, and from the letter of the Commissioner of Delhi and the depositions forwarded by him, it appears that the prisoner had borne precisely the same character in

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judges whose forefathers had sued for favour and protection from his imperial ancestors. I looked at the lattice window where at the dawn of that fatal 11th May he stood to hear the vows of allegiance from the mutineer troopers as they stood in the dry fosse below, at the cabinet whence he issued edicts as if the Mogul empire had been restored, at the hall of audience where he reproached his new followers for their rudeness in the imperial presence, at the old tree in the palace precincts where the European prisoners were executed with his sanction; at the shrine whither he fled for asylum when he found that the British had stormed the city gates. His own signatures, annotations, and orders after the outbreak showed him to have possessed more capacity than would have been expected from a man who had been immured all his life as a titular king in his ancestral place'. (Temple, Sir Richard—*Men and Events of My Time in India*, pp. 135-136.)



Delhi in 1857. The case as regards his conduct in Delhi cannot be considered to be completely and regularly proved because the witnesses have not been before the Court, and the prisoner has not had an opportunity of meeting and rebutting their evidence. But if the case in Oude be made good, the evidence taken at Delhi may be accepted as strongly corroborative and confirmatory of the general conduct and character of the prisoner. He was therefore charged

1st: Generally as Instigator throughout the Rebellion  
and

2nd: Particularly as an Instigator in Oude in 1858.

There seemed at one time to be very strong evidence to convict him of instigation amounting to direct attempt to murder. But the Court have hesitated to convict him of this crime, because the persons denounced were not actually murdered and it is not certain that the prisoner did not finally acquiesce in sparing them on certain conditions. But nevertheless the Court considers it proved that the Prisoner did on that occasion, very distinctly and officiously propound doctrines which had a direct tendency to encourage murder in many cases. He quoted and perverted texts from the Quran, insisted that the persons who had served the English were apostates and that their death was required by the law; and even went so far as to tell the rebel chief that if he spared them he was himself a criminal in the eye of God. The Court has given the prisoner the benefit of the doubt whether in the particular case these denunciations may not have been in some degree intended to compel, as the alternative of death, the abandonment of the English cause and adhesion to the rebels. But it is sufficiently clear that such doctrines are eminently calculated to lead to such bloody scenes as have characterized this Rebellion: and, from the whole of the evidence, the Court consider it quite established that the prisoner was as a counsellor and adviser, an active Instigator of the Rebellion. He bore that character at Delhi, and he had certainly acted up to it in Oude. He at one time attempted to make something of the fact that there were two notable Fazl Haqs among the Oude Rebels, but that is now quite cleared up, since it appears that one was ex-Tahsildar of the Bareilly District and lately a Chuckladar and leader of rebel troops whereas the present prisoner is quite identified as the person who was not a man of the sword, but a man of council and was the leading member of a sort of rebel privy council at Bondee. It seems doubtful whether the prisoner held any regular office, whether this Council was really of an Official character, but there seems to be no doubt of the fact, notorious at the time, that a few persons were the habitual advisers of the Begum and the rebel chiefs and were known in the Rebel Camp as 'the *Arbab-i Shoora* or masters of consultation, and sometimes by the English name of the *Cutchery Parliament*, and that in this council the prisoner was prominent.

It also appears from direct evidence that he was high in the confidence of Mummoo Khan the rebel chief and much consulted by him, as on the occasion on which he propounded the murderous doctrines.



The prisoner is evidently a very clever man, but either from an unscrupulous ambition or extreme bigotry has assumed the place in the rebel councils above described. He is a most dangerous character — one who may at any time do infinite harm and one whose removal from the country, justice and security demand.

He is a resident of Oude but comes of a family which owed everything to the British service and himself at one time occupied a good position in that service. He has, however, for many years past, abandoned the British service and served in honourable capacities several native States — Oude, Rampur and Alwar. He has always been a notable well-known man. Most of the witnesses who had not before seen him have all their lives frequently heard of Maulvi Fazl Haq. At the time of the outbreak, he was serving in Alwar. He subsequently voluntarily came into Delhi and thence forward continued to follow the fortunes of the Rebellion. He is a man who must be most severely punished and carefully excluded from India. But considering his advanced age, his position in life and his character as an Oude subject and for very many years past a servant of Native States, not of the British Government, we have thought it proper that he should be treated as a state Prisoner, not as an ordinary convict.

Sd. G. Campbell, Jud. Commr. of Oude.

Major Barron.

Offg. Commr. of the

Khairabad Div.

True Copy<sup>11</sup>

March 4, 1859.

The above proceedings should be read together with the petition of Maulvi Fazl Haq addressed to Lord Canning, a few extracts from which are given below:

(i) The humble petition of Maulvi Fazl Haq sentenced by the Special Commissioners of Lucknow to transportation for life and confiscation of property.

‘That your petitioner having in violation of the terms of the Royal Proclamation of amnesty been condemned to suffer transportation for life and confiscation of property and having in vain appealed successively to all the authorities in India for justice, or at least on consideration of his advanced age for clemency, now throws himself at your feet for redress.

‘Your petitioner refrains from submitting any other papers for perusal than a copy of the Judgment of the Special Commissioners of the last petition presented by him to the Government of India in which it is established by reference to the very terms of the Judgment that he has been tried, convicted and sentenced contrary to the intent of Her Majesty’s amnesty and of an intercessory address presented by the principal Mahomedans of Calcutta to the Government of India for his liberation. He will merely for the better understanding of the facts

For. Pol. Cons. 3rd June 1859. Nos. 387-89; pp. 43-47.



of the case recapitulate his movements, the proceedings of the local officer; and Government regarding him and the endeavours he made to obtain a removal of the sentence passed on him . . . . .

'It is evident that your petitioner is not punished for crime but is to be removed from the country to prevent his doing harm at any time, though what harm a man of his advanced age can do is difficult to imagine . . . .

'Having thus proved the trial, conviction and sentence to be altogether illegal because in violation of Her Majesty's proclamation as well as contrary to evidence and the rules of law as is manifest from the terms of the Judgment itself, your petitioner submits whether your Lordship will lend the sanction of your honoured name to so flagrant a breach of faith, law, justice—and all for what? to crush an old man by sending him to die away from his family and deprive them of the trifling property . . . .

Now a few extracts from the *Muqaddamatu-s Sauratu-l Hindiya* as translated by the writer from the original Arabic may be read. These are given below together with the Arabic text as found in the Rampur manuscript which I have also compared with the Aligarh copy.

'I hereby write this while I am a prisoner, broken, debarred and wistful. I am suffering from all kinds of unbearable hardships and am looking forward even for a momentary relief which is easy for my Creator to award. I am in chains and have been made crazy, fallen as I am into the trap of troubles in spite of the fact that I had been brought up in ease and had been enjoying prosperity from the beginning. I am expecting release from my torture under God's mercy through earnest prayers. I am a prisoner in terrible fright and distress in the hands of a frowning tyrant who has stripped me of all that I had of comeliness, style and garments and has inflicted on me all kinds of atrocities and untold miseries which are like thick layers of mischief. I have been a prisoner in a desperate condition, have lost all hope of release and am terrorised by a jailer who is rude and stone-hearted. But I have not given up hopes of divine mercy. Gentle, simple and afflicted as I am—a victim of oppression—I have fallen in the clutches of a fierce, accursed Satan-like wicked man; I am in despair, utter want and misery on account of the tyranny of a cruel and brutal oppressor and torturer. I am hopelessly depressed and involved in unparalleled hardships which are beyond human imagination. And I have been treacherously thrown into the most rigorous imprisonment and bloody tortures. I am in the prison of a white-skinned man of black heart, blue eyes, stern looks, brown hair and an unprincipled and crafty mind. He has stripped me of garments and put on me roughest clothing of canvas. I am utterly dismayed and have been imploring God since I have been banished through rigorous and tight imprisonment from my country and people whom I am pining to see. I have been sentenced summarily without a defence and without any consideration. I am very sad and sorrowful since I have been deprived of all associates and of the benefit even of a single servant. My limbs are broken under the worst kind of rack. I am like a lonely exhausted lion, melancholy, gloomy and . . . .



.... He (jailer) has imprisoned me, treated me with cruelty and inflicted on me all sorts of tortures in order to break my morale on account of my adherence to and firmness in, faith and religion and because of my reputation as one of the notable *ulama*. All this the English did with the object of destroying the system of learning and burying the banner of knowledge and effacing it even from paper and books. That Revolution ruined homes and made the country and its inhabitants a target of bolts from the clouds of sorrows.

.... The English of Great Britain filled their hearts with malice when they cherished secretly after they had established their rule over India. They surrounded it from all sides and humiliated its eminent nobles extremely, leaving not a single man capable of presenting an opposition. They broke their pledges most treacherously and enforced their usual coercion and fraud.

.... Verily the differences of religion and communities are like virulent diseases which mortify the body of kingdoms and bring about changes in the State, provinces and governments. Hence they tried their utmost and strained every nerve to remove these differences by means of their tricks and contrivances.

.... They appointed certain priests and clergymen to give wrong education and mislead and misguide the people. They even sent to every village and town a group of these ecclesiastics to create doubts by means of fabricated lies in the minds of the inhabitants regarding their own religion.

.... Matters came to such a pitch that many of the rebel troops took refuge in the capital of Dehli which was a famous city thickly populated and the home of many Timurides. There they installed a man who had previously been their head and had a staff and a wazir. But he was an extremely old man who was in reality ruled by his wife and the wazir who was truly dominant, was an ally of the English and was deeply attached to them, viewing all others than the English and particularly their enemies with strong hatred. The same was true of his household and of a group of his close relations and kinsmen who did whatever they wanted while professing submission to him. He was a ruler who knew nothing and who did nothing but the undesirable. Neither he ordered anything by his own decision, nor did he order anything publicly or in private, nor was he capable of doing good or harm. He appointed some of his own sons and grandsons to command the troops although they were cowardly, foolish and unfaithful and shunned the society of men of wisdom and probity.

In these circumstances rose for action—for waging a holy war and fighting a bitter fight and to attain martyrdom—a body of brave Musalmans from some villages and towns on the strength of a *fatwa* and explicit orders issued by the pious and notable *ulama* and well-known jurists who proclaimed that *jihad* was incumbent.

Since there were in Dehli many of my relations and family members and inasmuch as I had been called there in the hope of bettering the situation—whatever Destiny had decreed being as yet a sealed book—I started in the direction of Dehli which had been my headquarters. There I put up and met my people. To the people in general I gave the best advice I could think of; but they



did not accept my advice and did not act accordingly. When the English captured the city and neither the (Royal) army nor the inhabitants remained in it and when the edibles in it became scarce and we could not get water even — the enemies having controlled all supplies — I stayed there five days and nights. Then I came out together with my family and children leaving behind my books, my equipments as well as my property for want of conveyance. I pursued a road in expectation of safety relying on God, God alone being the saviour.

After capturing the city and its environments with the help of the white majority the English became anxious to seize the Emperor and his sons and grand-sons who had continued residing in the place where Destiny had planted them, cherishing false hopes held out to them. In that tomb the Emperor was complacent and contented and had a following. There he was made a prisoner and put in chains together with his sons and grandsons and taken in this condition to the city. On the way, one of the chieftains bulleted them. Their bodies were flung over there and their severed heads put in a tray were presented to the Emperor. Later even those heads were smashed and thrown away . . . . .

فان كتابي هذا كتاب اسير كمير خمير على ما فات منه حمير مبتلى بكل عسير لا يطاق و لو في آن يسير منتظر لفرج على ربه يسير و مكبول مجبول واقع في احوال على الدعة والسعة في بدء فطرته مجبول. يرجو النفس من كربة من نفس ربه بدعاء مقبول. و محبوس في باس بيس و بوس و كل الى ظلم عبوس. عراه عما كان له من رى و زى و ملبوس و ابتلاه بشبحون مشبحون في مضايق شبحون. هي مجامع فتن جون. مخيس منبس من الخلاص متانس نظرا الى تحكم مخيس منبس فظ غليظ القلب لاكنه من رحمة ربه ليس بيؤس و غير سلس ضرير . . . . . و جابر جائز بانر تعمس من ظلم جابر جائز شكس شرس و بانس انس منى لشدائد لا ينتهى اليها قياس قانس و مغتر معترفتن باشد احتباس و احمر باس في اسرابيض اسود الكبد ازرق عباس اصهب الشعر متلون لباس. جرده عما كان له من لباس و كساه اخشن كساء و كرباس . . . . . و عاجز جازع فازع الى ربه فازع نزيح من اسرته بالاسر بالاسر نازع اليهم نازع قضى عليه بلا مدع و منازع و سادم نادم عادم لكل منادم و خادم فت في اعضاده باشد مصادم و نجيد فريد طريد عنى فجلى من ارضه و بلده و كتيب غريب كريب عنى فانى عن اهله و ولده.

ضامه ظلوم و جاره و انى عنه اهله و جاره دخلى عنه و عنهم و جاره فمارثى له احد و لا اجاره. اسره فقسره و كسره بكل ضرب من الايلام لتصلبه و بغضه في الايمان والاسلام و اشتهاه انه من العلام الاعلام روماً لدرس رسم الدرس و طمس علم العلم حتى من قرطاس والطرس ذالك لواقعة فازعة تركت الديار بلاقع و جعلتها لصوائب المصائب مراقع امطرت على اهلها من غموم الغموم صواعق و صواقع . . . . . من قصتها ان النصارى البراطنة الاولى شحتوا صدورهم بالشحناء الباطنة بعدما تسلطوا على ممالك الهند و اقطارها و قراها و امصارها واستولوا على حدودها و ثغورها و احاطوا باعجازها و صدورها و ذللوا اعزة رؤسائها بالاستقصاء و لم يذروا فيها من يبدى لهم قرنه بالكيد و الزور. وانقضوا ما كان لهم من الايد و الزور . . . . . ان اختلاف الثل في الاديان والملل من اقرب العلل في بقاء التسلط و حدوث الحول في الولايات والدول فجدوا كل جد . . . . . لرفع هذا الاختلاف بابتداع



الحيل و دلوها للتعليم والتلقين والتضليل والتفتين انصاراً من الرهبانين والقسيسين بل ارسلوا في كل قرية و بلد طائفة منهم ليلقوا الناس بقرية في ريب و مرية فاوى من الجيوش المنحرفة الى دار الملك دهلى التى هى مصر مشهور و بلد معمور و مئوى لجمع كثير من ال تيمور فامروا بها من كان من قبل بينهم رئيساً له عملة و تامور و هو عمر قد رد الى اردل العمر و هو فى الحقيقة لزوجه و تاموره مامور و كان عامله الذى كان فى المعنى عالياً للنصارى مالياً فى حبهام غالباً و لمن عداهم لاسيما لعداهم مبغضاً قالياً و كذا امر عشيرته و شردمة من عشيرته لاقرين من سريره و سريره يفعلون ما يشاؤون و يعملون بأرائهم و فى طاعته يراؤن و هو امر لا يعلم امرا و لا يعمل الا امرا و لا يامر برأيه امرا و لا يفقه خيرا و لا يشرا و لا يحكم بشى جهرا و لا سرا و لا يملك نفعا و لا ضرا و قد امر ذلك الامر على الجيوش بعض من له من الاحفاد والابناء و كانوا هم من السفهاء الخوان الجبناء والمتفرين من العقلاء الامناء.

و قد انتهض من بعض القرى والبلاد جمع من المسلمين الجلال للجدال و الجلال والغزو والجهاد طمعا فى نيل الثواب والاستشهاد بعد الاستفتا والاستشهاد من العلماء الزهاد والفتاهم بوجوب الجهاد و بفتاوى ائمة الاجتهاد و اذ كان فى دهلى كثير من عيالى و اهلى و مع ذلك كنت مدعوا و كان الافلاح والافراج مرجوا والفرج والفرح مظنوناً و ما قدر فى الغيب مكتوباً مكنوناً توجهت تلقاء دهلى مما كان محلى فالقيت بها رحلى ولاقيت بها اهلى واشرت الى الناس بما اقتضى رأى و قضى به عقلى فلم ياتمروا بما اشرت و لم ياتمروا بما امرت فلما استولى النصارى على البلد و لم يبق فيه من الجيوش و من سكانه احد و عازت فيه الاقوات و لم يتيسر لنا الماء الفرات اذ قد استبد به العداة مكثت فيه خمسة ايام و ليال ثم خرجت مع اهلى و عيالى بعد ترك مالى من كتبى و نشبى و مالى لموز ما يكفى لنقل احمالى و اخذت للنساء سبيلا متوكلا على الله و كفى بالله وكيلا.

والنصارى بعد استيلائهم على البلد و سواده بسواد بيضانهم عمدوا الى اخذ الملك و اولاده و احفاده و هم لم يبرحوا مستقرهم والقضاء مكنهم فى ذلك المكان و اقرهم و هم مستوثقون بمن غرهم باكاذيبه و سرهم و كان فى تلك المقبرة مغروراً مسروراً محشوراً محفوراً فاضحى ماسوراً محسوداً مكموداً مصفوداً و اخذوا من معه من الابناء و لاحفاد مقتربين فى الاصفاد و ذهبوا الى البلد مع من معه من ال اهل والولد فاغتال اهد من عظمائهم هو طرخان اوبطريق ابنائه و احفاده بالبندق فى اثناء الطريق و اهدوا رؤسهم مقطوعة الى رئيسهم فى خوان موضوعة و تركوا جثثهم منبوذة ثم نبذوا تلك الرؤس مجذونة.

From a glance at the above sources of information the reader may now pass to a perusal of the following conclusions reached by the writer.

Maulvi Fazl Haq (1797/1212-1861/1278) son of Maulana Fazl Imam hairabadi, chief judge (*Sadru-s Sudur*) of Akbar Shah's time, was really a gifted *allama* and doctor of law and literature; he was also a thinker and a philosopher who believed strongly in the need for a firm Hindu-Muslim alliance in order to drive away the English from India. At the age of 28 (1825/1241) he



was appointed Cutchery Chief (*Sarrishtadar*) at the Dehli Residency which post, however, he resigned after a few years for he did not like British service. Then with a view to rouse the princes and people of India against British rule he took to travelling and visited Jhajjar, Saharanpur, Tonk, Rampur and Oudh. In 1848 he accepted service at Lakhaao and held the office of *Sadru-s Sudur* until 1856 when on seeing the tragic scenes which had followed the British annexation of Oudh he resumed his journeys, doing the necessary propaganda work to uproot the British Government. In this connection he also came to Alwar where he stopped until the outbreak of May 1857. Then he came back to Dehli<sup>12</sup> and did his utmost to promote the war. He also drew up the constitution (*Dastur-ul amal-i Saltanat*) for the government of Dehli—a fact mentioned vaguely by Zakaullah as if the said constitution was never completed and did not see the light of day. But its first item, namely the 'ban on cow-slaughter' was certainly carried out. According to the spies' reports Maulvi Fazl Haq worked ceaselessly to rouse the sepoys and Mughul princes to fight the English and turn them out of the country. After the fall of Dehli he fled to Khairabad whence he was brought as a culprit under a warrant of arrest to Lakhaao. There, he was tried. And the judge referred to him 'as a learned man exercising great influence over the masses and highly placed in life'; he also charged him with having instigated the Rebellion and to have kept it alive. Then he was sentenced to transportation for life and banished to the Andaman Islands. Through a fellow-prisoner Mufti Inayat Ahmad by name who was released in 1860, he managed to send his manuscript to India, and the same was published in the year of India's partition with a foreword from the pen of Muhiu'ddin Ahmad surnamed Maulana Abul Kalam Azad who observed, 'The late Abdul Haq Khairabadi copied this treatise personally and sent the copy thus made to my father at Mecca; that manuscript is still preserved in my library'.<sup>13</sup>

Like the defence of Bahadur Shah already noticed,<sup>14</sup> the defence of Maulvi Fazl Haq was also intended to defeat the prosecution. He pleaded alibi, asserting that throughout the period of war (May to September 1857) he had stayed at Alwar and that he did not come to Dehli until the close of the war. But the judges were not convinced and persisted in having the sentence passed on

<sup>12</sup> The date of Maulvi Fazl Haq's arrival in Dehli cannot be fixed with certainty for the Maulvi Sahib himself had shrouded it in mystery. He pleaded alibi and said that throughout the 4-month-long war he had remained at Alwar. The British spies would have us believe that he had arrived in Dehli on 16th August 1857 and continued attending the Royal durbars till 7th September and that he was also a member of the Administrative Court (*vide* Metcalfe—T.N.N., pp. 196-224 and the *Delhi News*, September 1, 1857). But from the trend of language used by Zakaullah (p. 687) as well as by the Judge (For. Pol, June 3, 1859; pp. 43-47), it would appear that Maulvi Fazl Haq had arrived in Dehli shortly after the outbreak of the Mutiny.

<sup>13</sup> It was in response to my request for this manuscript and the like that the Director of Archives sent me on 21st March 1958 two enlargements relating to the erection of a mausoleum at the tomb site of Bahadur Shah at Rangoon. I take it that the aforesaid manuscript from the personal Library of the Maulana has not reached the Archives. I take this opportunity to thank the Director for the said enlargements.

<sup>14</sup> *I'de* p. 156 *supra*.



him. In fact the defence adopted by the Maulvi Sahib was intended to whitewash his conduct in the eyes of the British,<sup>15</sup> and the same was true of his remarks about Bahadur Shah.

(in: *Bahadur Shah II*..... By Mahdi Husain, Delhi 1958)

<sup>15</sup> Writing in Urdu under the heading of 'Maulvi Fazl Haq and the *Fatwa-i Jihad* of 1857' (vide *Tahreek of Dehli* August 1957, pp. 10-15) Maulana Arshi of Rampur says that Maulvi Fazl Haq had nothing to do with the *Fatwa-i Jihad* published in the *Sadiqul Akhbar* of 27th July 1857 (Mutiny Papers, Box 4-6; vol. 4, July 27, 1857). It is true that the said *Fatwa* does not bear Maulvi Fazl Haq's signature, but it is not true that 'he had not been the leader of the Rebellion'. In fact he was a leading philosopher of the Indian Revolution of 1857; and through his philosophy he gave the movement life and strength. He also prepared the way for the outbreak of the Revolution by resigning British service in good time and travelling to different places, presumably with the object of rousing the people and princes against British rule. (Vide For. Pol. Cons, May 13, 1859, 306, 308; For. Pol. Cons. May 13, 1859, 659-660; For. Pol. Cons. June 3, 1859, 387-394; For. Pol. Jan. 13, 1860, No. 4; Pol. Procdgs. Sept. 1860, 556-558, Part. A; Home Judicial, Cons. June 10, 1859 No. 1). If Jiwan Lal be credited Maulvi Fazl Haq also held command of troops in the Royal Army and was desired once in the course of war to use them in order to collect revenue (Metcalf—T.N.N., 198).

Fazl Haq appears as Fazlul Haq in the *Trial of Ex-King of Delhi* (p. 182) and similarly also in a Persian letter of his (Mutiny Papers, Box 100, No. 96 of July 26) addressed to Mirza Mughul, the Commander-in-Chief, asking the latter to communicate to him (Fazlul Haq) all that passed between him and General Bakht Khan during their interview. Maulvi Fazlul Haq also directed the Royal Secretariat to write letters to (i) Hasan Bakhsh Uzbegi—an officer whose duty it was to realize the revenue of the Aligarh district, (ii) Faiz Ahmad who was appointed to realize the revenue of Bulandshahr district and (iii) Walidad Khan who was charged to aid the above two men in realizing the revenue. (Vide *Tr. of the ex-King of Delhi*, p. 183). In a word Maulvi Fazl Haq is identical with Fazl Haq who is subsequently mentioned as having directed the Royal Secretariat to write a letter to his own son Abdul Haq charging him, to make arrangements for realizing the revenue of Gurgaon district. And it must also be noted that Maulvi Fazl Haq (Fazlul Haq) is mentioned uniformly as ■ 'rebel'. (*Idem*, pp. 183, 184).







JAMAL MALIK

# LETTERS, PRISON SKETCHES AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL LITERATURE: THE CASE OF FADL-E HAQQ KHAIRABADI IN THE ANDAMAN PENAL COLONY<sup>1</sup>

## I

The Indian-Muslim scholar Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi (1797-1861) hailed from a prominent *'ulama* family of the Awadh region. Just like the *'ulama* of Farangi Mahal<sup>2</sup> and Allahabad, the Khairabadis were inclined to the idea of rational sciences (*ma'qulat*) and of 'the unity of being' (*wahdat al-wujud*), expounded by Ibn al-Arabi (died 1240). From the seventeenth century onwards, this scholarly tradition largely rejected the Islam of the Mujaddidiyya branch of the Naqshbandis. Fadl-el-Haqq, belonging to the Qadiri order, can be thought to be the last great *'alim* of his line, as his son 'Abd al-Haqq (died 1899), a teacher at the Delhi College, was a much inferior scholar than him. Fadl-e Haqq's own father Fadl-e Imam (died 1828) was a very prominent writer. There were also major debates and polemics between the *'ulama* of Awadh such as the Khairabadis and prominently Fadl-e-Haqq on the one hand and the better-known *'ulama* of Delhi, descended from Shah Waliullah (died 1762), on the other, even if there were familial relations between them. The latter were definitely closer to Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's (1803-92) position on the question of reform, while people such as Fadl-e Haqq who were representatives of the service elite were hardly reformist. In fact, the Khairabadis were closely linked to the Mughal dispensation, and this explains why, despite accepting the patronage and employment of the East India Company, they nevertheless were critical of British rule.

After putting down the Rebellion of 1857, British authorities sentenced the Indian-Muslim scholar Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi to deportation to the

<sup>1</sup> This is an updated and extended version of Malik, 'Briefe, autobiographische Aufzeichnungen und Gefängnisliteratur', pp. 52-66.

<sup>2</sup> On the Farangi Mahallis see Robinson, *The 'Ulama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia*.



Andaman Islands on charges of instigation to murder and high treason.<sup>3</sup> Subsequently, the English language historiography forgot about this scholar for the next half a century.<sup>4</sup> It was not until a few decades later that his many-faceted life was reconstructed, be it as an aggressive freedom fighter or as a conservative scholar. Lately, he has become an icon for both the freedom struggle and Islamic scholarship. Hence the Chairperson of the waqf-board of Andaman and Nicobar Islands points out in a rather opulent signpost on the graveyard of the scholar in South Point, Port Blair (which in fact has become a major shrine and centre of pilgrimage (*nazar*) for Muslims and Hindus alike):

The Mazar of Allama-Fazal-Haq-Khairabadi is located on the Foreshore Road in the outskirts of South Point Village at Port Blair and is popularly known as the Dargah [*shrine*, tombs, holy place] of Mazar-Baba. He was born in 1797 in a noble and affluent family of scholars in Khairabad (Old Oudh), Sitapura District in Uttar Pradesh. A renowned scholar of Islamic studies and theology, he had also excelled in Arabic languages and literature. He was equally an accomplished scholar of Urdu and Persian language. On account of his deep knowledge and erudition he was venerated and called as 'Allama'. Allama Fazal-Haq Khairabadi was also a great Sufi saint of that time. The forefathers of Allama had come from Iran who were renowned scholars of Islamic theology. Shah-Wali-Ullah who is known as Mohaddish (muhaddith; scholar of prophetic tradition—the hadith) Dehelvi was also from the same family who is buried in Menhdiyan in Old Delhi. Allama's hierarchy reaches to Ameer-Ul Momeneen, Hazrat Umar-Farooq 'Raziallahutala-Anhu' with 32 generations. He was twice honoured with the post of kutchery chief once at Delhi residency and second time at Lucknow. Later, he resigned from these posts to take part in freedom struggle against British rule. He drew up a constitution for running the administration of liberated Delhi. He roused the Mughal princes and the people of Delhi alike to take up arms against the alien rule and to bring an end to their hegemony from Indian soil.

During the period of turmoil and upheaval in 1857, he had issued 'Fatwa-E-Jehad' (a religious sanction) for initiating war of independence to liberate India from British yoke. He was later rounded up on a charge of inciting sedition. At the trial before the court of judicature at Lucknow he confessed his guilt without fear or fret and was sentenced to imprisonment for life and transported to Port Blair on 8th October 1859.

He has to his credit many books written on various subjects in vernacular and Arabic languages. Among his creative works are two of his important

<sup>3</sup> During colonialism deportations of delinquents were intended to reduce the costs of the prison apparatus. For example, France made it possible to create penitentiaries on her islands through the law of 1854; see Foucault, *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison*, p. 358.

<sup>4</sup> Such as Mohammed Mujeeb, Shaikh Ikram, Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, Mushirul Hasan, as well as the baltern historians, though Khairabadi is still known among Urdu-reading circles and amongst the religiously learned in South Asia.



political treatises i.e., 'Alsuratul Hindia' and 'Alfitnatul Hindia' which he wrote at Port Blair while in confinement on cloth pieces and papers with soft coal and pencil. He sent these manuscripts secretly by hand to his son in Khairabad through another political sufferer Multi-Inayat Ahmed-Kakaurvi. The former piece of work, which is in Arabic prose, is a historical narration and gives the account of the past events of 1857 uprising that he had witnessed from his own eyes. The later piece of work consists of two political satires in Arabic verse form (Qasayads) ending up lastly in admiration of prophet Mohammad by way of prayer. These two works reflect his life and appalling condition in prison and the treatment meted out to him during confinement at Port Blair prison house.

He died on 12th February 1861 at Port Blair and was buried on a piece of land located at short distance from Seashore Road on way to Corbyns Cove in the outskirt of South Point Village at Port Blair.

It is said that a person used to graze his cattle in the vicinity of Mazar one day at noon having been tired due to hot day, slept on a mound under the shadow of a pipal tree. He dreamt while asleep and heard the Muazzin call in his dream. When the call was over he saw a white bearded faqir asking him for water for purpose of ablution. He then suddenly, got up and performed Zohar Namaz [midday prayer] after doing his ablution on the spot. Since that day onward he started visiting that place daily out of reverence to that great bearded person whom he had dreamt. He started burning an oil lamp during night on the same spot under the pipal tree. Perhaps this man was a prisoner released from confinement and was freely settled down in that village.

The Dargah is visited by hundreds of persons regardless of caste, creed or religion everyday. It is also very dear to non-Muslim brothers who visit the Dargah in large numbers. The people of the Andamans have the belief that on visit to Dargah of Mazar-Baba, their miseries are taken care of. On fulfilment of their desires, they happily arrange feast at Dargah and invite friends and poors to enjoy the feast. Fact remains that the Mazar of Allama Fazal-Haq-Khairabadi exists as a true symbol of Hindu-Muslim unity in these islands.

This representation of the scholar is full of admiration and memorisation, rooted in devotion for his person and tied to a concrete place, similar to *tadhkirah* (the classic hagiography).<sup>5</sup> This semiotisation of memory therefore needs some explanation. This is even more the case since a vivid debate about Fadl-e Haqq has flared up recently between two warring factions that emerged in the nineteenth century: the first is the movement called *Ahl-e Hadith* which is said to have found its way to South Asia from Yemen from the 1830s onwards. It harboured some of its activists in the Jihad movement most of whom quietened down after 1857, while its reformism drew inspiration from Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), Shah Waliullah and the Yemenite scholar Muhammad al-Shaukani (1760-

<sup>5</sup> For the identity-giving role of *tadhkirah*, see the illuminating article by Hermansen and Lawrence, 'Indo-Persian Tazkiras as Memorative Communications'.



1834) in particular. Any acknowledgement of the authority of legal schools (*madhahib*) is refused, Sufism and folk religious practices as well as pilgrimages connected to shrine cults and visits to the grave of Prophet Muhammad are rejected and considered as heretical innovation (*bid'at*). At the same time *ijtihad* is allowed for members of the educated elite as well, rather than concentrating Islamic agency purely in the hands of the *'ulama*. Known as *ghair muqallid* (those who reject, even oppose, *taqlid*) they found their social basis primarily among trading communities, including Muslim notables, landholders and *'ulama*, from whom they also obtained patronage by means of different intellectual and social networks. One of their leading personalities was the administrator and financier Siddiq Hasan Khan al-Qanauji (1832-90), who was married to the powerful Begum of Bhopal, while the intellectual leadership was provided by various emigrant scholars from Yemen.<sup>6</sup>

In a reaction to this rather urban, mercantile movement, the *Hanafite* movement at Deoband, a qasbah near Delhi, was established in 1867, on which much has been written.<sup>7</sup> The Islamic discourse was complemented by a third important group, the second of the warring factions: the Hanafite *Ahl-e Sunnat wa al-Jama'at* (the people of the tradition of the Prophet and the community), also called Barelwis, after Bareilly, the birthplace of their central figure Ahmad Rida Khan (1855-1922). The movement was primarily active in the agrarian society of northern India. While the scripturalists (Deobandis and *Ahl-e Hadith*) were inclined to the Naqshbandi order and appreciated the idea of the 'unity of testimony' (*wahdat al-shuhud*) as propagated by Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-1624), the Barelwis tended towards the Qadiriyya and towards popular Indian interpretations of Ibn Arabi's complex philosophical idea of the 'unity of being'. They attach great importance to the idea of a living and present Prophet Muhammad, who possessed knowledge of the unseen (*'ilm al-ghayb*) and was omnipresent, being invested with God's preeminent light. Barelwis organise and take part in popular festivals, and consider themselves true Sunnis (*ahl-e Sunnat wa al-Jama'at*) their ritual practice being centred on Sufi shrines, particularly the periodic observance of the death anniversary (*'urs*) of the founder of the Qadiri order, Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir Jilani Baghdadi (d. 1166). They claim that individual believers need the Prophet's intercession with God if they hope for His forgiveness.<sup>8</sup>

The vivid debate about Fadl-e Hatiq between *Ahl-e Hadith* and the Barelwis, however, goes back to the tensions between representatives of the service elite and reformers in the 1820s. Hence the reconstruction of Khairabadi's biography helps to lay open internal Islamic disputes between reformists (the so-called Indian 'Wahhabiyya'), the descendants of Shah

<sup>6</sup> The movement has been analysed by Preckel, *Islamische Bildungsnetzwerke und Gelehrtenkultur im Indien des 19. Jahrhunderts*.

<sup>7</sup> See for example Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900*.

<sup>8</sup> The Barelwi movement has been portrayed by Sanyal, *Devotional Islam and Politics in British India*.



Waliullah, on the one hand and the upholders of tradition and the service elite the Khairabadis—on the other.

The bone of contention pertained to the unique position of Prophet Muhammad in the wake of the publication of Shah Isma'il's (d. 1831) polemic, *Taqwiyat al-Iman* (The Strengthening of Faith).<sup>10</sup> In this book—more like an Urdu edition of *Kitab al-Tawhid* written in Arabic by the eighteenth-century Arab reformer and Hanbalite, Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab—Shah Isma'il is very particular about traditional or transmitted sciences (*manqulat*), focusing on Prophetic tradition, the *hadith*, and radically rejects any sort of veneration of holy men and adherence to law schools which he calls *bid'a*, heretical innovation. Moreover, he argued that God can create another Muhammad—the Seal of prophets (*khatm al-anbiya*)—but would not make him appear on earth. With this latter argument he attacked the traditional prophetology, which had enveloped from the mystical idea of the pre-existent Muhammadan light and a pre-existent Muhammad (*imtinā'-e nazir*). Fadl-e Haqq, in contrast, maintained that it was impossible that the Prophet should have a match.<sup>11</sup> The creation of a peer of the Seal of Prophets was beyond even God's power. And, in doing so, he also instrumentalised his friend, the famous Urdu poet Mirza Ghalib (d. 1869), for whom he got some princely stipends. Apparently, Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi also wrote a Persian pamphlet against the *Wahhabiyya*, signed by several contemporary 'ulama.<sup>11</sup>

The Bareilwis tried to style the scholar as a solidarity-creating figurehead by, for example, expensively re-publishing all of Khairabadi's works,<sup>12</sup> and in this way inventing a genealogy for themselves which goes back to the first half of the nineteenth century in an attempt to monopolise the heritage of Fadl-e Haqq and his family. Even contemporary Deobandis acknowledge his achievements and impact:<sup>13</sup> Fadl-e Haqq's father Fadl-e Imam's *Mirqat* was taught approvingly for long years at Deoband, and the celebrated Deobandi historian Muhammad Miyan praised Fadl-e Haqq's academic and political achievements quite extensively.<sup>14</sup> Ahl-e hadith, on the other hand, while acknowledging Khairabadi's expertise in the field of rational sciences and literature, criticised him on account of his worldliness, his creating neologisms based in vulgar language and his

<sup>10</sup> The book was published first in 1824. See Ismail, *Support of Faith*.

In his reply, *Tahqiq al-fatwa fi Abtal al-Taghwa*—finished in 1825—he also declared Shah Isma'il a *kafir*.

<sup>11</sup> Mirza Ghalib writing to Mirza Rahim Beg Merthi, Aug. 1865, in Da'udi, ed., *Majma'ah-e Nathr-e Ghalib*, pp. 170-73; Mihr, ed., *Khutut-e Ghalib*, p. 560f; cf. 'Aqil, Mu'in al-Din, 'Maulana Fadl-e Haqq, Aik kitabiyyati Ja'izah', in Muhammad Sa'id al-Rahman 'Alawi, ed., *Allamah Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi awr Jihad-e Azadi*, p. 190.

<sup>12</sup> See the Arabic dissertation by al-Nisa, *Al-'Allama Fadl Haqq al-Khairabadi hayatuhu wa ma'athuruha ma' tahqiq kitabihi al-thaura al-hindiyya*, and Muhammad, *Imtiyaz-e Haqq*.

<sup>13</sup> See the positions in Qarshi, ed., *Maulana Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi* and 'Alawi, 'Allamah Fadl-e Haqq.

<sup>14</sup> Miyan, 'Ulama-e Hind ka shandar madi, pp. 446-55, relying on Sherwani, 'Abd al-Shahid Khan, transl. and ed., *Al-Thaurat al-Hindiyya*.



fanaticism (*ta'assub minhu*) against knowledgeable people (*ahl al-haqq*). Due to his ignorance in traditional sciences (*'ulum al-salaf*), he tended towards heretical innovation (*bid'a*), which became a bone of contention for the *ahl al-haqq*.<sup>15</sup>

Both positions, Bareilwis and Ahl-e Hadith, refer to sources dating from the colonial period which were substantial respectively, in creating the myth surrounding Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi and de-constructing him. The placket ('Mazar of Allama Fazal-Haq-Khairabadi, by Chairperson, WAKF Board, Andaman & Nicobar Islands') quoted above is as important in this context as the plan to mobilise popular and renowned people such as the famous Indian lyricist and filmmaker Akhtar Javed— demonstrably a descendant of the Khairabadi family,<sup>16</sup> to help commemorate the death anniversary of the scholar. For the 'urs perfectly provides for the reproduction of a specific group's cultural identity and secures its coherence in time and space.

This controversy of the 1820s and 1830s in which well-known men of letters like Mirza Ghalib were involved, or rather instrumentalised, is still *en vogue* and reflects the different religious identities and heterogeneity of Islam in South Asia. This most acrimonious debate in Islam also forms the background of the recently emerging critique on Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi. The critique helps, though, to unveil the myth developed around his person in the context of the Rebellion. The critics maintain that he was not so much a representative of scholarship as rather worldly inclined and a bon-vivant. They also argue—in contrast to his admirers—that the scholar of Khairabad was neither conspicuous in the affair about the mosque and the Hanuman temple in Ayodhya, when in 1855, he assumed a pro-British attitude—which finally led to the death of hundreds of Muslim zealots<sup>17</sup>—nor was he active in the Rebellion. The material collected so far does not, however, provide any definite evidence about the degree of Khairabadi's alleged participation. Historical analyses, especially Western and Russian, are unanimously of the view that Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi was one of those to spearhead the Rebellion. At the same time, the critical comments about his participation mentioned above are hardly taken into account. Even the latest contribution on Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi by Iqbal Husain (1988) from the Aligarh University does not consider them. This may be an indication of a missing 'cognitive interaction' between Indian scholars as well as among Indian and non-Indian ones.

The basis for our historiographical reconstruction of Fadl-e Haqq's biography, then, are his unpublished works in Persian, Arabic and Urdu, which

<sup>15</sup> See al-Qanauji, *Abjad al-'Uhum*, I-III, I, p. 347, II, p. 245; al-Hayy, *Nuzhat al-khawahir wa bahjat al-masami' wa al-Nawazir*, I-VIII, ed. by S. Abu al-Hasan 'Ali al-Hasani al-Nadwi, p. 413f, quoting from Siddiq Hasan Khan's *Abjad al-'Uhum*.

<sup>16</sup> Indeed, it might be interesting to see what the family's own take on the legend and myth of Fadl-e Haqq has been over the past decades. An inquiry into this issue would, however, go beyond the limits of this article.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. al-Ghani, *Tarikh-e Awadh*, Iols. I-V, p. 202f. Also see Qarshi, 'Allamah Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi, Jihad-e Azadi aur Shah Isma'il Shahid', in 'Alawi, *Allamah Fadl-e Haqq*, p. 60f.



were discovered and made accessible to researchers,<sup>18</sup> rather than standard works on the nationalist and colonialist discourse. In the present case, it is mainly letters, autobiographical literature and prison sketches left behind by the scholar from Khairabad—an important qasbah near Lucknow in the United Provinces in India, which had been a major weaving and textile painting centre. The critical examination of these textually rich 'relics' is significant because they offer unconscious and non-deliberate verdicts of historical events in the form of certificates, acts, coins, letters and scientific works, etc., which were by nature immediate and contemporary. They were not designed to teach the following generations.<sup>19</sup> Hence, it is through these relics that hitherto proven historical perspectives can be interrogated.

The early biography of Fadl-e Haqq can be reconstructed through the odd available letter. Some of his unpublished notes—such as letters to his father, the celebrated scholar and the Company's first *sadr al-sudur* in Delhi, Fadl-e Imam Khairabadi (d. 1828),<sup>20</sup> illustrate the period between 1234(1818) and 1237(1822), and provide some knowledge about his entry into the British service around 1815. To some extent they underline his ambivalent relations with British politicians, such as during his voyages around Delhi in the capacity of a chief record-keeper (*sarrishtahdar*) accompanying his superiors.<sup>21</sup> However, such letters can also provide important hints regarding the processes of mutual perception and colonial relationship on the spot. In a letter in Arabic dated 5th Dhi al-Qa'ada 1231 [September 1816], Khairabadi states that he had to copy too many texts and to constantly repeat the same tasks against his will while standing in front of the authorities. He complains about colonial arrogance and about the British dishonouring him by not respecting his being a member of the Muslim noble class. The only reason for his staying on in Company service was the fear of losing face if he resigned.<sup>22</sup> In 1818 his opinion was almost the same, as he wrote to his father, again in Arabic, stating that he had to obey orders even if they were against common sense, and that his work wore him out.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Some of these precious sources are reproduced in al-Nisa, *Al-'Allama Fadl Haqq al-Khairabadi*.

<sup>19</sup> In contrast, 'tradition' means written works particularly and consciously designed for the historical teaching of contemporary and following generations. For a division of sources into 'relics' and 'tradition' see Droysen, *Historik*, p. 37f; also see, von Brandt, *Werkzeug des Historikers* (10), p. 53f.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Khan, *'Ilm o 'Amal, I-II (Wiqa'i 'Abd al-Qadir Khani)*, pp. 255-56; 'Ali, *Tadhkirah-ye 'Ulama'-ye Hind*, p. 376ff.

<sup>21</sup> See his Arabic letter dated 20 Dhi-l-Qa'ada 1234/Sept. 1819, from Djina to his father, who stayed in Delhi. He calls himself '*al-mamluk*', the slave; see the copy of his handwritten letter reproduced in al-Nisa, *Al-'Allama Fadl Haqq al-Khairabadi*, pp. 516-22.

<sup>22</sup> Letter reproduced in al-Nisa, *Al-'Allama Fadl Haqq al-Khairabadi*, p. 511. For colonial arrogance see Fischer, *Indirect Rule in India*, p. 328f.

<sup>23</sup> See Barakati, *Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi awr sann satawan*, p. 21f; Sherwani, *Al-Thaurat al-Hindiyya; baghi Hindustan*, p. 151. For this book see Riyasat 'Ali Nadwi's review 'Baghi Hindustan', pp. 310-18.



His concern about the situation in colonial India in general and the decline in the prosperity of Khairabad in particular finds expression, among others, in a statement from 1827 at the latest—but which unfortunately is incomplete and was published for the first time almost 100 years later, in 1926. This statement gives an interesting account of the economic and social decline of Indians, which he addressed to the ruler on behalf of the citizens of Delhi.<sup>24</sup> Therein he criticised the economic situation, which had declined since the beginning of British influence, especially in the wake of imported British manufacture goods:<sup>25</sup> the native inhabitants—Hindus and Muslims alike—having hitherto worked in administration, trade and crafts as well as in agriculture were now suffering from unemployment while the British were dominating trade and confiscating land. The burden on farmers did not allow them to pay their taxes any more, while the artisans were suffering as well. Women who had been working on the looms and selling their products were rendered unemployed because of the government (Company) monopoly which had replaced manually working looms with mechanical ones. Additionally, the governor of Delhi, Charles Metcalfe (d. 1846), had ordered the introduction of a surveillance tax (*chaukidari tax*). Furthermore, each lane in Delhi's downtown would have to have an entrance door (*phatak*),<sup>26</sup> which would generate enormous logistical problems for trade. A further control measure was the constitution of an equally numbered jury of five Hindus to five Muslims per district.<sup>27</sup>

Interestingly, followers of Fadl-e Haqq draw attention to a similar Persian statement that was issued by the Mughal emperor in Delhi as a rallying call for the insurrection on 25th August 1857, and which was published in translated form in the *Delhi Gazette* and commented upon as 'the first manifesto in the European sense which has been published in India, the first list of grievances, the first step to stir up the people by promises unconnected with

<sup>24</sup> Published by Faruqi, *Nawa-ye Adab*, pp. 40-46. His statement is not, as expected, addressed to Bahadur Shah Zafar (d. 1862), who came to power later, but to Akbar Shah II (d. 1817), as Charles Metcalfe, who was the governor of Delhi from 1811-19 and again from 1825-27 and who introduced changes during his second period in power, is mentioned in there. Thus this statement was noted down before 1827.

<sup>25</sup> For the general situation see also Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars*, p. 358f; and Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire*, pp. 180-90.

<sup>26</sup> For the different entrance doors within the oriental city see Wirth, 'Die orientalische Stadt: Ein Überblick aufgrund jüngerer Forschungen zur materiellen Kultur', pp. 45-94, here pp. 67, 81f. For the infrastructure in Old Delhi see Malik, 'Islamic Institutions and Infrastructure in Shahjahanabad', pp. 43-64.

<sup>27</sup> This may be contrasted with the statement of T. Fortescue in 1820, who was of the view that "Comparing, therefore, the former and present times within this territory, both merchants and inhabitants feel their condition greatly improved. Nothing new or burthensome has been imposed, while great vexations and risks have been obviated. They consequently have no novel cause of complaint, nor do they in any respect manifest such a disposition." (Report by Mr. T. Fortescue, civil commissioner, Delhi, on the customs and town duties of the Delhi Territory, 1820, pp. 131-214, here p. 172, *Records of the Delhi Residency and Agency*, Lahore, 1911).



religion.... The grievances of each class are specified, and a remedy promised if they will but fight boldly for the old regime.'<sup>28</sup> The call sought to mobilise affected social groups: the Mughal emperor promised to support the zamindars, who had been suffering under high taxes, and to regulate their disputes according to the *sharia* and *shastra*. Traders, who bore high taxes and suffered under British monopoly, were also to be supported. The Indian civil servants were incited to resist while the army was to receive higher pay in the case of a British defeat. Craftsmen, who stood at the edge of ruin, were to be elevated as well if they joined the freedom fighters (*mujahidin*), and Islamic scholars were promised tax-free land if they joined the combat. On the other hand, supporters of the British were to be killed and their properties confiscated. It is essential for the subsequent process of making the myth of Fadl-e Haqq in contemporary sources that a connection be drawn between the events of 1827 and those of 1857.

After this statement, but not before the death of his father in 1828, Fadl-e Haqq quit the service in 1831. There are again epistles providing insightful information about his relationship with the British, such as a Persian note written by Mirza Ghalib from Rampur in early 1857: Ghalib writes that Khairabadi had left the civil service because of the rudeness and ignorance of the British rulers (*be tamizi wa qadr na shamasi-ye hukkam*), and subsequently had followed an offer from the prince of Jhajjar.<sup>29</sup> Probably there were also some contestations with other leading Muslim scholars working for the British, such as Mufti In'am Ullah Gopamawi (1857-58), a high jurist nominated by the British in Allahabad. He also went to Saharanpur where his elder brother Fadl-e 'Azim was Deputy Collector<sup>30</sup> and a special friend of William Fraser, who was Deputy Superintendent, Delhi, in 1820 and later became the Agent of Delhi until 1835.

This might be in contrast to the statement that Khairabadi was relinquished by the East India Company because of some corruption issues: he was not willing to support the politics of interneging gamblers as initiated by Thomas Metcalfe (1795-1853) in 1830, and which eventually also trapped Mirza Ghalib. Instead of imprisoning gamblers, he let them go.<sup>31</sup>

Although working for various princely states in the following period, writing several books in Arabic and Persian, and allegedly using his various

<sup>28</sup> Quoted in Rizvi, and Bhargava, eds. *Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, pp. 453-58, here p. 455.

<sup>29</sup> Letter to Saraj al-Din Ahmad dated 31 Jan. 1832, 'Abidi, ed., *Panj Ahang* p. 355f. Barakat, *Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi awr Sann satawan*, p. 22f.

<sup>30</sup> On Fadl-e 'Azim the poet Mu'min Khan Mu'min wrote a poem titled 'Tadmin shi'r Munshi Fadl-e 'Azim'; see *Kulliyat Mu'min*, Allahabad, 1971, pp. 235-37. According to Storey, *Persian Literature: A Bio-bibliographical Survey*, vols. I-II, 646, 689, Muhammad-Fadl-e 'Azim wrote the history of the Nepalese war (*Waqat-i-ye Kohistan*), and a *mathnawi* (*Afsanah-ye Bharatpur*) on the operation against Rajah Durjan Sai of Bharatpur in the year 1825-26. He held the office of secretary under W. Fraser in Delhi for 20 years. He was an acclaimed poet of Persian and historiographer. Cf. Storey, p. 1322 and Khan, *'Ilm o 'Amal*, I, p. 257.

<sup>31</sup> See British Library, London, Add. 22624 (*khulasa-ye akhbar-e atrafihi*), dated 23.5.1830 and 31.5.1830. I am grateful to Dr Margrit Pernau for sharing this information with me.



contacts for the mobilisation of Muslims against British rule,<sup>32</sup> the scholar from Khairabad managed to again hold a high position in the British administration of Lucknow just before the outbreak of the rebellion.

His early correspondence and statements are important witness accounts of a member of the Muslim service elite at a crucial time and show the existence of intensive reciprocal perceptions. This is one of the reasons why his unpublished works are of prime importance to historiography.

## II

Fadl-e Haqq's alleged role in 1857 offers an interesting insight into colonial history.<sup>33</sup> He is thought to have called upon all Muslims to participate in a Holy War (*jihad*) against the British, taken active part in the organisation of a subversive political institution, which was headed by 'the highly accomplished Maulvi Fazl Haq as the director',<sup>34</sup> and improvised a system of administration and constitution based on the principles of democracy. This legal opinion (*fatwa*) seemed to have made him a freedom fighter *par excellence*. Though he denied in his writings that he had ever killed anyone, Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi never denied that he had opposed British rule as such. However, apart from the claims of his followers, there is no definitive evidence about the extent of Khairabadi's alleged involvement in subversive activities, and no such claims could be supported on the basis of the available material, i.e., letters, poems, autobiographical accounts. The crucial *fatwa* was re-published in the *Sadiq al-Akhbar* in Delhi on 26 July 1857 with the title 'Copy of the *Fatwa* from the *Akhbar al-Zaffar Delhi Urdu*',<sup>35</sup> and duly signed by more than 30 'ulama, among them the high Company employee Sadr al-Din Azurda (d. 1868). It opined that in case the British attacked the city of Delhi, killed Muslims and appropriated their property, the *jihad* became personal obligation (*fard-e 'ain*) for those able to resist militarily. In case the inhabitants of Delhi were weakened by *jihad* the inhabitants of the surrounding regions were to support them.<sup>36</sup>

However, at the time the *fatwa* was issued, Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi was not in Delhi (he arrived in Delhi only in mid-August), and logically his name does not figure in the list of those who signed the *fatwa*.<sup>37</sup> Sayyid Ahmad Khan

<sup>32</sup> See also Gordon-Polanskaya, 'Osvescenie Narodnogo rostanija 1857-1859 gg. v. indijskoj i pakistanskoj periodiceskoj pecan', p. 173f.

<sup>33</sup> See also Husain, 'Fazle Haq of Khairabad—A Scholarly Rebel of 1857', pp. 355-65.

<sup>34</sup> See the National Archives of India, New Delhi: Foreign Political Cons. 13 May 1859.

<sup>35</sup> The *fatwa* was discussed in several issues of the *Dehli Urdu Akhbar*, Vol. 19/31, 32, 33, 34; cf. Muhammad 'Atiq Siddiqi, ed., *Atharah San Sattawan (1857)*, p. 201ff.

<sup>36</sup> See Qadiri, *Jang-e Azadi*, p. 403ff.

<sup>37</sup> 'Maulvi Fazl Huq of Khairabad who was in the Alwar raja's service on a monthly salary of Rs. 450 now arrived in Delhi. As the Maulvi was celebrated throughout Hindustan for his wisdom and sagacity the King made him one of his aides-de-camp. His arrival was highly displeasing to Hakim Ahsanullah Khan as so well known a Maulvi would certainly influence the King. But Fazl Huq did not pronounce a [judgement] in favour of a [holy war] or in any



(d. 1898) later commented that this particular *fatwa* was fake (*be-asth*) and many of the *‘ulama* signed it only under pressure and threat.<sup>38</sup> Most of them were loyalists anyway, and only a few would really have gone for  *Jihad*.<sup>39</sup> In fact, the colonial sources report that in a battle at Harchandpur Uttawah at the beginning of December 1858, '[A] rebel of high rank called the Moulvie was killed in the action of the 8th instant. This must be Fazl Haq.' Similarly 'In the fight of the 8th instant, a leader was killed supposed to be Moulavce Fazul Haq of Delhi.'<sup>40</sup> As will be seen below, there is a possibility of a namesake from Shahjahanpur with whom Fadl-e Haqq was confused.

The relevant court files, which would have given sound information about the legal case against Fadl-e Haqq in 1859,<sup>41</sup> could not be found in the National Archives, similar to so many other documents pertaining to Muslim culture in the nineteenth century.<sup>42</sup> However, a translation of parts of these files in Urdu as well as an incorrect and incomplete duplicate of the original could be traced in the library of Rampur. Copies of petitions in Persian and Arabic, which Fadl-e Haqq had addressed to princes and representatives of the British Crown asking for his release, as well as petitions by diverse notables, are nonetheless enlightening.

Some archival data suggest that after his detention in the Alipur prison, Fadl-e Haqq wrote several petitions to the viceroy.<sup>43</sup> Local notables also supported him with petitions, but to no avail.<sup>44</sup> Even from Port Blair in the Andaman Islands where Khairabadi was detained, the scholar tried to send a request for release to the Empress of India on 9 January 1860.<sup>45</sup> His son ‘Abd al-Haqq, who later was honoured with the title of Shams al-‘Ulama’ by viceroy Dufferin (d. 1902) and who was returned parts of the confiscated land of his father,<sup>46</sup> would eventually succeed in pushing through his father's release. Descendants of the Khairabadi family record that Fadl-e Haqq died on 20 August 1861 even before his pending release, just when his son ‘Abd al-Haqq arrived at

way mislead the King, though he was known to be in his counsels' (Sayyid Mubarak Shah in Edwards, *Red Year. The Indian Rebellion of 1857*, p. 212).

<sup>38</sup> Khan, *Asbab-e Baghawat-e Hind*, p. 78f.

<sup>39</sup> Qadiri, *Jang-e Azadi*, p. 406ff.

<sup>40</sup> See Rizvi and Bhargava, eds., *Freedom Struggle*, V, pp. 820, 834f. Sinha, ed., *Mutiny Telegrams*, pp. 45f, 87f.

<sup>41</sup> See ‘Arshi, Imtiyaz ‘Ali Khan, ‘Kya Maulana Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi ka 1857 ke fatwa-ye (sic!) jihad se ta‘alluq tha?', *Tahrik* 1957. Reprint in *Naya daur* (Lakhna‘u), Feb. 1981, pp. 4-12; Malik, *Tahqiqi madamin*, pp. 90-132.

<sup>42</sup> National Archives of India, New Delhi, Foreign Political Cons. 3 June 1859, Nos. 387-89. They were said to be not transferred, NT.

<sup>43</sup> See National Archives of India, New Delhi, Foreign Political, Dec. 1860, No. 557.

<sup>44</sup> See *Memorial of Calcutta Muslims to the Governor-General*, National Archives of India, New Delhi, Foreign Political, Sept. 1860, Cons. Nos. 556-58; in Urdu in Malik, *Tahqiqi madamin*, p. 114f.

<sup>45</sup> See National Archives of India, New Delhi, Foreign Political, Sept. 1860; Sec. Cons. No. 556; Urdu in Malik, *Tahqiqi madamin*, p. 119f.

<sup>46</sup> Sherwani, *Al-Thaurat al-Hindiyya*, pp. 232, 328f.



Port Blair to receive him.<sup>47</sup> However, as many important documents disappeared (i.e., were burned or destroyed) before, during and after the troubles of 1857, it is still not possible to claim with certitude that the Crown had agreed to the release of Fadl-e Haqq.

In order to shed more light on the career of Khairabadi, one has to turn to other source material, such as his prison writings, and to Khairabadi's grasp over the liturgical language Arabic. Similarly, the Arabic spatial context, for example, Mecca, is important because it helps to monumentalise the memory of his admirers. It is in this context that the meaning of poetry cannot be underestimated; this traditional medium of cultural articulation has ever since been a means to appeal to human emotions, to mobilise large masses and to revive their cultural memory.<sup>48</sup> In this context, documents that pertain to the genre of prison poetry (*habsiyyat*) dealing with the theme of imprisonment are especially informative.<sup>49</sup> The prison as a definite disciplinary apparatus influences the prisoner's everyday life, his predisposition and his moral. In the isolation that he experiences, the prisoner can give in to self-reflection. The silence of his wishes and desires and of his surrounding world provides him with the possibility of descending into his conscience, which he can interrogate and from where he can sense the emergence of a moral feeling. Probably the guard becomes his friend or even beloved, who looks after him and suffers with him, while the prison supports the organisation of a milieu of solidarity and hierarchy. Thus, prison literature has specific identity and solidarity-inspiring functions for the author as well as for his readers. Together with the mythical origins and whereabouts of the document, prison literature takes on a central meaning in the collective memory of people, here the Muslims, particularly in the wake of Indian independence in 1947. In prison literature a totally different world is conceived through the construction of another liminal space with its own laws pertaining to time and space—the *heterotopos* or 'the other space'. Linked to it are insights and autobiographical elements of the other world.<sup>50</sup> The text, however, remains utterly internalized and deeply silent until it can be 'heard' from this other, imprisoned world. Thus, the text has to be somehow liberated or liberate itself from the constraints of this; unique and dramatically constructed spatio-temporal setting. The smuggling of the text out of the place of the 'Other' is therefore the *Leitmotiv* of prison literature. Only then can the text start to create a link to the outside world, the world of its readers and public, and it is only

<sup>47</sup> Barakati, *Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi awr Sann satawan*, p. 65; Shihabi, *East India Company awr baghi 'Ulama*, p. 55. Again, this version seems to add to the construction of the myth around Khairabadi.

<sup>48</sup> For the function of history, collective memory and identity see Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis*.

<sup>49</sup> There is a long tradition of prison poetry, *habsiyyat*. See de Bruijn, 'Habsiyya', in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition, pp. 333f. For contemporary Islamist prison literature see Cooke, 'Ayyam min hayati: The Prison Memoirs of a Muslim Sister'.

<sup>50</sup> See Foucault, *Überwachen und Strafen*, pp. 305, 342.



outside that it can display its full and versatile meaning and become virulently active and alive. Through the subversive circumstances of smuggling as well as through the coding of the text, it achieves a very particular importance in the cultural memory of a certain audience; it creates curiosity and a specific, albeit biased and highly personalised, version of history. It obstructs the view for other historical realities but at the same time creates space for new insights. Furthermore, the enigma attached to reconstruction and non-publication of the manuscript for some time makes this work seem all the more important.

In addition to this, Mecca represents the imagined mythological ideal caliphate, the navel of the righteously guided world and *umma*, to which the son of the deported scholar (see below) is said to have sent the text at a time when Mecca was linked in many Indian Muslim minds with the Ottomans, who were emerging as more important after the Mughals had been definitively unseated.

Finally Arabic, as the holy language of the Quran, is a proven design for this imagined community. Thus historical memory can be used and mobilised for the reconstruction of history and reinvention of tradition confirmed in the form of a narrative.<sup>51</sup> In this context the contribution of ‘Abd al-Haqq Khairabadi (the son) is worth mentioning, as it must have been him who allegedly pieced the scattered text together and decoded most of it, for which he must have had a key of some description. However, all the data accessible so far lack information regarding this important task in the re-creation, re-making and re-imagining of the text.

It is, however, claimed by Muhammad ‘Abd al-Shahid Khan Sherwani in his *Baghi Hindustan*<sup>52</sup> that Fadl-e Haqq wrote with pencil and charcoal on shreds of cloth and paper coded Arabic notes in prose and poetry, notably qasidas, which were smuggled out of banishment by a prisoner released earlier—the well-known Mufti ‘Inayat Ullah Kakorwi (d. 1863),<sup>53</sup> one of the many Muslim scholars detained in the Andamans.<sup>54</sup> Hence, the notion of a local infrastructure with scholars, intellectual debates and discourses does not correspond to the popular image that the Andamans were barren islands and that the only intellectual source was that of memory.<sup>55</sup>

Khairabadi’s notes are said to have been reconstructed afterwards by his

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis*.

<sup>52</sup> Without, however, references to source material.

<sup>53</sup> Kakorwi was interned because he had issued a *fatwa* in favour of Nawwab Khan Bahadur Khan; see Rizvi and Bhargava, eds. *Freedom struggle*, pp. 170-75. He wrote a number of books in the Andamans and was finally released because he translated Abu al-Fida’ Imad al-Din al-Aiyubi’s (d. 1331) *Taqwim al-buldan* (see Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, II, p. 46; S. II, p. 44; *El(2)*, I, p. 1180, a standard book on geography in Arabic into English.

<sup>54</sup> Compare Qadiri, *Jang-e Azadi*, pp. 429-37, listing dozens of detained Muslim scholars.

<sup>55</sup> Compare, for example, Haq, ‘The Story of the War of Independence’, p. 23: ‘There were no books to study or refer to and every word had to be written from memory.’



son,<sup>56</sup> and a copy of this collection was sent to Abul Kalam Azad's (d. 1958) father Maulana Khair al-Din in Mecca.<sup>57</sup> Known as *Tarikh Ghadr Hindustan* (Story of the Indian mutiny), the script was mentioned first in Rahman Ali's famous biography of Muslim scholars in 1914<sup>58</sup> and allegedly used again by Mu'in al-Din Ajmeri (d. 1940) during the Khilafat Movement.<sup>59</sup> His copy was translated into Urdu by 'Abd al-Shahid Khan Sherwani and was published with a copy of the original only in 1947 with the support of Abul Kalam Azad. It became known as *al-Thaura al-Hindiyya (The Indian Revolution)*. Therein the reasons for the revolt, the misery of the prisoners and the situation on the deportation islands are pointed out.<sup>60</sup>

For sure, the scholar from Khairabad was above all a great expert in the Arabic language—he is said to have written more than 4,000 verses in Arabic. Furthermore, he was well known for his various scholarly works, mostly on logic and philosophy, in Arabic and Persian. For his excellent knowledge in Arabic, he was well regarded by various writers, for example by Sayyid Ahmad Khan.<sup>61</sup> He also had a number of critics, such as the group around the descendants of Shah Waliullah. Whether Fadl-e Haqq took active part in the revolt or not is still a matter of debate. In fact, his autobiographical notes and poems permit no such conclusion, but they do play an important role in the reconstruction of history and thus in the narrative of the national and religious identity-making of Indian Muslims.

### III

In the following, a prose text and two qasidas of *The Indian Revolution* will be analysed briefly. The text at hand is full of synonyms and antonyms and contains a large number of Arabic words of the same root, which certainly does not facilitate understanding. Furthermore, it is said that the scholar endeavoured to use utmost secrecy in writing these texts and also tried not to quote names—though one may presume that if the texts were written for an audience outside the prison, quoting names would have not mattered at all; in fact, name-dropping would have been totally understandable. Nonetheless, the works ascribed to Fadl-e Haqq are a difficult matter for translation, though they represent an outstanding

<sup>56</sup> This was claimed by Muhammad 'Abd al-Shahid Khan Sherwani in his *Al-Thaurat al-Hindiyya, Baghi Hindustan*, without references to source material.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>58</sup> See 'Ali, *Tadhkirah-ye 'Ulama-e Hind*, p. 165.

<sup>59</sup> Mu'in al-Din Ajmeri met the famous scholar, sufi and activist 'Abd al-Bari Farangi Mahalli (d. 1926) who went to Ajmer to attend the annual 'urs and mobilise prominent scholars and sufis to the Khilafat cause in April 1919. See Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics*, p. 102.

<sup>60</sup> See also Malik, 'Die "Erfindung" von Tradition', p. 83f.

<sup>61</sup> See Khan, *Athar al-Sanadid*, vols. I-III, ed. by Khaliq Anjum, pp. 95-113; also see al-Hayy, *Nuzhat al-khwatir*, p. 414ff.



and important part of Arabic literature.<sup>62</sup>

Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi called the prose writing *Risala ghadariyya* or *al-Fitna al-Hindiyya*,<sup>63</sup> respectively *Risala al-thaurat al-hindiyya*<sup>64</sup> a *qissah* (narrative, story). By addressing a defined audience, he denounces the brutal reaction of the British after the rebellion, time upon time using new words. He, who had been living a life of luxury, was betrayed and made a pauper, handed over to a tyrant who had taken from him his last amenities and bestowed harsh punishment upon him. This white skinned tyrant (the gaoler) with a black heart, blue eyes, a grim facial expression, red hair and a bad mood had taken away all his fancy clothes and instead had given him rags to wear. Khairabadi is now separated from his family, an accused without defence counsel and prosecutor (*bi la mudda'in wa munazi*). The reason this tyrant imposes unimaginable hardship on him is that the prisoner is a true Muslim and one of the greatest scholars. In other words, the tyrant is trying to eradicate all traces of Muslim scholarly tradition and knowledge.

After these introductory words, Fadl-e Haqq makes his position clear by analysing the intrigues of the British, whose aim it had been to play off the various groups against each other.

It was only because of the lies and false promises of the Christian sovereign that he was detained and deported. The amnesty of Queen Victoria was ignored. Fadl-e Haqq lamented in his qasidas. Colonial politics and the religious conversion of Indians connected with it were, according to him, based on two strategies: (i) The destruction of the traditional Islamic educational system and the standardisation of religious diversity.<sup>65</sup> This would facilitate the Raj's goal of national integration. (ii) The introduction of cash crops and the monopolisation of the grain market with the objective of making Indians materially dependent and

<sup>62</sup> The texts, prose and poems are reprinted in Sherwani, *Al-Thaurat al-Hindiyya*, pp. 26-85, 86-105 and 106-19. An English translation of the full text is available in Haq, 'The Story of the War of Independence' (being an English translation of Allamah Fadl-i-Haqq's *Risalah* on the War), pp. 23-57. In addition to the text of the qasida, an Arabic—albeit biased—commentary was published by one of his admirers, 'Ali, Ghulam Mihr, *Al-yawaqiyat al-mihriyya, sharh al-thaurat al-Hindiyya*, Chishtiyan sharif: al-maktabat al-mihriyya, ca. 1964, stressing the Barelwi point of view.

<sup>63</sup> *Risala ghadariyya* and *al-Fitna al-Hindiyya* have pejorative meanings: in the first case it is a *Book of Mutiny*, in the second it is *The Indian Intrigue*.

<sup>64</sup> The script in prose has been 'a continuation of the defence campaign of Maulvi Fazl Haq who had not lost hope of his release and had intended thus to obtain it'. Cf. Husain, *Bahadur Shah II and the war of 1857 in Delhi with its unforgettable scenes*, p. 375f.

<sup>65</sup> [fa inna kitabi hadha kitab asirin kasir khasir 'ala kafata min hasir; muhtalan bi-kulli 'asir, la yutaq wa lau fi anin yasir; muntazirin li-farjin 'ala rabbihi yasir]

<sup>66</sup> A diversity that had been the general position of the scholarship in Awadh from the time of the Qadiri sufi and *wujudi*, 'Abd al-Razzaq (d. 1724) of Bansa, the spiritual guide of the scholars of Farangi Mahall: this scholarship proved to be important when it came to appealing to a variety of social and religious groups living in north India at a time when internal feuds were hampering political and cultural integration. See Alam, 'Religion and Politics in Awadh society: 17th and 18th centuries', pp. 321-50; Alam, *The Languages of Political Islam in India*, pp. 98-112; see also Malik, *Islamische Gelehrtenkultur in Nordindien*, pp. 138-46.



thus to subjugate them absolutely. The scholar from Khairabad also claimed that the British prohibited Indians from exercising their rites.

Religious restrictions were introduced at first in the Hindu and Muslim units of the British armed forces. The aim was that once the army had lost its religion, other citizens would not be brave enough to resist for fear of punishment. Therefore, Khairabadi reports, they had forced Muslim and Hindu soldiers to taste animal fat, especially pig fat, but both groups (*fariqayn*) had refused to do so. This subsequently led to a rebellion against their superiors (*tarkhan*), in which they had killed the latter their wives and children. Once in Delhi, the troops proclaimed the former emperor their leader.<sup>67</sup> The frail emperor did not have any experience and was influenced by his wife [Zinat Mahall] and his Wazir, who loved and respected Christians and were in fact enemies of their opponents. The emperor lacked any authority whatsoever.<sup>68</sup> In this situation a group of courageous Muslims<sup>69</sup> obtained legal opinion (*fatwa*) from Islamic scholars, according to which a Holy War (*jihad*) was absolutely imperative.<sup>70</sup> This resulted in an insurrection in the form of a Holy War.

While all Hindus had been sympathisers of the British, Muslims had been divided into opponent- and sympathisers. The Christians had killed and plundered villages with the support of the Hindus, or had isolated them from the outside world by hiding the wheat accumulated by *Banias*.

After the arrest of the emperor and the killing of his descendants, the British decapitated and hanged people mercilessly. The number of the dead, mainly Muslims, went into the thousands. Hindus were penalised only if their participation was proven. The only Muslims being spared this fate were those who had emigrated, cooperated with the British, or denied their faith (*iman*). They should be considered spies like the servant of the king [Ahsan Ullah Khan], who had enabled the Christians to conquer the city.... Hindu chiefs were compelled to arrest all rebels and send them to Delhi where the Christians killed them. Thus the surrounding regions had been purged. Some of those found had committed suicide to save their honour, others had been killed or arrested and abused, yet others had been sold as concubines to disgusting men or for little money, while others disappeared without trace. Children became orphans, women became widows, and men lost their children. After that the Christians turned towards the east where another massacre took place.

As for himself, Khairabadi continues, he journeyed towards his homeland, Khairabad, although it was dangerous. The Christians had ordered the Jats to kill and plunder every traveller. It was hardly possible to cross the rivers.

<sup>67</sup> The insurrection troops entered the city on 11 May 1857. That same day, the Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah was nominated as their leader.

<sup>68</sup> This judgment is in opposition to his reported closeness with the emperor before the troubles; see Metcalfe, *Two Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi*, pp. 196, 217, 223, 224.

<sup>69</sup> [*jam' min al-muslimin al-jilad: lil-jidal wa-l-jilad*]

<sup>70</sup> [*ba'd al-istifta wa-l-istishhad min al-'ulama' al-zuhhad wa ifta'i-him bi wujub al-jihad wa bi fat aw a a'imma al-ijtihad*]



However, he eventually managed to reach his homeland.<sup>71</sup> In Awadh, a few rebels chose the wife of a former king (the wife of Nawwab Wajid 'Ali Shah, Hazrat Mahal and her underaged son Birjis Qadr)<sup>72</sup> as their leaders. The king (Wajid 'Ali Shah), was unreliable, a coward and politically ignorant, because of which the British had managed to annex all his territory. The royal family was besieged in their palaces (*qusur*) in the city (Lucknow). Thus everything had been turned into the exact opposite of what had been hoped for.

After this detailed narrative Fadl-e Haqq describes the dreadful massacre following the conquest of Lucknow, dwelling also on Hazrat Mahal and her greedy and incompetent leader, the 'amil Nawwab Ahmad Khan alias Murtaza Khan, who died on the Andaman isles. Another 'amil Ahmad Ullah Shah (d. 1858) was a formidable man who revolted. However, as Khairabadi says, he was insidiously assassinated on the order of a Hindu zamindar.<sup>73</sup>

After arguing that the queen of the Christians (Victoria) lured the Indians into a trap by issuing orders of amnesty,<sup>74</sup> Fadl-e Haqq recounts his own capture, in full belief of his amnesty. He also laments that two contentious apostates, who once disputed with him regarding a verse of the Quran, had given information about him to the British authorities.<sup>75</sup> The officer had condemned him to imprisonment and exile, and confiscated his property, books and house owned by his family. However, he was not the only one to fall victim to this intrigue: the Christians ignored and broke their promises, killing and arresting an indefinite number of people, and not even sparing the most distinguished families.

<sup>71</sup> This is probably a reference to the crossing of the river Ganges near Bhikanpur. There, Fadl-e Haqq spent 18 days with Habib al-Rahman Sherwani's father. See Sherwani, 'Murasalah be silsilah-ye madhmun Maulana Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi', pp. 53-54.

<sup>72</sup> For more information on Zinat Mahal and Birjis Qadr see Mukherjee, *Awadh in Revolt 1857-1858. A Study of Popular Resistance*, pp. 125f, 131, 135f, 151ff.

<sup>73</sup> The order was issued by the Raja of Powain who received Rs 50,000 from the British.

<sup>74</sup> The proclamation of Queen Victoria on 11 Nov. 1858, in which she ordered that India be put under direct rule from the Crown, as opposed to rule by the East India Company, states, 'Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except those who have been or shall be convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects. With regard to such, the demands of justice forbid the existence of mercy.' Hazrat Mahal issued a counter-proclamation warning all Indians not to accept the amnesty (see Edwards, *Red Year*, pp. 171-73). A discussion about the backgrounds and introduction of the *Ta'alluqdari Settlement*, 1858, which preceded the proclamation and introduced the policy of confiscation, can be found in Kumar, *Peasants in the Revolt: Tenants, Landlords, Congress and the Raj in Oudh, 1886-1922*, p. 7ff.

<sup>75</sup> The dispute was about Sura 5:51: 'Oh you who believe! Take not the Jews and Christians for friends. They are friends one to another. He among you who takes them for friends is (one) of them. Allah guides not wrongdoing folk.' In fact, this verse is made into an issue by Ghulam Mihr for it showed the struggle between the Wahhabis/Deobandis led by Ahmad Shah Barelwi and Shah Isma'il (e.g., wrongdoing folk), both leading figures of the mujahidin movement in 1820s, and the Barelwis/Khairabadis (the righteously guided). It can be speculated that the British wanted Khairabadi to reinterpret the verse for their purposes, which he might have declined and for which he was not released while other 'ulama such as 'Inayat Ahmad Kakori, were.



Khairabadi claims this to be the true history of the war.

In dense style, Fadl-e Haqq also narrates his experiences of deportation to the Andaman Islands, the hardship in prison, his desperation, but also his faith which helped him live through these times of hardship: the Christians detained him by providing wrong verdicts and producing false evidence. They then transported him from prison to prison and tantalised him by means of different inquiries. They took off his shoes and clothes and instead provided him with some rough material to wear. They changed his soft bed with a hard mattress, which seemed to be covered with thorns. No cup was allowed to him and the meals were horrific. He was given warm water to drink, and in spite of his old age was humiliated. The hardhearted enemies then brought him to an island, i.e., the Andamans,<sup>76</sup> where the sun would constantly shine right on his head and where difficult hilly paths and dangerous roads made walking impossible. The air was extremely warm and amenities more bitter than poison. The food was worse than the taste of cucumber, the water worse than snake poison. The sky resembled one big looming cloud, which kept pouring out nothing but sorrows. The earth looked dotted with measles and pocks, and from the roofs of the houses there were only drops falling like the tears from his eyes. The air was contaminated and therefore a constant source of ailments. Often there were epidemics. The sick had no chance to be cured; the sane was bereft of security. The one who cured disease became ill, and the one who was sick was a definite prey for death. There was no empathy and pity whatsoever; no disease was not fatal. Every disease ultimately led to death, even Hypochondria and Pleurisy. There were diseases totally unknown and very dangerous. The doctor could not come up with a diagnosis; instead he gave medicines which wrecked the patient. If a prisoner died, an unclean person looking like a devil or monster (*shaitan khannas*) would come to drag the corpse away by the feet, take off his clothes and dig the corpse into a sand hill without a coffin and without performing ablution. As there was no grave and no burial, one did not wish to die. If suicide was not illegal all prisoners would have taken recourse to it. It was in such an environment that he fell ill and succumbed to depression. Moreover, he caught worms and other diseases and although his body was aching, he was made to walk and exercise in the mornings and evenings. Soon he would die, after a prosperous and enjoyable life, when he was old and insane, wounded and

<sup>76</sup> For the Andaman islands see Government of India: Selections from the Records of the Government of India, Home Department No. XXV: *The Andamen Islands with Notes on Barren Islands*. Calcutta. 1859. According to reports of the census of 1881, there was a little autonomous world on the islands which was particularly designed for the detainees; see India Census 1881: *Statistics of the population enumerated in the Andamans. 1881*, Calcutta, 1883; also Shahjahanpuri, Khushi Ram, *Tarikh-e Jazirah-ye Andaman*, s.l., 1861; Thanseer, Muhammad Ja'far, *Kala pani ma'ruf beh tawarikh 'ajiba*. Delhi, written in 1879, reprint, Lahore, 1993; Qadiri, *Jang-e Azadi*, pp. 429-37. In Apr. 1859 there were 13,479 prisoners, cross-cutting all ethnic and social groups and nationalities. Their medium of communication was Hindustani, which every prisoner knew on the islands. Until 1922 the island served for deportation purposes.



ulcerated. But still he thanked God for His mercy because next to him he saw sick prisoners in chains, who were brought to their daily working place by a terrible man who did not show any empathy whatsoever. Khairabadi thanked God for having saved him from these atrocities. Having full belief in God, he asked the creator in the name of Prophet Muhammad, to free him from that horrifying situation and fulfil the divine promise to listen to the destitute.

Khairabadi claims to have told his misfortunes in two qasidas. The first one, the *Hamziyya* (the rhyme ends on a *hamza*), points to the satanic inspiration (which befell a tormented man; *hamazat al-shayatin*, or the satanic *waswasa*). The second qasida, the *Daliyya* (the rhyme ends in *dal*), recounts his hardships. Both qasidas were written in Rajab 1276 (December 1859-January 1860)<sup>77</sup> and end with a prophetic eulogy. Herein, he again laments that far away from his family, his only remaining friend would be water, and he mourns the loss of his identity as a nobleman, he who has been left defenceless against attacks by the vices of colonialism (*‘ayyub*). Finally, he implores the prince of Rampur, Yusuf ‘Ali Khan, whom he had served for some time, to support him.

Khairabadi also claimed to have had plans to write a third qasida ending on *nun*; however, this work, which would have had over 300 rhymes, could not be finished due to the circumstances.<sup>78</sup> If God should deliver him, he vowed to extend this qasida with the eulogy of a man who, because of his high moral standards and righteousness, would be noted among nobles (*makarim ul-akhlaq*) (who this eulogy would have been addressed to remain a mystery).

However, it is interesting to note that in a letter to the Nawwab of Rampur, he reiterated that he was mistaken for Mir Fadl-e-Haqq Shahjahanpuri, who was caught for his activities in Bareilly or Pilibhit, rather than in Bundi where Fadl-e-Haqq Khairabadi was trapped.<sup>79</sup>

#### IV

In the case of Khairabadi, one may suspect a judicial error on the part of the British administration. This is more likely, since there had been a namesake

<sup>77</sup> Sherwani, *Al-Thaurat al-Hindiyya*, p. 118.

<sup>78</sup> The fragment is printed in al-Nisa, *Al-‘Allama Fadl Haqq al-Khairabadi*, pp. 234-46.

<sup>79</sup> The letter in question, dated 18 Feb., says that his namesake had been appointed Sarrishtadar of Pilibhit and also worked as Tahsildar of Anwala. In the early days of the uprising, Sayyid Fadl-e-Haqq Shahjahanpuri had become Nazim Pilibhit and after the fall of Bareilly went to Awadh to be appointed Chakladar of Muhammadi. Later, he took refuge in Jaman along with the rebel forces of Ferozshah. His close relatives were serving the Company as senior officers, his brother Maulvi Mubeen being Deputy Collector Saharanpur. He therefore requested, that Ismail Khan Rais-e-Balagarh, who was fully aware of the affairs of the culprit, as well as of ‘Maulvi Fadl-e-Haqq Shahjahanpuri’, may please be approached to write down the details to Mr. Tarab, Commanding Officer Bareilly, and Mr. Tarab sends his comments on this report to the Department of Special Commissioner Lucknow, so that the difference between the affairs of the two may be proved, and the most grateful servant may be released. See Malik, *Tahqiqi madamin*, pp. 130-31.



(Sayyid Fadl-e Haqq Shahjahanpuri) active in 1857.<sup>80</sup> This error would provide evidence of the profound ignorance or even vindictiveness of the British, especially since the release of the alleged insurgent is said to have been discussed sincerely by the Crown. It seems that the European conviction of its superior position hampered a deeper understanding of the independent character of Indian culture, and jeopardised their insight into the autonomy of other cultural forms. This might also be true in the case of an anti-British revolutionary council (*King Council* or *majlis-e mushawarat*), which is said to have been established during the revolt. Manned by 10 members from civil and military departments, Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi being one of them, this council worked towards a constitution, supposedly the first constitutional elaboration in Urdu for an independent India. These regulations used Arabic and Persian nomenclatures rather than British ones, and adopted many elements of European statesmanship. It is said that the Council produced 'a constitution based on the principles of democracy',<sup>81</sup> curtailing the power of the monarch.<sup>82</sup> Nonetheless, the rebels proclaimed Bahadur Shah Zafar as the Shah of Hindustan, most probably to use the legitimacy of the Mughal crown as a symbol for unifying different groups. In this context the *farman* issued by the Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar is mentioned, in which he complains of British liberal ideas such as equality of education. In contrast to the emancipative endeavours of the rebels suggested above, the imperial *farman* seems to be rather reactionary. In the case that similar constitutional ideas existed in Indian rows, to germinate and push through constitutional notions, one may ask whether the revolt really aimed at restoring the old order or whether traditional historiography follows the 'traditionalisation' which would, indeed, correspond to the politics of colonial restoration. Any other perception of the upheaval would have meant appreciating progressive forces.

<sup>80</sup> For Sayyid Fadl-e Haqq Shahjahanpuri see Shauq, *Tadhkirah-ye Kamalan-e Rampur*, p. 320f. and Qadiri, *Jang-e Azadi*, pp. 566-68. He was active in Rampur at the time of Sayyid Ahmad 'Ali Khan (1200/1775-1256/1840), who ascended the throne in 1794 but held power only in 1810 when he became mature. It is said that Fadl-e Haqq Shahjahanpuri was extremely modest and introverted though he held high offices such as Na'ib Sarrishtadar in the *Mahkamah Sadr* of Rampur, then Sarrishtahdar in the Commissionary of Bareilly; during the rebellion he was Tahsildar in Pilibhit or Bheri, participated in the jihad of Mirza Firoz Shah and died as a martyr (shahid) in Jhansi, leaving behind no children. Rizvi and Bhargava eds, *Freedom*, p. 501, quotes an officer of the court of Shahjahanpur, who reports about the army of rebels in Shahjahanpur: One leader of rebels was Fadl-e Haqq of Shahjahanpur, stationed in Pihani and Padroah near Muhammadi. He had the control over 4,000 sawars and 900 Najibs as well as three canons, and also collected revenue. According to this statement Fadl-e Haqq was one of the six rebellious leaders, besides Khan 'Ali Khan of Shahjahanpur, Loni Singh Raja of Muthauli (see also 'L/P+S/6/466, Collections 59: Trial of Rajah Lonee Singh and Moulvee Fuzl Huk'), Khan Bahadur Khan of Bareilly, Wilayat Shah and Begam of Lucknow (Hazrat Mahal).

<sup>81</sup> See Mahdi, *Bahadur Shah II*, pp. lii ff. Parts of the 'Constitutions' are reproduced by Mahdi, *ibid.*, pp. 182-92, 389.

<sup>82</sup> Compare also Barakati, *Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi awr Sann satawan*, pp. 52-59, 82, citing, among others, a number of *Mutiny records*.



The Emperor's *farman* also stands in contrast to one of his letters addressed to the Nawab of Tonk, asking him for some dozens of camels with which he planned to proceed to the shrine of Bakhtiyar Kaki (d. 1230), buried in the Mehroli subdivision of Delhi, before embarking for Madina, because he considered the *jihad* to be senseless.<sup>83</sup> Moreover, we hardly know the view from the margins, such as the story of Umrao Jan Ada, a courtesan from Lucknow. Her portrayal by Mirza Hadi Ruswa (1858-1931) in the supposedly first Urdu novel tells a completely different story, as she views the so called 'revolutionaries' as nothing more than troublemongers. Similar revealing information about the uneasy situation during the siege is provided by people in other different professions such as the sweet and wood-seller, moneylenders, cobblers as well as some hungry sepoy, as can be read in the various Mutiny Papers, which, however, have not been used by historians for the reconstruction of the historical narrative so far.<sup>84</sup> It is astonishing to note that we find few vernacular voices in Urdu, and particularly in Persian, being heard in historical accounts of 1857.<sup>85</sup> In the light of these quite different views, it becomes indeed a problem to definitely ascertain the nature of the 1857 revolt.

A documentation putting together such material lying in the dusty state and National archives is of utmost importance, since these 'relics' do provide an important and palpable insight into the variety of collective and individual decisions at a vital cross-section of colonial history. They also allow for the creation of a distinct colonised identity, and highlight the process of inventing tradition as well as of mobilising collective identity for a variety of reasons.<sup>86</sup>

The account of Khairabadi's alleged participation in the revolt is as important to the construction of collective reality as are the doubts about the authenticity of his authorship of *The Indian Revolution*. The historical memory creates the sources it needs for its own reproduction. Thus the importance of historiography and validity of sources such as letters, autobiographical notes and prison literature constitute an important basis for the reconstruction of history and also of the processes of mutual perception at the cross-sections of European and non-European encounters.

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<sup>3</sup> Personal communication by Professor Aziz ud-Din Husain, New Delhi, 2005, referring to Persian archival material in the Haryana State Archives.

<sup>4</sup> I am thankful to William Dalrymple for sharing this insight with me.

<sup>5</sup> Therefore, it seems to be too early to state whether there were upheavals in other areas as well, such as the Deccan and Bengal.

<sup>6</sup> It may not be out of place to state that since independence, only one M. Phil thesis has been written on 1857 in the many universities of Delhi.



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## ‘ALLAMAH FADL-I-HAQQ

The glorious part played by the *‘ulama* in the movement which culminated in the War of Independence has not received the attention it deserves. In the period that followed the catastrophe of 1857 it was not possible to say or write anything against the British rule. The westerners, of course, had their own prejudices and short-comings, but even our own historians could not express their views with freedom. It is only in the beginning of this century that we notice a change in the approach of the historians, particularly those who wrote on this movement. Of the many *‘ulama* who had devoted their lives to preparing the nation for a decisive struggle against the foreigners the name of ‘Allamah Fadl-i-Haqq occupies a place of distinction. He commanded great respect for his learning and was considered to be an authority on rationalistic sciences. But more important in the present context is his pamphlet on the War of Independence which has already been published with an Urdu translation under the title *Baghi Hindustan*.<sup>1</sup> It is a brief but eye-witness account of some events of the War. Besides this, he composed two *qasidahs*— *hamziah* and *daliah*— during the period of his internment in the Andamans. He wrote them out on pieces of cloth and paper and sent them through Mufti ‘Inayat Ahmad to ‘Abdul Haqq. The latter made copies of these compositions and distributed them among the pupils of the ‘Allamah.

### Early life

The ancestors of the ‘Allamah traced their descent, from the Second Caliph of Islam. They came to the Sub-continent from Iran and some of them acted as *muftis* or *qadis* during the later Mughul period. His father, Fadl-i-Imam,<sup>2</sup> was the *Sadr-u's-Sudur* of Delhi. He used to spend his spare time in teaching and

<sup>1</sup> This was written by the ‘Allamah during the period of his life imprisonment in the Andamans. In 1277 A. H. he sent the pieces of paper and cloth on which he had written it out with charcoal to his son through Mufti ‘Inayat Ahmad who had been released at the recommendation of a British officer. The son of the ‘Allamah (‘Abdul Haqq) had these fragments put together and arranged in a proper form. Copies were made and distributed among select pupils of the ‘Allamah. *Vide*, Introduction to *Baghi Hindustan*.

<sup>2</sup> He was a great scholar of philosophy and logic and is the author of several works, some of which have been published. His *Mirqat* is quite a popular book on logic. The author's own copy of the *Talkhis-u'sh-Shifa* is preserved in the Lytton Library, Muslim University, Aligarh. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan speaks of him in very respectful works in his well-known book, *Athar-u's-Sanadid*.



writing books. Fadl-i-Haqq was born in 1797, and is said to have completed the course of his studies at the early age of fourteen. The Mughul Emperor was now completely under the influence of the East India Company, but even under these circumstances his Court had some attraction for scholars and poets. Of his early life an interesting incident has been related by the author of the *Tazkira-i-Ghauthiah*.<sup>3</sup> His father had entrusted to him the charge of a rather elderly student, who was not only unimpressive but also showed complete lack of intelligence. Young as the 'Allamah was, one day he got excited and expelled him from his class. The student went to the 'Allamah's father and related the whole story, weeping bitterly. The 'Allamah was asked to explain his attitude and was slapped on the face for showing discourtesy to a student. This acted as a great corrective, for never after did he show any harshness to any of his pupils.

For some time the 'Allamah worked as *Sarrishtadar* under the Resident of Delhi. But he soon became disgusted with the atmosphere of Government service and resigned his post. When the Nawab of Jhajhar heard this he invited the 'Allamah, offering him a monthly stipend of rupees five hundred. At the time of his departure the heir-apparent to the Mughul throne who later became Emperor Bahadur Shah presented him with a *shawl* and with tears in his eyes he said, "Since you have decided to leave, there is no option but to accept the position. Yet God knows it is difficult to utter the words 'good-bye.'"<sup>4</sup> After sometime he went to Alwar at the invitation of the Maharaja, and then to Tonk where the Nawab received him with cordiality. Ultimately he accepted a post in Rampur and at the recommendation of Mirza Ghalib became the Nawab's adviser in the composition of poetry.<sup>5</sup> After staying here for about eight years he went to Lucknow where he was appointed *Sadru's-Sudur*. Like his father he used to spend his spare time in teaching his students on an honorary basis. The author of the *Tazkirah-i-'Ulama-i-Hind* says: "In 1264 A.H. I went to Lucknow and saw the Mawlana (Fadl-i-Haqq) at a game of chess, smoking his *huqqah* and at the same time giving a lesson on the *Ufuq-al-mubin*. He was lecturing so nicely that the pupils could easily follow and grasp whatever he said."<sup>6</sup>

### Scholar and Poet

His reputation as a great scholar of Philosophy, Literature and Prosody soon spread far and wide and students came to him from distant places. He is stated to have composed about four thousand couplets.<sup>7</sup> He was a great friend of Mirza Ghalib and took active interest in his poetical compositions. He suggested to the Mirza that he should give up his difficult and enigmatic style. The poet is stated not only to have changed the style but also agreed to the 'Allamah's making a selection from his previous compositions. According to Azad the current *Diwan* of

<sup>3</sup> p. 123.

<sup>4</sup> *Yadgar-i-Ghalib* p. 355; *Panj-Ahang* of Mirza Ghalib, p. 122.

<sup>5</sup> *Intikhab-i-Yadgar*, Mufti Amir Ahmad Minai, *Preface to Makatib-i-Ghalib*, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> p. 164.

<sup>7</sup> *Siyar-al-'Ulama*, p. 22.



the Mirza is the same selection.<sup>8</sup> Of the poetical compositions of the ‘Allamah the *qasidahs* and *risalah* written during his imprisonment are of considerable interest to the students of history. It may be of some interest to mention here that the ‘Allamah took an active part in the religious controversies of the day. He was opposed to the views of the well-known Shah Isma‘il Shahid on a number of questions, particularly in regard to the doctrine of *imma‘u‘n-nazir*. What makes the story more interesting is the fact that Ghalib also composed a *mathnawi* on this issue in which he expressed the same view as was held by his friend, the ‘Allamah. The ‘Allamah’s stand was that there was no possibility of creation of another prophet like the Holy Prophet, as he was undoubtedly the last of the prophets.

It is not possible to give here an account of the delicate stage through which the Muslims of the Sub-continent had been passing during the two decades preceding the War of Independence. It may however be pointed out that after the publication of the *fatwa* of Shah ‘Abdul ‘Aziz that Hind-Pakistan was *dar-al-harb*,<sup>9</sup> the followers of his school became active. The tragedies of Bala Kot where Sayyid Ahmad Shahid and Shah Isma‘il had been killed and Hanumangarh where a number of Muslims had been butchered in a mosque which was seized by the Hindus<sup>10</sup> had filled the atmosphere with great excitement. None who had any regard for Islam, much less a person like the ‘Allamah, could remain unaffected by the severe blows that the Muslims had been receiving at the hands of the Britishers as well -as the Hindus and the Sikhs.

### Fadh-i-Haqq joins the Freedom Movement

One of the leading figures among the active workers of the freedom movement was Mawlavi Ahmadullah Shah<sup>11</sup> of Madras. He came to Kanpur and met Nana Sahib and Mawlavi Azimullah Khan. From here he went to Lucknow where large groups of persons became his disciples. ‘Allamah Fadh-i-Haqq also resigned his post of *Sadru’s-Sudur* and proceeded to Alwar, devoting himself to the task of preaching privately the cause of freedom.

In May 1857, the storm which had been brewing for some time burst forth with great violence and the sepoys of a regiment of the Bengal army rose against their officers and marched on Dehli. The events moved so fast and in so

<sup>8</sup> *Ab-i-Hayat*, p. 512; *Yadgar*, p. 201.

<sup>9</sup> *Fatawa-i-‘Aziziyah*, Vol. I, p. 17. (Mujtabai Press).

<sup>10</sup> *Qaisar-u’t-Tawarikh*, II, p. 112.

<sup>11</sup> He was the son of a courtier of Tipu Sultan. Naturally from the beginning he hated the British rule. He left his home and went out to Jaipur and then to Gwalior where he became a disciple of Mihrab Shah Qalandar. The latter took *bi‘at* from him for *jihad* against the foreigners. After this he came to Agra and stayed with Mufti Inamullah who was in the service of the Government. Here he started preaching and is stated to have gained considerable influence among the Muslims of the city. After some time he went to Fyzabad passing through Kanpur and Lucknow. At Fyzabad he was arrested. He was later on taken out of the jail in 1857 he siezed Lucknow and supported Prince Birjis Qadr. After the fall of Lucknow he went to Muhmmadipur and set up an independent government. Here too they continued to struggle against the British Government. Unfortunately on the 15th June 1858, Ahmadullah Shah was treacheously murdered by a Hindu Zamindar, Baldeo Singh.



unexpected a manner that it was after some hesitation that the old Emperor agreed to join the movement and declare his independence. 'Allamah Fadhli-i-Haqq also left for Delhi and attended the *darbar* on the 16th August. He signed the *fatwa* for *jihad* with some other 'ulama, on which a very large number of people joined the ranks of the fighters for freedom. After a few victories in the initial stages of the movement the liberation forces began to lose ground, the main causes of the failure being disruption and lack of organization. When the position became too weak to be repaired the 'Allamah is said to have suggested to General Bakht Khan to advise the emperor to leave Delhi for Rohilkhand where he would have the support of 50000 Rohilla fighters. It is difficult to say how the events of later history would have moved if the emperor had agreed to leave his capital, but as Fate would have it he declined the Rohilla chief's request.<sup>12</sup> Ultimately the Emperor had to leave the Fort and take shelter in the Rohilkhand and Fadhli-i-Haqq too left Delhi. For about two years tomb of Humayun where he was arrested, Bakht Khan retired to the 'Allamah seems to have remained in hiding. When a declaration was made to the effect that the Queen "offered pardon to all rebels and mutineers who had not directly taken part in the murders of Europeans" he came out of his concealment and decided to live in peace in Khairabad. He was however soon arrested and subjected to a trial in Lucknow.<sup>13</sup> The trial story is not without interest. The piety and goodness of the 'Allamah created a deep impression on the former who in order to save his life made a statement saying that he was not the same Fadhli-i-Haqq who had signed the *fatwa* of *jihad*. But the 'Allamah's devotion to truth would not allow him to save himself by taking advantage of a false statement. He immediately contradicted the informer's assertion and made an unqualified confession, adding that he was the person who had signed the *fatwa* and that, as he had done it to please his God, he would do it again if he were so asked. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and deported to the Andamans.

After some time Mawlavi Shamsu'l Haqq, the son of the 'Allamah, assisted by Khwajah Ghulam Ghauth Bekhabar succeeded in securing a release order for his father. He took it to the Andamans, but unfortunately reached there just at the time when the dead body of his father was being taken to the burial ground.<sup>14</sup>

From the brief account of 'Allamah Fadhli-i-Haqq's life and activities one can easily conclude that the widely-publicized theory that the revolt of 1857 was a mere mutiny of the sepoys is absurd. Nor is it the entire fact that the movement had remained confined to certain areas or that it was the result of an "awakening discontent, here and there provoking thoughts of rebellion, in certain groups of civil population."<sup>15</sup> In fact the disasters and losses suffered by the Britishers were so terrible and consequently the memories left in their minds were so bitter that

<sup>12</sup> The diary of Munshi Jiwan Lal records this and later visits of the 'Allamah to the *darbar*.

<sup>13</sup> He refers to this in his *qasidah*, known as *Hamziah*.

<sup>14</sup> He died on the 12th *Safar*, 1278 A.H. Shaikh Mohd. Ikram's statement in his *Rawd-i-Kauthar* (p. 417) that Mawlana Fadhli-i-Haqq was exiled to Rangoon after the "Mutiny" is not correct.

<sup>15</sup> *Cambridge History of India*, VI, p. 167.



they were unable to take a detached view of the entire movement. The part played by the various leaders of the Muslims, specially the role of the *Ulama* in preparing their co-religionists for a regular war of independence, is yet to be assessed in the light of material which has not been properly handled and utilized. The official documents of the Government and the diaries and despatches of military officials and civilians, who were associated with the work of suppressing the movement are no doubt contemporary evidence, but they give us only one side of the picture. To reconstruct the other side is a difficult task which requires long and sustained labour. But it would be worthwhile to undertake the task. For several decades after the War it was impossible to talk of liberation or independence. Even intelligent observers like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan had to condemn the war as a *mutiny* and propound their theories in that light. The historians of the nineteenth century and even those who wrote in the earlier decades of the twentieth, could not carry us far. Nevertheless, for a patient worker there is sufficient material, particularly in Urdu and Persian, to work upon. It has however to be examined carefully before it can be utilized.

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## THE CAUSES OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

The failure of the *Jihad* Movement led by Sayyid Ahmad Shahid resulted in great frustration among the Muslims. The tragedy of Balakot blasted all hopes of winning for the Muslims a really independent state which could act as a nucleus for building up Muslim strength. The reformist activities connected with the movement were carried on by some of the survivors and their adherents, but it was recognized that they could not achieve the results for which the *Jihad* Movement was organized. It could not be expected that the Muslims would easily reconcile themselves to defeat. A people which still cherished the memory of having so successfully sustained a brilliant and benevolent empire found it hard to believe that there was no avenue left of reviving it. The symbol of their past glory still maintained an impoverished and impotent court in the marble palaces of Shahjahanabad; his condition engendered pity for him and wrath against the British. There were men of spirit who had not lost all hope, but they were either desperate or ignorant of the odds against which they would have to contend.<sup>1</sup> Their hopes and sentiments were, however, shared by the mass of the Muslim people, whose faith was their fortification. The average Muslim never lost the hope that he might again witness the rule of his own people. The Muslim masses have been surprisingly empire-conscious in the subcontinent. When the war was over, the British instinctively blamed the Muslims, thinking that they were responsible, being implacable enemies of foreign rule; the part played by the Hindus was considered to have been merely "a temporary aberration."<sup>2</sup>

It is true that the Muslims were not entirely responsible for organizing the great Mutiny of the sepoys, nor were they the sole spreaders of discontent against British rule; but the rising was in greater accord with their sentiments, and they threw themselves into it with great enthusiasm.<sup>3</sup> Later historians are surprised by the fact that British vengeance was so vehemently directed against

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*Vide* the description of the activities of the leaders of the *Jihad* Movement. Hunter, W. W., *Indian Musalmans*, pp. 22-23; also Kaye and Malleon *History of the Indian Mutiny*, IV, 379. Thompson and Garratt, *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India* (London, 1934), p. 443; also *Cambridge History of British Empire*, V, 169. Ball, Charles, *The History of the Indian Mutiny*, II, 92-97; *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, V, 169.



the Muslims. When they look at the events, they find little reason to justify the opinion so widely held by the British during and immediately after the rising that the Muslims were mainly to blame for the insurrection.<sup>4</sup> The British reaction was, however, instinctive. They had always looked upon the Muslims with suspicion. The legacy of the Crusades has still not been buried; there is in the Western mind a bias against Islam which is born of centuries of gross misrepresentation. In those days when religious animosity was much deeper, the hatred of Islam and of the Muslims was much stronger and expressed itself in the policies of the State. It must, however, be realised that the Muslim sentiment against the British was strong. Partly it was the reaction against British hostility itself; but it was also based upon political consciousness and a natural resentment against a race which had deprived them of but all the blessings of political power.<sup>5</sup> The British could not but have sensed this in many a subtle way. The treatment meted out by them to the Muslims, so that even the burden of political subjection was unevenly distributed between the Muslims and the Hindus, must have made the British conscious of a burning feeling of discontent among the Muslims. Whatever might be the part played by the Muslims or the 'rebellion' the British, in view of their previous policies, had expected the Muslims to play a leading role in an insurrection against them. They were not far wrong. If the Muslims did not play a greater part, it was not because of any affection for the British, nor because of cowardice or unwillingness to make sacrifices, which is true only of a few calculating princes and their pro-British ministers; British policy had kept the number of Muslim sepoys purposely lower than that of the Hindus, so that the number of Muslims bearing arms was smaller and they were also in a minority in the areas where the Mutiny prospered. The Muslims were judged by the British, not so much by their comparative performance as by their sentiment and effort.

The political humiliation of the Muslims would have been quite sufficient a cause for them to rebel. As has been related elsewhere, no effort was made by the British to win their sympathy or to conciliate them; on the contrary gross discrimination against them was the cornerstone of the administrative policy of the East India Company. To add insult to this injury, their history was made the target of attack. The British exalted the pacific qualities of 'the mild Hindu' as a foil to set off the 'fierce fanaticism of the warlike Mahomedan.' This was not an exclusively Indian phenomenon; everywhere from Morocco to the Philippine Islands, wherever the Muslims resisted the aggression of the Christian West, they were called either mad or fanatic. Of course similar qualities in the aggressor were 'a passionate devotion to values or ideals.' In India such propaganda was not only a natural expression of deep seated prejudice but also of calculated policy. The Hindu was to be frightened to an extent that he would consider British rule the only safeguard against 'Muslim tyranny,' and as such the greatest boon of the gods. One has only to read the introduction of Elliot and

<sup>4</sup> Thompson and Garratt, *op. cit.*, p. 443.

<sup>5</sup> Savarkar, V.D., *The Indian War of Independence, 1857* (London, 1909), pp. 51-52.



Dowson's *History of India as told by its own Historians* to catch a glimpse of British motives for misrepresenting Muslim history in India; a careful perusal of its pages will further show how clever editing, by omitting such passages as could possibly have thrown some favourable light upon the achievements of the Muslims and concentrating upon descriptions of war and occasional lapses, has achieved a high standard in *suppressio veri*.<sup>6</sup>

This distortion was not practised by professional historians alone. When the 'Mutiny' developed, the first thought in the mind of the British officers in India was to play off the Hindus against the Muslims. When the spies warned the authorities at Lucknow that a rising was likely, Sir Henry Lawrence summoned a *darbar* attended by the sepoys where, in addition to distributing rewards and robes of honour, he dilated upon the inequities of Muslim rule and said that only the British could save the Hindus from such injustice.<sup>7</sup> Similar attempts were made by others. Aitchison regretfully remarks that these efforts failed.<sup>8</sup> A proud people resents nothing so much as the distortion of its history. It was intolerable that after having destroyed the Muslim Empire, the British should heap ignominy upon its memory. A fitting answer to British calumnies was that when the people did rise, they could think only of the aged and powerless Bahadur Shah, the decrepit symbol of a dead Empire, as the rallying point of their effort. They did not, until much later, when the poison of propaganda sank deeper into the people.

<sup>6</sup> Vide Elliot, Sir Henry, M.K.C.B., and Dowson, John, M.R.A.S., *The History of India as told by its own Historians*, (London, 1867), pp. xxii and xxiii, Elliot's original preface, which was published with the *Bibliographical Index to the Mohammedan India* in 1849.

He says about his work: "They will make our native subjects more sensible of the immense advantages accruing to them under the mildness and equity of our rule. If instruction were sought for from them, we should be spared the rash declarations respecting Muhammadan India, which are frequently made by persons not otherwise ignorant. Characters now renowned only for the splendour of their achievements, and a succession of victories, would, when we withdraw the veil of flattery and divest them of rhetorical flourishes, be set forth in a truer light, and probably be held up to the execration of mankind. We should no longer hear bombastic Babus, enjoying under our government the highest degree of personal liberty, and many more political privileges than were ever conceded to a conquered nation, ran about patriotism, and the degradation of their present position. If they would dive into any of the volumes mentioned herein, it would take these young Brutuses and Phocians a very short time to learn, that in the days of that dark period for whose return they sigh, even the bare utterance of their ridiculous fantasies would have been attended, not with silence and contempt, but with the severe discipline of molten lead or empalement."

Comment is superfluous. It is obvious that many 'bombastic Babus' were not too appreciative of the blessings of British rule, nor fully conscious of their duties as members of a conquered nation. To add to their folly, they still were full of nostalgia for the days of the Muslim rule, of which they must have heard from their fathers and grandfathers, who must have witnessed the conditions under Muslim rule themselves. Plassey had been fought only nine decades before.

Also, Kaye and Malleon, *op. cit.*, III, 361-62, which says, "It is a custom among us *odisse quern laeseris* to take a native ruler's kingdom and then to revile the deposed ruler or he would be succeeded.

Savarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-99.

Aitchison, Sir C. V., *Lord Lawrence* (London, 1905), p. 81.



consider the Muslim Empire as the embodiment of injustice and cruelty. The Hindus fell victims to the propaganda only when memories had been dimmed by time and history text-books written by British authors had fully conditioned the minds. The adopted son of the last Peshwa, Nana Sahib, and Rani of Jhansi and other Maratha leaders accepted the Emperor as their sovereign.<sup>9</sup> The Muslims could not but be deeply offended at British attempts to defame their past, of which they were justly proud.

The people, Hindus and Muslims alike, were exasperated at the racial hauteur of the British. Later the native population was accustomed to slights, but at this time, when pride was still not dead, it was intolerable.<sup>10</sup> It is true that some social relations existed between some of the leading nobility and British officers, but the contacts were inadequate and limited. There was growing a sense of superiority which did not always express itself in a subtle manner. In some ways a certain amount of exclusiveness was inevitable, because the social customs of the British were so different; yet, this did not justify the general attitude of superciliousness which was affected by the ruling race. The Muslims, who themselves had always been remarkably free from any feelings of racial superiority, were sorely offended at having been treated as inferiors by the rulers.<sup>11</sup> The more galling aspect of this attitude of contempt for the 'natives,' which became a term of abuse in course of time, because of the manner in which it was used was that they were not considered even to be civilized.

This attitude of the British was reflected in the contempt in which Hindu and Muslim cultures were alike held. Macaulay, in his notorious minute on the introduction of English as the medium of education said as early as 2 February, 1835, that a single English book was better than an entire collection of oriental books. The sheer arrogance of this remark can be judged by the fact that Macaulay was by no means an oriental scholar. Even when scholars like Sir Henry Elliot acquired Islamic learning it was to defame and abuse. This cultural arrogance had to be borne by men who were not inferior in education. Sleeman speaks of them in the following terms: "Perhaps there are few communities in the world among whom education is more generally diffused than among Mohammadans in India. He who holds an office worth twenty rupees a month commonly gives his son an education equal to that of a prime minister."<sup>12</sup> At another place he remarks, "The best of us Europeans feel our deficiencies in conversation with Mohammadans of high rank and education, when we are called

<sup>9</sup> Savarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-96; also Asoka Mehta, 1857, *The Great Rebellion*, Bombay, 1946, p. 40.

<sup>10</sup> Khan, Sir Syed Ahmad, *Risalah Asbab-i-baghawat-i-Hind*, edited by Dr. Mahmud Husain, Karachi, 1955, p. 34. Sir Syed bitterly remarks, "They seem to think that there is not a single gentleman in the whole of India"; *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, V, 170.

<sup>11</sup> Sir Syed, *op. cit.*, p. 34. Even in the *ishtihaar* issued by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal to soothe the feelings of the people regarding the missionary activities of some persons, the Indians are referred to as "uncivilized, because of their ignorance and lack of knowledge." *Ibid.*, p. 52.

<sup>12</sup> Sleeman, Sir William H., *Rambles and Recollections*, p. 523.



upon to talk subjects beyond the everyday occurrences of life. He is very capable of talking upon all subjects of philosophy, literature, science and arts, and very much inclined to do so and of understanding the nature of improvements that have been made in them in modern times."<sup>13</sup> Such people could not have borne without indignation the slights offered to their knowledge and culture. It should be remembered that the Muslims of the subcontinent had developed standards in polite behaviour which would be difficult to surpass; even acrimonious correspondence between enemies was carried on in the most inoffensive and polite language. As a result, they were inclined to exaggerate the meaning of the mildest innuendo or insinuation. When they were confronted with downright and openly expressed insults, they were exasperated. The deep seated inferiority complex was a later phenomenon; they had yet not lost their pride in their past or their own culture or sense of values. They associated the cultural arrogance of the British with their own political subjection.

This political humiliation was to be complete. The masses were still under the opiate of the impression that their Emperor was the sovereign.<sup>14</sup> It should be remembered that the myth of the East India Company ruling under the authority of the Mughul Emperor had been assiduously cultivated in the beginning; it had been only gradually permitted to grow weaker as the British power increased, until it was no longer considered necessary to keep up the pretence. Bahadur Shah had been permitted to maintain a shabby court but now he was informed that, after his death, his successor would have to vacate the palaces in the Red Fort of Delhi and move to Mehrauli, a suburb. This, of course, meant that the Mughul dynasty would lose even the nominal historical vestige of its Imperial past. Already to decrease the prestige of the family, the rulers of Oudh had been encouraged to adopt the title of 'king' to show that they were no longer even legally subordinate to Delhi. The next step had been to refer to the Mughul as 'king.'<sup>15</sup> When all this had been put into effect, and seemed that no curtailment in the Emperor's dignity and official position was likely to create public resentment, it was decided to remove the Imperial family from Delhi.<sup>16</sup>

The loss of political power and subjection to a foreign Government had

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 339.

<sup>4</sup> Sir Syed *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>5</sup> Lord Amherst, in 1827, changed the style of letters addressed to the Emperor. In the new formula, used in addressing the Emperor, his superiority was recognized but all references to his suzerainty or to the vassalage or allegiance of the East India Company to the Mughul throne were excluded, *Selections from the Panjab Records*, I, 343 sqq.; the coinage issued by the Company had borne the name of the reigning Emperor up to 1778; between 1778 and 1853, all the coins minted between the years 1778 and 1835, bore the name of Shah 'Alam giving the nineteenth year of his reign as the fictitious date of the minting. Afterwards the coins bore, along with the name of the East India Company, the image and superscription of the British monarch. The ruler of Oudh had been encouraged to assume the title of 'king' with the specific purpose of creating dissensions between 'two leaders of the Muslim community'. *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, IV, 575-606. The act was unpopular, *Ibid.* *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, IV, 607.



increased the feelings of sympathy and respect for the Imperial dynasty among the masses. This is borne out by the fact that when the insurrection started, those who rebelled instinctively, thought of uniting under the banner of the aged Emperor. It was the Mughul throne alone which could rally the rebels against British authority without any distinction of religion or racial origin. There can be no greater proof of the popularity of the Mughul dynasty. The Mughul Empire had stood in the popular mind for good and benevolent government. People still remembered the peace and prosperity of the day of the great Mughuls, when under the solicitous care of a well organized and enlightened government they had lived their lives with ease and enjoyed the fruits of their industry. The attempts of historians with ulterior motives had still not dimmed for them the memory of a better past, which seemed even more attractive in contrast to the anarchy which had followed the collapse of the Empire and the economic hardships brought by the British methods of trade and mistakes in administration.

This feeling of political frustration was aggravated by the annexation of Oudh. The character of the last monarch of Oudh has been painted in very dark colours. It is true that towards the end, Wajid 'Ali Shah lost all interest in government and was not able to put the administration into shape; but it was widely known that his faineancy was the result of despair. He had started well, but British interference and designs did not permit him to achieve any results from his efficiency and he came to look upon all effort as waste of time.<sup>17</sup> His removal and the annexation of Oudh proved extremely unpopular. A number of other political and economic causes mingled with the feeling of losing yet another territory to a foreign power, but the force of this feeling should not be underrated. Nothing else can explain the popular animosity towards the Britishers shown by the people of Oudh during the 'Mutiny.'<sup>18</sup>

The feeling in Oudh was in keeping with the feeling in several other parts of the subcontinent, where the doctrine of lapse enunciated by Lord Dalhousie produced similar results. The Hindu religious law not only permits but makes it almost obligatory for a Hindu to adopt a son if he has no male offspring; it is necessary for the comfort of the soul of the dead that the son should set fire to the funeral pyre for cremation. If there is no son, an adopted son can perform the ceremony with equal efficacy; consequently the Hindu law recognizes an adopted son to possess the same rights as a real son does. It was, therefore, customary in all Hindu dynasties for an adopted son to succeed the ruler at his death. The doctrine of lapse laid it down that the adoption of an heir would not be recognized and that in case a ruler died without issue, his State would be annexed to the British territories. It so happened that just at that time there were several rulers who came under the mischief of this law. The main sufferers, who took an important part in the 'rebellion' were Dhondu Pant, better known as Nana Sahib who was the adopted son of the last Peshwa, and the Rani of Jhansi, Lakshmi

<sup>17</sup> Savarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39,

<sup>18</sup> Ball, *op. cit.*, II, p. 572.



Bai, whose adopted child was deprived of the right to succeed to the throne. The numerous annexations made by Dalhousie gave the impression that the British were determined to wipe out the traces of Indian rule in the entire subcontinent. The East India Company had under-estimated the strength of popular sentiment in favour of the native rulers. It was a sop to the pride of the people that rulers of their own race still ruled certain parts of the land. The removal of these dynasties was, therefore, resented by the people. It was not only sentiment which looked with disfavour upon the annexation of the native states. They were the only areas still left in the subcontinent, where native talent could find an outlet, because the British had closed all higher posts to the sons of the soil. The annexation of a state meant wholesale unemployment in the higher rungs of the service.<sup>19</sup> This was very serious if we remember that no Indian could rise to a post higher than one carrying a salary of five hundred rupees a month, and posts carrying even that much salary also were very few.<sup>20</sup> The army maintained by the state was disbanded, only a minority being absorbed in the British native forces, and that too in the capacity of sepoys or, at best as minor non-commissioned officers.<sup>21</sup> The talented and the better qualified found this intolerable. No consideration was shown, to the feelings of those who had seen better days. Sometimes even the members of the ruling family were treated shabbily; for instance, the palace of the King of Oudh, Wajid 'Ali Shah, was taken away from his family.<sup>22</sup>

The East India Company had shown extreme indifferences towards the susceptibilities of the people in annexing territories or abolishing dynasties. They had not realized that the shadows of history may have a great meaning for a people which has so lately been deprived of political power. The Mughul Emperor, the Peshwa, the Raja of Satara—all were symbols of a historic past to many. It has been already mentioned what the Mughul throne signified to the entire subcontinent; Satara reminded the Marathas of the rise of their power; the Peshwas symbolized for them the days of their might. Symbols become dearer when the substance has departed; sentiment is offended when it finds that even the shadow of a past glory will not be tolerated by the foreigners. The people felt they wanted to destroy the power for their humiliation. They were also moved by pity. The stories of the plunder of the palace of the Bhonsla, whose dynasty had come to an end under the doctrine of lapse, while the *ranis* were still there, and the sale of the booty at ridiculous prices in the bazar was an unwise act and added to the prevalent bitterness.<sup>23</sup> The stories regarding the plight of the King of Oudh were related in every cottage in Oudh and the rest of Northern India and brought tears to the eyes of the listeners.<sup>24</sup>

Economic conditions had deteriorated. The Company's rule had brought

Sir Syed, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

Proclamation of a Mughul Prince, quoted in Asoka Mehta, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

*Ibid.*, the salary of a non-commissioned officer was rupees sixty to seventy a month.

*Cambridge History of the British Empire*, IV, 168.

Savarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

*Ibid.*, quoting *A Hindu of Bengal*, p. 7.



in its wake grave maladjustments. The upper rungs of the services were closed to the people. The Mughuls, and before them the Sultans, had encouraged migrants from other lands to come and seek employment under them, but their number was small and they, by no means, monopolized the higher grades of the services. An absolutely foreign cadre of services was a new phenomenon in the subcontinent, and had obvious economic and social consequences. The foreigners who came in search of a career in Muslim times settled down in their new land and made it their home. Their descendants were soon absorbed into the local Muslim population. Those who came were anxious to identify themselves with their new environment. Whatever they earned in their new country was not lost to it because it was spent in it. The Britishers, who were employed in this subcontinent, monopolized all the higher posts to the exclusion of the natives. They had no intention of settling down in the land of their employment. The money spent upon them was a double loss to the local economy, because it deprived the local population of employment and what was earned by the Britishers was entirely spent in the country, a good proportion of it was kept aside as savings, which was naturally transferred to Great Britain on retirement or even before. In the beginning of the rule of the Company these savings were fabulous and created a class of British 'nabobs' whose wealth became the despair of the British political reformers and had to be limited in its evil influence. Later the means of growing rich quickly by dishonest means were curbed, but the drain continued. With the decrease in the number of native ruling dynasties, the same means of collecting spoils were no longer available. Even through legitimate channels the amount of savings was not insignificant. The Government of India paid to its European servants pensions in Great Britain. All this was the penalty which the population of the subcontinent had to pay for the luxury of supporting a foreign Government, and the people were by no means convinced that they were not capable of ruling themselves. That conviction had to come after many more years of British education and exclusion from positions of responsibility.

The end of the Mughul Empire had meant unemployment not only to those who were engaged in the armed forces or in the administration. The Mughul State was a culture State and patronized art and culture by giving stipends and salaries to artists and men of merit. The British in India did not much appreciate the softer graces of life which the Mughuls had so assiduously cultivated. The music of the subcontinent meant nothing to them: nor could the agents of a commercial company be expected to be the patrons of an exotic art. Though the classical Mughul school of miniature painting had declined, yet a number of local branches of that school had grown up which showed some vigour and still could produce pleasing pictures. Poets and men of letters were no longer encouraged by the Government; the little interest shown in oriental learning was not able to survive Macaulay's assault upon its claim for encouragement. The two institutions at Calcutta, still maintained by the British, were not only totally inadequate for keeping the torch of oriental learning alive in such a vast area, but they were also no substitute for the patronage extended by



the Mughul Court. The courts of the native rulers maintained, in accordance with their tastes and resources, a tradition of this patronage, but they also were limited by the exigencies of living in troubled times and, at that time, shrinking resources. However, the policy of large-scale annexation wiped out many centres of such patronage. For the Muslims, in particular, the situation had become intolerable. In the whole of the northern area, only the court of Oudh was left with sufficient resources to maintain some artists and literati. Many whose names are enshrined in the history of Urdu literature had migrated to Oudh, Lucknow attracting them from Delhi, because of the extremely shrunken resources of the later Mughuls.<sup>25</sup> Now even Oudh was gone, and was left no haven of refuge for the Muslim men of talent north of the Narbada. In addition, the British had diverted the funds of several Muslim endowments to purposes other than those for which they were meant, and Islamic education suffered, bringing hunger and poverty to Muslim scholars.<sup>26</sup>

To make matters worse, trade and industry had suffered even more under the government of the East India Company.<sup>27</sup> It is a sad history of cupidity defeating its own purpose. The rapacity of the agents and employees of the Company ruined the famous industry of Dacca muslin. This material was valued all over the world for its gossamer thinness. Tradition has it that once the Mughul Empress, Nur Jahan, appeared in a dress made of the material before Jahangir, who objected to its transparency. She defended herself by saying that she had used seven folds of the material. Though, because of lack of patronage and competition with machinery, the industry has died, there are still some master pinner and weavers left who can create a superbly transparent and fine material, though, of course, compared to some pieces still preserved by a few old families, the present work is almost shabby and much too coarse. The British agents demanded impossible quantities at unreasonable prices and within too short periods, which the craftsmen found beyond their capacity to supply. They were treated so inhumanly that they found relief by cutting off their thumbs to make them incapable of spinning, rather than have to slave beyond the limit of

The most famous of these was the great Urdu poet *Mir*, whose pathetic lines about the decline of Delhi, which he recited on the occasion of his first public appearance in Lucknow, are so famous: —

کیا بود و باش پوچھو ہو پورب کے ساکنو  
ہم کو غریب جان کے ہنس ہنس پکار کے  
دہلی جو ایک شہر تھا عالم میں انتخاب  
جہاں منتخب ہی رہتے تھے سب روزگار کے  
اس کو فلک نے چھین کے ویران کر دیا  
ہم رہنے والے ہیں اسی اجڑے دیار کے

Hunter gives a fairly good picture in his *Indian Musalmans*.  
Sir Syed, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.



endurance for meagre wages.<sup>28</sup> The pressure upon all craftsmen was so great that there was no inclination to learn or teach a trade. To put local industry at a further disadvantage, more and more restrictions were placed upon the import of commodities from the subcontinent by the authorities in Great Britain and then in other European countries.

The shipbuilding industry is an instance. As the area had large forests conveniently situated near the sea, the Arab traders had established, through their patronage, a thriving shipbuilding industry. Coming from arid land themselves and being great sailors, they had all their ships built in India. They had almost the monopoly before the advent of the Portuguese of the entire trade in the Indian Ocean, and therefore the Indian shipbuilding industry flourished. The European traders also found that the Indian ships were better and cheaper; therefore, though the trade passed from the hands of the Muslims into the control of the Europeans, the Indian shipbuilding industry did not suffer materially. Great Britain, however, prohibited the carriage of any cargo by Indian ships into its harbours. As by now the British had almost the monopoly as carriers of India's sea-borne trade, the industry languished and then perished. The cumulative effect of all these factors was that the industries and the crafts in the subcontinent suffered, and brought economic distress and unemployment.<sup>29</sup>

Trade did not fare any better. In the days of the Mughuls, there were several merchant princes whose working capital was bigger than the capital of contemporary Bank of England. The fact that the East India Company remained a commercial concern until 1833, meant that private Indian traders had to compete with the Government under conditions dictated by the more powerful competitor itself. Even if the Company had been considerate, the fact remains that up to 1773 its servants were permitted to carry on trade in their own interest, Mir Qasim had to fight a war on this issue and was defeated and removed from the throne without being able to give any redress to his subjects. By the time of the 'Mutiny' the Indian merchants had almost been ruined. The British, even during the 'Mutiny,' maintained the monopoly of various items of trade. Indigo and cloth were the more paying items. Of course the British were the main carriers of sea-borne trade.<sup>30</sup>

The Company had perfected the art of manipulating the currency to its advantage. Before the advent of the British power in the subcontinent, the economy of the subcontinent was based upon currency of intrinsic value. The price of a coin was based upon the value of the specie in it. The Muslim rulers were responsible for linking the economy firmly to silver and gold. The

<sup>28</sup> Dutt, R.C., *Economic History of India*, pp. 26-27. Also Bolt, *Consideration on Indian Affairs*, pp. 191-94.

<sup>29</sup> Even the distant United States of America felt the impact of the competition of the textile industry of India. In 1916-17, the cotton manufacturers of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania petitioned for protection against the low priced goods from England and India; Bograt and Kemmerer, *Economic History of the American People*, p. 391.

<sup>30</sup> *Proclamation of the Mughal Prince*, p. 29.



proportion between the prices of gold and silver was fairly constant in those days, and fluctuations were few and far between. The production of commodities was kept up at a high level. The Indian Muslim Empire was almost self-sufficient in all the main articles which it needed. Steps were always taken to start manufacturing or producing any article of foreign origin as soon as it was felt that it would be needed in sufficiently large quantities. The result was that the subcontinent was a great importer of bullion and precious stones. There being no lack of bullion for the needs of the currency, sudden shortages of currency were almost unknown. There were periods when the currency was debased, but a fall in its value always corrected the proportion over, there is no record of a shortage of currency. Sultans maintained a very high standard of purity in their coinage, and were surpassed only by the Great Mughuls in this respect. With the coming into power of the East India Company, all this changed. Their wars of conquest consumed large sums of money; their servants took enormous bribes; the trade suffered to such a large extent that an intrinsic currency and sufficient quantities of bullion to support it became impossible. A grave shortage of currency began to develop and by 1825 it plunged the subcontinent into an acute depression. In 1835, India was based exclusively on a silver currency, gold being ruled out. To add to these difficulties, there developed a world shortage of silver, its production not being able to keep pace with the growing needs of the world. The shortage of currency did not come to an end until 1854, when the situation became little easier.<sup>31</sup>

The economic capacity of the people to withstand such depression had been gravely undermined by maladministration. The vast majority of the population was by now agriculturist. The avenues of employment becoming more and more clogged as the result of the policies of the East India Company and trade and industry suffering serious setbacks, it was but natural that agriculture should become the mainstay of the people for earning a livelihood.

Even if all were well with agriculture, the loss of alternative sources of employment would have serious repercussions on it. The demand for land would increase naturally, in course of time, to split the holdings into uneconomic fragments. There was no large-scale development of land during this period, capable of absorbing those who were being forced into becoming peasants. In the beginning the pressure would be absorbed by the forest land lying in close proximity to the villages which had hitherto served important economic needs. The shortage of fuel and timber, hitherto available almost for the labour of cutting and carrying it, would begin to be felt and encourage the undesirable habits of burning excellent manure like dung as fuel. The villager had free building material for his cottage in straw and timber; these supplies would begin to dry up creating grave hardship. All those contingencies did not arise all of a sudden; but they gradually built up a pattern which eventually became such an unhappy characteristic of the country life of the subcontinent.

<sup>31</sup> Professor Thomas in *Economic History Review*, 1936.



However, owing to the mistakes made by the East India Company the peasant was already in economic distress when these additional factors began to oppress him further. The British did not follow an enlightened agrarian policy. They misunderstood the system of the Mughul agrarian administration, and imposed a system based upon gravely mistaken notions. European travellers had looked for a feudal system under the Mughuls, which did not exist; their criticism of several features of Mughul administration is based upon their ideas of feudalism. When Lord Cornwallis created the Permanent Settlement of Bengal, he was trying to create a class with a vested interest in the permanency of the British rule, but he was also acting in accordance with his British prejudices. He thought it preposterous that there should be no class of permanent landlords in Bengal. The old collectors of revenue were exalted into landlords, but the assessment was so heavy that class also had to be dispossessed, because it could not pay the revenue which was demanded. The newly created estates were auctioned and unscrupulous speculators purchased them. The Mughuls, except in areas where tributary chiefs ruled had direct dealings with the peasants, who were recognized as the owners of their holdings. The State demand was a portion of the produce, paid either in kind or in cash depending upon the price of the commodity concerned. The collector was paid by the State for his services. All this was changed. The older landlords created by Lord Cornwallis could have some regard for the well being of the peasant: but the new ones, who had purchased the estates with the knowledge that the revenue demand was high, would drive the cultivator to the extreme of his misery. The Permanent Settlement had given them the fullest authority to do so because no protection was given to the cultivator against the extortions of the landlord. Whatever might have been the intention, the Permanent Settlement acted as an engine of oppression, in which the landlord was the agent of the Government to squeeze the peasant to pay the Government its inordinate demands in revenue. The prosperity of the landlords, once again without any benefit to the peasant and with severe loss to the State, is a much later development; this happened only when prices began to rise in response to world tendencies.

The imposition of landlordism upon the peasants of the North-Western Province (the western part of modern Uttar Pradesh) was no less an injustice to the peasant; it was mitigated by the fact that it was not based upon a permanent settlement of revenue. The strain upon the peasants was so severe that it led to many agrarian revolts. The British historians who try to defend Lord Dalhousie's large-scale annexations say that he was actuated by the desire to remove the oppressors of the people; by removing these vestiges of mediaevalism he was bringing the country towards more enlightened and beneficent rule. This argument would have been convincing if the condition of the people in the territories which have enjoyed British rule longer had been happier, and a new landlordism had not been imposed upon them.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Sir Syed, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23; Thompson and Garrett, *op. cit.*, p. 444.



The landlords also were not happy. Oudh had been the land of large landlords for a long time. Indeed some of the families were able to trace their origin to the ancient days of Gurjara-Pratihare rule, when the Rajputs had established a Hindu version of feudalism. The Muslim rulers were anxious to gain the loyalty of such chieftains, and therefore they had left them in possession of their ancient rights, insisting only that they would not maltreat the peasants. This was achieved by fixing the level of the demand upon agricultural produce and the perquisites which the chieftains could legitimately demand. With the weakening of the administrative machinery, the *taluqadars*, as they came to be called, became more assertive and the limits laid by the State could, in some cases, be violated, but on the whole, the force of tradition kept their demands within proper limits. When the British took over Oudh, they arbitrarily deprived several families of their possessions.<sup>33</sup> There seems to have been little method or consistency in the measures adopted. At the time of the annexation, the *taluqadars* had 25,543 villages in their estates; of these 13,640 paying a revenue of Rs. 35,06,519 were left in their possession; 11,903 villages paying a revenue of Rs. 32,08,319 were handed over to others. The confiscation was not spread evenly; some of the *taluqadars* lost their all. As the annexation had been made peacefully, these men were not punished for any defensive war or resistance; nor was this confiscation for the benefit of the cultivators, because these villages were given to others, thus creating new estates. It was the new landlord who became the oppressor of the cultivator; when the rebellion broke out, the newly created landlords were all turned out and the older *taluqadars* were reinstated in their places by the peasants. The assessment under the new rulers was so high that even what was left had to be sold by conscientious landlords to pay the revenue, because they could not put unjust and unbearable pressure upon the peasants; many estates changed hands and went into the possession of unscrupulous moneylenders who had no compunction in robbing the cultivator of his last morsel. The estates in the province of Agra did not fare better. The Raja of Mainpuri was deprived of 116 out of his 158 villages; another raja of 138, out of 216 villages which he had possessed. The doctrine of lapse was extended in the case of some landlords as well. Besides the landlord and the tenant alike were being squeezed of their last coin. In the district of Panipat, for instance, 136 horsemen were kept to collect the revenue; in the same area twenty sufficed to do the normal duties of police.<sup>34</sup>

It was only the landlord who was the target of a large-scale policy of confiscation. The Muslim rulers had given rent-free lands to religious men, scholars, men of talent and, more often for religious purposes, like the upkeep of mosques and temples. These lands had been in possession of the families of the grantees for generations and sometimes formed the sole means of a livelihood, particularly after the shrinking of the means of employment on account of the

<sup>33</sup> Thompson and Garrett, *op. cit.*, p. 444, Sir Syed, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

<sup>34</sup> Asoka Mehta, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.



establishment of the British rule. A harsh and searching inquiry was carried out into the titles of the holders, and documentary proofs were demanded, which had in most cases, perished in a climate so well known for the quick destruction of paper by parasites. Many families were thus reduced to beggary. Their discontent can well be imagined. Most of the sufferers were Muslims.<sup>35</sup> British had shown unbridled missionary zeal for converting the people to Christianity, forgetting their duties as rulers of a non-Christian population. It was widely believed in Great Britain that destiny had placed the Government of India in the hands of the British to establish 'the rule of Christ' in that land. Mr. Mangles, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the East India Company, said in the House of Commons in 1857 "Providence has entrusted the extensive empire of Hindustan to England in order that the banner of Christ should wave triumphant from one end of India to the other. Everyone must exert all his strength that there may be no dilatoriness on any account in continuing in the country the grand work of making all India Christian."<sup>36</sup> No one could object to private missionaries carrying on the work of trying to proselytize people into a faith which they considered to be true; but when proselytization becomes a plank in the policy of the State, it is a different matter. Several British policies were framed with that end in view. Macaulay in advocating the introduction of Western education was by no means oblivious to its missionary purpose. "It is my firm belief," he wrote in a letter to his mother on 12 October, 1836, "that if our plan of education is followed up, there would not be a single idolator in Bengal thirty years hence."<sup>37</sup>

Naturally with the support of the State, the hopes of the missionaries were high. Reverend Kennedy wrote at the time, "Whatever misfortunes come on us, as long as our Empire in India continues, so long let us not forget that our chief work is the propagation of Christianity in the land. Until Hindustan from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas, embraces the religion of Christ and until it condemns the Hindu and the Muslim religions, our efforts must continue persistently. For this work, we must make all the efforts we can and use all the power and all the authority in our hands; and continuous and unceasing efforts must be kept on until India becomes a magnificent nation, the bulwark of Christianity in the East."<sup>38</sup> The British Government in the subcontinent was never a secular Government in the strict sense of the word. Even after the proclamation made by Queen Victoria, the Government continued to be a Christian Government; it had an ecclesiastical department; the Church of England in India was an established Church and its priests were on the pay-roll of the Government. The Government found several ways of helping the missionary institutions, and generally they received preferential treatment in many a subtle manner. These actions of the Government did not irk the people, and even the more extremist politicians did not make them a political issue. Why was it,

<sup>35</sup> Sir Syed, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>36</sup> Savarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

<sup>37</sup> Savarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

<sup>38</sup> Thompson and Garrett, *op. cit.*, p. 319.



therefore, that the missionary zeal of the East India company created such misgivings in the public mind?

The reason is to be found in the utter disregard for the feelings of the people. When the authorities in Great Britain thought that their foremost duty was to propagate their religion, the average official in India showed much greater zeal for the cause than was good either for the Government or the missionary effort itself. It became a common practice for European civil and military officers to go to Hindu and Muslim religious gathering and make speeches denouncing the religions, to honour which the meeting had been held. These gentlemen who went uninvited, utilized their official position not only to propagate their views but also to insult other faiths, because their language was unrestrained. The preaching of many a missionary in the streets was even more tactless.<sup>39</sup> The exasperation of a proud but politically helpless people can be imagined.

The arrogance and utter lack of respect for other faiths expresses itself in all contemporary polemical Christian literature; even more forcefully it was demonstrated by the savage punishments given to the 'mutineers' and other 'rebels.' The Hindus were made to swallow beef and smeared with the fat of cows before execution; Muslims were sewn alive in the skins of pigs.<sup>40</sup> Those who inflicted these punishments were the people who had governed the land just before the 'rebellion' and were expected by their employers and countrymen to win the subcontinent for the Prince of Peace! The murders committed by the 'rebels' were no excuse for these barbarities; a mutinous crowd or army seldom behaves in a disciplined manner; the duties of a civilized Government are quite different from surpassing mutineers in savagery; besides, this was not a question of retaliation, because even in their wildest moments the 'mutineers' did not insult Christianity. More often before a massacre, they permitted their victims to read the Bible and to pray.<sup>41</sup> The 'rebels' did commit several misdeeds, but sacrilege or insult to any religion was not one of them. The British reactions in the religious field were dictated solely by the contempt in which they held not only the religions of those whose destinies they had come to rule but also their religious feelings and susceptibilities.

In the great famine of 1837, orphans were handed over to Christian missionaries to be brought up as Christians.<sup>42</sup> Throughout the British rule in the subcontinent unclaimed babies and foundlings were handed over to the Christian missions, but no one minded it, because this was done discreetly and the religion of the children so handed over was not known to the orphanage and homes run by the followers of other religions. In large-scale disasters or when the religion of the parents was known, the religious communities claimed these children; but in the great famine of 1837 when the desire to convert the entire subcontinent was great, children without any discrimination were entrusted to the missionaries to

<sup>39</sup> Sir Syed, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>40</sup> Russell, *My Diary in India*, p. 43.

<sup>41</sup> Kaye and Malleon, *op. cit.*, IL 263.

<sup>42</sup> Sir Syed, *op. cit.*, p. 13.



be brought up as Christians. This was looked upon an example of the schemes of the Government.

Teachers in the new educational institutions run by the Government were not slow in following the lead of the civil servants. The recent growth of knowledge in the field of physical sciences was used to subvert the beliefs of the pupils. New astronomical discoveries were used to prove that Hindu religious beliefs were wrong because Hindu astrology, with which Hindu astronomy was closely related, could be proved to be erroneous. Some conversions were made and people were growingly convinced that the new educational system was primarily designed to convert the people.

The policy of the Government was openly to bribe its servants with promotions to convert them to Christianity. In the army this reached scandalous proportions.<sup>43</sup> Many British officers had entered the military service in India for the explicit purpose of converting the sepoys. They worked as missionaries themselves whenever they were free; for the rest of the time they invited and encouraged professional missionaries. These officers were no more subtle or courteous than were their civilian counterparts; nor did missionaries show any more regard for the religious feelings of the sepoys or their petty Indian officers—the higher posts were not open to the Indians—than they showed for the susceptibilities of the crowd in the bazar. Here, of course, any protest would affect the sepoy's career. "Unrestrained filthy abuse was heaped" on the names of those religious personalities who were considered holy and sacred by the sepoys.<sup>44</sup> Even measures from which the Government could take some credit were misrepresented in the first instance, by the missionaries. The construction of the railways was heralded by them openly as a step in the direction of the breaking down of caste and, therefore, of the destruction of the Hindu religion; steamships, similarly, were depicted as a potent means of destroying Hinduism. Even if the Government officials had been discreet, it would have been difficult for the populace to distinguish the statements of one set of Britishers from those of others; but when the government officers and the missionaries worked in such unison, it was impossible not to think that the missionaries were speaking on behalf of the Government.<sup>45</sup> Lord Canning is reported to have been particularly partial to the missionaries.

The legislative measures of the Government were similarly taken to be dictated by missionary consideration. More open to this attack was the law that all the rights of the converts to inherit or share property would remain intact.<sup>46</sup> According to the Hindu and Muslim Law, a person who changes his religion cannot inherit property from his relations who belong to his previous religion. The new measure was obviously meant to encourage conversion. Another measure dictated by humanitarian considerations was looked upon with

<sup>43</sup> Asoka Mehta, *op. cit.*, p. 13, quoting 'A Hindu of Bengal,' *Causes of Indian Revolt*.

<sup>44</sup> Savarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-52.

<sup>45</sup> Sir Syed, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>46</sup> "Religious Disabilities Act, 1850".



suspicion; this was the law to abolish *sati*, the Hindu custom of a widow burning herself with the dead body of her husband as an act of conjugal piety. A measure of social reform — an act to permit the marriage of widows — was also disliked.<sup>1</sup> These were looked upon as measures to subvert the Hindu religion. The Government failed to realize that social reform is not a matter of law as much as of public conscience, which must be aroused before legislation. Here the public conscience was insulted by the missionaries who interpreted these laws as so many triumphs of Christian principles against the spirit of Hinduism and its moral code.

Whether the suspicions of the people were absolutely unjustified regarding the motives behind these laws is difficult to determine, because of the professions of the agents and of policy-makers of the Government that they did want to convert people to Christianity; it is, however, quite clear that if the intention was to reform and not to hurt, the missionaries should have been curbed in their statements regarding these measures. The Government had no means of knowing the feelings of the people. The legislatures had no native members. The British had overrated the timidity of the populace. There are many statements by British officials on record which show that the hatred for the Government was not unknown to them; yet they went on annoying the people in one way after another. The success of bringing under their possession such large territories and the fact that they had been able to act upon their policies unhampered by any serious opposition had turned their heads; they were confident that their power was so absolute that they could thrust almost any ideas on the people. Even national legislatures have to walk warily in the matter of social reform; here we have an instance of a foreign Government legislating in social matters without consulting the people in any manner whatsoever. In Hinduism, the social organization and social modes are all important, because Hinduism is not based upon a credo; on the other hand it is a way of life regulated by hoary customs and codes. It was an endeavour to change Hinduism itself, or, as some people thought, to demolish it, when social legislation of this nature was undertaken. Besides every religious community resents an interference by outsiders. Reform can come only from within. These measures also expose the fallacy of thinking that the legislatures would be better instruments in the hands of the rulers if no natives were included in them.

The sepoys played an important part in this 'rebellion.' Indeed some European historians exaggerated the importance of their participation to an extent that they consider the war to be a mere military mutiny. There is overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Several British historians have reached the same conclusion: that the war was a war of 'all the native race' in the affected areas against the foreign power which had established its rule in their land. 'It was not alone the sepoy who rose in revolt—it was by no means a merely military mutiny.' 'It became the rebellion of a whole people incited to outrage.' Several

<sup>47</sup> The abolition of *sati* took place in 1829; Widow's Remarriage Act was enacted in 1856.



contemporary British writers have recorded the fact that the British and their Government were hated intensely by the people.<sup>48</sup> Those who did not join the rebels were not motivated by the love of the British, but by cool and calculated belief that the rebels were not likely to win. Among these were some selfish persons who put patriotism in a lower category than self-interest; there were other like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan who were convinced that the war was suicidal and would bring even greater misery in its wake. The same causes prevented the rebellion from spreading to many areas, but the British rule was no more popular in those areas than it was in the areas which did rebel. The Mughul Emperor's manifesto bears that out, as do the various statements and manifestoes issued by other leaders. The Emperor appealed to the people in these words: "O, you sons of Hindustan, if we made up our mind, we can destroy the enemy in no time. We will destroy the enemy and will release from terror our religion and our country, which are dearer to us than life itself."<sup>49</sup> There is no talk of petty grievances; the main appeal is to patriotism and religion, which in India at that time was a synonym for all that the faith and ideals of the people connoted. The Emperor even offered to abdicate if a confederacy of Indian rulers would undertake the prosecution of the war. On 29 September, 1857, a Mughul prince in his manifesto, stated: 'It is well known to all that, in this age, the people of Hindustan, both Hindus and Muslims, are being ruined, under the tyranny and oppression of the infidel and treacherous English.'<sup>50</sup> This manifesto then proceeds to enumerate the various hardships under which the people were suffering and promises relief if the rebel arms were victorious. These manifestoes find no need to convince the people that British rule had been tyrannical, or that the country should be liberated; these facts are taken for granted. The emphasis is upon the feasibility of turning out the foreigner. It is obvious that the only doubt in the minds of the people and their leaders was whether the rebellion could succeed. The same gospel was preached from the pulpit of many a mosque and many a Hindu religious meeting. The people rose simultaneously with the sepoys in many places; the countryside was ablaze in most of the affected areas; the rebel armies could move without elaborate commissariat, being supported by the people; the British armies had to extract such cooperation from the people as they could by force or paying handsomely.<sup>51</sup> In Oudh, Rohilkhand and various other areas, the peasants fought along with their land-lords and other leaders. Surely these are not the characteristics of a mutiny of mercenaries. All sections of those who revolted, without any distinction of religion, forgetting the struggles between the Marathas and the Muslims, acknowledged as the head and symbol of their supreme effort to free their homeland from the shame of foreign rule the

<sup>48</sup> Ball. *op. cit.*, I, 644; Durand, *Life of Sir Alfred Lyall*, p. 69; *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, V, 179.

<sup>49</sup> Savarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>50</sup> *Proclamation of a Mughul Prince*, p. 26.

<sup>51</sup> Ball. *op. cit.*, II, 572; Kaye and Malleison, V, 207; *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, V, 179.



aged Mughul Emperor, which is simultaneously a great tribute to the memory of the tolerant and benevolent Empire which the rebels sought to revive and their desire to achieve political independence. There had mutinies before against the British but this was different; this was a national rising, the effort of a people to free itself from foreign rule, in short, a war of independence.

Nevertheless, as has been mentioned before, the sepoys played an important role, because without their participation, a war of these dimensions would have been impossible. There could have been a rising of the Princes, there could have been a rising of the mob; the former were difficult, because the Princes were too calculating and lacked the impetuous courage of the warrior, and in many instances the British had seen to it that the rulers would be advised by ministers chosen by the Paramount Power and not by men appointed by the Princes themselves; the latter would have been suppressed much more easily. The sepoys were the backbone of rebellion. It is, therefore, necessary to analyze the reasons of their dissatisfaction. The most important factor was that they were not foreign mercenaries serving in a land not their own; they shared the joys and sorrows of the people among whom they were born and bred and in the midst of whom they lived. It may legitimately be asked that if they had any patriotic feeling, why did they fight on so many battlefields against their own people and help the British in building up the empire which they now wanted to destroy.

The answer lies embedded in the tangled history of the subcontinent during Muslim rule as well as during the days of the anarchy which followed the collapse of the central authority after the death of Alamgir. From the earliest time the Muslims had recruited Hindu soldiers, who fought their battles and won new dominions for them. As they had often to fight against their own co-religionists, a new ideal of loyalty had to be built up, which was based mainly upon the influence of the Emperor or the officer under whom the soldier served. This loyalty, however, was occasionally strained when the soldier had to fight against an enemy whose cause might appeal to the soldier. The Muslim monarchs, therefore, were careful to employ their non-Muslim soldiers in a way which would not create too great a conflict in their minds. They also made a habit of cherishing and nurturing their Hindu soldiers. There were two honourable loyalties, a loyalty to the Empire and another to the chief of one's clan or hereditary chief. Whenever there was a clash, the loyalty to the clan or the hereditary chief almost invariably won. Against the rest of the world the loyalty to the Empire had the sway. As the Empire paid the salary, loyalty to it came to be called loyalty to one's salt. During the days of the anarchy when the Empire was no longer in a position to pay and trade and industry began to shrink, those who had earned their livelihood as soldiers in Imperial service had to seek employment elsewhere. The fighting chieftains, in search of building up States, needed these soldiers. They took service under anyone who paid them well, and

<sup>52</sup> Asoka Mehta, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63.



served him so long as he was in a position to disburse the salaries.<sup>53</sup> Even then the soldiers did not light-heartedly leave one employer for another. The new condition built up a new code of honour. The legal myth of the Empire and the lip loyalty of the contending power to the Empire kept the soldiers confused. They thought that in fighting for one chief against another they were doing nothing unpatriotic. They were not fighting against their country, because was the Emperor still not the ruler? This confusion was real and was found in many quarters which ought to have known better; if the professional soldier also had fallen a prey to it, there was nothing strange. The British kept up the pretence so long as it suited them, and when those who had been beguiled by such fictions woke up, it was too late. The sepoys were no exception. They had come to have qualms of conscience much earlier than this war. The Muslim soldiers were not too happy in fighting against the Afghans. They now looked upon the remnants of Muslim power with affection and had little enthusiasm in demolishing them. Gone were the days of Arcot, when the sepoys demonstrated their loyalty by subsisting upon the water in which the rice had been boiled and giving the rice to their English comrades. The realization had now come that they had demolished their own freedom and had subjected themselves to foreign rule. After the 'rebellion,' economic cause, forced many men still to seek employment in the British Indian Army; but now the British were wiser and they kept their Indian soldiers isolated from political influences. They also became more considerate in their treatment of these soldiers. Besides, the effectiveness of the sepoys as instruments of rebellion had been considerably reduced. The proportion of the British soldiers had been increased and the more important arms were no longer entrusted to the Indians. The Indian politicians, also, began to evolve other techniques of fighting for freedom; the development of new kinds of arms made it impossible in their opinion to wrest power by open rebellion.

In 1857, however, such an effort still seemed feasible. On the one hand the sepoys had lost enthusiasm for fighting for the British; on the other, the British began to neglect them. The very fact that the sepoys had been so successful an instrument in the hands of the British had made them suspicious of the Indian soldier.<sup>54</sup> The sepoys were irked by the suspicion with which they were treated, and however justified might have been the precautions against possible rebellion, they were not flattered by them. The British were no longer competing against other employers of soldiers; they now had a virtual monopoly of employment. They, therefore, thought that they need no longer give the added facilities to the sepoys to which they had been accustomed. Many of their privileges were cut down. They had been free from certain tolls; they were permitted to use the official post for communicating with their relations and families; when on active service they were entitled to an extra allowance called *bhatta*: all these facilities and concessions were cancelled or reduced effectively.

<sup>53</sup> Sir Syed, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.

<sup>54</sup> Holme, T. Rice, *A History of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 49.



There was little scope for promotion. The highest that a sepoy could rise was to become a *subedar* in the infantry or a *risaldar* in the cavalry. As such his salary was less than the salary of a newly recruited British private.<sup>55</sup> The Indian had still not cultivated the necessary inferiority complex to be reconciled to this kind of discrimination.<sup>56</sup> The arrogance of the British officers at this time was intolerable. They abused and insulted the sepoys in the most filthy language. The sepoys resented this treatment and burnt with indignation.<sup>57</sup> The Indian troops were increasingly required to fight in non-Indian territories. This was especially hard for the Hindus who lost their caste by crossing the sea or by going to lands where they could not observe the taboos of their caste. The reluctance of the sepoys to go abroad, demonstrated unmistakably so that they had even to be fired upon, was not taken into consideration; on the contrary, the Governor-General enacted the General Service Enlistment Act of 1856, which laid down that no one enlisted under it could refuse to go anywhere he was required for service. The sepoys understood the implications of this law. The Indian Army was no longer meant only for the wars in the subcontinent; it was now to fight for the expansion of the British Empire anywhere in the world. This meant much more fighting abroad than at home, because the sepoys were aware of the fact that hardly any power was left in the subcontinent which could challenge the might of the British, and they did not relish the prospect of having to fight in all the parts of the world. It should be remembered that for many sepoys, fighting was a hereditary profession; any worsening of conditions of service did not affect them alone but, as they reckoned, their entire generations. Formerly under the Mughuls or the smaller States which succeeded the Empire, a man could make a humble beginning, but his ability could raise him to the highest posts. Under the British the prospects of promotion had completely disappeared. The British way of rewarding was peculiar. If a *subedar* or *risaldar*—men of petty ranks and low salaries but the highest among Indian soldier employed by the British — showed greater aptitude or rendered meritorious service, he was retired before the normal period of service on full salary.<sup>58</sup> This policy, the sepoys suspected, was based upon mistrust and to prevent anyone from becoming too efficient a soldier. Under such circumstances, how could they hope for any betterment of their circumstances or the circumstances of their children.

Another blow to the sepoys was the annexation of Oudh. The Bengal Army had about sixty per cent of its strength recruited from Oudh. The end of the kingdom of Oudh naturally resulted in the disbandment of its army; in this way eighty thousand men were rendered idle.<sup>59</sup> These men had their relations in the Bengal Army. In the subcontinent of India and Pakistan, particularly in those days, the ties of the family were so strong that a man would share his last morsel

<sup>55</sup> Asoka Mehta, *op.cit.*, p. 12. quoting Frederick John Shore.

<sup>56</sup> Campbell, G., *Memoirs of My Indian Career*, I, 85.

<sup>57</sup> Asoka Mehta, *op. cit.*, p. 12. quoting Frederick John Shore.

<sup>58</sup> Jacquiemont, V., *Letters from India*, p. 23.

<sup>59</sup> Thompson and Garratt, *op. cit.*, p. 444.



with an unemployed close relation. Thus the sepoys were deeply affected, because they now had to support their poor relations. Besides another area where their children could have looked forward to advancement in life had disappeared. It can also be assumed that in addition to these economic considerations they were attached to the ruling house by ties of emotional affection; indeed contemporary accounts do record the fact that the fate of the last king of Oudh excited considerable sympathy even outside his dominions. The tenacity with which the peasants and landlords of Oudh fought the British during the war shows that they were not devoid of patriotic resentment at the dethronement of their monarch. On such occasions small shortcomings are forgotten and even weaknesses are idealized; in case of Wajid Ali Shah it was widely known that the administrative shortcomings were not entirely of his making.<sup>60</sup> It was at this time that the match stick was applied to the powder keg.

The story of the greased cartridges is too well known to be repeated in detail. The army was given new ammunition. These cartridges were heavily coated with grease, and what was worse, it was necessary to bite away the end of the outer packing before loading it into the rifle. These cartridges would have excited suspicion anyhow, because the average Hindu is exceedingly reluctant to put anything into his mouth which looks like animal meat or fat. It so happened that these cartridges were greased in the subcontinent itself, and news leaked out that the fat of cows and pigs was being used. As is well known, the cow is sacred to the Hindus; nothing could be more sacrilegious to an average Hindu than to have to put its flesh or fat into his mouth. Pork in any form is considered to be unclean by a Muslim, and the idea that he should have to put that fat of pig into his mouth was most revolting to the Muslim. When the troops protested, so great was the contempt for the religious feelings of the people among the officers that they threatened the sepoys with disciplinary action if they did not use the cartridges. It was only when the situation became very serious that the Government came out with a declaration that the grease used was not the fat of cows or of pigs. This was even a greater mistake, because it was a false statement and was known to be false to the sepoys.<sup>61</sup> It proved to be the last straw on the camel's back. The sepoy could not swallow such an insult to their feelings. The order to withdraw the objectionable cartridges was issued too late to mollify them.

The British had come to rely upon the Indian troops beyond the limits imposed by ordinary prudence. In 1857 there were more than two hundred and thirty-two thousand native troops compared to less than forty-six thousand British soldiers. The distribution was even worse. The majority of the native troops were stationed in the Presidency of Bengal. The European troops were concentrated mostly in the Panjab and Burma. The greater part of British manned artillery was also in the Panjab. The British troops in the Bengal Presidency were

<sup>60</sup> Savarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 7, quoting 'A Hindu of Bengal.'

<sup>61</sup> Kaye and Malleon, *op. cit.*, I, 381; Roberts, *Forty-one Years in India*.



spread thinly. Many strategic and important stations were garrisoned by the native troops; most of the treasuries and arsenals were in the hands of the natives.<sup>62</sup> Such a policy of trust would have been justified only if the Government had done everything in its power to keep the sepoys happy and contented; on the contrary the interests of the native soldiers were ignored and all that could have added to their exasperation was not left undone. It was perhaps not realized that the sepoys were fully conscious of their power. The precautions which the Government did adopt were clumsy and childish; for instance, the device of retiring persons before the expiration of the normal term of service as a reward for good service only got rid of the good and tried soldier and insulted him for his loyalty. It seems to have been taken for granted that the sepoys were a class apart from the populace and that the discontent so rampant among the people would not touch them. They also seem to have been considered bereft of a sense of dignity, self-respect, religious feelings and patriotism.

Some of the British historians have mentioned the fact that the sepoys had no scruples in using the same cartridges against the British as they had refused to use for them and have deduced from this that the objection against the greased cartridges was merely an excuse.<sup>63</sup> This view is based upon a faulty assessment of the religious prejudices of the sepoys. They did use the hated cartridges against the British, but they could compromise with their conscience for self-defence and for a patriotic reason. Besides they were now fighting to save the very religion which they believed the British had wanted to destroy and which would be destroyed totally if they permitted a single abomination to prevent their fighting for its very existence. The sepoys knew the difference between a great cause and a subsidiary matter. It also shows how strongly they had come to dislike the foreign domination.

Many British writers have given some other causes of this war. They could have been ignored but for the reason that they have formed the common stock of many a writer of popular history and are still held to be correct in certain quarters. It is said that the Indians, steeped in ignorance and superstition, believed that the British built railways were chains to bind the land and that the telegraph wires were strings spread for the same purpose. Several other fantastic statements of the same nature are made, which are all meant to show that the people had no real cause for dissatisfaction except their own folly and barbarian beliefs.<sup>64</sup> Some of the very ignorant villagers might have believed such tales; they were not the planners of the war. A few 'rebel leaders' did put forward the argument that the improved means of communications which made the transport of the troops easier and the transmission of news simpler and quicker were meant

<sup>62</sup> The comparative strength of the Indian and British troops was: British troops including invalids and non-combatants 45,522; Indian troops 232, 224; Thompson and Garratt, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

<sup>63</sup> Savarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 85, footnote.

<sup>64</sup> e.g., Thompson and Garratt, *op. cit.*, p. 442; *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, V, p. 69.



to strengthen the British hold upon the subcontinent and were not primarily conceived for serving the public. The sepoys were not unaware of the military importance of the railways and the telegraph lines. It was a part of their strategy to isolate the various British garrisons and to reduce their mobility. It may be asked in what other sense could the chains be laid upon the land. To read any other meaning in these statements is not only to render them meaningless but also to insult the intelligence of men like Mawlawi Ahmadullah Shah and the sophisticated 'Azim-ullah Khan. It was not superstition or rank ignorance, or for that matter any trivial grievances which resulted in the holocaust of 1857; it was nothing short of a burning indignation at the loss of liberty and the opportunities which liberty connotes; it was a desperate attempt of a subjugated people to shake off the shackles which sought to keep it in bondage.

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M. N. SAFA

## THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1857-59

### I

The War of Independence began on Sunday, 10 May, 1857, when the Indian sepoy at Meerut rose against their officers. Its symptoms, however, had begun to appear early in that year. The story of the greased cartridges had been agitating the minds of the sepoy and all kinds of rumours were spreading from place to place. At Behrampur, not far from Murshidabad, was stationed the 19th Regiment Native Infantry. In February a Brahmin *havildar* asked his Colonel, "what is this story everybody is talking about that Government intends making the native army use cows' and pigs' fat with ammunition for their new rifles?" The Colonel was apparently satisfied when in reply to his question the Brahmin *havildar* assured him that he, of course, did not believe in its truth. Later in the same month a detachment of 34th arrived there. On 25 February, the day after their arrival, the Colonel ordered a parade: the sepoy refused to receive the ammunition supplied to them. The Colonel went to the Lines, called the native commissioned officers and told them to explain to the sepoy that the cartridges to be served next morning were more than a year old and, therefore, above suspicion. In the night he heard a noise of the beating of drums in the Lines. He rushed to the Lines and pacified the sepoy telling them that their suspicions were baseless. The next morning the sepoy fell in for parade without any murmur.

The news of the outbreak of the 19th at Behrampur reached Calcutta early in March. It was decided that the Regiment should be sent for from Rangoon and the 19th should be punished by being disbanded. The punishment was carried out at Barrackpore. General Hearsey, commanding this station, held a parade of the troops and told them why it was necessary to punish the 'mutineers'. However, before they reached Barrackpore to receive the punishment, Mangal Pandey, a sepoy of the 34th, which was stationed there, precipitated the crisis by firing at his Sergeant-Major, on 29 March. A non-commissioned officer reported the matter to Lieutenant Baugh, Adjutant of the 34th. Baugh rushed to the Lines; when he was near the quarter-guard a shot was fired, which hit his horse. Baugh assisted by the Sergeant-Major fell upon Mangal Pandey. The Sergeant-Major was knocked down by another sepoy, and



Baugh was brought to the ground by Mangal Pandey. He managed to disentangle himself and withdraw to the Lines, but not without receiving injuries. In the meantime General Hearsey, having received a report of the incident, hurried to the scene. He found Mangal Pandey striding up and down and vehemently calling upon his comrades "to join him to defend and die for their religion and caste."<sup>1</sup> Mangal Pandey fired his musket but missed the shot. The General proceeded towards him; Pandey was lying on the ground covered with blood; he had shot himself. The wound was severe but not fatal; he was taken to the hospital.

On the last day of March, the 19th Regiment was brought to Barrackpore and publicly disbanded by General Hearsey. The disbandment was carried out without any untoward incident and "with perfect success." Six days later Mangal Pandey was tried by a court-martial and sentenced to death; he was hanged on the following morning. Two days later, 10 April, a *jamadar* of the same Regiment, Ishri Pandey, was tried for stopping the sepoys for coming to the help of the European officers when they were attacked by Mangal Pandey. Ishri was also sentenced to death and hanged. These punishments, however, did not satisfy the authorities; they thought that it was necessary to penalize the entire 34th Regiment for the deeds of the two individuals who had been hanged. The Governor-General, however, took several weeks to come to a decision. On 6 May the seven companies of the 34th posted at Barrackpore were disbanded. Meanwhile favourable reports were being received about the temper of the Bengal Army, particularly in respect of the excitement that had been caused by the greased cartridges. John Lawrence had written to Canning that "all were highly pleased with the new musket, and quite ready to adopt it." Hearsey had told him about the European troops that "it is not probable that I shall again require the presence of any of these troops at this station." Canning was thinking of sending the 84th Regiment back to Burma when all were startled by the news of the outbreak at Meerut.

The cantonment of Meerut situated at a distance of thirty-six miles from Delhi was one of the biggest military stations in Upper India. Besides European troops of Horse Artillery and Foot Artillery and a Light Field Battery there were three native corps stationed there; these were the 3rd Light Cavalry and the 11th and 20th Native Infantry. The disaffection caused by reports about the greased cartridges and the mixing of bone-dust had found its way to the ranks of the sepoys in Meerut also. Colonel Smyth, commanding the 3rd Cavalry, thought it was necessary to call the sepoys to parade and explain to them that the cartridge could be used without being touched by mouth. The parade was ordered for 24 April; of the 89 men who turned up for the parade only four accepted the cartridges; the remaining 85 refused saying "they would get a bad name if they took them."<sup>2</sup> Smyth's persuasions followed by a demonstration by a havildar-

<sup>1</sup> Forrest, G. W., *A History of the Indian Mutiny* (London, 1904), I. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Among these 85 sepoys 49 were Muslims and 36 Hindus.



major proved ineffective. An investigation was held and its report was sent to the Commander-in-Chief. He ordered a court-martial of the 85 "offenders." The Court declared them guilty and sentenced all of them to hard labour for ten years. The punishment was to be executed in a general parade fixed for 9 May. "The condemned mutineers," writes Colonel Malleon, "were marched to the ground, were stripped of their accoutrements, then every man was shackled and ironed, and they were all marched to the gaol . . . . There were sudden looks among the armed troopers of the 3rd, and an acute observer might have detected sympathetic glances from the *sipahis*. But there was no open demonstration." The folly of the action in heaping a public insult on the sepoys was obvious and "difficult to exaggerate,"<sup>4</sup> but it never struck the authorities on the spot that they were pursuing a wrong course. When a report was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, he approved of the sentence but "expressed his regret at the unusual procedure."

The reaction of the "unusual procedure" became apparent within less than thirty-six hours. The next day, 10 May, when the officers were preparing to go to the church for evening service the sound of musketry and columns of smoke announced the "mutiny" of the sepoys. While the men of the 3rd Cavalry rushed to the jail to deliver the prisoners the sepoys of the Infantry Regiments attacked the European officers and killed some of them. Soon after sunset the revolutionary sepoys took the road to Delhi. The officers stationed at Meerut were taken absolutely unawares; they failed to take pre-emptory action. Nothing was done during the remaining hours of daylight; it was dark when the European soldiers reached the Native Lines, and they found them completely deserted.

For centuries Delhi had been the seat of Government and centre of cultural and economic life of the people of this subcontinent. Since its occupation by General Lake early in the century, however, its importance was gradually decreasing, because Calcutta had become the *de facto* seat of Government. Nevertheless the people of the subcontinent had a great regard for their *de jure* sovereign, and his Imperial capital. The Red Fort was the symbol of Mughul greatness; it was, therefore, the most suitable place for becoming the centre of the Revolution. That is why the "mutinous" sepoys of Meerut rushed to Delhi.

On the morning of 11 May, the eighty years old Bahadur Shah was sitting in the *Musamman Burj* of the Red Fort. He was told that a party of troopers stood below the window and demanded admittance; they had come from Meerut and wanted to speak to their Emperor. Twenty-one years of successive frustrations caused by the Company's refusal to accede to the demands of their *de jure* Sovereign had made him weak and incapable of taking a quick decision. He knew that he was the last Prince of the House of Timur to enjoy even the nominal status of an Emperor because his son and successor was to be known

Malleon, G.B., *The Indian Mutiny of 1857* (London, 1891), p. 63.  
Forrest, *op. cit.*, I, p. 34.



merely as a Shahzadah.<sup>5</sup> He had consequently resigned himself to the life of a *darwish* giving consolation to his broken heart by composing poems. On hearing that the troopers had come with the purpose of launching a revolution and were resolved on fighting for the faith and killing the white men."<sup>6</sup> The Emperor sent a message to Captain Douglas, the Commandant of the Fort. Douglas hurried to the spot and wanted to go to the troopers and explain to them that the course they had adopted was not proper. Bahadur Shah stopped him from taking that risk. The troopers hurried to the Rajghat Gate<sup>7</sup> and entered the city and rushed to the Fort. In the meantime more troopers had come and spread over a part of the town. The officers in charge of the administration of the city became alert. Simon Fraser, the Commissioner, Hutchinson, the Collector, and Theophilus Metcalfe hurried to the Calcutta Gate which faced the bridge. But they found it in the possession of the revolutionaries. Fraser accompanied by Douglas, who had also arrived there, now rushed to the Chandni Chawk and thence proceeded towards the Fort which they ultimately reached. They were wounded, Douglas having received serious injuries because he had to save his life by throwing himself into the ditch. Inside the Fort and near the gateway Fraser tried to address the mob. Whilst speaking he was attacked and cut to pieces. Douglas and Hutchinson were also killed in the apartments of the former.

The revolutionaries now made their way to the Kashmiri Gate through which passed the direct road connecting the city with cantonments. Here they came face to face with the men of the 54th N.I. whom the Brigadier had commanded to proceed to the city. The troopers shot the European officers, their own men giving them no protection, and returned to the city. Some of the public buildings, for instance, the Bank and the Delhi Gazette Press, were captured and plundered. Within the city and not far from the Royal Palace was situated the Magazine containing ammunition. The revolutionaries as well as the defenders of the Magazine were fully conscious of the immense advantage which its possession would confer. Lieutenant Willoughby<sup>8</sup> who held charge of the Magazine decided to explode it rather than let it fall into the hands of the revolutionaries. He lost no time in taking necessary defensive measures. "The gates were closed and barricaded. Inside the gate leading to the park were placed two 6-pounders doubly charged with grape. Two sergeants stood by with lighted matches, with orders, if that gate should be attacked, to fire both at once and fall back on the body of the Magazine .... In all ten guns were mounted in position .... As a last resort a train was laid to the power magazine ready to be fired on a given signal." Scarcely had these preparations been completed when<sup>9</sup> demand in the name of the Emperor was made by the revolutionaries for the surrender of the Magazine. The defenders gave no reply, and the revolutionaries had no option

<sup>5</sup> Zahir Dehlawi, *Dastan-i-Ghadr* (Lahore, 1955), p. 79.

<sup>6</sup> *Memoirs of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan*, edited by S. Moinul Haq (Karachi, 1958), p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Rajghat Darwaza opened on the side of the river.

<sup>8</sup> Besides artisans and workers he was assisted by eight Europeans.

<sup>9</sup> Forrest, *op. cit.*, I. 45-46.



but to use force. They brought ladders and setting them by the walls began to climb over them. The defenders started firing at them from the roof of the building. Many fell under the grape shot of the garrison but so strong was the determination of the revolutionaries that "the gaps made in their ranks were swiftly filled by fresh men swarming up the ladders." <sup>10</sup> Ultimately Willoughby and his comrades were convinced that they could not long postpone the capture of the Magazine. A signal was given and the train leading to the powder magazine was lighted. The shells and powder barrels exploded with a thundering noise; hundreds of gallant revolutionaries were dashed to pieces. Of the nine Europeans among the defenders four survived and succeeded in making good their retreat.<sup>11</sup> The explosion of the magazine was an act of desperation; it indicated that the European officers and men were now losing hope of receiving succour from Meerut. Soon after the explosion the revolutionaries captured the Main Guard, which was not far from the Kashmiri Gate. By evening the cantonments were almost deserted. At the Flag Staff Tower, where the Europeans and their families had taken shelter, it was being suggested that a general retreat should be made. The Brigadier commanding the station resisted the suggestion for some time. But with the coming of the night and no prospect of succour he gave in; Delhi was evacuated. The revolutionaries had now full control of the capital.

In the night the firing of salute guns announced the assumption of the responsibilities of administration by the Emperor. On the following morning a *darbar* was held and a cabinet was installed which was to be known as the Court. It consisted of ten members, six being military officers. A working constitution, known as the *Dasturul 'Amal* was also prepared.<sup>12</sup> The Emperor went round the city and asked the people to re-open their shops, which they had closed for fear of plunder, and resume their normal activities. In the meantime more troops were coming in from different places and the problem of maintaining the army was becoming serious. Nor could the Emperor discourage the sepoys because it was evident that a large force would be needed by him for the defence of his capital. The officers of the revolutionary forces demanded that the Princes should be appointed to the command of the army. Bahadur Shah knew that they had no experience of fighting and would not make good officers. He therefore hesitated in accepting this demand. Ultimately, however, he had to yield to the pressure; Mirza Mughul was made Commander-in-Chief of the army; among other Princes who were appointed Commanders were Mirza Abu Bakr, Mirza Mendhu and Mirza Khizr Sultan.<sup>13</sup>

The news of the outbreak of the Revolution, the capture of Delhi and the establishment of Bahadur Shah's Government soon spread to different parts of the subcontinent. A number of important towns and cantonments, particularly in

*Ibid.*, I, 46.

Zakaullah, *Tarikh-i 'Uruj i Ahd i Saltanat i Inglisiah* (Delhi, 1904), p. 422.

For the *Dasturul 'Amal*, see Sen, S.N., *Eighteen Fifty-seven* (Delhi, 1957), p. 74-75.

*Memoirs of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan*, p. 7.



north Hind-Pakistan, rose against the British Government; the revolutionaries overpowered the local authorities and set up their own administration in the name of Bahadur Shah. Some of the leading chiefs sent their envoys to the Imperial Court with *nazrs* and messages offering submission. Among those who thus offered allegiance to the Emperor were the *Wali* of Oudh, Birjis Qadr,<sup>14</sup> the *Nazim* of Rohilkhand, Khan Bahadur Khan,<sup>15</sup> and minor chiefs, such as Mahmud Khan of Bijnor.<sup>16</sup> Similarly, military contingents stationed in different cantonments, came to the help of the Central Government; the Bareilly Brigade commanded by Bakht Khan, the Neemuch Brigade, commanded by Ghaus Muhammad, may be specifically mentioned. Besides these forces contingents from a number of places came to join the War. To these regiments and contingents originally belonging to the Company's army were added the volunteers who offered their services to the cause and were known as *Ghazis*. The Revolution had now spread over a large part of north Hind-Pakistan; there were, however, some chiefs who still sided with the British in suppressing the struggle for freedom. The Sikh States of Patiala and Jhind were a source of considerable strength to the British throughout the siege of Delhi; the Gurkhas had played the same role in the Oudh campaigns.

Bahadur Shah realized the magnitude of his task; he would have to contend against the mightiest empire of the day. He wrote to a number of Princes and chiefs to join the cause of freedom and help him in expelling the foreign power from the subcontinent.<sup>17</sup> He made frantic efforts to maintain peace and stop plunder which was the natural corollary of the disturbances created by the outbreak of the Revolution. He met with partial success only, because his resources were extremely limited and many of the local chiefs were unpatriotic and unscrupulous. In the countryside near Delhi the Gujars had started a campaign of loot; their activities had rendered the roads in this area unsafe.<sup>18</sup> More important was the problem of building up a strong army and maintaining it on a war-footing. For this purpose ample funds were needed, and the Emperor and his Government were insolvent. No doubt treasures were brought to the capital from certain places and funds were collected from the wealthy citizens of Delhi, yet these could hardly suffice for an army engaged in active fighting. Many of the sepoys failed to appreciate these difficulties. They clamoured for their pay and threatened to rebel when the Emperor expressed his inability to meet their demands.<sup>19</sup> In the later stages of the siege the Emperor went to the extent of allowing his personal effects to be auctioned for purposes of securing funds for the army.<sup>20</sup> With these disadvantages the revolutionaries, with leader,

<sup>14</sup> Husaini, Kamaluddin Haidar, *Qaisar-ut-Tawarikh*, II, p. 240.

<sup>15</sup> Metcalfe, C.T., *Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi* (London, 1898), p. 69.

<sup>16</sup> Garrett, *Trial of Bahadur Shah* (Lahore, 1932), p. 24.

<sup>17</sup> Garrett, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

<sup>18</sup> *T.N.N.*, p. 54.

<sup>19</sup> *Memoirs of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan*, p. 30.

<sup>20</sup> *Memoirs of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan*, p. 30.



defended Delhi for more than four months. The defenders suffered reverses and faced terrible conditions of life within the city, but they continued to bear hardships, and did not surrender until the enemy succeeded in forcing his way right up to the Emperor's Palace.

The first major action was fought on the banks of the Hindan River, about ten miles to the east of Delhi. On 27 May the Meerut troopers left for Delhi under the command of Brigadier Wilson. They reached Ghaziud-din-Nagar<sup>21</sup> on the morning of 30 May and there learnt that a force of the revolutionaries was posted on the other side of the river. The action started, the revolutionaries opened fire. Wilson immediately sent two companies to hold the bridge which was a key position for him; another detachment was ordered to proceed along the bank of the river and cross it at some distance. Having carried out these instructions they started firing at the left wing of the revolutionaries and ultimately succeeded in pushing them back. "The loss, considering the smallness of the force, was great."<sup>22</sup> On the following day the revolutionaries were again in the field of battle early in the morning. Once again they started firing, the British picket on the bridge being their first objective. Wilson immediately sent reinforcements. The revolutionaries began to waver under the pressure of the enemy fire. The latter seized the opportunity and made a general advance. The revolutionaries began to retire and the British won the day. On 1 June Wilson's forces were reinforced by the Sirmur Battalion of the Gurkhas who arrived from Bulandshahr.<sup>23</sup> Three days later orders were received from the Commander-in-Chief to proceed to Alipur. On 7 June Wilson joined Sir Henry Barnard at Alipur, where the latter had arrived two days earlier.

On Wilson's joining Barnard at Alipur, it was decided that they should proceed towards Badli-ki-Sarai where the revolutionary forces were encamped. The *sarai*, a large enclosure, stood by the side of the road, and about a mile to the west ran the Western Jumna Canal which was spanned by several bridges. Barnard decided to send the heavy guns by the main road with the infantry and the light pieces on either side of it. Colonel Hope Grant was to take the cavalry and horse artillery across the canal; he was to recross near the camp of the revolutionaries and attack them in the rear. Before dawn on 8 June the revolutionaries started firing on the advancing guns of the enemy. "To the destructive fire no adequate armour could be made, for the English guns were few and of small calibre. Men and officers began to fall quickly .... The situation was now critical in the extreme . . . ."<sup>24</sup> The 75th Foot were then ordered to rush upon the enemy. The sepoys fought desperately, but could not resist the pressure of the bayonet charge. They began a retreat and the British captured the *Sarai*. Barnard was determined to pursue the revolutionaries, lest they might rally and reorganize themselves for a fresh action. The British forces came right up to the

<sup>21</sup> Modern Ghaziabad.

<sup>22</sup> Forrest, *op. cit.*, I, 69.

<sup>23</sup> Holmes, T. Rice, *A History of the Indian Mutiny* (London, 1898).

<sup>24</sup> Forrest, *op. cit.*, I, 74.



Ridge, adjacent to the cantonments. It may be added that the Sirmur Battalion was in front of the marching forces. The General announced: "The object of the day having been then effected, the force was at once placed in position before Delhi."<sup>25</sup>

Fortunately for the British a young signaller at the Telegraph Office of Delhi was able to flash a message on 11 May, to Ambala, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Peshawar. The Commander-in-Chief, General Anson, was recouping his health in Simla; he received a report of the seizure of Delhi by the revolutionaries on 12 May. He sent necessary orders to the regiments stationed at places near Simla to move without the least delay, although he himself did not leave that day. He reached Ambala, on 15 May. Anson was hesitant in marching upon Delhi; he wrote to the Governor-General about his difficulties—want of transport, ammunition and siege artillery. John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, did not agree with his views and was for an immediate march on Delhi. Canning also had the same view. Anson, therefore, had no option but to prepare for a march on Delhi. Before undertaking the march the Commander-in-Chief put himself into communication with Meerut. It was not easy, because the entire country from Karnal to Meerut was in the hands of the revolutionaries. Hodson, who has earned notoriety for his barbarous treatment of the Imperial family, undertook to carry Anson's message to General Hewitt in Meerut. He was ordered "to keep open the communication between Karnal and Meerut with the Jhind sowars."<sup>26</sup> Anson's plan of march was "to assemble his army at Karnal; to march thence on the 1st of June: to enter Bagpat on the 5th; to await there the arrival of Hewitt with his contingent from Meerut; and then to advance to the attack of Delhi."<sup>27</sup> Anson died (27 May) before he could execute even the first stage of his plan. Barnard, his successor in command of the Delhi force, was anxious that he should not incur the charge of delay, "which had been the great crime of his predecessor in the eyes of the Government."<sup>28</sup> He, therefore, decided to march immediately without waiting for the siege-train.<sup>29</sup> The story of Barnard's march towards Delhi and his victory in the battle of Badli-ki-Sarai has already been told. On 8 June commenced the long siege of Delhi by the British forces, which ultimately ended in the capture of that city on 20 September.

<sup>25</sup> 'State Papers', p. 291 (quoted by Forrest, *op. cit.*, I. 77)

<sup>26</sup> Anson's Diary, quoted by Forrest, *op. cit.*, I. 60.

<sup>27</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

<sup>28</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

<sup>29</sup> The march to Delhi was characterized by acts of cruelty. "Many cruel deeds were wrought upon that march on villagers suspected of complicity in the ill usage of the fugitives from Delhi. Officers, as they went to sit on court-martial, swore that they would hang their prisoners, guilty or innocent; and, if any one dared to lift up his voice against such indiscriminate vengeance, he was instantly silenced by the clamours of his angry comrades. Prisoners condemned to death after a hasty trial, were mocked and tortured by ignorant privates before their execution, while educated officers looked on and approved." Holmes, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-20.



Barnard set up his positions on the Ridge. At the extreme right was thrown a heavy gun battery; further on was situated Hindu Rao's house, which served as the main picquet; to the north lay the Flag-Staff Tower, which also held a picquet. Beyond the Right Battery was the Sabzimandi which the revolutionaries could use for an attack on the right wing of the British and also for cutting their communications with Ambala. The city of Delhi was defended by a wall, twenty-four feet high and nearly seven miles in circumference; in its front was a moat and to the east of the city flowed the Jumna. The British forces had taken their positions on 8 June; on the following day the revolutionaries launched an attack on Hindu Rao's house. The Guides who had arrived the same day after concluding their long march from Mardan, were sent to reinforce the picquets. The revolutionaries were forced to withdraw but the Commandant of the Guides Cavalry Regiment was killed in the action. On 10 June the revolutionaries repeated their attack, coming this time from the side of the Ajmeri Gate. The British forces supported by the Gurkhas marched out to meet them. The revolutionaries did not fire at the Gurkhas saying that they wished to speak to them. The Gurkhas deceived them by replying, "Oh yes, we are now coming to join you." They were thus allowed to approach the revolutionaries up to within twenty paces, and then suddenly they fired at them, killing about thirty men. This created panic among the revolutionaries who made a retreat. A third successive attack having been launched on 12 June the British Commander set up a new picquet at the Metcalfe House to guard against the attacks on their left wing. The besiegers had not enough resources to invest the entire city. It was also clear that in artillery the revolutionaries were superior; they could afford to continue cannonading throughout the day. The situation was becoming critical for the British; it was, therefore, decided that the city should be taken by a *coup de main*. Accordingly arrangements were made for blowing up two gates, but Barnard abandoned the idea at the last moment. Keith Young writes under date 13 June; "Wake up about 1 a.m., and get ready. Arrangements made apparently for assault; but after an hour or two's delay, decided that it was too late .... Most fortunate, I think, that we did not attack, for failure would have been death and success was not quite certain . . . ."

The espionage system of the besiegers began to function early in the course of the siege. Of the attack launched by the revolutionaries on 19 June secret information had come in time to the British camp; Brigadier Grant was sent to meet them. He had to fight a hotly contested action. In the evening the British had to make a retreat after suffering heavy losses, which amounted to "three officers and seventeen men killed, and seven officers and seventy men wounded." The biggest attack of the month was launched by the revolutionaries on 23 June, the hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Plassey. Of the intended attack report had reached the British Commander through his spies. Reid who had to bear the main pressure of the attack of the revolutionaries thought that "no

<sup>30</sup> Young, Keith, *Delhi, 1857* (London, 1902), p. 59.



men could have fought better." He adds, "They charged the Rifles, the Guides, and my own men again and again, and at one time I thought I must have lost the day."<sup>31</sup> When reinforcements came the revolutionaries found it difficult to continue the fighting. The British forces rushed to the Sabzimandi and occupied it but not without stiff opposition; it was after a whole day's fighting that the revolutionaries returned to the city.

On the opening day of July the Bareilly Brigade commanded by Bakht Khan crossed the Jumna; it consisted of four regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, a horse battery and two post guns. Bakht Khan soon became the chief military leader of the revolutionaries and was appointed to the Supreme Command of their forces. After the arrival of the Bareilly Brigade the attacks of the revolutionaries became more vigorous and frequent. On 4 July they attacked Alipur; five days later they surprised an important picket on the mound behind Hindu Rao's house; again on the 14th they attacked the picket at the Sabzimandi. In the last action, "we were exposed to a heavy fire of grape from the walls, and musketry from behind trees and rocks."<sup>32</sup> The losses of the revolutionaries in this action were very heavy. On 23 July, however, they occupied Ludlow Castle.

The revolutionaries suffered an irreparable loss on 7 August when their powder manufactory was suddenly blown up. It was generally suspected that the explosion was not accidental. Hakim Ahsanullah was believed to have been one of the authors of this act of sabotage.<sup>33</sup> Nicholson's arrival at the head of the moving column further added to the advantageous position of the British. On 24 August, however, the revolutionaries left Delhi with the object of intercepting the siege-train. Nicholson marched out to bring them into action, and the Battle of Najafgarh was fought. Nicholson was able to capture a *sarai* which the revolutionaries held; they retreated, occupying a village in the rear. The British could not capture the village, but the revolutionaries evacuated it, returning to Delhi. The British losses were about a hundred men, three officers having been wounded. This was the last attempt made by the revolutionaries to intercept the siege-train; by 6 September the reinforcements arrived. On the following days work started on the batteries in front of the bastions which were to be attacked. On 8 September Ludlow Castle was seized; it was followed by the occupation of Qudsiah Bagh. Another battery was constructed in front of Ludlow Castle, which is at a distance of nearly 500 yards from Kashmiri Gate. Later two other batteries were constructed, one near the Qudsiah Bagh and the other at an old customs house, at a short distance from the water bastion.

The defenders responded to their preparations by more vigorous action. They brought out their guns in the open and "no part of the batteries was left unsearched by their fire .... Our loss during the six days the trenches were open was three hundred and twenty-seven."<sup>34</sup> However, arrangements were made for

<sup>31</sup> Quoted in Forrest, *op. cit.*, I, 94.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 107.

<sup>33</sup> *Memoirs of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan*, p. 22.

<sup>34</sup> Forrest, *op. cit.*, I, 131.



an assault to be made on 14 September. The storming forces were organized in five columns commanded respectively by Nicholson, Jones, Colin Campbell, Reid and Longfield. Nicholson's column was to storm the breach made in the Kashmiri Gate bastion. The revolutionaries offered a stiff opposition and resisted the advance of British forces with great obstinacy. Nicholson was mortally wounded in the fight at the Kashmiri Gate. As the men were falling here thickly Captain Brookes drew them off and retired to the Kabuli Gate, where he was joined by Brigadier Jones. The revolutionaries, however, could not repulse all the columns and ultimately the British forces succeeded in entering the city. An idea of the determined opposition offered by the revolutionaries can be formed by the heavy casualties in the British forces—eleven hundred and four men and sixty-six officers, or two men in nine, were killed or wounded. "During the 17th and 18th" Wilson wrote, "we continued to take up advanced posts in the face of considerable opposition . . . and not without loss to ourselves. On the evening of the 19th the Burn Bastion was surprised and captured by a party from the Cabul Gate and early next morning the Lahore Gate and Garstin Bastion were likewise taken and held."<sup>35</sup>

Bahadur Shah had left the Palace on the 19 September and taken refuge in Humayun's tomb. Bakht Khan, finding further resistance hopeless, decided to withdraw from Delhi and return to Rohilkhand. He, however, tried to persuade the Emperor to accompany him.<sup>36</sup> The struggle then could be continued in the regions of Oudh and Rohilkhand where the revolutionaries had considerable support. Bahadur Shah's kinsman, Mirza Ilahi Bakhsh, who had been in league with the British, advised him to surrender.<sup>37</sup> Unfortunately Bahadur Shah declined to accede to the request of Bakht Khan and accepted the advice of "that traitorous villain, the Mirza Elahee Buksh, who would have sworn away the life of his dearest friend if he had ought to gain thereby."<sup>38</sup> The Emperor surrendered himself on the condition that his life, and those of Zinat Mahal and Jawan Bakht, would be spared. Hodson put him in a bullock-cart and sent him back to the city where he was to remain as a prisoner until his fate was decided. In the case of the Princes Hodson's treatment was more savage. Bosworth Smith narrates the murder of the Princes in these words: "And if a tiger ever felt a pang of pity for the helpless prey beneath its talons, then, perhaps, Hodson would have been willing to restrain his impatience for the blood of his victims fallen from so high an estate, till at least they had gone through the formalities of a drumhead court-martial. Then, but only then . . ."<sup>39</sup> In his negotiations he was careful enough not to have a stipulation in regard to the lives of the Princes. They were deprived of their arms and despatched in bullock-carts to Delhi. When they reached the walls of the city, he stopped the Princes and shot them one after the other. "It was a

<sup>35</sup> Quoted in Forrest, *op. cit.*, I, 147.

<sup>36</sup> Kaye and Malleon, *op. cit.*, IV, 51.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> Smith Bosworth, *Life of Lord Lawrence* (London, seventh edition, 1901), II, 123.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122.



stupid, cold-blooded, three-fold murder." Bahadur Shah was tried for treason and found guilty by a court of British officers; he was sent as prisoner to Rangoon where he died in 1862.

The British took possession of Delhi on 20 September, 1857, when the real agony of the people of that city began. According to Mrs. Saunders, wife of the British Commissioner of Delhi. "For several days after the assault every native that could be found was killed by the soldiers, women and children were spared." Saunders himself wrote, "The troops were completely disorganized and demoralized by the immense amount of plunder which fell into their hands and the quantity of liquor which they managed to discover in the shops of the European merchants of Delhi." The initial massacres, which lasted for some days, "followed a more systematic reign of terror," which according to Dr. Percival Spear "lasted for several weeks," and really seemed to have continued for some months. The entire population of Delhi which survived these massacres was driven out of the city. Mrs. Saunders writes on 25 October, "Every house in the city was desolated and many of them injured . . . the inhabitants of this huge place seven miles round are dying daily of starvation and want of shelter. The Prize Agents are digging for treasure in the houses. The entire population of Delhi had to spend this winter either in the open or in hastily prepared shelter. In December a European observer reported that the search and plunder still continued. "He visited the outlying bands of fugitives from the city and found a very serious share of misery and sickness among the lower orders, the infirm and those with large families." During these months the city was subjected to a loot the like of which it had never suffered in its dismal history during the eighteenth century. The massacres of Nadir Shah, the plundering raid of the Marathas and Jats had lasted for some hours or at the utmost for some days. But in 1857, the entire civil population was driven out and in the absence of the owners the houses were broken into, their floors were dug up and their treasures removed or destroyed.

These looters were given the official title, Prize Agents, and the administration was directly responsible for what was happening, though much of the plunder did not find its way to the official godowns. The city was under martial law and trials started which in the circumstances could not be anything except a mockery of justice. Next to suffer were the city buildings. The principal mosques were occupied by troops, and there was a general discussion in the Anglo-Indian press regarding their fate. There was a proposal to sell the Jami' Masjid and then to use it as a barrack for the main guard of European troops, as in the opinion of some officers at Delhi it could "never be allowed to remain in the hands of the Muslim population." It was returned to Muslims only after five years. Some parts of the Fathpuri Masjid, the second largest in the city, remained in non-Muslim hands till 1875. The beautiful Zinat-ul-Masajid, built by a daughter of 'Alamgir I, was not given back to Muslims till Lord Curzon's time.

The fate of the Imperial Palace was much worse. Perhaps an even bigger loss was the destruction and dispersal of the Imperial Library, where rare and



illuminated works were being collected since the days of Babur and Humayun. Its contents were so varied and comprehensive that religious teachers like Shah 'Abdul 'Aziz, and Maulana Nazir Husain Muhaddis are stated to have utilized it for their works. This library was looted and scattered to all corners of the Earth so that we find some leaves of one Imperial album at Patna, a few in Berlin, some more in Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris, though of course, the major portion is in public and private libraries in England.

The Hindu population was allowed to return to the city in January 1858 and Muslims a few months later, but the destruction of buildings continued for long thereafter. The large area between the Jamī Masjid and the Fort, originally had the principal residential quarter of the Mughul nobility, and the large Akbar-abadī Masjid, where Shah Abdul Qadir used to teach.<sup>40</sup> All these buildings were razed to the ground and their sites ploughed up; the area was converted into a parade ground.

Perhaps the biggest loss was cultural. Many scholars, poets and men of letters perished in the massacres. Others had to seek refuge at Rampur, Haidarabad, and Lahore, and other distant places. The private libraries and collections of scholars also suffered the same fate.

The Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, John Lawrence, was on his way to Murree, when the telegrams reporting the outbreak in Delhi reached Lahore. The next senior official, Robert Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner, immediately set himself to the task of taking necessary steps. He drove to Mian-Mir, near Lahore, where the cantonment was situated and in consultation with the officer commanding it was decided that the sepoys should be disarmed. This was done on the morning of 13 May; soon after the fort in Lahore was taken into possession and the sepoys were disarmed. Montgomery then sent a circular letter containing instructions to Firuzpur, Amritsar, Phillaur and Kangra. Despite the measures taken by the Panjab authorities the sepoys in Firuzpur rose against their officers and putting their houses to fire they took the road to Delhi; they were pursued, but some of them succeeded in reaching their destination.<sup>41</sup>

The news of the outbreak at Delhi had reached Peshawar on 11 May. Edwardes, the Commissioner, lost no time in calling a council of senior officers; it was decided that General Reid should join Lawrence at Rawalpindi, so that the chief civil and military authorities might be concentrated at one place; a movable column was to be organized and kept in readiness to march to any place where it might be needed. On 16 May Edwardes was called, by Lawrence for consultation; when he returned five days later he learnt that preparations were being made by some regiments to rise against the Government. News came from Naushera that some companies of the 55th had risen and joined their comrades at Mardan. On 23 May a column marched out from Peshawar to pursue them; Nicholson was attached to it as political officer. The pursuit was not successful in

<sup>40</sup> Ikram, S. M., *Rud i Kausar* (Karachi, 1958), p. 576.

<sup>41</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 316.



the beginning, but Nicholson succeeded in the end; some of the sepoy were killed or captured, but a number escaped to Swat. The Akhund of Swat did not support them, but he provided them with guides who were to lead them across the river. Holmes rightly observed that "had he espoused their cause, and taking them with him, swept down upon the Peshawar valley; and preached a holy war against the infidels, he might have kindled the smouldering religious zeal of the population into such a flame as would have, perhaps, consumed the fabric of British power."<sup>42</sup> The revolutionaries now decided to proceed to Kashmir, but they were harassed by the armed zamindars of the Hazara region. Their numbers continued to decrease: "every man's hand was against them; and after many had been drowned, or stoned, or slain in battle by the mountaineers whom Becher hounded on against them, nearly all the rest, now too weary and too tamed by suffering to resist, laid down their arms, and suffered the penalty of mutineers."<sup>43</sup> It has been stated that in the end one hundred and twenty-four men surrendered to the *Sayyids* of the upper Kaghan valley near the Gori Nar lake. They were hanged excepting a few; twenty days later the ruler of Kashmir surrendered twenty men who had managed to enter his territories; they were also executed.<sup>44</sup> This was the "penalty of the mutineers."

The sepoy at Jullundur rose on 7 June and their major portion made for Phillaur to join the 'rebels' there. In Ludhiana, it is stated, a *Maulawi* had been preaching *jihad*: when the Revolution broke out he took his followers and proceeded to Delhi. The revolutionaries from Jullundur entered Ludhiana on 9 June, released the prisoners and ultimately left for Delhi. They could not stay there for long because in their hurry they had brought with them only blank cartridges.<sup>45</sup> If they had seized and retained Ludhiana they could have dominated the Grand Trunk Road and delayed the rush of reinforcements to Delhi. Immediately after the outbreak steps were taken to disarm the sepoy in Multan. This was carried out on 10 June.

The importance of keeping the Panjab and Frontier regions under control had been realized early and a number of special measures were adopted. The police force was strengthened and influential chiefs were persuaded to send their retainers to help it; the ferries and passages over rivers were strictly guarded; in the towns arrangements for the security of the treasuries were made. As to the behaviour of the people it may be added that "the frontier tribes, of whose conduct such fears had been entertained, were never really dangerous, though often troublesome. The ineradicable restlessness and unruliness of the Mahomedans were naturally excited by the electrical state of the political atmosphere. The Sikhs remained thoroughly loyal so long as they retained confidence in the vitality of the Government."<sup>46</sup> From the very beginning

<sup>42</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 328.

<sup>44</sup> *Punjab Government Records, Mutiny Reports*, VIII, 110-120.

<sup>45</sup> See Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 335.



Lawrence was naturally keen on keeping the Panjab quiet. To achieve this he had gone to the extent of recommending that Peshawar should be ceded to Dost Muhammad on the condition that he should maintain friendly relations with the British. Edwardes had opposed it and Canning had decided in his favour. In spite of the efforts of Lawrence and a capable team of officers a number of places in the Panjab became active scenes of revolutionary warfare. Jhelum, Sialkot and Peshawar may be mentioned specifically. Lawrence had some reports about the possible disaffection of the 14th Regiment stationed at Jhelum. An attempt was made to take it by surprise by sending a force from Rawalpindi. The sepoys came out of their lines and repulsed the attack on 7 July. On the following day they were again engaged in an action with the British forces. In the end they were overpowered, and only a few could manage to escape across the river. The garrison at Sialkot rose on 9 July, did some plundering and began their march to Delhi. Nicholson commanding the movable column was at Amritsar. He marched towards Gurdaspur to intercept the revolutionaries of Sialkot. The two forces met at the Trimmu Ghat on 12 July. In the beginning the revolutionaries pushed back their opponents; ultimately, however, they were overpowered by "sheer weight of metal." They had heavy casualties, but the survivors continued an unequal struggle for another four or five days, which ended in their destruction; only few could manage to escape by flight. In Peshawar also in the beginning of June emissaries from Delhi were preaching *jihad*, "and a number of *ghazis*, catching up cry, swarmed out of their fastnesses with a *moulvi* at their head, and planted their standard in a strong mountain village called Nowrunjee, just outside the Peshawar frontier."<sup>47</sup> The revolutionaries were, however, overpowered and the village was destroyed. The town of Peshawar did not remain unaffected. In August a *faqir* was found preaching in the Lines of the 51st. The officer commanding took pre-emptory steps against the sepoys who had risen: they were defeated and slain in large numbers. The same *faqir* suddenly re-appeared in September with fresh followers, mainly Mohmands; Edwardes succeeded in corrupting the tribesmen by promising them to restore their confiscated properties. They sent the *faqir* to Kabul.

Sind, Karachi, Hyderabad and Shikarpur were scenes of short-lived revolutionary activities. Owing to long distances and slow and unsatisfactory means of communications the emissaries of the revolution do not seem to have achieved much success in Sind. At about 11 o'clock on the night of 14 September two Indian officers informed the commanding officer at Karachi that the sepoys of the 21st had been holding consultations and that the Bombay Native Infantry intended to rise at about midnight. The officer commanding rushed to the town and informed the civil authorities; immediate steps were taken to assemble the women and children at a safe place which was to be under a strong guard; the treasury was also placed under guard. The remainder of the 2nd European Light Infantry now surrounded the Lines of 21st and taking them

<sup>47</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 364.



by surprise ordered them to fall in. The regiment was disarmed; it was discovered that twenty-seven men were absent. Subsequently "several of the ring leaders in the plot were secured in a few hours."<sup>48</sup> On 16 September a court-martial tried them. They were sentenced to death; seven were hanged and three blown away by guns. Later on another forty-three men were captured; "fourteen were hanged, three killed in the attempt to escape, four were blown away from guns, and twenty-two were transported. The twenty-seven absentees at the roll-call were nearly all apprehended in the neighbourhood and were also summarily disposed off."<sup>49</sup> Throughout these proceedings the 14th Regiment N. I. remained unmoved. Kanhayya Lal has rightly explained this by pointing out that "the majority of the men of the 14th were Jews."<sup>50</sup> As in Karachi, precautionary measures had been taken at Hyderabad and Shikarpur. At Hyderabad the 22nd Regiment was disarmed on 13 September and those sepoy who had left their lines were blown away from guns.<sup>51</sup> In Shikarpur a few sepoy rose on the night of 23 September, but they were soon overpowered. They could, however, manage to escape in the darkness of night, only three wounded persons were captured because they could not move.

## II

The British rule had been established over Rohilkhand in 1801 when it was ceded to the Company by the Nawab of Oudh. It was unpopular from the very beginning because the people had not forgotten the part played by the Company in the Rohilla War. The Rohillas, however, had been crushed so completely by the joint forces of Oudh and the Company that for over half a century they bided their time, waiting for a suitable opportunity to rise against the domination of the foreign power. Bareilly had occupied a prominent place in Rohilkhand, having been the capital of Hafiz Rahmat Khan. On the eve of the War of Independence, his descendants still occupied a position of eminence with his grandson, Khan Bahadur Khan, as their head. He had served under the Company's Government; now he became one of the organizers of the movement in the locality, Bakht Khan and Risaldar Muhammad Shafi being his two active colleagues.

The reports of the events at Meerut and Delhi unnerved the British officers in Bareilly and on 20 May, 1857, they sent their families to the hill station of Nainital. Commissioner Alexander did not remain inactive; he did all he could to persuade the people to remain loyal and quiet. A teacher of oriental languages in the local college is recorded to have addressed a gathering in the Jami' Masjid and appealed to them not to join the "rebels".<sup>52</sup> These measures,

<sup>48</sup> Ball, Charles. *The History of the Indian Mutiny* (London), II, 157.

<sup>49</sup> Ball, *op. cit.*, II, p. 158.

<sup>50</sup> Lal, Kanhayya, *Muharabah i 'Azim* (Lucknow, 1916), pp. 258-59.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 369-70.

<sup>52</sup> In 1816 the agitation against house tax flared up into a revolt under the leadership of Mufti Muhammad I'waz. It was a local affair; nevertheless, it indicated that the people were



however, proved ineffective. On Sunday, 31 May, when most of the officers were in the churches, the first shot was fired by the revolutionaries. It was a signal for the Indian officers and men of the Regiment posted in Bareilly to assemble round the green flag of the revolutionary force.<sup>53</sup> It had been arranged previously that in case of danger the European officers would go to the lines of the 8th Irregular Cavalry for concerted action. Accordingly, these rushed to the appointed rendezvous and seeing no chances of retaining control over the cantonment or the town they decided to proceed to Nainital; the party of the fugitives included Alexander. A few Indian troopers, however, chose to side with their British officers.

Khan Bahadur Khan, "a venerable man of dignified manners and considerable ability, much respected by both Europeans and natives," assumed control of administration in a regular ceremony.<sup>54</sup> He took immediate steps to put the administrative machinery in working order. To look after military affairs he created a War Council and decided to send Subedar (now Brigadier) Bakht Khan as his envoy to Delhi. A petition was immediately sent to Emperor Bahadur Shah with a request for the confirmation of Khan Bahadur Khan as the Nazim of Rohilkhand.<sup>55</sup> The Emperor accepted this request and conferred on him the title of *Nawab Intizam-ud-Daulah Khan Bahadur Tanwir Jang*.

Some parts of Rohilkhand had risen even before Bareilly; after the incident of 31 May the revolt became more widespread. Pilibhit was one of the *parganahs* of Bareilly. The Muslim population of this small town enthusiastically took up the cause of the Revolution; they accepted the authority of Khan Bahadur Khan without any hesitation. In the vicinity of Pilibhit a few Hindu Zamindars, particularly the Thakurs of Nawabganj, refused to submit to the officers of the new Government; they were, however, soon punished for creating trouble and disturbing the peace of the district. Anvala was another important town in the district of Bareilly. Its administration had been placed in charge of Nawab Kalian Khan; he was supported by a band of enthusiastic workers, including Hakim Sa'id-ullah, one of the signatories of the *fatwa* for *jihad* issued in Delhi.

In Badaun the Revolution had broken out earlier than in Bareilly. In the outlying villages disturbances had started as early as 19 May, 1857, but the town appeared to be comparatively calm. The Collector of the district, William Edwardes, precipitated trouble by calling the leading Muslim citizens to his residence and keeping them under custody on the 'Id-ul-Fitr day which fell on 25 May. He had taken this step as a precautionary measure; he had heard rumours that the Muslims would rise after the 'Id prayers. However, this action of the Collector caused great excitement among the people. On 2 June a regiment of the

prepared for a revolt and could not easily move into action against the Government. See Beveridge, H., *A Comprehensive History of India*, (London, 1872), III, 30.

At this time the 18th and the 68th N. I. and the 8th Cavalry Regiments were posted in Bareilly.

Khan, Najmul Ghai, *Akhbar-us-Sanadid* (Lucknow, 1906), II, 544.

For his petition see, Garratt, *op. cit.*, p. 278.



68th arrived at Badaun. This was taken as a signal for open revolt. The jail was broken open, and the police officers and men threw away their uniforms and joined the revolutionaries. Edwardes fled to the village of Shaikhupur and thence proceeded to Etah. Two weeks later 'Abdur Rahman Khan, who was appointed *Nazim* by Khan Bahadur Khan, took over the civil administration of the town; he was to be assisted by Niaz Muhammad Khan, the Commander of the forces and 'Azmatullah who was made *Bakhshi*. Subsequently Khan Bahadur Khan posted his own *Tehsildar* in different parts of the district. The authority of these officers could not be established without the use of force. Some of the Hindu landlords of the district resisted the establishment of the new Government and took to ravaging the countryside. Commander Niaz Muhammad Khan had to go round with his forces and crush the unruly elements. Within four or five months Khan Bahadur Khan's government was fully established in the district.

On 15 May, 1857, the reports of the Meerut incident reached Shahjahanpur which also, like Bareilly and Badaun, passed under the jurisdiction of Khan Bahadur Khan. The officers of the 28th N. I. posted there had great confidence in their sepoys. They did not know perhaps that Maulawi Sarfaraz Ali one of the most prominent leaders of the movement had been persuading them to join the Revolution<sup>56</sup> and had succeeded in spreading his influence. On reports that the people of the town were likely to attack the treasury the commanding officer strengthened the guards and sentries; the sepoys took this as a slight. On 31 May the sepoys attacked the European officers in a church. A Sikh regiment of about 150 soldiers soon came to their rescue. However, several officers were killed and their houses burnt in the course of the day. Ricketts, the chief civil officer of the district, took to flight which "was now imperative, for the mutineers were firing on the party . . . ."<sup>57</sup> The jail was captured and the rising became general after a large body of released convicts had joined the people.

The revolutionaries now set up one of their leaders, Qadir 'Ali Khan, as the chief civil administrator who was to be assisted by the Kotwal, Nizam 'Ali Khan; most of the old officers of the district were allowed to carry on their duties. Qadir 'Ali soon proclaimed his authority by marching in a procession through the streets of the city. On 16 June, Ghulam Qadir Khan, a descendant of Bahadur Khan, the founder of Shahjahanpur, returned to the town from the countryside where he had gone before the occurrence of these events. The revolutionaries now decided to accept him as their leader; he went to Bareilly and brought orders from Khan Bahadur Khan about his appointment as the *Nazim* of the district. The command of the forces was given to 'Abdur Rauf Khan; he resigned after two months. The main problem in the district, as in Badaun, was to suppress the recalcitrant Hindu zamindars. They could not be suppressed by the local authorities, who appealed to Khan Bahadur Khan to send help. In response to this appeal Mardan 'Ali Khan arrived with a large force and overpowered the

<sup>56</sup> Nevill, H. R., *District Gazetteers of the United Provinces* (Allahabad, 1910), XII, 141.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 142.



Rajputs, many of whom were killed in the action.<sup>58</sup> This victory had a sobering effect on the neighbouring towns and villages, which also acknowledged the authority of the new Government; Tilhar and Jalalabad may be particularly mentioned.

The districts of Bareilly, Badaun and Shahjahanpur roughly constituted the area under the jurisdiction of Khan Bahadur Khan. The *Nazim Tahsildars* and other local officers in these district were either appointed by him or were confirmed in the offices which they held. The leaders of the Revolution were in Moradabad and Bijnor able to get their appointments approved by the Central Government at Delhi.

In Moradabad the news of the occurrences at Meerut reached on 12 May, 1857. Saunders, the Magistrate, had joined the district only recently, but the District Judge, J. J. Cracroft Wilson, had been there for over sixteen years. Accordingly he was authorised by a telegraphic message from Agra to take over the administration. With the arrival of a party of the 20th N. I. the attitude of the 29th N. I. which was posted there also became doubtful. About 170 men of the Regiment came out to join the revolutionaries. Wilson, however, was able to control the situation for the moment as the bulk of the 29th was still loyal to the British. On 21 May a party of nearly two hundred *Mujahids* led by Bahadur Khan came from Rampur at the invitation of Maulawi Wahaj-uddin popularly known as Maulawi Mannu, the leader of the local revolutionaries. The green flag was planted on the banks of the Ramganga. Unfortunately, however, Maulawi Mannu was killed in the struggle before he could join the Rampur *Mujahids*. Nevertheless, the movement continued to grow and gained momentum after the jail was broken. Nawab Majduddin Khan, popularly known as Majju Khan<sup>59</sup> became the leader of revolutionaries. He was assisted by other leaders, particularly by the *'Ulama*. Maulana Kifayat 'Ali Kafi took the leading part in preaching *jihād*.

The ruling cheif of the neighbouring State of Rampur, Yusuf 'Ali Khan, was loyal to the British. He sent a detachment of his forces to Moradabad and a few days later on 6 June came there in person. He retained Nawab Majju Khan, but as a vassal of Rampur.<sup>60</sup> On 14 June Bakht Khan halted at Moradabad on his way to Delhi, and released the Revolutionary Government from the vassalage of Rampur. On his departure on 17 June, however, the forces of Rampur once again took possession of Moradabad. The Nawab's officers were unable to maintain peace in the district. Nearly all its towns and *tahsils* were affected by the movement and "throughout the district the Musalmans as a body had shown in the clearest manner their antipathy to the British Government and while in other parts the rebellion was confined mainly to the troops and the lawless sections of the population there can be no doubt that in Moradabad, as in other districts of

<sup>58</sup> Nevill, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

<sup>59</sup> Nevill, *op. cit.*, XVI, 165.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 166.



Rohilkhand, there was a general revolt on the part of the Musalman community, inflamed by fanaticism to an intense hatred of everything English."

The occurrences at Moradabad, particularly the release of prisoners, created an excitement in the neighbouring district of Bijnor. On the arrival of disaffected sepoys from Roorkee the people rose under the leadership of Mahmud Khan. Some of the Indian officers, including Syed Ahmad Khan, *Sadr Amin*, tried to protect the lives of the Europeans and the treasury; they could not, however, stop the movement. On 7 June the Europeans left the town and Mahmud Khan's Government was established. He was confirmed in his office of *Nazim* by an Imperial *farman* which was brought to him by 'Umdu Khan.<sup>61</sup>

Saharanpur and Muzaffarnagar were also affected. Thana Bhawan became the main centre of the activities of the revolutionaries in this area. Haji Imdadullah, an eminent religious leader, was at the head of the movement. In the beginning the revolutionaries gained a clear victory over the forces of the British Government in the battle of Shamli.

The fall of Delhi became a turning point in the course of the War. It affected the morale of the revolutionaries and though the conflict lasted for another year, they lost the initiative. The capture of Lucknow, in March, 1858, enabled the British to send a major portion of their forces to Rohilkhand. Indeed some of the British officers led by Colin Campbell were of the opinion that Rohilkhand should be recovered even before the recapture of Lucknow, but the Governor-General did not accept this suggestion. After the fall of Lucknow, Campbell lost no time in preparing for a campaign in Rohilkhand. His plan was that three columns should proceed from the north-west, south-west and south-east and continue their march converging upon Bareilly where the main battle was to be fought. The column which was to operate from the north-west marched from Roorkee, took Hardwar and proceeded towards Najibabad. Mahmud Khan met the British forces not far from Naginah. Shiva Prasad, a canal superintendent, advised the British to inundate the area with canal water. Mahmud Khan's men were taken unawares and many of them died when the terrain was flooded. They fought with courage but could not avert defeat. Mahmud Khan was taken captive.

On 22 April, 1858, the British proceeded on their march towards Moradabad. The same day Prince Firuz Shah had arrived there and expelled the officers who held it on behalf of the Nawab of Rampur. The latter, however, sent fresh forces to recover its possession. Firuz Shah was ready to face the new onslaught and had actually set his forces in battle array when it was reported that Brigadier Jones had reached the outskirts of the town. The Prince knew that he had not enough troops to meet the combined forces of the British column and the Nawab of Rampur, he therefore withdrew to Bareilly. Jones now took possession of the town and engaged himself for a week in plundering and killing the leaders of the revolutionaries. Among those who suffered at the hands of the revengeful

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Garrett, *op. cit.*, p. 24-25.



victors were Nawab Majju Khan and members of his family. On 3 May, the column left Moradabad, resuming its march on their way to Bareilly. An important battle was fought at Kakrala, near Badaun, where Prince Feroz Shah had arrived after visiting Anvala and some other places in the neighbouring area. In the battle that was fought in the darkness of the night on 29 April, General Penny was killed.<sup>62</sup> With the break of the day, however, the 64th Foot arrived on the scene. The revolutionaries, finding the pressure of the enemy too strong, decided to withdraw and proceed to Bareilly. About the same time another detachment of the British forces captured Bisauli. Khan Bahadur Khan's men saw that it would be difficult for them to hold any longer; they left the town and went to Bareilly. The British forces took possession of Badaun and established their Government. Khan Bahadur Khan knew that a large number of European officers and families had taken refuge in Nainital. He had to guard his capital against a possible attack from that direction. As soon as he found an opportunity he sent a detachment which proceeded as far as Baheri; this was followed by another which halted at Kathgodam. The main problem of the revolutionary forces was to climb the heights, unnoticed by the enemy. This was not possible; the British spies informed their masters about the advance of the revolutionaries. Necessary precautions were taken and it became impossible for the revolutionaries to proceed beyond Laldangi. The British received continuous help from the State of Rampur, particularly in the form of provisions; they could therefore successfully check the advance of the revolutionaries. Nainital could not be conquered. After the fall of Lucknow in the east, and Bijnor, Moradabad and Badaun in the west, Bareilly became the main centre of the revolutionary leaders of Oudh and Rohilkhand. Colin Campbell also marched towards it. Khan Bahadur Khan had selected for the site of his camp a plain on the banks of a rivulet, five miles from the town. The decisive Battle of Bareilly was fought the morning on of 5 May, 1858. A number of *Ghazis* took part in this hotly contested action. "The Sikhs and our light company", writes Sergeant Mitchell of the 93rd, "advanced in skirmishing order . . . and all at once a most furious charge was made by a body of about three hundred and sixty Rohilla Ghazis . . ." Campbell ordered the men of the 42nd to bayonet them. "But that was not so easily done"; continues Mitchell, "the Ghazis charged in blind fury . . ."<sup>63</sup> The revolutionaries were fighting with great courage when an unfortunate incident turned the scales in favour of their enemy. A detachment of Khan Bahadur Khan's newly-recruited soldiers suddenly took to flight, causing a general panic in his forces;<sup>64</sup> he tried his best but could not stop it. The defeat became a rout, and the grey-haired leader of the Rohillas had to withdraw from his capital. He went to Pilibhit and thence marched into the jungle of the Tarai. On 7 May Bareilly was occupied by the British.

Forrest, *op. cit.*, III, 353.

Mitchell, William Forbes, *Reminiscences of the Great Mutiny, 1857-59* (London, 1910), p. 254.

Barelvi, Altaf Ali, *Hayat Hafiz Rahmat Khan* (Badaun, 1933), p. 363.



The British forces had won a significant victory, but even in their defeat the revolutionaries had created such an impression of their valour that the British thought it unwise to take the risk of marching into the city; they were afraid that the Muslim population of the city would put up a determined resistance. On April, 1858, Walpole had to fight a stiff battle at the Bijpuria Ghat in Shahjahanpur. The revolutionaries were under the command of Nizam 'Ali Khan. He fought with courage but was slain in the battle. His death caused panic among his followers; they suffered a defeat and were dispersed.<sup>65</sup>

On 30 April the Commander-in-Chief, Colin Campbell, reached Shahjahanpur to find that the place had been evacuated by the revolutionaries only a day earlier. Most of the buildings in the city and cantonments, which could have been used by the troops, had been demolished, the jail was, however, intact. It was decided to use it as a military post. Lieutenant-Colonel Hall was given charge of the new post, and the main column resumed its march to Bareilly on 2 May. No sooner had Campbell left the place than the revolutionaries commanded by Maulawi Ahmadullah Shah returned and attacked the place with a view to recapture it. Hall could not defend city; the revolutionaries now started firing upon the enemy post in the jail. Campbell learnt about these occurrences on 7 May. The following day he despatched a field force under Brigadier Jones to proceed to Shahjahanpur. He could save Hall's tiny garrison from total annihilation, but it was beyond his power to resist successfully the attack of the main force of the revolutionaries. He, therefore, sent an urgent message to Campbell. In the meantime he was attacked by Maulawi Ahmadullah Shah on 15 May; he, however, managed to hold his ground. Three days later Campbell arrived on the scene. In a cavalry combat the revolutionaries were pushed back, but Campbell did not venture to pursue them. He sent for Colonel Coke who had been sent in pursuit of Khan Bahadur Khan; on his arrival the revolutionaries left Shahjahanpur and proceeded towards Muhamdi.<sup>66</sup>

On 24 May, 1858, Jones advanced upon Muhamdi. The capture of nearly all important places by the British and successive reverses met by the revolutionaries had begun to affect their morale. Some of the best colleagues of Maulawi Ahmadullah Shah had left him. Nevertheless, he did not yield and continued his resistance to the ever-increasing pressure of the British forces. However, he was not destined to survive long. On 5 June he "set out for Pawayau, hoping to induce the Raja to participate in the war against the British. Reaching the fort, he was refused ingress; and on attempting to force an entrance he was shot dead by the Raja's brother, Baldeo Singh, who was encouraged to resist by De Kantzow, at that moment the guest of the Raja. The latter proceeded at once with his brother to Shahjahanpur, and entering the house of Mr. Money,

<sup>65</sup> Actually a few desperate Muslims opposed the victors till the last moment of their life. See Lt.-General Shadwell, C.B., *The Life of Colin Campbell, Lord C'yde* (London, 1881), II, 209-17.

<sup>66</sup> Nevill, *op. cit.*, XVII, 149.



the Magistrate, while that official and his friends were at dinner, astonished the company by rolling on the floor before them the head of the rebel leader.<sup>67</sup>

These brought to a close the war in Rohilkhand and gave a decisive advantage to the British on other fronts also. Ahmadullah Shah was one of the greatest organizers of the movement as well as the war of Independence. Kaye lightly observes that "if a patriot is a man who plots and fights for the independence, wrongfully destroyed, of his native country then most certainly the Maulawi was a true patriot. He had not stained his sword by assassination, he had connived at no murders; he had fought manfully, honourably and stubbornly in the field against the strangers who had seized his country and his memory is entitled to the respect of the brave and the true-hearted of all nations."<sup>68</sup>

After the annexation of Oudh (13 February, 1856) Major-General Sir James Outram was appointed Chief Commissioner. Two months later, however, he had to go on leave for reasons of health. His successor, Coverley Jackson, was not a capable administrator; his treatment of the royal family became so intolerable that Wajid Ali Shah had to make a protest. The next Commissioner, Sir Henry Lawrence, had earned good reputation for his sympathetic administration in the Panjab. In Oudh, too, he took steps to remove disaffection; the nobles attached to the Court of the ex-King were given pension, some of the state servants were given assurances of re-employment, and confiscation and demolition of the places was halted.

The incident which had created disaffection in 48th Regiment had taken place soon after the arrival of Lawrence in Oudh and had alerted him. He lost no time in taking precautionary measures. The cantonment of Lucknow had three points of strategic importance—the Residency, the Machhi Bhawan and the village of Mundiaon. The first two places were fortified as best as was possible; the treasury at the Residency was to be guarded by a detachment consisting of 120 European and 220 Indian soldiers; at the Machhi Bhawan also a European guard was posted. The camp at Mundiaon had a regiment of 350 European soldiers in addition to 50 artillery men and a battery of Hindustani sepoy.<sup>69</sup> In a letter dated the 18th April, 1857, Lawrence informed the Governor-General of the spreading of discontent in the 48th. He was advised to move it immediately to Meerut, and take similar steps, if necessary, in other cases also. Two weeks later he had to report to the Governor-General the refusal of the 7th Oudh Infantry to accept the cartridges and their disbandment. On 12 May, Lawrence held a *darbar* to which he invited the leading citizens and the Indian officers of the army. In the course of his address delivered in Urdu he said, "Mussulman rulers at Delhi have persecuted the Hindoos rulers at Lahore have persecuted the Mussulmans; but the British Government has ever extended equal toleration to all."<sup>70</sup>

<sup>67</sup> Nevill, XVII, p. 149.

<sup>68</sup> Kaye and Malleon, *op. cit.*, IV, 381.

<sup>69</sup> The *Qaisar-ut-Tawarikh* gives a detailed account of the defensive measures taken by Lawrence; also see Forrest, *op. cit.*, I, 186.

<sup>70</sup> Forrest, *op. cit.*, I, 188.



The outbreak of the revolution at Delhi had excited the people of Oudh; on 30 May, they raised the revolt. A subaltern had informed Lawrence that a sepoy had told him that the soldiers would fire the first gun at 9 P.M. Sitting at the dinner table, Lawrence humorously told his informer, "Your friends are not punctual." Hardly had these words been uttered when the crack of musketry was heard coming from the lines.<sup>71</sup> The revolt had begun. Lawrence realized the importance of preventing the "mutineers" from joining the people of the town; he posted a European guard connecting the cantonment with the city. In the cantonment, however, the "rebel" sepoys killed several officers including Brigadier Handscomb.

On the following morning (31 May) the population also rose; they assembled in the 'Aish Bagh' and unfurled the Muhammadi flag. The police officers tried to suppress the rising and took several of the "rebel" leaders into custody including members of the royal family. But these measures could not stop the spread of disaffection in the neighbouring districts. As the revolt spread and became more general the British Government tightened its repressive measures. A gallows had been set up at the Residency where the revolutionaries were daily hanged in batches. The machinery of administration was intact, but the merchants and shop-keepers had begun to lose faith in the stability of the British authority.

Throughout the month of June the revolt continued to gather strength in the various districts of Oudh. Fyzabad, the centre of Maulana Ahmadullah Shah's activities, became one of the main strongholds of the revolutionaries. Groups of enthusiastic supporters of the Revolution had come from different places and assembled here to join the struggle. Ultimately they decided to march to Delhi by way of Lucknow. Lawrence had already learnt of these movements; he lost no time in forestalling them by taking an offensive. Accordingly early in the morning of 30 June, he reached the banks of Kokrail rivulet which intersected the Fyzabad road midway between Lucknow and Chinhut. He was told that the revolutionaries were encamping on the other side of the thick grove of trees. The English started firing in that direction; the revolutionaries returned the fire. Soon after the two forces were engaged in a regular fight. After a while it seemed that the centre of the revolutionary forces was giving way; the British officers thought they had won the day. They were, however, soon disillusioned. "In an instant," writes Forrest, "the wide plain swelled and an iron steam swept down upon our small band, and puffs of smoke . . . spread around our flanks like wandering fields of foam; the field pieces sent forth showers of grape, but onward the torrent came till it swept the Sikhs from the village, on to the 32nd who were in the act of deploying on the right."<sup>72</sup> The capture of the village, Isma'ilganj, raised the morale of the revolutionary forces. They continued their pressure and repelled the enemy's attempts to snatch the possession of Isma'ilganj. In this effort the

<sup>71</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-55.

<sup>72</sup> Forrest, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 231-32.



32nd suffered heavy casualties, which included their chief, Lieutenant-Colonel Case. Henry Lawrence, therefore, ordered a retreat, which became general and all traces of formation and discipline were lost. The victors pursued and "under a slaughtering fire the bridge was reached . . . but we had lost during the disastrous day 118 European officers and men killed, and 182 natives killed and missing, 54 Europeans and 11 natives returned wounded." An officer of the 32nd wrote, "Almost all our best men were killed..." With astonishing rapidity the revolutionaries planted their flag across the river. The bridges were held by the British. The revolutionaries, however, outmanoeuvred the enemy, and "crossing the river below the two bridges they boldly advanced, seized the houses round, swiftly loopholed them, and poured their musketry fire into the entrenchments." Thus the famous siege of the Residency had begun. The first memorable victory of the revolutionaries of Oudh was a brilliant achievement of their leader, Maulawi Ahmadullah Shah.

Ahmadullah Shah now held the city; he had managed to drag his heavy guns right up to the walls of the Residency. Henry Lawrence, in the meantime, had decided to withdraw his men and treasury from the Maechhi Bhawan and ordered the magazine to be exploded. This was considered necessary because that building had vulnerable points and would have easily fallen into the hands of the revolutionaries. The Residency buildings which were defended by entrenchments covered an area of about 60 acres. Besides the Residency proper, the three-storeyed official residence of the Chief Commissioner, which stood on a plateau, there were several other prominent buildings in the enclosure. Not far from this building lay the Banqueting Hall which was now converted into a hospital. Below it stood the Treasury Post; to its left was the famous Bailey Guard Gate with its lofty and well defended arch.<sup>73</sup> The Begum Kothi, so called because it was at one time the residence of a royal princess was one of the safest spots and was used as a shelter for women and children. Cubbin's house was another prominent building; it was used as a hospital for the officers. After taking their positions the revolutionaries lost no time in commencing operations; the Chief Commissioner's house was their main target. On the very first day, 1 July, a shell thrown by the revolutionaries had fallen in Henry's room. He was not injured; he was advised to move to a safer quarter. He laughingly replied that he did not think the revolutionaries had a marksman good enough to put another shell into his small room. He learnt too soon, however, that his views about the proficiency of the enemy's artillerymen were absolutely wrong. He had been on a round to inspect the defences and was feeling tired. He lay down on his bed to take rest. Soon after an officer brought a memorandum and began to read it. Henry did not approve of it and wanted to explain his views. But before he could finish the sentence a shell entered the room and the air became full of smoke. When the

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 236.

<sup>74</sup> In common parlance the name Bailey Guard was used for the entire Residency. "State Papers," II, 232.



cloud of smoke rolled away Henry was found lying under a cover stained with blood. Doctor Fryer, a surgeon, was soon in attendance. In reply to Henry's persistent inquiry, "how long have I to live?" the surgeon said, "about forty-eight hours." His calculation was not far wrong; Henry expired on 4 July.<sup>75</sup> A statesman-soldier of ability he had distinguished himself by his courage and devotion to duty.

After consultations among themselves the leaders of the revolutionaries raised Wajid 'Ali's young son, Birjis Qadr, to the *masnad* of his father (15 July). The accession of the Prince was proclaimed by a salute of 11 guns.<sup>76</sup> The mother of the young Prince, Hazrat Mahal, was to act as Regent. As later history shows she became one of the most prominent leaders of the War of Independence; she fought to the end and never bowed to the authority of the British Government. Her chief adviser was 'Ali Muhammad Khan, popularly known as Mammu Khan. General Husam-ud-daulah was put in charge of recruitment of soldiers. The moving force behind the rising in Lucknow was Maulawi Ahmudullah Shah. The new Government invited the *ta'lluqahdars* and other leading persons to join the Revolution; the response to this appeal was satisfactory.<sup>77</sup> When the revolutionaries had settled the local affairs they decided to send an envoy to Delhi to offer their homage to the Emperor. 'Abbas Mirza who was to go as envoy travelled *via* Moradabad, where he was advised by Wilayat Husain, a Deputy Collector, to contact the British authorities through him. 'Abbas Mirza gave him a rebuff and proceeded on his mission. He was given audience by the Emperor on 13 September. "After prayers," writes Jewan Lal, "Nazir Hassan Mirza introduced Mirza 'Abbas Beg, agent of the court of Lucknow. He presented the king with a *nazzar* of two gold *mohurs*. His Majesty conferred on him the title of Safir-ud-Dawlah."<sup>78</sup> Since the commencement of the Revolution in Lucknow the other districts of Oudh were also rising in revolt. Sitapur was the first to rise on 7 June. Some of the European officers were overpowered and killed but the majority managed to escape. Sitapur was followed on the following day, 8 June, by Fyzabad. The jail was broken and Ahmadullah Shah was released. He succeeded in persuading large numbers of people to join the movement and started for Lucknow at the head of a vast following.<sup>79</sup> Simultaneously with Fyzabad the small town of Dariabad also rose, but the few European residents there were safely escorted by a detachment of Sikh cavalry. Sultanpur rose on 9 June; "it was the only out-station, besides Sitapore and Fyzabad, where there were any of the old Bengal troops. The Bengal regiment there was the 15th Irregular Cavalry, a gallant but very bigoted set of

<sup>75</sup> Forrest, *op. cit.*, I, 262.

<sup>76</sup> It is significant that the proclamation of Birjis Qadr's accession to the *masnad* was made in these words: "People belong to God, the country belongs to the Emperor and the orders emanate from Birjis Qadr" Husaini, Kamaluddin, Haidri, *Khulasat-ut-Tawarikh*, II, 225-26.

<sup>77</sup> Husaini, *op. cit.*, II, 255-26.

<sup>78</sup> *T.N.N.*, p. 229.

<sup>79</sup> Maulawi Ahmadullah had been tried for treason and imprisoned in Fyzabad.



Mussulmans, who proved foremost in all the future operations not only in actual fighting, but in furnishing leaders to the mutineer Army.<sup>80</sup> Colonel Fisher, the commander of the Regiment was shot, and the revolutionaries marched to Lucknow. Within the next two days (10 and 11 June) Baharaich and Gonda also joined the Revolution. The neighbouring districts of Azamgarh, Banaras, Allahabad and Gorakpur had in the meantime all risen against the British Government and overthrown its authority.

For nearly three weeks after the commencement of the siege of the Residency on 2 July, the revolutionaries kept shelling the various buildings within the entrenchments. A general attack was made on 20 July, the revolutionaries marched with such determination that in spite of the shower of bullets for the Residency they came within a few yards of its defences. "At Innes's post the attack was more prolonged and resolute, and at one time that post seemed to be in danger of being cut off in the rear, as the enemy pressed on towards the neck of the spur near the church ... So they ... after a fairly brave effort retired precipitately. A few of them, who had gone at the obstructions, got entangled in the abattis, could neither go forward nor withdraw, and were all shot down."<sup>81</sup> The British regarded this as their victory; perhaps it was because the revolutionaries were obliged to withdraw in the end. On the following day, however, they suffered a great loss. Major Banks who had succeeded Lawrence as Chief Commissioner was shot dead by the revolutionaries when he was inspecting an enemy position through a loophole.<sup>82</sup>

The defenders of the Residency had been anxiously looking forward to receiving reinforcements from Kanpur. Havelock had captured it and, having left a small garrison to defend it, started for Lucknow on 20 July.<sup>83</sup> He crossed the Ganges on the 24th. He had not proceeded far when he was confronted with the revolutionaries and had to give them battles at Unao (29 July) and Bashirat Ganj (30 July). Havelock won two victories but only at a heavy cost, his casualties being nearly a sixth of the entire force. This made his advance difficult; he could neither carry the wounded and the sick, nor leave his men to look after them. His spirits were further damped by the news from Brigadier Neill that he could send no reinforcements to Lucknow because of the rise of Kunwar Singh, the zamindar of Jagdishpur. Havelock was, therefore, compelled to return to Mungulwar, near the Ganges, where he took his position for the time being. Nana Sahib had in the meantime sent a regiment to cut off Havelock's communications with Kanpur if he advanced far beyond the Ganges. From Mungulwar he had to withdraw to Kanpur.

<sup>80</sup> Innes, McLeod, *Lucknow and Oudh in the Mutiny* (London, 1896), p. 86.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 125.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 132.

<sup>83</sup> On 29 July, an officer hearing the noise of firing in the direction of Kanpur told his colleagues that Havelock had arrived and was forcing his way through the streets. Everybody was happy to learn this news. But they were soon disappointed that the guns were being fired by the revolutionaries.



On 31 July, Ahmadullah Shah launched another attack on the Residency and succeeded in reaching almost below the walls of its buildings. The defenders replied by heavy shelling, causing enormous loss of life in the ranks of the revolutionaries who were ultimately obliged to withdraw without achieving their objective. The revolutionaries had from the outset started throwing mines; so did the defenders. Lieutenant-Colonel Lines says, "The greater part of this mining contest lay in the enemy's mines of attack and our countermines."<sup>84</sup> On 10 August, the revolutionaries laid a mine near the Brigade Mess, which blew 20 feet of defence wall, and "they silenced the Cawnpore Battery on August 12th by their fire from Johanne's house, and they constructed batteries opposite the Bailey Guard Gate and Gubbin's post."<sup>85</sup> More successful were the attempts of the revolutionaries to break the Sikh Square on 17 and 18 August.

The third general attack was made by the revolutionaries on 5 September. To form an idea of the conditions inside the Residency reference may be made to a letter which General Inglis wrote to Havelock on 16 August. He said, "If you hope to save this force, no time must be lost in pushing forwards. We are daily being attacked by the enemy, who are within a few yards of our defences. Their mines have already weakened our post, and I have every reason to believe they are carrying on others. Their eighteen-pounders are within one hundred and fifty yards of some of our batteries, and from their position and our inability to form working parties we cannot reply to them, and consequently the damage done hourly is very great . . . Our native force having been assured . . . of your near approach some twenty-five days ago, are naturally losing confidence, and if they leave us, I do not see how defences are to be manned."<sup>86</sup> Despite these conditions the revolutionaries did not succeed in their objective. They had thrown two mines, aiming at Gubbin's house and the Brigade Mess. Both the mines proved harmless because they were short of their mark. After the failure of the mines they began their attack at three different aims. The guns of the defenders became active and repulsed the revolutionaries.

Even so the condition of the defenders was by no means assuring, and they still counted on the relief from Kanpur for which they sent repeated messages. Havelock's position there was much improved by the arrival of Outram who joined him on 15 September. Four days later the two Commanders crossed the Ganges on their way to Lucknow. They had to contest their way because parties of the revolutionaries had taken position at Mungulwar. Near 'Alam Bagh, four miles from Lucknow, however, a strong revolutionary force blocked their way. On 23 September, a battle was fought and the British forces succeeded in capturing 'Alam Bagh. Two days later they resumed their march and proceeded by a circuitous route avoiding the road passing through the city. The first serious opposition was offered by the revolutionaries at the Char Bagh

<sup>84</sup> Innes, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-37.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 144.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 148.



near a bridge crossing the canal, General Husam-ud-Daulah commanded revolutionary forces. The first part which rushed to the bridge was swept down by the fire of battery of six guns; but before they could reload their guns a British regiment stormed the battery and forced its passage. They proceeded to 'Aish Bagh but were pushed back to the Aminabad road. They now took the road which skirted the canal. On reaching Secundrah Bagh they turned left.

Some street fighting now could not be avoided, it was in these actions that Neill was shot dead by the revolutionaries. However, Outram and Havelock succeeded though not without heavy losses, in reaching the Residency the same evening, 25 September. Some forces had been left behind; they entered the entrenchments on the following morning. Originally Outram had entered the Residency with the object of withdrawing its defenders to a safer place. On arriving there, however, he found that circumstances would not permit him to carry out this plan and he decided to wait there for the arrival of Colin Campbell. Outram realized the importance of keeping hold over 'Alam Bagh which commanded the road from there to hold on as long as was possible.

Colin Campbell's departure from Calcutta was delayed by circumstances beyond his control, inadequate transport and equipment being the main reason. However, he arrived at Kanpur on 3 October; it was exposed at that time to serious danger. The Gawalior Contingent led by Tantia Topi was marching on Kalpi with a view to joining Nana Sahib for an attack on Kanpur. In spite of this threat Campbell decided to proceed to Lucknow for its relief. In the meantime Outram sent a British clerk accompanied by a Hindu spy with his advice in regard to the route to be followed and other relevant matters; Campbell acted on Outram's advice and reached Lucknow on 14 November. He took about a week to withdraw the defenders of the Residency in safety. "By the 22nd," writes Innes, "everything, the treasure, the food, and all the guns that had not been destroyed, had been removed out of the Residency without the enemy's knowledge .... on that night, the garrison evacuated the position they had held for six months . . . ."<sup>87</sup> Campbell decided to hold 'Alam Bagh so that he could "proclaim that Oudh was not evacuated, nor Lucknow finally surrendered . . . . Thus was the old Residency position relieved, its garrison withdrawn, and the new position and force at the 'Alam Bagh, under Outram, substituted for it."<sup>88</sup>

Colin Campbell returned to Kanpur in time to save it from falling into the hand of the revolutionaries. It took the British more than two months to materialize their plans for the recapture of Lucknow. The delay was caused by the late arrival of reinforcements. Two armies were to proceed from the east to join the siege. One of these was commanded by General Franks and was to march from Banaras; the other consisted of Gurkhas led by Jang Bahadur. Franks' advance was counteracted by a revolutionary chief, Mahdi Husain, between Jaunpur and Azamgarh and later by Ghafur Beg near Sultanpur

<sup>87</sup> Innes, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*



(February, 1858). Ultimately he succeeded in reaching Salimpur on the 1 March.<sup>89</sup> Jang Bahadur had entered the British territory in December, 1857. Advancing by way of Gorakhpur he reached the Gogra and crossed it on 25 February, 1858.

Colin Campbell left Kanpur on 28 February. "So powerful a British army had never before been seen in India. There were seventeen batteries of infantry, twenty-eight squadrons of cavalry, and a hundred and thirty-four guns and mortars."<sup>90</sup> The British army captured Dilkusha, an old palace below the Gomti. Next day Franks also arrived; two days later they crossed the river. Campbell waited for Outram. His arrival caused some confusion among the ranks of the revolutionaries. The British forces were now inside the city and had started bombarding the main buildings. On 11 March, Outram succeeded in marching up to the iron bridge and capturing it. For four or five days fighting continued. The defence was now collapsing and the British were gradually snatching possession of one important building after another. On 16 March Hazrat Mahal left the palace and accompanied by Birjis Qadr she escaped to Bondi. Ahmadullah Shah continued to offer resistance for three more days. Ultimately the revolutionaries were compelled to evacuate the city completely.<sup>91</sup> Ahmadullah Shah proceeded towards Shahjahanpur. Hazrat Mahal was approached for peace, but she refused to surrender and escaped into the territory of Nepal.

Kanpur was one of the most prominent centres of the Revolution of 1857. Nana Sahib who had been deprived of his adoptive father's pension had sent 'Azim-ullah Khan to plead his case before the Home Authorities, In London he became a popular social figure and "the ladies voted him charming."<sup>92</sup> He could not succeed in persuading the Government to change their decision in regard to Nana Sahib's claims, but his contacts there and his visits to France and Turkey greatly widened his outlook. On his return he was able to convince Nana Sahib that it would be of advantage to him as well as to his countrymen if he could join the revolutionary movement which was being organized secretly. Nana Sahib became a leading figure in the Revolution, although he maintained friendly relations with the British until the moment of his open declaration of war. Another important figure was that of Tantia Topi, a colleague of Nana Sahib, who remained firm till his capture on 7 April, 1859, through the treachery of Man Singh.<sup>93</sup>

Soon after the outbreak of the Revolution at Delhi, Wheeler, the commanding officer at Kanpur, took immediate steps to strengthen his position against possible disturbances. He asked for and was provided with a contingent from Lucknow; Nana Sahib also sent 200 men and two guns for his help. Throughout the month of May, 1857, there was no trouble in Kanpur. Early in

<sup>89</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, pp. 435-36.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 438.

<sup>91</sup> For his activities in Rohilkhand see above chapter.

<sup>92</sup> Traveyan, O., *Cawnpore* (London & Cambridge, 1865).

<sup>93</sup> Kaye and Malleon, *op. cit.*, V, 264.



June a subaltern, Cox, fired at a sentry. He was court-martialled but was acquitted on the plea that he was drunk. This incident excited the sepoys who rose on 4 June, released the convicts from the jail and seized the magazine, which were located in a suburb, Nawabganj. They elected Nana Sahib as their leader and wanted to go to Delhi where they would join the national movement. Azim-ullah Khan took a more realistic view of the situation and suggested that they should remain there and establish the authority of the Revolutionary Government in the area. The revolutionaries returned to Kanpur and besieged Wheeler and his small garrison. Under continuous shelling of the besiegers the defenders suffered heavy losses. In three weeks time conditions deteriorated; no reinforcements could be expected from Lucknow. A messenger in disguise was sent to Allahabad on 24 June. On the following day a letter came from Nana Sahib promising the garrison a safe passage to Allahabad. The conditions of surrender were discussed and settled by the representatives of the two parties. On the morning of 27 June, the men of the garrison as well as the women and the children reached the banks of the Ganges and embarked the boats that were ready for them. Hardly had the boats begun to move when the revolutionaries started firing at them. Under Nana's instructions women and children were brought back to Kanpur. Nearly all the men were killed either by bullets or by drowning; only a few survived to tell the sad story. Nana was now proclaimed Peshwa at the Palace of Bithur.<sup>94</sup>

When the report of the Kanpur incident reached Allahabad it was decided that Havelock should leave immediately for that place. On 12 July, Havelock's camp near Fathpur was attacked by Nana's forces commanded by his brother, Bala Sahib, and supported by Maulawi Liaqat Ali of Allahabad. The revolutionaries fought with courage, but they were ultimately pushed back. The British soldiers captured Fathpur and gave it up to plunder. On 15 July, Nana learnt that his forces had been defeated by Havelock who was now within a day's march of Kanpur. He ordered a general massacre of his prisoners—five men and two hundred and six women and children—lodged in a building known as Bibigarh. The barbarous act was perpetrated on the same night and their bodies were thrown into a well.<sup>95</sup>

On 17 July Havelock entered Kanpur and occupied it, his soldiers are said to have massacred 10,000 people in retaliation. Nana Sahib moved into Oudh, leaving his palace at Bithur to be razed to the ground. Shortly after this Neill arrived from Allahabad and joined him. Tantia Topi went to Gwalior, collected a fresh army and returned to Kanpur after crossing the Jumna on 10 November.

He attacked Major General Charles Windham and would have overwhelmed him if Colin Campbell had not arrived in time. After a long contest

<sup>94</sup> Holmes. *op. cit.*, p. 240.

<sup>95</sup> It has been stated that the cause of Nana's fury was the fact that the European prisoners were in secret condescendance with Allahabad.



between him and Tantia Topi lasting for several days the Maratha leader was obliged to withdraw his forces.

Banaras, the sacred city of the Hindus, had begun to show signs of disaffection soon after the outbreak of the Revolution. Among its civilian officers was Frederick Gubbins, the District Judge. He was firm and shrewd person, and "maintained order in the populous city until the arrival and action of Neill and his troops removed the pressing danger."<sup>96</sup> Banaras was more fortunate than many other places in the matter of receiving reinforcements; 150 men of the 10th Foot came from Danapur about the end of May, 1857; early in June Neill arrived with men of the 1st Madras Fusiliers. The local officers held consultations and decided to disarm the 37th N.I. Accordingly a parade was held. The sepoys now could not control them. They rose, but were overpowered in the end. They dispersed in disorder but were able to carry their arms with them. However, the British authorities with the help of the Raja of Banaras and some other Hindu leading citizens succeeded in suppressing the movement in the city.<sup>97</sup> On 9 June, Neill left for Allahabad, reaching there two days later.

The strategic importance of Allahabad, "where the sparkling stream of the Jumna loses itself in the turbid waters of the Ganges,"<sup>98</sup> was not fully realized by Canning and Anson. There was no European regiment at the time of the outbreak of the Revolution. It had become a stronghold of the revolutionary movement because of Maulawi Liaquat 'Ali's work and activities. He was a teacher commanding great respect and influence on the Muslims of the place.<sup>99</sup> The revolutionaries, however, did not become active until June 6, when their feelings were excited by reports of occurrences at Banaras. The immediate occasion for the outbreak of the sepoys was provided by a parade called for the evening of that day. The parade being over, Simpson, the Commanding officer, returned to the mess. The sepoys stationed at the bridge were ordered to remove the guns to the fort; they took them to the cantonment instead. Lieutenant Alexander of the Oudh Irregulars tried to intercept them; he was shot dead. This became signal for a general rise. The revolutionaries rushed to gaol and released the prisoners; they were now joined by the people of the town, and "within a few hours the authority of the English in Allahabad was overthrown; and a green flag, waving over the Kotwali, proclaimed the restored supremacy of Islam."<sup>100</sup> The fort was still in the hands of the British, mainly garrisoned by a Sikh regiment, who were mainly responsible for creating disorderly conditions there. "The Sikh," writes Holmes, "found abundant stores of wine, brandy, rum, and beer in

<sup>96</sup> Malleon, Colonel G.B., *The Indian Mutiny of 1857* (London, 1891), p. 180.

<sup>97</sup> Malleon, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

<sup>98</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

<sup>99</sup> "The Allahabad 'Maulavi' whose name was Liakat Ali, had been a school master, with a great reputation for sanctity." Malleon, *op. cit.*, p. 150. For his work we find a reference in these words: "The existence of a Mahometan conspiracy to exterminate the English was now (May 31) a matter of notoriety;" *Calcutta Review* as quoted by Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

<sup>100</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 217.



the cellars of the merchants, and sold all that they could not drink themselves to the Europeans. Men supposed to be on duty were to be seen staggering on the ramparts, so drunk that they could not hold their muskets. Many of the volunteers soon became as demoralized as the Sikhs, and joined them in plundering the houses of inoffensive traders, and smashing their furniture. On Neill's arrival order was established in the British forces. He bombarded a suburb of the city, Daryaganj, on 12 June, "burnt part of it to the ground," and his men "with reckless ferocity . . . destroyed every native whom they could catch." Neill was not satisfied with this. Having brought the situation under his control, "he sent out parties of Fusiliers, Sikhs and Irregulars, who swept over the country. . . . A detachment of Fusiliers went up the river in a steamer, throwing shot right and left, and firing every village that they passed . . . . Meanwhile another detachment had started from Benaras to reopen the line of communication, and was burning rebel villages, and hanging rebel zamindars as it pursued its way . . . . The work of retribution, however, was not over; and some of those who took part in it . . . recked little whom they slew, so long as they could slay some one. Volunteers and Sikhs sallied out of the fort into the streets, and slaughtered every native who crossed their path. A civilian boasted that a commission of which he was chief had hung eight or ten men a day . . . old men who had done us no harm, helpless women with sucking infants at their breasts, felt the weight of our vengeance no less than the vilest malefactors."<sup>101</sup> For the author of these atrocities, Neill, there was nothing unjust in what he and his men had done. On 17 June, he wrote, "God grant, I may have acted with justice. I know I have with severity, but under all the circumstances I trust for forgiveness."<sup>102</sup> Quite different, however, were the results of Neill's prayers, at least as far as his men were concerned. "On the 18th cholera broke out among them . . . . Eight men were buried before midnight. Twenty more died next day. The shrieks of the sufferers were so appalling that two ladies in a room over the hospital died of fright." However, Neill was now in a position to proceed to Kanpur.

Bihar was included in the province of Bengal. Its Commissioner, William Taylor, on learning that the sepoys stationed at Danapur, ten miles from Patna, had risen, took precautionary measures by calling all the Europeans to take shelter in his house. On 19 June, he called Maulawi Ahmadullah and other leaders of the Wahhabis on pretext of consultation and had them put under custody. He then started arresting other persons who were suspected of anti-British activities. From the papers found in the possession of Waris 'Ali, a police officer, who was also arrested, it was concluded that 'Ali Karim was leading the movement. A Magistrate was set to arrest him but 'Ali Karim managed to escape.<sup>103</sup> On 3 July, a group of the revolutionaries led by Pir 'Ali openly rose and planted the green flag. A Sikh regiment was sent to crush them. Pir 'Ali with

<sup>01</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

<sup>02</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

<sup>03</sup> Kaye and Malleeson, *op. cit.*, III, 35.



more than thirty followers was captured; eight of them including Waris 'Ali were sent to the gallows.

The sepoys who had risen at Danapur crossed the river Son with the help of Kunwar Singh, the zamindar of Jagdishpur and reached Arrah. This place was now held by the revolutionaries, and the European residents had entrenched themselves in a house which they had prepared for defence in case of danger. To receive these people troops were sent under the command of Captain Dunbar. Kunwar Singh offered resistance; Dunbar was killed in action and his troops retreated on 29 July. Two days later another detachment arrived. Its Commander, Major Eyre, taking lesson from Dunbar's disaster, decided to stop at a village, Gujraganj, near Arrah.<sup>104</sup> The revolutionaries came out of Arrah and gave Eyre a battle at his camping ground on 2 August. The revolutionaries were defeated and the British forces entered Arrah on 3 August. Patna was, however, not the only district of Bihar which had joined the Revolutionary War. The eastern districts of Bengal were not affected by the movement as extensively as the western parts of the province which now cover the modern Indian States of Bihar and West Bengal. The reason is obvious; long distance and inadequate means of communications must have stood as obstacles in the path of the organizers of the movement. There can, however, be no doubt that the emissaries of the revolutionaries came into contact with some of the regiments posted in the cantonments of Bengal. The revolt began with the rise of a few companies of the 34th N. I. posted at Chittagong. They defied their officers but did not resort to violence against them, seized the treasury which contained about three lakhs of rupees, liberated the prisoners from the jail, put the houses of European officers to fire, blew up the magazine and took the road to Sylhet. The revolutionaries were under the leadership of Raja 'Ali Khan, pay-havaldar of Company No. 4.<sup>105</sup>

The revolutionaries were harassed on their march by the retainers of the Raja of Tipperah. They had to take a difficult and longer route; their march became necessarily slow and gave the enemy enough time to send reinforcements to their garrisons at strategic points. Before they could reach their destination the civil authorities of the district sent the Sylhet Light Infantry under Major Byng. The two forces came face to face with each other near a small village, known as Latu. The revolutionaries tried but failed to persuade the Indian soldiers of Byng to join the revolution. On 18 December, 1857, a battle was fought in which Byng was killed; the revolutionaries, however, decided to withdraw into the jungles where they knew they could not be easily pursued they entered Manipur where they were joined by one of the leading chiefs. On the 22 January, 1858, a

<sup>104</sup> Kunwar Singh had joined the movement, because of the harsh treatment of the revenue officials who wanted him to make immediate payment of the large arrears which he owed to Government. Though a man of advanced years he fought with courage and determination. From Arrah he went to Jagdishpur and thence to Azamgarh. He was wounded in the arm which, it is stated, he himself mutilated and threw into the river. The wound proved fatal and he died of it on 26 April, 1858.

<sup>105</sup> Report of Captain Dewool, quoted by Ball, *op. cit.*, II, 220.



detachment of Sylhet Corps led by Captain Stevens surprised them "while their arms were piled" and put them to flight. This was a great blow to the revolutionaries. They were forced to withdraw into the hilly country where many of them perished.

The spread of the revolt in the upper provinces of India could not but have affected the sepoys in Dacca which was under the same Government as Bihar. The officers posted there had advised the Government at Calcutta to reinforce the station; a company of a hundred of the navy men had come in response to these appeals. Besides these, the able-bodied among the Europeans and Eurasians residing there were enrolled as volunteers and the cantonment was put in a state of defence. In spite of these precautionary measures the sepoys "continued in a state of disquiet, eagerly waiting for the news that filtered down . . . from up country."<sup>106</sup>

As the news of the outbreak at Chittagong reached Dacca the officers resolved upon disarming the companies of the 73rd posted there. Early in the morning of 22 November, the European volunteers and sailors who had come from Calcutta marched to the treasury and forced the sepoys on guard to lay down their arms. From there they rushed to the Lal Bagh, the quarters of the sepoys. The latter, decided to resist. "Most of the sepoys had gathered on the ramparts to the left. . . . the sailors and volunteers charged the ramparts and drove the sepoys before them . . . till at last they reached the turret in the angle of the wall, where they made a stubborn resistance."<sup>107</sup> The sepoys within the Lal Bagh enclosure were taken unawares and, therefore, it was not possible for them to continue to resist for a long time. A majority of them escaped towards Jalpaiguri but some of them were captured and brought back to Dacca to be put to death. "So all of them," writes the author of the *Reminiscences of Dacca*, "were put to the gallows and the Dacca mutiny thus terminated. The Antaghar Maidan being the scene of this tragical occurrence, used to be looked upon with awe by the people of Dacca; and many superstitious stories were used to be narrated by the people of the surrounding *mahallas*, Bangla Bazar, Shankhari Bazar and Kalta Bazar, how the spirits of the departed sepoys used to visit the *maidan* during the night and how the groans and awful sounds were used to be heard. These stories used to be told by the old people and we never dared to the *maidan* after evening. Thus the Dacca Mutiny ended."<sup>108</sup>

At Jalpaiguri on the Tista the 73rd Regiment Native Infantry was stationed; it was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Sherer. Though far from the main theatres of the Revolutionary War, "still rumours, detailed reports, letters, emissaries, found their way from time to time into the regimental lines."<sup>109</sup> On 25 June, the officer commanding was informed by his spies that the sepoys intended to rise against the Government. This report alerted Sherer who had the

<sup>106</sup> Bradley-Birt, F.B., *The Romance of an Eastern Capital* (London 1906), p. 253.

<sup>107</sup> Bradley-Birt, *op. cit.*, 257.

<sup>108</sup> Quoted by A. H. Dani, in his *Dacca* (Dacca, 1956), p. 69.

<sup>109</sup> Kaye and Malleon, *op. cit.*, III, 92.



ringleaders court-martialled and blown up by guns. The prompt steps taken by the Commander checked the disaffection for some weeks. After the suppression of the rise of the sepoys at Dacca it had become evident that they would make for Jalpaiguri where the main body of their Regiment, the 73rd, was stationed. On the night of 5 December, the detachments of the 11th Irregular Cavalry rose and moved towards Dinapur. Finding that the place was in a position to resist them they changed their mind and took the road to Purnia. The revolt could not spread further in the east because the British officers found opportunities of checking its advance by taking strong precautionary measures.

Jhansi had been annexed by Dalhousie under the pretext to which the British historians have given a rather dignified name—the Doctrine of Lapse. The widow of the deceased, “tall of stature and comely in person” was “indeed a woman whom it was dangerous to provoke;”<sup>110</sup> she found a good opportunity of taking a revenge in 1857. The sepoys stationed in Jhansi rose on 6 June 1857, the Rani assumed their leadership. Of the Europeans those who could manage to escape took shelter in the fort and offered resistance. The Rani decided “to gain her end by such a device as is most congenial to the heart of the Maratha. She sent messengers to say that all she wanted was the possession of the fort and that if the garrison would lay down their arms,” she would send them off under an escort to another station. Trusting the solemn oaths with which the messengers swore to the sincerity of their offer, the garrison walked out of the fort .... The moment they had quitted the fort the rebels fell upon them, dragged them off to a garden close by, and there murdered nearly every man, woman, and child among them.”<sup>111</sup> The Rani was now the master of the situation; she put the administrative machinery in working order.

On 22 March, 1858, Jhansi was besieged by Sir Hugh Rose. The Rani appealed to Tantia Topi who had after his withdrawal from Kanpur moved towards Kalpi and captured Charkhari. His forces had been strengthened considerably because the regiments of the Gwalior Contingent had joined him. In response to the request of the Rani, Tantia Topi marched to the relief of Jhansi. When he came within striking distance Rose attacked and defeated him (1 April). Tantia Topi's flight shook the morale of the garrison. Two days later the British forces entered Jhansi; the Rani, however, managed to effect an escape towards Kalpi. Tantia Topi also arrived there. Hugh Rose, therefore, decided to attack Kalpi and fight out a decisive action. He left Jhansi on 25 April, defeated the revolutionaries at Kunch on 5 May. He reached Gulali near Kalpi on 15 May and took about five days to establish his batteries. The battle that ensued proved to be one of the most contested actions of the War. It appeared in the beginning that the revolutionaries would come out victorious, “but the timely arrival of Camel Corps saved the day, converted defeat into victory, and enabled Sir Hugh Rose to

<sup>110</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 491.

<sup>111</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, 492.



close with glory the first part of his dashing Central India Campaign<sup>112</sup> The Rani and Tantia now proceeded towards Gwalior where they were joined by 'Ali Bahadur Khan, Nawab of Banda. Hugh Rose also marched thither. Two battles were fought at Morar and Kotah ki Sarai on June 16 and 17 respectively, the Rani died fighting bravely in the latter action. Tantia Topi and 'Ali Bahadur fled towards Jaipur; Robert Napier pursued them. They were defeated in a battle at Jaura 'Alipur. For several month after this defeat Tantia Topi was a fugitive, ultimately he was arrested on the basis of information supplied by Man Singh a Jagirdar of Gwalior, was court-martialled and hanged on 18 April, 1859. Tantia Topi was the last of the leading chiefs of the war to be captured and put to death. Firuz Shah who remained with him and was actively engaged in fighting till the last stages of the War managed to escape in disguise; Hazrat Mahal had already gone towards Nepal; Bakht Khan was killed in an action on 13 May, 1859,<sup>113</sup> the greatest of the heroes Ahmadullah Shah, had been treacherously shot in June, 1858.

(in: *A History of the Freedom Movement*, Vol. II (1831-1905), Pt. I, Karachi, pp 270-332)

<sup>112</sup> Malleon, *op. cit.*, p. 391.

<sup>113</sup> Sen, *op. cit.*, p. 371.







## THE GREAT REVOLUTION OF 1857

### THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION

#### The greased cartridge

The efforts of the Revolutionary leaders to prepare their countrymen and the Company's army for a war soon bore fruit. As has been mentioned the introduction of the Enfield Rifle, in which a greased cartridge had to be used, provided the sepoys with a genuine cause of grievance<sup>1</sup>; for the leaders of the Movement it proved to be an effective instrument of propaganda. The new rifle had been introduced at the close of 1856 and the cantonments of Dum Dum, Ambala and Sialkot were selected as depots for instruction in its use. How swiftly had the news spread that the Government had introduced the greased cartridge to spoil the faith and the caste of the Hind-Pakistani sepoys is indicated by an interesting incident which occurred in January, 1857. A low caste lascar asked a Brahmin for a drink of water from his *lota*. The Brahmin refused to give the water because he did not know to what caste the fellow belonged. "You will soon lose your caste," retorted the lascar, "as ere long you will have to bite the cartridges covered with the fat of pigs and cows." This incident was mentioned by General Hearsey, Commander, Presidency Division, in one of the two letters which he had forwarded to the Government of India on January 24, 1857; he had recommended "that the officer commanding the Rifle Depot might be authorized to obtain from the bazar whatever ingredients might be necessary, which the sepoys might be allowed to make up for themselves." The Government accepted this suggestion but before any action could be taken the symptoms of the Revolution became clear. "A few days after the story of the greased cartridges first transpired at Damdamah", writes Kaye, "the telegraph station at Barrackpur was burnt down. Then, night after night, followed other fires."<sup>2</sup> In the wake of these fires came the nocturnal meetings of the sepoys, and the excitement began to spread. By the beginning of February, it appears, reports about the new cartridge had reached Barhampur, a military station near Murshidabad.<sup>3</sup> They

<sup>1</sup> It is to be noted that "recent researches . . . prove that the lubricating mixture was actually composed of the objectionable ingredients, cow's fat and lard . . ." See Roberts, I, 431.

<sup>2</sup> Kaye and Malleon, I, 365.

<sup>3</sup> "What is this story everybody is talking about, that Government intends making the native army use cows and pigs' fat with the ammunition for their new rifles?" This question was put



were confirmed by the two detachments of the 34th Regiment, which came there on 18 and 25 February respectively. On the evening of the day following the arrival of the second detachment, the men of the 19th refused to receive the percussion caps for a parade which was to be held next morning saying, "there was a doubt how the cartridges were prepared." Colonel Mitchell, the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, went to the lines, called the Hind-Pakistani officers and explained to them that the cartridges to be served to their men had been made a year earlier, adding that those who disobeyed the orders of the officers would be severely punished. Late in the night sounds of the beating of drums and shouts were heard. The Colonel rushed to the scene and took necessary steps to quell the rising. But he was advised by his officers to withdraw his men because in that case they hoped the disturbers also would return to the lines. Mitchell acted accordingly and withdrew. On the following morning the entire Regiment fell in for the parade without any sign of insubordination.<sup>4</sup>

The Government however decided to punish them severely; their Regiment was to be disbanded. As it was feared that punishment could not be executed but in the presence of a European Regiment, a steamer, *Bentinck*, was sent to Rangoon to bring Her Majesty's 84th Regiment. Soon after this another incident occurred in Calcutta. Two sepoy<sup>s</sup> of a detachment, of 2nd of Native Infantry, on guard at Fort William, were courtmartialled and sentenced to imprisonment for 14 years for conveying a false rumour to the Subahdar commanding the Mint Guard (34th N.I.)<sup>5</sup>. This was a significant incident, and General Hearsey, Officer Commanding Barrackpur, thought that he should address his brigade. His suggestion was approved by the Governor-General, but he told him to remain careful and guarded in his words. "I am afraid," wrote Canning, "that, however brief your observations on that regiment (and they should, I think, be very brief), you will find it a nice matter to steer between exciting undue alarm and raising hopes which may be disappointed."<sup>6</sup> Fully realizing the delicate nature of his task, Hearsey issued orders for a general parade on the morning of 17 March. He began his address by warning the sepoy<sup>s</sup> of "the evil-minded and designing men who were leading them astray" and "making them instruments of their schemes of sedition," He explained to them

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by a havildar to Colonel Mitchell commanding the 19th Regiment Native Infantry early in February. Forrest, G. W. *Selections from the Letters, Despatches and other State Papers of the Government of India* (Calcutta, 1893), I, 39-41.

<sup>4</sup> Colonel Mitchell was later censured for his action in not insisting on the laying down of the arms by the "mutineers." See *State Papers*, I, Appendix A., p. XVII: Minute by the Governor-General.

<sup>5</sup> They had told the Subahdar that they had been sent to him by the Havildar-Major. "The Governor-General", they said, "is going to Barrackpore to take the magazine and there will be fighting there. The Calcutta militia are coming into the fort: you bring your guard and join them." The meaning of the message was clear. Forrest, G. W., *A History of the Indian Mutiny*, (Edinburgh and London, 1904-12), I, 16.

<sup>6</sup> Canning to Hearsey, March 14, 1857. MS. correspondence as quoted in Kaye and Malleeson, I, p. 391.



that the glazed surface of the paper in the cartridges was due to the starch used in its composition and that the fine quality paper used by Hind-Pakistan Princes was very similar to it. To prove his statement he took out a letter from his bag, which he had received from Gulab Singh of Kashmir, gave it to the officers and told them to show it to their men. Far more delicate was the question of the punishment of the 19th. Hearsey, however, could not avoid it and had to mention that it would be disbanded; "I inform you of this beforehand", he said, "because your enemies are trying to make you believe that European troops with Cavalry and Artillery will be sent here suddenly to attack you; these and such lies are fabricated and rumoured amongst you to cause trouble." In conclusion he assured his men that their religious prejudices would be safe and any one who attempted to interfere with them would be punished.

### **Barrackpur incident: Mangal Pande executed**

The 19th left Barhampur on 20 March but before it reached its destination a serious incident in the lines of the 34th added to the excitement of the sepoys at Barrackpur. On the afternoon of 29 March, a young sepoy, named Mangal Pande, put on his accoutrements and posted himself in front of the Quarter-guard. Heavily drugged with *bhang* he had lost control of himself and fired at a European Sergeant-Major. He missed the aim, but the Hind-Pakistani officers and men who were on duty did not move an inch to help the European officer. When the incident was referred to Lieutenant Baugh, the Adjutant of the Regiment, he rushed to the spot immediately, but he had hardly tightened the rein of his horse when Mangal Pande, hidden behind the station gun, fired at him. He missed the Lieutenant but wounded his horse, which threw the rider to the ground. Baugh immediately fired with his pistol, but like his adversary he also missed the aim. Both now engaged in a hand-to-hand fight, the Lieutenant being assisted by the Sergeant-Major. Mangal was now desperate and would have despatched both of them if another sepoy, Shaykh Paltu, had not seized him and averted his blows. Baugh and his companion managed to escape; Paltu had come in time to save them. The matter was reported to the General by a sepoy. Hearsey accompanied by his two sons reached the parade ground of the 34th and rushed to the spot where Mangal Pande was pacing up and down with a loaded musket in his hand. The General's defiance of all danger and Mangal's failure to get any support from his comrades convinced him that the game was up; he turned his musket upon himself, and discharged it with the pressure of his foot. He fell on the ground but the wound was not fatal; he was given medical aid and thus survived his attempt to kill himself.

On the morning of 31 March the 29th N.I. marched into Barrackpur. General Hearsey addressed a few words to them before ordering the decision about their disbandment to be read. They were asked first to pile arms and then

<sup>7</sup> Kaye and Malleson, I, 393.



take off their belts; this done they were ordered to march. At a short distance they were halted and paid their dues. They were also told that the Government had not disgraced them by stripping them of their uniforms and had decided to pay their passage home as a reward for their good conduct during their march from Barhampur. Canning explains the mildness of the decision in a letter to the Commander-in-Chief in these words: "Heavy as has been their crime—none heavier—it is not a mean or abject one; such as refusing to march to a post of danger; and the substance of their punishment is severe enough without being made to gall and rankle."<sup>8</sup> That the disbandment passed off without any incident was a source of satisfaction to the Governor-General who had specially sent a messenger to bring him a prompt report. The Government could now punish Mangal Pande. He was court-martialled and sentenced to death on 6 April; two days later he was hanged in the presence of all the troops at Barrackpur. On 10 April the Jamadar of the Guard was also court-martialled for inciting his fellow-sepoys not to help their European officer. He was also sentenced to be hanged. For some technical difficulties, however, his execution was delayed and could not be carried out before 21 April. The Government did not stop here; it decided to inflict exemplary punishments on the offenders. The next Regiment to suffer the blow was the 34th, to which Mangal Pande belonged. A special Court of Enquiry was appointed to go into the case and a decision was taken to the effect that excepting the officers and sepoy not present at Barrackpur the Regiment should be disbanded. Thus the three Companies stationed at Chittagong were exempted from the general order of disbandment which was carried out on 6 May.

### **Ambala: General Anson's address**

Before the execution of this sentence disturbing reports had come from the headquarters of the Army. Ambala, one of the depots of instruction, was apparently calm and the Commander-in-Chief believed that the sepoy stationed there were not in any way dissatisfied. In the third week of March, however, a Subahdar taunted two non-commissioned officers of the 36th Regiment, which formed the escort of the Commander-in-Chief, with having become Christians.<sup>9</sup> They reported the story to their instructor, Lieutenant Martineau. He made inquiries among the men of the depot and officially communicated his reactions to the Assistant Adjutant-General. The Commander-in-Chief, General Anson, promptly decided to inspect the depot on 25 March. After the inspection parade he addressed the Hind-Pakistani officers; Martineau translated his speech, sentence by sentence. He explained to the sepoy that their suspicions about the intention of the Government "to subvert their religion and to subject them to the loss of caste," were baseless, and expressed regret that there had been cases of

<sup>8</sup> *MS Correspondence*, quoted in Kaye and Malleon, I, 401.

<sup>9</sup> Obviously for the touching the cartridges.



the sepoys having refused to accept the assurances of their officers to the effect that cartridges with objectionable material would not be supplied to them. The need of obedience to Government was emphasized; it was their first duty. They were also told that the Government knew "how to deal with such instances of insubordination, and the Commander-in-Chief does not hesitate to say that they would be visited with the severest punishment." The same day General Anson wrote to Colonel Young: "There has been such an uneasy feeling in the depot here that I thought it right, after I had inspected it this morning, to address the Native officers and detachments on parade. It is a difficult and delicate subject to handle, but I trust that the course I have taken will produce some good."

General Anson was anxious to know the effect of his address and had ordered Martineau to send an immediate report about it. The latter accordingly wrote to the Assistant Adjutant-General that the Hind-Pakistani officers had expressed to him "their sense of the high honour done them by his Excellency, who condescended himself today to personally address them, for the purpose of quieting both their minds and those of their comrades in the army at large on the subject of rifle cartridges". The officer had however informed Lieutenant Martineau of the true position, for, he adds, "they know that the rumour is false, but they equally know, that for one man in Hindostan who disbelieves it, ten thousand believe it, and that it is universally credited, not only in their regiment, but in their villages and their homes . . . Their devotion to the service, and submission to the military authority, will inflict on them the direct and most terrible punishment they can undergo in this world."<sup>10</sup> To the Commander-in-Chief's reference that they had been "selected for this duty on account of their superior intelligence," their spokesmen clearly said that "their being selected as men of intelligence and fidelity thus becomes to them the most fatal curse. They will obey the orders of their military superiors and socially perish through their instinct of obedience." It is to be noted that the sepoys at the Rifle Depot in Ambala had not been served with the greased cartridges. They were allowed to use their own grease, but objections were now raised to the paper used for the cartridge. The Governor-General admits in a letter addressed to General Anson that "the Government was in some degree in the wrong" in the matter of the greased cartridge, but that no legitimate objections could be made with regard to the paper. The Governor-General's letter was still on its way when fires similar to those which had preceded the trouble at Barrackpur became frequent at Ambala. They caused anxiety and Courts of Enquiry to investigate the causes of fires were set up, but no information could be elicited because no one was willing to give evidence. The Commander-in-Chief was sorely puzzled and wrote to the Governor-General: "Strange that the incendiaries should never be detected. Every one is on the alert there; but still no clue to trace the offenders."<sup>12</sup> The fires at

<sup>10</sup> Young, Colonel, Kieth, *Delhi, 1857* (London and Edinburgh, 1902), p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> Kaye and Malleon, I, 409n. Martineau's letter to the Assistant Adjutant General is quoted in Cave-Browne, I, 45.

<sup>12</sup> Kaye and Malleon, I, 413.



Ambala had begun in the last week of March and continued to the beginning of May.

The growing symptoms of excitement could also be read in incidents at other places, such as the refusal of the 7th Oudh Irregular Infantry to accept the new cartridges. It was however at Meerut, one of the largest of military stations in British India and the headquarters of the Bengal Artillery, that events moved to a crisis. Meerut seems to have been an important centre of the secret activities of the Revolutionary leaders. Besides the "fires" we have recorded evidence of the agents of the Revolutionaries visiting the place probably to give final touches to their propaganda campaign. "The emissary of evil," writes Sir John Kaye, "who in some shape or other, was stalking across the country, was at Mirath in the guise of a wandering Fakir, or religious mendicant, riding on an elephant, with many followers. That he was greatly disturbing the minds of men was certain; so the Police authorities ordered him to depart. He moved; but it was believed that he went no farther than the Lines of the Native regiments."<sup>13</sup> Commissioner Willam's Narrative refers to him as "one of the many emissaries who were moving about the country appeared at Mirath in April...;" he was asked to leave the place and apparently he complied with the orders of his externment, "but, it is said, he stayed some time in the Lines of the 20th Native Infantry."<sup>14</sup> The Faqir's visit had not remained a secret, because references were made to it even in the press.<sup>15</sup>

### The storm bursts, 10 May

The outbreak of the revolution at Meerut on 10 May was precipitated by the indiscreet actions of the officers stationed there. They knew that the sepoys had been worked up and yet they dealt with them as if there was nothing unusual in what had been happening at places where Regiments of the Bengal Army were

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To find out the offenders a reward of Rs. 1000/- was notified but no clue could be found. It was however generally believed that the sepoys did it, and that it was under deliberate planning. The Joint Magistrate of the cantonment of Ambala writes to the Commissioner, Cis-Sutlej States, under 4 May, 1857: ".....and were it the act of only one or two or even a few persons the well-disposed sepoys would at once have come forward and forthwith informed; but there is an organized leagued conspiracy existing, I feel confident, and though all and every individual composing a regiment may not form part of the combination, still I am of opinion that such a league in each corps is known to exist, and such being upheld by the majority, or rather connived at, therefore it is that no single man dares to come forward and expose it." It is difficult not to agree with the arguments given above. See *Mutiny Records: Correspondence* (Lahore, 1911), VII, part I, pp 11.

<sup>13</sup> Kaye and Malleon, I, 415.

<sup>14</sup> *Meerut Narrative* (Unpublished Records) quoted in Kaye and Malleon, I, 415-16 n.

<sup>15</sup> *The Delhi Gazette* referred to his visit in its issue dated 7 May 1857 in following words: "A letter from Meerut mentions that a fakeer—painted yellow, and in sufficiently good circumstances to ride an elephant when he takes his airing—has taken up his abode near the Soorajkoond. He is said to have come from Philloor or Putteeala, and we imagine the authorities will have their eyes on him."



stationed. Even the Officer Commanding the 3rd Regiment of the Native Cavalry, Colonel Smyth, had ample opportunities of feeling the pulse of the army. Earlier in the year he had visited the fair at Hardwar where the revolt of the 19th was freely discussed.<sup>16</sup> There is evidence on record to show that discussions on religious topics were sometimes held between the British soldiers and the Hindu and Muslim sepoys of the Army. In fact one contemporary writer makes a definite statement that the sudden outburst of the Army at Meerut was the sequel of a heated religion discussion. "One day in the fasting month of the sand year of *hijrah* corresponding to the month of May of the Christian year," writes Khwajah Bashir Lakhnawi, "the Indian soldiers, the *sawars* and the *telingahs*, started discussions on religious topics; these soon developed into a quarrel; the parties rushed to arms and individuals began to fight." This is an important statement and explains the premature and precipitate outbreak of the Revolution.<sup>17</sup>

Later, Smyth, during his visit to the hill station of Mussoorie, is stated to have heard about the progress of events at Ambala. He informed the Commander-in-Chief about the dangerous state of the Army.<sup>18</sup> It is, therefore, surprising that he did not foresee any danger in calling his Regiment to parade; on the contrary, he thought that he would allay the excitement by telling them that in future they would not have to bite the cartridges.<sup>19</sup> The orders of the parade were given on 23 April for the following morning, only ninety skirmishers from different troops were to attend. Smyth was informed by the Havildar-Major that the men of the 1st Troop would not receive the cartridges. Captain H. C. Craigie, Commander of a Troop, wrote to the Adjutant: "Go at once to Smyth and tell him that the men of my troop have requested in a body that the skirmishing tomorrow morning may be countermanded ... and that the regiment will become *budnam* if they fire any cartridges..... This is a most serious matter and we may have the whole reigment in mutiny in half an hour if this be not attended to."<sup>20</sup> Smyth was, however, determined to see his orders carried out.<sup>21</sup> The parade was held and the Colonel explained the reasons for ordering it to the ninety men who were called, but when the cartridges were served, they were refused by all except five<sup>22</sup>; "they would get a bad name," was

Cf. Kaye and Malleeson, II, 32.

Lakhnawi, p. 21.

Kaye and Malleeson, II, 33.

It is interesting to note that Colonel Smyth, when later criticized for his action, stated that he had done it deliberately. By precipitating the outbreak of the revolt, he thought, he had upset the plans of the Revolutionaries for a simultaneous rising throughout the subcontinent. Cf. Kaye and Malleeson, II, 81.

*State Papers*, I, 228.

It could not have been a mere accident that fires in Meerut commenced on the night preceding the parade. Nor was it without significance that one of the first buildings set on fire was the house of a *sipahi*, Brijmohan (the son of a pig-keeper), who was a great favourite of Colonel Smyth. He had been dismissed from the Infantry for theft but had managed to get himself enlisted in the Cavalry under a different name. He had used the cartridge on the same day (23 April) and had thus earned the abomination of the sepoys. Cf. Kaye and Malleeson, II, 34-35.

For their names, see *State Papers*, I, 228.



their excuse. The Colonel made another appeal, saying: "You see the havildar-major has used one;" but the sepoy remained adamant and "I ordered the Adjutant to dismiss the men." Colonel Smyth's action was not liked by General Hewitt, the seventy year old Commander of the Meerut Division of the Army. He thought that slight discretion on his part could have easily averted the open mutiny of the Regiment. However, now that the Regiment had "committed an offence" he ordered an enquiry into the matter.<sup>23</sup> Among the witnesses who were the oldest troopers of the Regiment one at least, Mawla Bakhsh, had the "insolence of manner"<sup>24</sup> to assert that "I have doubts about the cartridges. They may look exactly like the old ones, but how do I know that pig's fat has not been smeared over them?"<sup>25</sup> The Court, however, did not pay much heed to this statement and gave their opinion that adequate cause could not be assigned for the disobedience of the Regiment. This report went to the Judge Advocate-General who recommended that all those who had refused to take the cartridges should be court-martialled. The Commander-in-Chief accepted this recommendation and necessary orders were issued for a court martial.<sup>26</sup> The tribunal met on 6 May and finished its work within three days. All the eighty-five men were found guilty by fourteen out of fifteen members of the Court and sentenced to imprisonment and hard labour for ten years. The whole trial was, to quote Kaye's expression, "a grim formality." "Every man," he writes, "felt that his condemnation was certain, and sullenly abided the issue." They did not put forward a defence; in fact, they were heading towards a Revolution.

When in due course the proceedings of the court martial came to General Hewitt he found no justification for showing any mercy to the majority of the prisoners, because "there has been no acknowledgement of error — no expression of regret—no pleading for mercy." He was, however, struck by the young age of some of them and remitted their sentence by one-half, because they had not been more than five years in the service. The sentence of all the prisoners was carried into effect on the morning of 9 May.<sup>27</sup>

The entire forces stationed at Meerut were to attend the parade to be held on the ground of the 60th Rifles, the 3rd Cavalry having been ordered to attend

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 230. The Court was comprised of the following officers:

President	Subahdar-Major Thakur Awustee (N. I.)
Members:	Subahdar-Gunga Deen Doobey (N. I.)
	Subahdar-Ram Churn (Light Cavalry)
	Subahdar-Gunnesh Singh (N. I.)
	Subahdar Goolab Khan (Light Cavalry)
	Subahdar Buxees Sing (N. I.)
	Jamadar Fyze Khan (Light Cavalry).

<sup>24</sup> Kaye and Malleon. II, 34.

<sup>25</sup> *Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry*. See *State Papers*, I, 236.

<sup>26</sup> The tribunal was comprised of 15 Indian officers of whom six were Muslims and nine were Hindus. Among the accused it may be noted forty-nine were Muslims and thirty-six were Hindus *Cf.* Kaye and Malleon, II, 35.

<sup>27</sup> *Cf.* Forest, G. W., *A History of the Indian Mutiny* (London, 1904), I, 33.



unmounted. The officers suspected trouble and had, therefore, dispersed the European troops and the Artillery in such a way that the sepoys could be instantaneously shot on the slightest show of insubordination. The eighty-five men condemned by the court martial were now brought under guard, they were in their regimental uniforms. The sentence was then read aloud, uniforms were taken off their backs; and the smiths were ordered to hammer the fetters on their ankles. "As each culprit was marched forward," says General Roberts, "he called on his comrades to rescue him, but no response came from the ranks." Evidently a response from the sepoys in the face of the precautionary arrangements would have been an act of folly. After the parade the prisoners were marched down the lines and escorted to the jail, apparently to the satisfaction of the authorities on the spot.<sup>29</sup> The folly of the course followed by the officers was however so apparent that the procedure was approved neither by the Commander-in-Chief nor by the Governor-General. Canning wrote, "The rivetting of the men's fetters on parade, occupying, as it did, several hours, in the presence of many who were already ill-deposed, and many who believed in the cartridge fable must have stung the brigade to the quick." After referring to the remarks of the Governor-General, a modern English historian writes: "No act of folly could have led to results more fatal. The native troopers, maddened by the spectacle, at once prepared for revolt from the English rule, and in order to rescue their comrades resolved to dare the worst extremity."<sup>30</sup>

One obvious result of this demonstrational method of punishment was that rumours of all sorts became strife both in the cantonment and the town. It was already in the air that two thousand fetters were ready for the Hind-Pakistani soldiers; now a rumour spread that European soldiers would suddenly attack and destroy the sepoy Regiments and that the morning parade was only the beginning and an experimental measure for a bigger and a more decisive action. News also found its way to the dinner table of the Commissioner that "the walls had been placarded with a Muhammadan proclamation calling upon the people to rise against the English."<sup>31</sup> The feeling of self-complacency had, however, completely overwhelmed the authorities and none of them took these reports seriously: they were all dismissed with "indignant belief". This gave the sepoys time to make a hasty plan.<sup>32</sup> Sunday had to be utilized: it was only on that day

<sup>28</sup> Roberts, Field-Marshal Earl, *Forty-one years in India*, (London, 1897), 1, 81.

<sup>29</sup> The same evening General Hewitt reported to the Commander-in-Chief that "the majority of the prisoners seemed to feel acutely the degradation," but "the remainder of the Native troops are behaving steady and soldierlike." *State Papers*, I, 247.

<sup>30</sup> Forrest, I, 34.

<sup>31</sup> Kaye and Malleson, II, 39.

<sup>32</sup> The European and Hind-Pakistani quarters in the cantonment of Meerut were separate: between them lay a space covered by gardens, trees and also some shops. The distance between the European and Indian barracks was enough to keep the nocturnal activities of one quarter hidden from the residents of the other. The barracks of the sepoys were to the south of the European quarters, and at a short distance to the south of the former lay the town. Thus, contact between the sepoys and the town was not only easy but could also remain a secret as



that a surprise attack could be made on the Europeans when most of them would be in their churches. In spite of the utmost efforts of the sepoys to keep their plans secret the morning of the fateful Sunday (10 May) presented signs which, though they went unnoticed at the moment were undoubtedly a pointer to the events that were to follow a few hours later. The Hind-Pakistani servants of the European barracks and their officers absented themselves from duty; though a significant circumstance, it was considered to be just accidental. In the sepoys' barracks, on the other hand, unwanted activity could be noticed; men of all types were coming from the neighbouring villages and were trying to arm themselves as best as they could. The morning services having passed off quietly, the European population was lulled into lounging through the heats of the summer midday. As the sun went down the chaplains began to prepare themselves for the evening service. The wife of one of them was warned by a devoted nurse that there was danger and precautions were necessary; "O, madam," said the poor woman, "don't go to the church this afternoon." These words were uttered just at the moment when the chaplain was ready to enter his carriage which was at the door. "Hearing this singular request," says he, "addressed to my wife I naturally enough enquired, 'why should not madam go to church, this evening?' The servant replied, 'Because there will be a fight.' I asked, 'Who will fight?' The woman answered, 'The sepoys.' Of course, I could not give any credence to such a statement."<sup>33</sup> The reaction of Mrs. Rotton was different. She was frightened and unnerved by the warning; "to quiet my wife's fear, I consented to both the children accompanying us in the carriage, together with this faithful servant, who was to take charge of them in the church compound while divine service was being solemnized."<sup>34</sup> The chaplain soon found that the maid-servant's warning was not baseless; the "sounds of musketry and pillars of smoke ascending into the air" convinced him that "mischief had already commenced".

The sepoys did not know that in view of the increasing heat of the season the evening church parade had been fixed half-an-hour later than on the previous Sunday. This, according to some authorities, saved the Europeans from total destruction in Meerut. It has been argued that if the sepoys had waited till the 60th Rifles were gathered into the church nothing could have prevented them

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far as the European soldiers were concerned. When the storm burst the people of the town "were armed and ready for the onslaught before the sepoys commenced the attack: plainly showing how perfectly they were aware of what was to happen." Roberts. I, 85.

A contemporary Hindu writer tells us that the sepoys had meetings and consultations among themselves and also with the people of the city. He writes: "The friends of the accused spent the whole night of the 9th and morning of the 10th in consulting the sepoys of the 11th and 20th Regiments and also men of the bazaar as to what were the best ways and means of freeing the prisoners." Pundit Kanhayya Lal *Maharbah-i-A'zim* (Newal Kishore Press, Lucknow, 1916), p. 43.

<sup>33</sup> Rotton, John Edward Wharton, *The Chaplain's Narrative of the Siege of Delhi* (London, 1858), p. 3.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*



from overpowering the crowded soldiers.<sup>35</sup> It was about half past six that the sepoys of "the 20th Regiment of N. I. turned out with arms."<sup>36</sup> The 3rd Regiment of Light Cavalry rushed to the jail, broke into the cells and liberated the eighty-five men, who had been imprisoned after the court martial, along with the other prisoners numbeing about 1200.<sup>37</sup>

Meanwhile the Infantry Regiments had become active. Some of their officers rushed to the lines and tried to persuade their men to desist from the course they had taken. Colonel Finnis, a good soldier and a popular officer, was addressing his men and imploring them to be faithful, when a young recruit of the 20th fired at him and wounded his horse; another shot hit him and then followed a volley; the Colonel fell dead, 'riddled . . . with bullets.'<sup>38</sup> This was the signal for a general rising of the sepoys, which soon spread over almost the whole of the cantonment area. With the coming darkness of the night they started putting the houses to fire. The situation worsened because the riff-raffs from the town and the neighbouring villages started plundering the people. The worst offenders, to quote S. N. Sen's words, "came from the slums of the city . . . The city police readily joined hands with them. The officiating Kotwal, Dhanna Singh, was a Gujar and his men came mostly from that lawless tribe. At this crisis he had no control over them and their passion for plunder got better of their good sense. The unsuspecting wayfarers were ruthlessly robbed and murdered and Indian citizens suffered at their hands equally with the Europeans. The house of Babu Birbal was burnt down and the wine shop of Kailash Chandra Gosh, a Bengali, was attacked."<sup>39</sup> This, however, is only a part of the picture. There are cases on record to show that the horrors of the night were interspersed by signal deeds of individual mercy and sympathy. The graphic and often exaggerated accounts of the incidents of this night present an overdrawn and misleading picture of the outbreak of the "mutiny" at Meerut. The stories related by some of the contemporary writers and the views of later historians formed on their basis leave an impression that the sepoys had become madcaps and were out for total destruction. Gough, for instance, refers to the activities of the sepoys as those of "absolutely a maddened crowd of fiends and devils" . . .<sup>40</sup> Sir John Kaye calls it a "night of horror such as History has rarely recorded;"<sup>41</sup> Forrest records that "half mad with excitement and aided by the scum of the city, the sepoy began the work

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Forrest, I, 35n.

<sup>36</sup> General Hewitt's report to the Adjutant-General, dated 11 May. See *State Papers*, I, 249.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.* Also see Ball, I, 57.

Kaye does not accept this view. "The troopers of the 3rd Cavalry," he writes, "at that time had no other work in hand but the rescue of their comrades. The other prisoners in the goal were not released, the buildings were not fired and the European goaler and his family were left unmolested." Kaye and Malleison, II, 43.

<sup>38</sup> Gough, General Sir H., *Old Memories* (Edinburg, 1897), p. 39; also see Kaye and Malleison, II, 44.

<sup>39</sup> Sen, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

<sup>40</sup> Gough, General Sir, H., *Old Memories* (Edinburgh, 1897), pp. 27-28.

<sup>41</sup> Kaye and Malleison, II, 51.



of pillage and murder."<sup>42</sup> Instances of similar comments could be easily multiplied but hard facts of history do not present such a dark picture as these writers would like us to imagine. The casualties were by no means considerable,<sup>43</sup> and for plundering the main responsibility rests on the Gujars and other riff-raffs of the city and the neighbouring villages.

The aim of the sepoys was to overthrow the administrative machinery, rather than murder or plunder the people; "they did not attack their own officers, but warned them to get away, telling them the Company's '*raj*' was at an end."<sup>44</sup> This is fully borne out by the conduct of the sepoys, although they were in a state of excitement. They set fire to the officers' bungalows and Government buildings, on which they could lay their hands, and cut the electric wire,<sup>45</sup> with a view to paralyze the administration, which, of course was the object of the Revolution.<sup>46</sup> It would be difficult to ignore the fact that soon after the commencement of the rising the cry was raised. "Quick, brother, quick: Delhi, Delhi!"<sup>47</sup> The 3rd Light Cavalry was soon on the ride and "scarcely drawing rein on the way, were pricking on, in hot haste, all through the moonlight night for Delhi." Behind them toiled on the footmen of the Infantry Regiments. Their march to Delhi was not systematic; small parties seem to have been on the road throughout the night. A Hindu businessman of Delhi, who was on his way to Meerut, saw a party of the *sawars* near the Hindan river soon after midnight and met another, four miles further on the road.<sup>48</sup> Early in the morning the advance

<sup>42</sup> Forrest, I, 36.

Sen also holds the same view: "...there is no clear account of further events except that there was a mad orgy of arson, pillage and murder in which no distinction of age or sex was made." Sen, *op. cit.* p. 60.

<sup>43</sup> According to Field-Marshal Roberts "besides Colonel Finnis, seven officers, three officers' wives, two children, and every stray European man, woman and child in the outskirts of the cantonments were massacred." Roberts, I, 85.

The number of stray cases could not have been large because once it was known that the sepoys had revolted the Europeans must have rushed back to their houses or other places of safety. Rev. T. C. Smyth, a protestant chaplain posted at Meerut, says: Mr. Rotton and I have buried thirty-one of the murdered, but there are others whose bodies have not as yet been brought in." See Ball, I, 65.

<sup>44</sup> Cf Roberts, I, 84.

We have on record a number of incidents which indicate the temper of the Revolutionaries. It is beyond doubt that they were out not for the total destruction of European life but for a violent Revolution. The wife of an officer of the 3rd Cavalry, in a letter, dated 14 May, writes: "Eliza and I were driving to the church, when we saw rioters pouring into the road, armed with clubs and swords. They warned us back, and we reached home safely." Quoted in Ball, I, 60.

<sup>45</sup> General Hewitt's Report (para. 4) in *State Papers*, I, 250.

<sup>46</sup> The view expressed by some writers that the sepoys had been overwhelmed by the fear that the European soldiers would destroy them has been accepted by Sen. He writes: "Fear had driven the sepoys wild but the worst outrages were not committed by them." See p. 60. Far more correct, however, is Kaye's remark: "It is hard to believe that on that Sabbath evening a single Native soldier had discharged his piece without a belief, in his inmost heart, that he was going straight to martyrdom. See Kaye, II, 57.

<sup>47</sup> Forrest, I, 36.

<sup>48</sup> Sen, p. 64.



parties were before the Mughul capital of Delhi, and by 8 o'clock they were knocking at the gate of the Red Fort.<sup>49</sup>

### Indecision of the European officers

An important issue connected with the outbreak of the revolt at Meerut is the inaction of the Europeans and their failure to go in pursuit of the Revolutionaries on their march to Delhi. The number of European forces stationed at Meerut was by no means inconsiderable; their officers have consequently been censured for cowardice and indecision. It would be unfair, however, not to consider the circumstances under which they worked. The sepoys were thoroughly acquainted with the military system of the Company and the weaknesses of their officers. They had made their plans, keeping these factors in view, and it was for this reason that their tactics proved to be so effective in paralyzing the efforts of the European officers. Colonel Smyth, Commander of the 3rd Light Cavalry, proved unequal to the task. He did not immediately rush to his Lines on hearing about the rise of his men; on the contrary, he went to the Commissioner's house, then to the General's and lastly to the Brigadier's and thus "he went everywhere but to his Regiment." To have avoided going to the Lines was undoubtedly an act of cowardice, but Smyth probably had guessed what later history proved that he would have surely met the same fate as Colonel Finnis when talking to his men.<sup>50</sup> However, Smyth passed the night at the headquarters of the Division under the safety of field-guns and rifles.

Brigadier Wilson, Commander of the station, behaved in a different manner. The moment he heard of the outbreak he took his horse and galloped to the parade ground of the Rifles, issuing orders at the same time that the Artillery and the Carabineers were to join him there. He ordered the Rifles who had assembled to go to the church to arm themselves and reassemble. When they got ready for action he sent one Company to the Collector's court to save the Treasury and another to protect the barracks. In the meantime the Artillery also arrived.<sup>51</sup> Leading them and the remaining Companies of the Rifles he marched down upon the Lines of the Native Infantry in search of the "mutineers". But there was not a single person in the Lines; they had dispersed, "in what direction we had no means of ascertaining, it being quite dark at the time, the moon not rising until nearly nine o'clock." Wilson continues: "I requested the Major-General Hewitt's orders as to what he would further wish done. At the same time I gave my opinion that from the hubbub and noise proceeding from the Sadar and city, the sepoys had moved round in the direction of the European portion of

<sup>49</sup> *Memoirs of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan* (ed. S. Moinul Haq, Karachi, 1958), p. 1.

<sup>50</sup> The example of Captain Carnegie and his subaltern, Clarke, has been quoted as an argument against Smyth. Carnegie was able to keep his troops under control and had made an attempt to rescue the prisoners in the jail.

<sup>51</sup> The Carabineers had lost the way and could join Wilson only when he was returning from the N. I. Lines.



the cantonment (this was my firm conviction at the time), and recommended that the brigade should march back for its protection, it being so weakly guarded." General Hewitt accepted the recommendation and the brigade was marched back. What puzzled, almost bewildered, the European officers was the fact that on their march back past the Sadr Bazar and the blazing bungalows "no armed men were seen." Wilson adds that only a few unarmed plunderers were found there, "the rest having vanished on the approach of the brigade."<sup>52</sup> Not being aware of the plans of the Revolutionaries and prejudiced by the idea that they had done all that under a mortal fear of being annihilated by the Europeans, it is no wonder that it did not occur to Hewitt, Willson or any other officer on the spot that the sepoys could have gone to Delhi. A junior officer offered to go after them with a squadron of his troops and some Horse Artillery. The offer was not accepted, because, Rotton truly points out, "our military authorities were paralysed. No one knew what was best to do, and nothing was accordingly done."<sup>53</sup>

By their premature rising, however, the sepoys at Meerut had anticipated the course of the Revolution. They did not realize that they had done great harm to their cause, but in marching to Delhi they adopted the only right course under the circumstances.

### DELHI: 11 MAY

#### The Meerut sepoys proceed to Delhi

The sepoys at Meerut seem to have decided to go to Delhi after some discussion.<sup>54</sup> It was the capital of the Mughul Emperor who still occupied the throne and claimed *de jure* sovereignty over vast territories. True, Bahadur Shah was no more than a monarch in name, depending upon a *pish-kash* (lit. a present) from the Company; but his ancestors had governed the people of the subcontinent with great success and had made a remarkable contribution to its civilisation. The Mughul throne had become almost a sacred institution, and its occupant an object of universal respect. The eighty-two year old Emperor, Bahadur Shah, was greatly handicapped by the circumstances in which he was passing his days. Nevertheless, it was inconceivable that if the subcontinent was to be ruled by a Hind-Pakistani he could be a person other than the occupant of the Mughul throne. For more than a century the Mughul Emperors had been puppets in the hands of ambitious ministers or powerful vassals, yet, it had never occurred to any of them to bring the Timurid dynasty to an end. Even the British authorities had

<sup>52</sup> Wilson's explanation submitted to the Headquarters dated 18 October, 1857. See *State Papers* I, 260-62.

<sup>53</sup> Rotton, p. 7.

<sup>54</sup> "Some suggested that they should set off in a body for Rohilkhand; others preferred the imperial city, only forty miles away." Sen, p. 63. The suggestion of Rohilkhand as a possible destination indicates that the Meerut sepoys knew that it was one of the strongholds of the Movement.



considered it unwise to close the chapter of the *de jure* sovereignty of the Emperor. The public crier still prefaced the proclamation of the Company's orders with the words: "People belong to God, the Empire belongs to the Emperor, and the order is from the Company Bahadur."<sup>55</sup> To an Englishman the contents of the public crier's proclamations may have appeared meaningless, but the Hind-Pakistanis fully understood its significance: the Empire *did* belong to the Emperor, no matter who governed it on his behalf or even against his will. The Meerut sepoys knew that after the overthrow of the Company's authority a new Government would have to be set up and nowhere could this be done more conveniently than in the historic palace of Shahjahan. Other considerations also went in favour of Delhi: it was a fortified city with a wall, and a ditch surrounding it and had considerable stores of munition, and lastly, the number of European soldiers there was negligible. Comparatively speaking, Delhi was a centrally situated town, and since the establishment of Muslim rule in upper Hind-Pakistan early in the thirteenth century it had been the seat of the Government except for some short intervals. This had given it a sanctity in the eyes of the people: besides, for centuries it had been the chief centre of the cultural, political, and economic life of the Muslims.<sup>56</sup>

Delhi had changed its site and topography, as also its name, under the various dynasties of Muslim rulers. The town which became the centre of the Revolution of 1857 was known as Shahjahanabad after its builder, Emperor Shahjahan. It lay, like its predecessors, on the right bank of the Jamuna: the other three sides were surrounded by stone and brick wall and a wide ditch nearly twenty-four feet deep. The wall was pierced by a number of Gates; among these the Kashmir Gate in the north, the Kabul and Lahore Gates in the west and the Delhi Gate in the south were important: on the eastern side a little to the south of the Red Fort was the Rajghat Gate. To the north of the Fort, and not far from it was the Calcutta Gate which commanded the passage to the bridge of boats. The Gates were built of stone and had quarters for city guards. The Kashmir Gate was the main exit of the city towards the north, and as such the nearest entrance to it from the side of the famous Ridge and the British cantonments. Naturally, therefore, it became the most important scene of fighting between the Revolutionaries and their British besiegers.<sup>57</sup>

Within the town the Red Fort (*Lal Qil'ah*) the residence of the Emperor, was undoubtedly the main centre of activity. After fifty long and dreary years of

Zaka Allah, Khan Bahadur Shams al-'Ulama Muhammad, *Tarikh-i-Urugh-i-Ahd-i-Saltanat-i-Inglishyah-i-Hind* (Delhi, 1904), p. 662.

In medieval Persian literature, Delhi is often mentioned as *hadrat*, an honorific title used for persons commanding respect. See, for instance, al-Kirmanî, Muhammad Mubarak al-'Alawî, *Siyar al-Awliya* (Delhi, 1302 H.) p. 581.

In later works there are numerous references to the high status of Delhi as a centre of cultural activities. Some of these may be seen in *Fughan-i-Dihli* (ed. by Kawkab, T. H., Lahore, 1954).

"The Cashmere Gate had been renewed not many years before the outbreak by Colonel Edward Smith of the Engineers." Metcalfe, Charles Theophilus, *Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi* (London, 1898), p. 23.



negotiation between the Emperor and the Company on the question of the former's status and privileges, the jurisdiction of the descendant of 'Alamgir had shrunk to the area covered by this fortress. Shah 'Alam II and after him, his two successors always maintained that the *de jure* sovereignty vested in the Emperor and that the Company was governing the Empire on his behalf. The British statesmen had, however, continuously followed the policy of gradually clipping the privileges of the Emperor; ultimately they had reduced him to a mere figurehead.<sup>58</sup>

### The sepoys enter the city

Broken by age, worries and frustration, Bahadur Shah tried to console his injured heart by spending most of his time in prayers and writing poetry. No doubt, he was interested in Sufism and had actually started enlisting disciples<sup>59</sup>, but it would be wrong to conclude that he had no interest in safeguarding the prestige of the Empire or restoring it to its former position. In the course of his efforts to retain his sovereignty his feeling had been deeply injured by the attitude of the British authorities. It was, therefore, obvious that he would always welcome an opportunity of throwing off the yoke of their control. This opportunity came to him on the morning of 11 May, 1857; after his morning prayers he was engaged in his *wazifah* (devotions) in the *Muthamman Burj* when he was suddenly disturbed by the shouts of the troopers.<sup>60</sup> The *sawars*, now clamouring for admittance, were an advanced party of the 3rd Light Cavalry; "scarcely drawing rein on the way" they had managed to cover in the night the forty odd miles that separated Meerut from Delhi. In the early hours of the day they crossed the Jamuna by the bridge of boats, having set fire to the toll house which lay on the left bank of the river.<sup>61</sup> As the door of the passage leading down the riverside was closed, the troopers addressed the Emperor from below the walls of the Fort. In reply to enquiries made by Hakim Ahsan Allah Khan and others who had been directed by the Emperor to meet the troopers they related

<sup>58</sup> See chapter I, for negotiations.

<sup>59</sup> The famous poet Ghalib refers to this in the following lines:

شبلی از منبر دہد آواز عشق  
شاہ ما بر تخت گوید راز عشق  
شای و درویشی این جا ہا ہم است  
بادشاہ عہد قطب عالم است

(Tr.— Shibli talks of (divine) love from the pulpit; our Emperor speaks on the secrets of love from the Throne.

Here kingship and mendicancy are united together; the Ruler of the day is the *qutb* of world.)

<sup>60</sup> Zahir Dihlawi. *Dastan-i-Ghadr*. (Lahore, 1955) p. 70.

<sup>61</sup> For some interesting details see *The Trial of Muhammad Bahadur Shah* (ed. by H. L. O. Garrett, Lahore 1932).



the circumstances under which they had risen and appealed to the Emperor, crying, "Help O King! We pray for assistance in our fight for the faith."<sup>62</sup>

Bahadur Shah who was completely taken by surprise<sup>63</sup> told the troopers, that he was a mere *faqir*, passing his days in retirement, and had neither money nor forces to assist them. In the meantime the Commandant of the Palace, Captain Douglas, having arrived at the scene, the Emperor came to the *Diwan-i-'Am* and asked him to do something. Douglas offered to go downstairs and speak to the *sawars*, but Hakim Ahsan Allah stopped him and said, "You have no armed soldiers with you. They have firearms. You oughtn't go near them."<sup>64</sup> Douglas then went to the balcony and asked the *sawars* not to annoy the Emperor. Baffled in their attempt to enter the Fort at this point they went to the Calcutta Gate which was also closed. They next tried the Rajghat Gate, where the doors were opened to receive them.<sup>65</sup> Referring to the first batch of the Revolutionaries who entered the city, Sayyid Mubarak Shah says that they were the seven troopers of the 3rd Cavalry who had burnt the toll house before crossing the river. "As they rode on," adds Kaye, "with the cry of '*Dim, Dim*,' they were followed by an excited Muhammadan rabble."<sup>66</sup> They marched along the road which passed below the *Sunahri Masjid*<sup>67</sup> and killed Doctor Chaman Lall, a Hindu convert to Christianity. This was perhaps the first act of violence, although Zahir says that a priest who lived in a house on that road was killed before the doctor.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>62</sup> Holmes, p. 105.

Mubarak Shah who was kotwal of Delhi during the Revolution, says that the Emperor offered to do "his utmost to get their crime pardoned". In reply the *sawars* said: "...we have already commenced a *jihad* and have come to Delhi considering you the Mahomedan King. You will see what will happen." I. O. MS. of R. M. Edward's English translation of Mubarak Shah's narrative of the seige of Delhi, ff. 7-8.

<sup>63</sup> Evidently he had no knowledge of the premature outbreak at Meerut.

<sup>64</sup> *Memoirs*, p. 1.

<sup>65</sup> Who opened the Rajghat Gate to let the Revolutionaries in is a mystery. Kaye, without quoting his authority, says, it "was opened to them by the Muhammadans of Thauba-Bazaar." Kaye and Malleson, II, 58.

Zahir holds the Hindus to be responsible for it; they were returning from their morning bath in the Jamuna and finding it closed they asked the guards to open it. When the guards refused to comply with their demand they broke the lock and entered the Gate by force. Zaka Allah says that a 'disloyal' *najib* did it. He also speaks of a rumour that a mysterious person dressed in green came to the Gate, opened it and disappeared. Mubarak Shah corroborates Zaka Allah's version that the Gate was opened by a *najib*. Zaka Allah, p. 410; Zahir Dihlawi, p. 86. Mubarak Shah, f. 6.

<sup>66</sup> Kaye and Malleson, II, 58.

<sup>67</sup> Sunahri Masjid: There were at least three mosques in Delhi known by this name. The one mentioned here is situated at a distance of about one hundred yards from the Fort. It was built by Jawid Khan in the time of Emperor Ahmad Shah (1748-54). It was called 'Golden Mosque' because originally its three domes and towers were covered with gold plate. These domes were repaired by Bahadur Shah in 1852. For a description of the mosque see Ahmad, Bashir al-Din, *Waqi'at-i-Dar al-Hukumat-i-Dihli*, Shamsi Press, Agra, 1919, II, 118-122.

<sup>68</sup> Zahir Dihlawi, p. 87.



### Commissioner Fraser and some other Europeans killed

The reports of the arrival of troopers from Meerut had now spread all over the city; the officers were alerted but they found themselves helpless. The Commissioner, Simon Fraser, on hearing the report of these occurrences, rushed towards the Fort to inform the Commandant and persuade the sipahi guards of the city to remain loyal.<sup>69</sup> Finding that Captain Douglas was with the Emperor, Fraser returned to the Calcutta Gate, leaving a message that the Commandant should follow him. Soon after Fraser's arrival there, other officers, too, came in and joined him; Metcalfe came from the Magazine where he had gone to obtain a couple of guns for guarding the bridge; subsequently Hutchinson and Douglas also arrived there. It was however, all too late now; the troopers had crossed the bridge and held possession of the Gate.

Fraser was trying to argue with the troopers when one of them fired at him, but he missed the aim. Fraser seized the musket of a *najib*, who was nearby, shot dead the leaders of the party, entered the buggy and proceeded to the Lahore Gate of the Fort; Douglas, who had also been with him, threw himself into the ditch.<sup>70</sup> Fraser managed to enter the window of the Gate and had it locked; Douglas, having been severely wounded, was carried into the Palace by a few *chaprasis*, who had followed him, and was taken upstairs. Fraser, however, stayed<sup>71</sup> downstairs and tried in vain to make an appeal to the Revolutionaries to stop violence. As he was addressing the noisy crowd with a sword in his hand "a man named Mughul Beg, an orderly of the Palace Guards, rushed upon him and clove his cheek to the bone."<sup>72</sup> The excited crowd now forced their way upstairs into the apartments where Douglas and Hutchinson were killed along with their

<sup>69</sup> Mu'inal-Din says that Hutchinson, Collector and Magistrate of Delhi, was informed by Baldeo Singh, Daru Shah of the Jamuna Bridge that "he had just received information that there had been a fight between the European and native troops in Meerut, and that the latter were marching straight upon Delhi, .... The Collector directed him to return to his post and have the gate leading to the bridge, closed, while he himself rushed to the Commissioner's house, woke him up from his sleep and told him all that was happening. The *chaprasis* (peons) at the court told Mu'in al-Din that Fraser had received an urgent letter from Meerut on the previous night but as he was feeling drowsy he thrust it into his pocket and went to sleep." *T. N. N.*, pp. 41-42; also see, Cave-Browne, I, 61.

<sup>70</sup> Douglas had left the Fort after his interview with the Emperor and seems to have joined Fraser somewhere outside it. Mubarak Shah does not mention his leaving the Fort, but he says that from the *Diwan i Khas* he went to his quarters (within the Fort) where Fraser had already arrived. (f. 10) Cave-Browne, however, definitely says that the Commandant went to the Calcutta Gate where the officers met, Hutchinson also having arrived there. See Vol. I, p. 61.

<sup>71</sup> According to Hakim Ahsan Allah he went upstairs and later came down to address the crowd. *Memoirs*, p. 2.

<sup>72</sup> Kaye and Malleeson, II, 60. Kaye relies for this version on the statements made by two witnesses, Bakhtawar Singh and Kishan Singh, at the trial of Mughul Beg in 1862. Mubarak Shah is positive that "an Afghan Khas-bardar of the King named Khaliq-Dad Khan struck him with his *tulwar* wounding him severely on the face...." (f. 9). At the trial of Bahadur Shah it was also mentioned that the first blow was struck by a seal-engraver, named Haji; Jiwan Lal mentions two names, Mughul Beg and Karlik Beg. *T. N. N.* p. 80; *Trial*, p. 238.



guests. Douglas had sent word to Hakim Ahsan Allah Khan to come to his rescue. When the Hakim accompanied by Sharif al-Dawlah, *Wakil* of the Emperor, arrived at the spot he found the Commandant lying on a coach. The latter asked him "to get me quickly two *palkis* and some men from the king" for the ladies; Fraser who was going downstairs asked for two guns. On Ahsan Allah Khan's return to the *Diwan-i-Khas* the *palkis* were sent to the Commandant and orders were given that the guns should also be sent. In the meantime, however, all Europeans in the apartments of Douglas had been killed.

The sepoys, now nearly fifty in number, forced their way to the *Diwan-i-Khas* and loudly proclaimed their arrival in these words: "We have come to fight for our religion and to pay our respect to his Majesty." The Emperor came out and pleaded his helplessness: "I have neither troops, magazine or treasury. I am not in a condition to join any one." They said: "only give us your countenance (*hamar i sar par hath rakhuji*), we will provide every thing." Bahadur Shah left the place quietly; the *sawars* now retired to the *Mahtab Bagh*,<sup>73</sup> which became the rendezvous of the Revolutionary soldiers.

### The sepoys seize control of the town

Outside the Fort conditions had become worse. Some batches of the sepoys had marched into the Daryaganj quarter and set fire to the houses of the Europeans and Indian Christians. The machinery of Government broke down and the riff-raffs of the city started a campaign of loot. The shops in the bazaars were hurriedly closed by their owners and the city was soon in a state of anarchy. It is to be noted, however, that the sepoys, at least an overwhelming majority of them, were fully conscious of the fact that loot and plunder on a large scale would defeat the very purpose of the Revolution. Zahir reproduces an interesting dialogue between the 'rebel *sawars*' and some of the Emperor's servants. The former asked the latter to make necessary arrangements for the supply of provisions. When it was pointed out to them that no arrangements could be made as long as the city was in a state of confusion the sepoys offered to stop arson and loot. Accordingly four leading citizens accompanied by the *sawars* and the servants of the Emperor went to the Kotwali and asked the public crier to proclaim throughout the city that His Majesty had issued orders that plundering must be stopped at once and that anyone found guilty would be treated and punished as a criminal.<sup>74</sup> The result was that in no time the shops were reopened

<sup>73</sup> To this version of Hakim Ahsan Allah may be added the incident related by Zahir that the *sawars* were infuriated at the sight of the cloth which had been brought for the coffin of the English officers. They changed hot words with the Hakim and Mahbub 'Ali Khan, the chief eunuch. Zahir, p. 101; *Memoirs*, pp. 2-3.

<sup>74</sup> The proclamation began with the words: "People belong to God, the Empire belongs to the Emperor, the order is from the Emperor". This is significant because it gives an indication of the mind of the Revolutionaries: the Company's authority to govern on behalf of the Emperor had come to an end. Cf. Zahir, pp. 101-103.



and the people resumed their normal activities in the *bazaars*. Hakim Ahsan Allah sent Zahir Dihlawi and Risaldar Mazhar Allah Beg to go round the main quarters of the city and see if conditions had improved. "Both of us" writes Zahir, "rode through the *bazaar* right up to the *Fathpur Masjid* and found that conditions in the town were gradually becoming normal and some shops had already reopened and were under guard; people were buying and selling things and the sepoys paid for what they took from the shop-keepers."<sup>75</sup>

By forenoon several Regiments of Infantry besides the troopers of the 3rd Cavalry had arrived from Meerut and joined their comrades; the sepoys of the 38th N. I. who were on duty in the city had already come over to their side. Having killed the European officers and some newly-converted Christians, on whom they could lay their hands, they now fell upon the Delhi Bank which was situated in the heart of the city close to the *Chandni Chawk*. Its manager, Beresford, his wife and their five children, had taken refuge on the roof of an outbuilding and closed its staircase. The Revolutionaries, however, scaled the walls in the rear of the building and overpowered their victims; the Bank was thoroughly plundered. Zaka Allah says that bags of money were carried away even by pious-looking men,<sup>76</sup> which, however were later seized by the Revolutionary forces. The next public building to suffer was the *Delhi Gazette Press*. The startling news that the Meerut "mutineers" were on their way to Delhi had been published in what they called *Delhi Gazette Extras*; by noon the printers who had announced the crisis succumbed to it. Besides other property the sepoys seized the type of the Press, which could easily be turned into bullets. The Church was also attacked but, significantly enough, it was not damaged or plundered; only the bells were torn off and the monumental slabs removed from the walls.

### Delhi Cantonment

The military authorities in the cantonment had received information about the arrival of the Revolutionaries fairly early.<sup>77</sup> Without losing time they

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

The Revolutionaries, particularly the troopers of the 3rd Cavalry, scrupulously avoided plunder; "the Cavalry mutineers from Meerut, as they marched through the streets of Delhi, refused to plunder ..." Norton, J. B., *The Rebellion in India* (London, 1857), p. 14.

The Hindu Gujars of the neighbouring villages, on the other hand, had rushed into the city and started a campaign of loot; they were joined by the riff-raffs of the town. See, Ball, I, 74; Mu'in al-Din definitely states that bands of Gujars had come from the villages of Wazirabad and Chandrawal; "Metcalf House was plundered by the Zemindar of Chandrawal." *T.N.N.*, p. 54.

<sup>76</sup> Zaka Allah, p. 414.

<sup>77</sup> Captain Tytler of the 38th N. I. giving evidence at the trial of the Emperor said: "On the morning of the 11th May, I think about 9 o'clock one of my servants rushed into the room and said Lieutenant Holland had sent over to say that troops were marching on Delhi." *Trial*, p. 168.



took action but their efforts, like those of the civilian officers also met with failure. Unlike Meerut, there were no European troops at Delhi. The cantonment was situated near the village of Rajpur beyond the Ridge. Here at the early sunrise parade the proceedings of the court martial of Iswari Pande had been read to the troops—the 38th, the 54th and the 74th Regiments. This had aroused a murmur of disapprobation, but the European officers did not think it worth taking any notice. Nor had any serious attention been paid to the fact that the Indian officers of the Regiments in Delhi, who had sat on the court martial at Meerut, could have brought with them information and reports of the disaffection which was fast spreading among the sepoys. It was, however, certain that on the previous evening a carriage had arrived in the Delhi cantonment; it had brought sepoys, but they were not in their regimental uniforms. This carriage had passed by the house of Captain Tytler of the 38th N.I. He had sent his servant to see if the Subahdar-Major of the Regiment, who had gone to Meerut to sit on the court, was in the carriage. The servant had reported: "there are a great number of natives in the carriage from Meerut, but none belonging to our regiment..."<sup>78</sup> Jat Mal, a news writer, said in his evidence at the trial of the Emperor that the arrival of the soldiery from Meerut was expected in the palace. "Letters came in from Meerut on Sunday, bringing intelligence that 82 soldiers had been imprisoned, and that a serious disturbance was to take place in consequence. Owing to this the guards at the gate of the Palace made no secret of their intentions, but spoke openly of what they expected to occur, which was that some of the troops, after mutinying at Meerut would come over to Delhi."<sup>79</sup>

Perhaps it is to the bearers of these letters that the author of the *Red Pamphlet* refers when he says: "There can be no doubt that on that afternoon they matured their plans for a rise; messengers were despatched to Delhi to inform the regiments there of the projected move, and to warn them to be ready to receive them on the 11th or 12th."<sup>80</sup> It is rather surprising that most of the historians have not laid emphasis on this aspect of the problem. The conduct and behaviour of the men in the Regiments posted in Delhi and their fraternization with the sepoys who had come from Meerut clearly indicates that they did not only know what was going to happen in the cantonment on that evening, but were also prepared for active participation in the Revolution.<sup>81</sup> The English historian, Sir John Kaye,

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Kaye confirms this in these words: ".....before the work of the toilet was at an end our people were startled by the tidings that the Native Cavalry from Mirath were forcing their way into the city." Kaye, and Malleeson, Vol. II, p. 63.

<sup>78</sup> Trial, p. 168.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., p. 123.

<sup>80</sup> Malleeson, Colonel G. B., *The Mutiny of the Bengal Army by one who served under Sir Charles Napier*, commonly known as the *Red Pamphlet* (London, 1858), p. 36.

<sup>81</sup> Mubarak Shah describes the meeting of the Hind-Pakistani Regiments in these words: "About this time the three Native Infantry Regiments which had been stationed at Delhi, viz. the 74th, the 54th and 38th, were marched down the Kashmere gate with the object of expelling the Meerut Mutineers from the city. When the 54th had gone a short distance within the walls some of the 3rd cavalry appeared and on seeing the regiment their leader rode out in advance



is right when he says: "What was said or done in the Lines on that evening and during the ensuing night can only be conjectured. But the following morning found every regiment ripe for revolt."<sup>82</sup>

The 54th commanded by Colonel Ripley was the first Regiment to be ordered out for service and move in the direction of the Kashmir Gate. Two of its Companies were left behind with Captain De Teisseir to bring the two guns which were to go with the Regiment to the city. Not far from the Kashmir Gate was the Main-guard where some men of the 38th were on duty under Captain Wallace. By the time that the 54th reached the Main-guard the Revolutionaries had also arrived there and won over the men of the 38th. The latter not only refused to carry out Wallace's orders to fire upon the "mutineers", but insulted him by sneering at him. Ripley now ordered his men of the 54th to fire upon the Revolutionary troopers of the 3rd Cavalry, who had assumed a threatening attitude. They did fire but only in the air; while the Revolutionaries succeeded in killing six officers. Ripley is, however, stated to have declared that he was bayoneted by his own men.<sup>83</sup> De Teisseir's two guns arrived at the scene, but only when the tragedy was over: the Revolutionary troopers had by now retired into the city with the sepoys of the Infantry Regiments. The guns were, however, posted at the Main-guard.

Meanwhile Major Paterson who was now at the Main-guard directed Wallace to rush to the cantonment and bring more succour. The 74th commanded by Major Abbot was accordingly ordered to march down to the Main-guard where it soon arrived with another two guns. Here they anxiously waited for help which, they still thought, would soon arrive. When "the agony of waiting for help became insupportable"<sup>84</sup> a volunteer offered to ride to Meerut. He had not gone far when he was shot dead by men of the 38th. Doctor Batson of the 74th now started, disguised as a Hind-Pakistani, for the same destination; he, too, was fired upon but escaped, only to be robbed by the villagers.<sup>85</sup>

### Jail prisoners released

When the Infantry Regiments accompanied by the troopers from Meerut were marching into the city some of them left the main body, went to the jail and

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and raising his sword above his head reversed it with the point downwards, calling out: 'Brother, are you with those of the true faith', on which the 54th halted to a man; from this it would appear that matters had been previously arranged and that parties were acting on a preconcerted plan.....The three native infantry regiments now made common cause with the cavalry mutineers and accompanied them into the heart of the city." Mubarak Shah, ff. 11-13.

<sup>82</sup> Kaye and Malleon, II, 63.

<sup>83</sup> Colonel Ripley was left on the road by the Revolutionary troopers under the impression that he had died. He was, however, picked up by Major Paterson, on his way to the Main-guard, who had him put in a conveyance and sent to the cantonments. See, Ball, Vol. I, p. 73; also see, Rotton, p. 9.

<sup>84</sup> Holmes, p. 107.

<sup>85</sup> Cave-Browne, I, 69-71.



asked the guards to open the gates. In the beginning the *najib* guards "made a show of resistance and fired a few harmless shots but very soon opened the jail, released all prisoners and removed their fetters."<sup>86</sup> A party of the convicts working on the roads was taken to the police station for being kept in custody. They were released by "two Mahomedan Sowars", who rode up to them and called out: "Are you all here for your religion or against it?" The Kotwal said: "We are all for our religion". As these words were uttered by their custodian the convicts rushed to an iron-smith's shop nearby and helped each other in removing their fetters.<sup>87</sup>

The Treasury Officer, Collins, having been killed, another civilian, Galloway, Assistant Magistrate and Collector, now stood on guard at its door. Finding that the sepoy's of the guard were on the point of revolt he rushed to the Main-guard for assistance, but he was told by the officers there that it was not possible for them to give him any help; he was however allowed to stay there, because it was comparatively safer. Galloway returned to his post where he was soon attacked and shot by a sepoy of his own guard. The Treasury was plundered<sup>88</sup> by the Sepoys, but they surrendered its contents to the Emperor.<sup>89</sup>

### The Magazine exploded

In the afternoon of the fateful day the most important incident was the explosion of the Magazine, not far from the Emperor's Palace. It contained vast stores of ammunition and a fairly large staff under the command of Lieutenant George Willoughby. Early in the morning Theophilus Metcalfe had come to the Magazine to obtain two guns for shelling the bridge and stopping the Revolutionaries from entering the city; but, for want of conveyance, the guns could not be moved in time and the troopers from Meerut had safely crossed the river. Willoughby had, however, become alert and made preparations for defence, because he knew that the Revolutionaries would demand its possession. The outer gates were barricaded and guns placed inside them; at the same time "a train was laid from the powder store to a tree standing in the yard of the Magazine", where Conductor Scully was posted. He was to fire the train on receiving a signal in case the defence failed, so that, "if the enemy broke into the

<sup>86</sup> Mubarak Shah, f. 14. Jiwan Lal's account differs from this version. According to him Thakur Lai, the jailor, resisted till about 5 o'clock in the evening. This is not probable and cannot be accepted against the statement of Mubarak Shah who was at the time moving about in the city. Jiwan Lal's remark that Thakur Das was a man of great bravery and loyalty may be correct, but obviously a single individual could not have resisted the troopers for long. Sen has accepted Jiwan Lal's version. See, *T.N.N.*, p. 84; Sen, pp. 73-74; Zaka Allah, p. 422.

<sup>87</sup> Mu'in al-Din adds here that "two men mounted on camels and dressed in green with red turbans rode by a trot, calling out, "Hear, ye people, the drum of religion is sounded." Whence they had come or whither they went, my informant knew not, but the excited and terrified crowds in the streets believed that they were heavenly messengers." *T.N.N.*, p. 48.

<sup>88</sup> Mubarak Shah, f. 16.

<sup>89</sup> Zaka Allah, p. 422.



stronghold, they should find death, not plunder within.”<sup>90</sup> The fears of Willoughby were not imaginary, nor his arrangements for defence made too soon; he had not to remain in suspense for long. A demand for surrender made on behalf of the Emperor was not acceded to, and the building had to be besieged. Captain Forrest, one of the European survivors of the siege, later stated at the trial of Bahadur Shah that the Emperor’s message had been brought by “a well-dressed Mussulman” between 9 and 10 A. M. Soon after, an officer in the Emperor’s service arrived on the scene and “placed guards of about 12 men at each gate of the Magazine.” After some time the Hind-Pakistan “Subahdar of our guard again expressed a wish to see either Lieutenant Willoughby or myself, we accordingly went to him. He told us that a messenger had come from the King to say that if we did not immediately open the gates, then he would have scaling ladders sent down to scale the walls.”<sup>91</sup>

Willoughby and his companions did not comply with this demand. The Revolutionaries, therefore, set the scaling ladders in position; and this was followed by a fight which demonstrated how determined the parties were to stick to their respective causes and to what extent the individuals participating in the struggle were prepared to go in making sacrifices for them. The Revolutionaries knew that in scaling the walls they would be playing with their lives. Yet, full of enthusiasm as they had been, they were prepared to defy all possible dangers. Under an incessant shower of bullets they continued climbing up the walls. “As the enemy streamed over the walls,” writes Kaye, “round after round of murderous grapeshot from our guns, delivered with all the coolness and steadiness of a practice-parade, riddled the advancing multitudes; but still they poured on . . .”<sup>92</sup>

The tiny garrison of the Magazine had drawn its courage and strength from the hope of receiving succour from Meerut; this, however, failed them. When, therefore, further defence became impossible, Willoughby took the fatal step. He went over to the river bastion for the last look towards Meerut; no help was coming. He gave the signal; and the train was fired by Scully. In a moment the Magazine exploded, producing a thunderous noise and killing a number of Revolutionaries and four out of the nine Englishmen. “I then went on”, writes Mu’in al-Din “to the Magazine”. The wall facing the river was blown down, and some of the inmates escaped that way. When the smoke had blown away, I entered the place; six wounded Europeans were found after the explosion, I had them sent away to the Palace, saving them from immediate slaughter. It was towards evening . . . Several Europeans from Dariagunge had taken refuge there . . . All natives were turned out of the place . . . Only twenty-five sepoys were killed by the explosion, but a mob of 400 onlookers perished.”<sup>93</sup>

<sup>90</sup> Holmes, p. 109.

<sup>91</sup> *Trial*, p. 125; Cave-Browne adds that the guard sent by the Emperor was under a son and a grandson of the Emperor. See Vol. I, pp. 77-78.

<sup>92</sup> Kaye and Malleon, II, 68.

<sup>93</sup> *T. N. N.*, p. 52.



Lavish praises have been showered on the defenders of the Magazine by Western writers, and there can be no doubt that they richly deserve this appreciation of their splendid sacrifice. But what surprises the reader is that not a word has been written about the dauntless courage and equally splendid sacrifices of those who defying sure death climbed the walls of the Magazine, and laid down their lives for the sake of a cause. Indeed, if we compare the conduct of the defenders with those who were attacking we would find that the latter exhibited greater courage. For the defenders there was no alternative; if they had not taken the suicidal step which they took they would have been overpowered. On the contrary the Revolutionaries could have saved much loss of life on their side by just prolonging the siege, ultimately the defenders would have either surrendered or destroyed themselves. But to the safer course of continuing the siege they preferred the hazardous one of scaling the walls under showers of bullets; evidently their casualties were far heavier than those of the defenders.<sup>94</sup> There is evidence to prove that the Revolutionaries knew what steps the British defenders were going to take to deprive their opponents of the valuable contents of the Magazine.<sup>95</sup>

### British officers leave the Cantonment

The explosion naturally created great excitement in the city. In the cantonment it startled into action the officers who were still waiting for succour from Meerut; it broke the last link between the Europeans and the Hind-Pakistani soldiers serving under them. The sepoys in the cantonment had not yet risen in open revolt, but it could be easily noticed "that they were festering with the bitterness of national hatred, and eager to strike."<sup>96</sup> It had become imperative for the British authorities to take all possible measures to protect the lives of the officers and their families. Earlier in the day some of them and a number of fugitives from the city and the Civil Lines, including women and children, had been put in the Flag-Staff Tower. Two guns were set in front of the building to defend it against any possible attack.

As the declining hours of the day were rolling by the chances of getting succour from Meerut were becoming more remote. The Main-guard, the last rallying point in the city, was evacuated after the story of the explosion had become known. At the Flag-Staff Tower, too, the situation was every moment growing uneasy. An attempt was made by an officer, Captain Tytler of the 38th,

<sup>94</sup> Of the nine defenders, five could escape alive; they were Lieutenants Forrest and Raynor, Conductors Buckley and Shaw, and Sergeant Stewart. Willoughby survived the attack on the Magazine, but was murdered on his way to Meerut. See Holmes, p. 109; also Cave-Browne, Vol. I, p. 79.

<sup>95</sup> ".....One man in particular, Kurreem Bukhsh, a *durwan*", wrote Lieutenant Forrest in his report dated May 27, appeared to keep up a constant communication with the enemy outside, and keep them informed of our situation." *State Papers*, Vol. I, p. 274.

<sup>96</sup> Kaye and Malleeson, II, 69.



to march his men and take unawares a party of the Revolutionaries who were reported to be enjoying siesta under the shade of trees along the canal bank near the Lahore Gate. The sepoy's refusal to carry out the Captain's order of firing at their *bhai-bands* unnerved most of the officers. Another incident soon followed. Captain De Teissier's guns had been recalled from the Main-guard and were moving towards the cantonment; they were seized by a picket of the 38th which had been placed at the gorge of Sadr Bazaar. Having seen this from the Flag-Staff Tower, De Teissier galloped down the hill and called out to his men to return. He was met by a volley of shots from the sepoy's of the 38th and, although he escaped uninjured, the incident demoralised the officers at the cantonment. One of them "suggested that we should get away while we could. At first the brigadier would not hear of such a thing . . . but the question was agitated and the idea of retreat gradually became familiar to men's mind."<sup>97</sup> Ultimately a decision was taken by the Brigadier; all took to flight, as best as they could, some hoping to reach Meerut, others took the road to Karnal. It is surprising that neither the sepoy's who were still present in the cantonment nor those who had taken possession of the city and the Palace thought it necessary to check their flight. Nevertheless, the sepoy's were careful enough to guard the powder-magazine, and they successfully defied the efforts of the fleeing enemy to blow it up.<sup>98</sup> The stores of this magazine passed into the possession of the Revolutionary Government on 12 or 13 May.<sup>99</sup>

The flight of the British officers and their families left the Revolutionaries in complete possession of Delhi. Late in the night the resumption of power by Emperor Bahadur Shah was proclaimed by a salute of 21 guns.<sup>100</sup> Obviously the first step for them now was to instal a regular machinery of government under the Emperor.

### BAHADUR SHAH LEADS THE REVOLUTION

On assuming power the eighty-four year old Emperor Bahadur Shah

<sup>97</sup> Le Bas in Fraser's Magazine, February 1858, as quoted in Cave-Browne, I, 84.

<sup>98</sup> It may be noted that this was the main powder-magazine and was situated about two miles from the city walls on the banks of the river to the rear of the cantonments. It was much bigger than the *Expense Magazine* in the city and contained more than one thousand barrels of powder against about fifty, which were blown up in the latter. Cf. Cave-Browne, Vol. I, pp. 69-70n.

<sup>99</sup> Statement of Jat Mal at the trial of the Emperor. See *Trial*, p. 120.

<sup>100</sup> *Trial*, pp. 120, 146; also see Zaka Allah (p. 662) who adds that the name of the Company disappeared from public proclamation (*dhandurah*) from May 12. Mu'in al-Din was told that the salute was fired to welcome the arrival of a fresh Regiment from Meerut. *T.N.N.*, p. 53.

Chunni Lal, editor of *Delhi News*, confirms this in his statement. Ball has given the substance of the eye-witness account of a Hind-Pakistani; it says: "About ten at night, two *pultuns* (troops of artillery) arrived from Meerut and entered the city and fired a royal salute of twenty-one guns." Ball, I, 101.



became the leader of the Revolution.<sup>101</sup> A hundred and fifty years earlier one of his illustrious ancestors had led his armies at the age of ninety to the field of battle and fought against the forces of disruption; but Alamgir's courage and firmness were exceptional. After his death the Mughul Court had degenerated into an arena of conflict between selfish politicians and factious groups, and this was undoubtedly the main cause of the decline of the Empire. The process of degeneration was rather fast, and by the time when Bahadur Shah ascended the throne in 1837, the sovereignty of the Mughuls had been reduced to a mere shadow of its past glory. As a Prince he had received good education and training, but the Company's Government had created conditions in which the Emperor was expected to live only as an idler. Other members of the Imperial family too had been encouraged to live a life of inactivity and dissipation.<sup>102</sup> The Mughul Emperor had thus been rendered politically ineffective, in fact, the Company was only waiting for the death of Bahadur Shah to bring to an end the "legal fiction" of the *de jure* sovereignty of a prince of Timur's house. None of the British officers holding the reins of government in India in the middle of the nineteenth century expected any serious trouble from the Red Fort, which, they thought, would soon be reduced to the position of a mere historical monument. Within its four walls lived a few hundred members of the Imperial family generally called *salatins*, who were believed to be harmless and innocent souls having no interest in politics. To make their helplessness doubly sure a British Commandant 'guarded' the main (Lahore) Gate of the Fort. After the annexation of the Panjab (1849) the strategic importance of Delhi had almost ceased to exist, and until the dawn of 11 May not one of the European officers posted there had any reasons to fear that the rays of the morning sun would bring in their wake the darkest episode in the history of British imperialism.

### The Revolutionary Government

The *Qil'ah-i-Mu'alla*, the Sublime Fort, had been for over two centuries the symbol of the greatness and sovereignty of the rulers of Hind-Pakistan, as well as the high traditions of its cultural life. Now, it was to play a significant role in the Revolution which aimed at restoring the freedom of the people under the leadership of the Emperor. "On this morning," writes Jiwan Lal in his diary under 12 May, "the whole body of native officers of the regiments that had

<sup>101</sup> Bahadur Shah was born in 1189 H. (1775 A. C.). In 1857 when the Revolution broke out he had completed 84 lunar years of his life.

<sup>102</sup> Mawlana Fadl i Haqq refers to the Princes who were appointed officers in the Revolutionary Army in these words: "They [the Princes] hated honest and wise persons. They had never witnessed a battle, nor had they any experience of the blows of swords and lances. They selected men from the gutter for their society and consultation. These inexperienced and extravagant fellows drowned themselves in the ocean of luxuries and extravagance and submerged themselves in the flood of debauchery. They were poverty-stricken and (suddenly) they became opulent; when they became opulent they took to a life of dissipation." "The Story of the War of Independence" in *J.P.H.S.*, Vol. V, part I.



arrived yesterday, concerted together and demanded an audience of the King. It was granted; the native officers presented *nazars* (tribute money) and described themselves as faithful soldiers awaiting his orders."<sup>103</sup> The Emperor called the leading citizens to his Court for consultation. The first step taken by them was to arrange for the supply of provisions for the soldiers. Subsequently a draft constitution vesting supreme control in a "Coirt of Administration", that is, *Jalsah-i-Intizam-i-Fawji wa Mulki*, was approved and enforced.<sup>104</sup> The *Jalsah* (Court) was to consist of ten members, six military officers and four others; the former were to be elected by and represented the different wings of the army, the infantry, cavalry and artillery. The procedure of the election of four non-military members is not mentioned. The Court had powers to elect its own President who had an extra vote. In view of the impending war the Court's decisions were to be approved by the Commander-in-Chief. If the latter did not agree with its decisions he could return them for reconsideration by the Court. If the Court insisted on its advice the matter was referred to the Emperor whose orders were final. The constitution of the Court leaves no doubt that its authors were anxious to make it an effective body. The military officers were in a majority, but they came by election. All decisions were taken by a majority vote. The original constitution seems to have been amended from time to time in view of the changing conditions and new developments in the situation. Turab 'Ali,<sup>105</sup> a British spy, writes in his report under 1 September, 1857: "The members of the Court or Military Council are as follows:

Ghous Mohumud ...	...	...	General, Neemuch.
Heera Singh ...	...	...	Brigadier, Neemuch.
Bukht Khan ...	...	...	General, Bareilly.
Mohumud Shuffee ...	...	...	Resaldar, 8th Irregulars
Hyat Mohumud ...	...	...	Resaldar, 14th Irregulars
Qadir Buksh ...	...	...	Soobedar, 72nd Regiment.
			Native Infantry
Hurdutt ...	...	...	Soobedar, 9th Regiment
			Native Infantry
			{ Soobedar, Hurriana Battalion
Names unknown ...	...	...	{ Soobedar, 11th Native Infantry
			{ Soobedar, 54th Native Infantry

The Kote (Court) also comprises five sepoy from every Regiment and Moulvie

<sup>103</sup> T.N.N. pp. 84-85.

On the authority of a Hind-Pakistani eye-witness Ball says: "The next day (12 May), about three in the after-noon, the empire was proclaimed under the king of Delhi, and the imperial flag hoisted at the Kotwali (chief police station)." See Vol. I, p. 101; also see p. 458.

<sup>104</sup> For a photographic sketch of the original document in Urdu, called *Dastur al-Amal*, see Sen (facing p. 74); also see *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 36, Nos. 539-41.

<sup>105</sup> Turab 'Ali was an active spy of the British; he was once arrested by the Revolutionaries, but let off on the recommendation of the Princes. *Zaka Allah*, p. 664.



Fuzul Huq is also a member."<sup>106</sup> Besides the 'Court' the Emperor also had a smaller "Privy Council" of persons in whom he had implicit confidence. "The King's Council", says Mubarak Shah, "was composed of Bukht Khan and Surfuraz Ali, and in a lesser degree of Fuzul Huq, but though the King wished it, the last was not permitted to be present in the Council."<sup>107</sup>

The new Government was confronted with tremendous problems, as it had been set up in the midst of a cataclysm. In less than twelve hours of the outbreak of the Revolution the administration of the city had broken down, the unruly elements of the population had seized the opportunity of creating confusion and started a campaign of loot, forcing peaceful citizens to stay in their houses; shops were closed, bazaars became empty and the city wore a deserted look. Besides reinstating the machinery of civil administration and restoring order in the capital the Emperor and his Court had another mighty problem to solve: they had to take immediate steps to provide means for the maintenance of an army. It is difficult to estimate the actual strength of the forces that had streamed into the city on the first day of the Revolution. We can, however, form some idea of their numbers, because Hakim Ahsan-Allah says that "by evening 100 irregular cavalry (*Turk-Sawars*) and three regiments from cantonment and two from Meerut had taken up their quarters in the Fort, the Malpert Regiment in Alamgarh, and the rest in the Diwan Khas, the Diwan Am, the Stables and Naqqar Khanah."<sup>108</sup> In a state of excitement, it appears, the Regiments posted in Delhi had rushed to the Palace, not caring even to guard the stores of provisions and keep them in tact. The contents of the Treasury, according to one contemporary authority,<sup>109</sup> had come into the possession of the Revolutionary Government, but the money thus obtained does not seem to have been much, because the inadequacy of funds hampered its work, even in the earliest stages.

The second day of the Revolution at Delhi, must have been a long day for the aged Emperor. Jiwan Lal's entries under this date give us an idea of the steps taken by the new Government to restore normal life in the city on the one hand, and prepare itself for a decisive struggle against foreign rule on the other.

### Attendants of Delhi

On 15 May a number of officers were appointed on the recommendation of Mawlana 'Abd al-Qadir Khan.<sup>110</sup> Mu'in al-Din Hasan Khan became the Attendant of the city. It was soon discovered that he was incompetent and had been guilty of plundering the people; Mirza Mughul who had recommended his appointment was ultimately compelled to ask for his removal. The Emperor dismissed him and "further ordered that after investigation his property should be

<sup>106</sup> Secret Letters, No. 191, 7 September, 1857; also see *Mutiny Records*, VII, Part II, 8-9.

<sup>107</sup> Mubarak, f. 97.

<sup>108</sup> *Memoirs*, p. 3.

<sup>109</sup> Zaka-Allah, p. 422.

<sup>110</sup> T. N. N., p. 91.



restored to any of the citizens who had been plundered and that the Kotwal should be punished."<sup>111</sup> He handed over charge to Mir Nawab who was also removed for incompetence.<sup>112</sup> Since Hakim Ahsan-Allah Khain does not mention that Mu'in al-Din was succeeded by Mir Nawab it may be concluded that his appointment was a stop-gap arrangement, and that he held the office only for a short period. Mu'in al-Din belonged to the police service of the Company and had been promoted from the position of an Inspector in charge of a suburban *thanah* to the Kotwalship of Delhi, which was a very important post. He, however, disappointed the Emperor and his advisers. The next choice, therefore, fell on a public figure. Qadi Fayd-Allah, to quote his successor in office, "was a Rais of the city."<sup>113</sup> He was recommended by Khwajah Wahid al-Din,<sup>114</sup> who also belonged to a distinguished family of Delhi. Fayd Allah, however, proved no better than his predecessor; cases of bribery were reported against him, and he was asked to explain his conduct. He sent the explanation along with his resignation. Mirza Mughul accepted the resignation and appointed Mubarak Shah<sup>115</sup> in his place; Khuda Bakhsh Khan was made his deputy.

The frequent changes of Kotwals in Delhi were not without significance. Under the Mughuls the Kotwal enjoyed very extensive powers. He was a Magistrate and a police officer combined,<sup>116</sup> and, therefore, to a large extent, the efficiency of the administration of a city depended on the ability and character of its Kotwal. The overthrow of the Company's machinery of administration by the Revolutionaries had naturally let loose the forces of disorder. Only a strong, honest and experienced man could control the situation. Sayyid Mubarak Shah's official papers, including reports made by him to the Emperor, the Commander-in-Chief and other authorities, and orders and instructions issued to him, leave no doubt as to the importance of the position he held. On 13 September, 1857, he fell ill and applied for four days' leave suggesting that the "Naib-Kotwal will act

<sup>111</sup> Chunni Lal's *Diary* says that he was appointed "to the Governorship of Delhi" on 12 May. He is supported by Hakim Ahsan-Allah Khan. See *Trial*, p. 176; *Memoirs*, p. 4.

Mu'in al-Din himself refers to his removal in these words: "A man called Mir Nawab had taken charge of the Kotwali with my consent and my connivance." It is obvious that he wants to conceal the incident of his dismissal for bribery. To justify his version he would like us to believe that after his dismissal "my position was better than that of the Kotwal . . ." The real fact, however, was that he was not only removed from office but was later on ordered by the Emperor to give up the property that he had plundered. *T. N. N.*, pp. 57-58, 140.

<sup>112</sup> Mubarak Shah places Mir Nawab before Mu'in al-Din; but this seems to be incorrect. Mir Nawab came after and not before Mu'in al-Din.

<sup>113</sup> Mubarak, f. 32. Ahsan-Allah (*Memoirs*, p. 13.) mentions his appointment under 28 May. But in the *Press-list of Mutiny Papers* we find a document dated 21 May which shows that he was Kotwal then. See p. 223. Bundle, 109.

<sup>114</sup> Khwajah Wahid al-Din was the son of Khwajah Farid al-Din and the maternal uncle of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. See Hali, Mawlana, *Hayat-i-Jawid* (Agra, 1903), Part I, chap. I.

<sup>115</sup> He says that Fayd Allah Khan was removed from office for reasons of health. Perhaps this was only an excuse for justifying his resignation. See *Memoirs*, p. 15; Mubarak, p. 76.

<sup>116</sup> There is recorded evidence to show that Mubarak Shah decided cases. See *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 209, No. 252.



in his place."<sup>117</sup> This means that throughout the period of the siege of Delhi, Mubarak was the *Kotwal* of the Imperial capital. Besides performing his normal police duties he was also expected to supply provisions to the army as well as the soldiers who went out of the city to fight the enemy<sup>118</sup>, bullock carts and carriages for transporting military equipment and elephants,<sup>119</sup> as well as artisans and coolies<sup>120</sup>; there were other duties also which he had to discharge. Mubarak was against forced labour: when it came to his notice that "4 carts were forcibly employed in carrying rations", he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief "to pay them hire",<sup>121</sup> and this is not the only recorded case of his recommendations to the officers to pay the wages and other dues of the poor labourers. It seems the *Kotwal* was also in charge of the prisoners of war, on 11 July, 1857, he reports to the Commander-in-Chief "the arrest of 5 British soldiers."<sup>122</sup> The fact that there are more than 1200 documents addressed to the *Kotwal* in the collection of papers seized by the British authorities on the fall of Delhi is a further proof of the importance of this office. They also indicate the varied nature of the *Kotwal's* duties and responsibilities.<sup>123</sup> He had assistants called *Naib Kotwals*.<sup>124</sup> It may be added that there was a separate *Kotwal* for the Red Fort: Nawab Yar Khan held his post on 24 August.<sup>125</sup>

### Shahadur Shah's efforts to restore peace and order

Emperor and his advisers fully realized the need and importance of restoring order and maintaining peace. In contemporary accounts there are numerous references to the Emperor's anxiety to provide security of life and property to his people. "The King directed Mirza Moghal", writes Chunni Lal, the news-writer, under 12 May, "to take a company of infantry, and adopt steps to prevent the plunder in the city. Mirza Moghal accordingly went to the principal police stations, seated on an elephant, and had proclamation made that every individual convicted of plunder would be punished with the loss of nose and ears, and all shopkeepers not opening their shops, and refusing to supply the soldiers, would be fined and imprisoned."<sup>126</sup>

*Press-list of Mutiny Papers, 1857* (Calcutta, 1921), p. 215, No. 393; on 1 June Bhao Singh was a *Naib-Kotwal*, *Ibid.*, p. 232, No. 131.

*Ibid.*, p. 205, No. 144.

*Ibid.*, p. 208, No. 236.

*Ibid.*, p. 203, No. 69.

*Ibid.*, p. 210, No. 296.

*Ibid.*, p. 205, No. 136; also see p. 229, No. 91.

*Ibid.*, pp. 216-51.

Bhao Singh is mentioned in a document dated 1 June and Shaykh Muhammad Amir in another dated 9 June, *Ibid.*, p. 232, No. 31 and p. 243, No. 22; also see p. 265, No. 166; p. 288, No. 6.

*Ibid.*, p. 271, No. 41.

*Trial*, pp. 176-77.

An idea of Chunni Lal's hostility towards the Emperor can be formed by his statement made at the trial. When asked by whose orders the Europeans were murdered in the Fort, he said: "It was done by the King's order: who else could have given such an order?" Kaye and Malletson,



Hakim Ahsan-Allah refers to several incidents of plundering, which were reported to the Emperor. On each occasion the Emperor took prompt steps to redress the grievances of the people; even an ordinary employee of the post office could easily obtain relief.<sup>127</sup> In suburbs of the city also conditions had become unsettled; the Government took immediate steps to restore order with the help of the leading persons of the localities concerned. As early as 18 May the police officer of a station in the suburbs sent a report "to the King— shelter of the worlds", saying, "that the orders of the royal missive have been fully explained to all the Thakurs, Chawdaries, Kanungoes, and Patwaries of this township of Najaf Garh, and the best arrangements have been established. ... As regards Nagli Kakrowala, Dachao-Kallan, and other adjacent Villages, your Slave has to represent, that, unrestrained by the dread of consequences, and bent on all sorts of excesses, the inhabitants have commenced plundering travellers. Two petitions regarding the conduct of these lawless disturbers of the peace have already been submitted, and I am now in hopes that some Royal Prince of reputation and capacity, may be deputed, with a sufficient force of Cavalry, Infantry and Ghazees, to settle the portion of the country, constituting your petitioner's jurisdiction, your Slave will then point out these lawless Villagers, and will be able for the future to preserve order, and prevent crime." The English rendering of the "autograph order by the King, 'in pencil', reads thus: "Mirza Moghal will quickly send a Regiment of Infantry, with its officers to Najaf Garh."<sup>128</sup>

The Emperor's anxiety to establish order and make the life and property of the people safe is indicated by a strict personal control over administration and prompt disposal of cases brought before him. On reports being received that the enemy troops were likely to march against the Old Fort some Regiments of sepoys were sent to offer resistance. The troops of the enemy did not come; the sepoys, however, started molesting the people. Mirza Mughul was directed on 17 June to stop this; and for not carrying out these orders promptly he was given a severe warning. "It is surprising," said the Emperor's order of 18 June, "that, up to the present time, no arrangement should have been made, and that you should not have given effect to the prohibition, by sending out some cavalry. It is the business of the army to protect, and not to desolate and plunder. The officers of the army will, therefore, immediately restrain their men from the commission of these improprieties, . . . You will immediately take steps to arrange this matter, and will allow no neglect to occur, in reference to it." The orders were further

Vol. V, 332. See *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, (p. 100) for an order of the Emperor to the Kotwal "to report on the riot committed by the *Tilangas*."

<sup>127</sup> Kanhayya Lal was "a servant in the post-office". When it was reported to the Emperor that his house was being plundered he ordered Mirza Mughul "to go at once himself or send one of the Princes to put a stop to plundering." *Memoirs*, p. 15.

<sup>128</sup> Found in the papers and documents filed in the trial of the Emperor. See *Trial*, pp. 7-8. The reference to *Ghazis* is interesting: it shows that within a week of the outbreak of the Revolution volunteers had joined the Revolutionary forces in adequate numbers.



reinforced by a postscript, in the Emperor's own handwriting, saying, "Make arrangements quickly".<sup>129</sup> Almost a week later Mirza Mughul and his brother and colleague, Mirza Khayr Sultan, received another strict warning when they reported a case of plunder by four or five men who had disguised themselves as sepoys of the Revolutionary Army.<sup>130</sup>

Sometimes, even high functionaries of the State went beyond the limits of their powers in demanding contributions from wealthy merchants of the city. Jugal Kishore and Sheo Prashad had paid Rs. 1,200 - as their share of subscriptions. On further demands being made they launched a complaint against "some troops". The Emperor immediately ordered a guard to be stationed at the house of the petitioners. Mirza Mughul is also reported to have exceeded his powers in issuing orders regarding disbursement of money to the forces. In reply to a warning verbally communicated to him the Prince had to explain his conduct thus: "Your slave affirms, with the solemnity of an oath, that no orders are ever issued, but such as Your Majesty has been previously made acquainted with or if any are issued, the physician, at least, is always informed of them."<sup>131</sup> Cases of reports made to the Emperor about the civil and military officers who harassed the people or indulged in extortion, or of plunder by the soldiers and the professional robbers can be added; almost on every occasion Bahadur Shah took prompt action to protect the life and property of his subjects. Occasionally the Court also issued orders to the officers not to plunder the people.

The soldiers of the Revolutionary Army and occasionally even their officers are mentioned as having taken part in plunder. The victims of these attacks, however, were only wealthy citizens who refused to cooperate with the Government or were suspected of being in active sympathy with the British and working for them. "Information was received", Jiwan Lal tells us, "that a man armed with a written authority from the English to raise money had been for some days in the house of Alap Pershad, Agent of the former Nawab of Jajjar, and was on his way to Muttra, travelling in a bullock cart. When he reached the Delhi Gate the guards searched the man and found the paper in question; they then confiscated his cart and severely beat the man. After this some 400 of the soldiers went to Alap Pershad's house and charged him with concealing Europeans, and on this pretence they searched and plundered his house, and those of seven other persons, and carried off property to the value of 50,000 rupees. As soon as General Muhammad Bakht Khan heard of this he sent off several hundred men to stop the outrage, but these soldiers would not interfere with the plunderers."<sup>132</sup> It is possible that not every body suspected was guilty, but such instances show that the Emperor and his Government were both anxious to stop

<sup>129</sup> *Trial.*, pp. 11-12.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>131</sup> Mirza Mughul's petition, dated 11 July, 1857. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>132</sup> *T.N.N.*, p. 166.



plunder and keep the excited people under control.<sup>133</sup> In special cases orders were issued that the premises of individuals were to be guarded. An order was issued, for instance, by Shaykh Muhammad Amir, the *Naib Kotwal* to the Thanahdar of Darlbah "to appoint guards at the houses of Jai Lal and Kanhiya Lal, jewellers." In the order 'Kanhiya Lal' was written by mistake: the correct name was Ghasimal.<sup>134</sup> The order was, of course, carried out.

As the Revolution spread over parts of the subcontinent and the Comapny's machinery of administration deteriorated or broke down, and lawlessness and highway robbery became common. In the region surrounding Delhi peace was maintained by the Central Government, but in territories which lay at a distance from the capital this responsibility fell upon the local leaders. Reports about the insecurity of roads and highway robberies were frequently received by the Centre; the new Government lost no time in making suitable arrangements and authorizing reliable persons to safeguard the lives and property of the people.<sup>135</sup> Nahir Singh of Ballabgarh, for instance, sent a letter suggesting measures for the protection of the region near his *jagir*.<sup>136</sup> For the safety of the roads in Bulandshahr the newly appointed Subahdar, Nawab Walidad Khan, is recorded to have set apart a company of 100 soldiers besides appointing new Tahsildars and Thanahdars.<sup>137</sup> It is to be noted, however, that of the chiefs and zamindars who were entrusted with the task of maintaining law and order some at least failed to cooperate with the Revolutionary Government. Mubarak refers to Thakur Tola Ram's misconduct; the latter had submitted "Arzies" to the Government tendering his allegiance. "A petition was read in open Durbar," writes Jiwan Lal, "from Rao Tulla Ram, noble of Rewari, to the effect that he was sending his brother with a confidential communication to the King, and begged he might be heard and a favourable answer sent."<sup>138</sup> Under an earlier date he tells us that Tula Ram had taken a large force with him to collect revenue. But he had failed to do so and had to come to Delhi to obtain necessary authority for using force in the collection of revenue.<sup>139</sup> On his return to Rewari, however, he seems to have changed his views and misused his power and position. The chief of Farrukh-nagar "complained that he was to be attacked by Rao Tulla Ram, of Rewari." This was not all; the latter had turned a traitor. In a letter which was

<sup>133</sup> Of the other definitely known cases that of Munshi Mohan Lal (Agha Hasan Jan, after accepting Islam) and Nazir Gobind Saran are mentioned by Ghulam Husayn, author of *Nusrat-namah* (Urdu translation published by Khwajah Hasan Nizami under the title, *Dilli ki Saza*, second edition. Delhi, 1946), pp. 14-15.

<sup>134</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 230, No. 75 and 76.

<sup>135</sup> Some of the petitions received by the Emperor and his orders and directions relating to arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security in the countryside have been published along with the proceedings of the Emperor's trial.

<sup>136</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 12.

<sup>137</sup> *Saza*, p. 24.

<sup>138</sup> *T.N.N.*, p. 163.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 159. He was expected to send Rs. 5,000/- in return for the *sanad* and Rs. 10,000/- as *kharif* revenue. Cf. *Memoirs*, p. 25; also see *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 9, No. 34.



intercepted and read before the Emperor he had written to Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Revenue Collector of Kot Qasim: "Are you intoxicated that you think the English are going away from Hindustan? They will most assuredly return and will destroy you."<sup>140</sup> Subsequently we find that the Emperor had to despatch some officers to punish him for these undesirable activities.<sup>141</sup>

To stop looting and restore normal conditions, however, the Emperor was prepared to take any steps that, he thought, would be effective. He was advised to march through the main streets of the city in a procession and personally order the people to shed their fears and resume their normal work. Accordingly he mounted an elephant and passed through the streets; this restored confidence among the people and some of the shops were opened. He also issued orders that some Regiments should be posted at the principal Gates of the town,<sup>142</sup> and later in the day once again he went out in a procession in response to the appeals of the citizens; he again called upon the shopkeepers to resume business.<sup>143</sup>

It is to be noted that the shops of the main bazaar only were closed. Even Zaka-Allah, an eye-witness, though openly hostile to the cause of the Revolutionaries, admits that "if a single house was plundered rumours would spread that the entire *mahallah* had been plundered; ... in short not one per cent of the rumours about the plunder of the city were true; there were hundreds of *mahallahs* in which not a *cawri* worth of property was plundered."<sup>144</sup> The exaggerated accounts of some writers create the impression that the city was completely in the grip of rapine and plunder. This is wholly untrue; looting there was, but not on a very large scale, and certainly not in the entire city. Stray cases seem to have occurred, but rumours of wholesale plunder made wealthy shopkeepers panicky. They closed their shops and began to make complaints that their lives and property were unsafe and they needed immediate protection. Of the soldiers who created disturbances in the city the majority were the Infantry men known as the *tilangahs*. They attacked the houses of persons who were suspected of harbouring Europeans, spying for the British or sending provisions to their camp at the Ridge. Zaka-Allah quotes the instances of Budi Chand, Mohan Lal, Qadi Pannu, Nawab Hamid 'Ali Khan, Turab 'Ali, Hakim Ahsan-Allah, and Ajit Singh, the uncle of the Raja of Patiala.<sup>145</sup>

T.N.N., p. 174.

The correspondence of Tula Ram is preserved in *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 10.

T.N.N., p. 195; also see *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 11.

According to Mubarak Shah "four hundred sepoys and two guns were stationed at each Gate. Large parties of cavalry were kept inside the palace, a troop being at the main Gate, and another by the Diwan Khas, six horse artillery guns fully equipped were in front of the Diwan Am", p. 33.

Charles Ball says that the Emperor when marching in procession passed by the *Jami' Masjid*, "where the standard of the prophet was unfurled, and the empire of Hindostan was proclaimed amidst the exclamations of the soldiers and the people." See Vol. I, p. 458.

Zaka-Allah, pp. 665-666.

*Ibid.*



A marked improvement in conditions was brought about by General Muhammad Bakht Khan. He arrived in Delhi at the head of the Bareilly Brigade on 2 July; the same day he was put in charge of the Army. Next day "he was also instructed to arrange for the civil administration, the police, and revenue departments." An order was issued whereby the royal princes were relieved from all further duties connected with the army.<sup>146</sup> Bakht Khan lost no time in taking strong measures to stop looting. He told the Emperor that "if any of the Princes attempted to plunder the city, he would cut off their noses and ears." The Emperor gave him full authority adding: "Do whatever seems good unto you."<sup>147</sup> The Muslim volunteers who had joined the War as *Mujahids* were also deadly against molesting the people. When Mawlana Muhammad Ishaq of Tonk who had been appointed Commander of a detachment of the Revolutionary forces found that Mirza Mughul paid no heed to his protest against looting by the sepoys he resigned from his post. The Prince appealed to him to withdraw his resignation, because the Mawlana was a competent person. But he refused to accede to his request, saying that he would not withdraw his resignation if looting was not stopped. He continued, however, to fight as an ordinary soldier in the Revolutionary Army.<sup>148</sup>

### THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

Under the new Government the Princes had become the officers of the Army. This was rather unfortunate, for it adversely affected the course of the war in the Delhi centre. Some of these Princes had no doubt joined the Revolution at the very outset and were anxious to assume its leadership which, they thought, had devolved upon them by virtue of their position. They were, however, thoroughly incompetent, having no experience of fighting or administration, Prince Firuz Shah, the maternal grandson of Ilahi Bakhsh,<sup>149</sup> being an illustrious exception. Bahadur Shah knew that the Princes were incompetent; moreover, he had been warned by Ahsan-Allah Khan and Queen Zinat Mahal that it would be

<sup>146</sup> *T.N.N.*, p. 137.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 134-35.

<sup>148</sup> Mawlana Muhammad Ishaq: He was born in Tonk and received his early education under his uncle who was a Commander in the army of Tonk State, and was held in great regard by the Ruler. Muhammad Ishaq was trained by him in the art of war and the use of the sword and spear; he was a good rider. His mother was greatly interested in Sayyid Ahmad Shah's Movement, and Muhammad Ishaq was influenced by her ideas. He joined the Revolution of 1857 immediately after its outbreak. He came to Delhi and was given the charge of a detachment of forces under Mirza Mughul. On the fall of Delhi he returned to Tonk and was arrested before he could enter the town, but not without offering resistance. He was tried at Ajmer and sentenced to death. But the Nawab of Tonk, who had a great regard for him and addressed him as *Makhdum-zadah* went to Ajmer and persuaded the Commissioner to pardon him. The Mawlana could not reconcile himself to the idea of living in the subcontinent as a British subject and migrated to Afghanistan. For further details see Athar Sahswani's article in *Al-Jami'at*, 3 December, 1956.

<sup>149</sup> See Muir, Sir William, *Records of the Intelligence Department* (Edinburgh, 1902), I, p. 413.



unwise to appoint the Princes to military commands. He, therefore, hesitated to take this drastic step and told the Princes that, inexperienced as they were, they would not be able to discharge their duties with efficiency. Subsequently, however, the Emperor was confronted with and had to yield to a demand from the military officers.<sup>150</sup>

### Military organization

Mirza Mughul was appointed Commander-in-Chief on Wednesday, 30 May, in the *Darbar*.<sup>151</sup> Zinat Mahal, always anxious to advance the claims of her son, Prince Jawan Bakht, now persuaded the Emperor, to appoint him Prime Minister.<sup>152</sup> The Princes were absolutely incapable of leadership, and soon became a positive source of disruption and demoralization of the Army. Mirza Abu Bakr who was the Supreme Commander of the Cavalry was present at the important Battle of the Hindan on 30 May, 1857. As soon as fighting commenced and the two sides started firing their heavy guns, the Prince became panicky and left the field of battle.<sup>153</sup> Mirza Mughul had extensive powers, as Commander-in-Chief, which he exercised rather unscrupulously. He did not cooperate with General Bakht Khan, the most capable and devoted of the military leaders of the Revolution, and placed obstacles in his path. In fact, throughout the period of the siege of Delhi we find Mirza Mughul disagreeing with him on questions of details as well as matters pertaining to the over-all strategy of the War. The Emperor invariably accepted the advice of Bakht Khan but the officers who were patronized by Mirza Mughul often refused to carry out his orders. Sometimes the Prince submitted petitions to the Emperor, which were full of complaints against Bakht Khan. The fighting forces were thus divided into two camps. This disunity was the main cause of the reverses suffered by the Revolutionaries, particularly in the later stages of the War. A reference to these differences is found in the report of the spy, Fath Muhammad, dated 1 September 1857. He writes: "The state of affairs at Delhi is as follows: The Nusseerabad and Neemuch Brigades are supporters of Mirza Moghul, and the Bareilly Brigade is devoted to the King. The officers of the Bareilly force and Mirza are bitter enemies."<sup>154</sup> Mirza Mughul's brother Khidr Sultan, was mainly responsible for the defeat of the Revolutionaries in the Battles of the Hindan and Badli ki Sarai. About his conduct in the Battle of the Hindan, Sayyid Mubarak Shah writes: "Mirza Khizar Sooltan not liking the turn matters were taking got out of his buggy and mounted

<sup>150</sup> Khwajah Wahid al-Din, a cousin of Syed Ahmed Khan, also put his pressure on the Emperor to appoint the Princes as commanders. His argument was that "the troops who have killed their officers will misbehave to you" if their wishes were ignored. See *Memoirs*, p. 6.

<sup>151</sup> *Memoirs*, p. 4; Kaye and Malleson, *op. cit.*, Vol. V. 328; also see Chunni Lal's statement in *Trial*, p. 146. Zaka-Allah (p. 679) gives 18 May as the date of the appointment of the Princes.

<sup>152</sup> *T.N.N.*, p. 97; *Trial*, p. 185; *Memoirs*, p. 7.

<sup>153</sup> Zaka-Allah, p. 679-80.

<sup>154</sup> See *Trial*, pp. 87-89, also *Secret Letters*, No. 191, dated 7 September, 1857.



his horse... turned to Meer Nawab and said, 'What is to be done now?' to which the latter replied, 'Come along Your Highness—look the English are advancing.' ...On hearing these words Mirza turned his horse's head and the mutineers seeing him retiring—first by twos or threes but soon in one mass—fled panic-stricken from the field . . . The rebel troops threw their arms in their flight and in sore straits and inconceivable confusion reached Jamna, . . . rushed into the river and perished." Similarly at Badli ki Sarai "on the pretence of bringing up magazine stores" he "was the first to fly".<sup>155</sup> On the day following the Battle of Badli ki Sarai (8 June) the historic siege of Delhi by the British forces commenced. The Revolutionaries had therefore to organise their administration in the face of an ever increasing pressure of the siege.

### Military administration

It is difficult to present a detailed picture of the military administration of Bahadur Shah on the basis of the extremely limited source material that has come down to us.<sup>156</sup> In some contemporary documents, however, there are a few stray references to steps taken by the Revolutionary Government from time to time in connection with the organization of the defence of Delhi. A careful examination of this fragmentary information reveals the fact that the Emperor and his advisers were anxious to build up a system of military administration. The Commander-in-Chief had the overall charge of the Army, and, there being no separate ministry for defence, his powers were extensive. An appeal against his orders could, however, always be made to the Emperor, but no officers of the Government could interfere in his work. Hakim Ahsan-Allah writes: "The officials all begged that all orders regarding the army might be issued through the General of the army, and that no officer of the Government (*Ahlkar-i Badshahi*) should be allowed to interfere. The King agreed."<sup>157</sup>

### The War Council

One of the important steps taken by the new Government was to appoint a *Majlis* (Committee) of leading citizens for securing provisions for the Army and the population; Mahbub 'Ali Khan and Mir Nawab were made directly responsible for this. On the same day (12 May) Munshi Fakhr al-Din Hasan was directed "to take charge of supplying provisions." The Emperor's orders to this effect were issued on 12 May and on the following day a statement of the

<sup>155</sup> Mubarak, ff. 54-55, 60.

<sup>156</sup> Most of the contemporary writers on the Revolution were Europeans who did not bother about the working of the Revolutionary Government. Among the few Hind-Pakistani writers none had the courage to discuss matters which, they thought, would displease the British Government. They condemned every aspect of the Revolution and censured every act of the new Government.

<sup>157</sup> *Memoirs*, p. 7.



"account of expenses for supplying provisions," was prepared<sup>158</sup> This arrangement seems to have been purely temporary; after the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief he became responsible for the supply of the provisions.<sup>159</sup> Of course the immediate officers of the various Regiments were directly responsible for securing supplies; the Secretariat of the Commander-in-Chief supervised the work of the department and sanctioned payment of the bills. As the number of forces increased with the arrival of contingents from different parts of the Empire the need of appointing a War Council had become necessary. A meeting of this Council was held on 28 July which Bakht Khan was unable to attend, because he was too busy with the collection of supplies.<sup>160</sup> The War Council was an active body issuing instructions and advising the officers with regard to the details of the movements of the Regiments and offering resistance to the attacks of the enemy.<sup>161</sup>

For obvious reasons the new Government retained in most cases the main principles and nomenclature of the Company's Army administration. The majority of the officers in the Revolutionary forces were men who had served under the Company. It was, therefore, convenient to adopt its methods and terminology in the new system. However, most of the officers being new to the posts to which they were now appointed the Government thought it necessary to issue orders about their specific duties and responsibilities. Some documents containing orders, "governing the conduct of the sepoys" and "defining the duties of the Colonel of a regiment" and "rules for the maintenance of discipline" have come down to us.<sup>162</sup> In the earlier stages of the Revolution, the Emperor had appointed only a few Commanders from among his sons and grandsons, but with the arrival of contingents of troops from different places the number of officers must have become fairly large. It is, however, beyond doubt that promotions on a large scale were given to the officers who were actively associated with defence of the Capital. Several officers with military ranks of the British Army have been mentioned.<sup>163</sup> Bakht Khan's appointment as General soon after his arrival in Delhi is recorded by Jiwan Lal;<sup>164</sup> he was also given the charge of the general administration of the city, particularly for purposes of defence. The Emperor's autograph order for a seal to be prepared for Bakht Khan calls him "the adviser of the State, the respected of the country, our own special slave, Muhammad

<sup>158</sup> Zaka- Allah, p. 579; *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 358.

<sup>159</sup> There are a number of references to documents regarding the supplies of provisions being submitted to the Commander-in-Chief. See, for instance, *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 204.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>162</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 179, No. 59, 60 and 62.

<sup>163</sup> Bakht Khan was made a Brigadier by Khan Bahadur Khan in Bareilly; he became a General in Delhi; See Najm al-Ghani; *Akhbar al Sanadid*, II, 553; also *Intelligence Records*, I, 148.

Similarly Sudhari (Sirdari?) Singh, Ghawth Muhammad and Hira Singh, Commanders of the Nimach forces, are called Generals. *Intelligence Records*, II, 6; *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, pp 24 (No. 215), 363 (No. 190); *Memoirs*, p. 18, Other instances can be added.

<sup>164</sup> *T.N.N.*, p. 134.



Bakht Khan. Lord Governor Bahadur, Controller of all matters, military and civil.<sup>165</sup> He was generally addressed as General Bahadur and was sometimes called 'Commander-in-Chief of the Army'.<sup>166</sup> Jiwan Lal's statement that he was appointed Commander-in-Chief and Mirza Mughul demoted to the rank of Adjutant-General on 2 July cannot be true, because only a week later (9 July) the latter submitted a petition which was attested by him "with the official seal of the Commander-in-Chief."<sup>167</sup> on the same date Bakht Khan sends an acknowledgement of the receipt of orders from the Commander-in-Chief.<sup>168</sup> There are clear indications in the Emperor's orders as well as other documents which were seized from the Red Fort that Bakht Khan enjoyed his confidence and exercised wide powers in military affairs. When Mirza Mughul made a formal complaint against Bakht Khan's "interference" the Emperor paid no attention and passed no orders on the "petition".<sup>169</sup> The procedure of the appointment of officers is not recorded in detail; however, it is evident that higher posts in the Revolutionary Army were filled by election. The officers of the Regiments elected their Commander from among themselves and the Commander-in-Chief, probably after the approval of the Court or the War Council, issued orders of his appointment.<sup>170</sup> Shaykh Shabrati, for instance, was elected *Subahdar* by the officers of the Cavalry and Infantry Regiments; they reported this to the Commander-in-Chief.<sup>171</sup> Officers were expected to maintain registers of men working under them; these were submitted to the Court.<sup>172</sup>

Besides the officers of the Regiments and Brigades there were separate Commanders who had the charge of the various branches of the Army. Prince Aba Bakr is mentioned by Hakim Ahsan-Allah as the "Commandant of the whole cavalry."<sup>173</sup> "Each Cavalry Regiment is now split up," says the report of a spy, "into small Thokes' or federacies, comprising those who are resident of a particular tract of country. For instance, the Hansi fellows form one Thoke', the Kalanoor men another Thoke' and so on through the whole body."<sup>174</sup> The upkeep of the horses of the Artillery was in the charge of Captain Mu'in al-Dawlah Haydar Khan;<sup>175</sup> Rajah 'Ali is mentioned as Artillery Inspector. Each Regiment, it seems, had a separate Paymaster who was under an Officer-in-charge; Colonel Mirza Suhrab Jang was the Commander of the 11th Regiment and Sayyid Umrao

<sup>165</sup> *Trial*, p. 34.

<sup>166</sup> *Trial*, p. 95.

<sup>167</sup> *Trial*, p. 87.

<sup>168</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 20.

<sup>169</sup> *Trial*, p. 89.

<sup>170</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 34, No. 506.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29, No. 380.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36, Nos. 546-47.

<sup>173</sup> *Memoirs*, p. 7.

<sup>174</sup> *Secret Letters*, No. 191.

<sup>175</sup> Mubarak, f. 63; *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, pp. 37-38; also see *Memoirs*, p. 8.



\*All acted as its Paymaster.<sup>176</sup>

### Finance

The most difficult problem of the new Government was finance. The number of forces arriving in Delhi was daily increasing, and only a few of them brought enough money for their expenses.<sup>177</sup> Bahadur Shah had no funds at his disposal, and he had told the Revolutionaries at the very outset that he did not have any money; but the sepoys had assured him that they would collect the necessary funds.<sup>178</sup> Perhaps neither the Emperor nor the leaders of the sepoys had a clear idea of the magnitude of this problem. The defence of the Capital had to be organized on a much larger scale and for a much longer period than they had imagined. With the continuous arrival of reinforcements of British troops the pressure of the siege became heavier every day; the prospects of an early conclusion of the war appeared to be meagre.<sup>179</sup> The morale of some sections of the sepoys was shaken, and they started plundering. Bahadur Shah's difficulties were considerably aggravated by the irresponsible conduct of the Princes and some officers who had adopted questionable methods of collecting funds for the Government as well as for themselves.<sup>180</sup> The leading merchants of the city who were subjected to extortion by Mirza Mughul, submitted a petition to the Emperor.<sup>181</sup> The Emperor remedied the situation by directing that the "Court" alone was authorized to collect funds. Orders to this effect were issued by the Commander-in-Chief, and the Kotwal was directed "not to realize money as it is the court only which can do that"; on the same day Khuda Bakhsh, Naib-Kotwal, informed Colonel Muhammad Khidr Sultan that the "Commander-in-Chief has ordered that none but the court is authorized to realize money."<sup>182</sup> It would, however, be wrong to conclude, that the Princes and other State servants alone were at fault; the wealthier sections of the people were also responsible for creating situations in which the normal machinery of the Government could not work smoothly; they did not rise to the occasion and failed to fully cooperate with the Revolutionaries. Since they refused to pay their contributions stringent measures had to be taken against them.<sup>183</sup> Sometimes the Commander-in-Chief

<sup>76</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 166, No. 2. Hakim Ahsan-Allah writes Suhrab i Hindi instead of Suhrab Jang. *Memoirs*, p. 7.

<sup>77</sup> Bakht Khan is said to have brought with him four lakhs of rupees and distributed advance pay to his soldiers for six months. Zaka-Allah, p. 678.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 691.

<sup>79</sup> For reinforcements arriving in the British camp see Young, Colonel K., *Delhi, 1857* (London, 1902), pp. 51, 78, 80, 87, 93, 119, 170, 266, 268, *et. seq.*

<sup>80</sup> For instance Fayd-Allah Kotwal was removed from office for accepting bribes. *Memoirs*, p. 15.

<sup>81</sup> See *Trial*, pp. 70, 71-72.

<sup>82</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 324 Nos. 59-68.; see *Memoirs*, pp. 26, 27. Also see Gauri Shankar's Report in *Secret Letters*, No. 191.

<sup>83</sup> *Memoirs*, p. 26.



called the bankers to advise him about the methods of collection.<sup>184</sup> According to Zaka-Allah the Government could not collect more than four or five lakhs of rupees from the *sahukars* and other rich citizens.<sup>185</sup> Besides collecting donations the Government took loans from money-lenders; regular bonds were executed and interest was paid on these loans.<sup>186</sup> The contents of some of the treasuries in the towns and districts captured by the Revolutionaries were also brought to Delhi.

Besides these collections and loans the Government asked some of the chiefs and landlords of the adjacent districts to send their contributions to the Imperial Exchequer.<sup>187</sup> It is not known to what extent these orders were complied with; the response was probably not satisfactory. Even in the second month of the Revolution the Government found it difficult to disburse the pay of its servants. According to Ahsan-Allah Khan a sum of 120,000 rupees was required for this purpose in the month of June;<sup>188</sup> subsequently, the expenditure must have risen considerably. A requisition from the Commander-in-Chief shows that he needed Rs. 16,000 "to pay the army, their wages for 4 days."<sup>189</sup>

For the wounded soldiers the Government maintained a hospital. It was under the Commander-in-Chief and the doctors employed there had to send daily and weekly reports.<sup>190</sup> Besides the staff employed in this hospital, the various Regiments had physicians and surgeons attached to them. Doctor Muhammad Jan was attached to the Volunteer Regiment, and Doctor Sultan to the 11th Infantry Regiment.<sup>191</sup> Medical aid seems to have been organized in a satisfactory manner; even Zaka-Allah who has presented an extremely distorted picture of the short-lived Revolutionary regime, has not criticized it; he has just ignored it.

Despite the paucity of funds at his disposal to meet the ever-mounting expenditure of the administration and the War and numerous difficulties in collecting Government revenue and taxes, the Emperor did not allow his officers to take anything from the people without paying for it. A number of documents in the collection of papers seized from the Fort prove that prompt payments were made for things purchased or work done on wages. Though confined to a besieged city which was being defended by forces comprised of heterogeneous

<sup>184</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 102, Nos. 59-60.

<sup>185</sup> Zaka-Allah, p. 678. He mentions the names of a few persons who were made to pay money to the Government.

<sup>186</sup> *Trial*, p. 69.

<sup>187</sup> A list is given in Zaka-Allah, p. 690.

<sup>188</sup> *Memoirs*, p. 13.

<sup>189</sup> The Emperor wanted that the men of the Cavalry and Infantry regiments should be paid Rs. 9, and 7 respectively. The Cavalry men protested against this and demanded Rs. 30 p.m. Mahbub 'Ali Khan ultimately agreed at Rs. 20 p.m. See Zaka-Allah, pp. 677-78; *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 401.

<sup>190</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 369.

<sup>191</sup> In the *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, we also have references to Doctor Mir Muhammad Khan (p. 65), Hawajj Bakhsh (p. 271) 'Abd-Allah, Sabur Khan and Imam Bakhsh (p. 369). Muhammad Khan and 'Ayn al-Din are mentioned as surgeons (pp. 171, 197). Also see *Trial*, p. 25.



elements and different units belonging to different places, the new Government tried its best to maintain normal conditions of life. The soldiers were not allowed to misbehave, and a strict control was kept over the police officers. Mu'mal-Din Hasan Khan, the first Kotwal of Delhi, was dismissed because of his harshness and excesses;<sup>192</sup> he was made to disgorge his ill-gotten wealth.<sup>193</sup> That the people of the city lived a normal life and could afford to indulge in pastimes like the flying of kites and pigeons, and the display of fire-works is indicated by Bakht Khan's orders to the Kotwal that these practices were to be stopped, because they disturbed the Army in its activities.<sup>194</sup> The Kotwal sought instructions of the Commander-in-Chief on 30 August; two days later the *Nath-Kotwal* issued instructions to the Thanahdars "to circulate the order of the Commander-in-Chief not to fly pigeons, kites or discharge fire-works."<sup>195</sup>

### Revenue Administration

In matters pertaining to revenue administration the Government was confronted with the problem of securing the services of experienced officers in adequate numbers. Most of the men belonging to this branch of administration were posted in districts and worked under the local Governments. On the collapse of the Company's authority in the Provinces and districts, power was seized by the local leaders of the Revolutionaries. In a number of cases these leaders were confirmed in their offices by Imperial *farmans* or *sanads*; even those who could not get confirmatory orders from the Emperor considered themselves to have been working under the Revolutionary Government. Among the well-known local Chiefs who received *sanads* of appointment were Khan Bahadur Khan (Bareilly),<sup>196</sup> Birjis Qadr (Lucknow)<sup>197</sup>, Mahmud Khan (Bijnore),<sup>198</sup> Walidad Khan (Malagarh),<sup>199</sup> and Liyaqat 'Ali (Allahabad).<sup>200</sup>

In the Capital itself the Emperor seems to have kept the Revenue department under his own supervision,<sup>201</sup> but most of the appointments were made by Bakht Khan and the Princes.<sup>202</sup> The Emperor ordered Muhammad 'All Beg to establish the Revenue Secretariat (*Khalsah Shairifah* and *Hudur Tahsil*) in

<sup>192</sup> Zaka-Allah, p. 688.

<sup>193</sup> T.N.N., p. 140.

<sup>194</sup> Press-list of Mutiny Papers, p. 274, No. 92.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid., p. 292, No. 194.

<sup>196</sup> Trial, p. 278.

<sup>197</sup> Husayni, II, pp. 225, 448.

<sup>198</sup> Khan, Syed Ahmed, *Sarkashi Zil'a Bijnawr*, (ed. S. Moinul Haq, Karachi, p. 177), pp. 42-43.

<sup>199</sup> Intelligence Records, II, p. 16.

<sup>200</sup> Zaka-Allah, p. 689.

<sup>201</sup> Fath Muhammad, a British spy, says in his report: "The King reserves the affairs of the country and the Revenue which he will administer himself." *Secret Letters*, Letter No. 191.

<sup>202</sup> Zaka-Allah, p. 689. In the *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 286, there is an application from Muhammad Khayr al-Din, requesting the Commander-in-Chief to appoint him Tahsildar in the District of Balagarh.



the house of James Skinner;<sup>203</sup> obviously there were separate officers for the collection of revenue in the Crown Lands. The Emperor sometimes wrote to big zamindars of the Crown Lands to send their quota the revenue of their lands. Only two days after assuming power he wrote to Skinner who was in his country house at Bilaspur (Bulandshahr): "immediately on receiving this order he is to transmit to us whatever revenue he may have collected on account of this harvest and that in future also he is to send us harvest by harvest the proceeds of the Tuppa of Ruboopoorā which is included among the Royal lands (Tuyool). Dated 19 Ramazan (14th May 1857) 21st year."<sup>204</sup>

The Minister concerned was directed to issue circulars to the Provincial Governments about the appointment of a Tahsildar to whom they were "to give facilities in the discharge of his duties."<sup>205</sup> Mawlawi Fayd Ahmad, an officer attached to the Revenue Board at Agra, had joined the Revolution, and had come to Delhi with the Nimach Brigade. He was appointed *Sarrishtahdar*, and to quote Hakim Ahsan-Allah, "all the office work was made over to him;" all the Thanahdars and Kotwals were directed to send their applications to him and obey his orders, and "the Maulawi should bring important cases before the King; . . . he should write daily an abstract of the *thanah* reports, and bring it before the King."<sup>206</sup> Zaka-Allah adds that he was given some judicial work along with Mirza Mughul and Khidr Sultan; perhaps cases of the Army men were decided by this Court,<sup>207</sup> where the Mawlawi represented the Emperor. Subsequently, however, Fayd Ahmad was attached to Revenue administration; he is mentioned as visiting Aligarh and Bulandshahr to collect revenue of those districts. The collection of revenue was among the duties of the local Chiefs and zamindars, but they used to withhold Government dues, and the Emperor was sometimes forced to send his officers to realize them. Mawlawi Fayd Ahmad was accompanied by Husayn Bakhsh; they were specifically directed to realize Government revenues from Gulab Singh (Kacher), Zahur 'Ali Khan (Dharampur) and Muhammad Dawud Khan of Bhikampur.<sup>208</sup> It is difficult to form an idea of the villages that paid the revenue to the Emperor; however, about the end of September, 1857, Muir was told by Clifford who was in Ghaziuddin-Nagar that

<sup>203</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 12, No. 13; p. 113, No 8; p. 400, No. 22; also see *Trial*, p. 10. Mirza Muhammad 'Ali Beg was in the beginning appointed Tahsildar of Mihrauli, *T.N.N.*, 101.

<sup>204</sup> *Secret Letters*, Letter No. 212 of 3.11.1857, No. 164, Bahadur Shah's order to Skinner was seized with other documents by Captain Briggs when the Palace fell to the British. Its translation was sent by the officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, to Edmunstone, Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, with a covering letter dated 6th October, 1857. It may be noted that the order of the Emperor mentions James Skinner who had died in 1841. Actually R.W. Skinner occupied the house at Bilaspur. See Kaye and Malleon, VI. 135.

<sup>205</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 180. No. 2.

<sup>206</sup> *Memoirs*, p. 16; also Mubarak, f. 109.

<sup>207</sup> Zaka-Allah, p. 688.

<sup>208</sup> Zaka-Allah, p. 691. He gives a list of other zamindars also who were expected to send contributions, See p. 690.



"several of the Goojur villages have already paid it to the late King; ..."<sup>209</sup> Ghulam Fakhr al-Din Khan, the Tahsildar of Kot Qasim, had been able to collect revenue to the tune of 3000 rupees; "Abd al-Haqq was despatched to Gurgaon for the same purpose."<sup>210</sup> Occasionally the Emperor inspected the accounts himself; on 23 July orders were issued to the Revenue Collector of Kot Qasim to submit his accounts for inspection by the Emperor.<sup>211</sup>

Besides land revenue the Government collected other taxes also. Sugar, for instance, was taxed at the rate of annas eight per maund; evidently, this was sales tax. Octroi duties on this commodity as well as salt were withdrawn.<sup>212</sup> On 23 August the *Mukhtar al-Saltanat* directed the Kotwal "to realize the rent from a dancing girl by distraining her property"; four days later, he asked the same officer "to realize the canal rents from Ghulam Nabi Khan."<sup>213</sup>

## Mint

In spite of their best efforts to secure donations, borrow money<sup>214</sup> and realize revenue and other taxes, the Revolutionary Government, it is easy to understand, could not collect enough money to meet the expenses of the war and the reconstruction of a broken machinery of administration. The system of paper currency did not exist and enormous quantities of metal were needed to coin money. As early as 23 May, 1857, orders were issued that "the old coins should be withdrawn from circulation, and new coinage introduced."<sup>215</sup> On 6 August the Commander-in-Chief sought the Emperor's permission to establish a mint in Delhi; this was sanctioned.<sup>216</sup> However, the price of gold had considerably risen and this must have affected the prices of other metals also. It was not possible, therefore, to coin money on a large scale. By September the financial position of the Government had deteriorated to such an extent that "gold and silver articles belonging to the palace have been sent to the King's mint for coinage."<sup>217</sup> To add

<sup>209</sup> *Intelligence Records*, I, 129.

<sup>210</sup> Zaka-Allah, p. 697.

<sup>211</sup> *T. N. N.*, p. 164.

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 149-152.

<sup>213</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 270, No. 20; p. 272, No. 43. The office of the *Mukhtar al-Saltanat* was at the time held by Samsam al-Dawlah Ahmad Quli Khan, the father of Queen Zinat Mahal and a grandson of Ahmad Shah Abdali's *Wazir*, Shah Wali Khan. See *Memoirs*, p. 14.

<sup>214</sup> The Government took loans from bankers and other rich persons and paid regular interest. The Muslims "could not be called upon to supply funds" (in the form of loans) because they would not take interest. However, they had to give donations in cash and also in the form of provisions for the *Mujahids*: *T. N. N.*, p. 99; *Trial*, p. 72.

<sup>215</sup> *T. N. N.*, p. 101.

<sup>216</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 14, No. 45; p. 407, No. 246, 247.

<sup>217</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Paper*, p. 8, No. 11; Gauri Shankar spy reports on 12 September: "A mint has been established and the silver of the King's howdas, sticks of office, and utensils are sent to the mint to be coined into rupees for the use of the army." The mint was set up in Katrah Maghru. See *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, 34; 56.



to the difficulties of the Government, anti-social elements had become active, and the Commander-in-Chief had to issue a proclamation to the people "warning them against counterfeiting coins."<sup>218</sup> Besides Delhi, Bahadur Shah's coins were minted at other places also, as, for instance, at Lucknow. Gold mohurs minted at Lucknow were brought to the Emperor and presented as *nadhr* by 'Abbas Mirza, the envoy of the *Wali* of Awadh. The legend on these coins indicated that the *Wali* of Awadh acknowledged the suzerainty of Bahadur Shah.<sup>219</sup> This is a fact of great constitutional significance. The East India Company had encouraged the Nawabs of Awadh to assume the status of a King and thus become rivals to the Mughul Emperor.<sup>220</sup> The Revolutionary leaders of Awadh reverted to the old constitutional position of their Chief *vis-à-vis* the Central Government and acknowledged the suzerainty of Bahadur Shah.

### Civil appointments

On 14 May the Emperor called Mufti Sadr al-Din and asked him to work as "City Magistrate, to try all cases, and decide them with impartiality and justice. The Moulvie excused himself on the plea of bad health."<sup>221</sup> But subsequently he seems to have accepted office under the new Government; on June 5, the Emperor appointed Mumtaz al-Dawlah Muhammad Taqi Khan as *Sadr Amin* "under Maulawi Mohd. Sadru'd-Din."<sup>222</sup> From the meagre and fragmentary references in contemporary records it appears that separate courts were set up for civil and military cases. Mawlawi Fayd Ahmad who had arrived in Delhi on 26 July<sup>223</sup> was "at once appointed Chief Criminal Judge by the King"; he was of advanced age but "retained his courage to the last and constantly exposed himself."<sup>224</sup> Mawlawi Ghulam Ahmad is also mentioned as an "officer-in-charge of the criminal court."<sup>225</sup> On 6 July Muhammad Quli Khan was appointed "Magistrate over the city with full powers."<sup>226</sup> In a circular issued by

<sup>218</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 36, No. 543.

<sup>219</sup> The legend on these gold mohurs was:

به زر زد سکه نصرت طرازی

سراج الدین بہادر شاہ غازی

The victorious coin was struck in gold: Siraj al-Din Bahadur Shah Ghazi. *T. N. N.*, p. 69; for gold mohurs minted in Delhi see *T. N. N.*, p. 96.

<sup>220</sup> See p. 12 (chapter I).

<sup>221</sup> *T. N. N.*, p. 90.

<sup>222</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 374, No. 1.

<sup>223</sup> Young, p. 156.

<sup>224</sup> Mubarak. f. 111. Besides this he had the charge of the Emperor's Secretariat. See *Memoirs*, note on p. 16. Fayd Ahmad was born in 1223 H. and was therefore in his fiftieth year at the time of the Revolution. See 'Ali, Rahman, *Tadhkirah i 'Ulama i Hind* (Lucknow, 1914), p. 165.

<sup>225</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 291, No. 168.

<sup>226</sup> *T. N. N.*, p. 141.



the Kotwal, Fayd Ahmad Khan is mentioned as *Munsif*.<sup>227</sup> The Judiciary, it appears, could not be organized as elaborately as other departments were done. There is recorded evidence to show that even minor cases of theft were brought before the Emperor and that he took action on them, issuing necessary orders.

Bahadur Shah and other Revolutionary leaders at Delhi were confronted with problems which were completely new to them. Few of them had any experience of administration, and much less of running it during a period of war. They seemed to have counted on two factors: that the Company's officers and forces would soon be overpowered and wiped out and that the Hind-Pakistani officers in the Company's service would respond to their appeals. In both cases their expectations were only half fulfilled. However, in spite of the unexpected and long course which the Revolution took and the protracted war that they had to fight the Revolutionaries succeeded in setting up a fairly efficient machinery of administration. Delhi had been completely cut off from the Panjab, and yet the Government was able to keep the economic situation under full control, almost normal levels of prices were maintained except in the case of gold for which the demand had grown. "Some of the *Telangahs* had so much money (in rupees) that they could not carry it; they would go about in the city purchasing gold. Because of their purchases the rate of gold has risen from 16 and 17 rupees to 27 and 28 per tolah . . . There used to be crowds of them at the shops of the gold-smiths, asking the latter to convert their gold into bangles or rings for their legs. Some of the *Telangahs* had as many as five rings on each of their thighs."<sup>228</sup> The demand for gold being confined to a very limited section of the people, the Government was able to keep the prices of other articles within reasonable levels. Ghee, for instance, could be purchased at one rupee for three seers.<sup>229</sup> The rate of sulphur, according to payment made under the orders of the Commandant of the Artillery to a grocer, works out to be less than three annas for a seer.<sup>230</sup> It was on account of the comparative cheapness of prices that the pay of a footman could be fixed at Rs. 5/- and that of a Cavalry trooper at Rs. 30/- per month.<sup>231</sup>

<sup>227</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 292.

<sup>228</sup> *T. N. N.*, p. 100; Zaka-Allah, p. 677.

<sup>229</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 253, No. 34. An idea of the prices of other articles may be formed by a list in the petition of a man named Ahsan al-Haqq whose property had been plundered. He claimed the prices of the articles looted at the following rates:

Cotton carpet, 5 yards long, valued at	7 Rs.
Copper saucer with cover	2 Rs.
Prayer carpet	2 Rs.
Banaras Scarf	7 Rs.
a house	200 Rs.
a pair of bullocks	100 Rs.
a sword	15 Rs.

See *Trial*, p. 18.

<sup>230</sup> Haydar Husayn Khan asks Jawala Nath "to credit Rs. 109 and 6 annas to the account of Lala Dina Nath, Grocer, from whom 14 maunds and 23 seers of sulphur have been secured for the magazine." *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 357 No. 51.

*T. N. N.*, p. 92.



With a hastily-reconstructed machinery of administration and an Army comprised of heterogeneous elements —regular units of the Company's Bengal Army, *Ghazis*, and Regiments belonging to Princely States besides retainers of minor Chiefs—the Revolutionaries, defended Delhi against a well-equipped and well-trained British force for four long months. They were defeated in the end but only after leaving behind a brilliant record of heroic deeds and sacrifices.

### THE DEFENCE OF DELHI (I)

#### The British forces move towards Delhi

The Revolutionary Government was hardly twenty days in the saddle when they had to fight their first battle against the British on the banks of the Hindan, a tributary of the Jamuna. In the long and eventful history of Hind-Pakistan never was a Government forced into a major war in such a state of unpreparedness as that of the eighty-two year old Bahadur Shah. The organizers of the Movement had planned a violent Revolution, but they had never calculated that it would mean a long war. The Army and the people, they thought, had been thoroughly worked upon; the former was ready to strike at a moment's notice, while the latter would support it. The wealthy classes could not be relied upon, but their number was small, and it was obvious that the Revolutionaries would not show much regard to the hoarders of wealth. The original programme of the Revolutionaries was that on a particular day the sepoys, in their respective stations, would simultaneously overwhelm the European officers and men of the Company's Army; this would be followed by a general rising of the people under the local leaders; the machinery of administration would thus be paralyzed, and a new Government established. The premature rising of the sepoys at Meerut had, however, upset their arrangements. No doubt they were able to capture Delhi, but before the reports of the outbreak could reach other important centres of the Movement, the British forces were already in motion.

Before the Telegraph Office at Delhi was captured by the Revolutionaries a short but highly alarming message had been flashed to<sup>232</sup> Ambala; from there the news was communicated to "all stations". The same day General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief of the Company's Army, who was recouping his health in Simla, received a report of what had happened in Delhi. No time was lost in preparing for a march on the Capital. He sent immediate orders to Kasauli, Daphnai and Sabathu that the Regiments stationed there were to move down forthwith; instructions were also sent to Ferozepur and Jullundur for precautionary measures and to Phillaur for the preparation of a siege train.

<sup>232</sup> The telegram sent from Ambala read as below:

"The following just received from Delhi: We must leave office. All bungalows are being burnt down by the sepoys from Meerut. They came in this morning. We are off: don't roll today. Mr. C. Todd is dead we think. He went out this morning and has not returned yet. We heard that nine Europeans were killed." *Mutiny Records*, VII, Part I, p. 17.



Having "pressed forward the urgent measures", Anson left Simla on 14 May reaching Ambala the next morning. It took him three more days to despatch the first detachment to Delhi.<sup>233</sup>

Anson has been criticized by some writers for not acting with as much promptitude as the occasion demanded; he was hesitant to risk an attack on the Imperial Capital. In reply to a letter from John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, in which the latter had emphasized the urgency of recovering Delhi, the Commander-in-Chief referred to the inadequacy of troops and equipment at his disposal, and then said: "It becomes now a matter for your consideration whether it would be prudent to risk the small European force we have here in an enterprise upon Delhi. I think not."<sup>234</sup> Lawrence was not convinced by Anson's arguments. Canning also held the same view; Anson was, therefore, overruled and had to proceed to Delhi. Before he could begin his march he sent Hodson, escorted by Jhind forces, to Meerut with a message for General Hewitt.<sup>235</sup> The latter had, however, already despatched a messenger to Ambala. The two envoys met on the road between Karnal and Meerut; "so unexpected was this meeting that at first each party took the other for 'moofsids', as we used in those days to designate the rebels; but we soon discovered our mistake."<sup>236</sup>

### The Sikhs support the British

Douglas Forsyth, Deputy Commissioner of Ambala, was a friend of the Maharaja of Patiala. He met the Sikh Chief and asked him: "Are you for us or against us?" The prompt reply of the Maharaja was: "As long as I live, I am yours." It may be noted here that the attitude of the Sikh States towards the Movement was important; if they had not preferred to cooperate and help the British, the course of the Revolution would have been entirely different. Delhi could not have been recaptured by the British if the line of communications had not been kept open in the Panjab, and this "important service" was rendered by the Phulkian Chiefs. The Revolutionary Government of Delhi had early realized the strategic importance of the territories of the Sikh States, particularly of Patiala. As early as 15 May, 1857, the Emperor had sent a *farman* to the Maharaja of Patiala. This was followed by several others, because Delhi was fully aware of the help which the British were receiving from these Chiefs.<sup>237</sup>

The cooperation of Patiala, Jhind and other Sikh States having been

<sup>233</sup> Cf. Forrest, I, 54.

<sup>234</sup> Smith, R. Bosworth, *Life of Lord Lawrence* (London, 1901), I, 492; also see Kaye and Malleon, II, 112-13.

<sup>235</sup> Hodson, George H., *Twelve Years of a Soldier's life in India* (London, 1859), p. 187.

<sup>236</sup> Mackenzie. Colonel' A. R. D., *Mutiny Memoirs* (Pioneer Press, Allahabad, second edition, 1891), p. 54.

<sup>237</sup> Forrest, I, 59; Roberts, *op. cit.*, I, 104. Some valuable documents of this correspondence may be seen in the Records Office of the Pakistan Government, Lahore. *Press-list of Mutiny Papers, Punjab Secretariat* (Lahore, 1925), p. 30.



secured and necessary information received from Meerut, Anson decided to proceed to Delhi. The Commander-in-Chief's plan was to assemble his army at Karnal where he arrived on the morning of 25 May. He hoped to enter Baghpat on 5 June and wait there for the arrival of General Hewitt. In Karnal, however, he was stricken with cholera and died early in the morning on 27 May.<sup>238</sup> Major General Sir Henry Barnard who succeeded Anson issued an order that villages which had ill-treated the European fugitives from Delhi were to be utterly destroyed.<sup>239</sup> The Field Force left Karnal on 30 May, reaching 'Alipur ten miles from Delhi, on 5 June; here it waited for the arrival of the siege train.<sup>240</sup>

### The Battle of the Hindan, 30-31 May

The Meerut troops commanded by Brigadier Wilson had already left their cantonments for Delhi on the night of 27 May; three days later they encamped near Ghaziuddin-nagar on the banks of the Hindan. The officers of the Revolutionary forces at Delhi decided to give them a battle before they crossed the Jamuna. Mubarak Shah tells us that the troops wanted the Emperor to accompany them to the battle field, but the old monarch said that he was too weak to join them. Mirza Khidr Sultan and Mirza Abu Bakr were, therefore, ordered to lead the Army, which consisted of "three regiments, four horse artillery guns, one gun of a bullock battery and four hundred cavalry."<sup>241</sup> Against this the British Column was comprized of "two squadrons of the Carabineers, a wing of the 60th Rifles, Scott's light field battery, Tombs' troop of horse artillery, two 18-pounder guns, all manned by Europeans, with some native sappers and irregular horse."<sup>242</sup> The Revolutionaries, though numerically superior, were handicapped by the fact that they had arrived from Delhi the same day and had no time to rest; the British having reached the site early in the morning and not expecting "the presence of an enemy nearer to us than Delhi", passed their day "in conversation and in sleep."<sup>243</sup>

The Revolutionaries were tired, but their presence having been discovered they could not postpone fighting for long. They began by opening fire from their heavy guns, which had been placed on a small ridge on the right bank and not far from the rivulet. The British guns replied, and at the same time their rifle-men moving forward along the causeway came to close quarters with the

<sup>238</sup> It is rather interesting to note that the "Native troops" thought that General Anson was commissioned to convert them. See Young, p. 21 n.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid*, p. 31.

<sup>240</sup> The siege train was equipped at Phillaur and consisted of "eight eighteen-pounders, four eight-inch howitzers, twelve five-and-a-half inch mortars, and four eight-inch mortars." Kaye and Malleon, II. 141 n.

<sup>241</sup> Folio, 53.

<sup>242</sup> Forrest, I, 66. The Revolutionaries had a numerical superiority, but the figures given by some Western writers are highly exaggerated. Cave-Browne, for instance, says, "some 700 Europeans ... drove ten times their own number." Vol. I, p. 313.

<sup>243</sup> Rotton, pp. 23, 24.



Revolutionaries. When the battle was in full rage Mirza Khidr Sultan came out of his carriage (*buggi*), mounted his horse and turned his head.<sup>244</sup> As the Revolutionaries were retreating a gallant sepoy of the 11th Regiment discharged his musket into an ammunition waggon, which cost him his life, but the explosion killed Captain Andrews with some of his followers, who were trying to capture it. "It taught us", comments Sir John Kaye, "that among the mutineers were some brave and desperate men, who were ready to court instant death for the sake of the national cause."<sup>245</sup>

On the following morning (31 May, 1857) the officers of the Revolutionary forces again left Delhi for another engagement. The battle was really an artillery duel which lasted for about two hours. Brigadier Wilson ordered a general advance; the sepoys found its pressure too heavy, "but although they felt that they could not hold their ground and continue the battle, they did not fly, shattered and broken, as on the preceding day. Having discharged into our advancing columns a tremendous shower of grapeshot, they limbered up their guns before the smoke had dispersed, and fell back in orderly array."<sup>246</sup> On both sides casualties were rather heavy; the retreat of the Revolutionaries, however, raised the morale of the Meerut Brigade. It was joined by the Sirmur Battalion of the Gurkhas on 1 June; three days later orders were received for a march towards 'Alipar. On 7 June Brigadier Wilson's force joined General Barnard early in the morning. Their arrival put the entire camp into high spirits. Keith Young wrote in a letter, dated 7 June, that "no one doubts for an instant the ultimate result of the contest and ere this reaches you all confidently expect that Delhi will be in our possession, and with very little loss on our side: . . ."<sup>247</sup> He was, however, soon disillusioned.

### The Battle of Badli ki Sarai, 8 June

By the end of the first week of June the British army was in a position to march on Delhi, the seige train having arrived on the 6th. Two days later was fought the Battle of Badli-ki-Sarai. On hearing that the Meerut Brigade was moving towards 'Alipur the Revolutionaries had decided to send a small force of Infantry, supported by five hundred horse, four heavy guns and two troops of Horse Artillery to stop the advancing British army. They did not send a large force because they had been misled by a British spy who "disguised as a Moulvee came into Delhi and informed the soubadars and other Native officers that four hundred of the 4th Ir. Cav. then with the British would during the fight come over and join them, that they must not interfere with them in any way as they were friends and easily recognizable being dressed in green Tunics and

<sup>244</sup> See *supra*.

<sup>245</sup> Kaye and Malleon, Vol. II, p. 138.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 139-40.

<sup>247</sup> Young, p. 44.



turbans and that he had been sent secretly with the information."<sup>248</sup> As the Revolutionaries were negotiating with the 4th Irregular Cavalry they were taken in by the spy and the "Rebel army marched that night taking the Moulvee with them and arrived at 'Badlee' ... Mirza Khizhar Sooltan was distinguished by a very brilliant hand-piece which glistened, sparkled in the sun."<sup>249</sup> They took their position in and around a *sarai* which was situated a little to the right of the Grand Trunk Road from Delhi; the ground on either side of the road was swampy, and a mile to the Western Jamna Canal, almost parallel to it for several miles. Brigadier Grant crossed the Canal and proceeding along its right bank took a position, from where he could cover the rear of the Revolutionary force; the main column marched down the road, and to its left was the third contingent commanded by Brigadier Graves.<sup>250</sup>

The day was just dawning when the British opened fire; the Revolutionaries replied with firmness. "The fire of the enemy's heavy battery, aided by several light guns", says Lieutenant Norman, second Adjutant-General of the Army, "began to tell seriously, the bullock drivers of our heavy guns ran away with the cattle, and one of the waggons blew up; our men fell fast, and the staff offering a tempting mark, two officers (Colonel Chester and Captain Russel) were killed, and several horses of the staff lost in the course of one or two minutes."<sup>251</sup> This upset the British Commander who ordered the Infantry to make a charge; it was followed up by flanking attacks and the appearance of Graves and Grant on the right and left of the camp of the Revolutionaries. Their officers, Mubarak Shah tells us, "saw the four hundred horses described by the Moulvee and fully satisfied, allowed them to advance unmolested."<sup>252</sup> They soon realized, however, that they had been deceived by the "moulvee"; the 3rd Cavalry advanced to meet them; both sides lost "some 200 men" in the contest, but Mirza Abu Bakr had fled from the field "on the pretence of bringing up magazine stores." This action of the Commander of the Revolutionaries disheartened them and "the infantry commenced retreating followed by the remaining artillery and 3rd Cavalry." The cowardice of the Prince had demoralized the Revolutionary forces; they withdrew after suffering heavy losses. For the British, too, "it was no

<sup>248</sup> Mubarak, ff.58-59.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.* f. 59.

<sup>250</sup> "The total force to be engaged in the main attack was in round numbers 170 cavalry and 1,900 infantry, with fourteen guns. That employed in the flank attack about 350 cavalry and ten guns." Norman's Narrative, *State Papers*, 1,435.

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*

Cave-Browne admits that "the heavy guns of the enemy. . . were playing with deadly effect on the advancing column." See Vol. 1, p. 321. Rotton confirms this; "The practice of their artillery was excellent; they had the range to nicety, and their fire was rapid and scarcely unbroken for a moment. There can be no question it was telling with deadly effect on our advance column." See p. 40.

<sup>252</sup> Mubarak, f. 60.



easy victory. Here, as on the Kindan, the rebels fought well; ... they worked the guns with fatal accuracy."<sup>253</sup>

Despite heavy losses in the field of battle and excessive heat, Barnard decided to follow up his victory by an advance on Delhi; he feared the Revolutionaries would reassemble and occupy another strong position if they were not pursued. Half a mile below the *sarai* near Azadpur the road split into two branches, one leading to the city of Delhi and the other to the cantonments. The British forces were divided into two sections; Barnard led one of them on the cantonment road, the other marched towards the city under Wilson. The Sirmur Battalion of the Gurkhas was extended between the two columns. The Revolutionaries had taken position on the Ridge and posted three guns at the Flag Staff Tower. From here they opened fire, and with accuracy, on Barnard's Column, hitting the marchers right up to the bridge over a canal nearby. Barnard, however, managed to cross over to the parade ground and then proceed through the deserted houses of the officers and the sepoys in the cantonment area. When he was within a few hundred yards of the Flag Staff Tower, his men wheeled up to its right and started firing; they were supported by the Gurkhas. Wilson's Column too was not allowed to proceed unhampered;<sup>254</sup> it met with opposition at the Sabzi-Mandi. Ultimately it succeeded in mounting the Ridge at the southern end. The losses of the Revolutionaries were no doubt heavier than those of the British,<sup>255</sup> but far more disheartening for them was the fact that the enemy now held the road to the Panjab and the northwest.<sup>256</sup> Delhi was thus cut off from one of the strategically most vital regions of the subcontinent. As the Revolutionaries had no navy and could not capture or exercise control over the sea ports, their only means of communications were the land routes that passed through the Panjab; these were now held by their enemy.

### The Siege begins

The British forces encamped below the Ridge in the parade ground, and "seldom has a finer position been occupied by a British Army."<sup>257</sup> In the rear of their camp ran the Najafgarh Jhil Canal which, though ordinarily dry during the

<sup>253</sup> Cave-Browne, I, 321.

<sup>254</sup> On hearing of the reverse at Badli ki Sarai the Revolutionary Government sent troops of Irregulars to reinforce its Army. They "went four *cos* beyond the Ridge," but they had no guns with them and were forced to make a retreat; their Commander, Risalahdar Mubarak Khan, was slightly injured. See Mubarak, f. 62.

<sup>255</sup> Some writers have put the losses of the Revolutionaries at a thousand; perhaps Kaye is nearer the truth, when he says that "the loss of the enemy is computed at three hundred and fifty men." See Kaye and Malleson, II, p. 145.

<sup>256</sup> The authorities of the Revolutionary Government were convinced that the main cause of their defeat was the treachery of the "moulvi" who had acted as a British spy; he had been kept as a closely guarded prisoner, and now that his guilt was proved, he was put to death. Mubarak, f. 62.

<sup>257</sup> Kaye and Malleson, II, 386.



summer months, was full of pure and wholesome water because of plentiful rains in 1856. "It is scarcely possible" remarked Colonel Baird Smith, "to over-estimate the value of such a provision both to the health and comfort of the troops, for without it the river, two miles distant, or the wells in Cantonment, all brackish and bad, must have been the sole sources of water supply for man and beast . . . the Jhil canal was not merely a good defensible line for military operations, but a precious addition to the comfort and salubrity of the camp."<sup>258</sup>

In front of the camp was the famous Ridge which extended from the Jamuna for about two miles and was roughly speaking sixty feet higher than the level of the city. Along the Ridge stood four buildings at some intervals—The Flag Staff Tower, an old mosque, an observatory, and, near the extreme south-western edge, a Maratha chief's country residence, known as Hindu Rao's House. In all these buildings pickets were established. To the right of his camp, Barnard threw a heavy battery near the end of the Ridge. Not far from it was the Sabzi-Mandi, a suburb of Delhi, which could provide a cover to the Revolutionary forces if they chose, as they frequently did, to attack the British camp from that side. Further down and facing the surrounding wall of Shahjahan's Capital stood the *'Idgah* and then came the suburbs of Kishanganj and Paharipur. In the wide space between the Ridge and the city there were a number of buildings and gardens; Metcalfe House and Ludlow Castle were important for both parties. Delhi's main strength was its surrounding wall, nearly seven miles in circumference, with a ditch below its base. To the east of the town flows the Jamuna, and a bridge of boats connected the Capital with the regions across the river. The city wall was pierced by several Gates where strong guards had been posted with guns at "commanding points". The area surrounding the Kashmir Gate became the chief battle-ground of the siege because it faced the British camp.

### Early skirmishes

The Revolutionaries had by now realized that they would have to fight a full-fledged war, and that first stage was the defence of Delhi; this was a hard task because the entire resources of the Sikh States besides their own forces in the Panjab and the north-west were at the disposal of the British. The Revolutionary officers decided to take the offensive, and on the afternoon of 9 June they came out of the Lahore Gate and attacked Hindu Rao's House where the British had established their main picket. Unfortunately for the Revolutionaries their enemy had been greatly reinforced the same morning by the arrival of the Guides consisting of three troops of Cavalry and six Companies of Infantry. They were immediately sent to support the picket. A contested action followed resulting in the withdrawal of the Revolutionaries, who probably had no

<sup>258</sup> MS. Memoir quoted in Kaye and Malleon, II. pp. 387-88 n.



information about the arrival of British reinforcements. In the action the British lost Battye, Commandant of the Guides Cavalry.

On the following day the Revolutionaries again marched out of the Ajmer Gate; Major Reid, commanding the Gurkhas, met them. The Revolutionaries did not fire at their countrymen and cried out: "We expect the Gurkhas to join us; we won't fire". Promptly came the taunting reply: "Oh yes, we are now coming to join you." They were allowed to come within twenty paces of the Revolutionaries; from here "they gave a well-directed volley, killing between twenty and thirty, and followed them up until fired on by the batteries of the Ajmer Gate."<sup>259</sup> Jiwan Lal in his account of the fighting on this date says that the Revolutionaries were commanded by Samad Khan and that "about 100 English were killed."<sup>260</sup> The next day (11 June) another attempt was made by the Revolutionaries to capture Hindu Rao's House, but the Gurkhas resisted their advance and forced them to withdraw. For three days successively they attacked the right flank of the enemy, but they did not achieve much success; they were, however, not deterred by discouraging factors. Early in the morning of the 12th they launched an attack on the left flank of the enemy. Taking advantage of the undulating ground and successfully using the trees as a cover they got on to the Ridge and surprised the Flag Staff picket. "In consequence of this", Rotton says, "the enemy advanced a little too near the guns without being observed; . . . The rebels evinced more than ordinary daring, coming up in spite of the steady resistance made against them by the picquet: . . ."<sup>261</sup>

The bullets of the Revolutionaries, some of whom marched right up to the lines hit the men in the British camp; three of them were killed.<sup>262</sup> Captain Knox of the 75th Foot tried to resist their advance, but he was shot dead by a sepoy; a number of men belonging to the same Regiment also fell with him. After a determined fight lasting for nearly two hours and a half the Revolutionaries were obliged to withdraw, but "they had inflicted some severe losses on our side."<sup>263</sup> An officer engaged in the struggle "found the Flag Staff full of our wounded men, and numbers lying round the open face in front. I am told, that out of the few who held the position, no less than forty-five men and two officers were killed and wounded—nearly all of the 75th and Europeans; . . ."<sup>264</sup>

### Attack on the Metcalfe House

The losses in the last engagement alerted the British Commander, and to lessen the possibility of a recurrence of surprise attacks it was decided to occupy

<sup>259</sup> *State Papers*, I, p. 294; Zaka-Allah, p. 580.

<sup>260</sup> *T.N.N.*, pp. 118-19.

<sup>261</sup> Rotton, p. 68.

<sup>262</sup> Zaka-Allah, p. 581.

<sup>263</sup> Rotton, p. 68.

<sup>264</sup> Ball, I, 463.



the Metcalfe House, "that estate, on which the late Sir Theophilus Metcalfe had so lavishly displayed his taste."<sup>265</sup> The building originally stood in a large garden covering about 1000 acres. It had been plundered and burnt by the Gujars under the zamindar of Chandrauli, but its walls still provided a good site for a battery, which the Revolutionaries had established. Its strategic importance was fully realized by the British, and the possibility of wresting it from the Revolutionaries was discussed on 11 June; but it was thought that "with so weak a force, the risk would be too great." Nevertheless, in consequence of the retreat of the Revolutionaries on 12 June it fell into British hands and a strong picket was established.

The combats of the first five days had been very encouraging from the point of view of the besiegers, but it was after much hesitation that the General agreed "to take Delhi" by a *coup de main*. A plan was made to blow up two Gates of the city and then force an entry before dawn on 13 June. But at the last moment, Barnard abandoned the plan because, it has been stated, he was told by one of his officers: "You may certainly take the city by surprise, but whether you are strong enough to hold it is another matter."<sup>266</sup>

### Role of the spies

It was now obvious that the siege of Delhi would be a long affair; steps were therefore taken by the British Commander to strengthen his position. Besides new batteries and pickets a very efficient and extensive system of espionage was established under Hodson. He contacted an acquaintance, Mawlawi Rajab 'Ali, who had served as the confidential *Mir Munshi* of Henry Lawrence. The *mawlawi* agreed to offer his services, and "with a fidelity and zeal which it is impossible to over-estimate in that crisis, did this man, rigid Mohammedan though he was, daily forward from the very heart of the city—in a quill, a chupattee, a sole of a shoe, the fold of a turban, or the matted hair of a Sikh—anywhere or anyhow, so as to escape detection—a slip of paper containing the news of all that was passing in the city which it behoved us to know; and so great was his tact that not a shadow of a suspicion rested upon him. Like the two ends of an electric wire were Rujjub 'Ali in the city and Hodson in camp; through them passed daily the most authentic intelligence of the rebel plans and movements."<sup>267</sup> Besides Rajab 'Ali there were other spies who sent information

<sup>265</sup> Cave-Browne, I, 331.

<sup>266</sup> Forrest, I, 86-87; Cave-Browne, I, 335-36. Hodson, one of the officers who were asked to draw the plan of assault, writes under 13 June: "I am very vexed, though the General is most kind and considerate in trying to soothe my disappointment—too kind, indeed, or he would not so readily have pardoned those whose fault it is that we are still outside Delhi." See Hodson, p. 204.

Keith Young thought otherwise. "Most fortunate, I think", he wrote in his diary, "that we did not attack, for failure would have been death—and success was not a quite certain; ..." See p. 9.

<sup>267</sup> Cave-Browne, I, 339-40.



to the British camp; Chunna Mai was richly rewarded for espionage after the re-establishment of British rule.<sup>268</sup> Gauri Shankar<sup>269</sup> was another spy; some of his letters were recovered from the Red Fort when it fell to the British; women were also engaged.<sup>270</sup> In some cases even the officers of the Revolutionary Government were in the pay of the enemy.<sup>271</sup> Subsequently the intelligence service was further strengthened and organized by the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, and William Muir was put in charge of it.

The Revolutionaries also had their spies but their system did not work as efficiently as that of the British. It is difficult to overemphasize the advantage of successful espionage during the entire course of the War of Independence, and there can be no doubt that one of the main causes of British successes in Delhi was that they received detailed and correct information of the resources and activities of its defenders, while the Revolutionaries in most cases built their plans on the basis of faulty information. 'The fact was', Mubarak Shah remarks, "that the Rebel Army possessed no really trustworthy information as to the number and position of the British troops—nor had they a [?] spy on whose words they could rely."<sup>273</sup> From the outset the Hindus of Delhi, particularly the wealthier among them, were lukewarm in their support of the Revolution. In a letter, dated 14 June, Keith Young wrote that "news of a reliable nature came in yesterday to Greathed to the effect that the Hindoos were becoming quite disgusted, finding they were being made complete dupes by the Mahomedans, who wish to make a religious war of it."<sup>274</sup> Nor was the attitude of the Hindu Princes of the neighbouring States encouraging. To the Emperor's letters inviting them to join the Revolution, the Raja of Gwalior said: "When you are really King will come to your assistance", The Raja of Dholpur wanted to put the messenger to death, and the ruler of Bharatpur said: "He was always disloyal to Delhi, and would remain so." These facts were reported to the British camp by a spy on 15 June.<sup>275</sup>

Another handicap was that they had very few good military leaders. The Indian officers who served in the Company's army were not promoted to higher commands; they were good soldiers and fought with courage and determination, but they had no experience of directing operations in a major war. Now, under the Revolutionary Government they were raised over-night to the highest positions and entrusted with responsibilities which they were unable to discharge. Worse was the case of the *Mujahids* or volunteers who joined the War as a sacred

Nizami, Khwajah Hasan, *Dilli ki Saza*, pp. 49-50.

See *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, pp. 3-8.

*Ibid.*, p. 177, No. 73.

*T. N. N.*, pp. 63, 67, 112 and 114.

For details of the working of this system see Muir, Sir William, *Intelligence Records*, I, p. 16, *et. seq.*

Mubarak, ff. 67-68.

Young, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

Young, p. 63.



cause; they had never received a systematic training in fighting, nor did the Revolutionary officers get an opportunity of teaching them the methods of war.

Nevertheless, in spite of these and some other handicaps the Revolutionaries fought a long war, lasting more than four months, to defend the Capital of their new Government. Of the large number of actions, ranging from mere skirmishes to full scale battles, that were fought during the course of this siege, brief references may be made to the most important ones.

### **The British capture 'Idgah, 17 June**

On 17 June the Revolutionaries were seen constructing a battery on a knoll near the 'Idgah. If this had been completed it would have become easy for them to enfilade the British position on the Ridge. Two Columns were therefore immediately sent by the British to seize the unfinished battery;<sup>276</sup> the Revolutionaries retreated but not without offering resistance. Evidently they were not prepared for a major attack by the enemy.

### **The Revolutionaries score a victory, 19 June**

Two days later on the afternoon of 19 June, the Revolutionaries came out from the Lahore Gate; they seemed to threaten the enemy position on the Ridge, but a large number of them had managed to march through the gardens and suburbs and reach the rear of the British camp. As the English had received through their spies full information about the plan of the Revolutionaries, they were not unprepared for the attack. Brigadier Grant came out with twelve guns and a Cavalry force to meet them. The guns of the Revolutionaries poured forth quick and well-directed fire and their infantry "shot down our artillerymen and horses". As darkness grew the pressure of the attack became heavier and "they very nearly succeeded in turning our flank." At about half past eight o'clock the British were obliged to return to their camp after losing three officers and seventeen men. Among the seven wounded officers was Brigadier Grant. His horse was shot in the action and he could not have escaped alive if a Muslim *sawar*, Rupa Khan, had not dragged him out of the crowd.<sup>277</sup> The Revolutionaries had scored their first victory, and "much disquieted by the day's operations were the besiegers." They had attacked the weakest, though a vital, point of the British camp. If they had taken full advantage of their victory and established themselves at this point of vantage "our communications would be cut off with the Panjab: our small force would be invested; and without supplies and reinforcements, it would be impossible . . . to hold our own."<sup>278</sup>

<sup>276</sup> For an account of this action by Major Reid who led the 2nd Column, see *State Papers*, I, 300-01.

<sup>277</sup> Brigadier Grant to Major J. Waterfield, 22 June, 1857, *State Papers*, I, 303.

<sup>278</sup> Forrest, I, 92.



An idea of the significance of this victory for the Revolutionaries can be formed from the reaction it had on a staunch ally of the British like the Maharaja of Patiala.<sup>279</sup> Edward Hare, referring to "the many chances against us which we escaped", relates the story of Barnes' meeting with the Patiala Chief after the latter had received a letter from Bahadur Shah who had mentioned the victory of 19 June and told the Raja that if he "did not instantly desert us and join him, he would be destroyed also." In his reply to a question from the perturbed Maharaja about the possibility of the survival of British Government, Commissioner Barnes tried to convince him that, "we are in a difficulty just now; but we have ship loads of troops coming from England who will soon crush the mutinous sepoys." The Maharaja remained loyal to the British and was profusely rewarded by them after the collapse of the Revolution. Later, it was discovered that the Maharaja had been playing a game of duplicity. "A letter, too", Hare adds, "from the Raja was found promising to join the King."<sup>280</sup>

The retreat of the Revolutionary forces, despite the favourable results of the day's fighting, had become inevitable because of the treachery of Ahsan-Allah Khan. Mubarak Shah says that the Revolutionaries had run short of ammunition, and the Hakim "purposely delayed sending further supplies. The result was that the Naseerabad troops were forced to retire and re-entered the city. Had they received it, they would very probably have advanced their batteries and fighting with still greater ferocity, have cut their way into the British lines."<sup>281</sup> However, a great opportunity was lost. The march of the Nasirabad troops for an attack on the enemy had raised great hopes in the minds of the people; their officers had received the Emperor's blessings before leaving the city, but, they had been unfortunate in one respect: their officers had quarrelled with those of other Regiments; consequently they did not receive cooperation from other troops.<sup>282</sup> Even without this cooperation they had fought

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According to Rotton "melancholy impression on most men's minds in camp" was due to "the enemy's significant mode of intimating to us the plan he intended to pursue in future. . . his eyes were open to the advantage he might gain over us, if he only harassed us in the rear." See p. 92.

Sir John Kaye's comments on the battle are significant: "Night fell upon a drawn battle, of which no one could count the issues, and as our officers met together in their mess tents, with not very cheerful countenances, they saw the camp fires of the enemy blazing up in their rear. We had sustained some severe losses." Kaye and Malleon, Vol. II, p. 415.

Hare, Edward, *Memoirs* (London, 1900), pp. 109-11.

Mubarak, f. 74.

T.N.N., p. 124. It is of some interest to note that besides the treachery of Ahsan-Allah Khan a split between the Nasirabad troops and other Regiments also contributed to the failure of the Revolutionaries. Cave-Browne reports this incident in these words: "Had simultaneous attack been made in front, the result would probably have been still more serious. Such was their original plan; but there was split between the old and new mutineers. The newly arrived Nusserabad men taunted the older portion of the rebel force with cowardice for not having long before cleared the ridge; so now they were left to fight alone, the other brigades refusing to attack the batteries while they were pressing on the rear." See Vol. I, pp. 346-47.



well, and could have achieved their object if they had received the necessary supplies of ammunition.

### The Battle of 23 June

It was reported by the British spies that the next attack would be launched by the Revolutionaries on the centenary of the Battle of Plassey (June 23). For some time the idea had become popular that British Raj would come to an end on that date, and the Revolutionary leaders had taken full advantage of this: the civilian and the soldier alike believed that 23 June would be a grand day in the history of the struggle. Their hopes must have risen considerably and the superstitious belief about 23 June almost confirmed by the arrival of three Regiments of Infantry and one of Cavalry from Jullundur and Phillaur on the 21st.<sup>283</sup> The plan of the attack was the same as that of the 19th; the newly arrived troops from Jullundur were to play the role which the Nasirabad Brigade had played on the previous occasion; however, they met with no better luck. The British, having learnt of their plans from the spies, demolished the bridges on the Najafgarh drain by which the Revolutionaries intended to cross with their guns; this was done on the night of 22 June. The troops of the Revolutionaries, unaware of this demolition of bridges, could not proceed much further than Sabzi-Mandi. Nevertheless they attacked the position held by Major Reid who wrote that "no men could have fought better," and "at one time I thought I must have lost the day." It was at this time that reinforcements under Major Olpherts arrived and added considerably to the strength and morale of British forces. The Revolutionaries continued the fight but were ultimately forced to make a retreat.<sup>284</sup>

The British had won a victory, but the price paid for it was heavy. Commenting on this battle, Sir John Kaye ruefully remarks that "it was one of those victories of which a few more repetitions would have turned our position into a graveyard, on which the enemy might have quietly encamped"<sup>285</sup> Keith Young corroborates these remarks by an entry in his diary on 23 June: "Fighting all day almost on our right to try and take some guns of the enemy; we lost many men, and all faces very long about it. Not much generalship, I fear."<sup>286</sup> However, the Sabzi-Mandi was gained and an advanced battery was set up at the Sammy House; this gave the British control over the Grand Trunk Road. The losses of the Revolutionaries were undoubtedly heavy. They had lost Sabzi-Mandi, a place

<sup>283</sup> Cave-Browne, I, 349; *T.N.N.*, p. 125.

<sup>284</sup> Keith Young definitely says that "they were met by Olpherts' force and soon driven back." See p. 78. He also mentions "so many casualties yesterday", p. 80. Hodson is more frank when he tells us that "the fight of the 23rd was a much more severe one than was reported ... and our loss was the heaviest we have yet had to deplore since we got here on the 8th." See Hodson, p. 221.

<sup>285</sup> Kaye and Malleon, II, p. 418.

<sup>286</sup> Young, p. 79.



of considerable strategic importance, and their casualties, particularly among the Jullundur troops, were pretty large. More than this, the prophecies about the collapse of British power on the centenary of Plassey had not come out true. According to the reports received in the British camp on the morning of 24 June from their spies in Delhi, the Revolutionaries were "most disheartened at the result of their attack."<sup>287</sup> Evidently these reports were not free from exaggeration. The Revolutionaries had done all that they could to launch an attack on the rear of the British camp to cut off their line of communication with the Panjab, from where incessant supplies and reinforcements were pouring in, but they had failed to achieve their objective. The strength of the Delhi Field Force had now reached 6,600; the new Adjutant-General of the Army, General Chamberlain, arrived on 24 June; "it is to be hoped he will be able to instil a little more energy and decision into our councils."<sup>288</sup>

Both parties had suffered heavy losses in the battle of 23 June; each was now convinced of the stiff determination and great potentialities of the other. The last week of June was a period of lull in the War; nevertheless, it was important because the belligerents were busy taking important decisions and making preparations for a decisive struggle. The besiegers were receiving reinforcements and again considering the possibility of a *coup de main*; the Revolutionaries were waiting for the arrival of the Bareilly Brigade under Bakht Khan. An important step taken by them was to adopt measures to counteract the advantages which the enemy hoped to secure by setting up an advanced picket in Sabzi-Mandi. "The mutineers," records Mubarak "on seeing this adopted the same course and sent two guns to the Teleewara supported by an infantry regiment and constructed batteries on right and left with an entire regiment of each."<sup>289</sup>

### Petty skirmishes

The Revolutionaries were however not inactive; not a day would pass without the British troops having to come out to meet a real or a threatened attack. On 27th June early in the morning the Revolutionaries advanced against the British picket at the Metcalfe House. This was followed by another against the pickets in the Sabzi-Mandi area. Though not a major battle, the action lasted the whole day;<sup>290</sup> nor was it insignificant. Hodson who took part in the contest speaks of it in these words: "We were turned out before I had hardly turned in, by another attack of the rebels. This time a faint ons, . . . For a short time, however, the cannonade was very heavy, and I have seldom been under a hotter fire than for about three quarters of an hour at our most advanced battery, covered every

*Ibid.*, p. 80.

Young, p. 81.

Ff. 75-76.

*T.N.N.*, p. 128.



moment with showers or rather clouds of dust, stones, and splinters; but we kept close and no one was hurt."<sup>291</sup>

The clash of 27 June brings the story of the War to the end of the first round. Its results were by no means decisive; both parties had, however, learnt some lessons from the actions that had been fought. They now decided to wait for reinforcements and improve their respective positions. During the last week of June the British forces were considerably strengthened by fresh arrivals from the various stations; arrangements were also made to send the sick and the wounded to Ambala.<sup>292</sup> In the Revolutionary camp reports had been received that Bakht Khan's (Bareilly) Brigade which was soon to attain great distinction in the War was quite near. As early as 24 June the Brigade had reached Garhmuktesar and was preparing to cross the Ganges on their way to Delhi.<sup>293</sup> The Revolutionary Government was anxiously waiting for their arrival. The second day of July found them in Capital.<sup>294</sup>

## THE DEFENCE OF DELHI (II)

### Bakht Khan and the Bareilly Brigade leave for Delhi, 13 June

Muhammad Bakhsh,<sup>295</sup> more famous as General Bakht Khan, raised the *Green Standard* at Bareilly on the morning of 31 May.<sup>296</sup> An Artillery officer in the Company's Army, he joined the struggle for freedom at an early stage and in course of time became one of the most eminent leaders of the Movement. His sincerity and devotion, his perseverance and sense of discipline and, above all, his love for *jihad* and readiness to sacrifice even his life in the sacred cause make of him a hero indeed.

<sup>291</sup> Hodson, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-20.

<sup>292</sup> For details of reinforcements see Norman's Narrative, in *State Papers*. I, 448.

<sup>293</sup> Young, pp. 81-82.

<sup>294</sup> *T.N.N.*, pp. 133-34; also see Young, p. 100.

<sup>295</sup> We have no authentic information about the origin and early life of Bakht Khan. It is, however, beyond doubt that he was a Ruhilah and belonged to a Pathan family of Sultanpur. It is difficult to accept Jiwan Lal's version that "the General pointed that he was the descendant of the same family as the king of Delhi, and asked the king to satisfy himself that this was true." *T. N. N.*, p. 134. Zaka-Allah also mentions this but in a derisive manner, which shows that he did not believe it to be a fact. See p. 681. Bakht Khan had joined the Company's service and risen to the position of an Artillery Subahdar. He had fought for the British in the First Afghan War and was with General Sale at Jalalabad. After this War he was posted at Neemuch and subsequently at Bareilly where he joined the Revolution. Mubarak Shah mentions an interview of the Kotwal with Bakht Khan. He charged the Kotwal with having served the British. In reply the Kotwal said: "Your Excellency was a Soubadar receiving Rs 80/- a month and have been 40 or 45 years a servant of the British". Mubarak, f. 86. Also see Kaye and Malleon, III. 203, n. Ricketts, quoted by Metcalfe in *T. N. N.*, p. 133 N.

<sup>296</sup> Kanhayya Lal, p. 290.



The Revolutionaries of Bareilly took a prompt decision about going to Delhi in response to an appeal from the Capital.<sup>299</sup> They had, however, to wait for a few days because the Revolutionaries from Shahjahanpur and some other places wanted to join them. Bakht Khan, in the meanwhile, helped Khan Bahadur Khan a descendant of the famous Ruhilah chief, Hafiz Rahmat Khan in establishing his authority in Rohilkhand and setting up a machinery of Government. But on hearing that Nawab Yusuf 'Ali Khan, the Ruler of Rampur, who was loyal to the British, had seized Moradabad, Bakht Khan decided to leave Bareilly without delay. Mawlawi Sarfaraz 'Ali who later became known as the *Amir al-Mujahidin* accompanied him and was the spiritual leader of the Army; Resildar Muhammad Shafi<sup>298</sup> was also with him. The Revolutionaries requested Yusuf 'Ali to join the War of Independence or at least allow his forces to do so. He did neither, but to placate the Revolutionaries he gave them a few thousand rupees and some provisions as his contribution. On 13 June the Bareilly Brigade, as these forces were called, left for Moradabad.<sup>299</sup> After staying there for four days and placing the town in the hands of the local Revolutionary leaders, Bakht Khan resumed his march on 17 June. At Garhmuktesar the Brigade took four days to cross the Ganges because the bridge had been destroyed by the British;<sup>300</sup> on the last day of the month it reached the left bank of the Jamuna. A messenger had already been sent to inform the authorities at Delhi of the Brigade's programme of entering the Capital. Bakht Khan carried with him the keys of the Bareilly jail, perhaps as an evidence of their loyalty.<sup>301</sup> The bridge on the Jamuna needed some repairs which were promptly carried out under the orders of the Emperor. Bahadur Shah was so keenly interested in the arrival of the Brigade that he "examined the Bareilly forces across the river through a telescope, and remarked upon the elephants and Cavalry."

When it entered Delhi, the Brigade was comprised of four Regiments of infantry, one of Cavalry, horse battery and two post guns,<sup>302</sup> besides three to four thousand *Ghazis*.<sup>303</sup> An attempt had been made by the British to blow up the bridge. A barrel was filled up with gun-powder and floated down the river; it was so timed as to explode and destroy the bridge when the Brigade would be crossing it. The boatmen, however, saw the barrel and brought it to Prince Khidr Sultan who gave five rupees to each of them as a reward.<sup>304</sup>

On entering the city early in the morning of 2 July, the Brigade was received by Nawab Ahmad Quli Khan on behalf of the Emperor. It was allowed

Kanhayya Lal reproduces the translation of a letter which was intercepted at Singhapur. It contained a message from Delhi in these words: "If you are coming to our help then you should take your meals there and wash your hands here." *Ibid.*, p. 292.

He played an important role in the defence of Delhi.

Najm al-Ghani, *Tarikh i Awadh*. (Lucknow, 1919), p. 552.

See *Kaye's Papers*, Home Miscellany, I. O., Vol. 727, p. 758.

Mubarak, f. 78.

Forrest, I, ff. 96-97; also see Kedar Nath's *Journal in Memoirs*, p. 46.

Mubarak, f. 79.

*Ibid.*, f. 83.



to encamp outside the Delhi Gate in the plain near the Jail.<sup>305</sup> The new-comers were so full of enthusiasm for *jihad* that they wanted to attack and capture the Ridge immediately after crossing the river, even before being presented to the Emperor. This, however, was not practicable.

### Bakht Khan appointed Commander-in-Chief

Bakht Khan was granted an interview by the Emperor the same day. He offered his services as Commander-in-Chief and promised to enforce discipline which, the Emperor had complained, was fast deteriorating. Bahadur Shah was deeply touched by Bakht Khan's offer and grasped his hands in token of friendship. Bakht Khan returned to the troops and announced his appointment; the officers swore allegiance to him. Later the Emperor called him to private audience, and a proclamation was issued that all officers were to receive instructions from Bakht Khan. Mirza Mughul was appointed Adjutant-General.<sup>306</sup>

The new Commander-in-Chief lost no time in making necessary arrangements for an offensive; he inspected the magazine and stores and held a levee of the leading citizens of Delhi. At about 8 o'clock in the night he went to the Emperor and had a long consultation; Queen Zinat Mahal, Ahsan Allah Khan and Ahmad Quli Khan were also present.<sup>307</sup> Mubarak Shah's account is slightly differs in details. He says that Bakht Khan was appointed Commander-in-Chief in this second meeting in the night and at that time he had Muhammad Shafi with him. Bakht Khan had told the Emperor that if he would appoint him Commander-in-Chief, "I will on my part appoint Mahomed Shufee General and Imdad Ali Captain and your Highness will confirm them in these posts." The Emperor had agreed. Soon after this, Mawlawi Sarfaraz 'Ali also came in; he offered himself

<sup>305</sup> It is rather interesting to note that Bakht Khan had brought with him a European sergeant who had accepted Islam and was given the name of 'Abd-Allah besides "two or three Christians, half-castes of the poorest class. Mr. John Powell, son of Mr. Powell of Shahjahanpore was also with them but under surveillance." Mubarak, ff. 84-85. This is confirmed by Forbes-Mitchell, pp. 281-82. Zaka-Allah, perhaps on the authority of Jiwan Lal, mentions two European sergeants who were introduced to the Emperor by Bakht Khan as expert gunners. See, p. 681; also see *T. N. N.*, p. 137.

<sup>306</sup> Zaka-Allah and Zahir Dihlawi speak of Bakht Khan's rude behaviour. Hakim Ahsan-Allah is also not too happy with him. He complains that "contrary to etiquette he did not make his obeisance at the *Red Purdah*, nor did his companions, . . . when he came near the King's Chair in the Diwan Khas, he salaamed as though to an equal, and merely taking his sword from his side, presented it to the King." *Memoirs*, p. 16; Zahir, pp. 140-141; Zaka-Allah p. 681.

<sup>307</sup> *T. N. N.*, p. 134.

The appointment of Bakht Khan to the supreme command of the forces was not accepted by the Princes, particularly Mirza Mughul, without reservation. From the outset therefore the relations of Bakht Khan and Mirza Mughul became strained, and throughout the defence of Delhi the Princes and their supporters tried to sabotage Bakht Khan's efforts. Ahsan-Allah Khan gives a garbled version of Bakht Khan's interview with the Emperor. He says, for instance, that the General did not offer *nadhr*; this is contradicted by Mubarak Shah. See *Memoirs*, p. 16; Mubarak, f. 85.



to be appointed *Wazir*: "Your Highness, I see no one here deserving of being taken into your confidence and council. If you consider it expedient nominate me as '*Wazir*'. After that you will have no anxiety or trouble."<sup>308</sup> Bahadur Shah, who had offered him a seat in the council "because he was a high moulvée", put off the matter saying: "We shall see." In any case Mawlawi Sarfaraz 'Ali with Bakht Khan and Mawlawi Fadl i Haqq formed the "King's Council."<sup>309</sup>

In the British camp the arrival of reinforcements again raised the question of a *coup de main*. A scheme was drawn up, according to which, two Columns would force entry through Kabul and Kashmir Gates and a third would scale the walls. On 3 July, however, reports were received that Bakht Khan intended to launch an attack on the British positions, and at the last moment the project of the assault had to be abandoned. The Chief Engineer regretted this decision, but there were others who thought that it was not an unwise step.<sup>310</sup>

### Attack on Alipur, 3 July

On the afternoon of 3 July the Revolutionaries marched out of the city and advanced towards 'Alipur; here they met and drove away Younghusband who commanded a party of the 5th Panjab Cavalry.<sup>311</sup> Their object was to intercept the 200 carts of provisions, coming from Patiala,<sup>312</sup> but they could capture and bring to the city only two.<sup>313</sup> On their return march to Delhi they were attacked early in the morning (4 July) by a British force. Major Coke who led this attack says: "after a few rounds from their guns, they carried them off in the direction of the city before we could get up to them." While Coke's men were resting under the trees on the bank of the canal the Revolutionaries again attacked them. In the end they retreated but not as a defeated party. "Major Coke was ... severely criticized for the comparative failure of the action."<sup>314</sup>

If Coke had failed to achieve his object, the Revolutionaries had not succeeded either. It appears that internal differences were again the main cause of their failure. It was for this reason that on the following day Mawlawi Sarfaraz 'Ali and Munshi Khayrat 'Ali begged the Emperor to confer the title of Governor

<sup>308</sup> Mubarak, f. 90; *Memoirs*, pp. 16, 17.

<sup>309</sup> Mubarak f. 96.

<sup>310</sup> *State Papers*, I. 448-49.

<sup>311</sup> Young, p. 106 and note. Referring to this defeat, Major-General Reeds wrote to John Lawrence: Younghusband ... put his sowars into and about a serai there and waited till the enemy came up ...; the consequence was that although he killed six of the insurgents he lost two of his men and all their luggage ... , having of course to retire when the guns opened. *Kaye's Papers*, Vol. 726, pp. 337-38.

<sup>312</sup> *T. N. N.*, p. 137.

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 138.

Keith Young wrote to his wife on 5 July: "it is supposed that the enemy went to Aleepore in the expectation of finding the 17th Irregulars there with treasure, ... but Lieutenant Hockin ... had been warned from here to halt at Lussowlie, which he did, ..." See p. 106.

<sup>314</sup> Forrest, I, 100.



on Bakht Khan, "for the whole army would not obey him till this title was conferred..." The Emperor agreed and orders were issued "to the effect that the Khan alone was to command and that the Prince had nothing to say to the army."<sup>315</sup> This arrangement could not work successfully because the Princes were not prepared to recognize any authority other than their own. "Mirza Mogul and Mirza Khizhar Sooltan who had for some time regarded the empire as virtually their own", writes Mubarak Shah, "and ever since the arrival of the Bareilly Brigade had considered themselves masters of Hindostan, were greatly displeased at Bukht Khan and Moulvee Sarfaraz Ali having thus interviewed the King . . . They conspired with the officers of the regiments which had been first in Delhi . . . Throughout the period of the defence of the Capital the Princes followed a policy of undermining Bakht Khan's authority and placing obstacles in his way; these dissensions proved suicidal to the national cause."<sup>316</sup> The Emperor knew that the Princes were incompetent and unworthy of the responsibilities of leadership. He, therefore, supported Bakht Khan and his colleagues.<sup>317</sup> It was very late, indeed too late, when Mirza Mughul realized the need of cooperating with Bakht Khan!<sup>318</sup>

On 5 July, Sir Henry Barnard died and was succeeded by General Reed. He ordered the bridges on the Najafgarh Jhil Canal to be blown up except one which was retained for the use of his own forces. This Canal running almost parallel to the main road was like a natural ditch guarding the British camp. An aqueduct from which the people of Delhi got their supply of water was also destroyed. "Another piece of engineering work," writes Cave-Browne, "was achieved about the same time. One of the greatest monuments of a bygone Mohammedan period is a gigantic aqueduct, by which water was brought a distance of many miles into the heart of the city. It crosses the canal by a bridge known as the *Pool-Chuddur*, by which horsemen were enabled to pass to our rear. This was also blown up, and a double end thereby gained; the passage of the horsemen obstructed and the water cut off from the city; . . ."<sup>319</sup> The destruction of the bridges was considered necessary because the attack on 'Alipur had given an indication of the changed strategy of the defenders. Instead of attacking the pickets and batteries of the enemy they now seemed to have decided upon attacking the rear of the enemy and cutting off his supply.

### The Revolutionaries score a victory, 9 July

The task of launching these attacks was entrusted to Risalahdar Muhammad Shafi and Imdad 'Ali of the Bareilly Brigade.<sup>320</sup> On the morning of 9

<sup>315</sup> *Memoirs*, p. 18.

<sup>316</sup> See *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 378. where Mirza Mughul is mentioned as C-in-C.

<sup>317</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 411.

<sup>318</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 353, No. 73 (a).

<sup>319</sup> Vol II, p. 14.

<sup>320</sup> Mubarak, ff. 100-01.



July at about ten o'clock these officers moved out of the city and proceeded to attack the advanced pickets on the right of the British Camp. Here a battery of three 18-pounders was set on a mound not far from the camp; below the mound on the low ground was a picket of two horse Artillery guns and further to the right another had been set up with the 9th Irregulars at a *faqir*'s enclosure. Muhammad Shafi attacked this position; he had taken good care to lessen the chances of attracting the enemy's attention, "their dress being the same as that of the 9th Irregulars, from which corps the *fakir*'s picquet was taken."

In this action several hand-to-hand encounters were fought; among these Imdad 'Ali's combat with Lieutenant Hills is interesting. Hills himself gives an account of the incident: "I went, however, at the fellow, and cut him on the shoulder; but some 'kupra' (cloth) on it apparently turned the blow. He managed to seize the hilt of my sword, and twisted it out of my hand; and then we had a hand-to-hand fight, I punching his head with my fists, and he trying to cut me, but I was too close to him. Somehow or other I fell, and then was the time, fortunately for me, that Tombs came up and shot the fellow."<sup>321</sup> This was not the end of the combat; Imdad 'Ali had not been killed by Tombs, he had only shammed dead. Imdad 'Ali's men started looting, which created confusion, and he could not achieve the object of his attack. On returning to his camp he told his men: "if the sowars had not commenced looting the heights were as good as won but what could be done when troops will not obey orders?"<sup>322</sup> Besides Muhammad Shafi's attack on the rear of the enemy, a sharp canon duel continued all through the morning on the sight of the British camp. A number of Revolutionary sepoy who were posted in Sabzi-Mandi "kept up a galling fire on our picquets." The battle lasted till sunset.<sup>323</sup> Bakht Khan sent an official report of the victory to the Emperor.<sup>324</sup>

<sup>321</sup> Norman's Narrative in *State Papers*, 1, 452.

<sup>322</sup> Hill's account was published in the *Times*, it has been reproduced by Cave-Browne, II, pp. 18-20.

It may be noted that Hill is not correct in saying that the man whom Tombs killed by "cutting him on the left wrist" was not the same whose attack had made him "somehow or other" fall. Sir John Kaye has discussed this point in detail; he is supported by Mubarak Shah. See Kaye and Malleon, 11, pp. 436-37, n.

<sup>323</sup> Mubarak, f. 101. Imdad 'Ali's remarks were not empty words of boast. In the beginning the Revolutionaries had fared exceptionally well. Keith Young's comments on this affair are: "I am sorry to say that it is an undoubted fact that the picket of the Carabineers and the 9th Irregular Cavalry disgracefully fled, though they were called upon by Tombs to charge the enemy—which they were quite strong enough to do, ... they all ran helter-skelter into camp, some of them getting thrown from their horses." See p. 123. The British losses in this action were "very great—two hundred and twenty-three killed and wounded." See p. 119.

<sup>324</sup> Jiwan Lal says that Bakht Khan had himself led the attack and "charged with cavalry into the English lines, cutting down a great number of officers and men." See *T.N.N.*, p. 145. This cannot be accepted against Mubarak 'Ali's definite assertion that "Mahomed Shafee and Imdad Ali with about 150 Sowars managed to get up to the British batteries and surprised the Europeans who were scattered about off duty, drinking tea." This is corroborated by Roberts who says, "Stilman and Hills were break-fasting together, when a sowar from the Native



### Attack on Sammy House: British retreat, 14 July

After a lull of four days a party of the Revolutionaries marched out from the Lahore Gate, moved towards Kishenganj and thence advanced upon the picket in Sabzi-Mandi. The British had considerably strengthened this flank and were ready to meet the charge. They decided to fight a defensive action, and this position was maintained till about 4 o'clock when a Column was formed under Brigadier Showers. It consisted of six horse artillery guns besides other detachments from different units. Brigadier Chamberlain accompanied it; it was subsequently joined by Major Reed also. The Revolutionaries began a slow retreat letting the enemy follow them "until they came within musketry-range of the city walls. Here they began to fall fast, and a retreat was ordered."<sup>326</sup> On the retreat of the British forces the Revolutionaries rallied in numbers and punished the enemy severely for his pursuing them in so indiscreet a manner. Hodson who had joined the Column resisted their charge, but when he tried to capture the two guns left by his opponents, "suddenly two rascals rushed forward with lighted portfires in their hands, fired the guns, loaded with grape, in our faces, and when the smoke cleared away, we found, to our infinite disgust and chagrin that they had limbered up the guns and were off at a gallop. We had then to effect our retreat to rejoin the column, under a heavy fire of grape and musketry, and many men and officers were hit in doing it."<sup>327</sup> Hodson learnt later that among the casualties of the day was his Adjutant-General, 'poor Chamberlain', whose left arm was broken below the shoulder. The scene of the hardest fighting of the day was an old temple, called by the Europeans, Sammy House. Three days after this battle, General Reed handed over command of the Delhi Field Force to Brigadier Wilson (17 July). The situation at the time of his taking over was by no means heartening. Two Commanders had been struck down by death and the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General lay wounded.

### British Commander disheartened

It was now for more than five weeks that the British forces had been before Delhi, nominally as besiegers, but, in reality, as the besieged. They had been victorious in some actions and the losses of the Revolutionaries had been heavy; but their casualties also were by no means negligible. The real cause of anxiety for them, however, was that the Revolutionaries were continuously arriving in Delhi from different places and their morale was rising. No one could say how long this state of affairs would last, and as early as the beginning of July

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officer's party rode up and reported that a body of the enemy's cavalry were in sight." Roberts, I, 187.

<sup>325</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 20, No. 64.

<sup>326</sup> Cave-Browne, II, pp. 24-25.

<sup>327</sup> Hodson, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-35.



"the thought of a retrograde movement had been fixing itself in the minds even of men who had been at one time eager for the bolder course, which had been described as the 'Gamester's Throw' ... The time for assaulting had passed ... and the question had arisen and had been freely discussed at Headquarters, whether, until we could appear before Delhi in greater strength, it would not, both on military and political grounds, be a wiser course to relax our hold, and employ our eager troops in other parts of the country."<sup>328</sup> The situation was so serious that Wilson asked Engineer Baird Smith to give him his professional advice. Smith emphatically opposed the idea of withdrawal, which, he argued, would be construed by the people of the subcontinent as a sign of weakness and defeat. He told the General that they badly needed long-range guns, and that after the arrival of the siege train their success was sure.

### Attack on Sabzi Mandi, 16 July

On 16 July the defenders were strengthened by the arrival of troops from Jhansi, consisting of the 14th Irregular Cavalry and the 12th N. I. A plan was made for an attack on the besiegers on the 18th. Rajab 'Ali informed his masters on the 17th that the Revolutionaries would march on 'Alipur and when the British forces would go to its rescue a rush would be made on their camp. Necessary precautions could, therefore, be taken by the British in time. Instead of marching on 'Alipur the Revolutionaries attacked the Sabzi-Mandi and the Ridge batteries. A Column was sent under Lieutenant Colonel Jones in the afternoon. About the end of the day the Revolutionaries withdrew; Jones did not commit the mistake of pursuing them. This was the last real contest in the Sabzi-Mandi area because the *sarais*, old buildings and gardens which provided cover to the Revolutionaries were cleared away; besides this, Sammy House was considerably strengthened.

### Metcalf House, 23 July

The next charge of the Revolutionaries was directed against the left flank of the British camp. Early in the morning on 23 July they came out of the Kashmir Gate, marched towards Ludlow Castle and captured it. From here they opened fire on the Metcalfe House picket; the enemy replied but owing to the cover of trees and walls his firing was not effective; a Column was then formed under the command of Brigadier Showers. The Revolutionaries followed their old tactics; they retreated allowing Showers to pursue them to a point

<sup>328</sup> Kaye and Malleon, II, 443-44.

Brigadier Wilson told Sir John Lawrence, in a letter dated 18 July, that the British forces had been attacked twice, adding in conclusion that "I candidly tell you that unless speedily reinforced this force will soon be so reduced by casualties and sickness that nothing will be left but a retreat to Kurnaul. The disasters attending such an unfortunate proceeding I cannot calculate." See *Mutiny Records*, VII, Part I, p. 231.



dangerously near the city walls. Here he was subjected to fire of grape from the walls, and "the casualties of the day were very great."<sup>329</sup> Colonel Seaton, who was officiating as Adjutant-General, and Showers were both among the wounded. On the other side "the loss of the enemy was not heavy, and they carried off all their guns"<sup>330</sup> The last incident of the month was the attempt of the Revolutionaries to throw a bridge over the canal in order to take their guns for an attack on the rear of the British camp. They had come out for this purpose on 28 July and had completed the construction of a temporary bridge at Bussye. Their labour, however, was wasted because it was swept away by flood before they could use it.<sup>331</sup>

### Bakht Khan's reforms

July was an important month in the history of the Defence of Delhi. It was marked by the arrival of Bakht Khan, Mawlawi Sarfaraz 'Ali and their co-workers in the Movement. Sarfaraz 'Ali became the Chief Adviser of the Emperor; he had great influence over the *Mujahidin* and is referred to as the *Amir al-Mujahidin* and *Imam al-Mujahidin*.<sup>332</sup> Their appointments had changed the entire pattern of the administration; reforms were introduced and steps taken to strengthen the fighting forces and control the situation in the city, which had been deteriorating as a result of the inefficiency of the Princes. On the day he took over charge, Bakht Khan allowed the shop-keepers to keep arms in their shops and asked the people not come out of their houses unarmed. He was very strict in punishing the sepoys who were caught plundering; their arms were to be seized and confiscated. He held a general levee and ordered the leading citizens to attend it; evidently the object of this order was to seek their cooperation in improving the law and order situation.<sup>333</sup> A couple of weeks later he ordered the withdrawal of octroi duty on sugar and salt, with a view to encourage its import into the city (15 July).<sup>334</sup>

Perhaps the most drastic step taken by Bakht Khan was his order regarding the slaughtering of animals for meat. He was fully conscious of the need of maintaining unity between the Muslims and the Hindus. As a gesture of good-will towards the Hindus Bakht Khan issued an order on 9 July forbidding the slaughtering of cows for purposes of meat.<sup>335</sup> He went a step further. On the eve of 'Id al-Adha the public crier announced by a beat of drum; 'The people are the Lord's, the country is the King's, the decree is that of Bakht Khan, chief of

<sup>329</sup> Rotton, p. 164. He was watching the battle from the Flag Staff Tower.

<sup>330</sup> Kaye and Malleon, II, 447.

<sup>331</sup> Forrest, I, 111-12; Norman's Narrative in *State Papers*, I, 460.

<sup>332</sup> Mubarak says, he was "a styled wazeer." See f. 112.

<sup>333</sup> *T.N.N.*, pp. 135-36.

<sup>334</sup> *Ibid.* p. 152.

<sup>335</sup> Zaka-Allah is not happy with this order and says it was "against the wishes and religion" of the Emperor. See p. 660.



the army. If any man high or low (shall) sacrifice a bullock or a goat he shall suffer death." Mubarak Shah tells us that the order was obeyed most implicitly and "not even a kid was sacrificed on the Eid."<sup>336</sup> There was a serious danger of communal clashes between the Hindus and Muslims. The spies and supporters of the British, who lived in the city, were trying to excite communal feelings, but the 'Id was celebrated on 1 August in perfect peace. The British authorities were sadly disappointed: "our hopes of a grand row in the city yesterday at the Eid Festival have not, apparently, been fulfilled ... The King had issued strict orders against killing cows, or even goats, in the city, and this, if acted upon, must have satisfied the Hindoos; and instead of fighting amongst themselves they all joined together to make a vigorous attack to destroy us."<sup>337</sup> This was a wise step, and is a clear evidence of Bakht Khan's statesmanship. A slight and seemingly harmless incident could have been made a pretext for communal riots, and nothing would have been more harmful to the cause of the Revolution than a Hindu-Muslim clash.

Bakht Khan knew that the co-operation of the Ruling Princes was absolutely essential, particularly those whose territories lay in the Panjab and the North-West. He, therefore, requested the Emperor to despatch letters (*shuqqahs*) to the Rulers of some of these States. The Chiefs of Jammu, Patiala, Jaipur, Gwalior, and Tonk were among those to whom an appeal was addressed.<sup>338</sup> A century of foreign domination had, however, completely demoralized the Princes, and none of them had the courage of joining the War of Independence, the only noble exception being the Rani of Jhansi. In fact the Princes and the landlords were the main props of British rule in the subcontinent. Some of the zamindars, however, did join the Movement. Their activities were no doubt mostly confined to the areas under or near their respective jurisdictions, but their recognition of the Emperor and the Revolutionary Government were a source of considerable strength to the cause of the Revolution. In some of the Princely States the people joined the Movement or were at least anxious to do so in spite of the fact that

<sup>336</sup> Folio 117. This is confirmed by Muir who wrote a letter to General Havelock on 17 August. In a postscript he says that Bakht Khan told the Emperor to forbid cow-sacrifice, "at the same time laying before His Majesty reasons in support of the lawfulness of such a course." Muir, *Intelligence Records*, II, 125.

<sup>337</sup> Keith Young's letter dated 2nd August, p. 171. According to Jiwan Lal this order was issued on 28th July, *T.N.N.*, p. 170.

<sup>338</sup> Mubarak says that the *shuqqahs* addressed to Jammu, Patiala and Jaipur fell into the hands of Hakim Ahsan-Allah who "tore them up and said he had forwarded them." See Folio 98. It is interesting, however, that a letter of Gulab Singh of Kashmir addressed to the Emperor was picked up by an officer from an interior apartment of the Imperial palace when it was captured by the British. Gulab Singh had written: "This suppliant has been the servant of the Lahore Government and has eaten its salt and has now, under the auspices of Your Majesty, possessed himself of Lahore and placed fifty of the principal (Sahibs) European officers in confinement at Jummo ... Let Your Majesty be most graciously pleased to issue a purwana bearing the royal seal, ... and he will at once have Putiala razed to the ground. He waits Royal orders to present himself before Your Majesty and kiss the Royal feet." *Secret Letters*, no. 64, Enclosure 8; also see *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, p. 125.



their Rulers were on the other side; a number of *Mujahids*, for instance, came from Tonk. Under 19 July, Jiwan Lal writes that fifty artillery-men of the army of Jaipur presented themselves and complained of the Raja and his Pundit Adviser, although "Rawul Sheo Singh and the whole army was anxious to join the rebels, and, as soon as an opportunity occurred, intended to seize the Rajah and bring him into service of the King. . . . Twenty troopers joined the rebels today from Gwalior."<sup>339</sup> Another contingent came from Jaipur under Nanney Khan Risaldar and was enlisted in the Cavalry on 30 July.<sup>340</sup> The number of Gwalior forces was fairly large; on 13 August 150 of their horsemen were posted as guards at the Kashmir and Lahore Gates.<sup>341</sup>

### Bakht Khan's difficulties

Bakht Khan's efforts to stabilize the administrative machinery of Government and strengthen his forces were to a large extent neutralized by the machinations of his opponents and the stupidity of the Princes and some of the officers of the Revolutionary Regiments. The latter could not easily reconcile themselves to the idea that a mere 'Subadar' should be raised to the supreme command. Tali' Yar Khan and other officers of the Regiments approached the Emperor with a request that the Princes should hold the supreme authority.<sup>342</sup> These differences continued and became wider with the arrival of fresh troops from different places. Paradoxically, therefore, the larger the number of troops arriving in the Capital the greater were the difficulties of the Revolutionary leaders. The author of the *Qaysar al-Tawarikh*, though hostile to the Revolution, is not wrong when he says that "if all the forces present in Delhi had possessed the true zeal of faith (*hararat i din*) and fought the enemy under a unified command then something would have happened and nobody would have been surprised at it."<sup>343</sup> Bakht Khan faced the situation with remarkable patience and ability; he tried hard to crush the forces of disruption and insisted on maintaining unity and coordination among the heterogeneous elements in Army. This explains why he did not take exception to Mirza Mughul's action in retaining the title of Commander-in-Chief, nor quarrelled with other officers on the question of his supremacy in command.

<sup>339</sup> *T.N.N.*, p. 155, 160, 173.

<sup>340</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 80, No. 267.

<sup>341</sup> *Ibid.* p. 362.

<sup>342</sup> "Next day in the afternoon (illegible) Qanbar (?) and Tale Yar Khan, with other officers of the regiment gave in a very long petition to the King saying, Bakht Khan was an officer of artillery. You have conferred on him the title of Governor-General and proposed to place us all under his order. It is contrary to the rules of Government. He is not fit for such a trust. You have dismissed your sons and appointed him. This does not please us." *Memoirs*, p. 18; also *T.N.N.*, p. 171.

<sup>343</sup> Husayni, Vol. II, p. 246.



## Finance

From the outset the Revolutionary Government was confronted with the problem of finding money for the War; as early as the first week of July it was reported to the Emperor that only 10,000 rupees were left in the Treasury.<sup>344</sup> The treasures brought by the sepoys were not sufficient for the ever-increasing expenditure of the War. Bakht Khan had with him several lakhs of rupees besides horses, elephants, guns, tents, carts and carriages,<sup>345</sup> and did not require any money for his own people who had already received six months' pay in advance, but arrangements had to be made for other Regiments also. Their officers harassed the Emperor and rightly told him that they could not fight in a state of starvation.<sup>346</sup> By the end of July conditions had deteriorated to such an extent that they had given four days notice for receiving their pay, "otherwise they must plunder the town and help themselves."<sup>347</sup> Plunder could not be tolerated under any conditions and therefore steps were taken to raise money by loans, subscriptions and collection of arrears of revenue.<sup>348</sup>

## Shortage of ammunition

Another problem was the shortage of ammunition. In the earlier days of the War gun powder and percussion caps were consumed indiscriminately. A number of sepoys wasted ammunition or destroyed it, burying it in the sand, because this provided them with a pretext to return to the city.<sup>349</sup> A factory was set up by Mirza Mughul in Telewarah; it supplied thirty maunds of powder and about a quarter of maund of percussion caps.<sup>350</sup> For the growing requirements of the Army these arrangements were inadequate, but they give us an idea of the determination of the Government to fight out the War to a successful end.

## The Jihad Fatwa

The second month of Bakht Khan's command thus commenced with serious handicaps; the situation demanded total effort and sacrifice on the part of the Revolutionaries. Bakht Khan introduced conscription for all able-bodied Muslims by proclaiming a *fatwa* which had been signed by a number of *'ulama*

<sup>344</sup> *Memoirs*, p. 19.

<sup>345</sup> According to an informer, Mir Muhammad 'Ali, he had eleven lakhs of rupees. See *Mutiny Records*, VII. Pt. I, p. 190. Jiwan Lal puts it at four lakhs. *T.N.N.*, p. 135.

<sup>346</sup> Mubarak, f. 104.

<sup>347</sup> Young, p. 160.

<sup>348</sup> On 12 July the Court submitted definite proposals for collecting funds. See *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 404, Nos. 149-50.

<sup>349</sup> Mubarak, f. 103.

<sup>350</sup> *Ibid.*



including Mawlana Fadl i Haqq and Mufti Sadr al-Din.<sup>351</sup> The exact date and text of the *fatwa* are not known, but it appears from Zaka-Allah's account that it was signed not long after Bakht Khan's arrival in Delhi. The promulgation of the *fatwa* attracted volunteers in large numbers and infused the Muslims with a new spirit; to their feelings of patriotism and love of independence was now added the zeal of religious duty.

### Nimach Brigade arrives in Delhi

At the end of July the famous Nimach Brigade arrived. Its fame had reached the Capital much earlier and its victory at Agra in the beginning of the month had been celebrated as a great achievement. Bakht Khan had sent his greetings to the officer of the Brigade and congratulated them on behalf of the troops fighting in Delhi; this communication was in reply to a petition of the Brigade addressed to the Emperor. "Brethren!", he wrote, "Your King and all of us are night and day labouring for the annihilation of a small body of Christians, those infidels having from fear of their lives entrenched themselves on the top of a hill which is neither practicable for Cavalry nor assailable by the Artillery. God willing, in a short time the plain of Delhi will be cleared of the existence of these impure Nazarenes. But now, brethren! you should march expeditiously without halting and reach the presence of your (both secular and spiritual) King and unite with us in the extirpation of the infidels."<sup>352</sup> This letter is dated 8 July; five days later "a regimental band played music expressive of good news (*muzda*) before the King in celebration of the victory."<sup>353</sup>

### Attack on Metcalfe House, 1-2 August

The arrival of new contingents of sepoys and *Mujahids* and the coming of envoys from some of the Chiefs and leaders from different places, particularly from Rohilkhand, raised the morale of the Revolutionary forces and intensified

<sup>351</sup> Mawlawi 'Abd al-Qadir, Qadi Fayd-Allah, Mawlana Fayd Ahmad, Doctor Wazir Khan, Muhammad Sa'id-Allah and Sayyid Mubarak Shah were among other signatories, Sherwani, 'Abd al-Shahid Khan, *Baghi Hindustan* (Bijnor, 1947), p. 156; Zaka-Allah, p. 675; Razi al-Din, *Kanz al-Tarikh* (Badayun, Nizami Press, 1907), pp. 357-52.

It appears that before this *fatwa* another had been signed by a number of 'ulama of Delhi. It was in reply to a proclamation issued by the British authorities, addressed to the Muslims of Delhi and its neighbourhood. The object of the proclamation was to deceive the Muslims by telling them that the Hindus alone were guilty of rebelling against the British and the Muslims had nothing to do with it; it was also mentioned that only the fat of cows (and not the lard) was used in the cartridges. The Muslims, however, did not fall into the trap. A reply was promptly issued by the leading 'ulama in the form of a *fatwa* which made holy war against the British obligatory, because they had attacked the city with the aim of destroying the lives and property of the people. This *fatwa* was published in the *Akhbar al-Zafar*, Delhi. See *Nawa i Azadi* (Adabi Publishers, Bombay, 1957), p. 8; *Mah i Naw* monthly (Karachi), IX, No. 3, pp. 14-15.

<sup>352</sup> *Secret Letters*, No. 64, Enc. 1. Also see *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, pp. 115-16.

<sup>353</sup> *T.N.N.*, p. 150.



their zeal for a decisive struggle. It was decided that after performing the prayers and ceremonies of 'Id al-Adha on 1 August a major attack would be launched.<sup>354</sup> Accordingly late in the afternoon on that day the Revolutionaries emerged from the gates of the city and commenced by attacking Metcalfe House, gradually spreading along the whole front. The battle continued throughout the night, the Revolutionaries kept on coming in batches and "not a man of ours advanced from under cover". When the day broke fighting was still going on; it lasted till about noon time when the Revolutionaries decided to withdraw, because they now saw no hope of success, and their losses had been heavy compared to those of the enemy.

### Alipur, 3 August

In another sector, however, the Revolutionaries had succeeded in their objective. The Revolutionary Government was not unaware of the movements of Nicholson's Movable Column.<sup>355</sup> To check the advance of the Column the Revolutionaries had rebuilt the bridge of Najafgarh canal, but this had been destroyed by the British. General Wilson informed Nicholson that the purpose of the reconstruction of the bridge by the Revolutionaries and concentration of their forces near it was to attack 'Alipur and cut the British line of communication. "I, therefore, earnestly beg you", Wilson had written, "to push forward with the utmost expedition in your power, both to drive these fellows from my rear, and to aid me in holding my position."<sup>356</sup> The reconstruction of the bridge had been completed on 2 August, and on the following day the Revolutionaries launched an attack on 'Alipur, but they had to withdraw because of the exceptionally

<sup>54</sup> It was customary for the teachers to give blessings to their pupils in the form of a short poem on the occasion of the 'Ids. This was generally known as 'Idi ('Id greetings). Bahadur Shah composed the following couplets on the occasion of the 'Id al-Adha (1st August, 1857). It contains a prayer for victory over his enemies, namely, Christians, Gurkhas, white soldiers and Gujars.

شکر اعدا الہی آج سارا قتل ہو  
گورکھا گورے سے تا گور نصاریٰ قتل ہو  
آج کا دن عید قرباں کا جب ہی جانیں گے ہم  
اے ظفر = تج جب قاتل تمہارا قتل ہو

Translation:- O God, May the entire army of the enemy be killed today ! from the Gurkhas and white soldiers, to Gujar and Christians.

We shall consider this day as the day of the 'Id of sacrifice only if, O Zafar, your murderer is killed by a sword." This appeared on the title page of *Sadiq al-Akhbar*, Delhi, 12 Dhi al-hijjah, 1273 H., under the caption *Qita'h Tahniyat i 'Id i Sa'id farmudah i Hadrat Abu Zafar Muhammad Siraj al-Din Bahadur Shah Badshah i Ghazi*. Reproduced in *Nawa i Azadi* (Adabi Publishers, Bombay, 1957), facing p. 6.

Nicholson had taken command of the Column on 22 June. See Kaye, *Lives of Indian Officers* (London, 1875), p. 359.

See Kaye and Malleson, II, p. 486.



heavy rains which made the movement of the soldiers impossible.<sup>357</sup>

### Explosion of the magazine factory, 7 August

On 6 August the Nimach and Nasirabad forces under their respective commanders, Sirdhara Singh and Badli Singh, made an ineffective attempt to attack the right flank of the British camp. This reverse was nothing compared to the calamity which befell the defenders on the following day. After the explosion of the Magazine near the Kashmir Gate on 11 May, the Revolutionaries had set up a manufactory in Begam Samru's House;<sup>358</sup> it exploded on the morning of 7 August. According to a British spy the cause of the explosion was "a spark from a hooqa,"<sup>359</sup> but the Revolutionaries suspected that Hakim Ahsan-Allah Khan was the author of this act of sabotage. The excited sepoys rushed to his house, plundered it and then set fire to it; they would have killed the Hakim if the Emperor had not intervened. Actually in this case Ahsan-Allah Khan was outmanoeuvred by Rajab 'Ali who was more cunning and certainly more efficient in the nefarious art of spying.<sup>360</sup> Nevertheless, two days later he (Rajab 'Ali) also came under suspicion; a price was set on his head, and he "was obliged to escape for his life, after having been for three months the invaluable medium of all city news in the intelligence department so admirably conducted by Hodson."<sup>361</sup> From the British camp, however, where he was in charge of the office of the intelligence department Rajab 'Ali continued to perform his duties as a spy.<sup>362</sup>

### Metcalf House again, 8 August

On 8 August the Revolutionaries marched out of the Kashmir Gate and

<sup>357</sup> Cave-Browne, II, p. 137.

<sup>358</sup> For Samru's House see Bashir al-Din, II, 209.

<sup>359</sup> *Delhi News*, 8 August, 1857 quoted in Mahdi Husain, p. 246, n. 6.

<sup>360</sup> Rajab 'Ali's friend Hodson refers to his treachery in these words: "On the 7 (August) a powder manufactory was exploded, and they suspended the minister, Hakeem Ahsanoolah, and searched his house: there they found a letter which had been sent him; concocted by Moulvie Rujub Alee, which confirmed their suspicions, so they plundered and burnt his house ..." See Hodson, p. 261.

It may be mentioned that after the collapse of the Revolution, Rajab 'Ali was amply rewarded for his treachery by the British Government; he was given lands and the title of *Arastu Jah* besides a cash reward of 10,000 rupees. In compliance with a request from the writer of *Tahqiqat i Chishti* he wrote an account of his life; this has been included in that book. See Chishti, Nur Ahmad, *Tahqiqat i Chishti* (Lahore, 1324 H), pp. 114-19; also see Jafri, R. A., *Bahadur Shah Zafar awr unka 'Ahd* (Lahore, 1957), pp. 1247-54.

<sup>361</sup> Cave-Browne, II, 136-37; for details of the story of the explosion see *Memoirs*, p. 21. Zahir says that the women of Ahsan-Allah Khan's family took shelter in his house; they were brought there by 'Aziz al-Din, a nephew of the Hakim. See pp. 143-44.

<sup>362</sup> For his report dated 15 September see *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, p. 48; also see Zaka-Allah, 647.



established a battery at Ludlow Castle; from here they could easily ply the Metcalfe House picket with shot and shell. For three days the British could not do anything to check them. Before sunrise on 12 August Brigadier Showers and Coke advanced silently towards the Revolutionaries who were completely taken by surprise. The British captured and brought with them four guns. Both sides suffered heavy losses in this affair; on the British side Showers and Coke were severely wounded and the number of casualties was large; "an officer was killed, eight wounded, and one hundred and nine men *hors de combat*"<sup>364</sup>

### Hodson captures Rohtak

Nicholson thus succeeded in bringing his Movable Column to the camp on 14 August; his arrival raised the strength as well as the morale of the British forces. The same day a body of the Revolutionaries, mainly Cavalry, came out with the intention of cutting off the enemy's communications with the Panjab. Hodson was sent against them. He pushed towards Kharkanda a small village near Rohtak, and fell upon a small part of the Revolutionaries led by Risaldar Bisharat 'Ali. The village was surrounded and "the little party of mutineers was soon mastered and the ressalidar shot down by Hodson himself. . ."<sup>364</sup> from here Hodson rushed to Rohtak where he had a skirmish with men of the *Rangarh* tribe, who were commanded by their leader, Babur Khan. The action was not decisive; on the following day Babur Khan again charged Hodson and pushed him back. A small battle was fought in the open in which the Revolutionaries suffered casualties; they retreated and evacuated Rohtak in the course of the night.

### Battle of Najafgarh, 24 August

In the last week of August the Revolutionaries planned an attack on the rear of the enemy. They were not unaware of the progress of the British siege train which was expected to reach Karnal on 25 or 26 August;<sup>365</sup> they also realised the great danger which its arrival would mean for them. Besides this, the Emperor is stated to have told the officers of the leading Brigades in the Capital that they should do some thing "to stop this rain of shot and shell pouring into the Palace"; the reference was to three shells which by accident had fallen in the Red Fort just at the moment when he was coming out of his apartments. On hearing these words from their Emperor the Commanders of the Nimach and Rohilkhand

<sup>363</sup> Forrest, I, 115; Cave-Browne, II, pp. 137-38.

<sup>364</sup> Cave-Browne, II, 145.

Risaldar Bisharat 'Ali belonged to 1st Irregular Cavalry and had been decorated with an Order of Merit. Hodson takes pride for massacring the leading persons of the village: "We polished off the Khurkhundah gentry in style, though they showed fight to a great extent. See Hodson, pp. 206-07.

<sup>365</sup> Young, p. 30.



Brigades held a council and decided that a major offensive should be launched on the rear of the enemy's position on the side of Najafgarh. Accordingly on 24 August after prolonged discussions the Nimach and Nasirabad Brigades marched out with the intention of proceeding to Najafgarh; Bakht Khan followed them; he was to remain in the rear, in charge of the reserve. They advanced up to the bridge without meeting opposition, and were able to cross it after some repairs. They occupied the villages in the neighbourhood and took a strong position at an old *sarai* where they posted four of their heavy guns. The British commander despatched Nicholson to attack the Revolutionaries.

Nicholson started at 4 A. M. in the morning and proceeded to a cross road. About five o'clock in the afternoon he crossed a *nalah* and arrived in front of the position taken up by his opponents. He now attacked the *sarai* and ultimately succeeded in capturing it. After this he changed front, swept down the line and pushed back the Revolutionaries. Mubarak adds that the Nimach troops were tired because they had no time to rest and their march was slow as they had to wade through water which was above their knees. Obviously they could not move fast enough to reach the *sarai* in time to reinforce its defenders; yet they "offered a desperate resistance, and a bloody hand-to-hand encounter." The village of Najafgarh, in the meantime, had been captured by Lumsden who had been assigned that task by Nicholson. From here he crossed over along the rear of the line with a view to strengthen the attack on the village of Nagli which had been occupied by the Revolutionaries. They latter offered a determined resistance and killed the British Commander with eleven of his men besides wounding twenty-six others. But after the capture of the *sarai* a portion of the British troops was sent against this small band of defenders, while the rest were re-formed to attack the camp of the Revolutionaries and the bridge in their rear. The Revolutionaries soon realized that the fall of bridge would mean utter destruction of their forces; hence they decided to make a retreat. The village of Nagli was also left to the enemy; "indeed, more properly speaking, it was not taken, but was evacuated by the enemy during the night."<sup>366</sup> The defeat at Najafgarh was the severest reverse which the Revolutionaries had suffered. Their losses, particularly among the men of the Nimach Brigade, were very heavy, and, more than that, the blow to their morale was almost irreparable. "The prestige of the rebel army," remarks Mubarak, "had waxed materially previously to their defeat at Nujufgurb but after that it was completely and for ever lost."<sup>367</sup>

Mubarak attributes the defeat of the Revolutionaries to the failure of the supply of provisions. Bakht Khan had sent a message to Mirza Mughul that the forces had nothing to eat and were starving and that parched gram should be sent to the battle front immediately. The prince could make no effective arrangements

<sup>366</sup> Norman's Narrative in *State Papers*, I, 465; also Kaye, J. W., *op. cit.*, pp. 366-67.

<sup>367</sup> Mubarak, f. 143.



for this.<sup>368</sup> The Revolutionaries could not continue their attacks after this defeat; they were now forced to fight defensive actions.

## THE FALL OF DELHI (September 1857)

### The situation deteriorates

After capturing Najafgarh the British officers began to reconsider the possibilities of an assault on the city. Only five days before the battle General Wilson had written a letter to the Chief Engineer of the Field Force, Colonel Baird Smith, dwelling upon the dangers and doubtful results of an assault without getting adequate reinforcements; he had wanted Havelock's men or some other troops should march on Delhi because "the force under my command is... actually besieged by the mutineers". He had concluded his remarks with a warning: "As an Artillery officer, I have no hesitation in giving my opinion that the attack on Delhi, garrisoned and armed as it now is, is as arduous an undertaking as was the attack on Bharatpur in 1825-26..." His officers, however, did not agree with this view; they were in favour of an immediate assault, and with the arrival of the siege train on the night of 3 September it became the common talk of the camp. Nicholson wrote on the 4th: "I think we have a right to hope for success, and I trust that ere another week passes our flag will be flying from the palace minarets."<sup>369</sup> Quite different was the state of affairs in the city: the demoralising effects of the defeat were becoming apparent. Mirza Moghul and his junta persisted in their opposition to Bakht Khan; their relations had become so bitter that the British spy, Fath Muhammad, said in his news-report of 1 September that "the Naseerabad and Neemuch Brigades are supporters of Mirza Moghul and the Bareilly Brigade is devoted to the King. The officers of the Bareilly force and Mirza are bitter enemies. It is not at all improbable that the Bareilly troops will fall out and kill Mirza Moghul." Personal jealousy and factional rivalries were not the only causes of this bitterness. "The Shahzadas," continues the spy, "manage to embezzle the collections made from the towns people. The Bareilly Brigade talk of returning to Bareilly."<sup>370</sup>

From the outset the Revolutionary Government was confronted with serious financial problems; the funds at their disposal were scanty and inadequate. The conduct of the Princes added to its difficulties. On Bahadur Shah's assumption of power they thought that fortune after all had begun to smile on them. For decades they had been living like prisoners with no prospects of the restoration of their lost glory and prestige. They could not have failed to realize

*Ibid.*, f. 142.

Kaye, J. W., *op. cit.*, p. 376.

*Secret Letters* (India Office Records). Letter No. 191.



that the Empire seemed to be dying fast, but with the outbreak of the Revolution they suddenly found themselves in the possession of power and dignity. Unfortunately, however, instead of utilizing this opportunity for the good of the people and the Empire they gave themselves up to a life of ease and dissipation, and began to behave in an irresponsible manner; power corrupted them absolutely.<sup>371</sup> For nearly four months the Revolutionary Government had managed to keep the financial situation under control, but the demoralizing effects of the reverse at Najafgarh created circumstances which led to a crisis. On 31 August the Emperor was forced to proclaim that the Princes were unworthy of credit and directed "that no one should give money to them."<sup>372</sup> Two days later he was surrounded by some officers of the sepoys, who demanded the pay of their Regiments. Bahadur Shah was greatly annoyed, because he did not have enough money to meet their demands. "There was much talking and shouting, at last Selim Shah Rissaldar (on leave)", says Gauri Shankar, "expostulated with the soobahdars and got them quiet." Bahadur Shan had only 40,000 rupees; this amount was not sufficient. He also offered them one hundred and one gold *mohurs* which he had received as *nadhr* on behalf of the Nawab of Bareilly, and ultimately 'the jewels of the zenana'. The courtiers were moved by this action of the Emperor and persuaded the officers to accept 40,000 as an instalment of their dues.<sup>373</sup> These reports of the spies were substantially correct. Thus they kept the British camp informed of the developments in the city.<sup>374</sup> An account of the setting of guns and other defence arrangements made by the Revolutionaries inside the city walls was sent to the British by Gauri Shankar on 12 September.

### British preparations for an assault

With this information in their hands it is not surprising that the British Command eventually agreed to launch an attack on the city. The preparations for the assault began with the digging of a trench to the left of the Sammy House and

<sup>371</sup> As late as 9 September the Princes were embezzling State funds. Jiwan Lal writes: 'The King ordered the arrest of the Princes who had misappropriated money collected for the pay of the sepoys'. Mubarak Shah says that the Emperor had persuaded the wealthier citizens of Dehli to pay donations. "From men," he says, "known to own upward of a lac a contribution of Rs. 25,000/- was demanded, but those assessed at this amount went to Mirza Moghul and giving him a present of five or six hundred rupees succeeded in having the call reduced to Rs. 1500/- or even Rs. 1000/-" Folio. 158.

<sup>372</sup> See *Secret Letters*, Letter No. 191 (Gauri Shankar's report dated 1st September 1857).

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.* (Fath Muhammad's report dated 2 September). Another spy, Turab 'All confirms this incident. Also see *Mutiny Records*, vol. VII, Pt. II, 15-17.

<sup>374</sup> Colonel Keith wrote to his wife on 2 September: "There are several letters from the city, all telling the same story of divided Counsels, internal dissensions, and troops running away." See Young, p. 258; For Gauri Shankar's report see, *Mutiny Records*, VII, Part II, pp. 33-34. On 7 September Nicholson wrote: "Poor Pandey has been in very low spirits since then (the battle of Nujufghurh), and, please God, he'll be in still lower before the end of this week." Kaye, J. W. *op. cit* pp. 376-77.



the setting up of a strong battery<sup>375</sup> at its end with the object of preventing sorties from the Lahore and Kabul Gates. These arrangements deceived the Revolutionaries; they made them think that they would be attacked from this side, whilst it had been decided that the main attack would be directed from the other flank.<sup>376</sup> By 6 September all the expected reinforcements had arrived, and on the evening of the following day the first battery was quietly installed about seven hundred yards from the Moree Gate. The work had to be completed in the night; for some time it went on undisturbed, but the Revolutionaries soon heard the noise, and immediately came a shower of grape from the Moree Bastion killing several workmen. If this firing had been continued the work would have had to be relinquished; but the Revolutionaries stopped firing because they took the workmen to be parties of men cutting brushwood and thought they had been scared away. When the day broke, they saw the battery and again opened fire, but it was too late now. The British on their part started firing at the Moree Bastion, and by afternoon reduced its masonry to a heap of ruins. This battery (No. 1) was commanded by Major Brind and came to be known after his name. On the left the besiegers were able to establish two batteries (No. 2 and 4) at the Qudsiah Bagh which was only five hundred yards from the Kashmir Gate. These were completed in three days (8 to 11 September). About the same time another battery (No. 3) was set up at the Customs House, only a hundred and sixty yards from the Water Bastion.

### Fighting at Kashmir Gate

The work of erecting the batteries had been conducted in great silence, and it was only after it had been completed that the Revolutionaries realized that the main attack was to be directed from the northern sector. It was now too late to take any effective measures and no amount of effort and sacrifice could save; fifty-four guns and mortars "belched forth havoc on the doomed city."<sup>377</sup> However, when the enemy's firing commenced on the morning of 12 September, the defenders tried their best to counter the attack. They had not raised their guns on to the bastions; they were, therefore, forced to bring them out into the open to

<sup>375</sup> This battery was erected on the suggestion of Reid and was therefore, known as Reid's Battery.

<sup>376</sup> According to the plan approved by the authorities the attack was to be made on the northern sector of the city extending from the Moree Gate to the Water Bastion near the Jamuna. It has been rightly pointed out that the defenders could have strengthened their position by pulling down the buildings and erecting a rampart, from which the attacking force could have been easily subjected to concentrated and heavy fire. It is difficult to explain why this step was not taken except by the fact that the Revolutionary leaders were busy quarrelling among themselves. Kaye and Malleon, IV, 6; Roberts, *op. cit.*, I, 218-19.

<sup>377</sup> Smith, R.B, *Life of Lord Lawrence*, 2 Vols. (London, 1883) II, 115. Mubarak refers to these incidents in these words: "By this time the British battery at the Koodsia Bagh had greatly damaged the city wall and smashed the muzzles of most of the mutineers' guns rendering them wholly unserviceable and killed nearly all the artillery men", Folio 154.



fire at the enemy's batteries. They also maintained steady firing of musketry from the walls of the city and inflicted losses on the besiegers,<sup>378</sup> but they could not stop him from breaking the screening walls near the Kashmir Gate and Water Bastion. The besiegers, to quote Mawlana Fadl i Haqq, "showered continuously heavy balls throughout the day and night. The wall of the city was breached and cracked, and openings became apparent in the wall and the ramparts. The gate was demolished and sources (of defence) were cut short; the curtain rose. None from among the soldiers was able to stand or sit there, nor could anyone peep from or ascend over the wall. Anyone who tried to peep from its wall was shot and fell into the ditch."<sup>379</sup>

The breaches having been examined by the British engineers and reported to be practicable, it was decided on 13 September that the assault should be made on the following day. It appears that the details of the plan of assault had become available to the officers of the Revolutionary Government. The British forces were now divided into four Columns and a Reserve. Nicholson was to lead the first Column, and he was also entrusted with the general direction of the assault. Brigadier Jones, Colonel Campbell and Major Reid were to command the second, third and fourth Columns respectively; Brigadier Longfield was in charge of the Reserve and had instructions to follow the first Column. In the meantime the reports of these measures and successful breaching of the wall had created a panic in the city; the sepoys had started "fast evacuating Delhi",<sup>380</sup> and the main brunt of the attack had fallen on the *Ghazis*. "Ultimately", to quote 'Allamah Fadl i Haqq again "there remained only a small party of *Mujahidin* who passed the nights in hunger, but rushed to fight at dawn, and waged war against the enemy. They together with a company of the forces guarded the wall of the city and stopped the enemy's entry through breaches . . . ."<sup>381</sup> This statement is corroborated by facts mentioned in the news-letters of the spies. On the 12th, Gauri Shankar reported: "The citizens took part in yesterday's fight and

<sup>378</sup> Between 7 and 14 September, 327 officers and men were killed and wounded. See Robberts, *op. cit.*, I, 221.

<sup>379</sup> *J. P. H. S.*, Vol. V, p. 34.

The decision was taken at a Council of War held in a tent in the British Camp. This Council had met in perfect secrecy and had continued its deliberations till 4: 30. It is, therefore, surprising that "when we took the Cashmere Gate next morning, an order book, similar to the book then in use in the army, was found dated Palace, September 13, 5 P. M., giving the exact detail of the force that was to assault the Cashmere Gate, and sketching out generally and briefly the other points of attack of the other assaulting columns." Wilberforce, R. G. *An Unrecorded Chapter of the Indian Mutiny* (London, 1894), p. 147.

In this connection it is interesting to note that the British spy, Fath Muhammad reported on 11 September that "the Afghan Ghazees in the city go out and mix fearlessly with the Afghans in camp, and bring in all details, even to the names of officers killed and wounded, which are published in the "*Delhee News*." See *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, 54.

<sup>380</sup> Cf. Hodson, p. 287.

<sup>381</sup> *J. P. H. S.*, Vol. V, p. 33, *The Story*, 33.



Moulvee Nawazish Ali of Habree, in Thaneisar District, with 2,000 men, went out to battle.<sup>382</sup>

### The Assault

Early in the morning on 14 September the British forces began to move and advanced as far as Ludlow Castle, the rendezvous for the three Columns on the left. After some time the 1st Column proceeded to Qudsiah Bagh and the 2nd further on to the Customs House, while the 3rd moved out along the road. From the Qudsiah Bagh the men of the 1st Column began to move towards the breach, they met with a storm of bullets but continued their advance until they reached the ditch. The ladders were thrown and Nicholson was among the first to reach the breach. The Revolutionaries abandoned the site, and the besiegers entered the city and took positions in the Main-Guard. The small party who were entrusted with the task of blowing the Kashmir Gate also moved forward and, in spite of heavy fire from the wicket, they managed to lay the powder bags and blow up the Gate. In the meantime the 2nd Column had carried the breach near the Water Bastion. On entering the city the British soldiers ran down the road, past the ramparts, and succeeded in capturing Moree Bastion without much difficulty or loss, the obvious reason being that the Revolutionaries had not anticipated this line of advance.

### Major Reid's Column repulsed

The fourth Column under Major Reid, however, had to face a different situation. Numerically the largest of the four Columns it was to serve as a *femt* to confirm the defenders in their expectations that the main attack would be made on that side.<sup>383</sup> The Column moved down the hill from behind the Gurkha stronghold at Hindu Rao's House, and came near the picket in the Sabzi-Mandi. Major Reid wanted to clear the Kishenganj Sarai, where the Revolutionaries had planted two batteries, and then make for the Lahore Gate. While he was preparing for this advance firing was heard, and it was found that the Kashmir Contingent were engaged with the Revolutionaries. He rushed to their aid. The Revolutionaries opened fire from the bridge over the canal and also from the *sarai*; Major Reid was hit and fell wounded in the head. He was thus "compelled to resign his command. The whole plan was now disconcerted ... the heavy guns from the rebel batteries swept the road with grape; the Cashmere Contingent on

<sup>382</sup> *Mutiny Records*, VII, Part II, 33.

<sup>383</sup> Mawlana Fadl e Haqq corroborates this: "...the Christians deceived the defenders and played a trick. They sent a division of their forces in front of another gate, so that (their opponents) should think that the other gate was being attacked. The *Mujahids* and a section of the forces, therefore, busied themselves in fighting and resisting them; They were thus deceived by this trick and device of the Christians" *J.P.H.S.*, Vol. V, p. 34 (*The Story of the War of Independence*).



the right, finding the enemy far more numerous than the expected, gave way, and could not again be brought up; any further attempt was hopeless, and it only remained to draw off the rest of the column with as little loss as might be, which was effected by Captain Muter of the 60th Rifles, who succeeded to the command on Major Reid being wounded."<sup>384</sup>

More disastrous was the fate of the other detachment of the Kashmir Contingent, which was ordered to occupy the 'Idgah. Hardly had its men got to the Rohtak road, which led to that building, when the Revolutionaries attacked them. The Kashmiris were pushed back and their guns were seized by the Revolutionaries.<sup>385</sup> They wanted to follow up their success, and had begun to threaten this vital point of the British position, when Hope Grant's Cavalry Brigade, which had hitherto been covering the assaulting forces, came to the rescue of the beaten Column. Grant's Brigade was also subjected to a sharp musketry firing from the houses and gardens of Kishenganj; at this critical moment Tombs brought his Artillery to their support. The British suffered heavy casualties, but Hindu Rao's House was saved.

### John Nicholson killed

The repulse of the fourth Column had a disastrous effect on the men of the other three also, who, flushed by their successes at the Moree and Kabul Gates, were now rushing to the Lahore Gate to join their comrades, believing that they too must have also scored an easy victory. They had, however, covered only a short distance, when fire was opened upon them from the Burn Bastion which commanded the Lahore Gate. The 75th Regiment which was in front of these men was forced to fall back upon the Kabul Gate. Seeing his men thus repulsed by the Revolutionaries, Nicholson rushed forward with the intention of assaulting the bastion, but the Revolutionaries had in the meantime made hasty arrangements to offer resistance; two guns were set up in a lane which had to be traversed before the bastion could be reached and some sharp-shooters were placed behind the windows of the houses as well as on their roofs. Nicholson was advised not to attack the dangerous spot and await intelligence before advancing further, but he did not pay any heed to their warning and ordered the 1st Fusiliers to advance. They were severely punished for this ill-advised action; their leader

<sup>384</sup> Cave-Browne, II, 183-84. When Major Reid found himself disabled he resigned his command to Captain Lawrence; in the meantime Captain Muter had actually assumed command of the Column. "This caused considerable confusion; Captain Lawrence, however, succeeded in asserting his authority, ... he retired leisurely and in good order on the batteries behind Hindu Rao's House." Kaye and Malleon, VI, p. 30.

For Muter's reasons for withdrawal, see his official despatch to the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, dated 17 September, in *State Papers*, I, 412.

<sup>385</sup> Captain Dwyer who commanded the Contingent attributes the defeat to numerical superiority of the Revolutionaries, but Major Reid's successor, Lawrence, thinks: "blame may be attached to the Jummo troops for the loss of their guns, ..." See official despatches of Lawrence and Dwyer in *State Papers*, I, pp. 410-411.



Major Jacob fell mortally wounded, and soon men and officers were falling fast. "The men of the column" said one of Nicholson's friends to Sir John Kaye, "had—in soldier's language —had their stomach full of fighting already, and they were not up to carrying out the programme. They reeled doggedly and slowly on. The sepoys in vast numbers disputed their advance. Under such circumstances it is of no use talking to soldiers, they won't do any more. But Nicholson tried, and as he stood before them entreating them to follow further, his single and stately figure became an easy mark. It would, indeed, have been a miracle had he escaped;"<sup>386</sup> and the Revolutionaries were obviously not in a mood to let such miracles happen! A sepoy took aim at Nicholson, and he fell with a bullet in his chest and died on 22 September.

### Campbell's Column withdraws from before the Jami' Masjid

The third Column had stormed the Kashmir Gate and proceeded towards the Main-Guard; from there they turned to the left, captured the Church and the Press and then came to Skinner's House. Here they met with resistance from a Regiment of the Nasirabad Brigade which held it; ultimately the British succeeded in capturing the building. Leaving these positions with Captain Wilde of the fifth (Reserve) Column, Colonel Campbell,<sup>387</sup> Commander of the third Column, pushed on through the Begam Bagh, entered the Chandni Chawk, took possession of the Kotwali, and with a detachment moved towards the *Jami' Masjid* where Muslims had assembled to offer prayers. When they found that the British soldiers were going to harm the innocent congregation, one of them came to the *minbar* and said: "now that the enemy is bent on damaging our mosque, I invite you all to lay down your life in the sacred cause. Those who are prepared to die should accompany me to the northern gate of the mosque." Thousands of Muslims who had their swords with them recited the *takbir*, *Allah-u-Akbar*, and rushed out of the gate. The British opened fire; two hundred of them were killed, but ultimately they succeeded in falling upon the enemy and forcing him to a hand-to-hand fight. Metcalfe who was at the head of the British soldiers could not stand this charge and withdrew.<sup>388</sup>

Campbell had by now received the disconcerting news of Nicholson's failure to take the Lahore Gate; he was also informed that his men were falling fast in Chandni Chawk, where the *Ghazis* were offering a stiff resistance.<sup>389</sup> He

<sup>386</sup> The statement of a friend of Nicholson, as quoted in Kaye, pp. 378-79.

<sup>387</sup> Colonel Campbell was guided by Theophilus Metcalfe who was acquainted with the city of Delhi.

<sup>388</sup> Nizami, Khwajah Hasan *Dihli ki Jan-kani*. (Delhi, 1922). pp. 33-34.

<sup>389</sup> "A large body of Ghazees," reports Mubarak, "assembling from various points advanced on the Kotwalee on which the Europeans came down and engaged them but were so greatly outnumbered that they were obliged to fall back on their main body at the Kashmir Gate after sustaining considerable loss." See ff. 165-66; also see Norman's Narrative in *State Papers*, I, 477.



was so disheartened by these reports and also because he had himself been wounded that he thought it wise to withdraw and not risk an assault on the Mosque. In his first official despatch, dated 16 September, Major-General Wilson tries to justify this retreat in these words: "The opposition, however, which he met from the great concentration of the enemy at the Jumma Musjid, and the houses in the neighbourhood, he himself, I regret to state, being wounded, satisfied him that his most prudent course was not to maintain so advanced a position. ... and he accordingly withdrew the head of his column and placed himself in communication with the Reserve..."<sup>390</sup>

### Street fighting in the city .

14 September was a day of deadly strife: the losses of the assaulting forces were eleven hundred and four men, and sixty-six officers killed or wounded—roughly speaking, about two men in nine. Wilson was disheartened, and his first reaction was that the Columns should be withdrawn to the Ridge. Other officers, however, thought otherwise. In reply to a question whether it would be possible for the Army to retain the ground that it had won, Baird Smith said rather emphatically: "We must do so." Wilson accepted the advice. On the following day, however, it was not possible to continue the offensive. The British soldiers had found numerous "bottles of beer, wine and brandy... in the deserted shops;... and that night and the next morning so utter was the disorganization in the whole force, that any attempt at an advance would have been certain failure and defeat."<sup>391</sup> Wilson had, therefore, to wait till the morning of 16 September, when news was received that Kishenganj had been evacuated by the Revolutionaries in the night. The British occupied it immediately and found there five heavy guns left by their opponents. Another gain was the capture of the Magazine; it was an important acquisition because it contained one hundred and seventy-one guns and howitzers and ammunition of every kind.<sup>392</sup> The fall of the Magazine was considered by the Revolutionaries to be a serious blow. Nevertheless, they did not lose courage and decided to make an all out effort to expel the besiegers. A deputation led by Mawlawi Sarfaraz 'Ali and Fayd Ahmad went to the Emperor and requested him to lead the troops "assuring him that the entire army, the citizens of Delhi and the people of the surrounding country would all follow and die for him, and expel the English." Bahadur Shah agreed, and it was decided that he would come out at noon time and lead his men in person. Thousands of citizens, *Ghazis* and sepoys gathered in front of the Palace, and the Emperor moved out of his apartments. But as soon as he came out of the

<sup>390</sup> *State Papers*, I, 372-73; Cave-Browne, II, 180-81.

<sup>391</sup> Cave-Browne, II, 187.

<sup>392</sup> The Magazine was defended by two Regiments of the Nasirabad Brigade known as the Dow and Macdonald Regiments. See Mubarak, f. 171.

It could be captured only when a battery was planted on the left of the College. See Cave-Browne, II, 188.



gate of the Palace and the troops and citizens started their march in the direction of the Magazine Hakim Ahsan-Allah told him that it would be dangerous for him to proceed further, because he would be shot by European riflemen who were concealed in the houses near-by, adding that the English would not spare him if he led the army. Bahadur Shah was unnerved by this warning and returned to the Palace, saying that he must go back to offer his prayers; the people and the troops also dispersed.<sup>393</sup>

### The Ghazis offer stubborn resistance: Greatheads Column repulsed

The report that the Emperor had returned to his apartments disheartened the people—both the troops and the citizens. They could now see that the situation was becoming critical, and the troops that had come from outside Delhi began to leave; many of its old citizens also decided to evacuate. The *Ghazis* and those among the soldiers who were determined to fight to the end, as is indicated by their stiff resistance on the 17th continued the struggle. The only important building lost on this day was the Delhi Bank; it was not won by the besiegers without hard fighting and some loss, but it brought them quite near the Imperial Palace. However, the *Ghazis* remained firm in their opposition on the following day also. The attack of a British force on the Lahore Gate, led by Greathead and composed of detachments from the 8th, the 75th, and a Sikh Regiment supported by fifty men of the First Fusiliers, made earlier in the day had miserably failed. In his report of the day Wilson writes: "We are still in the same position in which we were yesterday. An attempt was made this morning to take the Lahore Gate, but failed from the refusal of the European soldiers to follow their officers... The fact is, our men have a great dislike to street-fighting; they do not see their enemy, and find their comrades falling from shots of the enemy who are on the tops of houses and behind cover, and get a panic, and will not advance. This is very sad, and to me, very disheartening."<sup>394</sup>

### Fall of the Red Fort

The evening of the next day (19 September), however, proved more auspicious for Wilson's men; they captured the Burn Bastion on that night. Its fall weakened the defences of the Lahore Gate, which was seized by Brigadier Jones on the morning of the 20th, Jones was now ordered to send a detachment to take the *Jami' Masjid* and proceed with the remaining forces to the Ajmer Gate. Major Brind, who was given the command of the detachment which was to attack the *Masjid*, occupied it and wrote to the General, reporting his success and urging the need of capturing the Palace immediately. Wilson accordingly sent a Column

<sup>393</sup> Mubarak, f. 172-73. According to another authority the Emperor had come to Lal Diggi and it was from there that he returned to the Palace on the advice of his officers. Nizami, *Dilli-ki-Saza*, (Delhi, second edition, 1945), p. 42.  
<sup>394</sup> Kaye and Malleeson, IV, 44.



to attack the Red Fort, which was also captured. Inside the Palace the British forces found only a small band of the *Ghazis* who fell upon them and sacrificed their lives in the cause of freedom. Wilson wanted "to blow up the several bastions and portions of the palace," but Lawrence would not agree to it, because, as he said in his reply to the General, "the occupation of the palace would do as much good politically as its destruction."<sup>395</sup>

### **The heroic resistance offered by the Ghazis and other Revolutionaries**

The heroic resistance of the Revolutionaries in the last stage of the great Battle of Delhi is certainly one of the most remarkable though tragic chapters of the War, for, it was quite evident that no amount of sacrifice could save Delhi, once the British forces had entered it. Their slow progress and heavy losses during the first five days of the assault (14 to 18 September), however, leave no doubt as to the determination of the defenders; they had decided to fight to the end. The waverers and those among the sepoys who were not prepared to sacrifice their lives had started leaving the city immediately after the assault began. Rajab 'Ali's report of 15 September contains this information: "Today I heard that parties of the rebels were deserting by the Kootub road and towards Rewaree, and a few by other routes."<sup>396</sup> The flight of the sepoys had a very demoralizing effect on the population; it made the people panicky. On the afternoon of the 17th according to a report from the lookout at Hindu Rao's House, streams of people and animals were moving out of the Ajmer Gate. This large scale evacuation of panic-stricken citizens in its turn affected the morale of the defenders. Nevertheless, the Emperor and the leaders of the Revolution remained firm; they were determined to fight to the last man and had no intention of changing this decision until the afternoon of 19th.<sup>397</sup>

### **Bahadur Shah ignores Bakht Khan's advice**

The fall of Burn Bastion the same evening, however, changed the situation. The Revolutionary leaders thought that it would be suicidal for their forces to stay on in Delhi, now that all the strategic points and positions capable of defence had been captured by the besiegers. Bakht Khan, anxious to save the forces from annihilation, requested Bahadur Shah to accompany him to Rohilkhand where the position of the Revolutionaries was strong. There can be no doubt that if Bahadur Shah had accepted Bakht Khan's request the course of the Revolutionary War would have been entirely changed. The loss of Delhi,

<sup>395</sup> For Wilson's telegram to Lawrence, dated 21 September, and the latter's reply on the following day, see *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, 74.

<sup>396</sup> See *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, 48.

<sup>397</sup> "On the 18th, it was reported by the spies that the King with his sons, the three royal Regiments, some other corps of native infantry, and troopers of the light cavalry, had secured themselves in the palace, and were resolved to resist to the last man." Cf. Ball, I, 508.



Bakht Khan rightly argued, was not the end of the struggle; undoubtedly it was a great blow to the Revolutionary cause, but they could continue fighting in other theatres of War, "under the shadow of his name and presence," and the General was convinced that their chances of success were immense. Bahadur Shah, however, failed to take a prompt decision; he hesitated and told Bakht Khan to see him next morning in Humayun's Tomb, whither he had decided to go for refuge. It may be added that Bakht Khan had been rather indiscreet in making his request to the Emperor in the presence of Ilahi Bakhsh who was a traitor and had sold himself to the British. He listened to Bakht Khan's arguments without uttering a word, but, after his departure, he took the Emperor to his apartments and advised him not to accept the suggestion of the Ruhilah chief. He waxed eloquent on the hardships of War, particularly when the scene of fighting would be far from the Capital; moreover, he pointed out, success was not certain. On the contrary, if he dissociated himself from the Revolution, the British Government would certainly treat him with consideration. Bahadur Shah yielded to his kinsman's persuasions and refused to go with Bakht Khan, when the latter came to Humayun's Tomb on the following morning to hear his decision.<sup>398</sup> Bakht Khan and his followers, then "went their way, leaving behind the royal family and a numerous crowd of emasculated followers, the scum of the palace, men born never to rise above the calling of a flatterer or a scullion."<sup>399</sup>

### Bahadur Shah's surrender

Bahadur Shah's refusal to comply with Bakht Khan's advice was a great blunder, for which he had to pay a heavy price. Having thus persuaded the Emperor to remain in Humayun's tomb, Ilahi Bakhsh informed Rajab 'Ali who was his chief collaborator in the conspiracy. The latter communicated the news to Hodson who rushed to General Wilson and secured his permission to arrest Bahadur Shah and bring him alive. Wilson wanted to treat the Emperor as a law-breaker, but Hodson insisted on being authorized to give a guarantee of his life, should he surrender, obviously in return for a handsome price.<sup>400</sup>

<sup>398</sup> Hakim Ahsan-Allah Khan gives a garbled account of Bahadur Shah's escape. He writes, "Next day in the evening Bakht Khan and Kadir Bakhsh of the Sappers and Miners, came and said that the king must go by stealth to the Kutb and send his womankind too for their lives were in danger if they remained. They advised him to go by boat to Humayun's Tomb and thence to the Kutb by palanquin and that they would follow, that they would not have another such opportunity." He also adds that Bahadur Shah made some excuses, but ultimately he agreed. See *Memoirs*, p. 30.

This is incorrect; Bakht Khan was anxious to take the Emperor with him. He knew how important it was that the Emperor should continue to lead the Revolution. See Kaye and Malleon, IV, 50.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid*, p 51.

<sup>00</sup> Hodson, one of the greediest and most unscrupulous of British officers, has been condemned for murdering the Mughul Princes and his impertinence towards the Emperor; in fact, his earlier career, had not been cleaner either. He had become at one time "one of Henry Lawrence's disciples, and won for a time, his confidence and regard," but soon after he was



Hodson reached Humayun's Tomb with fifty of his troopers on 22 September. Rajab 'Ali was sent as a messenger to the Emperor, while Hodson and his men remained concealed in the buildings near-by. Two hours later came the word that the Emperor was ready to surrender. Soon after this the Queen and her son, followed by Bahadur Shah were before Hodson. The Emperor asked Hodson to confirm the pledge given by his messenger; Hodson complied with this last demand: "then, . . . betrayed by his own kinsmen, his city captured, his army defeated and dispersed, his hopes shattered, the last King of the house of Timour gave up his arms to an English subaltern, and was led captive to await his trial."<sup>401</sup> Bahadur Shah was taken to the city and was kept under guard in a small building, known as Zinat Mahal and belonging to his wife. On entering Delhi he expressed a desire to see General Wilson, but the latter refused to show him this courtesy.

### Hodson murders the Princes

Next morning having obtained permission from the General to capture the Princes; Hodson again came to Humayan's Tomb, he had one hundred horsemen with him and was accompanied by Rajab 'Ali and Ilahi Bakhsh. Besides the three Princes, Mirza Moghul, Khidr Sultan and Abu Bakr, there was a large crowd of the people in Humayun's Tomb; they were armed and capable of fighting.<sup>402</sup> They wanted to offer resistance, and fight to the last man, but the arch-traitors, Rajab 'Ali and Ilahi Bakhsh, told the Princes that the best course for them was to follow their father and ask for a guarantee for their lives,<sup>403</sup> but after two hours of fruitless negotiations Hodson refused the request. The helpless Princes were now put in a *rath* (covered chariot) which along with Hodson's party and a large crowd of men took the road to the city. When they were at a distance of one mile from Delhi, Hodson "ordered the Princes roughly to get out of the cart and strip,—for even in his thirst for blood, he had, as it would seem,

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found guilty of corruption and was dismissed. With the outbreak of the Revolution he found an opportunity of again getting into service and was given the charge of the Intelligence Department. For his corruption and other vices of character see Holmes, Appendix, N, pp. 591-617; Bosworth-Smith, I, 498-530.

This "explains the otherwise unaccountable persistency with which, on 21 September 1857, he importuned General Wilson to allow him to promise the King his life ... Hodson did give the King a quarter of his life before the royal family left the palace of Delhi; and I have also proved that he was not authorised to give that guarantee...I would not insult the intelligence of readers by demonstrating the obvious fact that he did not give it out of charity." Holmes, pp. 614-15.

<sup>401</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 385.

<sup>402</sup> "In it were the princes and about 3000 Mussulman followers. In the suburb close by about 3000 more, all armed, so it was rather a ticklish bit of work." Letter of Lieutenant Macdonell, second in command to Hodson, quoted in Hodson, p. 310.

<sup>403</sup> The traitors told the Princes that the Emperor was safe and quite well, giving them the impression that they would also be treated well.  
See Husayni, II, 453.



an eye to the value of their outer clothes — he ordered them into the cart again, he seized a carbine from one of his troopers, and, then and there, with his own hand shot them down deliberately, one after the other.<sup>404</sup> The heads of the Princes were removed from their bodies and according to some authorities, were sent to the wretched Emperor in a tray with a message from Hodson that "it was the *nadhr* which had been stopped and for whose restoration he had joined the mutineers." With a grim sense of humour Bahadur Shah is stated to have remarked: "Thank God, the Timurid Princes have always appeared before their fathers with reddened faces *sirkh-ru*."<sup>405</sup> Allamah Fadhli Haqq does not repeat the words of Bahadur Shah but he is definite that "they sent their severed heads in a tray to the King as a present."<sup>406</sup> Their heads were later hung on an old gate outside the city, which has since then popularly come to be known as the *Khuan Darwazah* (Blood Gate); "three bodies (were) exposed in the Kotwalee",<sup>407</sup> here they remained till 24 September when they were removed and thrown into the river.

This was not the end of the atrocities inflicted on the *Salatm* (the princes); "a large number, not less than twenty-nine, of these Princes had been

<sup>404</sup> Hodson has been deservedly condemned for this act of butchery. Bosworth-Smith calls it "a stupid, cold-blooded three-fold murder," because "the princes were unresisting prisoners in his hands. No evidence worthy of the name had been or could have been given as to their participation in the slaughter of our countrymen. Their very identity depended solely on the unsupported testimony of that traitorous villain the Mirza Fulahee Buksh, who would have sworn away the life of his dearest friend if he had aught to gain thereby." Smith II, 122-23. Kaye's comments are: "He wanted blood. His senses were blinded by his brutal instincts." Kaye and Malleon, IV, 55.

The official view of Ilahi Bakhsh's "services" was however different. Commissioner Saunders, for instance, recommended him to the Secretary to Government, Panjab, in these words: "Mirza Ilahi Bukhsh performed a most undoubted service in detaining the Ex-King and preventing him from taking his departure with the rebel army where his name would have become a rallying point for the disaffected and rebellious throughout the country." C. B. Saunders to R. H. Davies, Secretary to Government, Panjab, dated 13 June, 1859. The letter is quoted in Mahdi Hussain, p. 354.

<sup>405</sup> Nizami, *Dilhi ki Jan-kani*, p. 53.

The incident is not mentioned by the Western writers but several contemporary authorities refer to it in some form or the other; and the action is quite in keeping with the character of Hodson who wrote in a letter dated 23 September, 1857: "I am not cruel, but I confess that I rejoice in the opportunity of ridding the earth of these ruffians." Quoted in Kaye and Malleon, IV, 54 n.

<sup>406</sup> *J.P.H.S.*, Vol. V, p. 37. Also see Zahir Dihlawi, p. 164. Khwajah Hasan Nizami relates on the authority of his father, who had heard it from a friend of Mirza Ilahi Bakhsh, that Hodson drank the blood of the Princes saying that he would have lost his mental balance if he had not tasted it. Mawlawi Zaka Allah admits that the people of Delhi believed the story although he himself considered it improbable. Zaka Allah, p. 650.

<sup>407</sup> Letter by an Engineer officer, quoted in Ball, I, 516; Also see Holmes, p. 387; *State Papers*, I, 369; also see Ball, I, 511.

Kamal al-Din Haydar says that they were buried in the *Dargah* of Khwajah Baqi-Billah. See Husayni, Vol. II, p. 453.



picked on, lurking in the neighbourhood of the city.<sup>408</sup> In their trials false evidence was produced against them by hostile and interested persons. Speaking about two of these Princes, Mirza Mendhu and Bakhtawar Shah, Muir says: "I do not remember to have heard their names prominently mentioned in any of the rebel proceedings."<sup>409</sup> Some of the Princes were shot or hanged and several were thrown into prison where they were treated like ordinary prisoners and subjected to hard labour.<sup>410</sup> No consideration was shown to health or age; some of them died because they could not stand the torture to which they were subjected.<sup>411</sup> These incidents and other details available in contemporary records and books show that the officers of the Company's Army did not pay much heed to John Lawrence's orders, whose instructions were: "try them fairly, and if they are found guilty of having authorized or abetted the massacre of English women or children, by all means condemn them to death. But deal with no one as Hodson dealt with his victims."<sup>412</sup>

### Bahadur Shah's "Trial"

On receiving a report of Bahadur Shah's surrender John Lawrence sent a telegram to Barnes at Ambala that he would like him to be sent to Meerut. It was feared that his presence in Delhi or any other important place would be a source of encouragement to the Revolutionaries.<sup>413</sup> Saunders suggested that he should be sent to Govindgarh in Amritsar.<sup>414</sup> If he was to be kept in the Panjab, Lawrence thought, he could be lodged in the fort of Kangra.<sup>415</sup> Ultimately, it was decided that the Emperor should be tried by a Commission.<sup>416</sup> At this stage arose the question of the guarantee given to Bahadur Shah about his life. Wilson could not deny that he had given verbal instructions to Hodson that if the Emperor surrendered unconditionally his life should be guaranteed, but, he added, this was

<sup>408</sup> Smith, II, 150.

<sup>409</sup> *Intelligence Records*, I, p. 166.

<sup>410</sup> Ghalib, *Dastanbu in Kuliyat i Nathr i Ghalib*. (Lucknow, 1884) p. 401. Twenty-four Princes were hanged in Delhi on 18 November, 1857; of these "two were brothers-in-law, two sons-in-law of the King, the remainder nephews, etc." *Intelligence Records*, I, 273.

<sup>411</sup> One of the Princes, Mirza Qaysar, was the son of Shah 'Alam and was very old and weak; he was hanged. Another, Mirza Mahmud, son of Akbar Shah II, was suffering from gout and could not even move about; he was also hanged. For other details see *Dihli ki Jan-kani*. pp. 66-77.

<sup>412</sup> For the wretched fate of the daughters and some relatives of Bahadur Shah, see Ja'fari, R. A., *Bahadur Shah Zafar awr unka 'Ahd* (Lahore, 1955), pp. 978-90. Smith, II, 150.

<sup>413</sup> Telegram from Lawrence to Barnes, dated 22 September 1857, *Mutiny Records*, VII, pt. II, 104.

<sup>414</sup> Telegram from General Wilson to Lawrence, dated 29 September, 1857, *Ibid.*, p. 109.

<sup>415</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 130.

<sup>416</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 135.



done on the recommendation of Saunders;<sup>417</sup> Saunders, however, denied this when he was called upon to submit an explanation.<sup>418</sup>

Nevertheless, preparations for the trial of the Emperor were started in November and the final approval of the proposal by the Government of the Company was given early in 1858.<sup>419</sup> Accordingly, on 27 January commenced the historic "trial" of Bahadur Shah before a court comprised of British military officers in the *Diwan-i-Khas*. The trial was to have commenced at 11 A.M., but considerable delay was caused owing to a last minute change in the Commission, and Bahadur Shah who had been brought in time was made to wait for an hour and a half. Perhaps this was done deliberately to insult the Emperor.<sup>420</sup> During the trial he was made to sit on "a mean charpoy" between the President of the Commission and the Judge-Advocate, his son, Prince Jawan Bakht, standing to his left. The charges having been read out to him, the Emperor was asked to give a reply to the question, "Guilty or not Guilty"? In the beginning the Emperor was unable to understand what it was all about; ultimately, however, he was persuaded to say "not Guilty." Knowing that the trial was a farce the Emperor took no interest whatsoever in its proceedings. "During the greater part of the day, the royal prisoner appeared to consider the proceedings as perfectly unimportant, and merely tiresome; and he occasionally found relief from ennui by dozing. His son appeared more animated, and laughed and chatted with his father's attendant without appearing at all embarrassed."<sup>421</sup> The Court could not tolerate this. The Prince was, therefore, ordered not to attend. The preliminary formalities having been gone through, Bahadur Shah was charged with (1) encouraging, aiding and abetting Muhammad Bakht Khan and others in the crimes of mutiny and rebellion against the State, (2) encouraging, aiding and abetting Mirza Moghul, "a subject of the British Government" and others to rebel and wage war against the State, (3) proclaiming and declaring himself King and Sovereign, "being a subject of the British Government in India," and (4) feloniously causing and becoming accessory to the murder of 49 persons at Delhi on the 16th of May 1857 within the precincts of the Palace.

Bahadur Shah's "defence"<sup>422</sup> is an interesting document; he had always regarded himself as the *de jure* Sovereign of Hind-Pakistan; as such he could not be tried by a Commission appointed by the Company; evidently it is for this reason that he thought it advisable not to open the question of the competence of the court. Of course, he knew that the sanction behind the Commission's authority was brute force, and no agency born of brute force has ever shown

<sup>417</sup> Wilson to the Chief Commissioner, dated 27 December, *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, 332.

<sup>418</sup> Saunders' explanation to the Government of India. *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, 335-36.

<sup>419</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 371.

<sup>420</sup> Zaka-Allah adds that in order to insult Bahadur Shah British soldiers had painted his caricature portraits on the walls of the Lahore Gate of the Fort. The Emperor was shown with a hanging noose round his neck. See p. 723.

<sup>421</sup> *Trial*, Introduction: p. VIII.

<sup>422</sup> *Ibid.*, 227-31.



respect to the principles of justice and equity. Under these circumstances he thought it was useless to defend his case before the Commission. He, therefore, makes no reference to the Movement or the War of Independence in his statement. The only argument which he puts forward is that he was a tool in the hands of the Revolutionaries. Forced into a position where he had to say something in his 'defence' he gave a half-hearted and brief statement referring to a few incidents only. The crafty and traitorous Ilahi Bakhsh had demoralized him by persuading him to surrender and beg for his life.<sup>423</sup> After committing the blunder of surrendering himself to the enemy instead of acting on Bakht Khan's advice to continue the struggle, Shah had no choice but to assert that he was helpless. The logic of the situation created by his unconditional surrender demanded that he should tell the court that he could not help obeying the Revolutionaries. By making this statement, however, he could not vitiate the evidence that had been collected and produced about Mian Hasan 'Askari's work<sup>424</sup> in connection with the Movement. The Judge advocate-General addressed the court,<sup>425</sup> and gave a resume of the evidence; on the *same day* (9 March 1858) the Commission delivered its findings in these words:

"The Court, on the evidence before them, are of opinion that the Prisoner Muhammad Bahadur Shah, Ex. King of Delhi, is guilty of all and every part of the charges preferred against him."<sup>426</sup>

John Lawrence, to whom the proceedings of the trial had been forwarded, wrote a lengthy minute,<sup>427</sup> to the Government of India recommending transportation of the Emperor overseas. The Government agreed, and Bahadur Shah, escorted by a strong guard, proceeded towards Calcutta. The party of the Emperor consisted of sixteen persons including two of his wives, Zinat Mahal and Taj Mahal, and his favourite and youthful son, Jawan Bakht. The Emperor wore ochre-coloured clothes, a mark of humility and renunciation of worldly pleasures.<sup>428</sup> From Calcutta he was taken to Rangoon where he lived as a prisoner till his death.<sup>429</sup> He passed his days in complete retirement and spent his time mostly in prayers; his main hobby was the composing of poems.

Bahadur Shah is regarded as one of the leading *ghazl*-writers of Urdu; he also composed other types of poems, such as songs, *thumris*, etc.<sup>430</sup> His style is

<sup>423</sup> Kaye and Malleeson, IV, 51.

<sup>424</sup> For Mian Hasan 'Askari. See *Dilli ki Saza*, p. 63.

<sup>425</sup> See *Trial*, pp. 231-55.

<sup>426</sup> See *Ibid.*, p. 255.

<sup>427</sup> *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt II, 381 *et. seq.*

<sup>428</sup> For details see Husayni, II, 454.

<sup>429</sup> He was given a paltry allowance of 600 rupees per month for the expenses of the party. Zinat Mahal had some ornaments, which were utilized by the family in their moment of distress. Husayni, II, p. 454.

Also see 'Alawari, Amir Ahmad, *Bahadur Shah Zafar* (Lucknow), pp. 160-61.

<sup>430</sup> An account of Bahadur Shah's proficiency in writing poetry may be read in any work on the history of Urdu literature. His contemporaries considered him to be one of the best poets of their age. See for example, Garcin de Tassy's *Khutbat* (Urdu version.), pp. 221-22.



simple but elegant; his poems are full of pathos and elicit feelings of sympathy and appreciation. The great scholar and lexicographer, Munshi Karim al-Din, a contemporary of Bahadur Shah, places him in the first rank of the poets of his day and says: "he composed poetry of an order which in these days none else can produce."<sup>31</sup> Besides composing *ghazals* Bahadur Shah wrote a commentary of Shaykh Sa'di's famous *Gulistan*; it is known as *Sharh Gulistan*.<sup>32</sup> In its introduction he mentions another work, *Ta'lifāt i abu Zafar* in which he discussed the uses of words and terms.<sup>33</sup> He was a good calligraphist and used to train pupils in this art.<sup>34</sup>

The Revolution had created a terror among the British and the bureaucrats were obsessed with the idea that Bahadur Shah could at any time again be made the leader of a revolt. They therefore took every care to keep him at a distance from his people. They feared that his poems which recorded his hardships and tribulations, though couched in metaphorical language, could easily stir the sympathies of the readers. Professional musicians were not allowed to recite his beautiful and highly popular songs.<sup>35</sup>

Bahadur Shah expired on 7 November 1862.<sup>36</sup> His favourite Queen, Zinat Mahal, their son Jawan Bakht, and the latter's wife and daughter were the only members of his family by his side at the time of his death which was kept a secret. He was buried in the house in which he had lived as a prisoner; Hafiz Muhammad Ibrahim, the tutor of Prince Jawan Bakht, led the prayers and supervised the burial. The only trace of his grave was a zezyphus tree which stood near its head. As the grave was not looked after and no one was allowed to visit the place it was lost in an overgrowth of the bushes.<sup>37</sup> Subsequently the guard was removed, as it was thought that the grave was lost for ever. In 1903 'Abd al-Salam Rafiqi, editor of the monthly *al-Rafiq*, became interested in repairing Bahadur Shah's grave. He drew the attention of the people to this

<sup>31</sup> Munshi Karim-al-Din was co-author with Fallon of a well-known Urdu-English Dictionary; he has produced an Urdu dictionary, *Karim al-Lughat*. Besides this, he wrote a *Tadhkirah* of Urdu poets, called *Tabaqat-al-Shu'ara*, and a short history of Hind-Pakistan, *Tawarikh i Hind*, which was published in 1863 in the Government Press, Lahore.

<sup>32</sup> The commentasy of *Gulistan* was written from the point of view of a *sufi*. Bahadur Shah was interested in Sufism from the days of his youth and his inclination towards it continued to grow with age. It was published in the *Matba' Sultani*, Delhi, in 1259 A. H.

<sup>33</sup> 'Alawi, pp. 201-02.

<sup>34</sup> See Zahir Dihlawi, p. 41 *et. seq.*

<sup>35</sup> Mazahiri, Ibrahim Ahmad, *Rangun men Bahadur Shah Zafar ke akhri ayyaam* in the daily *Dawr i Jadid*, Rangoon, 23 December, 1956.

<sup>36</sup> The chronogram of his accession to the throne was *Chiragh i Dihli, Bujha hay Chiragh i Dihli* yields the year of his death. See Alawi, p. 163.

<sup>37</sup> It is interesting that almost in a prophetic strain Bahadur Shah had composed a line about the disappearance of the traces of the grave.

ہیں مرگ قبر پر اے ظفر کوئی فاتحہ بھی کہاں پڑے

وہ جو ٹوٹی قبر کا تھا نشان اس سے ٹھوکروں سے اڑا دیا

Translation. — After death, O Zafar? where is one to offer prayers on the grave? the marks of the broken grave have been effaced by the kicks (of some one).



matter by writing an article in his magazine in the form of an appeal from Bahadur Shah himself. He also met the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma and requested him to allow him to repair his grave. The Government did not agree to it and rejected the proposal; but Rafiqi did not give up his efforts, and the Nawab of Dacca also became interested in the matter. Ultimately the grave was released to the Muslims and they were allowed to raise a structure over it. In 1932 the Nizam of Hyderabad was approached by a deputation for a donation; he refused. However, two years later a trust was set up and a tomb was constructed;<sup>438</sup> which has since then been visited by many a lover of freedom.

## THE SACK OF DELHI

### Delhi, the main centre of cultural life

Delhi's fall was much more than the end of a ruling dynasty or the loss of a capital town; with it closed one of the most important chapters in the history of our civilization. The Muslims had found the subcontinent broken politically into a number of States of different sizes and socially into countless groups and sub-groups created by the caste system of the Hindus. They had brought with themselves entirely different concepts of life: in the field of administration they had created a universal caliphal State; in social life classlessness was the aim which their Prophet had directed them to achieve.<sup>439</sup> The impact of Islam on the people of Hind-Pakistan, therefore, brought about a drastic change in their political system; in social life and religious thought also its influence was considerable. The first wave of Muslim conquests led by Muhammad b. Qasim (711 A. C.) was brought to a halt as a result of internal dissensions, and for a time the political supremacy of Islam remained confined only to a portion of the subcontinent. The conquests of Sultan Mahmud of Gaznah in the early decades of the eleventh and those of Sultan Mu'izz al-Din in the last quarter of the twelfth century brought a vast area in the north under Muslim rule.

The independent Sultanate of Delhi founded early in the thirteenth century became powerful empire in the course of a hundred years. Its capital Dehli, was in the time of Sultan 'Ala-al-Din (d. 1316 A. C.) "the envy of Baghdad and Egypt, equal in rank to Constantinople and Bayt al-Muqaddas";<sup>440</sup> it

<sup>438</sup> For details See *Rangun min Bahadur Shah Zafar ki qabr in Dawr i Jadid*, 23 December, 1956. The writer's main source of information were the articles published in *al-Rafiq* and the *Safarnamah i Barma* of Sayyid Abu Zafar Nadawi.

<sup>439</sup> See for instance the last sermon of the Prophet, known as *Khutbah Hajjat-al-Wida'* in which he refers to the social theory of Islam in these words:

لا فضل لعربي على عجمي ولا عجمي على عربي ولا احمر على اسود ولا اسود على احمر الا بالتقوى

Translation:- (An 'Arab has no superiority over an 'Ajami, nor an 'Ajami over an 'Arab; the red-coloured races have no superiority over the black ones, nor the black over the red, except for their piety.)

<sup>440</sup> Barani, *Tarikh i Firuz-Shahi* (Bibliotheca Indica, 1862) p. 341.



had a special sanctity for the people because it was the chief centre of cultural life, a seat of learning, and the abode of distinguished *shaykhs*, scholars and other leaders of the Muslims. Its development and progress as a cultural centre, was uninterrupted even during the periods when it was not the capital of the Sultanate or its successor, the Mughul Empire.<sup>441</sup>

Along with the political expansion of the Sultanate the cultural forces of Islam were also finding their way into the remotest parts of the subcontinent mostly through the efforts of the selfless *sufi shaykhs*. Under Muhammad b. Tughluq's scheme of the so-called transference of the capital to Daulatabad the atmosphere became more favourable for the expansion of Islamic culture. The Mughul Emperors were great patrons of art and literature and had created good traditions by encouraging the growth and promotion of learning; these were kept alive even in the days of the decline of the Empire. It was during this period that the cultural life of Delhi was enriched by the achievements of eminent thinkers, writers and religious leaders, like Shah Wali Allah (d. 1762), Mirza Mazhar Jan Janan (d. 1781) and Shah Fakhr al-Din, and the well-known poets Khwajah Dard (d. 1784) *Sawda* (d. 1781) and *Mir* (d. 1810). In the nineteenth century the names of Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz (d. 1823) his grandson, Shah Muhammad Ishaq (d. 1845) Shah Ghulam 'Ali (d. 1824) and Shah 'Abd al-Ghani (d. 1878) may be mentioned as the great scholars and *shaykhs* of the period; *Ghalib* (d. 1869) *Dhawq* (d. 1854), *Mumin* (d. 1851) and *Shiftah* are counted among the most famous poets of Urdu. There were numerous other scholars, *shaykhs*, poets and artists who contributed to the growth and development of the cultural life of Delhi.

It was this great centre of Islamic civilization in Hind-Pakistan which was destroyed by the revengeful soldiers of the British Army, when they entered the city. There is abundant recorded evidence left by eye-witnesses and contemporary writers to give us an idea of the devastation wrought by the British soldiers.

### Evacuation en masse

The assault of 14 September created a stir in the life of the people of Delhi, and when British forces made some headway into the city on the 17th the defenders decided to fight for every inch of ground. But with the departure of the Emperor, the people became demoralized and began to leave the city; some families were able to escape to the eastern districts across the boat-bridge on the Jamuna, but the overwhelming majority of the citizens poured forth from the Delhi Gate and moved southwards in the direction of Khwajah Qutb al-Din's *Dargah* taking shelter in the fields, the ruins of old monuments, the tombs, and other places. In their distress the evacuees had left all their wealth and belongings

<sup>441</sup> Sikandar Ludhi had shifted the capital to Agra. In the time of Shahjahan Delhi was again made the seat of Government.



except small sums of money or ornaments that they could carry along with them. Much of what they were able to take with them was robbed by the Gujarars. A large number of Hindus and some Muslims who had remained loyal to the British naturally decided not to leave their houses. The poorer sections of the people wanted to remain in the city, but they were forced out. The soldiers had orders to drag the people out of their houses and present them before Colonel Burn who was appointed military governor and held his office in the house of a merchant, Qutb al-Din. The male members of the families were forced to carry on their heads bundles containing articles which were considered essential; they were followed by their women and children weeping and crying bitterly. The Colonel ordered his men to pick up from their burdens anything that was worth plundering, and then take them to Lahore Gate and push them out of the city.<sup>442</sup>

### Indiscriminate plundering and killing

When entering the city the British soldiers shot the people indiscriminately.<sup>443</sup> The quarter of the town known as *Kuchah i Chilan* was the special object of victimisation because the houses of many old and leading Muslim families were situated in or near it. The well-known historian, Zaka Allah, also lived there. He was friendly to the British, but even he had to leave the city. He says that a European soldier had entered the house of a Muslim Nawab with the intention of committing rape, but the owner of the house resisted and wounded him. In retaliation an order was issued by the Commanding Officer that all the male persons of the *mahallah* should be massacred or captured alive. The order was brutally carried out: many were butchered within the four-walls of their houses: those who were captured alive were tied with ropes and shot on the bank of the Jamuna. Luckily two of them Wazir al-Din, a nephew of Mawlana Sahbai and Mustafa Beg, survived. According to Zahir Dihlawi the number of the residents of this *mahallah* shot by the soldiers on the bank of the river was fourteen hundred; twenty-one members of Sahbai's family were among these unfortunate victims.<sup>444</sup>

However, a large part of the population having left the city, "it fared ill indeed with those few natives who, trusting to their friendly feelings towards us or wearied out with the sufferings which they had undergone at the hands of their own countrymen, thought more of saving their houses or the remnant of their property more than lives. Few of these escaped."<sup>445</sup> Indeed, loot had begun simultaneously with the entry of British forces. Muir writes to Edmunstone that

<sup>442</sup> *Jan-Kani* p. 61; Zaka Allah, p. 702.

<sup>443</sup> John Lawrence had to write to General Penny: "No man is more ready to hang or shoot mutineers and murderers than I am, but unless we endeavour to distinguish friend from foe, we shall unite all classes against us." Smith, II, 158. Also see complaint of Umed Singh, tutor of Maharaja Holkar. *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II. 284-86; Zaka Allah, p. 705.

<sup>444</sup> *Jan-Kani*, 64; Zahir, p. 171.

<sup>445</sup> Bosworth Smith, II, 146.



there were only ten men in the Red Fort when it was stormed on 20 September. "they were all killed, and the first comers served themselves to some nice loot."

<sup>446</sup> On the following day, Griffiths reports, "not a single house or building remained intact..." and the streets of the city were "deserted and silent, they resembled a city of the dead ... It was difficult to realize that we were passing through what had been only a few days before, the abode of thousands of people."<sup>447</sup>

Keith Young briefly refers to the decorations and equipment of a house which was of course plundered.<sup>448</sup> Three days of unrestricted loot were allowed to the Army,<sup>449</sup> which meant that Bahadur Shah was treated as a belligerent, although he was later tried for treason. Nothing could be more illogical than treating Delhi as a captured city from a belligerent power and at the same time trying the Emperor as a traitor.

The soldiers took the fullest advantage of the permission to loot. "Like hounds drawing a cover, they took street by street, and, entering one deserted house after another, tapped each wall or panel with the delicate touch of an artist, poured water over the floors, observing where it sank through fastest, and then, as though they had been gifted with the eye of an eagle, the ear of the Red Indian, or the nose of the bloodhound, cut their way straight through to the cranny or the cupboard, or the under ground jars which contained the savings of a lifetime or of generations. Happily it was a city of the dead which they were plundering." These remarks of Bosworth Smith refer to "the Sikhs and other Punjabi races;" by implication he suggests that the Hind-Pakistani soldiers of the British Army were the greatest looters. The truth, however, is that all sections of the Army indulged in looting and killing. Griffiths writes: "To my certain knowledge, also many soldiers of the English regiments got possession of jewelry and gold ornaments taken from the bodies of the slain sepoy and city inhabitants, and I was shown by men of my regiment strings of pearls and gold mohurs which had fallen into their hands."<sup>450</sup>

An idea of the destruction wrought by the British forces in three days of unrestricted loot can be formed by the condition of the city as Lord Roberts saw

<sup>446</sup> *Intelligence Records*, I, 125.

<sup>447</sup> Griffiths, C. J. *Narrative of the Siege of Delhi* (London, 1910), p. 199.

<sup>448</sup> On 19 September he writes to his wife, "... there are lots of spare houses. The one where the Rifles are is one of the best houses I have seen in India, and the very largest; the whole of the regiment is there, officers and men, and there are dozens of rooms still unoccupied. The house is beautifully furnished-chandeliers, large mirrors, couches etc. Most of the mirrors were smashed by our troops, ... when we first came in; it was great pity, but there is no preventing the men committing all kinds of devastation. I was amused when I went over the house (it belongs to a native noble Ahmed Alle Khan) to see most of the men of the Rifles lying on nice Mirzapore carpets. The Prize Agents will however, take possession of all these in time..." Young, pp. 297-98.

<sup>449</sup> Bosworth Smith defend this loot in these words..."if three days for looting had not been allowed them by the authorities, they would, probably, have taken it to themselves." See vol. II, 146-147. This is an argument which can satisfy but very few peoples.

<sup>450</sup> Griffiths, p. 232.



it on the morning of 24 September. "Our way from the Lahore Gate by the Chandni Chawk," he writes, "led through a veritable city of the dead; not a sound was to be heard but the falling of our own footsteps; not a living creature was to be seen. Dead bodies were strewn about in all directions, in every attitude that the death struggle had caused them to assume, and in every stage of decomposition. We marched in silence, or involuntarily spoke in whispers, as though fearing to disturb those ghastly remains of humanity. The sights we encountered were horrible and sickening to the last degree. Here a dog gnawed at an uncovered limb; there a vulture, disturbed by our approach from its loathsome meal, but too completely gorged to fly, fluttered away to a safer distance. In many instances the position of the bodies were appallingly life-like. Some lay with their arms uplifted as if beckoning, and, indeed, the whole scene was weird and terrible beyond description. Our horses seemed to feel the horror of it as much as we did; for they shook and snorted in evident terror."<sup>451</sup>

### Prize Agents

After three days, plundering assumed a different shape; the Prize Agents appointed by the Government started their work and carried it out with vengeance. A plan to plunder the city through these Agents had been formed even before the assault;<sup>452</sup> in any case they had been appointed earlier than 19 September.<sup>453</sup> They followed no laws and had no checks on their activities. Colonel Pelham Burn, Military Governor of Delhi, was ultimately forced to write to John Lawrence about their misconduct.<sup>454</sup> In spite of the appointment of the Prize Agents, private plundering continued. Neither the Prize Agents nor private plundering parties showed any regard to the conduct of their victims during the siege. The Military Governor appealed to Major-General Penny to lay down defined rules regarding the collection of loot; he suggested that the matter should be referred to John Lawrence.<sup>455</sup> The latter wrote to the Governor-General-in-Council, but pending a final decision he authorized Penny to restrain the Prize Agents and keep them "within such bounds as may appear to you just and reasonable;" he also added that "the property of bankers and others who took no active part in the rebellion" was not to be touched.<sup>456</sup> The Company's Government issued orders in the last week of November; in compliance with this notification the Prize Agents were withdrawn by an order of General Penny,

<sup>451</sup> Roberts, I, 258-59.

<sup>452</sup> Young, p. 263.

<sup>453</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 298.

<sup>454</sup> Lieutenant-Colonel Burn to Major-General N. Penny. Commander, Delhi Field Force, dated 18 October 1857. See *Mutiny Records*, VII, part II, p. 272.

<sup>455</sup> *Ibid.* p. 274.

<sup>456</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 276.



dated 15 December, which said that "search for, and appropriation, of private property in the city of Delhi shall cease from this date."<sup>457</sup>

The value of the property seized by the plundering soldiery and the Prize Agents must have been enormous; most of the loot, however, seems to have gone into the coffers of individuals. Officially, "not more than fifteen lakhs of rupees have been, or will be realized by the Prize Agents," although "we found that almost every thing of any value, with the exception of the ex-King's jewels and those of Begum Zeenut Mahul, had been disposed of by public auction."<sup>458</sup> Obviously the soldiers and Prize Agents robbed the Government of its share of loot on a large scale. The Crown jewels seized by the Army were also to be treated as prize money.<sup>459</sup>

### **Destruction of buildings, bazaar and cultural institutions etc.**

It is not easy to assess the extent of devastation caused by this unrestricted plunder by the British soldiers and the Prize Agents: Delhi was reduced to a third rate town with nothing of distinction left in it, except old monuments which it would have benefited no one to demolish. However, there is sufficient contemporary evidence to form an idea of the destruction of houses, uprooting of families and conversion of prosperous quarters of the city into wildernesses. The pages, of Mawlawi Zaka-Allah's *Tarikh i 'Uruj i Inglisbiyah*, Ghulam Husayn's *Nusratnamah* and Ghalib's letters besides some other contemporary works contain horrifying details and make dismal reading.<sup>460</sup> A few references to the fate of some of the well-known buildings and sites may be made. The more enthusiastic among the British officers wanted the city to be completely destroyed and all its buildings razed to the ground; some were anxious to see the *Jami' Masjid* converted into a church. It was, however, given

<sup>457</sup> Field Force order dated 15 December 1857. *Ibid.*, p. 281.

<sup>458</sup> Military Governor of Delhi to the Chief Commissioner. *Ibid.*, 289-90. It may be of some interest to add that in his complaint Umed Singh who was, to quote his own words, one of the old servants and partisans of the English gives some details about his own house. He says: "The gates of the city were shut, ingress and egress was by a ticket, and the digging of the best houses for hidden and buried property commenced. Three officers with a few builders are said to have come to my once grand house, and having demolished it, are said to have carried I don't know what ! Our property in cash, gold and jewels, silver vessels, shawls and furniture, alone was never less—it might be more—than two lacs. I have got a list of it all." *Mutiny Records*, VII, part II, p. 285.

Muir wrote to Sherer on 31 October; "The plunder daily being found in the city is more than enormous; it is almost incredible". *Intelligence Records*, I, p. 239.

<sup>459</sup> The decision of the Governor-General was communicated to the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab in a letter dated Allahabad, 20 March 1858. *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, p. 298. Even Hindu temples did not escape plunder and desecration. For a graphic account of the desecration of a "hideous idol" and the plundering of a temple by British officers, see Griffiths, pp. 245-46.

<sup>460</sup> It may be noted that these writers were pro-British and are extremely cautious in their statements.



over to the Army and "the Punjab Rifles were quartered" in it.<sup>461</sup> The Red Fort was the chief centre of opposition; it is not surprising therefore that some officers insisted on the total destruction.<sup>462</sup> Lawrence was against all such proposals, and refused to accept them. Despite his orders however some houses were burnt to ashes.<sup>463</sup> Among the buildings and bazaars demolished by the orders of the British authorities Chawk Sa'd-Allah Khan (an extremely beautiful quarter adjacent to the Delhi Gate of the Fort), Urdu bazaar, Khanam ka bazaar, Khan Dawran ki Haweli and Anguri Bagh may be mentioned; most of the houses and shops from the *Jami' Masjid* to the Rajghat Gate and from Calcutta Gate to Lahore Gate were either completely or partially destroyed. Within the Fort also a number of buildings and apartments were demolished. *Ghalib* says that the builder of the city would not have taken so much care to raise the structures as the Rulers of the day took in razing them to the ground. Most of the buildings inside the Fort and some in the city were so strong that axes and spades were broken; inside the Palace, mines of powder had to be laid and exploded.<sup>464</sup>

### Executions

Of the persons who were killed by the soldiers of the British Army or executed under orders of the authorities no estimate can possibly be made. Kamal al-Din Haydar whose sympathies are with the British puts the figure of executions of the Muslims at twenty-seven thousand. He adds: "general massacre lasted for seven days, it is not known how many people were butchered ... even children were massacred and it is not possible to describe how the women were treated."<sup>465</sup> In any case, the judicial machinery set up by the Government acted in a most irresponsible manner.<sup>466</sup> A Military Commission was appointed to try persons accused of rebellion; their sentences were executed by a Provost-Marshal. "Offenders," wrote a dispassionate author, "who were seized were handed over to a Military Commission to be tried. The work went on with

<sup>461</sup> Griffiths, p. 207.

<sup>462</sup> Bosworth Smith, II, 149.

<sup>463</sup> Mawlana Zaka-Allah refers to such incidents in an interesting manner. He says that "if a house caught fire for some reason no effort was made to extinguish it." p. 710.

<sup>464</sup> *Ghalib to Shafaq*. See Ikram, S. M., *Hayat i Ghalib* (Lahore), p. 156.

<sup>465</sup> Husayni, II, 454. In any case "for a long period after the capture of Delhi," says Griffiths, "executions by hanging were of common occurrence in the city, and the hands of the old provost-sergeant were full. Disguised sepoy and inhabitants taken with arms in their possession had short shrift, and were at once consigned to the gallows, a batch of ten one day suffering death opposite the Kotwali." See Griffiths, *op. cit.* 213-14.

<sup>466</sup> Bosworth Smith refers to this in these words: "What wonder, that many individuals, seeing the reckless manner in which powers of life and death had been granted to men, some at least of whom were likely to use them in anything but a judicial spirit, claimed and put into exercise the same terrible right for themselves; that there was a very carnival of revenge, and that deeds were done, of which those who were compelled to witness them speak, even now, with bated breath?" See vol. II, 154.



celerity. Death was almost the only punishment and condemnation almost the only issue of a trial.<sup>467</sup>

The executions were carried out in the main street of the city, the Chandni Chawk, in front of the Kotwali. A four square gallows was erected here, it soon became "a fashionable lounge" for the English officers who wanted to enjoy the sight. They sat on chairs arranged in front of a shop to witness the horrid scenes of "the death agonies of the men who dangled in groups from all four cross-beams at once, and whose bodies were soon deftly dropped, one on the top of another, into a cart beneath, to make room for fresh victims."<sup>468</sup> The Commission did not bother about the evidence against the accused: if he looked like a soldier, that was enough.<sup>469</sup> In another case an innocent person was hanged because he bore the name of a 'rebel'.<sup>470</sup>

### Delhi Agency Estates

Under the Delhi Agency there were seven estates—Jhajjar, Farrukhnagar, Ballabgarh, Loharu, Dujana and Pataudi. The Chiefs of the last two estates remained loyal to the British.<sup>471</sup> Raja Nahar Singh of Ballabgarh supported the Revolutionary Government and faithfully obeyed the instructions issued to him in connection with the maintenance of peace and order, recruitment of forces and collection of funds for the War. Mu'in al-Din says that he was virtually the governor of the city during the period of the siege. He was executed on 7 January, 1858.<sup>472</sup> Ahmad 'Ali Khan Biluch, the Chief of Farrukhnagar, was a supporter of the Revolution; he had to pay for it with his life and was hanged in Delhi.<sup>473</sup> Nawab 'Abd al-Rahman Khan of Jhajjar also supported the Revolution, but on occasions his attitude became wavering. His father-in-law, 'Abd al-Samad Khan was, however, an active leader of the Revolutionaries. He had managed to escape along with Bakht Khan, but his son-in-law was sentenced to death and hanged on 23 December, 1857, in spite of his cautious attitude towards the Revolution.<sup>474</sup> It is stated that the mother of the Nawab reached the place where

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 153 n.

<sup>8</sup> Bosworth Smith II, 145.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> Jafri, Rais Ahmad, *Bahadur Shah aur unka 'ahd* (Lahore, 1955) p. 1092.

<sup>11</sup> Husayni, II, 456-57, also see *Jan-Kani*, p. 72.

<sup>12</sup> *Trial*, pp. 4961; Husayni, II, 456-57. Lawrence wrote to Saunders that he had heard "a rumour that the Bullubgarh Raja is half-witted. If this be the case the Commission should be duly informed; we should not hang beings who are not able to take care of themselves". The Commission, however, thought that he was perfectly sane and sentenced him to death. See Bosworth Smith, II, 156; *T.N.N.*, p. 73.

<sup>13</sup> *Saza*, p. 64; *Jan-Kani*, p. 72; *Husayni*, II, 456-57.

<sup>14</sup> Metcalfe claimed to be a personal friend of Nawab 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. When Delhi was seized by the Revolutionaries, Metcalfe managed to escape from there and made his way to Jhajjar, but "the town was in a condition of great excitement." The Nawab therefore advised Metcalfe not to stay there and sent him a sum of one hundred rupees. Metcalfe succeeded in reaching Skinner's house. It is strange that Metcalfe did nothing to save his erstwhile friend



his son was hanged, and embracing his dead body she began to weep bitterly. This pitiable scene moved the onlookers, many of whom had tears in their eyes. Bahadur Jang Khan of Bahadurgarh had remained inactive; even as such he was not spared; his entire estate was confiscated.<sup>475</sup> The Chiefs of Loharu, Amin al-Din Khan and Dia al-Din Khan were not active Revolutionaries, although they were in sympathy with the Movement and were among the courtiers and advisers of Bahadur Shah. On the fall of Delhi they managed to escape with their families and, according to *Ghalib*, they had three elephants, forty horses and other paraphernalia with them. When they were staying at Mihrauli, twelve miles from Delhi, plundering parties of the soldiers robbed them of every thing except the clothes on their bodies.<sup>476</sup> Reduced to a state of destitution they resumed their journey to Loharu; on the way they were invited by the Nawab of Dujana to accept his hospitality. When Saunders, the Commissioner of Delhi, came to know of it, he asked the Nawab to surrender them. They were surrendered,<sup>477</sup> and were imprisoned in the Fort. Later they had to face a trial, but were ultimately released; they had to pay, however, a sum of six lakhs of rupees as ransom.<sup>478</sup>

### Notables

Besides the Mughul Princes and Chiefs of the Estates in the Delhi Agency a large number of leading persons were hanged or shot by the authorities. In the ghastly tragedy of the *Kuchah i Chilan*, already mentioned, the great scholar-poet *Sahbai* was killed; he was innocent and had not played an active role in the Revolution.<sup>479</sup> Muzaffar al-Dawlah was a well-to-do person who had no interest in politics; he was sentenced to death because the envoy of Lucknow to the Court of Bahadur Shah was his friend and had stayed with him.<sup>480</sup> Amir Mirza, the father-in-law of the author of *Dastan i Ghaadr*, had given protection to some Christian women. After the fall of the city a number of Muslim families took shelter in his house in the hope that some consideration would be shown to him for having protected the Christians, but the plundering parties of British soldiers came to his house, one after the other, and looted his property until

from the gallows. *T. N. N.*, p. 243; *Mutiny Records*, VIII, part II. 376. *Intelligence Records* I, 319.

<sup>475</sup> Husayni, II, 457.

<sup>476</sup> *Dastanbu*, p. 399.

<sup>477</sup> Lawrence to the Governor-General dated 20 October, 1857 in *Mutiny Records* VII, Pt. II, 189; also see *Jan-Kani*, p. 72.

<sup>478</sup> Husayni, II, p. 457.

<sup>479</sup> The well-known poet *Azurdah* refers to *Sahbai*'s murder in the following couplet:

کیوں کر آزرده کل جائے نہ سودائی ہو  
قتل اس طرح سے ہے جرم جو صہبائی ہو

*Translation*:— How is it possible for *Azurdah* not to go into exile and become insane, when an innocent man like *Sahbai* is murdered so (mercilessly).

<sup>480</sup> Husayni, II.



Nothing of valuables was left there. One morning two British soldiers came to him and asked him to surrender his wealth. Amir Mirza said he had none left with him; instantly he was shot dead.<sup>481</sup> Nawab Akbar was hanged merely on suspicion;<sup>482</sup> Nawab Mir Khan, *jagirdar* of Palwal, was executed because he used to pay visits to one of the Princes.<sup>483</sup> Nizam al-Din Khan, son of Hakim Sharaf al-Din Khan, and Khalifah Isma'il, son of the famous poet, *Zawq*, were arrested and hanged, although they were absolutely innocent.<sup>484</sup> Mawlawi Muhammad Baqir, the father of the famous Urdu writer, *Azad*, was not an active revolutionary; on the contrary he had tried to save the life of Taylor, Principal of the Delhi College by keeping him in his house. When the Revolutionaries came to know of it, they attacked the house of the Mawlawi. Taylor had left his place; but he was later captured and put to death. Mawlawi Muhammad Baqir was executed, because he could not save Taylor's life.<sup>485</sup> Neither age nor proficiency in fine arts and learning could save innocent people from the gallows. Sayyid Ahmad Mian *Mir Panjah-Kash* was the best calligraphist of his time and had gained wide reputation for his excellent hand; paradoxically enough he was also expert in the art of *panjah-kashi* for which extra strong fingers are needed; he is an old man of ninety-five. None of these considerations could save him because he was associated with the *Darbar* of Bahadur Shah.<sup>486</sup> Besides these, many cases of a number of scholars and leading persons have been mentioned by contemporary writers.<sup>487</sup>

### Libraries, khanqahs and madrasahs destroyed

The story of the sack of Delhi would remain incomplete if a reference, however brief, is not made to the destruction of libraries, *khanqahs*, colleges and other cultural institutions of the city. Foremost among the collections of rare and useful books was the Imperial Library. Most of the Mughul Emperors were interested in learning, and some of them patronized art. Akbar had left a large collection having 24,000 volumes,<sup>488</sup> to which additions must have been made by his illustrious successors.

Mufti Sadr al-Din *Azurdah* was one of the top-ranking scholars of the seventeenth century; he was a pupil of Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz, and was widely respected for his learning and piety. For about twenty-five years he had served

<sup>481</sup> Zahir Dihlawi, pp. 168-69.

<sup>482</sup> *Saza*, p. 52.

<sup>483</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>484</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 58.

<sup>485</sup> It has been stated that Taylor had given to the Mawlawi a packet containing some papers with a request that they should be handed over to some European officer. The Mawlawi agreed and did it; Taylor had written on one of the papers that if the Mawlawi had so desired he could have saved his life.

<sup>486</sup> *Saza*, p. 55.

<sup>487</sup> See, for instance, *Ghadr ki Subh wa Sham*, pp. 86-89.

<sup>488</sup> See Smith, V.A., *Akbar, the Great Mogul* (Reprint, Delhi, 1958), pp. 307-08.



the East India Company as the *Sadr al-Sudur* of Delhi. During the Revolution he was associated with the Emperor's Court and was one of the signatories of the famous *fatwa* of *jihad*. He was arrested by the British Government and kept in custody. Subsequently he was released,<sup>489</sup> but his extensive property and collection of books were confiscated.<sup>490</sup> He was reduced to such a state of poverty that from his death-bed he had to make a appeal to the Ruler of Rampur for a stipend for his wife.<sup>491</sup>

Nawab Diya al-Din Ahmad Khan was the son of Ahmad Bakhsh, Chief of Loharu. He wrote poetry in Persian and Urdu with *Rakhshan* and *Nayyar* respectively as his pseudonyms. He was greatly interested in collecting books. *Ghalib* refers to him as a brother, mentions his collection frequently and laments its loss in these words: "the library which, I fear to say, was worth twenty thousand rupees, has been plundered". Diya al-Din had a good collection of historical works, and the British historian Elliot had received considerable help from him in compiling his well-known History of Hind-Pakistan. Along with Diya al-Din's library *Ghalib* mentions the collection of Nazir Husayn Mirza: the houses of both were swept clean of their belongings.<sup>492</sup> Shah Wali-Allah had left a good library; in the time of his son, Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz, considerable additions were made, and it had become the largest collection of books on religious learning in Delhi. Similarly the libraries of the descendants of Shaykh 'Abd al-Haqq and Khwajah Mir *Dard* were among the good private collections of Delhi.<sup>493</sup>

Some of the well-known *khanqahs* and colleges were also destroyed. Between the Red Fort and the *Jami' Masjid* stood the *khanqah* of Shah Kalim Allah Jahanabadi (d. 1729); it had become a regular colony where most of his descendants lived. "God only knows," writes *Ghalib*, "where have the residents of this locality gone, if they ever survived the bullet; they had some relics of the great shaykh." An eminent scholar as the Shaykh was, his relics must have included rare manuscripts. The *khanqah* was razed to the ground, his grave, which stands even today, alone escaping destruction.<sup>494</sup> Another leading *khanqah* destroyed in the holocaust was that of Mirza Mazhar Jan Janan.

<sup>489</sup> With his signature of the *fatwa* he had written the words مالحر (without dots or diacritical marks). This can have two different readings according to the position of dots: بالخير (*bil Khayr*) which means "with a good end", and بالجبر (under compulsion). The Mufti stated that he had written بالجبر (*bil jabr*) and had the same in his mind while other people thought it was *bil khayr*. He was acquitted by the Court. If this story is correct and if he had written *bil jabr* avoiding the dots deliberately the Mufti can not be given much credit for his courage of conviction. See Sherwani, M. 'Abd al-Shahid Khan, *Baghi Hindustan*. (Bijnor, 1947), p. 171.

<sup>490</sup> *Jilami*, Faqir Muhammad, *Hadaiq al-Hanafiyah* p. 482.

<sup>491</sup> *Kilasiki Adab*, quoted in Ja'fari, *Bahadur Shah Zafar*, p. 349.

<sup>492</sup> Ikram, p. 160.

<sup>493</sup> Ikram, p. 160.

<sup>494</sup> Nizami, Khaliq Ahmad, *Tarikh i Masha'ikh i Chisht*, p. 422; also see letter of *Ghalib* to Hakim Sayyid Ahmad Hasan Mawdudi in Mihr Ghulam Rasul, *Khutut i Ghalib*, (Lahore), II, 138.



Of the numerous mosques that were either demolished or suffered at the hands of the retaliators only a few may be mentioned; besides their sanctity as houses of worship some of them were excellent monuments showing the development of Muslim architecture. The *Akbarabadi Masjid* which is now covered by the lawns of the Edward Park was, in the words of Syed Ahmad Khan, "a mosque, attractive, heart-ravishing, delightful and life-giving;" it was a prominent building of Shah Jahan's Delhi. It was built by a wife of the Emperor, who was known as *Akbarabadi Mahal*. It was built of red stone and had a marble *pish-taq*. Around the mosque were rows of cubicles (*thughahs*) for the students who lived there. Shah Wali-Allah's two sons, Shah 'Abd al-Qadir (d. 1814) and Shah Rafi' al-Din (d. 1817) used to lecture to their pupils in this mosque. A market known as the *Urdu Bazar* lay between the *Akbarabadi Masjid* and the Lahore Gate of the Fort. It was demolished under orders of the British authorities.<sup>495</sup>

The *Zinat al-Masajid*, second only to the *Jami' Masjid* in grandeur and size, was built by 'Alamgir's younger daughter, Zinat al-Nisa.<sup>496</sup> It was seized by the British Government and placed at the disposal of the Army. Some parts of the beautiful edifice were demolished including the tomb of Princess Zinat al-Nisa, which was attached to its court-yard; it was further defaced by the construction of ugly walls which were removed during the viceroyalty of Lord Curzon.<sup>497</sup>

### The Jami' Masjid

The *Jami' Masjid* of Shah Jahan, one of the prettiest mosques of the world and a fine specimen of Muslim architecture in this land, was, since its construction, looked upon as a place of special interest and sanctity. During the Revolutionary regime, as has been stated previously, it had played a vital role; it was in this mosque that the *fatwa* of *jihad* was proclaimed. The British soldiers and officers were full of fury against it because it had defied their attacks; they wanted it to be demolished or as an alternative converted into a church. "Others," says Bosworth, "in the still worse spirit of religious savagery, urged that the Jumma musjid, one of the noblest Muslim buildings in the world, should be destroyed, or, at least, that the cross should be planted on its summit and that it should be turned bodily into a Christian church."<sup>498</sup> This was considered impolitic, but the revenge of the victor took another form; the mosque was placed at the disposal of the Sikh soldiers to be used as barracks. Zaka-Allah writes: "The *Jami' Masjid* was desecrated in this way that it was used as barracks for the

<sup>495</sup> Khan Syed Ahmed, *Athar al-Sanadid* (ed. S. Moin ul Haq, Karachi, 1966), p. 178, Bashir al-Din, *op. cit.*, II, 140-42.

<sup>496</sup> For a detailed description of the mosque before the Revolution see *Athar*, p. 180 and Bashir al-Din, II, 127-32.

<sup>497</sup> Bashir al-Din, II, p. 131.

For the desecration and demolition of other mosques see Ja'fari, pp. 1013-20.

<sup>498</sup> Bosworth Smith, *op. cit.*, II, 149.



Sikh soldiers; no effort was made to avoid using (parts of) it as lavatories and urinals; pigs were slaughtered and their flesh was cooked within its precincts.<sup>499</sup> Subsequently the Sikh soldiers were ordered to vacate the mosque, but it was locked up, and the Muslims were not allowed to use it as a house of worship. It is not easy to realize the intensity of their grief at being deprived of the right of praying in the great mosque.<sup>500</sup> After four years the Government released the mosque but laid down a number of conditions with regard to the offering of prayers by the Muslims. They were to leave the mosque immediately after prayers; non-Muslims could enter it, and sentries were to be posted at its gates. The Managing Committee had to give an undertaking that in case any thing was done in the mosque against the wishes of the Government it would have the right of locking it up.<sup>501</sup>

The details of the acts of vandalism, ruthless killings and "indiscriminate judicial murders,"<sup>502</sup> committed by the British soldiery in Delhi could not have been known in other areas in their full enormity. Within a week of the entry of British forces the city had become "a fearful picture of desolation; the retribution has indeed been awful".<sup>503</sup> However, on the basis of the limited information which reached Lahore the chief Commisioner thought it necessary to give a warning to the authorities concerned. On 23 October he wrote to Saunders: "It is too bad, the way that the troops are allowed to plunder."<sup>504</sup> It appears that plundering continued even after the final withdrawal of the Prize Agents in December, 1857. Late in February in the following year Lawrence visited Delhi and found that "the work of plunder and bloodshed was still going on. The people . . . were still being arrested in large numbers, and many of them hanged or put in irons."<sup>505</sup> When he thought he had put a final stop to these things he left Delhi; but he had to return because he learnt that a prisoner had been executed in defiance of his orders. He condemned the action in "a severe despatch." The Magistrate of the city requested him to modify some strong of his expressions. "No," replied Lawrence, "there is not a word of it I will alter. It is not half strong enough."<sup>506</sup> Besides Lawrence some other British officers also thought that their countrymen had been doing shameless things. "I have heard", wrote Lord Elphinstone to Lawrence on 25 November, "some very painful accounts of the

<sup>499</sup> Zaka-Allah, p. 716. Also see previous references.

<sup>500</sup> The poet Qurban 'Ali Beg *Salik* refers to the feelings of the Muslims in the following line:

نماز ہے نہ ادا ہے نہ کوئی جاتا ہے  
جب اس کو دیکھے خالی تو جی بھرا آتا ہے

(Neither the prayers are offered, nor is the *adhan* called there; when one sees it empty one's heart is touched with pity). See Ja'fri, p. 1131.

<sup>501</sup> Ja'fri, p. 1011.

<sup>502</sup> For Canning's comments on the "acts of tyranny, cruelty, and injustice of the most brutal and horrible nature," see Bosworth Smith, II, 164.

<sup>503</sup> Muir to Edmonstone, referring to Saunders' account. *Intelligence Records*, I, 124.

<sup>504</sup> Bosworth Smith, II, 155.

<sup>505</sup> Bosworth Smith, II, pp. 159-60.

<sup>506</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 160.



doings of our troops at Delhi since the place has been taken. Friend and foe are treated alike. The pillage has been more complete than even that of Nadir Shah".<sup>507</sup> In comparing British vandalism with Nadir Shah's sack of Delhi, Elphinstone has not taken all factors into consideration: Nadir Shah's massacre lasted for seven hours (8. A. M. to 3. P. M.)<sup>508</sup> only, while British killings continued for months; Nadir Shah collected his booty from the rich citizens, but the British Army made no distinction between the rich and the poor, and most of the wealth plundered by them went to the coffers of the individuals.<sup>509</sup>

Canning was deeply affected by the horrors of British vandalism in Delhi, and in a letter addressed to the Queen he attributed it to the "rabid and indiscriminate vindictiveness . . . even amongst men who ought to set a better example". The Queen shared his "feelings of sorrow and indignation," but most of the English people did not; in fact she lamented the "unchristian spirit shown . . . here by the public towards India in general, and towards Sepoys without discrimination".<sup>510</sup> In England a section of the press condemned the Governor-General's "action"; he was called Clemency Canning out of mockery.

The citizens of Delhi had been driven out and were lying in shelterless places in the neighbourhood of the city, chiefly in the Qutb and Nizam al-Din areas. Dr. Farquhar reported, in December 1857, that they were still lying there exposed to the rigours of the cold weather and winter rains. This is corroborated by *Ghalib* who writes in a letter, dated 5 December, to Har Gopal: "You can not find in this city a Muslim, however much you search for one."<sup>511</sup> Early in the following year (January 1858) the Hindus were allowed to return, and it was not until July that the courts reopened.<sup>512</sup>

(in: *The Great Revolution of 1857*. By Syed Moinul Haq. Karachi 1968, pp. 96-247)

<sup>507</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 162.

<sup>508</sup> Fraser, James *The History of Nadir Shah* (Second edition, London, 1742), p. 185.

<sup>509</sup> The number of persons massacred by Nadir's men has been given as 8000 by one historian and 30000 by another. Against these figures the 27000 executions (mentioned in *Qaysar al Tawarikh*) besides individual killings in the streets make horrible record. On 25 October the wife of the Commissioner of Delhi wrote, "every native that could be found was killed by the soldiers, women and children were spared". Quoted in Spear, *Twilight of the Mughuls* (Cornbridge, 1951) p. 218.

<sup>510</sup> For relevant quotations from the letters see Bosworth Smith, II, 162-63.

<sup>511</sup> *Mihr*, p. 134.

<sup>512</sup> Spear, (p. 220) on the authority of the *Delhi Settlement Report* of 1862.







# THE GREAT REBELLION

## I. INTRODUCTION

The Indian Mutiny<sup>1</sup> has been a popular subject with historians, both British and Indian. British historians have been inclined to dismiss it as a "sepoy mutiny"<sup>2</sup> that was "wholly unpatriotic and selfish. . . with no native leadership and no popular support."<sup>3</sup> Some Indian writers, on the other hand, have glorified it as a "War of Independence"<sup>4</sup> in which people rose *en masse*, gave no quarter to the Firinghis<sup>5</sup> and fought to the bitter end. While describing the British characterization as a result of imperial arrogance, it would be as well to bear in mind that the Indian interpretation is a product of uncritical nationalism. Both the views are extreme, and suspiciously convenient to their protagonists' interests.

The British view is too facile; it fails to explain how it was that "in the course of ten days English administration in Oudh vanished like a dream, and not left a wrack behind,"<sup>6</sup> nor why "at several places the populace rose before the sepoys at those stations mutinied."<sup>7</sup> Moreover, if it was a purely military insurrection, why was it deemed "necessary to punish the country people and citizens by fine and hanging for complicity in acts with which they of their own accord had nothing to do"<sup>8</sup> and why did Lord Canning always "judge much more harshly those of the civil population who had been led to acts of rebellion" than the rebellious sepoys?<sup>9</sup> Why did the discovery of a plan to murder all Europeans

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<sup>1</sup> The word "Mutiny" is used because of the currency it has gained. I do not regard this event as "Mutiny." —T.K.

<sup>2</sup> Sir John William Kaye, Col. G. B. Malleson and a host of other British writers have written books about the rebellion of 1857 under this title.

<sup>3</sup> Sir John Seeley, quoted by Asoka Mehta, *The Great Rebellion*, (1946), p. 39.

<sup>4</sup> V. D. Savarkar, *India's War of Independence*, (1946).

<sup>5</sup> English people.

<sup>6</sup> G. W. Forrest, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, (1904), vol. I, p. 217.

<sup>7</sup> *Oxford History of India*, p. 722.

<sup>8</sup> Sir W. H. Russell, *My Diary in India in the Year 1858-59*, (1860), vol. II, p. 259.

<sup>9</sup> Sir George Campbell, *Memoirs of My Indian Career*, (1893), vol. I, p. 283.

Lord Ellenborough observed in British Parliament on February 16, 1858, as follows: ". . . though our historians are so fond of asserting that the Mutiny was. . . purely a sedition, our action in hanging many thousands of citizens after travesties of trial or none at all, and burning villages of friends as well as foes, with any race but Indian, would have turned the Mutiny in a



at Nagpur synchronize with mutiny at Aurangabad,<sup>10</sup> and why did "the revolt burst with the suddenness of an eastern tempest" and "in thousands of square miles overthrow and scatter to the winds the Company's administration which had seemed secure against any shock?"<sup>11</sup>

How widespread the revolt was will become clear from the following descriptions given by the Reverend Alexander Duff, Charles Ball, and even Sir John William Kaye and Colonel G. B. Malleeson, who otherwise termed it a "sepoy mutiny." According to Duff, "Never has the enemy been met without being routed, scattered, and his guns taken, but though constantly beaten he ever more rallies, and appears again ready for a fresh encounter. No sooner is one city taken or another relieved than some other one is threatened....No sooner is one district pronounced safe through the influx of British troops, than another is disturbed and convulsed. No sooner is a highway opened between places of importance, than it is again closed and all communications are for a year cut off. No sooner are the mutineers and rebels scoured out of one locality than they reappear, with double or treble forces, in another. No sooner does a mobile column force its way through hostile ranks, than they reoccupy the territory behind it. All gaps in the number of foes seem to be instantaneously filled up and no permanent clearance or impression appears anywhere to be made. The passage of our brave little armies through these swarming myriads instead of leaving deep traces of a mighty ploughshare through a roughened field seems more to resemble that of an eagle through the elastic air, or stately vessel through the unfurrowed ocean."<sup>12</sup> Another British historian, Charles Ball, describes the popularity of the revolt thus: "In Oudh, the rebels could march without commissariat, for the people would always feed them. They could leave their luggage without guard because the people would not attack it. They were always certain of their position and that of the British, for, the people brought them hourly information. And no design could possibly be kept from them while secret sympathizers stood round every mess table and waited in almost every tent in the British Camp....No surprise could be effected except by a miracle, while rumours communicated from mouth outstripped even our cavalry."<sup>13</sup> Kaye admits that in the areas between the rivers Ganges and Jamuna "there was scarcely a man of either faith who was not arrayed against us."<sup>14</sup> Malleeson also states that in four northern provinces—Oudh, Rohilkhand, Bundelkhand, and Saugar and Narbada—"the great bulk of the people rose against the British rule."<sup>15</sup> "Oudh

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general rising of the population." Quoted by Edward Thompson, *The Other Side of the Medal* (1930), p. 107.

<sup>10</sup> Thomas Lowe, *Central India During the Rebellion of 1857 and 1858*, (1860), p. 24.

<sup>11</sup> Sir G. O. Trevelyan, *The Competition Wallah*, (1860), p. 49.

<sup>12</sup> Reverend Dr. Alexander Duff, *The Indian Rebellion, Its Causes and Results in a Series of Letters*, (1858), p. 233.

<sup>13</sup> Charles Ball, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, (No Date), vol. III, p. 572.

<sup>14</sup> Kaye, *A History of the Sepoy War in India*, (4th ed. 1878), vol. II, p. 195.

<sup>15</sup> Malleeson, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, (1880), vol. III, p. 487.



has been," admitted the Reverend Cave-Browne, "the focus of a rebellion, deeper and more desperate, because it was essentially popular..."<sup>16</sup> Even in the Punjab, where no revolt took place, "the whole native community from the moneyed banker to the petty tradesman, from the government contractor to the common coolie stood aloof: no help, no supplies were forthcoming," till Delhi fell in the middle of September, 1857.<sup>17</sup> According to Thomas Lowe, "the infanticide Rajput, the bigoted Brahmin, the fanatic Mussalman, and the luxury-loving, fat paunched, ambitious Mahratta—had joined together in the cause; cow-killer, and the cow-worshipper, the pig-hater and the pig-eater, the crier of Allah is One and Muhammed is His Prophet and the mumblor of the mysteries of Brahm," had revolted conjointly.<sup>18</sup> "It is beyond doubt," writes R. C. Dutt, "that political reasons helped a mere mutiny of soldiers to spread among large classes of the people in Northern and Central India, and converted it into a political insurrection."<sup>19</sup> In short, the oft-voiced assertion of British historians that the rebellion of 1857 was no more than a "sepoy mutiny" is not quite the truth. In fact, within a few weeks of the breaking out of the rebellion British Empire in upper India had all but disappeared.<sup>20</sup>

But merely because the rebellion was up to then the biggest upsurge against the British would not lend it the character of a war of national independence. A clear refutation of this assertion "lies in the fact that as soon as the mutinous troops and the rebellious chiefs were expelled from a district peace was immediately restored."<sup>21</sup> Besides, this view is also historically incorrect. There was no feeling of nationalism, as we know it today, extant among the Indian people then. This lack of "nationalism" was clearly reflected in the absence of a general plan for the rebellion or a central organization for the guidance of the rebels once the rebellion broke out. The campaigns of Bakht Khan, Nana Sahib, Tatya Tope, the Rani of Jhansi, Kunwar Singh and the Moulavi of Fyzabad were confined to narrow limits of their respective territories. There was also hardly any liaison between either the different rebel leaders or the centres of rebellion. On the contrary, the moment the visible vestiges of British

<sup>16</sup> Rev. J. Cave-Browne, *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, (1861), vol. I, p. 28-29. Author of *The Lost Dominion* concurs with the Reverend. He observes: "All that is necessary is to remark that the Mutiny was in no sense a national revolt, except in Oudh..." Quoted by Edward Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

According to Lt.-General McLeod Innes "at least, the struggle of the Oudhians must be characterized as a war of Independence." Quoted by Savarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 357; see also John Bruce Norton, *Topics for Indian Statesmen*, (1858), ch. ii. and Trevelyan, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>17</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 193.

<sup>18</sup> Lowe, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

<sup>19</sup> R. C. Dutt, *The Economic History of India*, vol. II, (7th ed. 1950), p. 223.

Disraeli thought "that the mutineers of the Bengal Army were not so much avengers of professional grievances as the exponents of general discontent." Quoted by Edward Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

<sup>20</sup> Mark Thornhill, *The Personal Adventures and Experiences of 'a Magistrate During the Rise, Progress and Suppression of the Indian Mutiny*, (1884), p. 178.

<sup>21</sup> Sir Syed Ahmad Khan to Kaye: *Kaye's Mutiny Papers*, vol. 725, pp. 1011-16.



rule seemed to disappear, conflicting regional and class loyalties of the rebel leaders as well as the masses came to the fore and, in consequence, weakened the anti-British united front.<sup>22</sup>

The extremist Indian view is also belied by the narrow geographical scope of the rebellion. It affected hardly one-sixth of the area of the country and less than one-tenth of its population. Not only that. The rebellion, shameful though it is to admit, could not have been suppressed without the active support of Indians themselves.<sup>23</sup>

To understand, therefore, the real nature of the rebellion, and to estimate its effects on subsequent Indian history —social, economic and political—it is essential that we investigate into the real causes, follow its course through blood and terror<sup>24</sup> and study the role played by various classes. Thus alone shall we rescue the story of the rebellion from the morass in which special pleading and interested accounts have pushed it.

## II. THE CAUSES

The primary cause of the revolt was the imperialist exploitation of the Indian people. It would be well, therefore, to go back to the days of the founding of the East India Company. The stories of the fabulous profits being made by the Portuguese, the Dutch and the French companies trading with India tempted British merchant-adventurers to form a trading company for a similar purpose. In 1600, the East India Company obtained a Charter from Queen Elizabeth I to trade with India and the Spice Islands. Trade with India in those years consisted of buying handicrafts and other valuable and artistic products from the country. As the Indian craftsmen were generally ignorant of the value of their goods in the international market, the wily and unscrupulous merchant-adventurers bought their goods for a mere trifle, and made huge profits. The dividends of the East India Company till 1765 varied from 100 to 250 per cent per annum.<sup>25</sup> This did not include the pickings of its individual agents and servants in India.<sup>26</sup> (The fac

<sup>22</sup> See below sections IV, V and VI, of the article.

<sup>23</sup> Asoka Mehta, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

<sup>24</sup> Rev. Dr. Frank Bright in his *History of England*, period IV, (1893) writes about atrocities committed by the Indian rebels and British soldiers thus: "The contest seemed to lie between two savage races, capable of no thought but that, regardless of all justice or mercy, the enemies should be exterminated" (p. 328). Marx justified, however, the barbarities of the Indian rebels. He remarked: "However infamous the conduct of the sepoys, it is only the reflex, in a concerted form, of England's own conduct in India, not only during the epoch of the foundation of her Eastern Empire, but even during the last ten years of long-settled rule" (*Marx and Engels on Britain*, p. 449).

<sup>25</sup> Joan Beauchamp, *British Imperialism in India*, (1935), p. 17; also see R. Palme Dutt, *Modern India*, (1927), p. 31.

<sup>26</sup> William Bolts described the situation thus: "...the dominions in Asia, like the distant Roman provinces, during the decline of that empire, have been abandoned as lawful prey, to every species of speculators; insomuch that many of the servants of the company after exhibiting such scenes of barbarity as can scarcely be paralleled in the history of any country, have



that even petty employees of the Company on their return to England could establish themselves as lords, and were generally addressed as Nabobs indicates their tremendous illegal gains in this country.)

In 1765, the East India Company acquired the *Diwanee* of Bengal. By then, it had ousted all other European competitors from the Indian market. The acquisition of the *Diwanee* and the virtual monopoly of the trade with India further increased the profits of the Company and its servants, while adding heavily to the misery and privation of the people of India. Adam Smith has this to say about the *Diwanee*: "The Government of an exclusive company of merchants is perhaps the worst of all governments for any country whatever. No other sovereigns ever were or, from the nature of things, ever could be, so perfectly indifferent about the happiness or the misery of their subjects, the improvements or waste of their dominions, the glory or disgrace of their administration, as, from irresistible moral causes, the greater part of the proprietors of such a mercantile company are, and necessarily must be. It is a very singular government in which every member of the administration wishes to get out of the country, and consequently to have done with the government as soon as he can and to whose interest the day after he has left it and carried his whole fortune with him, it is perfectly indifferent though the whole country was swallowed up by an earthquake."<sup>27</sup> According to William Bolts "while this (British) nation is gazing after the fruit, the Company and their substitutes are suffered to be rooting up the tree—The Company, if left to pursue its present system, will ruin itself; the possessions in Bengal will be beggared...."<sup>28</sup> Holmes remarks that "the native administrators oppressed the peasants and embezzled the revenue. The servants of the Company found it profitable to connive at the abuses...."<sup>29</sup>

The inevitable result of the accumulation in England of the wealth of plunder was that it became, along with similar other accumulations, the basis of capitalist enterprise in that country. Marx observes that "chartered companies were powerful instruments in promoting....concentration of wealth....the treasures obtained outside Europe by direct looting, enslavement and murder, flowed to the motherland (metropolitan country) in streams and were there turned into capital."<sup>30</sup> Brooks Adams, while agreeing with Marx, remarks cynically: "Had Watt lived fifty years earlier, he and his invention must have perished together," for lack of sufficient capital to set them working.<sup>31</sup>

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returned to England loaded with wealth;...." (*Considerations on Indian Affairs*, (1772), Preface).

For an interesting study on the subject see James H. Holzman, *The Nabobs in England* (1926): *passim*.

<sup>27</sup> Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, (1930 ed.), book. IV, ch. vii.

<sup>28</sup> Bolts, *op. cit.*, Preface.

<sup>29</sup> T. Rice Holmes, *A History of the Indian Rebellion*, (5th ed., 1898), p. 6.

<sup>30</sup> Marx, *Capital*, vol. I, pp. 835-36.

<sup>31</sup> Brooks Adams, *The Laws of Civilization and Decay*, p. 260.



Thus, while according to the terms of the original Charter, the East India Company was "not to exchange as far as possible the manufactured goods of England for the products of India but to carry the manufactures and commodities of India and Europe,"<sup>32</sup> acts of Parliament were passed in 1700 and 1721 absolutely prohibiting, with a few specified exceptions, "the employment of printed or dyed calicoes in England, either in dress or in furniture, and use of any printed dyed goods, of which cotton formed any part."<sup>33</sup> It was a penal offence to wear wrought silk or printed or dyed calicoes from India, Persia and China. The penalty was up to £200.<sup>34</sup> "Had India been independent she would have retaliated, would have imposed prohibitive duties upon British goods, and would thus have preserved her own productive industry. This act of self-defence was not permitted her; she was at the mercy of a foreign ruler. British goods were forced upon her without paying any duty, and the foreign manufacturer employed the arm of political injustice to keep down and ultimately strangle a competitor with whom he could not have contended on equal terms."<sup>35</sup> This happened at a time, when, due to the East India Company's policy of territorial aggrandizement and annexation, the chief source of demand for Indian goods—the native courts—were disappearing from the Indian scene. The process of decay began by the establishment of foreign rule and helped by the force of foreign influence, was completed by the competition of foreign goods.

The Industrial Revolution in England completely transformed the character of her relations with India. The expansion of British manufacture overwhelmed and ultimately destroyed the primitive Indian industry and converted the country into a source for raw material. India became a major market for British goods. The condition of the uprooted artisans and craftsmen became miserable. Lord William Bentinck wrote to the Court of Directors that their "misery hardly finds a parallel in the history of commerce. The bones of the cotton weavers are bleaching the plains of India."<sup>36</sup> The population of Dacca—renowned throughout the world for the fine quality of muslin that they produced—decreased from 150,000 to 20,000 between 1827 and 1837.<sup>37</sup>

The transformation in trade relations had severe repercussions on the Indian social structure. The uprooted artisans fell back upon agriculture.<sup>38</sup> There was no possibility of the growth of a modern industrial system within the orbit of imperial relations. But there was considerable pressure on land already, and it

<sup>32</sup> Queen Elizabeth I's Charter to the East India Company. Quoted by Wadia and Merchant, *Our Economic Problem*, (1945), p. 279.

<sup>33</sup> Marx, *Articles on India*, (2nd Indian ed., 1945), pp. 43-44.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.

<sup>35</sup> James Mill, *History of British India*, (H.H. Wilson's Continuation), book. I, ch. viii, etc.

<sup>36</sup> Marx, *Capital*, vol. I, ch. xv, sec. 5.

<sup>37</sup> Marx, *Articles on India*, p. 22.

<sup>38</sup> Prof. D. R. Gadgil in his celebrated work *Industrial Evolution of India* observes: "The decay of urban industry, certainly heightened the pressure on land, not so much by an active migration from the cities ... (not that this was entirely absent), but by retaining people on land, who would, otherwise, have been in due course absorbed into the urban industries" (p. 45).



could not sustain more: with the primitive implements available, intensive agriculture was out of the question. Also, there was the heavy incidence of the new system of land revenue. In Bengal land revenue, which stood at £811,000 in 1764-65 was increased to £1,740,000 in 1765-66, the first year of the *Diwance*.<sup>39</sup>

During the Hindu and the Muslim rule the "King's Share" was a proportion of the year's produce and was surrendered as a tribute of tax by the peasant joint-owners of a self-governing village community to the ruler or his nominee. "The soil in India belonged to the tribe or its subdivision—the village community, the clan or the brotherhood settled in the village—and never was considered as the property of the King.... Either in feudal or imperial scheme there never was any notion of the ownership of the soil vesting in anybody except the peasantry."<sup>40</sup> Under the Company's rule it was assumed that the state was the supreme landlord. In place of the traditional share of the government in the produce paid by the village communities as a whole, there was introduced a system of fixed payment in cash assessed on land which had no reference to good or bad harvest or to how much of the land was cultivated. In most cases the assessment was individual, either levied directly on the cultivator or on landlords appointed by the government. With the individual's land being directly assessed, the village community lost its economic function. Even where groups of owners or village communities were recognised as proprietors of land the results were not very different, because the responsibility was collective only in name. There was a strong trend towards individual assessment, and in practice, co-proprietors were treated as individual proprietors who could sell or mortgage their land.<sup>41</sup> "Our policy has been," Sir John Strachey wrote, "to encourage the growth of private property in land. . . . (though) former governments hardly recognised the existence of such property."<sup>42</sup>

The right of private ownership of land resulted in indebtedness, because "when there was no such right, there was, comparatively speaking, no credit; there was no adequate security that a landlord desirous of borrowing could offer, and there was, therefore, less indebtedness."<sup>43</sup> Though mortgages were not infrequent, permanent alienations were unknown; a man could not be deprived of his inheritance for debts due either to the state or to any individual.

<sup>39</sup> Wadia and Merchant, *op cit.*, p. 279.

<sup>40</sup> Radhakamal Mukherjee, *Land Problems of India*, (1933), pp. 16 and 41; also see Strachey, *India: Its Administration and Progress*, (4th ed., 1911), pp. 137, 365.

<sup>41</sup> R. C. Dutt, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 85.

<sup>42</sup> Strachey, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* p. 427.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan also is generally of Sir John's view. He observes: "Under former rulers, in old times, the system of buying and selling rights in landed property, of mortgage, and of transfer by gift, undoubtedly prevailed. But there was little of it, and what little there was, was due to the consent and wishes of the parties concerned. To arbitrarily compel the sale of these rights in satisfaction of arrears of revenue, or of debt, was a practice in those days unknown." (*The Causes of the Indian Revolt*, (Urdu, ed., 1858), pp. 27-28.



Under the operation of the Company's law, however, the village was usually in debt from the zamindar downwards and of all creditors the Bannia was the most pitiless.<sup>44</sup> It could not be otherwise. The Company's law not only gave protection to him; it also gave him land as security for his claims. "What is sad to acknowledge," writes Mark Thornhill, "by its cumbrous procedure, by its delays, and by its expensiveness, it (the new legal system) gave him (the Bannia) the means of fabricating these claims. So great were the facilities it afforded in this way, that forged documents, and false witnesses became almost stock in trade of a successful Bannia, as his account books or his commodities."<sup>45</sup> Moreover, a Bannia could now afford to be rapacious. Unlike in the days of native rule, his extortions could not be limited by the risk of drastic retaliation. The effect of this change in the legal system was that more land changed hands in one generation than ever before in memory. The ancient proprietors gave place to new owners, mostly Bannias.<sup>46</sup> These auction-purchasers, Kaye contends, dwelt principally in the cities.<sup>47</sup> They desired only to gain profit out of their investment unlike the old proprietors, people belonging to the soil essentially, who had loved their land for itself, independent of the rent it afforded them.<sup>48</sup>

For the Court of Directors of the Company, too, the land was no more than merchandize, and its sale was authorised in 1776, in default of payment on the part of the zamindars with whom the government contracts were made.<sup>49</sup> "Under the (new) system," Kaye writes, "men who had been proprietors of vast tracts of country as far as the eye could reach shrivelled into tenants of mud huts and possessors only of a few cooking pots."<sup>50</sup>

But the new system had its own inherent weaknesses. The Company could never be sure of the income from its dominions. To overcome this uncertainty, Lord Cornwallis wrote to the Court of Directors on August 2, 1789: "It would be necessary for the public good to grant a right of property in the soil to them (zamindars) not as mere revenue agents of the state (which they had always been) but as landlords in the English sense. . . . The outlines of the plan now proposed are well calculated to secure and even increase your revenue."<sup>51</sup>

The hopes that had been painted by Lord Cornwallis were too rosy. The Court of Directors gave its consent to the proposal of Permanent Settlement without much ado, and the revenue settlement of Bengal was declared permanent

<sup>44</sup> Thornhill, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34. For elucidation of this point see Strachey, *op. cit.*, p. 427; also Khan, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-30.

<sup>46</sup> Thornhill, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

<sup>47</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 260.

<sup>48</sup> Thornhill, *op. cit.*, p. 34; William Edwards, *Personal Adventure in the Indian Rebellion*, (2nd ed., 1858), pp. 11-13.

<sup>49</sup> Arthur Mills, *India*, (1858), p. 108.

<sup>50</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 157.

<sup>51</sup> *Cornwallis Correspondence*: Lord Cornwallis to the Court of Directors, p. 533. The Board of Control rightly designated him as "the greatest creator of private property in land." Quoted by Ramsay Muir, *The Making of British India*, (1923), p. 253.



in 1793. According to Sir Richard Temple, the Permanent Settlement was "a measure which was affected to naturalize the landed institutions of England among the natives of Bengal."<sup>52</sup> But by this measure, as Lord Metcalfe observed, the ancient rights of the ryot "were virtually destroyed by the title of property conferred by us on those who had no pretensions to it."<sup>53</sup>

Even under the Permanent Settlement estates were "liable to be sold in default of payment under the provisions of Act I of 1845."<sup>54</sup> Holmes writes in the *History of Indian Mutiny* that the result of Cornwallis' action was that "the inferior tenants derived from it no benefit whatever. The zamindars again and again failed to pay their rent charges; and their estates were sold for the benefit of the government."<sup>55</sup> The collector of Midnapore wrote in 1802, that, a few years of the "system of sale and attachment" had reduced most of the great zamindars in Bengal "to distress and beggary and produced a greater change in the landed property of Bengal than has, perhaps, ever happened in the same space of time in any age or country by the mere effect of internal regulations."<sup>56</sup>

Another consequence of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal was the subdivision of rights in land. The zamindars leased out their interests to the middlemen, and the middlemen leased out in turn, creating a long chain of rent receivers and rent payers who intervened between the state and the actual cultivator. In 1819 the absolute subjection of cultivators to the mercy of the zamindars "was regretfully admitted, and yet no steps were undertaken to protect the ryot."<sup>57</sup> Thus, feudalism on the one hand and serfdom on the other became the principal characteristics of the land revenue system of Bengal. Thornhill appraised the new relationship thus: "The old proprietors belonged to the village; the cultivators were men of their own caste, often their relations. They loved their land for itself, independent of the rent it afforded them. The feeling of the new proprietors was different—they cared nothing for the land, they desired only to get a profit out of their investment."<sup>58</sup>

Sir Thomas Munro's ryotwari system of land did not produce different results. It too broke across Indian institutions, as had the zamindari system. The Madras Board of Revenue wrote on January 5, 1818: "Ignorant of the true resources of the newly-acquired countries, as of the precise nature of their landed tenures, we find a small band of foreign conquerors no sooner obtaining possession of a vast extent of territory, peopled by various nations, differing from each other in language, customs and habits, than they attempt what would be called a Herculean task, or rather a visionary project even in the most civilized

<sup>52</sup> Sir Richard Temple, *Men and Events of My Times in India*, (1882), p. 30.

<sup>53</sup> *Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalfe*, p. 253.

<sup>54</sup> Arthur Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

<sup>55</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>56</sup> Report of the Collector of Midnapore in 1802. Quoted by R. Palme Dutt, *India Today*, (Revised ed. 1947), p. 191.

<sup>57</sup> Wadia and Merchant, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

<sup>58</sup> Thornhill, *op. cit.*, p. 34.



countries of Europe, of which every statistical information is possessed, and of which the Government are one with the people, viz., to fix a land-rent, not on each province, district or country, nor on each estate or farm, but on every separate field within their dominions.

"In pursuit of this supposed improvement, we find them unintentionally dissolving the ancient ties, the ancient usages which united the republics of each Hindu village, and by a kind of agrarian law newly assessing and parcelling out the lands which from time immemorial had belonged to the Village Community collectively. . . . professing to their demand to each field, but in fact, by establishing such limits, and unattainable maximum, assessing the ryot at discretion, and, like the Mussalman Government which preceded them, binding the ryot by force to the plough, compelling him to till land acknowledged to be over-assessed, dragging him back to it if he absconded, deferring their demand upon him until his crop came to maturity, then taking from him all that could be obtained, and leaving him nothing but his bullocks and seed grain, nay, perhaps obliged to supply him even with these, in order to renew his melancholy task of cultivating, not for himself, but for them."<sup>59</sup>

Dr. Francis Buchanan, who carried on a "statistical survey" on behalf of the Company between 1800 and 1814, reported that "the natives allege that. . . they did not actually pay one-half (to the Mughal officers) of what they do now."<sup>60</sup> Bishop Heber observed in 1830 in his memoirs that the peasantry in the Company's dominions was "on the whole worse off, poorer and more dispirited than the subjects of the native Princes." "The fact is," the Bishop asserted, that "no native Prince demands the rent which we do."<sup>61</sup>

The wealth which the Company derived from the exploitation of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa tempted it to expand its territory. The Company's armies fought twenty wars between the Battle of Plassey and the Great Rebellion. In one hundred years, Mysore, Maharashtra, Karnatak, Tanjore, Bundelkhand, Rohilkhand, Haryana, the Punjab (including pre-partition North Western Frontier Province) and Oudh were added to the Company's domain. All the former native states, from Kashmir down to Cochin, became the Company's "protectorate." What most affected the Company's soldiers was the annexation of Oudh—"the fatherland of the bulk (three-fourths) of the Company's army"<sup>62</sup>—by Lord Dalhousie in 1865. (Oudh had, in fact, been managed by the Company under a system of double-government since the middle of the 18th century.)<sup>63</sup> "The Mussalmans, not only of Oudh, but of all upper India, were embittered and

<sup>59</sup> Minutes of the Madras Board of Revenue, January 5, 1818. Quoted by R. P. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

<sup>60</sup> Quoted by R. P. Dutt, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-6.

<sup>61</sup> Bishop Heber's *Memoirs and Correspondence*, (1830), vol. II, p. 413. When he asked an intelligent Indian if he would wish to become a British subject, the reply was, "of all misfortunes keep me from that."

<sup>62</sup> Lt.-General McLeod Innes, *The Sepoy Revolt*, (1857), p. 26; Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>63</sup> Innes, *Ibid.*, p. 27; Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 71.



angered by the suppression of one of the few Muhammedan reigning houses which had been left in power," wrote Lieutenant-General McLeod Innes in his excellent book, *The Sepoy Revolt*.<sup>64</sup>

The city's six to seven thousand inhabitants, depended on the late Court's profligacy, and the traders, who had ministered to its luxuries, lost their livelihood.<sup>65</sup> Thousands of others whose sole business was to cater to the Court's degrading pleasures were deprived of employment.<sup>66</sup> The makers of rich dresses, fine turbans, highly ornamented footwear, and many other subordinate trades, suffered severely from the cessation of the demand for the articles which they produced.<sup>67</sup> L. E. Ruutz Rees has described vividly the effects of the disappearance of the Court's patronage: "Thousands of nobles, gentlemen and officials, who during the King's time had held lucrative appointments, and who were too idle to work, were now in penury and want and their myriads of retainers and servants thrown out of employment. . . . Then the innumerable vagabonds, desperados and beggars, who under the native rule infested the city, and found bread in it, were starving under our administration. The native merchants, shopkeepers and bankers, who, while Wajid Ali was on the throne, made large profits from supplying the luxurious wants of the King, his courtiers, and the wealthy ladies of the thronged harems, found no sale for their goods; and the people in general, and especially the poor, were dissatisfied because they were taxed directly and indirectly in every way."<sup>68</sup>

The class which perhaps suffered most heavily was that of the talukdars.<sup>69</sup> Under the weak rule of the Nawab Vazier of Oudh, they had exercised authority almost independently of him,<sup>70</sup> extorted land revenue at the point of the bayonet<sup>71</sup> and kept the country in a state of instability, rendering life, property and industry insecure.<sup>72</sup> According to Sir W. H. Sleeman, "whenever they quarrel with each other, or with the local authorities of the (native) government, from whatever cause, they take to indiscriminate plunder and murder—over all lands not held by men of the same class—no road, town, village, or hamlet is secure from their merciless attacks—robbery and murder become their diversions, their sports; they no more hesitate of taking the lives of men, women and children, who never offended them, than those of deer or wild dogs."<sup>73</sup> But even where no talukdars intervened, hundreds of villages had been

M. R. Gubbins, *An Account of the Mutinies in Oudh and of the Siege of Lucknow Presidency*, (2nd ed. 1858), p. 70.

*Ibid.*, p. 70; L. C. Ruutz Rees, *A Personal Narrative of the Siege of Lucknow*, (1858), pp. 33-34.

*Ibid.*, p. 70.

*Ibid.*, 70.

Rees, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

Gubbins, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

*Ibid.*, p. 67.

Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 114; Innes, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

*Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 137-8.

Col. Sleeman's *Diary*. Quoted by Kaye, *Ibid.*, p. 135.



ruined and desolated by the exactions of the greedy and rapacious officials—*amilis*.<sup>74</sup> The “sufficient evidence” of the wretchedness was “miserable and starved cattle, unable to drag the wretched implements of husbandry in use, squalid and deserted villages, ruined wells, and a naked and starved peasantry.”<sup>75</sup> M. R. Gubbins, the judicial commissioner of Oudh, on the eve of and during the revolt, observed that “I have never met with such evidence of general poverty as in Oudh.”<sup>76</sup> Of the conditions of the Oudh peasantry in the pre-annexation period, Kaye said, that “never were the evils of misrule more horribly apparent, never were the vices of indolent and rapacious government productive of a greater sum of misery.”<sup>77</sup>

The utter worthlessness of the upper classes was therefore assumed as a fact by the Company. The Company’s servants convinced themselves that the liquidation of the landed aristocracy was the greatest benefit that could be conferred upon the people of Oudh.<sup>78</sup> In pursuance of this end, the Inam Commission was appointed to enquire into the titles and deeds of the landlords. In the five years that preceded the revolt, more than 21,000 of the 35,000 estates were confiscated.<sup>79</sup>

G. B. Seton-Kerr in his memorial to the Governor-General compared the working of the Inam Commission to that of a “shearing house.” He wrote: “Each day produced its list of victims; and the good fortune of those who escaped but added to the pangs of the crowd that came forth from the shearing house, shorn to the skin, unable to work, ashamed to beg, condemned to penury.”<sup>80</sup> Thornhill characterized the decisions of the Commission “as acts of confiscation.”<sup>81</sup>

Thus, families who had held possession of inherited estates for long years, and never doubted the security of their tenure, found themselves deprived of their freeholds. In this way, observed Kaye, “a revolution was gradually brought about by means of English application (of law), which, acting coincidentally with the other agencies, swelled the number of the dissatisfied, dangerous classes, who traced their downfall to the operations of the British rule, and sullenly bided their time for the recovery of what they had lost, in some new revolutionary epoch.”<sup>82</sup>

The tiller of the soil did not derive any benefit from all this, as the Company had claimed that he would. Its servants were anxious to show a large balance-sheet to the Court of Directors to prove them the profitable nature of the new acquisition. To increase the total collection, they increased, therefore, the

<sup>74</sup> Kaye, *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 114-115; Innes, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

<sup>75</sup> Gubbins, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>77</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 114.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 154.

<sup>79</sup> G. B. Seton Kerr’s Memorial to the Governor-General. Quoted by Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 17. Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

<sup>80</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 177-178.

<sup>81</sup> Thornhill, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

<sup>82</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, p. 179; Thornhill, *op. cit.*, p. 33.



rate of land revenue.<sup>83</sup> Gubbins is constrained to admit that the pressure of the government's demand in many districts was "greatly too high."<sup>84</sup> Thornhill describes the settlement of the land revenue as "cruel."<sup>85</sup> He writes "Our land revenue was undoubtedly too highly assessed, and our system of enforcing payments by the sale of land made its severity the more felt. All our law, by assisting the extortions of the Bannias, cast on our government the odium of much of their rapacity." Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, who cannot be accused of ever having been anti-British in his sentiments, remarks in his brochure, *The Causes of the Indian Revolt*, that "the system of Revenue Settlement, introduced by the English Government is undoubtedly creditable. But the rate of land revenue is heavy (italics mine) when compared with former settlements... The assessments imposed by the English government have been fixed without any regard to the various contingencies. Land lying fallow pays in the same proportion as cultivated land. . . . The cultivators are obliged to borrow money in order to pay land revenue. The interest on these loans is exorbitant."<sup>86</sup>

A large number of estates every year were auctioned under the decrees of the courts, in lieu of debts which sometimes ran to no more than a couple of rupees. They were bought by new men from the Lower Provinces. The former proprietors, who still belonged to the soil, were reduced to the position of small farmers and under-tenants on their ancestral lands. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan describes the effect of the numerous sales of landed property in the first days of British rule by saying that Indian society was turning upside down.<sup>87</sup>

The introduction of judicial and revenue stamp paper, which was contrary to the spirit of Indian custom and tradition, put a heavier burden on the already pauperized people. It also tended greatly to hinder the administration of justice.<sup>88</sup> To cap all this, a heavy tax on opium was imposed. This inflamed the discontent of the poorer population.<sup>89</sup> So now there was a tax "on petitions, on food, on houses, on eatables, on ferries. There was an opium contractor, a contractor for supplying corn and provisions, a salt and spirit contractor and in fact contracts were given for everything that in Paris would come under the name of octroi. Everything in the shape of food was consequently very dear. . . .

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Forrest, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 162; Rees, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35.

Gubbins, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

Thornhill, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

Khan, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-30.

*Ibid.*, p. 27.

Marx has written as follows:

"The original class of zamindars... soon melted away under the pressure of the Company, in order to be replaced by mercantile speculators who now hold all the land in Bengal, with the exception of the estates returned under the direct management of the Government" (*Articles on India*, (Indian ed., 1943), p. 18.).

Khan, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31; Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 177-78.

Gubbins, *op. cit.*, p. 41.



contractors. . . . were making large fortunes, while the people suffered by their extortions."<sup>90</sup>

The disbandment of the former King's army, which had swollen to 70,000 men, according to Resident Lowe's calculations,<sup>91</sup> had thrown a horde of desperados upon Oudh. "To discharge a sepoy was to create a bandit," remarked Lt.-General Innes.<sup>92</sup> There was not a family in Oudh which did not have one member at least serving in the army. The region was thus overrun by the disbanded soldiers who had found no place in the new Oudh Irregular Force and the military police.<sup>93</sup> The disbandment resulted in forced unemployment in almost every Oudh peasant's home.

To this military class, hitherto favoured, the annexation of Oudh proved prejudicial also for another reason: "the home of the sepoys and the garden-plot of the pensioner were no longer exempted from taxes."<sup>94</sup> Because of this 14,000 petitions had emanated between the annexation and the Mutiny from 75,000 sepoys belonging to the province against the hardships of the revenue system.<sup>95</sup> Of the sepoys, 25,000 were Brahmins. They were doubly hit when lands attached to charitable institutions were confiscated. With the snatching away of their comfortable income, members of the priestly class "turned their power which they exercised over the minds of others to fateful accounts by fomenting popular discontent, and instilling into the minds of the people the poison of religious fear."<sup>96</sup>

The conditions created by the annexation of Oudh have been admirably summed up by Malleon: "The annexation of Oudh. . . . alienated the rulers of Native States, who saw in that act indulgence in a greed of power to be satiated neither by unswerving loyalty nor by timely advances of money on loan to the dominant power. It alienated the territorial aristocracy, who found themselves suddenly stripped, by the action of the newly-introduced British system, sometimes of one half of their estates, sometimes even of more. It alienated the Mohammedan aristocracy—that courtiers—men whose income depended upon the appointments and pensions they received from the favour of their prince. It alienated the military class serving under the king, ruthlessly cast back upon the families with small pensions or gratuities. It contributed to alienate the British sepoys recruited in Oudh—and who so long as their country continued independent, possessed by virtue of the privilege granted them of acting on the Court of Lucknow by means of petitions presented by the British Resident, a sure mode of protecting their families from oppression. It alienated alike the peasants of the country and the petty artisans of the towns, who did not relish the change

<sup>90</sup> Rees, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35.

<sup>91</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 126-7.

<sup>92</sup> Innes, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

<sup>93</sup> Gubbins, *op. cit.*, p. 69; Michael Joyce, *Ordeal at Lucknow*, (1938), p. 47.

<sup>94</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 27.

<sup>95</sup> Mehta, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>96</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 180.



of a system, which, arbitrary and tyrannical though it may be, they thoroughly understood, for another system, the first elements of which were taxation of articles of primary necessity. In a word, the annexation of Oudh converted a country, the loyalty of whose inhabitants to the British had become proverbial, into a hotbed of discontent and of intrigue."<sup>97</sup>

There was, in addition, the dissatisfaction of the Indian people over their exclusion from lucrative offices and jobs. This difficulty pressed more heavily on the Muslims than on the Hindus. The latter generally did not take service. They were engaged in such work as their forefathers had done before them. The Brahmins were favoured by tradition and did not need to go into service; the Vaishyas were traders and bankers; the Kshatriyas, once rulers of the country, kept each his small portion of land, preserving a semblance of authority. There was only one section among the Hindus—the Kayasths—that earned its livelihood from public service.<sup>98</sup>

Muslims, on the other hand, depended largely on public service. Before the Company's rule, they had filled the most honourable posts in Muslim governments, and they still hoped for similar jobs. But under the Company's administration, they were denied these. The jobs that were available to them, such as in the Company's army as sepoy, they looked upon with disfavour. The reason for this dislike was simple: under their own governments, they had held the highest civil and military offices, and enjoyed emoluments not inferior to those received under the Company's rule by Europeans. Some of them had received Rs. 1,000 per mensem as commandants of cavalry; but now their sons could draw a pay of only Rs. 80—and that too if they were fortunate enough to become Risaldars.<sup>99</sup> The extinction of native states aggravated the situation. The Duke of Wellington had probably this in mind when he remarked that to annex a state was "to degrade and beggar the natives, making them all enemies."<sup>100</sup> Sir Thomas Munro also pointed out that this policy "debased the whole people."<sup>101</sup>

The Europeans, who filled these posts did not, and were not expected to, maintain large retinues, as the Indians in the former governments had done, and would probably do if they were given the posts. Thus the poorer sections of the Indian people would in any case have been unable to obtain those posts, whatever the government ruling over them. The consequence of this was that they were prepared to join in any upheaval on the chance of improving their lot. In fact many of them took service with the rebels for the amazing sum of one anna or one-and-a-half anna per diem, and many instead of cash accepted a couple or perhaps one and a half seers of grain daily.<sup>102</sup>

Malleon, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 348-9.

Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

*Ibid.*, p. 36; Gubbins, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

*Ibid.*, p. 26.

*Ibid.*, p. 36.



Whilst the resumption of "religious endowments....grievously affected the old Mussalman families, roused their resentment, made them ripe for sedition,"<sup>103</sup> the new system of education, based on the primacy of the English language, and western literature and science, pushed the Muslim intelligentsia into insignificance. Kaye admits that "the tendency of our educational measures, and the all-pervading Englishism with which the country was threatened, was to lower the dignity of Muhammedanism and to deprive of their emoluments many influential people of that intolerant faith."<sup>104</sup> The abolition of the use of Persian language in the law courts, and admission into public service by examination, also decreased, if they did not wholly destroy, the Muslims' chances of official employment.<sup>105</sup>

Lowe summed up the situation succinctly enough to justify a somewhat lengthy quotation: "It is quite evident that the resources of this country, instead of being developed and improved, have been permitted to lie as they did a thousand years ago, and decay; that such of the native arts and manufactures as used to raise for India a name and wonder all over the Western world are nearly extinguished in the present day; once renowned and great cities are merely heaps of ruins—dens for hyenas and jackals; its colleges are no more—the wise men of the East live only in fables and histories of the past; its temples and wondrous caves of Ajanta and Ellora and other places are crumbling fast to dust; and by and by there will scarcely be a trace of them left; its tanks and caravanserais are going and gone to rapid ruin; its canals for irrigation are filled up and forgotten; while districts have been deserted by their inhabitants, and the jungle and wild beasts have succeeded them and deadly malaria closed them....ruin, ruin, poverty. . . . as though a leper had touched the land, it were hastening to decay. . . . No one who has eyes and ears to use, can doubt for a moment that we have almost totally neglected the resources of such a mighty country, while we have introduced the trash of our manufacturing towns into every cranny of the land.... It appears as though we had endeavoured to destroy every inherent useful production of Eastern merchandize."<sup>106</sup> And Lowe asks, "What must be the end of such shortsightedness if such an erroneous line of policy is pursued?"<sup>107</sup>

In the midst of this intense suffering, a long-drawn out depression (1825-54) characterized by a particularly steep decline of prices, cut across the deplorable economic, political and social conditions.<sup>108</sup> In 1850, the production of silver-fell short of the world demand for it, and this aggravated the situation further—first, because Indian currency had been placed on an exclusively silver

<sup>103</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 197.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 196.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 196.

<sup>106</sup> Lowe, *op. cit.*, pp. 357-8.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 358.

<sup>108</sup> Prof. Thomas, *Economic History Review*, (1933).



basis by an Act of 1835; and, secondly, because India was still passing through the transition from barter to money economy.<sup>109</sup>

At this critical moment in the expansion of their influence and power, the British suffered reverses in the First Afghan War (1838-42), the Crimean War (1854-56) and in the two wars against the Sikhs (1845-49). This, nearly shattered the general belief "in their invincibility," despite the fact that they won all these wars; for the people discovered that the British were no supermen. They were capable of making almost fatal mistakes—mistakes which perhaps clever adversaries could exploit.<sup>110</sup>

As belief in the invincibility of the British army had almost ended, the sepoys convinced themselves that the many victories which the English had gained, had been due entirely to the Indians' prowess. They believed and voiced the belief in no uncertain terms that they had enabled the English to conquer Hindustan from Burma to Kabul.<sup>111</sup> The composition of the Company's army was also favourable to the growth of this belief. There were 360,000 sepoys as against 40,000 British soldiers, and 12,000 Indian gunners as against 6,500 European.<sup>112</sup>

Another nearly shattered belief was in the inexhaustibility of British resources. Kaye has emphasized this: "The idea broached in Parliament of drawing troops from India for the Crimean War, took intelligent natives of India by surprise. . . . We could not more loudly proclaim the inadequacy of our resources than by denuding ourselves in one quarter of the world that we might clothe ourselves sufficiently in another."<sup>113</sup>

In these circumstances, the sepoys were quick to take offence when they were told that they would no longer enjoy the privileges of foreign service (*batta*) when serving in Sind, or in the Punjab. They asked why they should not have the same privileges merely because the British boundary-line had been extended to what was recently foreign soil. Reconciliation to the decision was almost impossible in the context of their conviction that the territories could not have been conquered without them. They felt embittered because their employer the Company had rewarded them for their good services by depriving them of a well-deserved portion of their pay.<sup>114</sup>

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, Asoka Mehta, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>110</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 274. See also A. L. Morton's *A People's History of England*, (1945), p. 45.

Personally, I regard these reverses of as great an importance as the defeat of Russia at the hands of Japanese in 1905.—T.K.

<sup>1</sup> Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

<sup>2</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 341.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 343.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 277, 310:

It was on the walls of the Jami' Masjid (Delhi) that some versifier wrote the lines of which the following is a rough translation:

When war is nigh, and battle is sighted,  
God and the soldier is all the cry;  
When battle ends in victory,  
God is forgotten, and the soldier slighted.



Another matter that touched the sepoys to the quick was the Company's alleged interference in their religious beliefs. Acts such as the abolition of *Sati*, legalization of remarriage of Hindu widows, and prohibition of the killing of daughters, whether in themselves good or bad, were repugnant to Indian customs and traditions. They increased the suspicions of the Indians.<sup>115</sup> In 1850, an act was passed permitting converts to Christianity to retain their patrimony. In the midst of the furore this created among Indian people, a letter by one Mr. Edmond was circulated from Calcutta to all the principal officials of the Company's government. The letter said that as the entire sub-continent was under the control of a Christian power, it was but right to convert the Indian people to the Christian faith.<sup>116</sup> It is no metaphor to say that the Indian people were blinded with fear at learning of this circular," writes Sir Syed Ahmad Khan.<sup>117</sup> It was rumoured that the Indian servants of the Company would be the first to be converted to Christianity, and after that the mass of the people. It was presumed that the letter was written by order of the government. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal issued a denial to these rumours when he heard of Edmond's letter. But the denial offered only a temporary relief; the general belief remained that government had only postponed the project and would resume it the moment it felt strong enough to do so.<sup>118</sup>

There is no doubt that the Company's government was at best only slightly acquainted with the prevailing mental climate. There was no communication between rulers and the ruled, no living together or near one another—as had always been the custom among conquerors who came from the north-west. The English rulers always looked forward to retirement, and returning "home." They seldom came to settle in India.<sup>119</sup>

The Indian people had no voice in the administration of the country. The government could, therefore, never know the inadvisability or otherwise of the laws and regulations which it passed. It could never hear, as it ought to have heard, the voice of the people on these subjects. The people had no means of protesting against what they felt was wrong, or of giving expression to their wishes. "But the greatest mischief lay in this that the people misunderstood the views and the intentions of the government. They misapprehended every act, and whatever law was passed was misconstrued by men who had no share in the framing of it, and hence no means of judging its spirit. At length, the Indians fell into the habit of thinking that all laws were passed with a view to degrade and ruin them, and to deprive them and their compatriots of their religion....At last

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- Sir T. Metcalfe, *Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny at Delhi*, (1888), p. 23.
- <sup>115</sup> Bundle 194, Fol. no. 30. *Parwanah* of the rebels giving details of their grievances against the British and appealing to their countrymen to revolt. (Vide *Press List of Mutiny Papers*, Imperial Record Office, Calcutta, 1921).
- <sup>116</sup> Khan, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.
- <sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.
- <sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.
- <sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.



came the time when all men looked upon the English government as slow poison, a rope of sand, a treacherous flame of fire. They began to believe that if today they escaped from the clutches of the government, tomorrow they would fall into them; or that even if they escaped the morrow, the third day would see their ruin. When the rulers and ruled occupy relatively such a position as this, what hope is there of loyalty or of good will?"<sup>120</sup>

Not that all Englishmen were ignorant of the feelings of Indian subjects. Some of them actually warned the Company's government of the explosive situation in their territory. Metcalfe had expected "to wake up some fine morning and find that India had been lost to the English Crown."<sup>121</sup> Colonel Sleeman had written to Dalhousie in April 1852 that the native states "might unite in some desperate act."<sup>122</sup> Director Tucker warned the government that the talukdars of Oudh were silent because "the natives of India are accustomed to endure and to submit; to the will of their rulers; but if an enemy were to appear on our western frontier, or if an insurrection unhappily takes place, we shall find these talukdars in the adverse ranks, and their ryots and retainers under the same standard."<sup>123</sup> Lord Canning said, prior to his departure from London: "We must not forget that in the sky of India, serene as it is, a small cloud may arise, at first no bigger than a man's hand, but which, growing larger and larger may at last threaten, to burst, and overwhelm us with ruin."<sup>124</sup> The Company's government remained oblivious to these warnings.

It was a climactic time.<sup>125</sup> Even a normally innocent act could unwittingly have ignited the situation. And at that time the government decided to introduce new cartridges, which the sepoys believed were really greased with the fat of cows and pigs, and the use of which would deprive them of caste and religion. "And thus a chance spark, but a fiery one, fell upon combustible material and caught at once."<sup>126</sup> The hatred that was suppressed after Plassey and had accumulated since then erupted violently. The dispossessed, discontented Rajas and Ranis, zamindars and tenants, artisans and workers, the Muslim priests and intelligentsia and the Hindu Pandits saw the eruption as an opportunity to redress their grievances. The British faced for the first time since their arrival in India such a powerful combination of divergent elements.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>121</sup> Quoted by Forrest, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 10.

<sup>122</sup> Quoted by Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 136.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 165.

<sup>124</sup> Henry S. Cunningham, *Earl Canning*, (4th ed., 1899), pp. 36-37.

<sup>125</sup> John Bruce Norton writes: "...there was disaffection enough in the land for half a dozen rebellions. ..." (*The Rebellion in India: How to Prevent Another?* (1857), pp. 6-7).

<sup>126</sup> Field Marshal Lord Roberts admits: "The recent researches of Mr. Forrest in the records of the Government of India prove that the lubricating mixture used in preparing the cartridges was actually composed of the objectionable ingredients, cows' fat and lard and that incredible disregard of the soldiers' prejudices was displayed in the manufacture of these cartridges." (*Forty-one Years in India*, (One-vol. ed., 1908), p. 431).



### III. THE ORGANIZATION

The question arises, then: What kind of organization was it that organized, canalized and later led the rebellion?

We know little about the organization of the rebels especially in the pre-rebellion period. The reason for this is obvious. The rebels worked illegally, and therefore kept no records about the nature, the functions and the structure of their secret organization. Books on the revolt are replete, no doubt, with the accounts of itinerant Moulavis and Faqirs, Pandits and Sanyasis, the volunteer begging parties and the Madaris who roamed from place to place and spread the message of revolt. Such books abound also in stories about the red lotuses and *chappatis* passing from village to village. The author of *A Narrative of the Indian Revolt* has described the passing of the lotus thus: "A man appeared with a lotus flower and handed it to the chief of the regiment. He handed it on to another—every man took it and passed it on and when it came to the last, he suddenly disappeared to the next station. There was not, it appears, a detachment, not a station in Bengal through which the lotus flower was not circulated."<sup>127</sup> Sir George Otto Trevelyan is of the opinion that the red lotus united all the sepoys.<sup>128</sup> Each one was made to swear over the red lotus that he would act with the others when the call came.

After this ceremony every regiment created its own secret branch of the organization. "From the available evidence...." writes Wilson, in his *Defence of Lucknow*, "every regiment had a committee of three members and this used to do everything connected with this Mutiny.... The committee had to decide on all important schemes, to do all the correspondence, and several other things."<sup>129</sup> According to Savarkar,<sup>130</sup> the sepoys used to meet secretly at night. All resolutions were passed in the general meetings, and all the decisions that were taken in the inner circles were obeyed strictly.

When the sepoys came to attend the secret meetings, they would conceal their identity by covering their faces completely except the eyes. At the meetings they dilated upon the thousand and one oppressions committed in the country by the British.<sup>131</sup> If any one was suspected of being an informer, he was immediately put to death. When a regiment was fully organized, the chief committee of that regiment began negotiations with the chief committee of another for working together. The binding oaths of the regiments, like those of the individual sepoys, were precise and determined. Every regiment was a unit in the larger organization. To facilitate deliberations between the various regiments, it was arranged that on festive occasions regiments should invite one another for celebration. This afforded a pretext for united secret meetings. Selected sepoys

<sup>127</sup> Innes, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

<sup>128</sup> Anon, (1858), p. 4.

<sup>129</sup> Trevelyan, *Cawnpore*, (1899).

<sup>130</sup> Lt.-General T. F. Wilson, *Defence of Lucknow*, (1859); Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 109.

<sup>131</sup> Savarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91.



met in the houses of the subedars. The work of deciding important matters was left to the officers.<sup>132</sup>

The circulation of *chappatis* on the eve of the outbreak was, in all probability, a signal to prepare the people for the coming upheaval. Nawab Moinuddin describes how early one morning in February the watchman of Serai Farukh Khan brought a *chappati* and asked him to cook five similar ones to send to the five nearest villages, with the instruction that each village chowkidar was to prepare five similar *chappatis* for distribution in the same way. Each *chappati* was made of barley and wheat flour. It was about the size of a man's palm, and weighed two tolas.<sup>133</sup>

This circulation of *chappatis* was an exact repetition of what had happened before the Mahrattas invaded northern India in 1803; the only difference was that in place of mutton, a sprig of millet had accompanied the *chappati*.<sup>134</sup> Similarly, before the Santal rebellion a branch of the *Sal* tree had been circulated from village to village.<sup>135</sup> According to Sir John Malcolm "there had been a mysterious circulation of sugar grist before the Mutiny of the Coast Army in 1806."<sup>136</sup> Dim prophecies and rumours foreshadowing a holocaust came in the wake of these *chappatis*. They created alarm in the public mind.

It was generally believed by British authorities at that time that the rebellion was principally organized by the Muslims. The Rev. J. Cave-Browne asserts that the Punjab government from the beginning declared that the revolt was essentially of Hindustani and Mohammedan origin. The Mohammedans were regarded as the instigators, and the Hindus the dupes.<sup>137</sup> Gubbins concurs with Cave-Browne. He says that the Mohammedans "had carefully fostered and had turned the alarm of the Hindus to their advantages."<sup>138</sup> Major F. J. Harriot, Deputy Advocate-General to the military commission which tried Bahadur Shah "Zafar," said: "It is a most significant fact of these proceedings that though we come upon traces of Mussalman intrigue wherever our investigation has carried us, yet not one paper has been found to show that the Hindus, as a body, had been conspiring against us, or that their Brahmins and priests had been preaching a crusade against the Christians.....A Mohammedan priest with pretended vision and assumed miraculous powers—a Mohammedan King, his dupe and his accomplice—a Mohammedan clandestine embassy to the Mohammedan powers of Persia and Turkey—Mohammedan prophecies as to the downfall of our power—Mohammedan rule as the successor of our own—the most cold-blooded murders by Mohammedan assassins—a religious war for Mohammedan ascendancy—a Mohammedan press unscrupulously abetting—and Mohammedan

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 90-91; Sir Metcalfe, *op. cit.*

<sup>133</sup> *Narrative of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 5; Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 365.

<sup>134</sup> Metcalfe, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>137</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 638n.

<sup>138</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 273.



sepoys initiating the Mutiny. Hinduism, I may say, is nowhere either reflected or represented; if it is brought forward at all, it is only in subservience to its ever aggressive neighbour."<sup>139</sup> Subaltern Roberts (later Field-Marshal Lord Roberts) therefore wanted to show "these rascally Mussalmans" that "with God's help, Englishmen will still be masters of India."<sup>140</sup>

The assertion that the instigation was Mohammedan was reinforced by the fact that "a bit of raw flesh" had accompanied the *chappatis*.<sup>141</sup> Hindus, being generally vegetarians, it was thought that they would not have permitted this. However, there are some flaws in this which would make this interpretation unacceptable. In the first place, "Mohammedans are bad conspirators; their methods are too clumsy; they are too ready to break into violence. . . .on the other hand, the Hindus have a genius for conspiracy; they possess a power of patience, of foreseeing results, of carefully weighing chances, of choosing time and weapon, of profiting by circumstances, never losing sight of the object desired, taking advantage of every turn of fortune—all qualities invaluable for success in intrigue."<sup>142</sup> Sir Charles Theophilus Metcalfe is, therefore, of the opinion that the "bit of raw flesh might have signified extermination."<sup>143</sup> This interpretation is supported by Kaye's statement that "Mohammedans and Hindus were plainly united against us."<sup>144</sup> The banning of cow killing soon after the rebels captured power anywhere also supports the conclusion that the rebellion was a joint Hindu-Muslim venture.<sup>145</sup> Moreover, five of the ten members of the Court of Administration, appointed by the rebels in Delhi, were Hindus: General Ghowri Shankar and Subedar-Majors Bahadur Jiwa Ram, Shiv Ram Misr, Het Ram, Beni Ram.<sup>146</sup>

According to Colonel G. B. Malleson, Moulavi Ahmadullah Shah of Fyzabad was "undoubtedly a leader of the conspiracy"<sup>147</sup> and this cannot be denied. But it cannot also be denied that Nana Sahib and many others were leaders too. About Nana Sahib, Kaye remarked that "there is nothing in my mind more substantiated than the complicity of Nana Sahib in widespread intrigues before the outbreak of the Mutiny. The concurrent testimony of witnesses examined in parts of the country, widely distinct from each other, takes his story altogether out of the conjectural."<sup>148</sup> Besides, Kunwar Singh of Bihar, Azimullah, Bakht Khan, Ali Naqi Khan, Rango Bapuji, Tatya Tope, and Rani Lakshmi Bai

<sup>139</sup> Gubbins, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>140</sup> *Trial of Bahadur Shah*, (1895), p. 160.

<sup>141</sup> Lord Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

<sup>142</sup> Metcalfe, *op. cit.*, pp. 9, 40.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>145</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 565.

Sir C. Aitchison in his *Lord Lawrence* (1893) remarks: "In this instance we could not play the Mohammedan against the Hindu" (p. 77). See also Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 273.

<sup>146</sup> Metcalfe, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>147</sup> Bundle 199, Fol. 137, (Urdu), dated July 10, 1857.

<sup>148</sup> Malleson, *op. cit.*, vol. V, p. 292.



of Jhansi were acknowledged leaders of the rebels. (In course of the rebellion, differences between the two communities of course did arise. These will be dealt in a subsequent section.)

Their method of working in the pre-revolt days has been speculated upon by Nawab Moinuddin, Kotwal of Delhi during the rebellion, in his book *Two Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi*. According to him, the burning down of the house of a European or of a telegraph office was in the nature of a signal. The burning of a telegraph office would immediately be communicated along the line from Calcutta to Punjab, and it was calculated that those in the know of the secret would understand on hearing this that they too must do likewise.<sup>149</sup> Information of this arson was widely circulated in the country; it is said that letters were sent from regiment to regiment inciting the sepoys to similar acts and non-compliance was threatened with social (or caste) ostracism.<sup>150</sup> In all correspondence, the rebels used a kind of cipher composed of dots and numbers. Mention of names was carefully avoided.<sup>151</sup> Azimullah, according to Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, even carried on treasonable correspondence with Omar Pasha of Constantinople, in which he told of the sepoys' discontent, the troubled state of India generally and solicited Turkish help for throwing off the British yoke. Lord Roberts also states that Azimullah carried on similar correspondence with the French government through French settlers in Chandranagar.<sup>152</sup>

Cracford Wilson after "carefully collating oral information with facts as they occurred" felt convinced that Sunday, 31st May 1857, had been the day fixed for rebellion to commence throughout the Bengal army.<sup>153</sup> But other equally competent observers did not accept Wilson's "findings." For instance, Sir John Lawrence categorically asserted that "not one of the numerous letters which had been intercepted, written by the sepoys, contained so much as a hint of such a plot, and that none of the faithful sepoys, none of the condemned mutineers who might have saved their lives by disclosing it, if it existed, knew anything about it."<sup>154</sup> "How is it," he asked, "that the people or soldiers did not rise simultaneously in insurrection?" Even if it is presumed that the time fixed for it was anticipated by the Meerut outbreak, "how came it then that the news of that outbreak was not followed by immediate insurrection?"<sup>155</sup>

Doubtless, these are cogent arguments. But they are belied by the facts; they fail to answer certain pertinent questions: Why, on May 11, 1857, did the sepoys at Delhi open out so as to expose their officers to the fire of the Meerut

<sup>49</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 579 n.

<sup>50</sup> Metcalfe, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>51</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 653.

<sup>52</sup> Innes, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

<sup>53</sup> Lord Roberts, *op. cit.*, pp. 428-29.

<sup>54</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 109.

<sup>55</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 546.



rebels?<sup>156</sup> Why did the sepoys rise in revolt on such a large scale within a month or two? The fact that the rebels could organize an uprising which covered the country between the Ganges and the Jamuna speaks volumes of conspiratorial arrangement and also of the organizational ability of the leaders of the revolt. That the building of the organization had not progressed sufficiently far is, however, evident from the absence of any unified plan of campaign and of an over-all command.

We can, therefore, safely conclude that the rebels built up an "organization" in the pre-rebellion days. It is, also, equally evident that the organization was still in an embryonic stage at the time of the outbreak of the rebellion.

#### IV. THE EXTENT

The revolt, which began in Meerut on May 10, 1857, spread like wildfire. Within a week of the breaking out of the rebellion the English empire in upper India had all but disappeared.<sup>157</sup> Between the frontiers of Bengal and Punjab, English authority was acknowledged only for a few miles around Agra, and in some other isolated spots where there happened to be English regiments. "To live in India now," wrote Lowe, "was like standing on the verge of a volcanic crater, the sides of which were fast crumbling away from our feet, while the boiling lava was ready to erupt and consume us."<sup>158</sup> Every ploughshare in upper India was being turned into a sword.

The Meerut rebels rushed to Delhi, the age-old capital of India. They entered it through Delhi Gate, without any serious opposition, besieged the last Moghul, Bahadur Shah "Zafar" and proclaimed him the *Shahensha-e-Hindustan*.<sup>159</sup> The administration of Oudh fell like a house of cards.<sup>160</sup> British authority was merely confined to the provincial capital and its neighbourhood,<sup>161</sup> writes Gubbins. In Rohilkhand, the whole countryside was in rebellion.<sup>162</sup> Khan Bahadur Khan proclaimed himself the viceroy of the Emperor of India.<sup>163</sup> Nearly all Bundelkhand was up in arms against the British.<sup>164</sup> The entire Doab was in the throes of revolution.<sup>165</sup> McLeod Innes observed that "there was forthwith a cessation of *Pax Britannica*, and the entire disorganisation of the civil administration in the upper provinces, i.e., the plains watered by the Ganges and

<sup>156</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 113; Anderson and Subedar, *The Lost Days of the Company*, (1918), vol. I, p. 113.

<sup>157</sup> John Bruce Norton, *Topics for Indian Statesmen*, (1858), ch. ii, *passim*.

<sup>158</sup> Thornhill, *op. cit.*, p. 178; also see Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 192.

<sup>159</sup> Lowe, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>160</sup> Metcalfe, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

<sup>161</sup> Forrest, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 217.

<sup>162</sup> Gubbins, *op. cit.*, p. 143; Thornhill, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

<sup>163</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 138, 411-412.

<sup>165</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 411.



the Jamuna, down to the Bengal proper."<sup>166</sup> Of Central India, Canning wrote, "I look upon Central India as gone; and to be reconquered."

In Kanpur Nana Sahib "led" the rebels.<sup>167</sup> The villagers of the neighbourhood, exhorted by the Mahratta Pundits, who were preaching a crusade on behalf of the Nana, were arrayed with the rebels.<sup>168</sup> A single thought ran through every mind in the area—"now or never was the time to shake off the oppression of the stranger."<sup>169</sup> In Jhansi, Lakshmi Bai "raised the banner of revolt."<sup>170</sup> The fanatical influence of the Wahabis in Patna and of the Brahmmins in Banaras made these two cities formidable.<sup>171</sup> The high price of food grains and other provisions which was always attributed to British rule, came in handy as justification and propaganda to the rebels of Allahabad.<sup>172</sup> In Bihar, the Permanent Settlement vanished like a dream.<sup>173</sup>

Generally, the revolt of the sepoys was followed or accompanied by a rebellion in the city and the countryside. But in several places the people rose in revolt-before the sepoys.<sup>174</sup> Wherever revolt broke out, the government treasury was plundered, the magazine was sacked, barracks and court houses were burnt and prison gates were flung open.<sup>175</sup> The rebels "everywhere displayed towards the government records the same animosity as they did to the account books of the Bannias and for a similar reason. They regarded them as machinery by which we enforced our severe taxation and maintained that disciplined order which had become so distasteful to them."<sup>176</sup> They therefore destroyed the government's records and condemned the Bannias' account books to the same fate. "Dispossessed landowners, clutching at the opportunity for which they had long awaited, gathered their tenants together, hunted out the purse-proud upstarts, who had bought up their estates, and triumphantly established themselves in their

<sup>166</sup> Innes, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

<sup>167</sup> Innes, *The Sepoy Revolt*, (1897), p. 61.

<sup>168</sup> Tatya Tope in his evidence before the Court Martial said that the Nana acted under compulsion. He was "a prisoner in the hands of the rebels."

See Forrest, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 420; Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 310; Malleson, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 515; Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

When Tatya Tope made that statement, there was no reason for him to belittle his own or his master's role in the rebellion. On the contrary, there was every temptation to exaggerate their part in order to become immortal national heroes.

<sup>169</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 518.

<sup>170</sup> Trevelyan, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>171</sup> Even a cursory glance at the Political Proceedings, No. 280, dated December 30, 1859, will convince any impartial student of history that the Rani took the field against the British in March, 1858, and that, too, when the British finally refused to accept her professions of loyalty.

Also see Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 370.

<sup>172</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 209; Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 200.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 244.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 98ff. He too fought under compulsion. See *Patna University Journal*, viii (1954).

<sup>175</sup> *Oxford History of India*.

<sup>176</sup> Thornhill, *op. cit.*, pp. 35, 86.



ancestral homes. Insolent debtors mobbed and slaughtered. . . .the Banias, whose extortions they would have punished before but for the dread of the strong arm of law."<sup>177</sup> Traders were forced to help the rebels to save themselves.<sup>178</sup>

After destroying the visible vestiges of foreign rule in the regimental centre, the sepoy turned their attention to Delhi. Its conquest imparted a political significance to a movement which might otherwise have been regarded as little more than a local outburst. Even Lowe, who was by no means an admirer of things and persons Indian, has to admit that the rebels had selected "a grand centre of operation, well stored with every munition of war a first class arsenal should contain; a city fortified, rich in native wealth, and splendour, containing one of the largest treasures of the British and powder magazine of an enormous magnitude. . . .(and an) inimical Mohammedan population!"<sup>179</sup> Strategically also, the seizure of Delhi was a master stroke. Here the relieving English forces would be hemmed in and cut off from their base and would have to disappear, handicapped as they were by the sheer absence of means to replace the losses.<sup>180</sup> It thus fixed the vital struggle at a site where the large body of English troops in India could be most easily dealt with.

But the decision to restore the authority to the last Moghul and of Nana Sahib, a Mahratta, aroused apprehension among the Rajput States, among the Sikhs in the Punjab, and in the mind of the Nizam of Hyderabad. About the strategic importance of the Rajput States, Lord Canning confessed in a despatch to the Court of Directors, that "if Scindia joins the rebellion, I shall have to pack off tomorrow."<sup>181</sup> The rulers as well as the people of the Rajput States feared that the triumph of the rebels would mean the revival of loot and plunder, and destruction at the hands of both the Moghul and the Mahratta freebooters. They remembered vividly the time when they did not enjoy the "protection" of the Company. They, therefore, feared the loss of "peace, stability and security," which had followed in the wake of that "protection," which had been backed by the proclamations and practice of George Lawrence."<sup>182</sup> For the sake of self-preservation, they therefore helped the power which had rescued them from Moghul and Mahratta brigandage. The Nizam, too, showed no sympathy for the rebels. His ancestors had been able to create a "state" because of declining Moghul power. He did not, therefore, look forward to that power's restoration.<sup>183</sup> Canning paid the Indian States a well-deserved tribute when he remarked that they "acted as the breakwaters to the storm which would have otherwise swept us in one great wave."<sup>184</sup>

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 87.

<sup>178</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 240, 352. Also see Frederick Cooper, *The Crisis in the Punjab* (1858), pp. 208, 212.

<sup>180</sup> Lowe, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

<sup>181</sup> Innes, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

<sup>182</sup> Quoted by Mehta, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

<sup>183</sup> Innes, *op. cit.*, p. 28; and Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

<sup>184</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 500.



The rebels had expected active support from the Punjab. They reasoned that since it had been conquered only eight years earlier, British rule could hardly have won the hearts of the people and their loyalty. On its support or otherwise the fate of the British depended in India. Thornhill admits that "if the Punjab rose our position would be all but desperate...we might not be able to hold out till assistance arrived from England."<sup>185</sup> But the Punjab remained "on the whole, loyal."<sup>186</sup> Instead, from this province, the British were able to raise 39,000 men of all communities, creeds and dialects.<sup>187</sup>

The causes for the Punjab's antipathy to the rebellion were many and varied. The Sikh sardars were afraid of the restoration of the Moghul hegemony as it would have meant their own certain suppression.<sup>188</sup> Moreover, Sir Henry Lawrence had dealt gently with them, respected their fallen fortunes, and laid a lighter hand upon their tenure than the British had in any other province.<sup>189</sup> "The magnificent success of Sir John Lawrence's Government during the rebellion," writes G. W. Forrest, "must be in a large degree attributed to the measure carried out by Sir Henry Lawrence for upholding the jagirdars<sup>190</sup> in their ancient rights."<sup>191</sup> Those sardars who were suspected had been deported; and those who were allowed to remain, remembering the tyranny of the Khalsa army, shrunk, from the prospect of success of a revolt which would probably place them at the mercy of another equally tyrannical army.<sup>192</sup> The dispossessed Sikh feudal barons, leaders of the Sikh Wars, remembering their defeat at the hands of the Poorbeah sepoy led by the Company's officers, rushed to help the British. They thus hoped to avenge that defeat and, by winning British favour, to regain their former positions and privileges.<sup>193</sup> They had not, moreover, forgotten that the Poorbeah sepoy had stigmatized them "as men of low caste."<sup>194</sup>

The Sikh people shunned the idea of joining the rebels also because it seemed to them inevitable that success of the rebellion should bring in its wake religious persecution at the hands of the Muslims. The martyrdom of their ninth Guru, Tegh Bahadur, in Chandni Chowk, Delhi, and the two *ghalugharas* (massacres) were still fresh in their memory. John Lawrence, estimating rightly their feelings, had spread the tale that the King of Delhi would reward any one who killed a Sikh and brought his head for proof.<sup>195</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Quoted by P. E. Roberts, *India*, vol. II, p. 388.

<sup>6</sup> Thornhill, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

<sup>7</sup> Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

<sup>8</sup> Aitchison, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

<sup>9</sup> Khushwant Singh, *The Sikhs*, (1953), p. 83.

<sup>10</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 61.

<sup>11</sup> Landlord.

<sup>12</sup> Forrest, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 172.

<sup>13</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, pp. 33, 311; Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 59-61; Forrest, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 333-34, 344-46.

<sup>14</sup> Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

<sup>15</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 472 n.



It would not be accurate to say that only the Sikhs from amongst the Punjabis, had stood by the British. The Punjabis helped them as a whole during the rebellion. The villagers belonging to all the three communities—Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims—assisted the British authorities to capture rebels at various places.<sup>196</sup> The land revenue was paid regularly and almost to the last pie.<sup>197</sup> Holmes records that incomes from "the excise taxes positively increased and there was but little falling off in the attendance of the government schools."<sup>198</sup> Indeed, writes the Reverend Cave-Browne, "in some districts of the Punjab, the payments (of land revenue and other taxes) were made before they were actually due; a fact which carried with it the cheering conviction that with the mass of the population. . . . the continuance of our Raj was really desired. . . . (They) had no wish to change masters, especially with the prospect of the interregnum of anarchy...."<sup>199</sup>

In Peshawar, the government raised big loans from the merchants. The merchants thus came to have a stake in the continuance of the Company's government. "They were converted from indifferent spectators of the rebellion to interested supporters of the law."<sup>200</sup>

The Muslims of the Punjab, too, were afraid to side with the rebels. The British had saved them from the oppression of the Sikhs. While in other parts of India, the British had caused the ruin and suppression of the Muslims, in the Punjab they were their saviours.<sup>201</sup>

Frederick Cooper says that "certain great causes have doubtless operated in keeping the Swatis, Peshawaris and Kabulis well affected. The assessment of the valley is of lightness to them formerly unknown. The Duranis ground the people to dust. They do so at Kabul to this day. The Sikhs levied annually twelve lakhs from the valley and as much more in plunder. The British government contents itself, and makes the people content, by taking six lakhs, and spending as much monthly. . . . The large expenditure, and the vast number of troops, have opened out a market for cereal produce, as well as for wood and the fruits of the hills. So much so that the greatest punishment to a fractious tribe is to shut them out from the Peshawar and cantonment markets."<sup>202</sup> Kaye cynically observes that "much as those wild Muslims loved Mohammed, they loved money more... every man who had a matchlock or a *talwar* or better still a horse to bring to the muster, came forward with his tender of service to the British officers at Peshawar."<sup>203</sup>

<sup>196</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 296; Also see Metcalfe, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

<sup>197</sup> Cooper, pp. 64, 154-55; Also see *The Hero of Delhi*, (1948), pp. 171-209; R. C. Dutt, *The Economic History of India*, vol. II (7th ed. 1950), p. 90.

<sup>198</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 336.

<sup>200</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 281-82.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 286; Holmes, *op. cit.*, pp. 363-64.

<sup>202</sup> Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

<sup>203</sup> Cooper, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-74.



The explanation of the enigmatic behaviour of the Punjabis is understandable. The conquest of the Punjab had been so recent that the Punjabis had not had time to forget the evils from which that conquest had set them free<sup>204</sup> and to experience the evils which had followed in the wake of British rule in other provinces. Under the new regime the burden of the taxes and levies which had increased enormously in the anarchy that followed Maharaja Ranjit Singh's death had been lightened. Dacoity had almost been stamped out. A summary and equitable settlement of land revenue had increased the prosperity of the ryot, and made him contented.<sup>206</sup> The new rulers had assessed the land rather low, "leaving a fair and liberal margin to the occupiers of the soil."<sup>207</sup> Because of the Punjab's proximity to the frontier, they had not meddled with its land tenure system. The construction of new roads, canals, and bridges and the preservation of forests and grazing tracts had been undertaken vigorously.<sup>208</sup> In short, the Punjabis came to know of the benefits of a strong government after years of unrest and anarchy.<sup>209</sup>

The Punjab had been blessed, too, with a succession of golden harvests, such as had not been known for years.<sup>210</sup> "The country was too happy and prosperous," writes Cooper in *The Crisis in the Punjab*, "to join in any *éméute*, out of pure friendship,"<sup>211</sup> and run the risk of an uncertain future.<sup>212</sup>

In addition, according to Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, there were other "cogent causes."<sup>213</sup> In the first place, "the poverty which was rife in India had not yet had time to affect the Punjab." Secondly, there was a powerful European army on the spot. Thirdly, wisdom was shown by the officials in at once disarming the sepoys. Fourthly, the whole of the Punjab had been disarmed, after annexation. Fifthly, Punjabis and Pathans had already taken service and there was no unemployed population to be tempted to untoward adventures. Sixthly, the desire for plunder in Hindustan (that is, Delhi, Lucknow and Agra etc.) had possessed them. "Thus, the submission, if not acquiescence, of the more dangerous class, was secure," writes Sir John William Kaye.<sup>214</sup>

In the early days of the rebellion, however, Punjabi "support" to the British was "passive."<sup>215</sup> "They enlisted but not in great numbers. They held back

<sup>04</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 492.

<sup>05</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

<sup>06</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33; Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 421.

<sup>07</sup> Forrest, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 171.

<sup>08</sup> R. Bosworth Smith, *Life of Lord Lawrence*, (1883), vol. I, p. 341.

<sup>09</sup> Forrest, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 171; Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 311.

<sup>11</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 436.

<sup>12</sup> Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>13</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 282.

<sup>14</sup> Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

<sup>15</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 59.



until Delhi had fallen, and then recruits came in thousands," writes Sir Charles Aitchison in his *Life of Lord Lawrence*.<sup>216</sup>

### V. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

In the wake of the initial success of the rebels came the weakening and disintegration of the strong anti-British combine. The hatred of foreign rule had brought the rebels together; different concepts of "free" India threw them apart. Feudal rivalry rose between the Moghuls and the Mahrattas. It was because of this that Nana Sahib, the adopted son of the last Peshwa, refused to go to Delhi. He feared he would be "overshadowed by the Moghul court," and lose his individual power and influence among the host of princes.<sup>217</sup>

The feudal barons who fomented or acquiesced in or later joined the rebellion in a bid to regain their "absolute rule in the zamindari"<sup>218</sup> were shocked to find the control of the movement gradually slipping out of their hands. A contemporary writer in the *Calcutta Review* (1858) noted that "not a few of the rajas were wise enough to see that a servile war, an uprising of the lower against the higher classes, would not answer their purpose."<sup>219</sup> The plans chalked out by the rebels for the political and economic reconstruction of the country show that the Rajas had assessed well.

Bahadur Shah was declared *Shahenshah-e-Hind* on May 11, 1857. But in truth he was reduced to a mere nonentity in the first week of July—that is, towards the close of the first phase of the revolt. The rebels of Delhi issued a *Parwanah*<sup>220</sup> after the arrival of General Bakht Khan, outlining the structure of the new state. Bahadur Shah was again formally proclaimed the Emperor of India, but the real executive power was vested in the Court of Administration.<sup>221</sup> The Court was to administer the state, maintain peace and order, collect land revenue from the sub-divisions and raise loans from the Mahajans,<sup>222</sup> defend the realm and, prosecute wars.<sup>223</sup> The Emperor had promised the Court that "in reference to you no representation of any party whatever will be heeded; and in all such orders as may emanate from your Court, none of the servants of the State, nor the Princes Royal, will in any way interfere."<sup>224</sup>

<sup>216</sup> R. C. Dutt, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 90.

<sup>217</sup> Aitchison, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

Although the crusading spirit of the Sikhs slumbered, it was by no means dead. There were Sikh regiments fighting on the side of the rebels in Delhi. See Metcalfe, *op. cit.*, pp. 183, 199.

<sup>218</sup> Forrest, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 420; Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

<sup>219</sup> A Proclamation issued by a Moghul Prince stating the aims of the rebels. Quoted by Asoka Mehta, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-31.

<sup>220</sup> *Calcutta Review*, 1858, p. 64.

<sup>221</sup> Bundle 57, Foil. no. 539-41 (Urdu), dt. nil.

<sup>222</sup> Their own words, *Ibid.*, rule no. 7.

<sup>223</sup> Indigenous bankers, moneylenders or workers.

<sup>224</sup> *op. cit.*, preamble.



The Court of Administration was to consist of ten members; six from the army and four from the civilian departments.<sup>225</sup> The representation of the army was equally distributed among its three branches: infantry, cavalry and artillery.<sup>226</sup> Members were to be elected by a majority vote from amongst "intelligent, wise, capable and experienced men who had also to their credit a record of past faithful service."<sup>227</sup> The last condition is not wholly intelligible in view of the fact that only a few of the rebels had any claims on past services. Perhaps, and one cannot be certain about this, it was for this reason precisely that this condition was not made absolute. For, it was specifically provided that this condition could be waived in the case of very capable and intelligent persons.<sup>228</sup> The civilian members of the Court were to be selected in the same manner by their respective (?) departments.<sup>229</sup>

One out of the ten members of the Court was to be elected President<sup>230</sup> (*Sadr-e-Jalsa*) and another Vice-President<sup>231</sup> (*Naib Sadr-e-Jalsa*) by a majority vote. The President of the Court had two votes. Each member of the Court was in charge of the department of the state from which he had been elected.<sup>232</sup> He was assisted by a Committee, consisting of four members of the Court. Each Committee could have as many secretaries attached to it as were required. Proposals passed by a majority vote in a Committee were forwarded to the Court for approval through the member-in-charge.<sup>233</sup> No specific mention was made of the headships of the departments whose representatives on the Court were elected President and Vice-President. Presumably, they were to act as the heads of their respective departments in addition to their duties as President and Vice-President. "The government at Delhi," wrote Sir George Campbell, "seems to have been a sort of constitutional Milocracy. The King was king and honoured as such, like a constitutional monarch; but instead of a Parliament, he had a council of soldiers, in whom power rested, and of whom he was in no degree a military commander. No Arabic or Persian names, forms or terms appear to have been introduced; but, on the contrary, English terms and modes of business were generally adopted. All petitions seem to have been presented to the King, but the great authority to which all of them on all matters were referred (by order endorsed on the petition), was the 'Court', a body composed of a number of colonels, a brigade major and a secretary. All the colonels, etc., were sepoys who had made their mark."<sup>234</sup>

Bundle 153, Fo. 12 (Persian'), August 19, 1857.

Bundle 57, Fo. 539-41, rule no. 2.

*Ibid.*, rule no. 24.

*Ibid.*, rule no. 4.

*Ibid.*, rule no. 5.

*loc. cit.*

Their own words, *Ibid.*, rule no. 3.

Their own words, *loc. cit.*

*Ibid.*, rule no. 11.

*loc. cit.*



Emperor Bahadur Shah had the right to attend the session of the Court.<sup>235</sup> No decision of the Court was enforceable in the state without the signature of the Emperor. If a resolution of the Court was disapproved by the Emperor, it was to be re-considered by the Court.<sup>236</sup> In actual practice, however, the Court resolved as it chose<sup>237</sup> and compelled the King to affix his seal thereon. In his defence statement submitted to the military commission especially appointed in 1858 to try him, Bahadur Shah stated: "The mutinous soldiers had established a Court in which all matters were deliberated upon, and decisions taken. But I never took any part in their conferences.... As regards the orders under my seal and under my signatures, the facts are that from the day soldiery came and killed the European officers, and made me a prisoner, I remained so thereafter. They caused to be prepared papers they thought fit, brought them to me and compelled me to affix my seal. Sometimes they brought the rough draft orders and had their copies made by my secretary. While, at others they brought letters in original intended for Despatch, and left their copies in my office. Hence several rough drafts in many different hands have been filed in the proceedings. Frequently, they had my seal fixed on empty unaddressed envelopes. I neither knew the contents of the letters nor as to whom they were being sent... My life... being in danger, I could not do anything in the matter... They accused my servants... and Queen Zeenat Mahal of being in league with the British. They even threatened to kill them (the servants) and wanted me to hand over the Queen to them as a hostage."<sup>238</sup> On one occasion Bahadur Shah felt so "wearied and helpless that he resolved to relinquish the title of the Emperor, fraught with cares and troubles," and "pass the remaining days in service acceptable to the God."<sup>239</sup> Once he even threatened to commit suicide by swallowing a diamond.<sup>240</sup>

The Court held two kinds of sessions:<sup>241</sup> the ordinary session was held for five hours each day in the Red Fort; special sessions were held for the transaction of any urgent business at any time of the day or night.<sup>242</sup> The rebels must have recognized the necessity of unanimity and expedition, for they had provided for the process of guillotine to safeguard against frivolous proposals. Thus an amendment to a proposal could not be moved unless it was supported by four out of ten members, and the Court could always apply the guillotine after three speeches had been made, on the plea of urgency.<sup>243</sup> In all matters, a

<sup>235</sup> Campbell, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 356.

<sup>236</sup> Bundle 57, Fo. 539-41 (Urdu), rule no. 8.

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*, rule no. 7.

<sup>238</sup> *Trial of Bahadur Shah*, (1895), pp. 137-140. Prince Zaheer-ud-Din alias Mirza Moghal wrote to the Emperor that he had a talk with General Bakht Khan and other members of the Court, but they refused to accept His Majesty's proposals. Bundle 199, Fo. 155 (Persian), dt. nil.

<sup>239</sup> *Trial of Bahadur Shah*, Ex-King's Defence Statement, p. 137-140.

<sup>240</sup> *Delhi Urdu Akhbar*, vol. 19, no. 21, May 24, 1857. Also, *Trial of Bahadur Shah*, pp. 134-135, quoted in full in a letter from the King to Mirza Moghal, dt. nil.

<sup>241</sup> Bundle 199, Fo. 260 (Persian), August 9, 1857.

<sup>242</sup> Bundle 57, Fo. nos. 539-41 (Urdu), rule no. 3, dt. nil.

<sup>243</sup> *loc. cit.*



majority vote of the Court was essential. But any decision taken in the absence of a member was applicable to his department<sup>244</sup> also. This implies joint responsibility.

To maintain secrecy, the *Parwanah*<sup>245</sup> ordained that the meetings of the Court would be *in camera*. Any disclosure, implicit or explicit, of its proceedings by any of the members was punishable by his removal from the Court. The same punishment was prescribed for any sort of deception towards the state, or for showing partiality towards a person or a body of persons.<sup>246</sup>

The procedure formulated by the rebels was neither comprehensive nor conformable with the parliamentary rules in any modern state. The rebels had no experience of parliamentary government, much less of drafting of procedural rules. All the same the underlying basis of the procedure seems to be the Panchayat system. It appears as if the Court was devised primarily to satisfy the democratic instinct of their own class whose socio-political organization has always been the traditional Panchayat.

A *Parwanah*,<sup>247</sup> dated August 8, 1857, the only one of its kind available, gives us a clue to the nature of business transacted by the Court. This *Parwanah* was some kind of a summons to the members of the Court to attend a special meeting of the Court, the agenda for which included the problem of proper administration of the City of Delhi, better administration of supplies, more efficient upkeep of the army, better distribution of the *dak* and the raising of loans from the Mahajans. The Court also issued frequent orders and circulars on discipline in the army, the suppression of corrupt practices, abuse of authority and rapacity.<sup>248</sup>

Not only was the nature and extent of authority exercised by the Court wide and comprehensive; the Court was also not prepared to tolerate any encroachment upon its authority by extraneous influences. In military matters, for instance, neither the Emperor nor the royal princes had any effective voice. In a letter dated June 26, 1857, the Emperor complained to his son, Mirza Moghal:<sup>249</sup> "Formerly some troopers took up quarters in the Hayat Baksh and Mehtab Gardens. Owing to the injury caused to these gardens through their stay, the troopers were made to quit on our orders. But now again nearly two hundred soldiers ...are staying.... there; you are, therefore, directed to speak to the members of the Court and have them removed." On another occasion, Bahadur Shah deplored that the army officers indulged in the "practice of coming into the Court carelessly dressed and in utter disregard to the forms of respect to the royalty.... They came galloping on their horses to places....which not even Nadir

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*, rule nos. 8, 9 and 10.

<sup>245</sup> *Ibid.*, rule no. 8.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*, rule nos. 4, 8.

<sup>247</sup> *Ibid.*, rule nos. 4, 6.

<sup>248</sup> Bundle 57, Fo. no. 285 (Urdu), August 8, 1857.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*, Fo. nos. 9, 120 and 276 (Urdu), dt. 13 and 14 July and 8 August, 1857, respectively; also see Bundle 57 Fo no 58 (Urdu), July 3, 1857.



Shah, nor Ahinad Shah, nor any of the British Governor-Generals of India ever entered on horseback....Do the army have the welfare of the State at heart?"<sup>250</sup> cried the last Moghul in despair.

The plight of the royal princes was even worse. They did not wield any influence at all. In fact, the hopes of the princely order were being frustrated at every step by the "headstrong" and "insolent" soldiery. Mirza Moghal, heir-apparent and Commander-in-Chief of the rebel army until the arrival of General Bakht Khan on July 1, 1857, wrote to Bahadur Shah: "Your Majesty is aware that before Bakht Khan came, active operations of war were carried on daily and without any let or hindrance....Today, when I went outside the city with my regiments to attack the enemy, he interposed and kept the whole force standing inactive. He wanted to know under whose orders they had been brought out, and commanded that they were not to proceed without his permission, (in the end) he forced us to return."<sup>251</sup>

The tussle which ensued between Mirza Moghal and General Bakht Khan, and which filtered down to their respective followers, was not merely personal bickering. In fact, the princely order could no longer place any confidence in the infantry.<sup>252</sup> The jealousy, strife and conflict between the heir-apparent and the revolutionary General were, beneath the surface, a struggle between the dying aristocracy and the new force of peasant proprietors. It was, therefore, not at all surprising that the feudal barons began soon after to groan under the levelling attempted by the rebels, and lost much of their enthusiasm in the midst of the struggle. "The *Shahzadas*" writes the Rev. Cave-Browne, "began to feel their condition perilous and tried to open negotiations (with the British)."<sup>253</sup>

The Court of Administration was also the highest judicial authority. It established law courts, appointed judges, and regulated the judicial procedure for civil and criminal cases. The police officers as well as the civil servants were appointed by the Court, and were responsible to and could be removed by it.<sup>254</sup> It tried to eradicate bribery and corruption, and it did this with a heavy hand. The

<sup>250</sup> Bundle 199, Fo. no. 195 (Persian), July 23, 1857. 1

<sup>251</sup> *Trial of Bahadur Shah*, pp. 134-35. Copy of an order from the King to Mirza Moghal, dt. nil.

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, Fo. no. 185 (Persian), August 7, 1857. 1.

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid.*, Fo. no. 49 (Persian), August 7, 1857.

<sup>254</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 140.

H. H. Greathed in his *Letters Written During the Siege of Delhi*, (1853), writes on August 9, 1857: "I am beginning to get letters from the princes. They declare they have been all along fondly attached to us and that they only want to know what they can do for us" (pp. 205-6). King Bahadur Shah, it may be remembered, addressed a letter to the Lt.-Governor of Agra on May 11, 1857, informing him of the arrival of the rebels from Meerut. On July, 4, 1857, General T. Reed, commander-in-chief of the British besieging force at Delhi, wrote to Sir John Lawrence, chief commissioner, Punjab, informing him that if "we would guarantee his (King's) life and pension, he would open the gates (of the City or Red Fort) for us." Zeenat Mahal, the favourite wife of the King, offered "to exercise her influence with the King, to bring about some arrangement" (Greaded, *op. cit.*, p. 217).



man in the street could appeal to the Court in all cases of alleged abuse of authority and oppression.<sup>255</sup>

In the sphere of finance, too, the Court was supreme. The revenue officials were appointed and could be removed by it alone.<sup>256</sup> It also enjoyed authority to collect land revenue and other taxes and levies.<sup>257</sup> None except the Court could raise loans on behalf of the state. Officials were required to forward immediately to the Court any *Parwanah* that they received from any other quarter for raising funds. They were also instructed not to arrest without the summons of the Court a person refusing to lend money.<sup>258</sup> Once when Mirza Sultan Khizr tried to raise funds on his own, the Court strongly protested and asked the Emperor to warn the princes against doing so.<sup>259</sup> The Emperor refused to give his assent to a suggestion made by Mirza Moghal that the officials of the royal household, instead of the agents of the Courts, should collect money, in spite of the Mirza's plea that it would help raise more funds.<sup>260</sup> He reminded the Mirza that the Court was the sole authority in that matter.<sup>261</sup>

It cannot be denied that the Court failed miserably in the matter of raising loans. The propertied classes appear to have been too frightened at the demand of the rebels to advance them loans, or at their "innovation" to abolish landlordism.<sup>262</sup> On their part the peasant-soldiers were unable to entertain any idea of nationalization of land due to the nature of their class origin. The Mahajans refused to part with money except under duress. The wholesalers, and retailers, too, refused to sell their goods on credit to the new state which they were convinced was bankrupt and unstable.<sup>263</sup> They were not wholly unjustified in view of the fact that the Court had been unable to restore peace and order in the City.<sup>264</sup> Hoarding, profiteering and black-marketing reduced the people to misery. The Court did, it is true, make heroic efforts to save the state from economic ruin. It tried to fix and control prices.<sup>265</sup> But in the absence of rationing, assured supplies and a stable administration, price control did not and could not succeed.

<sup>255</sup> Bundle 199, Fo. no. 137 (Urdu), July 20, 1857; Petition of the members of the Court to the King.

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>257</sup> Bundle 129, Fo. no. 6 (Urdu), August 18, 1857.

<sup>258</sup> Bundle 109, Fo. no. 137 (Urdu), July 10, 1857.

<sup>259</sup> Bundle 129, Fo. no. 61 (Urdu), August 8, 1857.

<sup>260</sup> Bundle 153, Fo. no. 17 (Persian), dt. nil; Bundle 57, Fo. no. 532 (Persian), August 19, 1857.

<sup>261</sup> Bundle 153, Fo. no. 16 (Persian), dt. nil.

<sup>262</sup> Bundle 199, Fo. no. 248 (Persian), August 6, 1857.

<sup>263</sup> Bundle 199, Fo. no. 137 (Urdu), July 10, 1857. It reads as follows: "If on inspection of the documents, and on the testimony of their witnesses, viz., the *Kanungo* (Registrar of Landed Rights), the *Patwari* (Village Accountant), and other respectable men of the place, it shall be clearly proved that the claimant had really been the land-holder....the settlement will be made in his favour."

<sup>264</sup> Bundle 106, Fo. no. 20 (Urdu), June 6, 1857; also Bundle 126, Fo. no. 20 (Urdu), June 1, 1857.

<sup>265</sup> Bundle 40, Fo. no. 297 (Urdu), August 9, 1857.



Necessity forced the Court to heavy and arbitrary taxation. This cannot be denied, though, that the incidence of taxation fell almost entirely on the classes which could pay.<sup>266</sup> Tax measures left the man-in-the-street untouched. On the contrary, the Court tried to give him relief. It passed orders for liquidating the zamindari system and giving proprietary right to the actual tiller.<sup>267</sup> It is evident from the orders passed by the Court that it had intended to overhaul the system of revenue assessment. Its authority was, however, too short-lived to accomplish the task.

A similar Court of Administration was set up in Lucknow. Like the Delhi rebels, the Lucknow insurgents crowned Birjis Qadr, a natural son of the ex-King of Oudh. On his elevation to the throne, or rather on his being created Nawab Vazir of Oudh—for his authority was subordinated to that of the Emperor of Delhi—his mother and Mammu Khan enjoyed power that was checked only by the caprice of the troops, to whom their elevation was due.<sup>268</sup>

The real power was, in fact, vested in a minister and a Court of Administration.<sup>269</sup> The Court consisted of the King's principal servants, of the rajas and great landed proprietors of the area and the self-created high dignitaries of the army. The Court deliberated upon how operations against the British were to be conducted. It had its own commander-in-chief; formerly, the commander-in-chief was Hishmat-ud-Dowlah, a brother-in-law of the ex-King. The Court had appointed generals of divisions, brigadiers and colonels, and had apparently, a well constituted and well regulated army.<sup>270</sup> In truth, however, the sepoys themselves elected their officers, and the officers their commanders—all in the name of the King. But if, as happened not infrequently, they happened to displease the gallant sepoys, a debating assembly would immediately be called by the privates, at the conclusion of which they would usually be degraded or executed.<sup>271</sup> Thus, the new dignitaries were not treated with respect, and they did not command that obedience which military officers are entitled to in a disciplined army. Their offices, except the very highest, were replete with danger.<sup>272</sup> The rebel troops paid no heed to their commanders, and did what they liked.<sup>273</sup>

<sup>266</sup> Bundle 129, Fo. nos. 42, 49, 57, 79, 85, 100, 101 and 102 of various dates; also Bundle 130, Fo. nos. 5, 9, 17, 22, 25, 35, 55, 61, 67, 86, 90, 120, 121, 125, 150, 158, 171, 182, 188, 201 and 202 of various dates.

<sup>267</sup> Bundle 153, Fo. no. 6 (Persian), July 28, 1857.

<sup>268</sup> See footnote 261.

<sup>269</sup> Capt. G. Hutchinson, *Narrative of the Mutinies in Oudh* (1859), p. 161; Rees, *op. cit.*, p. 261. Hutchinson gives the names of the following five members of the Lucknow Court of Administration: (i) Capt. Raghunath Singh; (ii) Capt. Umrao Singh; (iii) Capt. Imdad Hussein; (iv) Darogha Wajid Ali; and (v) Mammu Khan Sharf-ud-Dowlah. (p. 180).

<sup>270</sup> Rees, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

<sup>271</sup> J. Talboys Wheeler, *India Under British Rule*, (1886), p. 265.

<sup>272</sup> Rees, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-3.

<sup>273</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 262-3.



## VI. ROLE OF CLASSES

The upper classes were terrified at the growth of a democratic spirit among the soldiers, became suspicious of the results of the revolt, and lost their enthusiasm after the first flush of the rebellion was over.

The changing attitude of the upper classes during the rebellion, especially that of the talukdars, zamindars and sahukars, makes this clear. During the first phase, which lasted approximately till the first of July, 1857, the date on which the Court of Administration was formed in Delhi, "backed by their retainers, the talukdars, rose almost to a man, forcibly ejected those upon whom their....estates had been bestowed."<sup>274</sup> Henry St-George Tucker, in a letter to the Governor-General described the situation thus: "All the large landholders and auction-purchasers are paralysed and dispossessed, their agents being frequently murdered and their property destroyed."<sup>275</sup>

But with the disappearance of British authority, the concept of "freedom," too, began to take shape. The sepoys as well as the common people began occupying lands, "plundering" towns, and destroying government records and other deeds of property.<sup>276</sup> It was on one such occasion that Kunwar Singh, who led the rebels in Bihar, and was himself big landlord, stopped his followers from indulging in such factions, on the plea that "otherwise, after the British were driven out of the country, there would be no proof of the rights of the people, and no evidence to determine the amount due from one party to the other."<sup>277</sup>

However, mostly the armed masses were lords of their respective areas, expropriating the rich at will.<sup>278</sup> Mark Thornhill writes that "every shop was completely plundered, and not only plundered but wrecked. The doors were torn out, the verandahs pulled down, the floor dug up, and also great holes dug in the walls. Whatever was worth carrying off had gone to the villages, the rest lay in the streets. The roads were covered with torn account books, broken bottles, fragments of jars and boxes besides the debris of the floor and verandahs."<sup>279</sup> All those who had anything to lose cursed the sepoys.<sup>280</sup> "The rebels were," Sir Syed Ahmad Khan remarked, "for the most part men who had nothing to lose, the governed not the governing class."<sup>281</sup> The upper classes, therefore, began to fear victory more than the defeat in the rebellion. Victory, they thought, was more likely to bring about their complete extinction. "Most of them were shrewd enough to perceive that it would not answer their purpose to join the rebels."<sup>282</sup>

<sup>274</sup> Innes, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

<sup>275</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

<sup>276</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 233-34.

<sup>277</sup> Thornhill, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

<sup>278</sup> *Arya Kirti* by Rajani Gupta of Bengal. Quoted by Savarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

<sup>279</sup> Metcalfe, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 352; Lowe, *op. cit.*, p. 185; Thornhill, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-7; Gubbins, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>280</sup> Thornhill, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

<sup>281</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

<sup>282</sup> Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 5.



After the second week of the siege of Lucknow the rebels "did not seem to have received further reinforcements from the talukdars of Oudh."<sup>283</sup>

It was due to the emergence of the common people as leaders of the rebellion that General Outram found as late as September 17, 1857, "a large and influential class in Oudh... among the most powerful and most of the middle classes of chiefs and zamindars who really desire the establishment of our rule."<sup>284</sup> Lt-General McLeod Innes firmly believed that "the participation of most of them in the Mutiny had been more nominal than real."<sup>285</sup> While some of them preserved "armed neutrality,"<sup>286</sup> others "sent to the rebel camp only such contingents as were demanded and personally remained passive."<sup>287</sup> Still others "kept the British authorities informed of the movements of the Mutineers, and of their want of ammunition."<sup>288</sup> Some of the talukdars and Bannias even supplied the British armies with necessities<sup>289</sup> and gave shelter to British fugitives.<sup>290</sup> Kaye writes: "Some powerful rajas, whose interest it was to maintain order, either sided with the English or maintained a discreet neutrality whilst the tumult was at its height."<sup>291</sup> Holmes records that "though of the whole body of influential landowners some unquestionably took an active part against us, a considerable number was passively loyal, and some few manfully threw themselves into the breach and exerted their influence to stem the rush of insurrection."<sup>292</sup> General Outram could not find any positive evidence that, before the issuing of the Canning proclamation of March 20, 1858, any talukdar took the field *in person* on the side of the rebels.<sup>293</sup>

In "marked contrast" with this conduct, however, the talukdars "rose *en masse* in rebellion after the publication of the Canning proclamation."<sup>294</sup> The proclamation had confiscated all lands of the province with the exception of those held by six specified persons and others who could prove to the satisfaction of the government that they had been loyal during the rebellion.<sup>295</sup> A "favourable" factor in this forced decision to revolt was that by then the rebels had been beaten at Delhi, Lucknow, Kanpur, Banaras and Allahabad. The latter had also been weakened by internal dissensions and economic crisis. This eliminated the fear from the minds of the talukdars that the traditional economic

<sup>283</sup> Joyce, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

<sup>284</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

<sup>285</sup> General Sir James Outram, *Orders, Despatches and Correspondence*, (1859), p. 297.

<sup>286</sup> Innes, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

<sup>287</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 265.

<sup>288</sup> Lt.-Gen. Innes, *Lucknow and Oudh in Mutiny*, (1896), p. 293.

<sup>289</sup> Gubbins, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

<sup>290</sup> Innes, *The Sepoy Revolt*, p. iii; Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

<sup>291</sup> All "personal narratives" are full of such references. According to Gubbins, "there is only one instance of treachery... which we came across" (*op. cit.*, p. 140).

<sup>292</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 260.

<sup>293</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, pp. 143, 260.

<sup>294</sup> Quoted by Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 626.

<sup>295</sup> Innes, *Lucknow and Oudh in Mutiny*, pp. 291-93.



and social structure would be affected if they associated intimately with the encroaching commoners against the British.

Realizing the dangerous consequences of the proclamation, Sir George Campbell, a distinguished civilian, had advised the government against the implementation of the proclamation. Instead, he urged them to assure the talukdars that "bygones should be bygones," because won over by Sir Henry Lawrence's mild policy, some of them had sent supplies for the provisioning of the Residency at Lucknow, and had aided British fugitives after the rebellion in Oudh.<sup>296</sup> General Outram asked the Governor-General to treat the talukdars as "honourable enemies" and to guarantee them the possession of land. He warned Lord Canning that if nothing more than their lives and freedom from imprisonment were offered to the talukdars, they would be driven in despair to wage a guerilla war which would involve the loss of thousands of Europeans by battle, disease, and exposure; whereas if the possession of their lands was guaranteed to them, they would exert their influence to support the government in the restoration of order.<sup>297</sup> The situation was sufficiently serious to induce Lord Canning to accept General Outram's proposal for winning the feudal barons. He assured them a fair deal; the result was instantaneous. On October 22, 1858, when rebellion was still raging in Oudh, the *vakil* of the Begum of Oudh went to the British Commander-in-Chief's camp to ask what terms she might expect. All the rajas and talukdars who were still at large, had already despatched their agents on similar errands.<sup>298</sup>

After the revolt, therefore, "the talukdars not only recovered their estates, but they received, in many cases, extravagant privileges to which they themselves had no pretensions, and solemn promises that the privileges should be maintained were given by the Government."<sup>299</sup> After the rebellion about two-thirds of the land passed into the possession of big landlords<sup>300</sup> under the tenure which prevailed at the time of the annexation of Oudh.<sup>301</sup> This was the price of their betrayal of the revolt, that after the order of confiscation, the talukdars received, in fact, more than they had demanded before the rebellion. No wonder the British army of occupation was "joyfully welcomed by the chief landlords and the respectable villagers."<sup>302</sup>

In Delhi, the tale was similar. After entering the Moghul capital and formally proclaiming Bahadur Shah the Emperor of India, the rebels took over the city. "All is confusion and riot," was the terse report of Rajjab Ali, a British

Malleon, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 409.

George Campbell, *op. cit.*, vol. II., p. 14; Bosworth Smith, *op. cit.*, vol. II. pp. 176, 191, 193-95; Innes, *The Sepoy Revolt*, pp. 244-45.

Quoted by Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 447; Malleon, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 251. The proclamation was disapproved by Lord Ellenborough, President of the Board of Control: See Cunningham, *op. cit.*, Ch. VII, *passim*.

Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 533.

Strachey, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

*Ibid.*, p. 382.

Sykes, *Compendium of the Laws, especially relating to the Taluqdars of Oudh*, pp. 382-83.



spy.<sup>303</sup> Nawab Moinuddin describes the scene as follows:<sup>304</sup> "They addressed the Emperor with such disrespectful terms as 'I say, you, King! I say, you, old man! (*Arre, Badshah! Arre, Buddhe*).' 'Listen,' cried one, catching him by hand. 'Listen to me,' said another, touching the old king's beard. Enraged at their behaviour, yet unable to prevent their insolence, the King found relief in bewailing before his servants his misfortunes and his fate." Those who had formerly been only too glad humbly to obey his orders were not ashamed to mock and humiliate him.<sup>305</sup> His Queen was threatened with arrest many times; his sons were made to play second fiddle; and the royal physician was actually imprisoned by the rebels.<sup>306</sup> Sick of all this, Bahadur Shah asked the sepoys to leave the city.<sup>307</sup> When these requests went unheeded, he decided to negotiate with the British, but found himself too helpless to do so. That was on July 24, 1857.<sup>308</sup> After that, he vacillated between the desire to become a *faqir*, and the desire to "resign the imperial power" into the hands of the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner and Alwar; he could rely on nobody "to organize and administer the very important affairs of the Empire."<sup>309</sup> When his request to the four rulers failed to solicit the necessary answer, "Bahadur Shah, Emperor of Hindustan, sent in (agents to British camp) to treat for terms."<sup>310</sup>

If such was the plight of the Emperor of India, the condition of the feudal and usurious classes in general can well be imagined. To put a stop to the destruction and plundering of their property they decided "to buy up a regiment by a monthly payment,"<sup>311</sup> later, raised a private police force to protect themselves from plunder and violence.<sup>312</sup> Soon, however, the arrangements failed. On August 20, the bankers of the city decided to resist jointly their exactions of the sepoys.<sup>313</sup> Forced by starvation due the refusal of shopkeepers to sell provisions for want of payment,<sup>314</sup> the sepoys began to indulge in unrestrained looting.<sup>315</sup> They even threatened to sack the city. Scores of bankers, merchants, former courtiers and princes were threatened by the sepoys in daily bids to extort money from them.<sup>316</sup>

The propertied classes abandoned willing cooperation with the sepoys. They helped under duress, and only to the extent necessary to save their lives and

<sup>303</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 434; Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 391. Charles Raikes, *Notes on the Revolt in the N. W. Provinces of India*, (1858), pp. 156ff.

<sup>304</sup> Quoted by Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 37.

<sup>305</sup> Metcalfe, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>306</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 87.

<sup>307</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93; Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

<sup>308</sup> Metcalfe, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-94.

<sup>309</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 165 and 178.

<sup>310</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 220; Holmes *op. cit.*, p. 354.

<sup>311</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 39. See footnote 252.

<sup>312</sup> Metcalfe, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93.

<sup>314</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202.

<sup>315</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 214.

<sup>316</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 216.



property. They buried their wealth,<sup>317</sup> and refused all supplies for want of payment.<sup>318</sup> On August 30, Dolali Mall, Chief of the Commissariat, reported that he was no longer able to serve out rations to the troops.<sup>319</sup> On the following day, Mulahi Lala Muthridi, a contractor, petitioned that no more sulphur could be purchased and the manufacture of gunpowder, therefore, must cease.<sup>320</sup> The upper classes were convinced that "the Mutineers who were laden with looted wealth, could neither leave the city, nor protect it."<sup>321</sup> They stayed only to enrich themselves.<sup>322</sup> Thus "the awful misery of warfare and the ghastly destitution of anarchy were fully felt by the population — shopkeepers, retail traders" and other rich classes.<sup>323</sup> "From a Mohammedan correspondent," wrote Frederick Cooper, "we are informed of the enormous exertion which Muftee Sadder-ud-din ... Hakim Ahsan Ullah Khan, Mirza Elahi Baksh and Begum Zeenat Mahal are prepared make to make up with the English Government .... The mercy of the government is particularly asked for the King, the nobles and the citizens of Delhi who are innocent and helpless."<sup>324</sup>

The story was repeated in Bengal. The zamindars remained actively loyal to the English. The reason for their loyalty is easy to understand. During the rebellion, the peasantry of Bihar (which then formed a part of the Bengal Presidency) came out openly not only against the British, but also against the zamindars and their agents. The memorial submitted by the Bengal zamindars in December 1857, to the Governor-General states that "so essentially have they identified their interests with the rulers, that... (they) have in every part of the scene of the mutinies been exposed to the same cruelty, which mutineers and their misguided countrymen have displayed towards the British within their reach."<sup>325</sup>

In the villages and towns in affected areas, the shrewd traders and the parasitic money-lenders, who had grown fat under the British land and legal systems, helped the Company's government as long as they could do so; they helped the mutineers only when evasion was impossible.<sup>326</sup> They thought that the victory of the rebels would mean the restoration of the old village economy in which they had no place.<sup>327</sup> They, therefore, longed for the restoration of "law and order," and for the resumption of the "ordinary routine of trade." This was possible only under British rule. Thornhill's remark that "with the exception of

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*Ibid.*, *passim*.

*Ibid.*, p. 93.

*Ibid.*, p. 214.

*Ibid.*, p. 213.

*Ibid.*, p. 214.

*Ibid.*, p. 94.

*loc. cit.*

Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

*Ibid.*, pp. 210-11.

Asoka Mehta, *op. cit.*, p. 64; Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 458.

Holmes, *op. cit.*, pp. 45, 163, 170, 188, 252 and 261.



Bannias, who suffered by it, all classes enjoyed the confusion"<sup>328</sup> succinctly sums up the situation. Kaye found "much sincerity" in the professions of delight on the part of the trading classes, "who commonly lost more than they gained by these convulsions."<sup>329</sup>

The merchants and bankers in the coastal and unaffected areas actively supported the British. They had heard about the expropriation of the property of their own class in the "liberated" areas several times in a short period. They were certain that the success of the rebellion, whether under the banner of feudal barons or of the rebellious soldiery and the pauperized peasantry, would mean their own extinction economically. "The bannias....and native contractors, never lost their confidence in the power of (the Company's Government) but always said.... 'Sahib, it is but a little while; and these rebels will bite the dust (literally eat dirt), for the Company is Almighty.'"<sup>330</sup> According to Holmes, "the mercantile and shopkeeping classes....who knew that their position and prosperity were staked upon the continuance of orderly rule, and would be liable to ruin amid the anarchy which would be sure to follow upon its subversion, were steady, if not loyal supporters of the Government...."<sup>331</sup> They shut their ears against rumours about the fall of British rule in India,<sup>332</sup> vied with each other in the loyalty of their addresses and offers of service.<sup>333</sup>

The Parsees, who were mostly traders, helped the British for another reason also, "if they are rich," writes Thomas Lowe, "they owe it to no Hindu or Mussalman... if they lean more to the British than any other race in the land it is because British justice and equable laws protect them from the rapine and persecution they have so often suffered under other powers.... In the last Mutiny they suffered equally with the Europeans at the hands of the the Mutineers, and in many cases worse.... Through these merchants, we obtained all that was necessary for the march."<sup>334</sup>

Indians who had been taught English and native officials generally took no part in the revolt. While the former remained "invariably loyal"<sup>335</sup> to the British, the latter "stood gallantly" at their post<sup>336</sup> throughout the crisis. Their disapproval was based on self-interest. They knew that if the *Badshah Hakumat*<sup>337</sup> were re-established they would be thrown out. Being ignorant of

<sup>328</sup> For reasons see Strachey, *op. cit.*, p. 427.

<sup>329</sup> Thornhill, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

<sup>330</sup> Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 391; Thornhill, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

<sup>331</sup> Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

<sup>332</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 45; Kaye, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 117; Thornhill, *op. cit.*, p. 108; Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

<sup>333</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

<sup>334</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 163 and 168.

<sup>335</sup> Lowe, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

<sup>336</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 143. For reasons see Raikes, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

<sup>337</sup> Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 143. Norton in his *Topics for Indian Statesman* (1858) observed: "... We must also acknowledge with thankfulness the debt we owe to the educated natives" (p. 56).



Persian, innocent of eastern customs and of a non-aristocratic origin, they would not find any place in the social and political set up.

The rebellion was crushed within the short time of two years. It was crushed so easily because of betrayal by the propertied classes. To save their class interests, they committed suicide as a free people. None of the ruling princes joined the revolt — because Lord Canning had solemnly guaranteed their right of adoption in perpetuity.<sup>338</sup> Of the rajahs and ranis, only Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi laid down her life against the British, though she took the field against the British in March 1858, — only after she had failed to convince them that she was in no way connected with the uprising or massacre at Jhansi.<sup>339</sup> Bahadur Shah fought under compulsion; Nana Sahib took the field against the British only as a prisoner in the hands of the soldiery.<sup>340</sup> The zamindars, both of the British and pre-British times, the merchants and the money-lenders, the educated middle class and the native, officials—all sided with the British or observed sullen neutrality as demanded by the circumstances in which they were caught. All looked to the British as saviours at a time when the Indian peasantry was fighting desperately to free itself of foreign as well as feudal bondage. Thus, though originally organized to restore the outmoded and pre-British economy, "which had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism,"<sup>341</sup> the rebellion ended as a peasant war against indigenous landlordism and foreign imperialism.

## VII. CAUSES OF FAILURE

There were, however, other causes, besides betrayal by the propertied classes, which contributed to the defeat of the rebels in India's fight for political-economic freedom. Strangely enough, the rebellion failed to throw up a single military leader of ability. This becomes obvious when one compares the dogged resistance put up by the British at Lucknow with that of the rebels at Delhi, Jhansi or Gwalior. Doubtless, the Indians, too, gained some notable victories. But these were, it could be said, due to their superior numbers than to better strategy or tactics. Sir John Lawrence has rightly remarked that "had a single leader of ability arisen among them (rebels) ....we must have been lost beyond redemption."<sup>342</sup> Moreover, when the rebellion broke out, the Crimean War and the war with Persia were over, and the British army was in good form. A new treaty of friendship had been signed with Afghanistan. The Russian threat from

<sup>338</sup> Also see Bruce Tiebant McCully, *English Education and the Origin of Indian Nationalism*, (1940), pp. 226-227.

<sup>339</sup> Moghul government.

<sup>340</sup> S. C. Macpherson, *Memorials of Service in India*, p. 311.

<sup>341</sup> Political Proceedings: no. 280, December 30, 1859.

<sup>342</sup> In a letter dated April 20, 1859 addressed to Her Majesty the Queen Empress, the Parliament, the Court of Directors, Governor General etc., Nana Sahib wrote that it was "strange" and "surprising" that they had forgiven people "who truly are murderers," and he, who had "joined the rebels from helplessness," had not been forgiven. Political Proceedings, nos. 63-70, May 1859; no. K. W. 63).

<sup>343</sup> Marx, *op. cit.*, p. 28.



beyond the Khyber Pass was, therefore, not immediate. The British were free to deal with the Indian revolt.

There was another factor which the rebels had not been reckoned with: that England would declare war against China. Considerable forces, for deployment in that country sailed through the Indian ocean, within hailing distance of Calcutta. "To this fortuitous circumstances, under God's providence, was due the early re-establishment of British authority in North-Western India."<sup>343</sup>

The rebels not only suffered from perpetual financial stringency<sup>344</sup> but were also short of war equipment.<sup>345</sup> Major General Sir Owen Tudor Burne noted that the Oudh rebels had insufficient arms. They had 684 cannons, 186,177 muskets, 561,321 swords, 50,311 spears and 638,683 minor weapons. A great proportion of the wounds were, in fact, inflicted by sabre.<sup>346</sup> A *talwar* was surely no match against an Enfield rifle! Charles Ball claims that if the rebel army of Bengal had held "the Minie rifle in their hands, Delhi might still have belonged to the Moghals; and in the place of a wretched charpoy in a prison chamber, the descendant of Timur might even now be sitting upon the crystal throne in the palace of his ancestors."<sup>347</sup>

In addition to the Enfield rifle, there was the telegraph — another modern invention pitted against the rebels. According to Russell, "never since its discovery has the electric telegraph played so important and daring a role as it now does in India. Without it the Commander-in-Chief would lose the effect of half his force. It has served him better than his right arm."<sup>348</sup>

Moreover, in the absence of a compact organization such a revolt could not succeed. The revolt were a motley crowd: dispossessed rooted artisans, impoverished peasants, disgruntled sepoys and fanatical priests, having different concepts of free India. The inchoate aspirations of the leaders were embodied in the Court of Administration and a system of government which was no more than a magnified village panchayat. (This was, after all, their only political heritage.) True, the socio-economic content of the new state was in the direction of instituting peasant proprietorship.<sup>349</sup> But even if the rebels had succeeded, the new state, in spite of its elected Court of Administration, would have, in time, relapsed into the old monarchical system. This becomes almost certain when, we recall that General Bakht Khan, the rebel leader of Delhi, had assumed the title of "Lord Governor Bahadur, Controller of all Matters, Civil and Military."<sup>350</sup> This interpretation is supported by the fact that the revolt was caused not by a

<sup>343</sup> Anderson and Subedar, *op. cit.*, 114.

<sup>344</sup> Metcalfe, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

<sup>345</sup> See above, sec. V.

<sup>346</sup> Metcalfe, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

<sup>347</sup> Maj-Gen. Sir Owen Tudor Burne, *Clyde and Stratlinairn*, (1891), p. 55n.

<sup>348</sup> Ball, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 609.

<sup>349</sup> Russell, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 224.

<sup>350</sup> See footnote 261.



revolutionary technological change in the means of production, necessitating a readjustment in the established social relationship and demanding a new system of government, but merely by the dissolution of the old social order without the birth of a new one.

### VIII. SOME EFFECTS

Although the rebellion was suppressed within two years, its effects were long lasting and widespread. "There came over the British Government and its officers," observes Sir John Strachey, "a flood of reactionary opinions." Because the princes had rendered signal services by acting as the breakwaters to the storm, "to preserve them as a bulwark of the Empire has ever since been a principle of British policy," noted P. E. Roberts, an English historian.<sup>352</sup> Queen Victoria's proclamation, on becoming the Empress of India, read thus: "We hereby announce to the native princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company are by us accepted and will be scrupulously maintained and we look for like observance on their part . . . . We shall respect the rights, dignity and honour of native princes as our own. . . ."<sup>353</sup>

The revolt also led to an "alliance" between the Indian landlords, moneylenders and the British, who thought it would be difficult for them to rule permanently if they adopted policies "by which the better classes of the natives of Hindustan would remain alienated from us."<sup>354</sup> The Queen's proclamation stated therefore: "We know, and respect, the feeling of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith . . . . and in framing and administering the law, due regard will be paid to the ancient rights, usage and customs of India."<sup>355</sup> The Government of India suggested to London in November 1859, that "the maintenance of a landed aristocracy in India where none existed, is an object of such importance that we may well afford to sacrifice to it something of a system which, while it has increased the independence and protected the rights of the cultivators of the soil, has led to the exhaustion or decay of the old nobility."<sup>356</sup> It was in pursuance of this policy that two-thirds of the talukdars of Oudh, whom Canning had contemptuously described as "men distinguished neither by birth, good service or connection with soil," were rehabilitated "as a necessary element in the social constitution of the provinces."<sup>357</sup> More. Between 1858 and 1862 the proposal for extending the zamindari settlement was subjected to heated debate by the British. The proposal

1 Bundle 199, Fo. no. 25 (Persian), August 7, 1857.

2 Strachey, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

3 P. E. Roberts, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 388.

4 Ramsay Muir, *op. cit.*, p. 382.

5 Gubbins, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

6 Muir, *op. cit.*, pp. 382-83.

7 Govt. of India to the Secretary of State for India. Quoted by Strachey, *op. cit.*, p. 381.



was finally dropped because of the financial troubles which had been caused by the revolt.<sup>358</sup> But this "alliance" between Indian landlords and British imperialists pushed India into an agrarian crisis whose effects have still to be fully wiped out.

From the economic and political planes, the "alliance" extended its influence to the social and cultural planes. The policy of changing the "squares of obsolete tradition for the rounds of civilized enlightenment"<sup>359</sup> was abandoned. "A nervous fear," wrote Sir Henry Maine, "of altering native customs has, ever since the terrible events of 1857, taken possession of Indian administrators."<sup>360</sup> The British in India began jealously to guard and preserve the social and religious survivals against the demands of the progressive, rising middle class in respect of age of marriage, legislation against untouchability, divorce among Hindus, and the right of inheritance to Hindu women.

The army and the Muslims were regarded by the British as the chief instigators of the revolt. They therefore received special attention. The Peel Commission (1858) recommended the reduction of the native army, and nearly 200,000 men, including some from the military police, were disbanded. Another Army Commission which was appointed 21 years later drew two lessons from the revolt: First, of retaining in the country an "irresistible force of British troops," and secondly, "of keeping the artillery in the hands of Europeans." Lord Canning, who was regarded in England as "pro-nigger," and derided for his "clemency,"<sup>361</sup> recommended that no European soldier should be allowed to stay in India long enough to forget that he belonged to an army of occupation. His suggestion was incorporated in the Army Amalgamation Scheme of 1861.<sup>362</sup> Similarly, principal treasuries, big arsenals, strategic positions and key fortresses and military positions were, from now on, guarded by European troops whose number was "enough....to hold their own, even in the event of a Mutiny."<sup>363</sup>

The Muslims, too, felt the wrath of the British. They were accused by the latter of taking a leading part in the rebellion.<sup>364</sup> "To teach these rascally Mussalmans a lesson," the Nawabs of Jhajjar, Ballabgarh, Furrukhnagar, and twenty-four shahzadas were hanged.<sup>365</sup> Muslim property was either confiscated or destroyed. While Muslims were made to pay 35 per cent of their immovable property as punitive fine, Hindus were let off with only 10 per cent. After Delhi

<sup>358</sup> Strachey, *Ibid.*, pp. 381-82.

<sup>359</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 382.

<sup>360</sup> Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>361</sup> Quoted by Asoka Mehta, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

<sup>362</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 71-73.

<sup>363</sup> *loc. cit.*

<sup>364</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 74. Gubbins wrote: "The British India Empire was before essentially founded on opinion. It will hereafter have the secure basis of physical power. We relied before upon the support of an army raised from our native subjects. Hereafter we shall trust more to the bayonets of our countrymen" (*op. cit.*, p. 436).

<sup>365</sup> Raikes remarked that "a Mohammedan was another word for a rebel" (*op. cit.*, p. 175). Also see Ball, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 79, 92; Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 272; Innes, *The Sepoy Revolt*, p. 8.



was re-conquered the Hindus were allowed to return within a few months, but the Muslims could not, before 1859. C. F. Andrews observes in his *Zakaullah of Delhi* that "decay immediately overtook the revival of learning in Delhi, from which it never recovered."<sup>366</sup>

The story was the same in other places and provinces.

The Muslims continued their struggle against the British— if not openly, then in daily antipathies. These took the form, collectively, of antagonism to British culture and civilization, philosophy and education, everything British. Thus in the post-rebellion period "while... Hindus... inspired by the arts and sciences of Europe, were experiencing an intellectual and moral renaissance," wrote Sir Theodore Morrison, "the Muslims all over India were falling into a state of material indigence and intellectual decay."<sup>367</sup>

The result was that "the proportion of the (Muslim) race which a century ago had the monopoly of government, has now fallen to less than one-twenty-third of the whole administrative body. This, too, in the gazetted appointments, where the distribution of patronage is closely watched. In less conspicuous office establishments...the exclusion of Musalmans is even more complete."<sup>368</sup> By the time they realised the cost of such an attitude, (in the writings of men like Sir Iqbal Ahmad Khan), the Hindus had taken long strides in education and had entrenched themselves in government services and business—the only avenues open to the educated classes. This uneven development of the two communities worsened the Hindu-Moslem problem. It was later to distort India's struggle for national independence. Encouraged and exploited by the British, this development eventually led to the creation of Pakistan.

British territorial expansion in India practically ceased after the rebellion, and the era of imperialist consolidation..... set in. Sir John Seeley said that "about the time of the Mutiny, annexation almost ceased and yet the quarter of the century in which no conquests have been made has been the period of a rapid growth in trade."<sup>369</sup> According to Asoka Mehta trade expanded by nearly 360 per cent.<sup>370</sup>

This expansion was due to the opening up of interior markets by means of a network of railways and roads, to capital investment. But "you cannot maintain a net of railways over an immense country," wrote Marx, "without producing all those industrial processes necessary to meet the immediate and current wants of railway locomotion, and out of it there must grow branches of industry not immediately connected with railways. (It) will ... dissolve ... the hereditary divisions of labour, upon which rest the Indian castes—those impediments to Indian progress and Indian power."<sup>371</sup> Thus, England though

Sir William Muir, *Indian Mutiny: N. W. P. Intelligence Records*, (1902), vol. I, p. 273.

C. F. Andrews, *Maulavi Zakaullah of Delhi*, p. 38.

Quoted by Mohammad Noman, *Muslim India*, (1942), p. 32.

Sir W. W. Hunter, *Our Indian Musalmans*, (2nd ed., 1872), p. 170.

Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, (8th ed., 1912), p. 313.

Mehta, *op. cit.*, p. 70.



"actuated only by the vilest interests," became "the conscious tool of history" in bringing about "the greatest, and to speak the truth, the *only social* revolution ever heard of in Asia."<sup>372</sup> But, observed Marx, "the Indians will not reap the fruits of the new elements of society scattered among them by the British... till the Indians themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether."<sup>373</sup> It was on the realization of this truth that the Indians began their organized struggle for independence in 1886. Sixty-one years later, on August 15, 1947, they won their freedom.

(in: *Rebellion 1857. A Symposium*. Edited by P.C. Joshi. New Delhi 1957, pp. 1-70)



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<sup>372</sup> Marx, *op. cit.*, p. 65. 373.

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.



## WAR OF 1857 IN DEHLI

(11th May 1857)

In the preceding chapter half a century of Mughul twilight has been followed under the searchlight of the Records wherein the reader has seen by empses the cold war between Akbar II and after him Bahadur Shah II on the e side and the British Authorities on the other. This cold war was transformed o hot war shortly after the arrival of the Mirath mutineers in Dehli on 11th ay 1857. But this transformation took place on account of the circumstances er which Bahadur Shah had no control. And since after the four months of war ay-September 1857) he stated in his defence<sup>1</sup> before the military commission tribunal which tried him that he had no intimation on the subject of the Mutiny vious to the day of the outbreak, that the mutineers had made him a prisoner l that he was coerced to do whatever they required —it has been contended t Bahadur Shah played no independent role in the war of 1857.<sup>2</sup> But the ence of a prisoner under trial is almost always prepared with the object of eating the prosecution, and the defence of Bahadur Shah was no exception. He s a prisoner and a victim of defeatist mentality who did not assert his rights of *jure* sovereignty and the vassalage of the East India Company before the itary tribunal. His life had been guaranteed conditionally by General Wilson; whatever might be the truth about it, Bahadur-Shah was treated by the itary tribunal as the arch-culprit, and his mental distress during the 42-day-long trial<sup>3</sup> (January 27—March 9, 1858) was like that of a criminal awaiting his conviction. Consequently he was anxious to dissociate himself from the mutineers; he disowned all their doings. In fact Bahadur Shah's fears of the mutineers on the one hand and of the British on the other neutralize themselves; an it would be unscientific to draw conclusions from his defence. Yet almost all English writers have made the written defence put in by Bahadur Shah the basis of their studies on the subject; and a modern historian drawing upon Malleson say, 'There can hardly be any doubt that when after a great delay and wavering Bahadur Shah at last accepted the title of emperor of Hindustan he assumed the responsibility of the position which had been forced upon him. It is more than

<sup>1</sup> *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 138.

<sup>2</sup> Majumdar, R.C.,—*The Sepoy Mutiny and the Revolt of 1857*, pp. 116 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Appendix A, p. 321 *infra*.



probable that the old man left to himself would have shrunk from the position'.<sup>4</sup> But such an observation betrays complete ignorance of the 50-year-long cold war that had preceded the uprising of 1857. It is true that in the course of his letter<sup>5</sup> to George IV of England, Akbar II had promised not to have recourse to arms<sup>6</sup> for the redress of his grievances; but now the times had changed. Bahadur Shah had become more conscious of British tyranny and considered himself a prisoner of the British as is evident from his verses composed a few years before the Mutiny.<sup>7</sup> Mukand Lal the Emperor's private secretary and Hakim Ahsanullah Khan, his physician, explained the situation in the course of their evidence before the military tribunal during Bahadur Shah's trial. Says Mukand Lal, The King of Dehli has for some two years been disaffected against the (British) Government and was disposed not to respect his obligations to the English. The particulars are as follows:—When Mirza Haidar Shikoh and Mirza Murad, sons of Mirza Khan Bakhsh son of Mirza Sulaiman Shikoh came here from Lakhnao they in concert with Hasan Askari arranged and suggested to the King that he should have a letter prepared and despatched to the King of Persia. This letter they suggested should represent that the English had made the King a prisoner and had put a stop to all those marks of respect to which as King he was entitled and had suspended the appointment of any heir-apparent. It was further to represent that his wishes in reference to the appointment of any particular son as heir-apparent were not attended to. Under these circumstances the letter was to request that such an understanding might be established that mutual interchanges of visits and letters might be the result. Sidi Qambar who was one of the King's special armed retainers, was presented with Rs. 100 through Mahbub Ali Khan for the expenses of his journey and was despatched in the direction of Persia with a letter that had been prepared in the King's private secretariat. After this Mirza Haidar and his brother returned to Lakhnao, and having despatched his brother Mirza Najaf, a distant relation of the King, with Mirza Bulaqi son of Mirza Musharrafu'ddin son of Mirza Agha Jan to Persia reported the same to the King in writing. It is now about three years since some infantry soldiers stationed at Dehli became the disciples of the King through Mirza Ali whose duty it was to receive and present all petitions and through Hamid Khan Jamadar; and on that occasion the King gave each of them a document detailing the names and order of those who had preceded him in the direct line, disciples to each other, himself included together with a napkin dyed pink as an emblem of his blessing. The Agent of the Lieutenant-Governor hearing of this occurrence enquired regarding it and for the future prohibited the King's making any more the men of the army his disciples. It may be said that from that day a sort of understanding was established between the army and the King. *Some 20 days before the commencement of the late*

<sup>4</sup> Majumdar, R.C.—S.M.R., p. 118.

<sup>5</sup> *Vide* p. 128, *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> *Vide* p. 128, *supra*.

<sup>7</sup> *Vide* Appendix C.



rebellion intelligence was received here that the troops at Mirath were about breaking out in open mutiny but it had not been heard that they were to come here. When the troopers arrived they first came under the Palace windows and told the King that they had come to him after killing all the English at Mirath and that they would slay immediately those that were here, and they further said that they would for the future consider the Prisoner their King until that time there was not one Englishman left in all India—all had been slain. They further said that the whole army would obey the Kings orders. The King said that they had a disposition to come, they prepare themselves for all the consequences and if were so prepared they were at liberty to come and take the management of matters into their hands. While these disturbances were going on these traitors got into the city; the special armed retainers joined them and Qadir Dad Khan a resident of Kabul slew the Resident Mr. Fraser while some of the infantry soldiers with others of the King's retainers went to the apartments of the Commandant of the Palace Guards and slew him there. After that the English were killed all about the city wherever they were met with. The same day proclamation was made by beat of drum throughout the city that God was the Ruler of the World and Bahadur Shah was Sovereign of the country and had the supreme authority'.<sup>8</sup>

Like Mukand Lal, Hakim Ahsanullah Khan also emphasized that in order to vent his anger against the British Bahadur Shah was prepared to go to extremes. He was prepared even to change his religion and adopt the Shia cult if pleased the Shah of Iran to help him against the British. Says Hakim Ahsanullah, 'Since the time when during the administration of Lord Ellenborough the *nazr* which used to be presented to the King of Dehli on the part of the Governor-General was discontinued the King was always very much aggrieved. At first he wrote on the matter to England and he always afterwards used to complain against the order and to express his dissatisfaction thereat. Subsequently the king was very much grieved in consequence of the Government not having acceded to his wish that his youngest son Mirza Jawan Bakht might be recognized as heir-apparent. Sometime afterwards the King sent Mirza Haidar, his nephew, to the King of Persia. I enquired from Mirza Ali Bakht who was a great friend of Mirza Najaf, whether the latter had carried any letter from the King of Dehli to the Sultan of Persia. He replied in the affirmative and described the contents to be to the effect that the King of Dehli had adopted the Shia creed and the King of Persia should help him. Moreover in that letter the King of Dehli described his miserable and helpless condition . . . Then Sidi Qambar was sent by the King to Mirza Najaf to obtain a reply to his previous communications....From the conversation of the King it appears that when war<sup>9</sup> was going on in Bushire

Pr. Tr. B. S., pp. 101-102.

Three years after the arrival of Lord Canning in India (1856) broke out the Anglo-Persian War. Says Sewell, 'That nation had for years been in the habit of treating the representatives of England with growing contempt. In 1855 this conduct had become so marked that the British Commissioner at Teheran was compelled to leave the city. And at the commencement of the year 1856 the Persian Government had committed a wanton outrage by the seizure of



he had strong hopes of receiving aid from Persia in the shape of money and troops, and during that period he used constantly to make enquiries regarding the events which were occurring in that quarter. During the period of war with Persia some of the princes used to observe that if the Emperor of Russia were to aid the Persians the English would be defeated and the Persians would become masters of India; and the King himself agreed to this opinion'.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore Hakim Ahsanullah Khan hinted that Bahadur Shah was not unaware of the large-scale preparations that the sepoys had made for the Mutiny. He said, 'I believe information must have reached the King of the mutiny of some of the native regiments after the annexation of the Panjab and I doubt not that the King learnt the fact with satisfaction. 'On hearing of the regiments refusing to handle the new cartridges near Calcutta when the excitement spread extensively over the entire length and breadth of the country Bahadur Shah remarked that he would in that case be placed in better circumstances inasmuch as a new dominant power would treat him with greater respect and consideration. Dissatisfied with the British Government, Bahadur Shah made anxious enquiries about the native army whenever any war took place but he took pleasure in hearing of the British defeats and reverses. And when it was known that the discussion about the cartridges was spreading, it was remarked that *whereas the matter touched the religion of the people the excitement would spread extensively over the entire length and breadth of the country and the native army would desert the British Government and thus their rule would be put to an end. The King remarked that he would in that case be placed in better circumstances inasmuch as a new dominant Power would treat him with greater respect and consideration. In short Bahadur Shah believed that his own prosperity would go hand in hand with the ruin of the British Power*'.<sup>11</sup> Hakim Ahsanullah Khan also hinted that Bahadur Shah was hostile to the English not only on his own account but also on account of the people of India since he believed that the British Government wanted to change the religion of the people. 'The sepoys were aiming at expelling the English and at becoming masters of the country; and before the outbreak at Mirath they had organized a conspiracy all over the country. The 38th Native

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Herat from the Afghan, Esa Khan. Accordingly Lord Canning declared war on November 1st. Early in December the troops landed 12 miles south of Bushire in the Persian Gulf, and an action ensued between the British and the enemy who had marched down to prevent a landing. The British army marched on Bushire, and fleet also advanced thither and commenced bombarding the town. A breach was easily effected and the town surrendered. In January 1857 a treaty of friendly alliance was signed between Amir Dost Muhammad of Kabul and the British Government; and thus strengthened, the British were able to inflict a defeat on the aggressive Persian troops in the battle of the Khooshab (7th February, 1857). In April 1857 the British captured Mahamreh which was followed by a Treaty of Peace guaranteeing that Persian troops should be for ever withdrawn from Herat and Afghanistan and that the English Commissioner should be treated with all distinction at Teheran'.

Sewell, R.—*Analytical History of India*, pp. 263-264.

<sup>10</sup> *Pr. Tr. B. S.*—pp. 161-163.

<sup>11</sup> *Pr. Tr. B. S.* pp. 163-164.



Infantry otherwise known as Volunteer Regiment of Dehli said that before the breaking out of the mutiny they had leagued with the troops at Mirath and that the latter had corresponded with the troops in all other places so that from every cantonment troops would arrive at Dehli'.<sup>12</sup>

Then Hakim Ahsanullah Khan described the events of 11th May saying, 'On the morning of 16th Ramazan 11th May at about 7 o' clock A.M. a Hindu sepoy of the 38th Regiment of Native Infantry came up to the door of the Diwan-i Khass in the Palace and said to some of the door-keepers that happened to be on the spot that the native army at Mirath had mutinied against the State and were now on the point of entering Dehli; that he and the rest of them would no longer serve the Company but would fight for their faith. My house is in the Palace and close by the Diwan-i Khass; and I was immediately informed by one of the Musalman door-keepers of what the 38th sepoy had said. I had hardly received this information when the King of Dehli sent for me. I went to him immediately and the King said, 'Look, the cavalry are coming by the road of the Zer-jharoka (ground immediately under the lattices of the Palace). I looked and saw about 15 or 20 of the Company's Regular Cavalry, then about 150 yards distant. They were dressed most of them in uniform but a few had Hindustani clothes on. I immediately suggested to the King to have the gate fastened by which entrance to the Palace from the Zer-jharoka is obtained; and this had scarcely been done when 5 or 6 sawars came up to the closed gate which leads directly under the Musamman Burj Palace where the King has his own private residence in close contiguity with the apartments of the queens and other secluded females of the establishment. The sawars commenced calling out, '*Dohai, Badshah!*' (Help, O King!) we pray for assistance in our fight for the faith.' The King hearing this made no response, nor did he even show himself to the men beneath; but told Ghulam Abbas who was also present to go to Captain Douglas commandant of the Palace Guards and apprise him of the arrival of the sawars and request him to do whatever might be necessary in the case. The King then returned to his inner apartments and I went to the Diwan-i Khass and almost immediately Ghulam Abbas returned accompanied by Captain Douglas. The latter instantly went to the balcony overlooking the Zer-jharoka where the cavalry still remained and said to them, 'Go away from this place: this is the King's Palace; your presence here is an annoyance to the King'. On this the cavalry went off in the direction of the Najghat Gate which gives an entrance to the city immediately to the south of the Palace. The King on hearing that Captain Douglas had come went out and met him in the open space between his private residence and the Diwan-i Khass when Captain Douglas said to him, 'Don't be alarmed, the disturbance shall be put down at once. I will have the men apprehended'. He was going off apparently for this purpose and requested that the gate under the Musamman Burj which I had closed might be opened to enable him to go and speak to the cavalry for the purpose of reasoning with them. The King said: 'You have neither pistols, nor

*Op. cit.*, p. 165.



guns, nor soldiery with you; your going among these men would be indiscreet'. So Captain Douglas went off to his own apartment. Shortly after Pran Jamadar, a servant of Captain Douglas, came and said that Captain Douglas wished that I and Ghulam Abbas would go to him. We accordingly went and Captain Douglas said to us, 'I have sprained my foot. There was another gentleman with him whom I did not recognize; he was lying down on a couch had a sabre wound on his right arm. Captain Douglas said, 'Send two palanquins with bearers immediately that the English ladies here may be taken to the Queen and placed under her protection'. And just at this time Mr. Simon Fraser, the Commissioner, came into the room and said, "Get from the King two guns with artillery and place them at the gateway underneath us." On this Mr. Fraser came down from Captain Douglas' apartment above the gateway accompanied by myself and Ghulam Abbas. I and Ghulam Abbas went straight to the King to deliver the above message. With the King's permission we immediately sent the palanquins for the ladies and also gave instructions about the guns; but shortly after this, information reached us that the Cavalry had entered the Palace enclosure by the Lahore gate where Mr. Fraser wished the guns placed and over which Captain Douglas had his residence: it was also told us that they had killed Mr. Fraser and had gone up to Captain Douglas to kill him. This was instantly confirmed by the return of the *palki* bearers who told us that they had witnessed Mr. Fraser's murder, that his body was in the gateway and that the troopers had ascended the upper building for the purpose of murdering those who were there. The King on hearing this gave orders for all the gates of the Palace to be closed; but answer was given that the Infantry, viz. some of the 38th Native Infantry who were on guard at the Palace would not allow of such being done. After the lapse of some time the cavalry to the number of about 50 rode up to the Diwan-i Khass, dismounted and picketed their horses in the adjoining garden. The infantry—I am not sure of what regiments, but I think of all the three Dehli regiments—also came into the Palace enclosures and laid down their beddings in any of the Palace buildings that they could lay their hands on. The infantry from Mirath did not reach Dehli till about 2 p.m. of that day; they did not reach Dehli in a body but came straggling in; and as they arrived they joined the infantry of the Dehli regiments in spreading their beddings over all parts of the Palace enclosures. There was no regular Court that day; but the King came out some 3 or 4 times to the Diwan-i Khass where the mutineers were lying about all over the palace; and the rebel troopers came flocking into the Palace the whole day and even after the night had set in. The 54th came in the evening and went off at once to occupy the Salimgarh Fort where they, on the next day, fixed guns which they had brought out of the magazine for the purpose of checking any advance of the European troops from Mirath. For three days constant alarms, and specially at nights, were given that the Europeans were coming when the bugles sounded and mutineers got under arms'.<sup>13</sup> Hakim Ahsanullah Khan continued, 'The King was surprised

<sup>13</sup> *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 94.



to see that the troops had come to him. I also wondered at the circumstance because nothing had happened immediately before their arrival which might have led us to expect them though when the discussion about the cartridges first became known it was believed that it would cause some mischief. On the same day (11th May on which the troops arrived) I represented to the King that nothing good could be expected from them. And I addressed a letter to the Lieutenant-Governor of Agra on the part of the King informing him of the arrival of the troops and representing the King's inability to take any measures against them and begging for help in the shape of European troops'.<sup>14</sup>

The evidence of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan being incomplete in many parts it is hereby completed by that of Ghulam Abbas the royal wakil who said, 'Before 10 o'clock Captain Douglas and all other European officers were killed. Immediately after this two companies of infantry which were on guard at the Palace gates followed by the rebel cavalry that had come from Mirath marched into the courtyard of the Diwan-i Khass and commenced firing their muskets, carbines and pistols in the air, at the same time making a great noise. The King hearing the noise came out; and standing at the door of the Diwan-i Khass told his immediate attendants to direct the troops to discontinue the noise they were making and to call the Indian officers forward that they might explain the object of such proceedings. On this, the noise was quelled and the officers of the cavalry came forward, mounted as they were and explained that they had been required to bite the cartridges the use of which deprives the Hindu and Musalmans of their religion as the cartridges were greased with beef and pork fat, that they killed the Europeans at Mirath and had come to claim his protection. The King replied, 'I did not call for you; you have acted very wickedly. However the troopers in large numbers came into the Diwan-i Khass and said, 'Unless you, the King, join us we are dead men and we must in that case just do what we can for ourselves.' The King then seated himself in a chair and the soldiery—officers and all—came forward one by one and bowed their heads before him, asking him to place his hand on them. The King did so. After a little while he went to his own apartments and the troopers picketing their horses in the courtyard took up their quarters and spread their bedding in the Diwan-i Khass and placed guards all about the Palace. After sunset I went home. On coming to the Palace next morning I learned that the guns the reports of which I had heard at 10 or 11 o'clock the night before, had been fired by the Dehli native battery as a salute to the King,<sup>15</sup> I then came to the Diwan-i Khass where I met Hakim Ahsanullah whom I asked whether the King had decided on any measure to put down the disturbance. He told me that the King had despatched a letter on the subject by camel express to the Lieutenant-Governor at Agra; and about 15 days later I again asked him if any answer had been received. He said that the camel rider had returned without a receipt or reply but said he had delivered the letter and

<sup>14</sup> *Idem*, p. 164.

<sup>15</sup> *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 28.



was told a reply would be sent afterwards'. Zakaullah reproduces the Lieutenant-Governor's reaction to the said letter saying, 'On hearing the contents the Lieutenant-Governor remarked: "Himself he (Bahadur Shah) has become Badshah, and now he writes this to us".<sup>16</sup> It follows that the Lieutenant-Governor treated the letter in question as an ultimatum, else he would have immediately sent a grateful reply. Far from it, in the words of the author of the *Qaisaru-t Tawarikh* 'he sent the same letter of Bahadur Shah to the Ruling Chiefs of Rajasthan'.<sup>17</sup> It should also be noted that the above letter had been sent to Agra by Hakim Ahsanullah Khan in the afternoon of 11th May and it was in the following night that Bahadur Shah accepted the mutineers' request.

In the course of his account of 11th May Zaheer Dehlawi<sup>18</sup> writes, 'When crossing the Jumna the mutinous troops came to the Fort and stood underneath the Jharoka; the Emperor ordered Hakim Ahsanullah to enquire of them the particulars. 'We have decided', said they, 'that all of us should act unitedly on one specified day and time to raise the standard of rebellion. Your Majesty should place your hand on our heads and do justice.' 'Listen brethren!' replied Bahadur Shah, 'Who calls me "king"? I am a retired fakir. Why have you come here? I have neither a treasure nor an army. I can do only one thing for you. I can mediate between you and the English, the Resident is coming to see me. Let me hear from him the fact of the matter.'

Of all the above witnesses Mukand Lal and Hakim Ahsanullah Khan were the most important; and; both gave a clear account in unequivocal terms of Bahadur Shah's hostility to the English and of his desperate efforts to secure allies in his war with the Company. Bahadur Shah was not an enemy of individual Englishmen and did his utmost to save Douglas and Fraser and other unarmed Europeans — men as well as women; but he was at war with the East India Company. His psychology of war and his ways and methods of war differed completely from those of the mutineers as is evident from his letters still extant.<sup>19</sup> He was not a simpleton as the British Government or some of the mutineers blinded by their mad fury and lust for indiscriminate bloodshed appear to have supposed.<sup>20</sup> He was the owner of a newspaper<sup>21</sup> and was in touch with the leading newspapers of Dehli and had diaries<sup>22</sup> written at the Court giving all kinds of events local as well as provincial and foreign. Undoubtedly he was alive to the situation and was fully aware of the mutineers' grievances against the British and shared the common belief that the death knell of British rule would be

<sup>16</sup> Zakaullah—T.U.A.S.I., p. 60.

<sup>17</sup> Kamalu'ddin Haidar—*Qaisaru-t Tawarikh* or *Tarikh-i Awadh*, Vol. II, p. 439.

<sup>18</sup> Zaheer Dehlawi—*Dastan-i Ghadr*, p. 50.

<sup>19</sup> *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 134.

<sup>20</sup> Majumdar, R. C.—*Sepoy Mutiny and Revolt of 1857*, p. 116 ff. Book III, Chapter I.

<sup>21</sup> *Sirajul Akhbar*.

<sup>22</sup> (i) *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 93; (ii) *Khulasa Akhbar*, MS. N. A. I., No. 128; (iii) *Roz-namcha Bahadur Shah*.



sounded shortly.<sup>23</sup> He was also aware, as Hakim Ahsanullah Khan hinted, of the sepoys' concerted efforts at raising a rebellion.<sup>24</sup> But he was not prepared for and certainly did not like the sudden arrival in Dehli of the mutineers from Mirath, therein he perceived a great blunder on their part. Obviously he stood at a vantage ground compared to the average sepoy and he realized that in striking the blow rashly at Mirath and then leaving behind the task of finishing the enemy incomplete, their coming over to Dehli was the greatest and most unpardonable blunder on the part of a handful of mutineers from Mirath. Malleson who was a contemporary, graphically describes what Bahadur Shah had, in fact, already realized or visualized.<sup>25</sup> He says, 'The story of the events of the 10th May at Mirath and of the 11th at Dehli came as a surprise to the revolters all over India because the astute men who had fomented the ill-feeling against the British which by this time had become pretty general had laid down as a cardinal principle that there were to be no isolated outbreaks, that the explosion should take place on the same day all over the Bengal Presidency and they had fixed upon Sunday the 31st May as the day of the general rising. But the chief conspirators had to employ a large number of instruments. The rashness of premature action of a single instrument may destroy the best laid plot. The heads of the conspiracy had corrupted the 3rd Native cavalry and the 20th Regiment N. I.<sup>26</sup> and had formed their committees in these regiments. But at a critical conjuncture these latter had been unable to restrain the rank and file of the regiments from premature action. Excited to fever pitch, 85 men of 3rd L. C.<sup>27</sup> had with the sympathy of their comrades refused to receive the proffered cartridges. Brought to trial for the offence, they had been condemned, sentenced and lodged in jail. This sentence had been too great a stimulus to the passions of the troopers to allow them to await patiently the day fixed upon. They saw that the English were unsuspecting and they believed that the plot, so far as Mirath was concerned, might, by a prompt rising be brought to a successful issue. In that

<sup>23</sup> Pr. Tr. B. S., p. 164.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> Detailed information to this effect is given by Pundit Kanhiya Lal in his book *Tarikh-i Baghawat-i Hind*, also called *Mahariba-i Azeem*, Vol. II, pp. 7-8. See Chapter III, p. 104, *supra*.

It is a fact attested by all the historians that Mirath remained under British control throughout the period of war. In fact it formed the shelter of the Europeans—men and women—who were hunted down in Dehli; and there was a constant danger on 11th May, 1857 of some European troops moving down from Mirath in pursuit of the mutineers, (Sewell — *Analytical History of India*, pp. 266-267). On 14th May Chunni Lal reported that four men coming from Mirath told the soldiery at Dehli that European troops were coming from Mirath in their pursuit (*Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 110). For some inexplicable reason these much-talked-about troops of Mirath did not come down to Dehli till the close of May. According to Sewell (p. 267) when Anson the commander-designate died of cholera on 27th May, 1857, his place was taken by Sir Henry Barnard. Sir Henry Barnard was joined at Dehli by a body of troops from Mirath under Wilson on 7th June, 1857.

<sup>26</sup> *I.e.* Native Infantry.

<sup>27</sup> Light Company.



events proved them to be right. But they had lost sight of the fact that by acting solely for their own hand they were imperilling the great principle which had been impressed upon them by their committees and with it the general success aimed at by their chiefs. This premature action proved ultimately as fortunate for the English as disastrous to the cause of revolt. A blow which struck simultaneously all over India might have been irresistible lost more than half its power when delivered piecemeal and at intervals'.<sup>28</sup> At another place Malleson reports that 'Canning highly rejoiced to hear that the mutinous troops from Mirath had gone over to Dehli. He had great faith in the power of the Commander-in-chief to retake the imperial city. Past history affords good reason for that belief. In September 1803 the troops of Sindhia had not offered the semblance of a resistance to the small army of General Lake. In the wars of the earlier Mughuls with the representatives of the dynasties which they supplanted, Dehli had never offered any but the slightest resistance to the army which had been victorious in the field. Even the conviction prevalent at Calcutta, especially in military circles, was that the mutineers had played the British game by rushing into a walled city where they would be as rats in a trap'.<sup>29</sup>

Bahadur Shah who knew all this confronted a formidable situation on the arrival of the mutineers from Mirath. He thought of reconciling the mutineers to the British Authorities and at the same time prepared himself for the worst by despatching the much-talked-about letter which amounted to an ultimatum to Agra.<sup>30</sup> Then he waited for the Dehli regiments to decide and determine their attitude; and it was subsequent to their joining the Mirath mutineers in the afternoon that he accepted the joint leadership of all at night.<sup>31</sup> That in spite of all the follies of the Mirath mutineers Bahadur Shah sympathised with them and 'cherished a hearty disposition to show them every favour and kindness and directed them to take up their quarters in Salimgarh'<sup>32</sup> and called them 'his children'.<sup>33</sup> speak volumes for his patriotism, and balance of mind. Since he had fully realized the urgent need of restoring order he lost no time to impress upon the mutinous soldier the importance of stopping at once all plunder, and robbery in the city. But the mutineers who took full advantage of the Emperor's name and of the protection that he offered to them did not share with him the responsibility for restoration of order and maintenance of peace. Driven by their erratic fears and irrational suspicions verging on insanity they continued to smell an Englishman in every quarter and in every private house and dwelling which they on that plea looted unscrupulously. Says Chunni Lal, 'The cavalry and infantry hearing that some Europeans with their wives had gone into the Magazine brought 2 guns from Darya Ganj and loading them with stones fired them at the

<sup>28</sup> Malleson—*The Indian Mutiny of 1857*, pp. 87-88.

<sup>29</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 92.

<sup>30</sup> *Vide* Chapter II. p. 81 *supra*.

<sup>31</sup> *Tr. B. S.*, p. 105 and *Tr. of Ex-King of Delhi*, p. 220.

<sup>32</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 108.

<sup>33</sup> *Idem*, p. 134.



gates, the Europeans within returning the fire from several pieces with grape. Subsequently the Magazine blew up when several men of the city were killed and many of the houses in the neighbourhood destroyed. The European men and women who had been in the Magazine fled in the direction of the river. They were however pursued by the cavalry and killed. Three sergeants and two women were brought prisoners to the King. One of the sergeants begged the King's protection for himself and fellow-prisoners saying that otherwise they would be killed by the mutineers. The King had them placed in the Tasbeeh Khana. Then the infantry mutineers attacked the house of Salig Ram, the treasurer, but were unable to force its massive gates till midnight when they made an entrance and in conjunction with the Mahomedans of the city plundered the place of all the property it contained. Some sergeants were taking away two guns from the cantonments but the cavalry came up with them and brought the guns back. There was a salute of 21 guns fired under the Palace, and all night throughout the city the greatest uneasiness and tumult continued to prevail in consequence of the plunder, pillage and burning of houses'.<sup>34</sup>

## GRAPPLING WITH TERRIBLE PROBLEMS

(12th May 1857)

At least 350 out of about 10,000 Mutiny Papers in the National Archives dealing with the War of 1857 in Dehli and over 200 documents<sup>35</sup> given in the *Proceedings of the Trial of Bahadur Shah* bring into relief the terrible problems with which Emperor Bahadur Shah grappled from the beginning to the end of the long drawn-out drama of the War, every day bringing in a fresh set of problems—control of the lawless elements in the city and among the mutineers.<sup>36</sup>

*Idem*, pp. 108-109.

These documents were studied and reviewed by Major Harriott, the Judge Advocate-General in connection with his survey of Emperor Bahadur Shah's role in the Mutiny and War of 1857. And he said, 'If I have not succeeded in tracing to the King himself a foreknowledge of the leading events that were to take place on Monday, the 11th May, I trust it has been made obvious that the secret was his possession of some influential inmates of the palace. The babbling garrulity of Prince Jawan Bakht sufficiently indicates this, for such is his joy at the anticipation of murdering the English that he is unable to restrain his expressions of it. My chief object has been to render clear what I believe to be the truth, viz., that the conspiracy from the very commencement was not confined to the sepoys and did not even originate with them but had its ramifications throughout the palace and city. We have evidence that the mutineers of the 11th and 20th Regiments of Native Infantry before the Magazine was exploded, proceeded to attack and escalate it, and it is then for the first time that we find the King through his troops acting in open alliance with these traitors. From that moment there is no further disguise and no attempt at concealment. Fairly launched into the stream of sedition he is hurried onward by the swollen flood.' (*Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 145).

Their numbers, according to different accounts, range from 4,000 (*Friend of India*, August 27, 1857) to 50,000 (Muir—*R. I. D.*, i, p. 535) and 60,000 (Metcalf, *T. N. N.*, pp. 179 and 181).



It should be noted that the terms 'mutineers', 'rebels' and 'traitors' were used by the British. Mirza Mughul was angry with Jiwan Lal for his using such terms as these (Metcalf, T. N. N., 179). Mirza Mughul meant to say that the sepoys whom the British called mutineers and rebels became patriots on joining the standard of Emperor Bahadur Shah. And there is positive evidence that the Emperor looked upon them as patriots and wanted them to behave as patriots; and he rebuked them and expressed his displeasure and anger whenever he noticed that their conduct was unpatriotic. In one of his letters to Mirza Mughul he said, "It is the business of the Army to protect and not to desolate and plunder. The Officers of the Army will therefore immediately restrain their men from the commission of these improprieties; and further as the intelligence of the approach of the enemies was false, these lawless soldiery should not now be kept in the old Fort but on the contrary entrenchments should be constructed for them at the distance of 5 or 6 miles, and they should be stationed there so that OUR SUBJECTS MAY OBTAIN IMMUNITY from the hardships complained of, and that at the same time a barrier may be raised against the approach of the enemy troops. You will immediately take steps to arrange this matter and will allow no neglect to occur in reference to it. Be assured of our kindness" (In pencil in the King's handwriting, to give the order greater force: *Make arrangements quickly.* (Pr. Tr., B. S., No. 8, 18th June, 1857, p. 8).

He also wrote the following letters: (i) To

(i) To

Mirza Mughul.

Son.—The illustrious and valiant Mirza Mughul Bahadur. Learn, that orders have day after day been issued to the Officers of the Cavalry to vacate the Garden and they have till now done nothing but make excuses and promises. Definite orders are therefore now issued to the intent that you, our Son, will summon the Officers and will tell them that *if they consider themselves the servants of the State* they will not go to the Batteries tomorrow, but will leave the Garden and remove their quarters to Keetur's (Englishman's) house situated under the Palace where there is abundance of accommodation and ample shelter of trees. What they urge in reply you will submit for our consideration. (No. 17, Pr. Tr. B. S., dated 26th June, 1857, p. 9).

Order under the autograph cypher of the King in pencil, dated 27th June, 1857.

(ii) To

Mirza Mughul and Mirza Khair Sultan.

Sons, — The illustrious and valiant Mirza Zaheeruddin, otherwise Mirza Mughul Bahadur and Mirza Khair Sultan Bahadur. Learn, that your petition regarding the proceedings of four or five ill-conducted men, who assuming as a disguise, the appearance and dress of soldiers of the Native Infantry of the Company have gone about plundering the inhabitants of the City and have now left for the country, and representing the detriment to the Government which must ensue, in consequence, and further requesting permission to take measures for suppressing such practices and for capturing the men alluded to, has been perused. It is a matter of some surprise that from the lawless doings of but four or five men so much plunder and devastation in the City and so much ruination of the people generally should result; and that on their capture alone the establishment of order should be expected to depend; for not a day has up elapsed since the arrival of the Army and its taking quarters in the City that petitions from the townspeople have not been submitted representing the excesses committed by numerous Infantry Sepoys, about whom there could be no suspicion of disguise and that orders have not been issued, day after day, to you, our Sons, to take measures with the aid of a Military force to suppress these disorders. Considering all this, it seems now altogether unlikely that order can be secured while the Army remains in the City. However, you, our Sons, are nevertheless directed to send to our glorious presence someone able to recognize the vagabonds alluded to, that he may be sent accompanied by horsemen and footmen of our own Royal Levies with a mandate to the Chief Police Officer of the city, and his subordinates to arrest and forward without delay to our presence those whom he may point out, and if any



maintenance of the Army and shortage of supplies, restoration of peace and order in the city and its protection against the British attacks; suppression of plunder and robbery; revival of the administrative system<sup>17</sup> including the civil, criminal and revenue courts and the machinery for the regular collection of revenues; recruitment of new soldiers; securing arms and gunpowder as well as funds to meet the salary bills of the Army and the Palace staff, maintenance of the Royal

villainy or instigation to plunder shall be proved against those who may be thus apprehended they will receive punishments adequate to their guilt. But you, our Sons, are directed to take all proper steps to prevent the men of the Army from plundering and desolating the City. In every case of an offence of these kinds being proved or where a man may be found in the private residence of any of the inhabitants, the Officers will award punishment to the offender so that these evils may be suppressed. Be assured of our kindness. *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, No. 18, p. 9.

Autograph Order by the King, in pencil dated 4th July, 1857. Mirza Mughul Bahadur will lay strict injunctions on the Officers of the 9th Regiment Native Infantry, to refrain from the spoliation complained of. (*Pr. Tr. B. S.*, No. 24, p. ii).

*Order of the King dated 16th July, 1857 reference to the petition from Ratan Chand Superintendent of the Royal Gardens.*

(iii) To

Mirza Mughul,

Son,—The illustrious and valiant Mirza Zaheeru'ddin otherwise Mirza Mughul Bahadur! Learn,—that we are informed by a petition from Ratan Chand, Superintendent of the Sahibabad Garden . . . that the Troopers of the Cavalry, come from Jodhpur, have picqueted their horses in front of the shops and have taken possession of a number of them; that some of the shop-keepers have in consequence vacated their shops and gone away and those of the tenants who remain are ready to do the same. Under these circumstances loss to our personal Revenue must ensue. You, our son, are therefore directed to cause these Troopers to remove from their present location and to assign them some other place to stay in, so that this cause of loss to our Revenue may be checked. Be assured of our kindness. (*Pr. Tr. B. S.*, No. 29, p. 14).

Autograph order by the King, in pencil in answer to this petition of Sheo Diyal and Shadi Ram merchants, dated 17th July 1857.

Mirza Mughul will provide for the protection of the petitioners. (*Pr. Tr. B. S.*, No. 39, p. 15).

*Order under the autograph special cypher of the King, in pencil, dated 17th July, 1857.*

(iv) To

Mirza Mughul,

Son,—The illustrious and valiant Zaheeru'ddin otherwise Mirza Mughul Bahadur! Learn, that on perusal of the petition of Syed Husain Ali Khan, Police Officer of Pahar Ganj regarding the wounding of a Jamadar and some Policemen by the violent hands of the Goojars of Aliganj, Mallanji Hasangarh and Alapur, a special order was sent to you with the said petition in original. Today on perusal of a representation from the Police Officer of Mahrowli we learn that the same Goojars are now engaged in highway robbery and in plundering the country. The suppression of such disorders is of the utmost moment and, you are directed, therefore immediately to send out one Company of Infantry and 50 Troopers to capture the Goojars in question with the Chief Men of their Villages. If they are captured they shall receive the punishment due to their misdeeds, and complete order will ensue. Be assured of our kindness. (*Pr. TV. B.* No. 31, p. 15).

The old administrative institutions had not died out. Almost all were kept alive under the nominal rule of the East India Company. They began to function with the restoration of order on 12th May and the following days. Reference might here be made to the Civil, Military and Artillery departments, besides the Revenue and Pay departments mentioned in the Mutiny Papers, (Box 57, Nos. 539 and 541) and in documents 11, 41, 43, 47 of the *Proceedings of the Trial of Bahadur Shah*.



house in the midst of scarcity caused by the suspension of the *peshkash* and the prosecution of war in order to expel the English from the country. These problems were terrible enough to have scared away a sprightly and powerful despot. But Bahadur Shah the octogenarian was not frightened and did not slink away.

On 12th May, 1857 he took his seat on the Silver Throne in the Diwan-i Khass and held a durbar after it had been discontinued for the past 15 years.<sup>38</sup> The Army Officers presented nazrs and promised allegiance; then at their request high commands in the Army were given to the Princes.<sup>39</sup> This done, a feast was given under Royal orders to the whole Army who were supplied with confectionary, and the Army Officers received in addition a present in money. The Emperor then ordered the grocers Ram Sahai and Dilwani Mai to provide (at his expense<sup>40</sup>) for the Army 500 rupees worth of meal, pulse and gram daily. And he appointed Muniru'ddin Khan, ex-thanadar of Pahar Ganj, Governor (*subadar*) and Kotwal of the city and charged him to prevent plunder. A few cases of plunder in the Churiwala street being brought to notice, the Emperor sent for the officers of the infant regiments and directed them to place one regiment at the Dehli Gate, one under the Palace windows and one in Darya Ganj; and he said, 'I do not like that my subjects should be plundered'. When, shortly after he heard of another case of plunder in the Nagar-Seth street he ordered Mirza Mughul to take a company of infantry and adopt measures so as to stop plunder completely in all parts of the city. Mirza Mughul went to the principal police stations seated on an elephant and had it proclaimed that every individual convicted of plunder would be punished with the loss of nose and ears and that the shopkeepers who did not open their shops and refused to supply necessities of food to the Army, would be confined and imprisoned. Not content with this, later in the day the Emperor himself went in state mounted on an elephant with Prince Jawan Bakht in the hind seat through the Chandni Chowk street. The Royal procession was accompanied by two regiments of Telinga infantry and some guns; and the Telingas shouted '*Bahadur Shah ki jai*'.<sup>41</sup> The Emperor spoke to the shopkeepers kindly, promised them peace and order and directed them to open their shops and resume their business and supply the Army the necessities of food. Afterwards letters were despatched to the rulers of Patiala, Jhajjar, Ballabgarh, Bahadurgarh and Alwar asking them to come over to Dehli to join the 'patriotic' Army and 'to

<sup>38</sup> The Silver Throne had been removed from the Diwan-i Khass into the vault below and had been lying there since 1842. It was brought back to the Diwan-i Khass on 12th May, 1857.

<sup>39</sup> Mirza Mughul, who was the eldest and as it appears from the *Roz-namcha Bahadur Shah*, MS N. L. about 40 years of age, was appointed Commander-in-chief. Mirza Kochak Sultan, Mirza Khair Sultan and Mirza Mendliu were appointed colonels of Infantry; and Mirza Abu Bakr, the youngest prince and a grandson of the Emperor, was appointed colonel of a regiment of cavalry. (Metcalf—T. N. N., pp. 85-87. *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, pp. 30, 94).

<sup>40</sup> The bracket is mine. Until a satisfactory arrangement was made, the Emperor considered the sepoy his guests and fed them. This is evident from the text of the documents.

<sup>41</sup> Zakauallah—T.U.A.S.I., p. 662.



repel any attack upon the city by the English'.<sup>42</sup> The above account presents before our eyes one of the most memorable scenes of the drama of the War in Dehli. An Indian Emperor highly popular among the Hindus and Musalmans has staked his life and the lives of all dear to him on the face of the earth by accepting leadership of the national or *quasi-national* Indian troops whom he calls *his own Army*; and in order to expel the English from the country he solicits help from the Indian Rajas and Ruling Chiefs. And without waiting for their reply he proceeds to grapple with the problems before him. He is seated on the throne of his great ancestors in full glory but without an atom of their powers. His position is like that of a constitutional monarch without a constitution, all physical powers having supposedly rested with the Army who are sorely lacking in discipline.<sup>43</sup> He wants to awaken in them the spirit of patriotism by building a liaison between them and the people; and he wants also to secure their co-operation in building a normal life in the city. With the help of some of their leaders and the highly accomplished Maulvi Fazl Haq<sup>44</sup> as the director, he improvises a system of administration and a constitution based on the principles of democracy. An executive committee or Administration Court of ten members from the civil and military department of government is formed; and it is laid down:

'Whereas to avoid disorder in the sections of administration of the military and civil departments it is absolutely necessary to form a constitution, and whereas to work out the constitution it is necessary first to appoint a Court the following regulations are hereby laid down:

- (i) A court should be established and named: Administration Court, that is a Court to administer military and civil affairs.
- (ii) This Court should consist of ten members — 6 military and 4 civil. Of the military members two should be selected from the infantry platoons, two from the cavalry and two from the artillery.
- (iii) Out of these ten men, one should be appointed President (*Sadr-i Jalsa*) and another Vice-President (*Naib Sadr-i Jalsa*) by a unanimous majority of votes. In every department there should

The above account is based on the Mutiny Papers Box 39, May 11, December 7, 1857 and the *Narrative* of Chunni Lal the news-writer and the evidence of Mukand Lal, Private Secretary of the Emperor. (*Pr. Tr. S.*, pp. 101, 102, 107-114).

This is evident from the numerous complaints made to the Emperor by the people. *Vide Pr. Tr. B. S.*, pp. 5-26.

*Vide* (i) Appendix H (ii) For. Pol. Cons. 13th May 1859, N. A.

This Court has been called the Court of Mutineers. Spear (p. 206) puts its formation in the month of July. But it was surely a part of the Constitution (*Dastoor-ul Amal-i Saltanat*) which according to Zakauallah (T. U. A. S. I., p. 687). Maulvi Fazl Haq had drawn up for the government of Bahadur Shah.

Muinu'ddin says that the period between the 11th and 25th May was occupied in restoring order and discipline in the city — a task which could never have been performed without a constitution. *Cf. Metcalfe — T.N.N.*, p. 61.



be appointed secretaries according to need. The quorum for the Court meeting should be five whereby work should be done satisfactorily.

- (iv) At the time of the appointment of these ten men they should take an oath that they would do court work with honesty, sincerity, great industry and with deep thought and care; and that they will not neglect even the slightest detail in matters administrative and that they would not covertly or overtly have resort to taking and seizing, or to partiality of any kind and in any manner or at the time of dealing with matters of administration in the Court. On the contrary they will always keep themselves engaged in and apply themselves attentively and diligently to executing the State matters whereby the State should obtain security and the people should enjoy peace and repose; and that they would not divulge any item of the Court work under consideration before its enforcement plainly or by allusion without the permission of the Court and *Sahib Alam*.
- (v) Election of the Court members should be in this manner: by the majority of votes two men should be elected from the infantry platoon, two from the cavalry troops and two from the artillery; such men must possess a long record of service and must be clever and well-versed, able and intelligent. Should any person be highly clever, intelligent and learned and an adept in the administration of the Court work but lacking long service, this latter disqualification in that case will not obstruct the appointment of such a person. And in the same way will be appointed four civil members.
- (vi) After ten members have been appointed, if any member gave his vote before the full Court regarding any matter in such a manner as to be against honesty and sincerity or calculated as partial to anyone, then that member will be removed from the Court by the definite majority of votes; and another person will be elected in his place according to regulation *five*.

All the items of administration to be considered should be first treated in the Court and after the approval of *Sahib Alam* the decision of the Court should be communicated to His Majesty (*Huzur-i Wala*)

- (vii) After the programme has been drawn by the majority of votes it will be submitted for approval to *Sahib Alam Bahadur* and the Court will remain under the control of the alluded *Sahib Alam Bahadur*. And no matter of administration whether military or civil will be executed without the sanction of the Court and the approval of the *Sahib Alam* and without the information of the same being given to His Majesty (*Huzur-i Wala*). In the event of



a difference of opinions and, after being re-considered by the Court, the same matter—the difference still continuing—will be sent up through the *Sahib Alam* to His Majesty the Shadow of God (*Huzur Zille Subhani*). The order given thereupon by His Majesty (*Huzur*) will be final.

- (viii) In the Court none, barring the *Sahib Alam Bahadur* and His Majesty the Shadow of God (*Huzur Zille Subhani*) who will be entitled to be present, no non-member will be present, nor will he join the meeting.

When out of the specified number of the Court members, anyone for some valid and acceptable reason be unable to attend the court meeting, then the votes of the remaining members of the Court will be tantamount to the vote of the Court in full strength.

- (ix) Should a member of the Court desire to express his opinion regarding any matter, he would first secure the consent of another member; then he may make the proposal of the same as a matter already agreed upon by two members.
- (x) When an item is to be considered in the Court according to Regulation *nine*, then the proposer should first speak in the Court meeting. No one will interrupt his speech until he has finished it. If a member of the Court has any objection to make regarding it, he should explain it and no one will interrupt him either, until he has finished speaking. Should a third man make a speech amending or adding or subtracting from the objection, and if the remaining members of the Court observe silence regarding it, then every member of the Court should write out his opinion separately. After consulting Regulation *eight*, decision will be arrived at by the majority.
- (xi) Those who from every section of the military are elected according to Regulation *two*, should be appointed managers and administrators of that section. Under their control should work, a committee of 4 men according to Regulation *four*: in that committee secretaries should be appointed according to need. And whichever proposal is formally put up in that committee by the majority of votes that proposal will be presented to the Court by those very officers of that Committee. It should be executed by the Court according to Regulation *seven*. The same process should be adopted in every military and civil section.
- (xii) At any time according to the demand of the occasion right should be vested in the Court to make amendments by majority of votes in this constitution.<sup>46</sup>

(i) Mutiny Papers, Box 57, Nos. 539-541.

(ii) Translated by the writer from the original Urdu text.



Since the above document is undated and since it contains the ambiguous terms 'Court', and 'Sahib Alam', it has been assumed<sup>47</sup> that it was created after the arrival of Bakht Khan. But the above-mentioned court was an *administration court*, not an ordinary court as the term 'court' was commonly understood among the soldiers in those days. Says the Emperor in the course of a letter dated 8th July 1857 to his son Mirza Mughul,

Son! you the light of our eyes, already know that a very small balance of cash remains in our Treasury: that there is no immediate prospect of revenue from any quarter and that the little money that remains must of necessity be very soon expended. You are directed to call together during the day or to-night all the officers of the Regiments which first arrived, in order that they may deliberate and decide on means to be adopted for raising funds to meet the daily necessary and emergent expenses. *A meeting of this kind in the language of the soldiery is called a 'Court'*.<sup>48</sup>

In the light of this information the assumption that the said Administration Court was created after the arrival of Bakht Khan falls to the ground and the nature of the court in question becomes intelligible as being a court of *administration* ruling and linking together all the branches of the administrative system like a modern cabinet and not merely a military council or a meeting of soldiers organised for the purpose of raising funds. As for the term 'Sahib Alam'<sup>49</sup> it should be noted that there are some letters of the *mujahideen* wherein Mirza Mughul has been clearly addressed as 'Sahib Alam'. And there are many documents in the *Proceedings of the Trial of Bahadur Shah* which envisage a constitution much before the arrival of Bakht Khan and show that Mirza Mughul had been performing the role of a *Sahib Alam* without brandishing the title.<sup>50</sup> An undated document No. 15 arranged under the head of Loan exhibits

<sup>47</sup> Spear—T.M., p. 206.

<sup>48</sup> *Pr. Tr. B.S.*, p. 40.

<sup>49</sup> 'Muhammad Bakht Khan' says Spear, 'was nominated Governor-General (the title was Sahib Alam) and a Court known as the Administrative Court or Court of Mutineers was created after his arrival' (T. M., p. 206). But there is no connection between the terms 'Governor-General' and 'Sahib Alam'. Bakht Khan was called 'General' or 'Lord Governor-General' but not 'Sahib Alam' which was the title or honorific used for Mirza Mughul, as is seen in the letters addressed to him by the *Mujahideen* in fair number (Mutiny Papers, Box 65, No. 32, 37, 39). Since the *Mujahideen* had come to Delhi about the same time as did Bakht Khan (and many of them came in his company), they could not have used his title (if 'Sahib Alam' had been his title) for his rival Mirza Mughul. Further Prof. Spear implies that General Bakht Khan created the Administration Court after his arrival in July. This is untenable, for Bakht Khan knew nothing about administrations or constitutions. It is true that he liked to maintain a constitution and to abide by law but he had no knack of making or drawing a constitution. This work Emperor Bahadur Shah and Maulvi Fazl Haq could do very well.

<sup>50</sup> For instance, documents No. 2 dated 14th May; No. 4, dated 24th May; No. 13 dated 18th June; No. 15 dated 20th June; No. 17 dated 26th June; Nos. 24 and 25 dated 4th July; No. 26 dated 11th July; Nos. 29, 30, 31 and 32 undated; No. 33 of 18th July; No. 36 of 22nd July; No. 38 of July; No. 40 of 25th July; No. 43 of 30th July; No. 18th August and the undated documents numbered 50, 52, 53 and 54 (*Pr. Tr. B. S.*, pp. 4-40). Also see documents numbered 1, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 13 dated 8th July, 15th July, 28th July, 29th July, 6th August, and 27th August respectively arranged under the head of Loan (*Pr. Tr. B. S.*, pp. 41-47). *Vide* document No. 1 dated 1st June 1857; No. 2 dated 22nd June; No. 3 dated 9th July; No. 4 dated



the role that Mirza Mughul continued to play even after the arrival of Bakht Khan.<sup>51</sup> Similar is the case with the documents Nos. 19, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28 and 33 of 12th, 17th, 18th July and 1st, 2nd, 4th and 23rd August respectively arranged under the head of Military.<sup>52</sup> All kinds of petitions addressed to the Emperor including one from Bakht Khan himself were sent down by the Emperor with his own remarks to Mirza Mughul for disposal. Another document numbered 39, dated 9th September, brings into relief the position of Mirza Mughul as officer in charge of the commissariat arrangements and the distribution of pay to the troops, and depicts him as the 'Vicar' of the Emperor.<sup>53</sup> And a document No. 38 of 23rd August gives a 'petition' of Bakht Khan addressed to Mirza Commander-in-chief Bahadur; it runs as follows:

*Petition from Muhammad Bakht Khan dated 23rd August 1857*

To

Mirza Moghal—the Lord of Gifts, etc., Mirza Muhammad Zaheeruddin, Commander-in-chief Sahib Bahadur.

'The order directing me to send one officer from each corps of infantry, Cavalry etc., to meet as members of the Court arranged by Your Highness's wish has been received. I sent for the Commissioned Officers in question, and explained to them the necessity for their attendance at your Court at 10 A.M. to-morrow. They have all willingly and heartily agreed to attend, as they have been directed. They urge, however, that their baggage has just now been laden; but that after reaching Palam, they will return, and will with hearty pleasure attend the Court in question. This petition is submitted for your information. Petition of the slave Muhammad Bakht Khan, Lord Governor-General, attested with the seal of Muhammad Bakht Khan, Commander-in-chief of the Army'.

*Note on the face*—The purpose of the petition has been learned'.<sup>54</sup>

In this 'petition' Bakht Khan has addressed Mirza Mughul as Commander-in-chief and has subscribed himself as Commander-in-chief and Lord Governor-General, but not as *Sahib Alam*.

All these documents combine to show that a constitution (*Dastur-ul-mal-i Saltanat*) had been enforced much before the arrival of Bakht Khan and that Mirza Mughul had been acting as *de facto Sahib Alam*. And the elements of that constitution are traceable in the administration that obtained during the months of May and June 1857. Probably after the arrival of Bakht Khan in July some amendments were made since meetings of the Court became frequent and regular. Or as the *Delhi News* suggests the old Administration Court became unpopular and the Army formed an independent Court consisting of the delegates from every company and every troop in Delhi.<sup>55</sup> But the branches, if any, shot up

10th July; No. 5 dated 12th July; No. 6 dated 13th July and the undated documents numbered 7 and 8, arranged under the head of Pay (*Pr. Tr. B. S.*, pp. 50-51).

*Idem.*, p. 46.

*Idem.*, p. 57, 58, 59, 60, 62.

*Idem.*, p. 64.

*Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 63.

*Delhi News*—9th September, 1857.



as time advanced from the parent body namely the War-State mechanism the Emperor had set to work in the middle of May with a vast secretariat in the Red Fort and sub-offices in the city. Thanas<sup>56</sup> were established in different parts of the city, and so were the revenue,<sup>57</sup> civil and criminal courts of justice<sup>58</sup> as well as the Court of General Supervision<sup>59</sup> and even hospitals<sup>60</sup> and news-papers.<sup>61</sup> Every thana was daily inspected<sup>62</sup> and reports were sent regularly through proper channels to the Royal Court. Price lists<sup>63</sup> giying standard prices fixed by a tariff board passed through different thanas, and were then sent out for circulation in the city at stated intervals. As a result profiteering was stopped. Jiwan Lal gives only one example of 'a defaulter', saying: 'The shop of Jamna Das was plundered because he sold *atta* at a high price'<sup>64</sup>. All matters, great and small, were recorded in the registers of the different offices, for instance the death of a gunner,<sup>65</sup> the burial of a dead body<sup>66</sup> of a *mujahid*, remittance to a camel driver of Re. I in advance;<sup>67</sup> the payment of wages to the coolies, each coolie being paid 10 annas<sup>68</sup>; the theft of a sepoy's gold bangle<sup>69</sup>; a list of the water-suppliers sent to the various trenches from the Kotwali<sup>70</sup> and a list containing the names<sup>71</sup> of all the Hindus and Musalmans in the Emperor's service besides a list of the Army officers who took part in the Mutiny as well as the names<sup>72</sup> of all the functionaries at the Kotwali and different thanas and an alphabetical list of all the mutineers<sup>73</sup> with their parentage, caste and residence. There are also files of all

<sup>56</sup> Mutiny Papers. N. A., Box 157, No. 2, June 16, 158, No. 2, June 1, 1857.

<sup>57</sup> *Idem*, Box 189, No. 6, 28th June, 1857; Box 171, August 19, 1857.

<sup>58</sup> *Idem*, Box 69, No. 41, 22nd July, 1857.

<sup>59</sup> *Idem*, Box 69, No. 1.

<sup>60</sup> *Idem*, Box 137, No. 7, also No. 8 dated 14th July 1857 which contains a statement of the daily allowances and wages of the employees in the Hospital.

<sup>61</sup> *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 9. Order under the King's Seal dated 29th June, 1857.

<sup>62</sup> There is a document of 13th June 1857 stating that the thanas in the city were inspected and a report made about the diary of each thana. *Vide* Mutiny Papers, N.A., Box 61, Nos. 16-17. Also see (i) Box 194, Nos. 13-14 of 23rd and 31st July, 1857; (ii) Box 135, Nos. 149-153 which give daily reports of the Thanas of the Turkoman gate, as well as of those of Guzzar Dareeba and of other quarters of the city.

<sup>63</sup> *Idem*, Box 131, No. 71, August 6, 1857; No. 83, August 11; No. 90, August 14; No. 93, August 15, 1857 and Box 131, No. 126, 12th September, 1857.

<sup>64</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 121.

<sup>65</sup> *Idem*, Box 65 Nos. 16-18, 2nd August, 1857 and Box 135, No. 158, August 31, 1857 and No. 202, 2nd September, 1857.

<sup>66</sup> *Idem*, Box 65 Nos. 16-18, 2nd August, 1857 and Box 135, No. 158, August 31, 1857 and No. 202, 2nd September, 1857.

<sup>67</sup> *Idem*, Box 135, No. 9, 3rd June, 1857.

<sup>68</sup> *Idem*, Box 131, No. 101, August 22 1857.

<sup>69</sup> *Idem*, Box 131, No. 41, 5th July, 1857.

<sup>70</sup> *Idem*, Box 194, No. 9 12th July, 1857.

<sup>71</sup> Mutiny Papers, N. A., Miscellaneous Box 28. Altogether there are 633 names, the majority of which are Hindus.

<sup>72</sup> *Idem*, File N. 117.

<sup>73</sup> *Idem*. There is a big chart of 43 lines, each line with an average of 18 names, containing in all about 800 names. The Hindus form the majority.



kinds of petitions received at the Royal Court as well as of the official communications and circulars under the name *parwana*. Gauri Shankar, Brigadier-Major, sent to the office of Diwan Jwala Nath three parwanas asking him to approve and return the same.<sup>74</sup> A separate court with a secretariat functioned under Mirza Mughul subject to the Emperor's orders which were issued frequently on sundry topics.<sup>75</sup> Mirza Mughul also wrote letters<sup>76</sup> to his Royal father with filial feeling and affection, and received immediate replies containing directives for war and advice in all matters concerned. In his capacity as commander-in-chief Mirza Mughul worked as a liaison officer between the civil and military departments and formed a link between the brigadiers, colonels, artillerymen, warriors and police officers on the one hand and the amirs, mahajans, merchants and local chiefs on the other. He was a very busy officer<sup>78</sup> under whose care functioned the aforesaid Administration Court. Under his personal supervision there was also a ceaseless flow of official correspondence—missives, directives, parwanas, financial and technical reports and credit-letters and receipts. And he kept the Emperor informed about every detail.<sup>79</sup> Almost in the same way the functionaries of lower grades and even ordinary men<sup>80</sup> wrote letters to the Emperor, each in his individual capacity, and occasionally made some suggestions, which the latter acknowledged. Particularly worthy of mention here is the order issued from the Court of Justice to the Chief Police Officer of the city giving instructions as to the procedure to be followed in submitting cases, besides a similar document illustrating the functioning of the Civil Court. There is yet another document with interesting references to the letters written by Bhao Singh Naib Kotwal to (i) Col. Khizr Sultan<sup>81</sup>, (ii) the sanadars of the different Police Stations, (iii) Lala Gulab Rai and Mehr Chand, mahajans<sup>82</sup>, (iv) Hakim Ahsanullah Khan and Faizul-lah Khan Kotwal<sup>83</sup>, (v) sanadar Shihabu'ddin<sup>84</sup>, (vii) Bakhshi Mirza Fazil Beg and even to the

Mutiny Papers, N. A.—Box 135, No. 202, 2nd September, 1857.

*Pr. Tr. B. S.*, pp. 8-9, order under the autograph cypher of the King in pencil, dated 20th June, 1857.

*Idem*, p. 13, Nos. 23 and 27. Petition of Mirza Mughul, dated 11th July, 1857.

*Idem*, p. 13, Nos. 23 and 27. Petition of Mirza Mughul, dated 11th July, 1857.

Mutiny Papers, N. A., Box 131, No. 126, September 12, 1857.

Mutiny Papers, N. A., Box 131, No. 126, September 12, 1857.

(i) Petition of Mathra Das and Salig Ram, *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 15, August 23, 1857.

(ii) Petition of Gauri Shankar Shukul. *Idem*, No. 3, p. 52.

(iii) Petition of Nabi Bakhsh, No. 14, p. 46.

Mutiny Papers, N. A., Box 131; Nos. i, 5, 14, 25, 30, 33, 34, 39-40, dated May 8 to September 12, 1857.

Mutiny Papers, N. A., Box 131; Nos. i, 5, 14, 25, 30, 33, 34, 39-40, dated May 8 to September 12, 1857.

Mutiny Papers, N. A., Box 131; Nos. i, 5, 14, 25, 30, 33, 34, 39-40, dated May 8 to September 12, 1857.

Mutiny Papers, N. A., Box 131; Nos. i, 5, 14, 25, 30, 33, 34, 39-40, dated May 8 to September 12, 1857.



Emperor<sup>85</sup>. Another document gives contents of the papers sent by Khwaja Khairiyat Ali, an accountant of the Commander-in-Chief's office, to Col. Khizr Sultan announcing the programme of the Commander-in-Chief's tours and that he was at the moment in the trenches with his army<sup>86</sup>.

These documents impressed Sir John Lawrence who observed, 'The papers referring to the *system of the King's government* exhibit in a remarkable manner the active personal share which the king himself took in the conduct of affairs. ... it must be admitted that his orders were not unworthy of the situation. He did make an effort to preserve order in the city, to repress rapine and murder in the villages, to check malversation and to restrain the excesses of the soldiery'.<sup>87</sup>

### FIGHTING TO EXPEL THE ENGLISH (13th May—1st July 1857)

Almost all the problems with which Emperor Bahadur Shah was grappling were interconnected, one depending upon the other for its solution. But the problem to expel the English headed them all and was the all-embracing one. Shortly after accepting the leadership of the sepoys on 12th May, he had sent letters to the Indian Princes asking them to join him in the war.<sup>88</sup> When he obtained no response and came to know that Chiefs of Patiala<sup>89</sup> and Jind<sup>90</sup> and other Indian Princes<sup>91</sup> were actively helping the English, he concentrated on the defence of Dehli and the territory directly under his rule<sup>92</sup>; this too could not

<sup>85</sup> Mutiny Papers, N. A., Box 131; Nos. i, 5, 14, 25, 30, 33, 34, 39-40, dated May 8 to September 12, 1857.

<sup>86</sup> Mutiny Papers N. A., Box 135, No. 216, September 8, 1857.

<sup>87</sup> *Press-List of the Mutiny Papers*, pp. ii-iii.

<sup>88</sup> *Ide supra*.

<sup>89</sup> According to Jiwan Lal the Maharaja of Patiala had joined the English with his army, and the mutinous sepoys coming from Ambala were attacked by the Patiala troops. Their weapons were taken from them and men despoiled (Metcalf T. N. N. p. 97). Then Jiwan Lal says: 'About 1200 men arrived from Lahore and Ferozpur to join the mutineers. They came unarmed and many wounded. They were full of complaints that they had been attacked by the Maharaja of Patiala when they were sitting unarmed and unclothed on the ground and had fled' (*Idem*, p. 105). In his entry of May 21, Jiwan Lal also says that the Maharaja of Patiala had tried to gain over to his cause two regiments of the Purbias who had promised to extinguish the fire of mutiny among their relatives serving in the regiments which had mutinied at Meerut' (*Idem*, p. 99).

<sup>90</sup> 'A carter reported,' says Jiwan Lal, 'that the forces of the Maharaja of Patiala and of the Raja of Jind, and the English were to be seen between Ambala and Delhi; also that heavy artillery was seen on the road drawn by elephants (Metcalf—T. N. N., p. 114).

<sup>91</sup> 'News was received that both Jaipur and Patiala were taking precautions to prevent the mutineers from remaining in their territories. (*Idem*, p. 99).

<sup>92</sup> The territory directly under Bahadur Shah's rule besides Dehli proper extended to Rohtak in the north-west, Riwari to the south-west, Mathura and Palwal to the south and Ghaziabad to the east.



remain safe from the enemies unless they were completely driven out of Mirath. The Emperor lost no time in urging his Army to make an attack and expel the English from that city.<sup>93</sup> But the Army was sorely lacking in discipline and allegiance. 'The King' says Muinu'ddin Hasan, 'repeatedly urged an attack upon Meerut but the mutineers delayed, first on one pretext, then upon another'<sup>94</sup>. The Emperor thought he could not make them march without supplying the sinews of war<sup>95</sup>, without removing the disorders from the city and without freeing it completely from pillage and plunder. To this end he now turned his thoughts and energies; and the success he attained was noticed by Muinu'ddin Hasan who observed, 'The period between 11th and 25th May was occupied in restoring order and discipline in the city'<sup>96</sup>. Similar is the information given by the Delhi newspapers—*Sirajul Akhbar*<sup>97</sup>, *Dehli Urdu Akhbar*<sup>98</sup>, *Zafarul Akhbar*<sup>99</sup> and the *Sadiqul Akhbar*<sup>100</sup> which continued their publications throughout the period of war, thus testifying to the order and discipline in the city and territory of Delhi. The *Sirajul Akhbar* mentions pointedly how the Emperor<sup>101</sup> charged Mirza Iughul and others to maintain peace and order. According to almost all contemporary evidence the Emperor remained extremely busy all these days (11th-25th May) with sundry affairs but he was ceaselessly intent on creating favourable circumstances and conditions which might enable him to send the army towards Mirath to expel the English<sup>102</sup>. Viewed from this standpoint all the tails of the Royal activities and day-to-day programmes which appear wildering and incongruous at first sight, become intelligible... On 13th May the

(i) Metcalfe—T. N. N., 61. (ii) *Dehli Urdu Akhbar*, May 31, 1857, p. 4 Mutiny Papers Collection No. 2, Vol. 19, No. 22.

(i) Metcalfe—T. N. N., 61. (ii) *Dehli Urdu Akhbar*, May 31, 1857, p. 4 Mutiny Papers Collection No. 2, Vol. 19, No. 22.

A few sepoys coming from Firozpur and Ambala expressed their readiness and desire to go to Mirath provided they were given the sinews of war—arms and provisions (*rasad*) (*Dehli Urdu Akhbar*, May 31, 1857, p. 3).

Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 61.

Mutiny Papers, Box No. 1, Vol. 13, No. 24.

*Idem*, Box No. 4-6, Vol. 4, No. 6.

*Idem*, Box No. 2, Vol. 19, No. 34.

*Idem*, Box No. 2, Vol. 19, No. 27.

Emperor or *Huzur-i wala* (Mutiny Papers, Box 57, No. 539-541) is one among many other forms of address used for Bahadur Shah, for example *Shanshah-i Hind* or Emperor of India; (*Vide Sadiqul Akhbar* p. 4; July 27, 1857, Box 4-6, Vol 4); *Zille Subhani* (Shadow of God); *Khalifatul Rahmani* (Caliph of God); *Farogh-i Khandan-i Aalishan-i Gorgani* (the height of the exalted dynasty of Timur); *Chiragh-i Dudman-i najdat nishan-i Sahibqirani* (the light of the Family of the Lord of Times whose emblem is valour). *Vide Dehli Urdu Akhbar*, May 31, 1857. Deliberately ignoring all this the British writers have used for Bahadur Shah the term 'King'. I have used the term Emperor as found in the *Sadiqul Akhbar* mentioned above.

The *Dehli Urdu Akhbar* of 21st June, 1857, reproduce an authentic letter of an earlier date which stresses the great need of an attack on Mirath to expel the English. It says, 'In Mirath there are only 300 white soldiers. If the victorious troops march on Mirath they will be readily supported by the inhabitants of Mirath who are waiting for them to come'. (*Dehli Urdu Akhbar*, Box 2, Vol. 19, No. 25, June 21, 1857). The same suggestion is also reported in another issue of the *Dehli Urdu Akhbar* (Box 2, Vol. 19, No. 28, July 12, 1857).



Emperor called Mirza Muniru'ddin governor and kotwal of the city to account for his failure to procure necessities of food for the Army and ordered him to make immediate arrangements. Later, on hearing a report of the outbreak of disorder and pillage in the Cantonment, Sabzi Mandi and Pahar Ganj areas, he ordered him to proceed with the 38 Regiment N.I. in that direction to prevent plunder and restore order. And he personally attended to the needs of the Army and awarded all the regiments Rs. 400 each; and summoning the grain dealers he ordered them to regulate the rates and open their granaries and commence selling the grain in the market. In order to protect the grain dealers and grocers he appointed 200 sepoy with headquarters in Darya Ganj and they were told off to different streets in the city to look after the maintenance of law and order. Then the Princes — Mirza Mughul, Mirza Khair Sultan and a few others— were ordered to proceed severally with two guns each to the Kashmiri, Lahori and Dehli gates to preserve peace<sup>103</sup>. A wazir, Hamid Ali Khan by name, being accused by the sepoy of concealing some Englishmen in his house, the Emperor had the vezir's house searched, but no Englishman was found. Hamid Ali Khan who had been imprisoned and whose property had been looted on this account was released, and the property restored. It was then proclaimed under Royal orders that those in whose houses Europeans were found would be dealt with as offenders. In connection with the Emperor's attempts to restore law and order it is also mentioned that two watermen who had stolen some butter from a shop in the Lal Kuan street were arrested; and two notorious characters Gami Khan and Sarfaraz Khan besides a few men accused of plunder in the Teliwara and Sabzi-mandi zone were apprehended. An attempt was also made by the Emperor to raise an army in the hope of finding the new recruits comparatively more submissive and ready to carry out his orders and march against the English at Mirath<sup>104</sup>. According to Chunni Lal it was proclaimed by the Kotwal that all such persons who wished to take service should come forward bringing their own arms<sup>105</sup>.

On 14th May the Emperor appointed Maulvi Sadru'ddin Khan, judge of the Civil and Criminal Courts. 'And an order was written' says Chunni Lal, 'to the address of Raja Ram Singh, Ruler of Jaipur, directing his early attendance at the Royal Court together with his army; and orders were also issued in writing to

<sup>103</sup> *Vide* copies of the Newspapers written by Chunni Lal, news-writer from 11th to 20th May 1857 (*Pr. Tr. B. S.*, pp. 107-112).

<sup>104</sup> In his entry of 18th May Chunni Lal tells us that orders were issued to Hasan Ali Khan of Jhajjar to raise troops, cavalry and infantry (*Pr. Tr. B. S.* p. 113). And the reason for this new recruitment is also found in a remark of Jiwan Lal. Referring to the kind of bravery shown by many of the mutineers, Jiwan Lal says, 'In the absence of the English they were as lions, but on hearing of their (English) approach they sought places of refuge like rats in the presence of a cat' (Metcalf—T. N. N., p. 102). And the *Dehli Urdu Akhbar* reports that some of the mutineers had become extremely rich and it gives details to illustrate how they were trying still to increase their wealth (Mutiny Papers, Collection No. 2, Vol. 19; No. 22; May 31, 1857).

<sup>105</sup> *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 111.



Nawab Abdur Rahman Khan of Jhajjar', Bahadur Jang Khan of Dadri, Akbar Ali Khan of Patowdi, Raja Nahar Singh of Ballabgarh, Hasan Ali Khan of Dojana and Nawab Ahmad Ali Khan of Farrukhnagar, desiring them all to attend the Royal Court<sup>106</sup>. Subsequently news being received that the Gujars of Chandrawal—the allies of the British—were every night plundering the shops in Sabzimandi, Teliwara and Rajpur, Mirza Abu Bakr was ordered to pursue the said Gujars. Mirza Abu Bakr went immediately to Chandrawal and laid it waste but the culprits had made their escape. The following day i.e. 15th May a *shuqqa* was again sent to the Raja of Jaipur soliciting his attendance at the Royal Court, similarly *shuqqas* were also sent to the chiefs of Jhajjar and Ballabgarh. Then arrangements were made for bringing money from the Rohtak treasury as well as for the enlistment of 400 foot-soldiers and one regiment of cavalry at the rate of a monthly salary of Rs. 5 for the foot-soldier and Rs. 20 for each trooper. Then Mirza Muniru'ddin, the kotwal and governor of the city who had never given satisfaction by his work and who was in fact a British spy<sup>107</sup>, was dismissed; he was superseded as kotwal by one Qazi Faizullah-Khan and the post of governor of the city was abolished. The same day when it was reported that the sepoys were in the habit of patrolling the streets and lanes with drawn swords which frightened the inhabitants and shopkeepers, the Emperor ordered that no one should go about the city with a drawn sword. And with a view to further control the soldiery he ordered the commandant of the Jhajjar cavalry to take up his quarters in the Mahtab Bagh. Then news having reached him about the arrival of 14 boats laden with edibles belonging to Ramjidas Gurwala, the Emperor ordered Dilwani Mall who had been previously appointed to arrange for the supplies, to have the cargo of the said boats landed and to bring it along'.<sup>108</sup>

In pursuit of his efforts to expel the English beyond the eastern bank of the Jumna and to deprive them of their allies the Gujars, the Emperor sent an order on 16th May to Walidad Khan of Malagarh,<sup>109</sup> drawing his attention to the anarchy that prevailed on the eastern side of the Jumna' and charged him to suppress it. Then he considered a petition of the shopkeepers of the Lahori gate to the effect that Kashi Nath, the thanadar of their locality demanded a bribe of Rs. 1,000, else, he said, he would send them as prisoners to the Kotwali. Qazi Faizullah was directed to place the said Thanadar under arrest.<sup>110</sup>

On 17th May in an attempt to rouse the sepoys; to fight the English before it was too late, the Emperor went to inspect the fortifications of Salimgarh and assured the soldiers that he was associated with them in a common cause. Then he arranged for the recruitment of new troops, and looked into the administration of villages. In the words of Chunni Lal, 'the land holders of the

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Metcalfe—T.N.N., pp. 27-31.

<sup>108</sup> Pr. Tr. B. S., pp. III ff.

<sup>109</sup> District Bulandshahr, I. G. IX. p. 50.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.



Nadholi having attended, the Emperor told them to keep up a proper management in Nadholi, failing which they would be expatriated<sup>111</sup>.

Some time back the Emperor had sent two messengers to bring news about the English position in Mirath. Now they returned from Mirath and reported that about 1000 European soldiers with some Englishmen, women and children were collected there in the Sadr Bazar and had erected fortifications on the Suraj Kund on which they had mounted guns, drawn by elephants. They further represented that the Gujars were committing highway robberies all along the road from Mirath to Salimpur and had maltreated them too<sup>112</sup>. On hearing this the Emperor was so disconcerted that he thought of making a fresh attempt at securing the co-operation of the Indian Princes and with their help to organize an assault on the English at Mirath. In the words of Chunni Lal, 'several missives were written and despatched by two, three or four troopers each, directing early and immediate attendance, to Maharaja Narendra Singh of Patiala, Raja Ram Singh of Jaipur, the Raja of Alwar, and the Rajas of Jodhpur, Kotah, Bundi, etc.'<sup>113</sup> At the same time the Emperor charged Hasan Ali Khan of Dojana to raise new troops, cavalry and infantry<sup>114</sup>. And he also made an attempt to raise funds. A list of the leading merchants of the city was prepared and they were required to provide collectively 5 lakhs of rupees to meet the daily expenses of the troops, amounting to 2,500 rupees<sup>115</sup>. He achieved no success. But he did not lose heart. He ordered Mirza Mughul to proceed with a strong force towards Mirath to attack any English force assembled there<sup>116</sup>, and had also two companies of infantry stationed at the Jumna bridge<sup>117</sup>. But Mirza Mughul was not a warrior. Although the Emperor had placed at his disposal 4 guns and 4 regiments of infantry and cavalry and charged him positively 'to blow up the British entrenchments at Mirath, he hesitated and requested that Mirza Aminu'ddin Khan, Mirza Ziyau'ddin Khan and Hasan Ali Khan, and other great chiefs holding extensive territories might be sent with him; in that case he promised to exterminate the English<sup>118</sup>. When these amirs who were present made no response and remained silent, the Emperor ordered his grandson Mirza Abu Bakr who was a raw youth in his teens to start with the force<sup>119</sup>. Mirza Abu Bakr obeyed and prepared himself to conduct the expedition. The Emperor ordered Mahbub Ali Khan and Hakim Ahsanullah Khan to provide funds for it<sup>120</sup>.

Muinu'ddin Hasan tells us the story of Mirza Abu Bakr's expedition paying, 'At last under pressure from the King, Mirza Abu Bakr as commander-

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, pp. 112-13.

<sup>113</sup> *Idem.*, p. 113.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>116</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 99.

<sup>117</sup> *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 113.

<sup>118</sup> *Idem.*, p. 114.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*



in-chief started with a force on the 25th of May to attack the English at the Hindan River. The force consisted of Cavalry and of Field and Horse Artillery. The battle began with artillery fire. The Commander-in-chief mounted on to the roof of a house near the River Hindan close to a bridge across the river and watched the battle. From time to time he sent messages to his artillery to tell them of the havoc their fire was creating in the English ranks. Near the bridge he placed a battery which carried on an exchange of fire with the English which became like a conversation of question and answer. Presently a shell burst near the battery, covering the gunner with dust. The Commander-in-chief experiencing for the first time in his life the effects of a bursting shell, hastily descended from the roof of the house, mounted his horse, and galloped off with his escort of sowars far into the rear of the position, not heeding the cries of his troops. A general stampede then took place<sup>111</sup>.

From the spies' reports it appears that in the course of five days (24th to 28th May, 1857) the Badshahi troops who had been sent across the Hindan to make an attack on the 1700 Englishmen—'entrenched at Mirath, shooting every black person who passed by'<sup>122</sup>,—went as far as Salimpur. Then they 'created a disturbance and returned on the pretence that no arrangements had been made for *rasad* (provisions) for them'<sup>123</sup>. Information was also received that a small force of Europeans was encamped on the banks of the Hindan intending to guard the bridge. Troops were ordered out to engage the Europeans<sup>124</sup>. Towards evening news was received that there had been a fight with the English at the Hindan. It transpired that the artillery of the mutineers had been taken and the gunners had fled. The firing of the English had been so good that many of the rebels covered with dust had gone to hell; many like birds borne on the wing had fled back to the city. Report said that there had been a fight at close quarters with swords in which the English were victorious. Many wounded men with sword and gunshot wounds had been brought into the city in doolies (covered stretchers) during the night. The Dehli Hindus who had suffered much at the hands of the mutineers since their arrival in the city expressed their joy that these wicked men, like decapitated fowls, with bloody wounds had now themselves been tossed hither and thither and had lost all their manhood and bravery. The King ordered reserves to be sent to the assistance of the mutineers. Mirza Abu Bakr who had commanded, arrived and boasted to the King of his bravery in the fight. The King was much perplexed; all night he sat, surrounded by his advisers and those who adorned his court, taking counsel and discussing the turn that affairs had taken'.<sup>125</sup> This took place on 30th May. 'On 31st May', the reports continue, 'bodies of cavalry arrived from the Hindan, and impressed every man of every class high and low on whom they could lay hands for transport service. The city

<sup>111</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., pp. 61-62.

<sup>122</sup> *Delhi News*, File No. 15, Nos. 120-146. Dated 24th May, 1857.

<sup>123</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., pp. 107-108.

<sup>124</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., pp. 107-108.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*



was in great uproar. Many rose to resist such oppression by force of arms. The Subadars of the infantry came to the King and represented that a great many Mahomedans had fallen in yesterday's engagement, claiming that they had fallen in jihad. It was admitted that as soon as the rebels received a volley from the English they lost heart and began to return to their city.<sup>126</sup>

This was the first defeat of the Badshahi Army at the hands of the English. It had serious repercussions, and in fact sealed the fate of the war. Bahadur Shah had read the situation correctly when he, foreseeing the advance of the British across the Hindan had pressed his Army to take time by the forelock and attack them before they were prepared, and to expel them completely from Mirath. He was sorely disappointed by the Army officers including Mirza Mughul<sup>127</sup>. It fell to the lot of a boy commander — Mirza Abu Bakr — to lead the army and fight the first battle of the War of 1857 in Dehli. Mirza Abu Bakr had never seen any battle before. He was struck with terror on seeing the shells burst, killing hundreds of his men; he was stunned at the sight of bloodshed. His flight which was a foregone conclusion could have been easily avoided, not by sending reinforcements as the Emperor did, but by going into the battlefield personally. The Emperor's presence alone would have set the matters right. Even his death in the battlefield would have been a redeeming feature; it would have saved the Royal house from the charge of cowardice.

According to Zaheer Dehlawi the battle of the Hindan was not an aggressive battle; it was a defensive one. While the sepoys in the Badshahi Army were enjoying themselves and had become lax for want of regular parade and military exercises and were completely unaware of the British preparations in the Mirath region and on the eastern side of Jumna whence they never dreamed of a British attack, one fine morning it was suddenly announced that the British troops had crossed the Hindan and were advancing into Ghaziu'ddin Nagar. Panic seized them and everybody in the Fort and Palace. The Emperor felt more afflicted and embarrassed than anybody else; he had realized the crisis. Unable to find any man to lead the troops in that critical moment, he was compelled to ask his own grandson Mirza Abu Bakr to take the lead. The helter-skelter<sup>128</sup> that followed has been described by Zaheer Dehlawi<sup>129</sup> and others.<sup>130</sup>

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>127</sup> *Vide, supra.*

<sup>128</sup> Shri Nigam charges Bahadur Shah with destroying his own army, and says 'The defeated Indian troops returned to Delhi. At that time the river Jumna was crossed by a boat bridge. When Bahadur Shah learnt about the defeat of the Indian force he ordered the boat bridge to be destroyed just when the troops were crossing it. Hundreds of troops were thus drowned and their guns fell into the hands of the British'. Nigam, N. K.—*Delhi 1857*, pp. 72-73.

It is dangerous to draw hasty conclusions, the incident like many others in the diaries of that momentous period of war is not given in an intelligible form. The *diaries* comprise scattered and disconnected notes which less substantiated by other sources in detail cannot be relied upon. Muinu'ddin Hasan's statement from which the above inference has been drawn is not confirmed by Jiwan Lal; not is it borne out by Zaheer Dehlawi who gives an eye-witness account of the wounded soldiers returning from the battle of the Hindan. And both state that



That Bahadur Shah had foreseen the British aggression is also borne out by the statement of Forrest to the effect that General Anson and Sir John Lawrence had been concerting measures<sup>131</sup> to make an attack upon Dehli. Previously the British had secured promises of help from the Rajas of Patiala and Jind. By 23rd May their plan of operations was complete. A British army consisting of 300 Europeans, 1000 Indian troops and 22 field guns were to march from Ambala and Karnal via Baghpat where they were to join Hewitt's troops from Mirath; then the united forces were to advance upon Dehli<sup>132</sup>. But the sudden death of Anson at Karnal (25th May) spoilt the British plan and the attack was postponed and did not come off until 27th May. Then the Mirath contingent under Brigadier Wilson joined at Baghpat the troops headed by Barnard, the successor of Anson. At daybreak on 30th May, Wilson's contingent reached Ghaziu'ddin Nagar, a village about a mile on the left bank of the Hindan and nine miles from the city of Dehli. Now the Badshahi troops who had been already sent by the Emperor under the command of Mirza Abu Bakr had taken their position on a ridge on the opposite bank of the Hindan. As soon as they saw the enemy approach they opened fire so vigorously that it impressed Cave-Browne<sup>133</sup>. But it was ultimately silenced by the heavy British guns, and the Badshahi troops retreated leaving behind their guns. However, they returned the following day, 1st May. Again they opened fire from the ridge where they had again taken up a good position. An artillery duel began and continued for two hours at the end of which the British troops made an advance and the Badshahi troops retired though they continued their fire and managed this time to carry away their guns.

Great reactions followed the defeats of the Hindan and Ghaziu'ddin Nagar. The confidence which on 12th May, 1857 the Emperor<sup>134</sup> had inspired in the minds of the inhabitants<sup>135</sup> was shaken; and the hopes of order, discipline and prosperity, which had dawned, receded. Complaints arose about the difficulty of getting provisions into the city owing to the shops being closed. 'Under the King's orders soldiers were stationed in the bazar to keep the shops open', says Anan Lal<sup>136</sup>. A letter was received from the Raja of Ballabgarh saying that 'he had imprisoned 11 soldiers, found deserting to their homes with gold mohurs to the value of 2,060 rupees<sup>137</sup>'. In these circumstances the Emperor wrote the following letter to his son, Mirza Mughul:

the sepoys who were defeated in the battle returned to the city, though they were, hungry, thirsty and vexed'.

(i) Zaheer Dehlawi—D.G., pp. 86-88 and (ii) Metcalfe—T.N.N., pp. 61-62 and 109.

(i) Zaheer Dehlawi—D.G., pp. 86-88 and (ii) Metcalfe—T.N.N., pp. 61-62 and 109.

Forrest, G.W.—H.I.M., I, pp. 64-70.

Forrest, G.W.—H.I.M., I, pp. 64-70.

Cave-Browne—P. D. I., p. 312.

Dehli Urdu Akhbar, 31st May, 1857, Mutiny Papers, collection No. 2, Vol. 19; No. 22.

Vide, supra and the Sirajul Akhbar, Mutiny Papers, Box No. I, Vol 13, No. 8 (May 9-15, 1857) and No. 9 (May 16-22, 1857).

Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. no. 110.

Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. no. 110.



'My son! be it known—when the sepoy's foot and horse came to me in the beginning, I told them plainly that I possess neither army nor wherewithal to help them but that I would NOT HOLD MY LIFE DEAR IF MY LIFE WERE OF ANY USE TO THEM. When I said this all of them became happy and contented; and they promised to lay down their lives in the attempt to carry out my orders and in showing me allegiance. Thereupon I advised them that their first task was to supervise the Magazine and Treasury so well that both these things should later prove assets to them as well as to me. Afterwards they frequented the Diwan-i Khass, the Diwan-i Amm, the Mahtab Bagh and other places inside the Fort and put up and stayed there as they liked. With the object of giving them all possible comfort—knowing that they were ignorant and unacquainted with the Court Etiquette. —I prohibited my servants from intercepting them. Although I had given no word to supply them wherewithal, I went out of my way to the extent of borrowing money so that due salary may be given to everyone of the sepoy's, infantry and cavalry. Many a time, I gave warnings that they must not plunder the city and must in no circumstance exercise high-handedness over the inhabitants but my warnings have produced no effect.

'By now ten<sup>138</sup> days have passed but the sepoy's continue to indulge in their old vicious habits. True, the sepoy regiments have withdrawn from the Diwan-i Khass and the Diwan-i Amm, but *they are not carrying out my orders*.<sup>139</sup> I had ordered them that they should encamp outside the city, that no one from the infantry and cavalry should go about in the city wearing arms and that no one should oppress and exploit the inhabitants of the city. But I find that one regiment is residing at the Dehli gate, a second at the Ajmeri gate and a third at the Lahori gate right inside the city walls. And I find they have plundered some of the bazars outright: they carry on their plunder by day and by night. On the false pretence that an Englishman is lurking inside, they dash into the people's private dwellings and plunder them; they break open the locks and take away the shutters and doors and they plunder the goods in the interior most shamelessly. Although it is an accepted old convention that the cities and towns which fall into the hands of aggressors before the commencement of aggression and bloodshed remain exempt from plunder, yet these sepoy's do not care to observe this time-honoured convention. Even Chingiz Khan and Nadir Shah who became notorious for their tyranny used to give amnesty to those cities and towns which had surrendered without making resistance.

'Moreover these sepoy's threaten my servants and the inhabitants of the city and harass them. Although I ordered—and have ordered repeatedly—that the

<sup>138</sup> The number 'ten' is rather idiomatic than mathematical. (*Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 134).

<sup>139</sup> The phrase—'*they are not carrying out my orders*'—has a close bearing upon Muinu'dd Hasan's statement previously quoted, i.e. 'The King repeatedly urged an attack upon Meer but the mutineers delayed, first upon one pretext, then upon another' (Metcalf—T. N. N., 61). This lends strength to the conclusion that the given letter was written on the eve of, probably after, the battle of the Hindan.



sepoy Infantry must vacate the Farrashkhana quarter and although I have similarly ordered the cavalry to vacate the Mahtab Bagh, yet they have not given up possession of those places. These are the most exalted places into which no one—not even a Nadir Shah, an Ahmad Shah or a Governor-General—has ever come, riding on horseback.

\*Furthermore the sepoys requested me in the beginning that I might allow the princes to hold high commands in the army, and they promised them complete obedience and allegiance; I did according as they desired that the princes—now army commanders—should be given *khilats* so that they should look grand and worthy of the military offices and posts of responsibility and trust they held. They insisted upon my doing this much for them whereby, they contended, they would feel honoured and would enjoy recognition and esteem. They all insisted that all the European prisoners should be killed at once, even this was done to meet their wishes and demands. The same day a circular order bearing my royal seal was issued announcing that civil courts had been opened in the city; but the inhabitants took no notice of this.

\*Apart from all this it is worth noting that whenever a high and responsible officer of the British Government came into the Fort, he dismounted from his horse at the gate of the Diwan-i Amm whence he proceeded on foot. But these sepoys come riding on horseback and dash into the Diwankhana and Jilokhana while they are underdressed and wear no turbans on their heads. They do not know how to pay homage and how to observe etiquette at the court. While attending the durbar the sepoy officers pay no heed to their dress; they use *topis* as headgear instead of turbans and keep their swords hanging about. Not even the British officers did so during the period of British rule.

\*These sepoys have spoilt and wasted all the material of the Magazine and they have squandered the amounts of money in the Treasury. Then they clamoured for increment in their daily allowance; that too was granted. Although they have got the increment more than their numbers warranted, yet they lay severe hands on the shopkeepers and oppress them in different ways; they take edibles from them but do not pay the price.

\*As for the condition outside the city it should be noted that these sepoys do not proceed to the countryside to look after the functioning of the government machinery. Consequently hundreds of people are killed and thousands robbed.

\*As for the administration of the city it should be noted that our men and functionaries are not sufficient in number to be able to cope with the administrative problems of all the districts; no tahsildars and no police officers are available. No one from the sepoy infantry and cavalry ever go to the countryside. In which case there might have been a hope of improvement in administration.

\*In these circumstances it has become tremendously difficult to maintain transit of goods and provisions and to keep open the commissariat; and it is now almost impossible to collect revenue.



'As an unavoidable result of all this, chaos in the city and country has become imminent. And to crown all the sepoys accuse the royal servants saying, They are hostile to us'. Then they imperiously and haughtily demand of them their own daily allowance. In compliance with my personal orders these servants of mine show kindness to them and are even meek to them; they humour them and show them every indulgence. In spite of all this the sepoys are not happy.

'THIS BEING THE TRUE STATE OF AFFAIRS HOW CAN ONE POSSIBLY SUPPOSE THAT THESE SEPOYS DESIRE IMPROVEMENT AND WELFARE OF THIS COUNTRY OR THAT THEY WANT TO SHOW ALLEGIANCE TO OUR AUTHORITY?

'There is still another point which demands consideration. In the treasury there is no money left. As for the mahajans and merchants of the city, so much have they been fleeced and ruined that they are not in a position to advance further loan. On the horns of this dilemma how and for how long can payment of the sepoys' daily allowance continue, and what will be the plight if and when one day the supply of food from the countryside being cut off the commissariat is closed down and the sepoys' allowance is discontinued?

'OVER AND ABOVE THIS THE FUN IS THAT WHILE THE SEPOYS THEMSELVES COMMIT MISCHIEF AND THE MISDEEDS WHICH ENTAIL ALL KINDS OF EVILS, THEY THROW THE BLAME ON AND ACCUSE THE ROYAL SERVANTS. THIS IS A SITUATION WHICH BRINGS TO MIND THE PROVERB.—THE THIEF PLAYS THE POLICEMAN.

'The sum and substance is that when the army is in this bad, dirty, untidy state, my kingship will obviously go to dogs and will be ruined. My destitution and helplessness having so aggravated and reached such a pitch, I have made it a point to spend the rest of my life in undisturbed devotion to God, bidding goodbye to kingship which abounds in unending troubles and disasters. I have resolved to go first to the shrine of Khwaja Sahib whence after making proper arrangements I should leave for Mecca.

'It should also be noted that when the sepoys had arrived from Mirath then the royal servants and the inhabitants of the city made no resistance whatsoever. They did them no harm, nor did they do anything adverse to them and detrimental to their interests. So in no way do the inhabitants of the city deserve ill of the sepoys; in no way can, fairly speaking, the lives, honour and property of the inhabitants be imperilled and destroyed. NOW ON BEHALF OF MY SUBJECTS AND PLAYING THE ROLE OF THEIR SPOKESMAN I CALL UPON THE SEPOYS TO REALIZE THE SITUATION THAT HAS RESULTED. I ask the sepoys to think why we should continue to participate in their doings and why we should make our sons their partners and helpers.

'The oppression and tyranny which the sepoys are now exercising and inflicting call for serious thinking on our part. I consider THAT OPPRESSION AND TYRANNY DEROGATORY TO MY KINGSHIP. I consider this a derogation that being a king I should ally myself with these sepoys and approve



of their killing and plundering the innocent inhabitants of the city. Here is a point worth considering: on the one hand there should be love and friendship and goodwill between myself as king and my subjects and on the other hand *my army* should commit such misdeeds as not even the enemy forces would commit; and let the said army should consider their misdeeds an act of merit. HAD THESE SEPOYS ACQUITTED THEMSELVES WISELY AND WELL, PROTECTING THE SUBJECTS AND LOOKING AFTER THEIR INTERESTS, IDENTIFYING THEMSELVES WITH THE ROYAL SERVANTS AND THUS WINNING THE ROYAL FAVOUR, THEY WOULD HAVE IN THAT CASE EARNED MY APPRECIATION AND ADMIRATION. We had entertained hopes that by discharging their duties and responsibilities in this manner the sepoys would promote and help the maintenance of peace.

'My son! you should summon the infantry and cavalry officers and explain fully all these points to them and make them understand the same. If they duly desire to serve and promote the interests of my empire they should give a written bond and agreement, the draft of which will be forwarded to them. In order to give them assurance we will also on our part write a bond. They must give up their excesses and indulgence in oppression and high-handedness, and they must not commit the misdeeds which they have been committing up till now. Let the infantry troops carry away their tents from the city and out of the city this very day. If anyone of the sepoys will be found killing or plundering any of the inhabitants his guilt being proved he will be awarded such condign punishment as should serve as a deterrent to others; others must know that by committing such misdeeds they cannot escape punishment.

'This done, one regiment or several should, armed with royal orders, proceed into the country to put an end to tumult and disorder; they should be employed in maintaining peace. These regiments must proceed to the work thus assigned to them with a light heart and without murmuring. Imprudently and unadvisedly they must not make unreasonable requests for acquiring control of the Magazine and Commissariat. The regiments thus told off would be entitled to return when and if it were fully ascertained that the English troops had closed on them. In that case they would be free to fight in whatever manner and according to whatever plan they liked. The sepoy army must decide and fix the strength of the troops necessary to be allocated to different places; they should determine how the troops should be distributed. Need will arise for keeping some inside the city but it is not necessary for the present. The city and country alike are being ruined while the sepoy army does not care to help maintain order at all outside.

'There is still another point which along with other points you should bring home to the sepoys and impress upon them. It is this. If the sepoys will not do so cheerfully and with sincerity to achieve and accomplish these wishes of their king and if they will not exert themselves wholeheartedly to execute his orders and instructions then we shall betake ourselves to the Khwaja Sahib and sit there as a fakir. In that case no one should raise objection to our doing so; and the sepoys themselves should become masters of the city, fort and country.



No one of the kings and no one of the war-mongers of history has through the ages oppressed a person who has surrendered and sued for peace. To such a person all kings and conquerors have given free choice and option to adopt and pursue his own way.

'You should speak to the sepoy's and tell them that out of the two stipulations mentioned above *they must accept one*, and the same should be inserted in their petition which must be signed, sealed and confirmed by their officers. That petition you should forward to us.

'My son! you must not take this lightly. On account of old age and feebleness I cannot bear all the loads on my shoulders. It is not a child's play to rule a people and at the same time to keep an army under control<sup>140</sup>.

From the internal evidence of this letter which is undated it appears that it was written either on the eve, or after the battles, of the Hindan and Ghaziu'ddin Nagar. The probability is that it was written in the midst of the reactions which had followed the defeat and flight of the Badshahi Army. It was then that Bahadur Shah felt terribly disgusted with the undesirable elements in his Army almost in the same way as a father feels disgusted with his unworthy sons. Then it was that he sent for his sons and grandsons—Mirza Mughul, Mirza Abu Bakr and Mirza Abdullah and expressed his anger at their sympathy with the sepoy's, warning them that one day they would be hanged as soon as the English entered the city'. 'My fate', he said, 'may be thus expressed:

*'Kafan pahan kar zindagi ke aiyyam kisi bagh men guzar doonga'*  
(For the rest of my life I shall live in the seclusion of some garden clothed in my winding-sheet)<sup>141</sup>

And it was about this<sup>142</sup> time that Bahadur Shah had heard the news of the preparations in the British Camp for an assault on the city of Dehli. Says Jiwan Lal, 'It was reported that 9 regiments of British infantry, 3 regiments of cavalry with field batteries and siege train had arrived at Alipur'. On hearing this in the durbar of 3rd June, the Emperor discussed with the Army chiefs their chances of defending the city. 'The mutineer chiefs', continues Jiwan Lal, 'declared their ability to defend the city. The King inquired at what points it was proposed to oppose the English. The places stated were Dhirajki Pahari, Kenghur<sup>143</sup> Purtosa<sup>144</sup> near the garden of Mahaldar; also at Salimpur. The forces to be collected at each spot were to be specified, and an early attack on the city was anticipated'.<sup>145</sup>

<sup>140</sup> Translated by the writer from the original Urdu text. *U'de Zakaullah*—T.U. A.S.I., pp. 691-695. Cf. *Proceedings of the Trial of Bahadur Shah*, pp. 134-135 or *Trial of the ex-King of Delhi*, pp. 201-204.

<sup>141</sup> Metcalf—T. N. N., p. 111.

<sup>142</sup> 3rd June, 1857.

<sup>143</sup> These names are not in their original forms.

<sup>144</sup> These names are not in their original forms.

<sup>145</sup> Metcalfe—T.N.N., p. 112.



At all events the above letter is a positive evidence of Bahadur Shah's sincerity of purpose. While it shows that good many of the sepoys and perhaps some of the officers had been disobedient and had been misbehaving, it absolves the Emperor from all responsibility for the consequences. This letter also shows how morally strong Bahadur Shah was in the midst of troubles and afflictions, not only was he conscientious but also possessed a wakeful and resourceful mind. He was by no means apathetic or indifferent to the problems of war and administration; he was intent upon all these. And he was hopeful amidst failures and was ready to evolve new plans to meet a rapidly aggravating situation. Where robust and youthful commanders would have shuddered and paled, fled or committed suicide, the aged Bahadur Shah stuck to his guns, knowing the value of persistence, tenacity as well as of life. However, he did not hesitate to express his displeasure, on noticing instances of the shameful conduct of the sepoys, and held out threats to quit the Fort, to renounce the world and to commit suicide. But these threats were really intended to work out a psychological change in the Sepoys and to make them zealous in war; these were intended to give the delinquents in the Army a fresh chance to start with a clean slate by atoning for the past and by promising under a written bond to remain loyal to the State and to the cause of the Mutiny till the end. The threats were noble and the motives behind these threats were nobler still. The threats were a picture of a desperate and agitated mind, but the constructive suggestions which attended them reflected also a mind which was at once thoughtful, legal and constitutional.

The victorious British troops had halted after the battle of Ghaziuddin Nagar. They were reinforced on the 1st of June by a battalion of the Gurkhas commanded by Major Reid. On 7th June they advanced; and crossing the Jumna at Baghpat reached their headquarters at Alipur. Then it was resolved to proceed to Dehli without delay. But news spread in the British Camp that the Royal Army was preparing to oppose the British advance and had with this object occupied a strongly fortified position at Badli-ki-Serai. Says Forrest, 'The position which the rebels had chosen was admirably formed by nature for withstanding the march of an attacking force, and was capable of being made strong. They held a large enclosed building with a strong gate called the Serai (resting-place of travellers) of Badli. It stood on the left of the road and the camp was grouped about it. About a hundred and fifty yards in front of the serai on a small natural elevation, the enemy had made a sandbag battery of four heavy guns and an 8-inch howitzer. To the right of the Serai was a small village whose mud walls and enclosures and gardens offered a strong cover for infantry. The ground on either side of the road was intersected with water-cuts and generally swampy, while nearly parallel to the road on the right, at the distance of about a mile, ran the canal, spanned by numerous bridges'.<sup>146</sup> The British troops crossed the canal at midnight, and at daybreak an artillery duel began. But the royal artillery proved much superior. Thereupon the 75th regiment of the British troops made a

<sup>146</sup> Forrest, G. W.—H. I. M., pp. 72-73.



desperate attack upon the Royal Army and defeated them completely. The sepoys fled leaving their guns behind, and their camp fell into the hands of the British who pursued them. The victors then seized Badli-ki-Serai and occupied the whole area and suburbs of Sabzi-Mandi including Hindu Rao's House.<sup>147</sup>

It was in the course of preparation for this battle that the Emperor was approached on 3rd June 1857 to declare jihad on the English<sup>148</sup>; and immediately in the words of Jiwan Lal, 'all the remaining bungalows were destroyed and fired. Ghaziu'ddin Nukur, the zamindar of Poonah<sup>149</sup> and Satgaon<sup>150</sup>, issued notification that no supplies were to be given to the English; every straggler from the English Army was to be murdered, if caught, the village obeying these instructions to be held hereafter rent free. Other zamindars took similar action, showing their hatred of the English and sympathy with the King'. Great hopes were built in the Dehli circles on the results of the forthcoming battle; and confidence having returned 'a meeting of the bankers was held under the orders of the King and one lakh of rupees was subscribed and a promise was given of a second lakh payable in 4 days<sup>151</sup>. Then the Royal Army erected two batteries in front of the Serai; they had also fixed there several heavy guns to sweep the whole of the open ground; and to give effect to their guns they placed at intervals large gumlas (earthen jars)<sup>152</sup> painted white to enable them more accurately to mark the distances and to regulate the elevation of their guns'.<sup>153</sup> On 6th June news having reached the Royal Camp that the English would enter the city that night, the Emperor had the ramparts of the city lined with soldiery. Hakim Ahsanullah Khan was ordered to serve out rations. One hundred maund of *atta* and *dal* were taken from Dwalli Baniyah. The city kotwal was ordered to have ample provisions ready, and 24 guns were sent to the front to oppose the English advance; and all the approaches to the city including the bridges were destroyed.<sup>154</sup> The Emperor was doing everything in his power to encourage the Army to fight well. According to Jiwan Lal's entry of 7th June 'orders were issued through the police that each sweetmeat seller was instantly to prepare twelve rupees' worth of sweet-meats to be sent out to the victorious troops to reward them for their bravery, seventy sowars from Alipur having reported that they had defeated the English force and pursued it for six miles'.<sup>155</sup> Jiwan Lal further says that sixteen carts of provision for the English forces having been seized by the Gujars, the carts were taken to the King and were plundered by the

<sup>147</sup> *Idem*, p. 77. *Vide* Map of the War of 1857 in Delhi.

<sup>148</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 113.

<sup>149</sup> Names of parganas in the vicinity of Dehli.

<sup>150</sup> Names of parganas in the vicinity of Dehli.

<sup>151</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 113.

<sup>152</sup> *Vide* (i) Map of the War of 1857 in Dehli (ii) Cave-Browne—*The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, Vol. I, p. 318.

<sup>153</sup> *Vide* (i) Map of the War of 1857 in Dehli Cave-Browne—*The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, Vol. I, p. 318.

<sup>154</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 115.

<sup>155</sup> *Idem*, p. 116.



city Musalmans under the King's orders.<sup>156</sup> Furthermore, he says, 'A sowar arrived from Badli Serai to inform the King that the mutineers would engage the English; that day at midday and that the English had sent spies into the camp of the mutineers in the disguise of 4th Native Infantry who were acting as the King's bodyguard. A fight had ensued and the English had taken possession of the camp of the mutineers. Heavy firing continued all day till 4 P.M. Seventeen guns fell into the hands of the English who advanced as far as Mubarak Bagh on the road to Sabzi-Mandi; and the mutineers retired to the city leaving the countryside into the hands of the English. Only Mahommedans were killed in this fight, and no Hindus. Ammunition and supplies were constantly despatched in the direction of the battlefield. The city people poured volleys of abuse upon the mutineers who were seen returning to the city, accusing them of cowardice'.<sup>157</sup>

Like the defeats at the Hindan and Ghaziu'ddin Nagar the defeat of the Royal Arms at Badli-ki-Serai created a panic in the city; many shops were closed. In his entry of 10th June Jiwan Lal says, 'The King issued a proclamation for the forcible opening of all the shops in the city'.<sup>158</sup> He was extremely perplexed and in the course of his diligent search for a man who might be brave enough to attack the English before they attacked the city, he made a choice of General Samad Khan and called him to a private interview. According to the information of Jiwan Lal, 'General Samad Khan agreed to attack the English if placed in command of the King's troops. The King ordered his appointment as commander-in-chief with the presentation of the usual *khila't*. A proclamation was issued to the army to muster and advance under the generalship of Samad Khan when victory would be their reward. About 10 o'clock a force of 1,800 Sepoys and 12-horse guns issued from the Lahore Gate and Kashmiri Gate. On reaching the English position Samad Khan communicated with the English to say that he had been sent by the Raja of Jhajjar to join the English force. This feint did not succeed, and an order was issued to attack. About 100 English were killed; the English then pushed forward their artillery. The General came under fire, and immediately retreated leaving several fieldpieces behind him. The force retreated through the Kashniri Gate into the city. Artillery fire was then opened from the Kashmiri Gate bastions. The whole force by the evening returned within the city walls. The heads of the Europeans killed in the fight were cut off and paraded through the city'.<sup>159</sup>

It was after their victory in the battle of Badli-ki-Serai reported on 8th June by Forrest and on 9th by Jiwan Lal that the British were able to establish their camp at the Ridge—a long series of rocky hills ranging from the banks of the Jumna about two and a half miles above the city of Dehli and extending an equal distance, closing below a large stone building called Hindu Rao's house

*Idem*, p. 116.

*Idem*, pp. 117-118.

*Ibid.*

Metcalf—T. N. N., p. 119.



adjacent to the Grand Trunk Road. Rising 60 feet above the level of the city with an average distance of a mile from the city walls, this Ridge served the English well both as a place of defence and a vantage point for offence.<sup>160</sup> And Hindu Rao's house in the possession of the British was the keypoint of their position. The Royal Army wanted to capture it. And with this object in view they made several sorties, on the 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th June 1857 but were always repulsed. The sortie of 12th June aimed furthermore at the capture of the Metcalfe House which lay close to the river, but was equally a failure. In the course of the next few days the English set about planning to take the city by a *coup de main*; but before their plans were mature the Royal Army made another attack on the Hindu Rao house on 17th June. They were repulsed after a hard and close fight, which became known as the battle of the 'Idgah mound which lay on the right of Hindu Rao's house. Here the Royal Army had intended to construct a battery but were prevented from doing so by the British. Here too, a bitter fight took place comprising a hot musketry fire under the joint command of Major Tombs and Major Reid.

After two days another sortie was reported. Says Forrest, 'On the 19th secret notice of a sortie having been received, the picquets were reinforced and in the afternoon threatened the whole of our position, whilst a large body filed unobserved through the gardens and suburbs to our right. About sunrise some flying sowars announced that the enemy were about to attack our rear. The infantry were employed guarding the picquets from the attack in front, and only some few troops were in camp. Twelve guns and some four or five hundred cavalry under Brigadier Grant were quickly collected and sent forward to meet them. They found the enemy strongly supported by infantry posted in wall gardens, against which our artillery could make but little impression. Their guns poured forth a quick and well-directed fire, and the infantry from the gardens shot down our artillerymen and horses. As long as it was light, the steady fire of our guns and the dashing charges of the cavalry succeeded in keeping the rebels in check. But in the dusk of the evening their superior numbers began to tell, and they very nearly succeeded in turning our flank, and for some time two guns were in great jeopardy. All was now in confusion, and the darkness of the night began to increase the disorder when the infantry came up, dashed forward, and cutting a lane through the rebels, rescued the guns. The firing on both sides gradually ceased, and our infantry being much too weak in numbers to attack the enemy's extended line, our troops returned to camp about 8.30 P.M. At daybreak our troops again advanced to attack the enemy, but found only a strong picquet which was easily driven back, and we captured a gun and two waggons which they had left the night previous. The force had scarcely returned to camp when the enemy again made their appearance, pushed on their guns and opened fire. Our troops promptly turned out in force and the enemy quickly dispersed'.<sup>161</sup>

<sup>160</sup> *I*vide Forrest—H. I. M., I., p. 78.

<sup>161</sup> Forrest, G. W.—H. I. M., I., pp. 89-92.



Forrest's confessions regarding the superior artillery and firing of the Badshahi Army finds confirmation in the diary of Jiwan Lal who testifies to the high ability of Quli Khan, an artilleryman in Badshahi service, saying 'Quli Khan distinguished himself by his exertions keeping up a constant fire from the bastions at the English; the whole city was full of his praises. The King cheered by the prowess of this man, ordered one hundred maunds of gunpowder to be prepared. Salt-petre and charcoal were purchased'.<sup>162</sup> The same day the English established a battery in full view of the Kashmiri Gate and opened fire on it. But the fire of the Badshahi artillery confounded the English so much that they lost all courage and were disheartened!

It appears from Jiwan Lal's account of 12th June that the Emperor now took stock of the situation; and finding that his Army had made no progress 'expressed anger at the apathy of the mutineers who were making no serious attempt to drive off the English; the (King) chided the chief at not having gained a single victory'.<sup>163</sup> The following day (13th June) the whole force was mustered including the sappers and miners, and the King's Bodyguard, and marched out of the Kashmiri Gate to give battle to the English. (Some time later) a sowar arrived from the battlefield and reported that the Sepoys had reached the Kaband and came under the artillery fire of the English. The mutineers having lost twenty cavalry and sixty sepoy by the fire, the whole force was retreating, the regiments reported as having set the example being the mutineers from Umballa'.<sup>164</sup> On 14th June about 3 P.M. '6,000 sepoy with 12 guns marched out of the city. A fight ensued, in which loss occurred on both sides. Reserves were sent up. Heavy artillery fire lasted the whole night. Early in the morning on 15th June seven canon balls fell in the King's Palace. Ten thousand mutineers were let out of the city at midnight to attack the English camp. Many fell on both sides but the troops could make no headway against the heavy fire of the English and returned in great disorder to the city'. On the 16th again a fight took place between the Sepoys and the English. It was indecisive as usual; many were killed.<sup>165</sup> On the 17th an order was issued to Qazi Faizullah Beg to prepare provisions for the troops that were about to attack the English. Forty cannonballs were picked up this day, fired from the English Camp. Many persons were killed by them. It was reported to the King (in the Durlar) that three batteries had been constructed—at Dir Chuki Hill and also on the 'Idgah—and that they (mutineers) intended to attack the English. Later on in the day the English attacked the 'Idgah battery and drove the mutineers out of it, capturing two guns'.<sup>166</sup> On the 18th reinforcements came to the Royal Army from Nasirabad. On the 19th the officers of the Nasirabad troops attended the Royal durbar and made special preparations for an

<sup>162</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 121.

<sup>163</sup> (i) Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 120.

(ii) D. N. 20th June, 1857.

<sup>164</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 121.

<sup>165</sup> *Idem*, p. 123.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid*.



attack on the English Camp. The attack materialized on 20th June. A severe engagement followed, in which many were killed.<sup>167</sup>

Every day the usual fighting took place ending indecisively in an artillery duel. The 23rd of June was a special day, being the centenary of Plassey and the first day of the month of Zilqada for the Musalmans and the festival of Jatra for the Hindus. On this day took place the battle of Sabzi-Mandi whence the Royal Army advanced to the rear of Hindu Rao's house, 'and made such a vigorous attack on a British Battery commanded by Major Reid that Major Reid could not help paying them a tribute: "No men could have fought better. They charged the Rifles, the Guides, and my own men again and again; and at one time I thought I must have lost the day. The cannonade from the city, and the heavy guns which they had brought out raged fast and furious, and completely enfiladed the whole of my position. Thousands were brought against my mere handful of men, but I knew the importance of my position and was determined to do my utmost to hold it till reinforcements arrived".<sup>168</sup> observed Major Reid. 'After a while', says Forrest, 'the reinforcements came, and an attempt was made from the Mound Battery to drive the rebels from the Sabzi-Mandi, which with its narrow lanes, mud walls, enclosures and flat-roofed houses offered good cover to infantry; and from wall and roof the enemy poured forth a stream of fire on the advancing troops. The men fell fast, stricken by the bullets of the foe and the fierce rays of the sun. Thrice were the streets cleared, but when the soldiers tried to force the houses, the enemy returned from every lane and renewed their murderous fire. 'The mass then got into the Sabzi-Mandi and gardens on our right and made repeated attacks on the rear of Hindu Rao's house and on the mound. Our fellows followed them three times into the Sabzi-Mandi, but they got into houses and closed the doors on themselves; and when our troops withdrew, came out again and fired away.' Through the whole of the hot tropical day did the battle rage, and it was not until evening had closed that the enemy returned into the city having lost over a thousand men'.<sup>169</sup>

The battle ended in British victory, and Sabzi-Mandi was now in their possession; and they fortified it so well connecting it by a line of breastworks and picquets with the Ridge that further attacks by the Royal Army on the rear of the British Camp were rendered impossible.

The following day (24th June) General Chamberlain, commander of the British siege train in the Panjab; arrived at the Ridge to fill the post of Adjutant-General of the British Army. And his arrival was followed by that of the reinforcements from the Panjab. About the same time (1st and 2nd July) reinforcements also came to the Royal Army.

<sup>167</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 124.

<sup>168</sup> Forrest, G. W.—H. I. M., vol. I., p. 94.

<sup>169</sup> *Idem.*, p. 95.



## UNABLE TO DRIVE THE ENGLISH FROM THE RIDGE (2nd July-25th August 1857)

The given period (2nd July-25th August) presents a momentous scene in the drama of the war of 1857 in which the most important actor is General Bakht Khan. Bakht Khan or Bakhtawar Khan being his sobriquet, his name was Muhammad Bakhsh, his father's name being Abdullah Khan. He hailed from Sultanpur<sup>170</sup> and had sprung on the paternal side from the Rohila stock of Ghulam Qadir Rohila and on the maternal side from the Oudh family of Nawab Shujau'd-Dawla<sup>171</sup>. Jiwan Lal reports his descent twice over. The first report says; 'The General pointed out that he was the descendant of the same family as the King of Dehli and asked the King to satisfy himself that this was true'.<sup>172</sup> The second report says, 'Bakht Khan represented that he was a native of Sultanpur in Lakhaon and related to the royal family of Oude and requested that the truth of his statements might be inquired into'.<sup>173</sup> Regarding his antecedents only this much is known that he had served the East India Company as the chief Indian officer of a field battery of the artillery at Jalalabad in the First Afghan War. On his return from Afghanistan he was made Subadar of the Artillery at Nimuch whence he came over to Bareilly after the outbreak of the Mutiny. There he helped Khan Bahadur Khan, grandson of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, the last independent ruler of Rohilkhand, rise to eminence as Nawab Nazim under the Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah. According to Forrest, Bakht Khan then assumed the title of Brigadier and drove every evening in the carriage of the murdered Brigadier (Sibbald) escorted by a large staff.<sup>174</sup> Afterwards he proceeded to Rampur, Moradabad and Rajabpur *en route* to Dehli which he reached on 2nd July, with a formidable reinforcement<sup>175</sup>, for the Royal Army. 'On the 1st and 2nd July', says Forrest, 'the Rohilkund mutineers arrived at Delhi marching across the bridge of boats within full view of the spectators from our Camp posted on the Ridge. They consisted of four regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, one horse battery and two post guns, and were commanded by one Bakht Khan, an old subadar of artillery. He was well-known to many officers of that arm in

Sultanpur—a town in Oudh 34 miles south of Ajodhya was the scene of an outbreak of revolt caused by the 13th Bengal irregular cavalry on Tuesday morning, 9th June (Hall, C.—H. I. M., I, p. 247).

Najmul Ghani—*Akhbaru's Sanadid* II, 35; *Ajkal*, Dehli; August 1957, pp. 97-102

Metcalf—T. N. N., pp. 134, 146. Without mentioning his authority Cooper says, 'Bakht Khan came from a family of Hindu extraction but was converted under temptation of territorial acquisition'. (Cooper—*Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 201). This is not correct.

Metcalf—T. N. N., pp. 134, 146. Without mentioning his authority Cooper says, 'Bakht Khan came from a family of Hindu extraction but was converted under temptation of territorial acquisition'. (Cooper—*Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 201). This is not correct.

Forrest—H. I. M., III., p. 309.

Forrest—H. I. M., I., p. 90. It appears that a large number of the *mujahideen* accompanied Bakht Khan from Rampur, Moradabad and Rajabpur in the vicinity of Amroha where he had halted in the course of his journey to Dehli. *Vide* (i) Najmul Ghani—*Akhbaru-s Sanadid* II, pp. 36 ff; (ii) Zaheer Dehlawi—D. G., p. 97.



camp. They described him as a big fat man, obsequious, fond of the society of Europeans, and very intelligent".<sup>176</sup>

The aged Emperor who needed badly a general, able to build discipline in his army, welcomed Bakht Khan and 'grasped his hand in token of friendship'; and considering him the right man he appointed him commander-in-chief<sup>177</sup> and also awarded him a personal distinction by calling him *farzand* (honoured son), Mirza Mughul who had hitherto been the commander-in-chief and whose authority had been uncontrolled in all matters relating to the Army was made Adjutant-General<sup>178</sup>. It is said Mirza Mughul did not like this change; and in course of time frictions arose between the two contestants. But a minor friction<sup>179</sup> of 17th July apart, which was removed on a personal intervention from the Emperor, the two appear to have worked amicably till the end of the period when Bakht Khan's hold over the military and civil administration of which he had been put in charge began to shake<sup>180</sup>, and complaints against him began to arise. Referring to the good effect of Bahadur Shah's intervention, Major Harriott the Judge Advocate-General remarked, 'I think this is conclusive of the three<sup>181</sup> conspiring, consulting and agreeing together'<sup>182</sup>.

At the time of Bakht Khan's arrival the British position was weak, even critical. The numbers of the white-skinned troops who alone could be relied upon was small; their base of operations was unsafe; their camp was not immune against diseases, and treachery was not unknown. They were still on the defensive, anxious to conserve their energies and avoid unnecessary loss of lives. The untimely death of General Anson, who had been commander-in-chief at the time of the outbreak of the Mutiny at Karnal while he was intending to proceed to Dehli on 24th May 1857 followed by that of his successor Sir Henry Barnard on 5th July 1857, both falling victim to cholera, combined with the precarious health of Reed the next incumbent of the post, had tended to create a bad omen. And 12 days after Barnard's death, Reed had to proceed (17th July 1857) on sick leave, passing the command of the British army to General Wilson. Referring to the difficult position of the new General, Cooper observes, 'There is, we believe, no parallel in the annals of warfare to the position of Major-General Wilson when he assumed command of the indomitable little band before Delhi on 20th

<sup>176</sup> Forrest—H. I. M., I., pp. 96-97.

<sup>177</sup> 'A shield, a sword, and the title of General were bestowed on Muhammed Bakht Khan, and he was appointed commander-in-chief of the whole of the forces' (Metcalf—T. N. N., p. 134).

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>179</sup> *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 149.

<sup>180</sup> If Jiwan Lal be credited Bakht Khan's powers were restricted on 15th July 1857. *Ibid.* Metcalf T. N. N., p. 152. It is reported that under pressure from the Army officers the Emperor then appointed three Generals of Division: 'Mirza Mughul and officers were summoned by the King and ordered to select three Generals of Division, placing eight regiments of infantry and two of cavalry under each. Under these circumstances the Bareilly Brigade alone remained under General Bakht Khan (*Idem*, p. 152).

<sup>181</sup> *I.e.* the Emperor, Mirza Mughul and Bakht Khan.

<sup>182</sup> *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 149.



July, the numerical force at his command (exclusive of small bodies of cavalry and artillery) consisting of only about 2,200 Europeans and 1,500 natives, in all 3,700 bayonets while the enemy were literally numberless, in perfect preparation behind strong defences and perfectly equipped.<sup>183</sup> Cooper may well have added that Bakht Khan, the new Commander-in-chief of the Royal Army, was an experienced general, capable of inspiring the sepoy with confidence and of giving them a lead in fighting. Knowing that Bakht Khan was aware of their weaknesses the British officers were impressed by him; and their writers have spoken highly of him though sarcastically<sup>184</sup> also. They described him as a clever man of large body with a height of 5 feet 10 inches and a chest 44 inches round, possessing varied experiences of 40-year-long service under the East India Company<sup>185</sup>. But Bakht Khan—literally lord of good fortune—was not favoured by luck; he was luckless as Zakaullah calls him sarcastically<sup>186</sup>. And it was a herculean task which Bakht Khan on his appointment as Commander-in-chief of the Royal Army was called upon to perform—building discipline in the Army, restoring peace in the city, stopping plunder and oppression of the inhabitants, making new regulations and executing new plans, and finally driving the English from the Ridge. Bakht Khan applied himself strenuously to this task, but while he succeeded to some extent in improving discipline in the Army and also in restoring peace in the city he failed completely in driving the English from the Ridge.

The troopers who had been occupying the exalted places like the Diwan-i Khass and the Royal gardens were made to withdraw from these as well as to vacate the crowded parts of the city whence they had been accustomed to collect money through plunder and illicit means. Now they encamped in protected places<sup>187</sup> outside, and were called to the parade every morning at a fixed hour. After the parade which used to be held frequently from the Ajmere gate right up to the Dehli gate and sometimes at other places, Bakht Khan spoke to them kindly and comforted them; and a special message from the Emperor was announced to every regiment to the effect that 'each man who went out to the battlefield and each man who distinguished himself would receive a grant of 5 bighas of land and receive honorary posts'<sup>188</sup>. After the parade General Bakht Khan rode to the Magazine and examined the Park of Artillery. Thus he satisfied himself daily as to the efficiency of the army as well as that of arms. Good reports about these having reached the Indians on the other side, some of them in

<sup>183</sup> Cooper—*Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 183.

<sup>184</sup> Keith has given a caricature of Bakht Khan with sarcastic remarks. *Vide Keith—Delhi-1857*, p. 178.

<sup>185</sup> Cooper—*Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 201.

<sup>186</sup> Zakaullah calls Bakht Khan, Kambakht Khan, i.e. chief of the luckless.

<sup>187</sup> The Bareilly troops were lodged in Kalan Mahal; some were lodged in Salimgarh and Hammam Kothi and so on. Bakht Khan himself was posted along with some troops under his charge outside the city. (Metcalf—*T. N. N.*, pp. 134-135).

<sup>188</sup> Metcalf—*T. N. N.*, p. 142.



the British camp are reported to have rallied to the Emperor. So did, for instance, good many Sikhs who joined the Royal Army according to Jiwan Lal<sup>189</sup>. Moreover the troops applied themselves under the Emperor's orders to helping the collection of revenues. When Walidad Khan, Collector of Revenues, sought aid from the Emperor to realise his revenue. 'Bakht Khan was ordered to despatch immediately troops to bring the defaulting tenants to their senses'<sup>190</sup>. On another occasion, according to reports, 50 sepoys were enlisted and sent to assist Walidad Khan in collecting revenue<sup>191</sup>; orders were also issued to the Chief of Rewari to collect the revenue and pay the amount into the treasury<sup>192</sup>. The attempts of the English officers to collect revenue for themselves from Baghpat were foiled,<sup>193</sup> and collections of revenue from Farrukhnagar and other places were made.<sup>194</sup> In the city a vigorous search about spies and suspicious characters was instituted, and many places of secret communications and supplies to the British were stopped. Some butchers caught red-handed carrying meat to the British camp were decapitated<sup>195</sup>. Similarly an attempt to carry provisions for Englishmen was intercepted by Bakht Khan personally; twenty carts loaded with provisions sent by the Maharaja of Patiala to the British Camp were captured<sup>196</sup>. Jiwan Lal himself was arrested and exposed. He was charged with sending news to the British and with causing Brahmins to pray for the restoration of the English and for the defeat of the King. He was also accused of treason and held guilty for calling the Sepoys 'faithless traitors'. Furthermore regular payments for the royal servants were arranged<sup>197</sup>; and the Emperor, at least for some time, was relieved from worries about the payment of salaries to the Army<sup>198</sup>. In a word there was an all-round improvement; and Bahadur Shah's position was better than before, and his prestige was exalted. Before the arrival of Bakht Khan the Royal Palace used to be thronged by undesirable people and the Emperor was assailed by loud cries and addressed sometimes disrespectfully<sup>199</sup>. Now not only was all this stopped but Bahadur Shah asserted himself in right royal manner. He embellished the Diwan-i Khass and restored its dignity having excluded all armed men from it. Youths without turbans were also excluded from the royal levees<sup>200</sup>. All loose practices not in agreement with the Court etiquette were

<sup>189</sup> *Idem.*, pp. 108, 183.

<sup>190</sup> *Idem.*, p. 145.

<sup>191</sup> *Idem.*, p. 157.

<sup>192</sup> *Idem.*, p. 147.

<sup>193</sup> *Idem.*, p. 156.

<sup>194</sup> *Idem.*, p. 174.

<sup>195</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., pp. 137-138.

<sup>196</sup> *Idem.*, p. 179.

<sup>197</sup> *Idem.*, p. 136.

<sup>198</sup> On his arrival, Bakht Khan had paid the Army six months' pay in advance. He reported also that he had treasure to the extent of 4 lakhs. He declared he would not trouble the King for assistance. *Vide* Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 135.

<sup>199</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 87.

<sup>200</sup> *Idem.*, p. 140.



tabooed 'as being both distasteful and disrespectful to the King'. Once Bakht himself had to apologize when he, forgetting the convention of Court, whispered something after the durbar into the Emperor's ear. The Princes at once objected and openly charged the General with bad manners. The General apologized, and after flattery from him the matter was dropped<sup>202</sup>. The Emperor was looked up to for support and guidance by the patriotic amirs and princes abroad. He was looked up to, for instance, by some eminent deputationists from Fakhra and Kanpur who sought his approbation on announcing that they had killed all the English in their respective cities<sup>203</sup>. The victory of Agra being reported, a triumphal poem was composed and formally presented to the Emperor, celebrating his victory over the English<sup>204</sup>. And whenever the Emperor noticed the slightest apathy on the part of the Army — officers or sepoy — he showed anger and censured them in strong words. One day on being told that 'in consequence of the heavy rains the troops had found the country flooded and had returned, Bahadur Shah became very angry and said, 'You will never capture the ridge'<sup>205</sup>. Then he summoned all his officers to the Diwan-i Amm and addressed them saying, 'All the treasure that you brought me you have expended; the Royal treasury is empty and without a pice. I hear that day by day the soldiers are leaving for their homes. I have no hopes of becoming victorious. My desire is that you all leave the city and go to some other central point. If you do not, I'll take such steps as seem most advisable'<sup>206</sup>. Later when about 6,000 *mujahideen* from Nasirabad and Tonk desired permission to come to Dehli, Bahadur Shah rebuffed them, saying: 'There are 60,000 men at Dehli and they have not yet driven the English from the Ridge. What can your 6,000 do'<sup>207</sup>? And when Bakht Khan complained that soldiers no longer obeyed his orders, Bahadur Shah said angrily, 'Tell them to leave the city'<sup>208</sup>. Then he called the Army officers and said, 'It is intolerable that the residents in the city should be harassed and threatened by the soldiers who had come to the city with the avowed object of destroying the English and not their own countrymen. These soldiers are always boasting that they are going out of the safety afforded by the fortifications to destroy the English, and yet they are always returning to the city. It is quite clear to me that the English will ultimately recapture the city and will kill me'<sup>209</sup>. On hearing this the officers seemed impressed; they besought him to put his hand on their heads for without doubt they would be victorious. There were about 150 officers present; and as they passed before him he placed his hand on the head of

<sup>202</sup> Ibid.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid., p. 161.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid., p. 148.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid., p. 150.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid., p. 178.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid., p. 177.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid., p. 179.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid., p. 180.



each man. Then His Majesty uttered a prayer and said, "Go with haste and be victorious on the Ridge". This done the King rose, and after they had gone he entered the fort of Salimgarh and ordered them to fire the shells from the batteries<sup>210</sup>. Then he ordered pay<sup>211</sup> to be distributed to the soldiers and made it a point to interview every man of note in the army. Like other officers Bakht Khan too was encouraged by the words and expressions of Bahadur Shah. He informed him that the officers had gone out with an escort of 400 cavalry and the local zamindars to make themselves acquainted with the various positions they were to occupy; then he said feelingly, 'Now I shall be victorious; if God wills I shall prosper. My plan is to attack the English at Alipur'.

On his arrival in Dehli Bakht Khan had created a stir in the British ranks, and the British plans of action for 3rd July were altered. These were to take the city by means of a *coup de main* when on the given day three assaulting columns with a large infantry reserve were to advance on the city: 'one column was to effect an entrance by blowing in the iron grating of the canal near the Kabul Gate; another column was to enter the Kashmiri Gate after it had been blown in; a third was to escalate the side and endeavour to effect an entrance in that direction'. But on hearing of Bakht Khan's arrival and his plans of assault on 3rd July the British dropped their own plan of assault. They feared that unless they fortified themselves in self-defence, the surprise on the part of Bakht Khan might be complete. General Chamberlain then commanding the British troops had been impressed by the vigilance of the *Badshahi* Army 'who were not by any means shut up or unable to send out patrols and picquets'.<sup>212</sup> 'On the afternoon of 3rd July', says Forrest, 'large bodies of the insurgents moved into the gardens and suburbs on our right, and all our troops were turned out to meet the expected attack. But instead of attacking our picquets, the rebels moved rapidly upon Alipur, one march in our rear, and compelled a squadron of the Punjab cavalry to fall back. The fire of their guns was heard in camp, and soon after 2 A.M. a force marched to overtake or to intercept them. It was commanded by Major Coke, and consisted of about three hundred horse, eight hundred foot and twelve guns. At first it was impossible to determine whether the rebels were pushing forward to Karnal or returning to Delhi. About sunrise, however, Major Coke "found the enemy were retiring to the city, but spread all over the country. On crossing the canal, a considerable body with guns were seen at a village about a mile from the bridge, where at once proceeded to attack them. After a few rounds from their guns, they carried them off in the direction of the city before we could get up to them which they were enabled to do as they were on a road; whereas we had to

<sup>210</sup> *Idem.*, p. 181.

<sup>211</sup> Both the statements—the distribution of pay by the Emperor and Bakht Khan's giving the force 6 months' pay in advance—come from the same source (Metcalf—T. N. N., pp. 134-181). They appear self-contradictory and cannot be reconciled unless the diarist meant to convey that Bakht Khan had paid a few troopers only, leaving the rest of the Army to be paid by the Emperor.

<sup>212</sup> Forrest—H. I. M., I., p. 97.



advance over the open country which was in many places a swamp through which the guns and troops could make their way with difficulty. A number of the enemy sought refuge in a village where they were killed. The rest fled in all directions, followed by the Guides Cavalry who sabred many. It was, however, useless to attempt any further pursuit for the heat was great and the European soldiers were exhausted. Major Coke therefore returned to the banks of the canal and rested his men under the shade of the trees. By some misconception his artillery returned to camp. While his men were resting, a fresh force from Delhi attacked them and we beat them back and pursued them for a considerable distance; but seeing that there was a large force collecting behind them, I withdrew the infantry, and took up a position that commanded the bridge; and as I expected they were bringing up guns, I sent into camp for artillery. Before the guns arrived, however, the enemy made a second attack with considerable loss. Soon after, the artillery and cavalry came up and followed the enemy who again dispersed and fled in all directions". Our men returned completely exhausted by the heat; indeed many of the 61st sank down beneath the trees, and elephants had to be sent from camp to carry them in. The enemy took off their guns and returned to camp, having lost about a hundred men. Major Coke was at the time severely criticised for the comparative failure of the action. I am dissatisfied, wrote Hodson, with the day's work inasmuch as more might have been done, and what was done is only satisfactory as a proof of the ease with which Anglo-axons can thrash Asiatics at any odds<sup>213</sup>.

It should be noted that the Indian sources—Muinu'ddin's and Jiwan Lal's diaries, the spies' reports and Maulvi Zakaullah and Zaheer Dehlawi's works—give no details of the military operations like the above; nor are the Mutiny Papers worth much. We are therefore compelled to borrow the story of military operations from the English sources. From the Mutiny Papers we get only this much of information that on 3rd July 1857 Khwaja Khairiayat Ali, a *Munshi* in the office of General Bakht Khan, wrote to the Emperor requesting that the 18th Regiment which was under orders to march to Alipur might be replaced by some other regiment. The Emperor left this to the discretion of Bakht Khan<sup>214</sup>.

Regarding the action on 9th July too, the information given by the Mutiny Papers is scanty, *i.e.* 'the trenches at Sabzi-Mandi were seized from the English along with two guns, and two gunners — Sarfaraz Khan and Muhammad Khan — deserted the English camp'. According to Jiwan Lal, General Bakht Khan attacked the English camp with 10,000 men — both cavalry and infantry — besides a large number of the *mujahideen*. 'Fighting took place at the Chowni Bastion. General Bakht Khan captured Tis Hazari<sup>215</sup> from the English and then charged with cavalry into the English lines, cutting down a large number of officers and soldiers. Part of the English camp was being plundered when the

Forrest—H. I. M., I., pp. 99-100.

Box 199, No. 112. M. P., N. A.

Tis Hazari—now known as Tis Hazari Maidan—still exists outside the Mori Gate. But it is fast disappearing under the new scheme for habitation and building purposes.



gunners turned the fieldpieces upon the sepoy and shot them down wounding and killing a great number. The sepoy then retreated to the city having seized 20 horses, 70 camels and much valuable property besides 13 cavalymen and 20 infantry soldiers who were taken prisoner. The heads of the English killed in action were presented as trophy to the Emperor who was much pleased and gave a reward of 100 rupees each to those who had killed them.<sup>216</sup> This account is on the whole borne out by the English writers—Forrest, Ball, Cooper, Keith and Sidgwick, who testify indirectly to the gallantry and rapid movements of the 'insurgents' without mentioning their leader, Bakht Khan. The English writers also tell us that in the midst of an unceasing rain of artillery fire from the ramparts of the city on the English batteries and Sabzi-Mandi pickets, sprang a body of cavalry out of the Kabul and Lahore gates at 9 A.M. on the 9th of July. Their numbers increased as they proceeded towards the British camp at which they suddenly fell about 11 A.M. The British Carabineers bolted and were pursued by the invaders who were engaged by a division of the British army headed by Major Tombs and Hills. In the course of the hand-to-hand fighting that followed, Hills was wounded. Then the invaders made an appeal to the Indian gunners in the British Camp saying, 'Get your guns ready and come away with us to Dehli'. But the gunners did not respond. They shouted for Major Olpherts European troop, whose guns were unlimbered in their rear to fire at them. They fled but managed to carry off some horses and killed several camp-followers who fell into their hands. This action which had lasted the whole day continued in the midst of torrential rains. In a contemporary letter of 11th July it is described as day of the "most hard fighting"; and although the said letter speaks magniloquently of the success of the British arms, the writer could not help acknowledging, at least indirectly, that the coup of 9th July had been well devised by the invaders. Subsequently the British called a court of inquiry to sit on the circumstances attending their defeat, but nothing came to light beyond the fact that there was treachery on the part of their own picket of the 9th irregular. The finding of the Court of Inquiry was that 'the enemy deceived every body by advancing as friends and pretending they were the 9th. When Hodgson of the Guide Corps rode up and asked who they were, the men quietly said, "We are the 9th Irregulars; go and bring up the rest of your regiment; the enemy is in front." Thus they walked slowly to the bridge leading out of the British Camp, then made a rush and bolted. It was a bold thing to do, but resulted in nothing'.<sup>217</sup>

Of the next action of 14th July, Jiwan Lal takes no notice. But the English writers give a rich account saying, 'On the morning of the 14th July the mutineers moved out of the city and attacked our batteries at Hindoo Rao House and picket in the Subzee Mundee suburb. Our troops remained on the defensive until 3 P.M. maintaining their position against a force, believed

<sup>216</sup> In Jiwan Lal's narrative (Metcalf—T. N. N., p. 145) of the above action there is no continuity of thought and the chain of events is broken more than once. I have built a connected account without altering his meaning (M. H.)

<sup>217</sup> Ball, C—H.I.M., I, pp. 480-481.



consist of 20 regiments of infantry, a large body of cavalry and several fieldpieces and supported by a fire of heavy artillery from the walls. At 3 o'clock a column was formed under the command of Brigadier Showers, Major Reid with the troops from Hindoo Rao's picket co-operating on the left. This service was gallantly performed and the enemy driven in confusion.<sup>218</sup>

It appears that the objective of the Royal Army's attack on 14th July as on the 9th was to get at 'one of the British batteries close by'; but they failed on both occasions. Seeing this, a British soldier who had participated in the fight on 14th July remarked, 'Their (Sepoys') cavalry, I knew, could not do much, and their infantry I did not care for. Had the enemy had one particle of pluck and rushed in at us, not one of us would have lived to tell the tale; as it was they came so close that they pelted us with stones. At 2 o'clock we had a general advance and drove the enemy like so many sheep into the city. We all got up within 200 yards of the walls and were much punished by the grapeshot again.'<sup>219</sup>

Regarding the action of 18th July Jiwan Lal is extremely sketchy. He says, 'The rebel forces from Nasirabad and Delhi engaged the English, the fighting continued for some time. The English were overpowered and retreated leaving their guns on the field of battle'.<sup>220</sup> But the English writers as usual elude us with details. Space forbids to have anything more than a bare summary from their writings. Reid, on relinquishing command of the Delhi field force on 7th July, said, 'The enemy scarcely allowed a day to pass without an attack or demonstration upon some part of the British position. Thus from the 17th to 31st the troops were kept in a state of incessant activity. And a letter of 27th July conveyed the following, 'The Pandies are dispirited at finding so little advantage follows their efforts against our position'.<sup>221</sup> On 30th July General Wilson wrote Colvin, Lieutenant-Governor of the N. W. Provinces, 'The enemy are very numerous and may possibly break through our entrenchments and overwhelm us; but the force will die at their post. Luckily the enemy have no head and no method, and we hear dissensions are breaking out amongst them. Reinforcements are coming up under Nicholson. If we can hold on till they arrive, we shall be secure'.<sup>222</sup>

On the 1st of August while Jiwan Lal says that the English with a battery of six guns had attacked the Sepoys and were beaten back, Forrest describing it as the Bakar-'id day emphasizes the joint fight put in by the Hindus and Muslims.<sup>223</sup> According to Jiwan Lal the Bakar-'id festival fell on 2nd August

*Idem*, p. 483.

Ball, C.,—II. I. M., pp. 483-484.

Metcalf—T. N. N., p. 154.

Ball, C.,—H. I. M., p. 486.

Ball, C.,—H. I. M., p. 487.

Forrest (I, p. 113) reproduces the spirit of Hindu-Muslim zeal saying, 'The Jami' Masjid rang with the prayers of the faithful; and Brahmin priests stimulated the fanaticism of the followers of Vishnu.'



when Bahadur Shah recited some verses<sup>224</sup> that he had composed encouraging the sepoys to fight and fight to the end. A few days before this, the ulama had proclaimed a jihad<sup>225</sup> against the British. Keith says, 'The King, caused a proclamation to be made that 14,000 fanatics and 8 regiments are on their way from Peshawar and will arrive in two days, and it enjoins all who wish to 'take part in a holy war to join this body'<sup>226</sup>. In the words of Forrest, 'Again and again the (Hindu-Muslim) assailants rallied and rushed upon the breastworks but the steady volleys stopped their charge. All that August night the battle raged, the batteries from 4 bastions poured forth without ceasing their shot and shell'<sup>227</sup>. The fight continued the succeeding day till past noon; then the valiant Hindu-Muslim soldiers retired. The Sammy House where some crucial fighting took place was the silent witness of this fiercest scene in the long-drawn-out drama of the war. The result created a great depression in their ranks; they were literally sickening. Forrest rejoices to note that 'the tide had begun to turn; the British were fast becoming the besiegers and not the besieged'<sup>228</sup>. Five days later exploded 'accidentally'<sup>229</sup> the powder manufactory at the Churiwala street. There is a conspiracy of writers: about the term 'accidentally'<sup>230</sup> used in this connection. But it appears that the explosion was brought about through some device of the British spies. All the same the sepoys kept on fighting the whole of this day. And they seized the Ludlow Castle'<sup>231</sup>. The Emperor finding himself unable to drive the English from the Ridge reproached the troops for not carrying

224

فکر ادا الی آج سارا قتل ہو  
گورکھا گورے سے تا گور نصاریٰ قتل ہو  
آج کا دن عید قرباں کا جب ہی جانیں گے ہم  
اے ظفر تیغ جب قاتل تمہارا قتل ہو

'O God! May the whole army of the enemy be killed to-day! May the Englishmen along with their allies—the Gurkhas, Goras and Gujars be killed! We shall recognize this day as the day only when to-day, O Zafar! your murderer (Englishman) be killed.' For the facsimile of the document containing these verses see p. facing 245. It should be noted that the term *qatl* (murderer) used in the above quatrain is neither accidental nor poetic. It has a background, and elucidates the term *dushman-i alam* (enemy of the world) which is noticeable among the many anti-British verses composed by Bahadur Shah before the Rising of 1857. Vide Appendix C.

225 *Sadiqul Akhbar* of July 27, 1857. Mutiny Papers, Box No. 4-6.

226 Keith—*Delhi-1857*, p. 173.

227 Forrest—*H.I.M.*, I., p. 113.

228 *Idem*, p. 114.

229 *Ibid.*

230 According to a British spy, 'A spark from a *hooqa* was the accidental cause of explosion' (*Delhi News*, August 8, 1857).

231 The Ludlow Castle was seized from the Badshahi army by the British on 8th September 1857, not earlier. Greathed's report that the King's troops were driven out of the Ludlow Castle on 23rd July or 12th August is not correct. Vide Greathed, p. 230 and Forrest, I, p. 127.



the Ridge. They replied that neither artillery nor cavalry could mount the Ridge and that they were consequently helpless and could not take it.<sup>232</sup>

On 14th August at last the long-expected reinforcements under Nicholson arrived at the Ridge but they had to wait for the necessary ammunition and siege train—a movable column to suppress the Mutiny wherever it might appear—which took another ten days to come. This period Hodson utilised in making successful raids through rapid movements over a wide area from Dehli to Hansi and Jind. In this manner the English avoided pitched fighting and battles. This is the meaning behind Jiwan Lal's following remark: 'The King received a report that the Army had gone out to fight but the English did not care to engage. It became an artillery duel.'<sup>233</sup>

On 21st August—just after a month when the Emperor had issued orders to General Bakht Khan to attack the English vigorously and simultaneously at Sabzimandi, Alipur, Mubarak Bagh and at other points so as to ensure their total discomfiture<sup>234</sup>—appeared a lining. Reviewing the work done by General Bakht Khan and his troops since their arrival, Bahadur Shah felt that a word of commendation and approbation from him might prove more useful than mere criticism, rebuke and disparagement. Hence he issued a *shuqqa* to the officers of the Bareilly force praising them for their bravery and directing them to present themselves at the Royal Court<sup>235</sup>. He appreciated the progress that had been made in different spheres, pointing out the defects that had remained, and promised rewards in case of his victory. Then he stressed that the candidates to be recruited in the Royal service, particularly in the Army, must be carefully scrutinized<sup>236</sup>. Some of the Sikhs also were praised for their move in the right direction. Prince Khizr Khan wrote to them a letter stating that the Emperor was highly pleased with them. He praised them and advised them to send six companies to Shamgarhr<sup>237</sup>. The Sikh officers replied that their soldiers had gone to the trenches at Teliwara. This done the Emperor set his hands to preparing a proclamation which he issued on 25th August—the day of the Najafgarh battle.

The said proclamation was a threefold appeal to (i) the Zamindars, (ii) the Sepoys and (iii) the Artisans. Addressing the Zamindars he said, 'It is evident that the British Government in making the zamindari settlements have imposed exorbitant *jammās* and have disgraced and ruined several zamindars by putting up their estates to public auction for arrears of rent insomuch that on the institution of a suit by a common ryot—a maid servant or a slave—the

<sup>232</sup> Keith—*Delhi-1857*, p. 172.

<sup>233</sup> Metcalfe—*T. N. N.*, p. 156.

<sup>234</sup> *Idem*, p. 160.

<sup>235</sup> Mutiny Papers, Box 199, No. 300.

<sup>236</sup> It appears that Zinat Mahal Begum was also interested in this matter. The Mutiny Papers contain a letter from her, disapproving the recruitment of worthless men made by Nawab Vilayat Ali Khan in the regiment. But the *écriture* is not very clear, and the wording of the letter is not intact. *Vide* Box 191; 18th August, 1857.

<sup>237</sup> Box 152, No. 35, 23rd August, 1857.



respectable zamindars are summoned in court, arrested, put in jail and disgraced. In litigations regarding zamindari the immense value of stamps and other unnecessary expenses of the civil courts which are pregnant with all sorts of crooked dealings and the practice of allowing a case to hang on for years are all calculated to impoverish the litigants. Besides this the coffers of the zamindars are annually taxed with subscriptions for schools, hospitals and roads etc. Such extortions will have no manner of existence in the Badshahi Government, but on the contrary the *jammās* will be light, the dignity and honour of the zamindars safe and every zamindar will have absolute rule in his own zamindari<sup>238</sup>. (ii) Then addressing the Sepoys the Emperor said, 'Indians in the Military Service, after having devoted the greater part of their lives attained to the post of Subadar of 60 or 70 rupees per mensem; and those in the Civil Services obtained the post of *Sadr-i Ala* with a jagir or present. But under the Badshahi Government like the posts of Colonel, General and Commander-in-chief which the English enjoy at present, the corresponding posts of Pansadi, Panjhazari, Haft-hazari and Sipahsalari will be given to the Indians in the Military Service; and like the posts of Collector, Magistrate, Judge, Sadr Judge, Secretary and Governor which the European Civil Service servants now hold, the corresponding posts of Wazir, Qazi, Safeer, Suba, Nazim and Diwan etc. with salaries of lacs of rupees will be given to the Indians of the Civil Service together with jagirs, khilā'ts and inams and influence'<sup>239</sup>. (iii) Then addressing the Artisans he said, 'It is evident that the Europeans by the introduction of the English articles into India have thrown the weavers, cotton dressers, carpenters, blacksmiths and shoemakers etc. out of employ and have engrossed their occupations so that every description of native artisans has been reduced to beggary. But under Badshahi Government the native

<sup>238</sup> In the course of its comment on this Proclamation the *Friend of India* (which also gave its English translation) says, 'The declaration that the land tax is oppressive and ought to be lowered was only to be expected . . . The promise that every zamindar should be absolute on his domain was natural from one who knew what we did not know that the feudal aristocracy was still strong ....

'The King calls the subscriptions 'extortions' and describes .... their popular estimation. The utter hatred in which stamps were held was perhaps more generally known. It was perceived even by Europeans that they were a breach of that great social contract on which socialistic society is founded. The Ruler is to enjoy boundless luxury . . . But in return he is to do justice, swift stern justice between man and man without favour and without price. It is this feeling more than actual hardship which produces the bitter hatred of our courts by every class of native society'. (*Friend of India*, 7th October, 1858).

<sup>239</sup> 'The next complaint that natives under British sovereignty do not rise is simply the enunciation of truth . . . It is admitted by Europeans as much as by natives, and plan after plan to amend the grievance has broken down. The attempt to remove it by new offices and increased salaries is merely a palliative. What natives want is not salaries 'but power; and according to the European line of thought they always misuse power; power they cannot have. The *Sadr-i Ala* as the King implies is very well paid but he has no influence and no presents'. (Comments from the *Friend of India*, 7th October, 1858.)



artisans will exclusively be employed in the services of the Badshah, the rajas and the rich; and this will no doubt ensure their prosperity<sup>240</sup>.

In the course of its comment on this Proclamation the *Friend of India* says: "This is the most invaluable contribution to the history of the rebellion"

One day before this Proclamation was issued, i.e. in the morning of 24th August a big attack was organised by the Royal<sup>241</sup> Army. 'The Mutineers' as the British writers call them, 'started with 18 guns with a view to put off British communication with the Punjab and prevent the arrival of the said siege train. But they were pursued by Nicholson who overtook them towards the close of the day near the Najafgarh canal'. 'The enemy position,' says an English report, 'extended' for about 3,000 yards with their left occupying a village near a bridge over the canal and their right on a hillock and a serai. Nicholson at once decided to attack this hillock and the serai. Under cover of the guns the infantry advanced in line and after storming the hillock changed front and bore down on the enemy's right. The mutineers gave way but a party held out in a village in rear and slipped off in the night<sup>242</sup>.

This was the battle<sup>243</sup> of Najafgarh of which a graphic account is given by Nicholson himself in the course of a letter to his adjutant-general. He emphasizes the dangers that he and his troops encountered saying, 'The troops are likewise entitled to credit for the cheerfulness with which they bore the hardships they were exposed to; they marched at daybreak and had to cross two difficult swamps before their arrival at Nangloo<sup>244</sup>; and as it would not have been prudent to take the baggage across the ford at Baprowla<sup>245</sup> they were obliged after 14 hours' marching and fighting to bivouac on the field without food or covering of any kind<sup>246</sup>'.

## FALL OF DEHLI

(26th August—20th September 1857)

For the disaster of Najafgarh which marks the epilogue of the drama of the war, and in the words of Zaheer Dehlawi 'the beginning of the complete demoralization of the Purbiyas'<sup>247</sup> the Emperor held Bakht Khan responsible<sup>248</sup>;

<sup>240</sup> 'The new class of artisans prospers but the old one of Manufacturers has undoubtedly been eaten up by Manchester and Sheffield . . .

<sup>241</sup> 'With regard to the traders the King can find no grievance except the customs; so he promises boldly an impossibility—the carriage of all merchandise at State expense'. (*Ibid*).  
I.e. 'Badshahi'—a term commonly noted in the Urdu and Persian records.

Sidgwick, F. R.—I. M., p. 72.

Since it was a mere surprise and there was no pitched lighting, it would be perhaps better to call it 'action' instead of 'battle'. *Vide* Map of the War of 1857 in Dehli facing p. 251.

Nangloo was a village about 9 miles from Bahadurgarh on the road from Dehli to Najafgarh.

Baprowla or Bassrowla was a village along the Najafgarh jheel or canal.

Ball, C—H. I. M., I., p. 495.

Zaheer Dehlawi—D. G., p. 105.



Bakht Khan had at a critical moment withheld support from Sudhari Singh also called Sirdhara Singh, commander of the Nimuch troops<sup>249</sup>. Relating the circumstances that had led to the said disaster, Zaheer Dehlawi says, 'All the Generals had agreed to proceed from Dehli to Najafgarh considering it a fit place to intercept the arrival of the British siege train from Firozpur, and they also intended to proceed *via* Bahadurgarh to make an attack on the British Camp in the rear. One day Bakht Khan started from Dehli and marched with his troops along the road to Najafgarh. On arriving near the Najafgarh canal he chose a particular site and encamped. The following day Ghaus Khan<sup>250</sup> and Sudhari Singh started and marched with their troops likewise along the same road. They found Bakht Khan camping on this side of the canal and suggested that he should advance and encamp across the canal. Bakht Khan did not accept the suggestion and continued his encampment on the site he had already chosen. Ghaus Khan and Sudhari Singh proceeded to cross the canal. They had hardly pitched their camp when they were overtaken by torrential rains and were at the same time subjected to heavy bombardment from the British guns. Great was the loss of lives and ammunition that the Nimuch troops suffered; and it was with great difficulty that Ghaus Khan and Sudhari Singh made their way back to Dehli with a small number of the soldiers who had survived. Bakht Khan now came back to Dehli<sup>251</sup>.

From the spies' reports it appears that General Ghaus Khan had not accompanied his Brigade to Najafgarh and that the Nimuch troops defeated in the said battle were then under the command of General Sudhari Singh<sup>252</sup> only. Writing on 26th August Turab Ali, a British spy, says, 'To-day is Wednesday. Early this morning intelligence was received of the total defeat of the Neemuch Division. It appears that in order to evince their bravery the troops made a march

<sup>248</sup> Gauri Shankar, a British spy, says, 'The King is very displeased with General Bakht Khan and accuses him of destroying the brave Neemuch Brigade by failing to render timely support. He is not to show his face and is abused'. (*Dehli News*, August 28, 1857). Jiwan Lal says, 'On Tsree Bing from the Nimuch Camp related (to the King) how the English first captured two guns which he with great bravery, afterwards, retook with the assistance of certain landholders. He accused the Bareilly troops of quarrelling with the Nimuch force, and returning to Dehli without co-operating with them. He prevailed upon the King to give him the command of five hundred cavalry and four companies from each regiment to attack the English with'. (Metcalf—T. N. N., p. 209).

<sup>249</sup> *Delhi News*, August 28, 1857.

<sup>250</sup> Zaheer Dehlawi (p. 104) has erroneously put Ghaus Khan along with Sidhari Singh as being present in the battlefield of Najafgarh. In fact, he was not in the action. On arriving afterwards in the Durbar when he was informed about the disaster, he disclaimed all knowledge of an engagement with his troops, saying that he had received no information and doubted the truth of what he had heard. On being assured that his troops had been defeated, he asked for reinforcements. One regiment of Sikhs and four of cavalry were placed under his command. The force marched, but after going a short distance met the defeated force returning, covering their retreat, they returned to camp.' (Metcalf—T.N.N., p. 208).

<sup>251</sup> Zaheer Dehlawi—D. G., p. 104.

<sup>252</sup> *Delhi News*, File No. 124, August 26, 1857.



of 13 *koss*, crossed the Najafgarh Bridge (leaving the Division under General Bakht Khan in their rear) and attacked the British force under General Nicholson. At the commencement of the battle, the bridge was destroyed and thus the retreat of the mutineers was entirely cut off. They were doomed to destruction. Their guns, ammunition, baggage etc. all fell into the hands of the British. It is reported that the three Regiments of Infantry fought separately. They exhausted all their ammunition. General Bakht Khan with his Division could not join in the attack, nor advance to the rescue. The cavalry made their escape; most of them have reached Dehli. The destruction of the Najafgarh Bridge has entirely prevented the return of the rest to Dehli. It is confidently reported that all the Neemuch Division are destroyed<sup>253</sup>. In a supplementary letter of 27th August, Turab Ali says, 'After receiving intelligence of the defeat of the Neemuch Brigade at the instance of Bakht Khan, the personal troops of the King also turned out to the attack, viz. Khassabardars, the Bachhera Regiment (horse and foot) of Hakeem Abdul Haq etc. etc. The conflict was maintained till evening. About forty men of the King's levies were killed and wounded'<sup>254</sup>. Turab Ali's reports are supported by those of Rajab Ali and Jiwan Lal. Rajab Ali says, 'General Nicholson returned triumphantly at 5 P.M. on 26th August. The battlefield was at Nunglee, a village one mile from Najafgarh on the Dehli road on the other side of the Najafgarh bridge. The British troops were drawn on the Najafgarh side. The rebels had taken up a position on either side of the Bridge with a strong picquet at the Bridge and the main body in the rear. General Bakht Khan was at Palam, three *koss* from the scene of action and seven *koss* from Dehli. When he heard of the total defeat of the rebels under General Sirdhara Singh he struck his camp and made hot haste for Dehli. The discomfited troops of General Sirdhara Singh followed precipitately in his rear'<sup>255</sup>. Jiwan Lal says, 'The King sat in the Hall of Public Audience. A trooper named Ashraf Khan entered the Hall; and, saluting His Majesty, proceeded to relate how the Bareilly Brigade being encamped at Palam (*Elipalam*), the Nimuch Brigade unexpectedly arrived. General Bakht Khan held a consultation with the officer commanding the Nimuch force. He advised him to halt there (as the English force was only a short distance off) and join forces with him, proposing to make a joint attack the next day. The Brigade of the Nimuch force would not agree to this plan, but pushed on to Bakghara<sup>256</sup>, intending to encamp there for the day and rest his men. While the camp was being pitched, and the men had piled their arms, and many had taken off their belts and accoutrements, they were suddenly attacked by the English from two directions with a heavy fire of artillery and musketry. Taken unawares, the sepoys bolted, leaving twelve guns and their ammunition. The loss, Ashraf Khan went on to say, was a thousand killed and wounded. The King on hearing the

<sup>253</sup> *Delhi News*, File No. 124, August 26, 1857.

<sup>254</sup> *Delhi News*, File No. 124, August 26, 1857.

<sup>255</sup> *Delhi News*, File No. 124, August 26, 1857.

<sup>256</sup> *I.e.*, Bapraula. *Vide* p. 252 *supra*, footnote.



news was greatly disheartened'<sup>257</sup>. All this finds confirmation in the account given by Forrest to the effect that the news of the Badshahi troops having reached the British head-quarters at the Ridge, General Wilson sent a British column under the command of Nicholson to intercept them. Nicholson arrived on the Bahadurgarh road the morning of 25th August and learnt that Badshahi troops had been at Palam the previous day and would be reaching Najafgarh in the afternoon. 'He left the Bahadurgarh road and planned to intercept them at Najafgarh before nightfall. He crossed the Najafgarh canal near the village of Basrowla<sup>258</sup>; and finding the said troops spread out over a distance of two miles between the Najafgarh canal and the Nunglee village with thirteen guns placed strategically in an old Serai and near the canal bridge, Nicholson fell on them unawares and surprised them so completely that they fled pell-mell towards the bridge leaving behind their guns. Nicholson then made an attack upon the Serai and seized it as well as the village'.<sup>259</sup>

In connection with his report that the King was disheartened on hearing the sad news of Najafgarh, Jiwan Lal says, 'The King regarded the information as very serious. He summoned the following persons to his Council Room—Mirza Mughul<sup>260</sup>, Mirza Koaish<sup>261</sup> Mirza Khair Sultan, Mirza Abu Bakr, Mirza Abdullah and Mirza Abu Nasr. After consultation His Majesty directed a force to be sent off at once under the command of Captain Walidad Khan to take the English Camp'<sup>262</sup>. The Emperor was given to understand that all the British forces had at the moment gone out<sup>263</sup>. From the account given by Keith it appears that all the reactionary elements rallied to the Emperor, and an army of the people of Dehli—even women<sup>264</sup> and unarmed men—marched to make an attack on the British Camp; they risked their lives in the attempt to take the English batteries. But they failed completely amidst a great slaughter that followed<sup>265</sup>. This army was also joined by Mirza Mughul who started simultaneously with his men to attack the British Camp; but returned, in the words of Jiwan Lal, 'without making an attack with the loss of seventeen men killed<sup>266</sup>. The guns which Mirza Mughul had mounted in different batteries kept up an incessant fire all day from

<sup>257</sup> Metcalfe—T.N.N., pp. 207-208.

<sup>258</sup> *I.e.*, Baprawla. *Vide* p. 252 *supra*, footnote.

<sup>259</sup> Forrest—S.L.D.S.P., I., pp. 359 ff.

<sup>260</sup> 'Mogul' and 'Koash' are the incorrect forms of Mughul and Koaish. I have not used the incorrect forms.

<sup>261</sup> 'Mogul' and 'Koash' are the incorrect forms of Mughul and Koaish. I have not used the incorrect forms.

<sup>262</sup> Metcalfe—T.N.N., p. 208.

<sup>263</sup> According to Rotton (N. S. D., p. 209) the Nimuch troops had ascribed their defeat to the 'whole English army turning out to the attack made against them.'

<sup>264</sup> Referring to these women Charles Ball (H. I. M., vol. I., p. 504) quoting a contemporary letter says, '... It must be fresh in your memory that when the mutineers came out of the city for a grand attack upon our camp, while Nicholson's force was at Nujufghur, they were followed by crowds of these very women.'

<sup>265</sup> Keith—*Delhi-1857*, pp. 243-244.

<sup>266</sup> Metcalfe—T.N.N., p. 208.



the Mithai Bridge under the command of Mirza Koash and from Kishanganj under the command of Mirza Abdullah'.<sup>267</sup>

Evidently the war in Delhi had now become the People's War. The people of Delhi proper as well as of the villages were helping the Royal *Shahum* Nationalist troops, looking upon them as the Army of Liberation. In his report of 27th August Gauri Shankar, a British spy says, 'The people of the village of Nunglee gave great assistance to the rebels and fought side by side with the sepoys. There was a great attack on the (English) Batteries yesterday. Mirza Mughul took out all his Division. The Nasirabad regiments also turned out. There were several Shahzadas present with all the personal troops of the King and the contingents of Nawab Aminu'ddin Khan and Fajru'ddin Khan and other nobles of the city. About fifty of them were wounded or killed; and one of the Shahzadas, Ghulam Mustafa, was wounded. There were not sufficient doolies for the wounded, and at last they were carried in, on the crossed muskets of their comrades. The city people are much terrified at the utter defeat of the Neemuch troops and the Army gets more and more dispirited. They have now no hopes of victory. General Bakht Khan's Division, however, is still confident and hopeful'.<sup>269</sup> According to another report General Bakht Khan reassembled the fugitives of the Nimuch Brigade and intended to march out again to Najafgarh. Writing on 28th August Turab Ali says, 'Yesterday'<sup>271</sup> two regiments of Infantry with some ammunition left Delhi for Najafgarh. Shahzada Muhammad Azeem has returned from Hansi and has joined the King's personal forces. About 20,000 of the country people have got together and have diligently spread reports that they have recovered the twelve guns captured from the Neemuch Brigade and have taken seven of the British guns besides. Yesterday the Neemuch and Bareilly Brigades again started for Najafgarh with eight guns. The cavalry were to start at midnight or early this morning. The infantry and guns have undoubtedly started as the writer further saw them off. Ever since Maulvi Fazl Haq arrived in this city from Alwar, he is unceasingly employed in stirring up the army and the city people against the British. It is likely that an attack on the British batteries will be made to-day. The Shahzadas now turn out in these sorties at the instigation of Maulvi Fazl Haq and usually take their stand on the Sabzi-Mandi Bridge'.<sup>272</sup> While Turab Ali gave the above report Gauri Shankar, another British spy, writing on the same day said, 'Bakht Khan wishes to make a second attempt to reach Najafgarh but he proposes this time to go round by Gurhee Harsaroo and Gurgaon. The Najafgarh zamindars promise to give him all the assistance, and some zamindars of Panipat and Sonipat are also with him. Bahadur Ali Khan of Bahadurgarh is endeavouring to raise the country and he

<sup>267</sup> *Idem.* p. 200.

<sup>268</sup> *I.e.* the personal troops of the Emperor.

<sup>269</sup> *Delhi News*—27th August, 1857.

<sup>270</sup> *Delhi News*—August 28: Gauri Shankar, a British spy being the reporter.

<sup>271</sup> *I.e.* 27th August, 1857.

<sup>272</sup> *Delhi News*, August 28, 1857, Turab Ali being the reporter.



sends a messenger to Bakht Khan assuring him that the country is on his side. Some Sikhs (also) have been instructed to go to the Punjab to endeavour to raise Manjha (?) in revolt. In the village of Sahni, district Rohtak, Risaldar Khan has collected a large body of insurgent Ranghars. In village Tosham, district Harreeana, there is another body of insurgents and the sowars go off to join them; and many troopers on leave and pensioners of the Government have also collected at this spot where they say there are 20,000 rebellious zamindars. Their object is to plunder Hisar. Those *risings of the country population* are more to be dreaded than a military revolt. To-day the city Brigade under the command of Mirza Mughul went out to the batteries at Kishanganj and Qudsia Bagh. In to-day's Durbar the zamindars of Nunglee came to complain that they had been punished for assisting the King's forces. Their villages had been totally destroyed. The King sent them to General Bakht Khan<sup>273</sup>.

The aforesaid report about Maulvi Fazl Haq's anti-British views and activities which give a clue to his attempts at jihad is reflected in his own writings<sup>274</sup>. But a hidden feature in the picture which the spies could not notice lay in the fact that Fazl Haq shared his views with Emperor Bahadur Shah. On account of his weakness; old age, sainthood and sufism Bahadur Shah could not speak out like Fazl Haq, but he seized every opportunity that presented itself to encourage the Army. Writing on 2nd September from the city of Dehli, a British spy says, 'Yesterday Heera Singh, Brigade Major of the Neemuch force had an audience with the King. The King spoke encouragingly to him and directed him to reorganize the Brigade; and although he could not give such guns as had been lost, he (King) would replace them to the best of his ability. The King has promised to give siege guns. He also bestowed 2,000 rupees upon Heera Singh to make new camp equipage'<sup>275</sup>. As a result an atmosphere of devotion was created; and to this effect some volunteers wrote<sup>276</sup> to the Emperor, and the Princes also expressed their readiness to go to Panipat<sup>277</sup> in order to intercept the British siege

<sup>273</sup> *Idem.*, Gauri Shankar being the reporter.

<sup>274</sup> *Ide* Appendix. II.

<sup>275</sup> *Delhi News*, File 129, September 2, 1857.

<sup>276</sup> *Ide* Appendix. F.

<sup>277</sup> *Joint Petition of Mirza Mughul, Mirza Abdul Hasan, Shah Bakhtawar and Mirza Khair Sultan, sons of the King.*

TO

NO DATE.

THE KING ! SHELTER OF THE WORLD !

RESPECTFULLY PRAYETH.— That four Regiments of Infantry, two of Cavalry, and twelve Guns of Horse and Foot Artillery, according to the detail below, with a full supply of ammunition, other necessities of war and some treasure, may be speedily made over to your slaves in order that they may proceed to Paneeput, and may there, through Your Majesty's auspices and by God's blessing, obtain immediate and complete victory and at once return to the Royal presence. This day has been fixed for our departure.

74th Regiment of Native Infantry	...	
38th Ditto Ditto	...	I
54th Ditto Ditto	...	I



train. In the same spirit Mirza Mughul wrote a letter assuring the Emperor on his own behalf and also on behalf of others of the common resolve to fight till the end.

'Your Exalted Majesty' said he, 'may keep your mind free from the dread of the enemy. Your slave has personally been staying in the batteries with the Troops for two days; and where the batteries of the infidels were, there they are still. They have made no advance. If their batteries had advanced considerably, they must have come into the city. The whole Army is prepared to slay the infidels, and an attack is about being made immediately. Through Your Majesty's prestige the batteries will be speedily taken. And as some of the soldiers come into Your Majesty's presence and report what they have heard and not what they have seen, pray do not believe their statements, but be fully assured that so long as there is life in the frames of your slaves, no harm shall reach Your Majesty. Let it be known that matters are in the dispensation of God. Your slave is not neglectful. Let it be known to Your Majesty that he stays personally in the batteries.'<sup>78</sup>

But Mirza Mughul was not far-sighted; he did not know that the fall of Dehli was not far off. The British had made active preparations for a big assault on the city of Dehli while the morale of the Badshahi Army which was never very high had lowered appreciably since the disaster of Najafgarh. In its ranks differences, always deep-rooted, had leapt to the surface. Fath Muhammad the British spy says, 'The Nasirabad and Neemuch Brigades are supporters of Mirza Mughul and the Bareilly Brigade is devoted to the King. The officers of the Bareilly force and Mirza Mughul are bitter enemies. Every brigade is clamorous; they are actually in want of food. There is not a silver in the Treasury. The Bareilly troops talk of returning to Bareilly. The Bareilly Officers after holding a separate meeting went to the King. Some of the cavalry said they had gone to ask for the dismissal of Mirza Mughul or for leave to go to Bareilly; and if both these

20th Ditto Ditto	...	1
Volunteers	...	400 Men
Corps of Gwalior Cavalry	...	1
Corps of Regular Cavalry	...	1
24-Pounder Guns	...	4
Howitzer and Mortar	...	2
Companies of Militia	...	2
Jhajjar Cavalry	...	100 Troopers

Petition attested with seals of Mirza Sultan Zaheeru'ddin, Commander-in-Chief Bahadur; Mirza Muhammad Abdul Hasan, Colonel of the 20th Regiment of Native Infantry; Shah Bakhtawar, son of the king, Abu Zafar, and Mirza Khair Sultan Bahadur.

*Autograph order by the King in Pencil.*

The departure of you, our sons, is exceedingly right and proper; but first get a petition from the Officers of the Regiments expressing their willingness to accompany you, and lay it before us, that we may have assurance on this point.

(*Pr. Tr. B. S. No. 41, p. 65 and Tr. E. K. D., pp. 91-92*).

*It should be noted that Zahoru'ddin is wrong; the correct word given in the Persian original is Zaheeru'ddin; (M.H.).*

<sup>78</sup> This letter is undated according to the *Proceedings of the Trial of Bahadur Shah* (No. 47, p. 68). But the context shows that it was written, after the disaster of Najafgarh, in the opening days of the month of September.



requests were refused; they would commit some violence'<sup>279</sup>. What the Emperor did to pacify the Bareilly troops is not known. The spies' reports are incomplete, but they emphasize the split in the Badshahi Army saying, 'Each cavalry is now split up into 'Thokes'—confederacies comprising those who are residents of a particular tract of the country. For instance, Hansi fellows form one 'Thoke', the Kalanor men another 'Thoke', and so on through the whole body. No one agrees with the other'<sup>280</sup>. Matters aggravated as days advanced. Perhaps the enemy<sup>281</sup> hand was working secretly in their midst setting them all by the ears and making them all quarrel with their own king as they actually did, demanding their pay under threats of plundering the Palace and the City. 'I have 40,000 rupees which you are welcome to take' said the Emperor in an attempt to pacify the quarrelsome heads. Then he added, 'There are 101 gold mohurs which were recently presented to me by the Subadar of Bareilly, you might have them too'<sup>282</sup>. When he found the Army Officers still dissatisfied, he offered all the jewels of the Zenana; and rising from his chair he threw before them the embroidered cushion on which he had been sitting and bid them take that<sup>283</sup>. Then he went into his private apartments, and brought out jewelry and gave them to the officers saying, 'Take this and forget your hunger'<sup>284</sup>. There was such a clear note of sincerity in his word and deed that the hearts of the unprincipled<sup>285</sup> and unyielding soldiers now melted and they were heard to say, 'We cannot accept of your Crown jewels, but we are satisfied that you are willing to give your life and property to sustain us'<sup>286</sup>. Thereupon the Emperor gave away 40,000 rupees and promised to pay the balance within fifteen days; and he made arrangements to raise a loan.<sup>287</sup>

<sup>279</sup> *Delhi News*, File 131, September 1, 1857.

<sup>280</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>281</sup> Read carefully the following quotation from Keith will give an insight. It is suggestive enough. Writing on 14th June, 1857, he says, 'We still continue to occupy our old position on the Ridge, and the enemy occasionally make faint efforts to dislodge us ... But it is annoying to think that there seems little prospect now of our entering Delhi until the Sikh corps join us or until the Bhurtpore or Jeypore or other contingents make their appearance; or until there is such a decided schism in Delhi as to show that the two parties are pitted one against the other. News of a reliable nature came yesterday to Greathed to the effect that the Hindoos were becoming disgusted, finding they were being made complete dupes by the Mahomedans who wish to make a religious war of it.'

Keith—*Delhi-1857*, p. 60.

<sup>282</sup> *Delhi News*, September 5, 1857.

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>284</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 207.

<sup>285</sup> On 11th May, 1857 the Emperor had said plainly to the 'mutineers', 'I am a fakir and possess no treasure.' *Vide* (i) *supra*; (ii) Zaheer Dehlawi—D. G., p. 50.

<sup>286</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 207.

<sup>287</sup> Writing on 2nd September, 1857 a British spy says, 'The writer went to the Palace hearing that the Officers had all gone there to demand an issue of pay. A crowd of 500 men of all ranks was collected round the Diwan-i Khass. Mirza Mughul, Mirza Abu Bakr and Mirza Khair Sultan Shahzadas were surrounded by the crowd. The soldiers shouted out that Ahsnullah Khan Hakeem alone prevented their receiving their pay. They clamoured for his death and for



This was decidedly a pathetic and heart-rending scene in the drama of the war, staged in the course of a few days following the disaster of Najatgarh, but it was not the last<sup>288</sup>. The Emperor pulled himself together and Providence enabled him to endure the worst afflictions that have ever befallen a crowned head. He continued to perform his usual duties. The King, says a British spy, 'exercises the affairs of the Country and Revenue'<sup>289</sup> which he will administer himself. In addition, he adopted new measures to collect money to be able to pay the

the imprisonment of the Shahzadas and avowed their intention of dividing the City into allotments and extorting their pay by force. They were most fierce and insolent in their demands. Mirza Mughul, in fear of his life, sent for Mirza Ilahi Bakhsh who succeeded in appeasing them and took them before the King. The King declared he had no pay to give them. The troops rejoined that in that case they would plunder both the Palace and the City and massacre all the Court. Upon this the King rose and threw down the *cassiolee* on which he usually sits in the Durbar and gave orders that all the property of the Court—the horses, elephants, caparisons and even the ornaments of his Begums should be immediately made over to them; and then turning his face towards Mecca he burst into tears exclaiming that he was well punished for his sins. . . . Hearing these passionate cries, the whole Court and the Begums were moved to tears, and even the soldiery were ashamed of their violence, excusing themselves on the ground of the extreme distress and hunger to which they were reduced. Mirza Mughul brought out 40,000 rupees and begged them to take that sum as an instalment. The influential men of the city hearing of this scene repaired to the Palace and agreed among themselves to raise 1,50,000 rupees; and should more be required the Begums were to furnish the excess until the English should arrive. The King and the citizens have no escape from the clutches of the tyrants. . . . There was a grand consultation which lasted till midnight at the house of Mufti Sadru'ddin, and a deputation has gone this morning to wait on the King.

On 3rd September Munshi Agha Jan and Waris Ali agreed to pay 10,000 rupees each. They yielded only when the soldiers beating their swords, threatened to pour holes in their bodies. Munshi Agha Jan stood out bravely calling upon them so as to kill him, but his relations could not bear the sight of seeing him tortured. . . . The ambassadors from Lucknow and Bareilly are much surprised and terrified at the state of affairs in Delhi. They now know the prospects of the King's cause; and perhaps will not be so anxious to obtain grants from the King'.

(*Delhi News*, 2nd September  
Turab Ali, the British spy, being  
the reporter)

<sup>8</sup> Writing on 3rd, 4th and 7th September the British spies reported similar scenes and said, 'The Army now think of nothing but of their pay and how to get food. . . . Bakht Khan's troops say if they do not get pay in a day or two they will bolt. On 6th September 'the Gwalior sowars and Bareilly officers went to the Durbar and asked for pay with a great deal of insolence. The King replied, 'I have been wearing mourning ever since you came here and have always ready to expire; you would better kill me'.

(*Delhi News*—6th September, 1857  
from the pen of Turab Ali, the British Spy).

Writing on 4th September Jiwan Lal says, 'Certain officers of the Nasirabad camp gave His Majesty a great deal of annoyance last night regarding their pay. In consequence of this the King ordered all the silver goods to be made over to them, saying 'Sell them, and divide the proceeds among yourselves for pay'. The officers were still dissatisfied. (Metcalf—T.N.N., p. 219).

*Delhi News*, 2nd September, 1857.



promised balance to the Army<sup>290</sup>; he also encouraged frequent sittings of the Military Court<sup>291</sup> and referred to it certain problems, and concerted measures with Bakht Khan to meet the British assault<sup>292</sup>. Writing on 4th, 5th and 7th September 1857, Jiwan Lal says, 'The King held a council to-day'<sup>293</sup> in which the position of affairs was considered. General Bakht Khan reported that the English siege train had arrived and they were erecting breaching batteries opposite the Kashmiri Gate. The King inquired, 'What arrangements are you making for meeting the English fire? If you cannot oppose them you had better open the gates of the city at once'. The General said, 'I am removing the Magazine outside the city, and I propose to meet the English fire with forty guns for which I am constructing batteries'. The General further said that he had arranged to employ 2,000 cavalry to cut off all commissariat supplies from the English camp. The King inquired what stock of gunpowder there was; and an urgent letter was sent off to the Nawab of Farrukhabad to send without delay 2,000 maunds of sulphur. Then orders were sent to the police to appoint a 'Punch' every day to fix the prices of food. The police had also caused the attendance of every jeweller. They were informed that the citizens must raise eight lakhs of rupees immediately for the pay of troops. After giving these orders the King directed Mirza Mughul to exercise due diligence in the realization of the money and notify the Royal orders by beat of drum throughout the city. In consequence of this step being taken the Military Council decided to attack the English next day, and it was proclaimed that every citizen, Hindu or Mahomedan, who assisted in the attack, should share

<sup>290</sup> 'His Majesty' says Jiwan Lal, 'sent a written order to General Bakht Khan to pay the troops to the amount of 26,000 rupees.' (Metcalf—T. N. N., p. 221). It should be recalled that on his arrival in Dehli (*vide Supra*) Bakht Khan had promised to relieve the Emperor of all anxieties for the payment of the Army since he had brought from Bareilly a sum of 400,000 rupees. But General Bakht Khan now disappointed the Emperor.

Then at the instance of the Emperor 'Mir Said Ali Khan, Hakim Abdul Haq, Mirza Ilahi Bakhsh and Salig Ram the Treasurer met and consulted on the ways and means of paying the Army.' (*Idem*, p. 222).

On September 7 Mir Said Ali Khan, Diwan Mukand Lal, Badru'ddin Khan, Hakim Abdul Haq with his sons, and Nawab Quli Khan were all arrested and put in the Palace Guard-room by order of the Military Court till money was forthcoming. They pleaded that they were making arrangements to raise the money. On September 8, the Emperor summoned the Military Court and made them release the honourable prisoners. They agreed to 'raise money by a self-imposed tax throughout the city for the pay of the Army'. (Metcalf—T. N. N., p. 225). On the same day the Emperor ordered the Police 'to collect three months' rent from every shop and dwelling-house for the pay of the Sepoys. Then he ordered the arrest of the Princes who had misappropriated the money collected for the pay of the sepoys' (*Idem*, p. 226).

On September 9 when the Sepoys had resumed fighting the Emperor sent them 60 maunds of sweetmeats and 24 rupees. (*Idem*, p. 227). On September 12, he sent 5,000 rupees to the gunpowder factory for the manufacture of gunpowder. (*Idem*, p. 228). Then 200 men were enlisted to collect the revenue from Loharu.

<sup>291</sup> Metcalf—T. N. N., pp. 214, 225, 226.

<sup>292</sup> *Idem*, p. 222.

<sup>293</sup> *I.e.* September 5, 1857.



in the plunder and whoever made prisoners of the Gurkhas, Sikhs<sup>294</sup> or the English would be handsomely rewarded'. Previously Jiwan Lal says, 'Autograph letters were despatched to the Rajas of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner and Alwar that the King was in want of troops and was desirous of annihilating the English, but inasmuch as he had no reliable person to organize and administer the very important affairs of the empire at this juncture, he wished to form a Confederacy of States; and if the States he now addressed with these letters would combine for the purpose, he would willingly resign the imperial power into their hands'.

By 5th September the British siege train and ammunition convoy had arrived safely at the Ridge, as was reported by Bakht Khan who complained:

'For days I have been saying that a force must be sent out to intercept the siege train at Panipat<sup>296</sup> but no attention was paid. The siege train has arrived, and now we are in a plight and the population are in a state of great alarm'<sup>297</sup>.

The Emperor made no reply. Perhaps he recalled how Bakht Khan himself had brought about the destruction of the Nimuch troops through self-session. He also recalled that Bakht Khan had been untrue to his word. On his arrival in Dehli on 2nd July he had declared that he had brought treasure to the extent of four lakhs and that he would not trouble the Emperor for any assistance<sup>298</sup>. But he had since then held tight the strings of his purse and had in any case encouraged the insolent demands of the Army officers for pay. And himself, he pressed the Emperor for paying the Bareilly troops<sup>299</sup>. Says Jiwan Lal, 'General Bakht Khan made a complaint that whereas, the King's servants and other troops had received wages, the Bareilly force, on which the brunt of the fighting fell, had received nothing; that all his men were in consequence discontented. The King replied I have already caused one lakh of rupees to be distributed; the treasury is empty. How many lakhs of rupees have passed through your hands? Why have you not paid your men with some of the money?'<sup>300</sup> Bakht Khan on whom the Emperor had counted so much from the beginning and whom he had called *farzand*,<sup>301</sup> now stood exposed. He could make no reply. The Emperor was wroth but he kept his head cool and continued

<sup>294</sup> While the majority of the Sikhs were with the British, a small number were certainly with the Emperor. In his letter to G. C. Barnes, Commissioner and Superintendent, Cis-Sutlej States, Ambala, Rajab Ali Meer Munshi to the British Commander-in-Chief, says, 'I have the honour to inform you that yesterday I sent a man to Delhi in order to persuade all the Sikhs in the rebel army there to come over to the English Camp.' (*Delhi News*, File 133, September 6, 1857). Also see Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 208.

<sup>295</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., pp. 219-220.

<sup>296</sup> The Princes had expressed their readiness to go to Panipat for this very purpose. *Ide* p. 261 and footnote *supra*.

<sup>297</sup> *Delhi News*, 6th September, 1857.

<sup>298</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 135.

<sup>299</sup> *Ide*, p. 223.

<sup>300</sup> *Ide*, p. 224.

<sup>301</sup> *Ide* p. 231 *supra*.



to urge his troops to fight the English to the last. Says a British spy, 'The king inspected and approved seven rocket guns and ordered them to be placed in position to commence firing rockets'<sup>302</sup>. 'To-day the force inside the city was paraded outside, and each Regiment was accoutred for fighting and they were told that this was not the time for fighting but they must die at their posts'<sup>303</sup>. Further the Emperor ordered conscription; and it was proclaimed in the streets of the City of Dehli that 'every adult whether Hindu or Musalman in the King's service or out of his service, a resident of the city or visitor, should go out and attack the English. All plunder after the victory except arms and ammunition is to belong to the captors. Let everyone strive his best, as his eternal and temporal interests depend upon his exertions. Whosoever wilfully neglects his duty will be considered an enemy of the Government'. Afterwards a parade was held, and a slip of paper containing the Proclamation was put into the hands of every soldier. The matter is kept as secret as possible. And a munshi of the Kotwali is now going the rounds of the city accompanied by the crier explaining the order to all concerned<sup>304</sup>. This proclamation was announced by beat of drum under the joint orders of the Emperor and Mirza Mughul<sup>305</sup>. And again it was proclaimed that 'every man should fight as they were of one body and one life. Every Hindu and Musalman has been sworn by oaths, the most binding upon his religion, to go forth and attack the English'<sup>306</sup>. Giving a short report of the action that followed, a British spy said, 'Yesterday the fighting was severe. The Bareilly and Naseerabad Brigades, and in fact all the troops inside the city were engaged. The 61st N.I. and 20th L.N. lost between 30 killed and wounded. Every regiment lost some. The 8th Irregulars dismounted and fought on foot at the Batteries. They too lost 200 killed and wounded. The reports to-day in Durbar stated the entire loss at 500 killed. This number does not include the wounded. The Hindus, and Musalmans have interchanged oaths binding themselves not to desert. Nevertheless, 25 sowars made their escape to-day'<sup>307</sup>.

The scene which is now unfolding itself before the reader's eyes is the last and longest of the many tragic scenes in the drama of the war in Dehli. It begins with the rain of bullets in the Royal Palace and the streets of the city, the breaching and cracking of its ramparts, the bombardment of its gates, the battering of its bastions, the transformation of its different parts into a vast armed camp packed with sepoys, the ceaseless thundering of guns day and night, the heaping of dead bodies in the streets, the desertions of individual sepoys and groups from the body of the Army, the spread of confusion and consternation in all circles—and closes with the exhaustion of guns in the Fort and the gunpowder in the magazine, the enemies' advance into the city, their capture of the Qudsia

<sup>302</sup> *Dehli News*, 6th September, 1857.

<sup>303</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>304</sup> *Delhi News*, File 139; September 9, 1857.

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>306</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>307</sup> *Delhi News*, File 140; September 9, 1857.



Bagh, Kashmiri Gate, Kishanganj, Lahori Gate and finally of the Jamī Masjid and the Fort. Writing on 9th September a British spy says, 'The guns still maintain a fire from the Cutchery Bastion. Since yesterday all passage by the Kashmiri Gate has been closed. The round shot and shell from the British Batteries fall there like rain. Several travellers and some sepoy's of the 9th Native Infantry were wounded at Col. Skinner's House. The Bastion at the Kashmiri Gate has been much shaken and the wall of the city is breached in several places. The Shah<sup>308</sup> Bastion between the Mori and Kabul Gates is also much battered and the guns on it are completely silenced.<sup>309</sup> All last night the troops remained under arms at the Kashmiri Gate. They muster very strong from the Kashmiri Gate, Ball Diggi and Darya Ganj to the Delhi Gate. The Chandni Chowk up to the Ajmeri Gate is much less frequented. The rebels for the most part are quartered in the shops and houses along the street leading from the Kashmiri Gate to Delhi Gate. Inside the city there are no preparations for resistance but eight guns were yesterday mounted on the Palace walls by the garrison of Salimgarh. In yesterday's conflict the Neemuch cavalry suffered severely. Muhammad Shafi, second in command of the Bareilly Brigade, was wounded. The casualties amongst the cavalry were considerable<sup>310</sup>. The Kotwal of the City went round at night and ordered the inhabitants of every street to be armed and ready: directly the English made their appearance they were to slay them. The soldiery made the King come out of his privacy and abused him in terms not to be described. The King wept bitterly and exclaimed, 'For God's sake, take my life'<sup>311</sup>. He surrendered all the money and was frantic with grief. All the brigades of the City are standing. The rebels are constructing an inner battery behind the Shah Bastion and another close to the Budergah<sup>312</sup> Gate and the compound of Baboo's<sup>313</sup> house which will contain two guns. The 9th N. I. went up to the King and declared their unwillingness to fight any more saying, 'Fate has been fulfilled. Now we will issue from the Kashmiri Gate and yield up our lives. Send up such support as you may deem proper. Great consternation prevails: there are no guns left in the Fort. The guns are made to do double duty, sometimes in the Fort and sometimes at the Kashmiri Gate. The barracks are repaired as quickly as possible, and every man who shows his face, whether merchant or shopkeeper, is seized and made to work. . . .'<sup>314</sup>

On 10th September the British spy in the city found the guards stronger than usual and every preparation made for resisting an assault. One heavy gun

<sup>08</sup> 'Shah' is incorrect. The name of this bastion was *Siah Burj* i.e. Black Bastion. *Vide* Zaheer Dehlawi—D.G., p. 109.

<sup>09</sup> *Delhi News*, File No. 140, September 9, 1857.

<sup>10</sup> *Delhi News*, File No. 140, September 9, 1857.

<sup>11</sup> *Idem*, File No. 141, September 9 and 10, 1857.

<sup>12</sup> The correct name given by Zaheer Dehlawi (D. G. p. 109) is Badrrau Gate or Badr Gate.

<sup>13</sup> This is the corrupt form of 'Wood, house' i.e. *Lakrion ki tal* mentioned by Zaheer Dehlawi (1) D.G. p. 109).

<sup>14</sup> *Delhi News*, September 9, 1857.



was mounted at each gate. At the Diwan-i Amm there were four guns and six ammunition tumbrels. 'The citadel of Salimpur is well fortified and guns are mounted on all sides. There is a strong muster of troops from the Kashmiri Gate to the Lahori Gate; and in the main streets every house is filled from top to bottom with sepoy. The cavalry are encamped about the Bank<sup>315</sup>, the Lall Diggi<sup>316</sup>, and flour mills<sup>317</sup>. There is also a large party of them in the Masjid near the Dehli Gate. Others are scattered here and there over the City. In every gate there is a gun, and inside the Kashmiri Gate there are four guns<sup>318</sup> in position. The *mujahideen* are collected in a body, ready for action'<sup>319</sup> .....

On 11th and 12th September the British spy reported saying, 'The Rebels on the whole are pleased with the ardour now displayed and declare that if they fought from the outset with the same spirit the affair should not have been so protracted. All traces of the English would have been swept from the page of history. At night strong guards are posted at the bridge of boats and upon the battlements about the Kashmiri Gate. . . . Between the Kabul and Kashmiri Gates they are constructing a large Battery. More guns have been mounted on the walls and at the city gates. The cavalry shows better heart just now than the Infantry. The sowars of the 9th and 13th Irregulars and the 4th Regiment Cavalry are always forward. They vow their intention of meeting the assault at the gate. The infantry who try to escape are brought back by the sowars. Yesterday Abbas Mirza came in from Lakhnao. He brought some jewels and gold mohurs. The King has established a mint at Katra Mashroo. A new rupee from this mint was brought for inspection to-day. The silver of the King's howdah and sticks of the office and utensils are sent to the mint to be turned into rupees for the use of the Army. A man came to Mirza Mughul and offered for a reward of 9,000 rupees to inveigle the British force into an ambush where they might be easily killed. Aminu'ddin and Ziyau'ddin, sons of Nawab Ahmad Bakhsh, are prevented by order of the King from leaving Dehli. The city people hear that Musalmans are killed without mercy by the British but Hindus are spared.'<sup>320</sup>

Meanwhile the British were making strong and active preparations for the final assault on Dehli. On 6th September they received fresh reinforcements from Mirath; on the 7th came the Jind contingent<sup>321</sup> and good many of the

<sup>315</sup> For Bank and Lall Diggi see the map facing p. 274. The 'flour mills' were destroyed in the course of the war and cannot be traced.

<sup>316</sup> The 'flour mills' were destroyed in the course of the war and cannot be traced.

<sup>317</sup> The 'flour mills' were destroyed in the course of the war and cannot be traced.

<sup>318</sup> For the guns at the gates of the city see the aforesaid map which has been prepared largely on the basis of the sketch given by Raja Mahr Singh of Ballabgarh. (*Vide* Muir, W.—R.I.D., vol. I, p. 535).

<sup>319</sup> *Delhi News*, September 10, 1857.

<sup>320</sup> *Delhi News*—File 141. September 11 and 12, 1857; Turab Ali, Kalloo and Mohan Harkar British spies, reporting.

<sup>321</sup> 'His Highness the Raja having made a particular request that they should be employed when the attack on the city took place', says Keith (*Delhi-1857*, p. 265).



Muzbee<sup>322</sup> Sikhs also joined the British standard. The same day a new battery called Brind's Battery was erected under the command of Kaye and opened such a severe fire on the Mori Gate Bastion that the Bastion was completely demolished. In the afternoon of 8th September the British captured the Ludlow Castle and Qudsia Bagh; and both these places were immediately utilised as sites for the erection of batteries whence firing began and continued day and night. Unable to withstand the British shells, the Badshahi Army brought forward their own guns and enfiladed the British batteries, and they opened fire at the British Camp from the City walls. By the night of 13th September the British made two breaches near the Kashmiri Gate Bastion. 'Before the 14th of September', says Muinu'ddin Hasan, 'the bastions upon which the English concentrated their fire had become dust'<sup>323</sup>. In the morning of Monday, 14th September, five British columns stormed the city, closing upon it from different directions. The first column commanded by Nicholson marched down the Qudsia Bagh to storm the breach near the Kashmiri Gate Bastion. The second column commanded by Col. Jones proceeded to storm the breach of the Water Bastion. The third column commanded by Col. Campbell assaulted the Kashmiri Gate after blowing it up. The fourth column under Major Reid advanced from Sabzi-Mandi towards Kishan Ganj and Paharipur, and made a thrust at the Kabul Gate. The fifth or reserve column under Brigadier Lony field awaited the result of the attacks and bided time to take possession of the posts assigned to it immediately as the other columns entered the city. The Kashmiri Gate was relentlessly blown up with dynamite by Lieutenant Salkeld who was soon crushed to death by the patriots of Delhi. But the Gate lay in ruins, and the storming party of the British Army soldiers burst in. They took possession of the large buildings in the neighbourhood; and then rushed along the rampart to the Mori Gate Bastion and the Kabul Gate in the face of a very obstinate resistance. This was small comfort to the British assailants, for although they had seized a large belt stretching from the Water Bastion to the Kabul Gate including the Church and the College, the Badshahi troops had smashed 4th British column which comprised the Gurkhas and had been striving under Reid's command to enter the city by the Lahori Gate and seize the Kishan Ganj zone. And the Badshahi troops continued to hold possession of the principal parts of the city including the Lahori Gate Bastion and other bastions as well as the Fort.<sup>324</sup> 'The mutineers', says Muinu'ddin Hasan, 'defended Jami' Masjid and checked the English advance. The English fell back on the Cashmere Gate. A further stand was made by the mutineers at Pulbin

<sup>322</sup> 'Muzbee' is derived from the Arabic word *mazhab*. Forrest (H.I.M., vol. I, p. 126) gives it as 'the name of a class of Sikhs originally of low caste'.

<sup>323</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 69.

<sup>324</sup> (i) Charles Ball—H.I.M., I., p. 499.

(ii) Forrest—H.I.M., pp. 131-135.

(iii) Rotton—N.S.D., pp. 261-264.

(iv) Sidgwick—T.M., pp. 71-75.

(v) *Illustrated London News*, November 21, 1857, p. 514.



Bund<sup>325</sup> and at the Calcutta Gate. The fighting continued for five days through the city<sup>326</sup>. But on Monday, the first day of their assault, the British gained little ground. In the words of Forrest, 'When the day closed only a portion of the walls of Dehli were in our possession. . . . The little ground we had gained had been won at a heavy cost. Eleven hundred and four men and sixty-five officers or about two men in nine were killed or wounded'.<sup>327</sup>

Now the British erected their guns and mortars at the places they had gained, and fired ceaselessly at the Palace, the Jami' Masjid and the streets and houses in the city. Early in the morning of 16th September they stormed and captured the Magazine as well as Kishan Ganj. In the course of the next two days (17th and 18th September) they advanced slowly, encountering vehement opposition at every step. On 19th September a party of British troops having rushed from the Kabul Gate attacked the Burn Bastion which fell into their hands the same day. 'In the evening', says Muinu'ddin Hasan, 'General Bakht Khan, collecting a force, went to the King and begged him to fly to Lucknow with him. He also offered to collect the scattered rebel forces outside the city and again fight the English. But the old king refused his help. Bakht Khan then marched for Lakhnau with all the forces he could collect'.<sup>328</sup>

In the morning of Sunday, 20th September, the British took possession of the Lahori Gate and the neighbouring Bastion. Then they captured the Jami' Masjid. 'The Jumma<sup>329</sup> Musjid', says Rotton, 'which resisted an assault on the memorable 14th of September, and from which we had to retire, now fell an easy prey before our victorious arms'.<sup>330</sup> This done, they seized the Fort, blowing up the gate. Col. Jones wrote to General Wilson announcing the capture of the

<sup>325</sup> This is a typical example of the corrupted forms of proper names frequently found in Metcalfe's edition of Jiwan Lal's diary. I am of opinion that 'Pulbin Bund' stands for 'Bund (Band) Gali' commonly known as 'Gali Sarband' which was a small street near Begam Bagh and Chandni Chowk. (I *vide* Map of the War in Dehli p. 374). The fight that took place in the Begam Bagh and Chandni Chowk area is described by Zaheer Dehlawi (D.G., pp. 109-123); and the traces of the stand made by the inhabitants in the small street near Chandni Chowk that were seen even after the fall of Dehli are noticed by Charles Ball (H.I.M., vol. II, p. 167).

<sup>326</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 70.

<sup>327</sup> Forrest—H.I.M., vol. I., pp. 146-147.

On 14th September there was a very stiff hand-to-hand fight in the streets between the British troops and the inhabitants of Dehli. Zaheer Dehlawi (p. 113), the eye-witness says, 'Thousands of people collected, each wielding a stick or broken lathi or sword and with the help of a gun which they had managed to carry from the Lahori Gate to the Kotwali, they made an attack on the British troops and drove them back'. So many were killed that Zaheer Dehlawi saw heaps of dead bodies along the road from the Jami' Masjid to the Kotwali. This is confirmed by Muinu'ddin Hasan who says, 'At the Kotwali a gun had been planted and fired by some sowars and bad characters. This fire fell in the midst of the English advancing column, killing and wounding upwards of fifty of them'. Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 70.

<sup>328</sup> Metcalfe—T. N. N., p. 70.

<sup>329</sup> 'Jumma Musjid' also misspelt by Metcalfe (*vide* T. N. N., pp. 23, 98) is incorrect. It should be Jami' Masjid.

<sup>330</sup> Rotton—N.S.D., p. 315.



Palace in these words, 'Blown open the gate and got possession of the Palace'.<sup>331</sup> The Fort including the Palace, according to Rotton, 'was well-nigh deserted; few men found within were indiscriminately slain'.<sup>332</sup>

When Bakht Khan left Dehli in the evening of 19th September no trace of the Badshahi Army had remained. All had fled; and Zaheer Dehlawi gives an eye-witness account of the flight of the Purbiyas from the city.<sup>333</sup> The night of 19th September Emperor Bahadur Shah spent practically alone in the Fort. Before daybreak he left and fled to the Dargah of Nizamu'ddin, so did the Princes but they went straight to Humayun's Tomb.<sup>334</sup> At the sacred tomb of Hazrat Nizamu'ddin Auliya Bahadur Shah burst into tears and spoke his mind to Shah Ghulam Hasan, custodian of the Dargah.<sup>335</sup> Then he entrusted to his care the Sacred Hairs in a Box<sup>336</sup> which he had carried from the Fort. Afterwards he too proceeded to Humayun's Tomb where he was taken prisoner the same day.<sup>337</sup> In his diary Keith reports this event saying, 'The King brought in by Hodson. See the old scoundrel'.<sup>338</sup> Writing about the same day, Muir says, 'The King, the Begum Zinat Mahal are close prisoners; and to-day<sup>339</sup> the Princes Mirza Mughul, Abu Bakr and Khair Sultan were brought in by Hodson from Humayun's Tomb, and shot at the Dehli Gate. The bodies are now lying at the Kotwali'.<sup>340</sup> According to Zaheer Dehlawi thirty Princes—sons, sons-in-law and grandsons—of Emperor Bahadur Shah were arrested. Then they were taken outside the Dehli Gate and beheaded; their severed heads were sent to the Emperor.<sup>341</sup>

(in: Mahdi Husain: *Bahadur Shah II...* Delhi 1958)

<sup>331</sup> *Idem*, p. 316.

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>333</sup> Zaheer Dehlawi—D.G., p. 112. Also see Charles Ball who, in the same context says, 'But Pandys don't stand so firmly as people expected'.

<sup>334</sup> This is my conclusion based on a study of all the available evidence. Zaheer Dehlawi appears confounded on this point. At one place (p. 116) while mentioning the Emperor's flight to Humayun's Tomb he gives us to understand that the Princes also went there. Subsequently (p. 124) he says that the Princes were arrested at the Dargah of Nizamu'ddin. But a local enquiry that I recently made shows that while Emperor Bahadur Shah's arrival at the Dargah straight from the Fort is strongly believed and in fact proved (*vide* Photo in the Preface), their no evidence of the Princes' arrival, or of their arrest, in the precincts of the Dargah. The Princes' flight direct from the Fort to Humayun's Tomb is attested by Muinu'ddin Hasan. (Metcalf—T. N. N., p. 70).

<sup>335</sup> *Vide* Preface.

<sup>336</sup> *Vide* Photo in the Preface, p. xv.

<sup>337</sup> 'On 21st September' says Rotton (p. 318) 'Hodson went out accompanied by a native who knew the Royal family and took the person of His Imperial Majesty Shah Bahadur Shah and brought him in, a prisoner to Palace'.

<sup>338</sup> Keith—*Delhi-1857*, p. 301.

<sup>339</sup> *I.e.* 21st September.

<sup>340</sup> Muir, W. — 'State Papers', vol. I, p. 369 quoted by Forrest—H. I. M., vol. I, p. 148.

<sup>341</sup> Zaheer Dehlawi—D. G., p. 315.







MAHDI HUSAIN

## BAHADUR SHAH II AND THE WAR OF 1857

In my childhood I used to hear stories about the Mutiny (*Ghadr*<sup>1</sup>) of 1857 from my revered father who had witnessed it as a boy of 13, then living with his parents in Dehli. One day, while narrating the story he said feelingly, 'We were compelled to leave Dehli our paternal home and all our belongings, afraid of the plundering raids of the Telingas and fled to Alwar where we found shelter and we did not return until many years after the fall of Dehli and restoration of peace'. In this manner was awakened in me some curiosity about the so-called *Ghadr* but I had no time to think seriously of it until the 18th of November 1956 when I wrote an article on 'Emperor Bahadur Shah II and his role in the War of 1857' for the *Anrita Bazar Patrika*. It is reproduced below together with its criticism which appeared subsequently in the same paper.

### *Emperor Bahadur Shah II: His Role in the War in 1857*

The last Mughul Emperor of Dehli (this spelling, is strictly according to the chronicles and is in fact truly Indian. Delhi is the English spelling) commonly known as Bahadur Shah Zafar was the second son of Akbar Shah and his Rajput wife Lal Bai. He was a great scholar of Persian, a marvellous calligrapher and a gifted poet of Urdu with Zafar as his pen-name. He composed many *ghazals* in Urdu as well as *diwans* some of which are available in printed form. He also wrote a commentary on Shaikh Sa'di's *Gulistan*.

He ascended the throne in 1837 when he was 62 years old. Since his accession he remained for the most part in Dehli Fort as a pensioner of the East India Company and had nothing to do with the administration of the city and country which remained entirely in British hands. He was a very quiet man of sufi disposition. His activities were confined to writing books, holding discourses in poetry and visiting the shrine of sufi saints like the *dargah* of Hazrat Nizamu'ddin Auliya and that of Shaikh Qutbu'ddin Bakhtiyar Kaki where he had

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<sup>1</sup> *Ghadr*—a Hindustani equivalent for the Mutiny, meaning perfidy, treachery and base ingratitude — became after the fall of Dehli a popular expression to denounce the Rising of 1857.



built a palace called Zafar Mahal. From this Zafar Mahal he used to watch the annual Hindu-Muslim fair or picnic called *Phul Walon Ke Sair* which he had inaugurated. This national fair continued to be held in the precincts of the Qutb shrine even after Bahadur Shah regularly every year until the year of communal fury, *i.e.* 1947. It was restored through the efforts and sacrifice of Mahatma Gandhi.

### *He joins the Rebels*

When on 10th May 1857 the Indian contingents commonly known as Telinga—perhaps because their officers came from the Telingana territory—rose in a body against the British at Mirath and secured arms and booty by reckless killing and loot. Bahadur Shah II of Dehli knew nothing about the matter. In the morning of 11th May they arrived in Dehli and the revolt spread to all classes of people in the city. In the morning of 12th May the Telingas called on the aged and infirm Emperor Bahadur Shah in the Fort. They implored him to accept their services in the cause of Mughul rule which they said they were anxious to restore. In spite of his old age Bahadur Shah accepted their request. Along with his sons Zaheeru'ddin Mirza Mughul and Mirza Jawan Bakht and other able-bodied members of the royal family he went in cavalcade from the Fort up to Chandni Chowk. There he stopped near the gate of what was then known as 'Begum Ka Bagh' and addressed the Telinga army saying, 'I am with you wholeheartedly. But I possess neither a treasure nor an army. If I get back my dominion I shall bestow gifts on you in right royal manner'. They replied, '*Huzur!* we require neither wealth nor army. We only want this much—and this is our earnest desire—that *Huzur* may kindly give us the support of your name. We shall lay down our lives at your feet. We want to see you recover your Indian dominion and we should thereby earn a good name for ever.' The Emperor said in reply, 'Whatever I possess is at your disposal. Eat and drink out of my provision. And with a bold heart turn these adversaries (the English) out of India and make my coin current.' Immediately a gold coin was struck with the following verse engraved on it:

*Bazar zad sikka nusrat tarazi*  
*Siraju'ddin Bahadur Shah Ghazi*  
 (Siraju'ddin Bahadur Shah Ghazi  
 struck gold coin as a sign of victory)

### *Emperor's Patriotism*

In the morning of 13th May the Emperor held a *darbar* in the Diwan-i Khass of the Dehli Fort. The *darbar* was attended by all the officers of the Telinga army. But, in the course of the arrangements they made there for the capture of the city, for the conveyance of ammunition and other details they dictated their own terms which the Emperor accepted and he assured them of his espousing their cause which was the cause of India's liberation, provided they proved obedient to his orders, behaved properly and observed discipline.



Presumably the Emperor had strong misgivings about the Telingas and feared that they would misbehave and would ultimately make his position worse. That in spite of his misgivings he did not disappoint the Telingas and accepted their request speaks volumes for Bahadur Shah's patriotism and his desire for the liberation of India. He had no personal ambition left for he was now extremely old and had been used to living the life of a dervish.

In the afternoon of the same day the Telingas brought 60 Englishmen, ladies and children as prisoners before the Emperor and wanted his permission to kill them. The Emperor dissuaded them from killing innocent people. And he ordered those ladies and children to be taken to the Fort, and looked after.

### ***New Government Set Up***

On 14th May, the English having evacuated the city of Dehli, a kind of national government was set up there. All Hindu and Muslim officers, Raos and Rajas were called to attend the Court. The Emperor desired co-operation from all and sent circular letters to the jagirdars and amirs requesting them to come over. But there was little response; and amirs like Aminu'ddin Ahmad Khan and Ziyau'ddin Ahmad Khan of Loharu attended the court but made lame excuses and went away. Most of the remaining, amirs and jagirdars who had been approached sent in messages alleging their inability to leave their estates in the midst of turmoil.

On 15th May another *darbar* was held and new officers of the Indian Army of Liberation were appointed. The supreme command of this army was given to Zaheeru'ddin Mirza Mughul and a subordinate command was taken by the queen Zinat Mahal Begum. Mirza Jawan Bakht, a son of the Emperor and the queen, was made wazir. Two Hindu officers stand out prominent in the list. One was the Rao Sahib of Pargana Dadri and another was a chieftain named Sai Mall. The Rao Sahib was awarded a royal robe and put in charge of the commissariat and transport while Sai Mall was appointed commander of a battalion and charged to seize the British provisions. When shortly after Sai Mall was killed, his maternal grandson Puran Mall succeeded him in the office.

### ***Rebel Army's Excesses***

But in spite of the Indian Army of Liberation thus formed, the Indians were not united. Some of them carried tales to the British who had established their camp on the Ridge, now known as Fatehgarh or Jitgarh. Among such tale carriers is found the name of a Muslim, viz. Agha Jan and of a Hindu called Mohan Lall. They are said to have opened secret correspondence with the British.

For the next four months Bahadur Shah held the trembling throne of Dehli while he himself was trembling, under the weight of years and for fear of the disobedient and irresponsible army who had already proved wayward and were committing blunders every day.

On 16th May they requested the Emperor to make over the aforesaid English prisoners to them and they wanted to kill them all. The Emperor ordered



the army not to do, took the prisoners out of the jail and making them stand before the Naqqarkhana killed them all with swords. This was not all. The Telingas began to lay hands even on their own countrymen. They attacked Munshi Mohan Lall and plundered the house of Munshi Gobind Dass whom they suspected of being pro-British.

At this stage rumours were set afloat — and no wonder were engineered by certain schemers— that the queen Zinat Mahal Begum and a leading Amir Hakim Ahsanullah Khan had on their own account opened secret correspondence with the British. But this is mere hearsay. The truth of the matter is that the queen Zinat Mahal Begum continued true to the cause her royal husband had espoused.

Meanwhile the war between the British on the Ridge and the Indians and their Emperor in the city of Dehli was in progress. Skirmishes and fighting continued until the 14th September on which fateful day the British succeeded in storming Dehli. On hearing of this, Bahadur Shah burst into tears and said, 'I had foretold this calamity. At long last these ungrateful men have ruined me in my old age. However today I shall go personally to the battlefield to fight.' Saying this the 84-year-old Emperor buckled his armour and rode out of the Fort. But the British guns were booming and bullets were ceaselessly falling all around. Some of the men of the now broken Army of Liberation persuaded the aged Emperor to go back into the Fort. He retired. The war was over and in the course of the next four days the rump of the Indian army melted away.

### LAST OF THE TIMURS

On 19th September Emperor Bahadur Shah found himself alone. And fearing a bitter fate awaiting him he sent out the queen and other ladies and some princes in the darkness of the night from the Fort to some unknown place. Alone he remained dismayed in the Fort for the rest of the night. On the morrow he left it quietly and went straight to the shrine of Hazrat Nizamu'ddin Auliya. He sat down by the side of the sacred tomb and burst into tears. After a short time he looked to the custodian of the shrine and said, 'I had told you this much before. These luckless rebel soldiers are wayward. They have no stamina, no discipline and no powers of endurance. I had apprehensions from the beginning; now they have come true. These soldiers have fled before the English. Brother! although I am a retired fakir yet in my veins runs that great blood which would keep me fighting if I took to it, to the last drop of it in my body. My forefathers have seen worse days than these and they never lost heart. But I have read the writing on the wall. I see with my own eyes the fast approaching tragic end of our glory. Now there is not a shadow of doubt left that of the great house of Timur I am the last mark and trail seated on the throne of India. The lamp of Mughul dominion is fast extinguishing; it would remain but a few hours more. Since I know this definitely why should I cause more bloodshed unnecessarily? Hence I left the Fort. The country belongs to God; He may give it to whomsoever He likes.' Saying this he delivered into the custody of the shrine a box which alone he had carried with himself on leaving the Fort. This box contained three hairs from the



sacred beard of Prophet Muhammad — a holy relic which had passed on as sacred from father to son in the house of Timur since the 14th century A.D. (8th century Hijra). Then the Emperor felt relieved and said, 'It is more than a day that I took my last meal. Give me something to eat.'

### BANISHED TO RANGOON

Some coarse food was readily presented and he took some hasty morsels and then left for the mausoleum of Humayun which stood a few furlongs from there. He took shelter near his ancestor's tomb. But he was pursued immediately by the British troops and arrested by Hodson who captured also two of the sons of the Emperor and one grandson. They surrendered to him but in spite of their surrender they were shot dead by Hodson. Bahadur Shah was taken into the Fort and tried. After a long trial the judges decided that Bahadur Shah was guilty of abetting murder. As a result he was deposed and banished to Rangoon in December 1858 where he lived and died as a dervish (1862).

### HERO AND MARTYR

It follows from the above that Bahadur Shah was not only a great patriot and hero but a martyr in the cause of India's liberation. He combined in his person qualities of fakir and king and did no harm to anyone. He might have succeeded in expelling the Englishmen had there been union among the Indians. It was his misfortune that he was born in a disunited India and the closing years when life had gone out of the Mughul rule. But he had a genuine love for India and plunged himself into a whirlpool of disasters for the sake of his countrymen. He was a symbol and standard bearer of Hindu-Muslim unity. And it is a fact that during the short period of his nominal and ineffective rule the Musalmans abandoned cow-slaughter.

*Amrita Bazar Patrika*, Nov. 28, 1956

Letter to the Editor

### Martyr or Traitor

Sir,— Prof. Mahdi Husain, M.A., Ph.D. (London) D. Lit. (Paris) wrote an article on the above subject in the Sunday 'Amrita Bazar Patrika' of November 18, last. The account we are told is based on contemporary Persian sources. But as he has not said anything to indicate the nature of these sources it is not possible to discuss in detail the facts stated by him or the views and sentiments based thereon.

There is however one passage which cannot go unchallenged, particularly as the real facts are contrary to what he has said and demolish the whole structure he has sought to construct. The passage runs as follows: 'Rumours were set afloat and no wonder were engineered by schemers — that the queen Zinat Mahal Begum and a leading amir Hakim Ahsanullah Khan had on their own account opened secret correspondence with the British. But this is a mere hearsay. The truth of the matter is that the queen Zinat Mahal Begum continued true to the cause her royal husband had espoused'. Fortunately for



history, but unfortunately for the two illustrious persons involved we have positive evidence to prove that these rumours were only too true. A book published in 1858 contains a number of letters written during the siege of Delhi by H. H. Greathed Commissioner of Mirat who was appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor of North-West Province as his Political Agent at Delhi attached to the Field-Force. In a letter dated camp Delhi August 23, 1857 he writes, 'An emissary came out from Zeenut Mahal the favourite wife of the king, a great political personage offering to exercise her influence with the King to bring out some arrangement'. In another letter dated August 19, 1857 Greathed says, 'I am beginning to get letters from the princes declaring they have been all along fondly attached to us and they want to know what they can do for us'.

Prof. Mahdi Husain is quite right when he says that Zinat Mahal continued true to the cause her royal husband had espoused for Bahadur Shah himself led the way to such treacherous intrigues with the English. Immediately after the Mutineers from Mirat arrived at Delhi and Bahadur Shah accepted their leadership he sent post-haste a secret message to the British Lieutenant-Governor at Agra informing him of the situation. This fact is mentioned by Jiwan Lal Munshi who was at Delhi at the time in his Persian narrative which has been translated by Metcalfe. Hakim Ahsanullah admits in his evidence at the trial of Bahadur Shah that he sent the message on behalf of the King asking for the help of British troops to put down the sepoys. According to the written statement of Chunni Lal published in the proceedings of the trial of Bahadur Shah the sepoys intercepted a letter written by Ahsanullah Khan and bearing his own seal in which he offered to the British to make over all the soldiery now in Delhi. Ahsanullah when confronted with the letter said it was a forgery.

During my recent visit to London I came across a letter from the British Commander of the forces besieging Delhi dated 4th July 1857 in which he refers to a proposal made by Ahsanullah on behalf of Bahadur Shah that if the British guaranteed his pension he would secretly admit the British troops inside the Fort of Delhi through Jer-darojah, a private entrance, into the palace. So the sepoys were quite right in suspecting the loyalty of Ahsanullah and Bahadur Shah, and we can well understand why they threatened to take away Zinat Mahal Begum and keep her as a hostage for the loyalty of Bahadur Shah.

According to Prof. Mahdi Husain 'Bahadur Shah was not only a great patriot and hero but a martyr in the cause of India's liberation'. If we understand the meaning of English words, Bahadur Shah has not the least claim to be called a hero, a patriot or a martyr. The only epithet applicable to Bahadur Shah is traitor. The queen Zinat Mahal, the princes and Ahsanullah who all—to use Prof. Husain's words — 'continued true to the cause, espoused by Bahadur Shah', also deserve to share the epithet equally with him.

Sd. Dr. R. C. Majumdar,  
Professor of Ancient Indian History and Culture,  
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On reading the above letter I wrote a commentary of my article; and after sending the same for publication to the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* I pursued further studies and researches. After several months of ceaseless work at different places— Calcutta, Patna, Rampur and Dehli — I wrote this book entitled *BAHADUR SHAH II AND THE WAR OF 1857 IN DEHLI WITH ITS UNFORGETTABLE SCENES*. Seven of its never-to-be-forgotten scenes which if reiterated, will enable the student to acquire proper understanding and insight are reproduced below.

*First scene.* — From 14th to 16th May while news poured in at the Royal Palace of the march of British troops from Mirath, Emperor Bahadur Shah continued to advise his Army to make an attack on Mirath and expel the English completely from that city and its environments. But his advice went unheeded and the English exploited the situation; they concentrated troops at Baghpat, thus threatening to attack Dehli. In the course of the next four days (27th to 30th May) they fortified their position, and Wilson marched with his divisions from Mirath in the direction of Dehli reaching Ghaziu'ddin Nagar near the Hindan at laybreak on 30th May. There they encountered some opposition from the Badshahi Army (*Sipah-i Shahi*) who made an attack according to plan but were repulsed; another attack made on 31st May proved equally ineffective. The victorious British troops advanced to Alipur where they fortified themselves as well as at Baghpat (4th June).

*Second scene.*—On 8th June took place the battle of Badli-ki-Serai which was again a victory for the British resulting in the British occupation of Hindu Rao's house and the Flagstaff. Now they began to look confidently forward to conquering Dehli, and 7,000 British and allied soldiers held themselves ready to fall from the heights of the Ridge upon the city below at any suitable moment. But on 9th June the Badshahi Army made a grand attack on the ridge; and fighting continued the whole day, the shells from the Badshahi artillery falling on the Ridge ceaselessly till 11th June.

*Third scene.*—On 12th and 13th, and again on the 17th and 23rd June, the Badshahi Army made fresh attacks, heedless of the loss of lives and property inflicted by the British who had meanwhile burnt a Royal battery as well as the village of Kishangarh. Believing that 23rd June—the centenary of Plassey—was the last day of the British Raj in India the Badshahi Army rushed fiercely that day on the British Camp and severe fighting ensued at the Sabzi Mandi, but they were not favoured by luck and the Sabzi Mandi area fell to the British. Still the Badshahi Army pulled themselves together and advanced to make a fresh attack on the British Camp (30th June); and they became distinctly hopeful and courageous after the arrival of General Bakht Khan on 2nd July.

*Fourth scene.*—On 3rd July General Bakht Khan fell on the British at Alipur and he did so again on the 4th. From 5th to 8th July no attack could be made because the British troops had destroyed the Najafgarh canal bridge and the rains had set in, but a fresh attack was made on the 9th when over 200 British soldiers were killed. In the course of this attack, it is said, the Badshahi Army



made a vain appeal in the name of India to the Indian gunners in the British artillery and urged them to come over to their side.

*Fifth scene.*—From 10th to 13th July while there was no fighting, huge ammunition and stored convoys from the Indian Princes reached the British Camp and 300 Sikh artillerymen also arrived to reinforce them. But the Badshahi Army were not dismayed. On 14th July they fell on the enemy's camp at the Sabzi Mandi but were driven back. Four days later they made another attack at the same Mandi though fresh reinforcements of Sikh cavalry and large convoys of ammunition and stores had reached the British Camp the same day. Fighting was held up for the next four days (July 19-22) on account of the incessant rains. The Badshahi Army made a sally on 23rd July and occupied Ludlow Castle. But a rift having occurred in their ranks quarrels broke out. For this reason there was no fighting till the 2nd of August when the Emperor raised their dropping spirits and inspired them with new zeal. As a result they made a severe attack on the enemy but there was no appreciable success. Fighting ceased for the next two days (4th and 5th August) only to be resumed on the 6th; and after 11 days' continuous action it ceased again for three days (19th to 21st August), the arrival of fresh reinforcements for the British from the Punjab having changed the programme. Under the leadership of Nicholson the British now held out a new threat of a sweep on Dehli. But the Badshahi Army who had been preparing for a fresh grapple were surprised and defeated by Nicholson on the 26th. This was followed by a cessation of fighting for the next ten days during which period there came for the British another instalment of reinforcements and ammunitions from Mirath and Firozpur, and some troops also came from Jind.

*Sixth scene.*—On 8th September the Qudsia Bagh and Ludlow Castle were seized by the British; and an attempt made by the Badshahi Army to recover these places proved abortive. Then the British fortified the Ludlow Castle and constructed a battery in front of it; they also began to make serious preparations for the grand assault which had long been in the offing. On 11th and 12th September they bombarded and destroyed the Kashmiri Gate Bastion and their shells began to fall into the city. On the 13th all the British batteries began simultaneously to fire on the city and the strength of the Badshahi Army fell from 60,000 to less than 10,000 while that of the British rose from the pre-Badli figure of 1,700 to 8,000.

*Seventh scene.*—On 14th September began the planned assault. The British assailants seized the Kashmiri, Kabuli and Mori Gates and destroyed the Water Bastion. At the same time they bombarded the Royal Palace and Salimgarh. The assault continued on the 15th and 16th; the bombardment of the Royal Palace and Salimgarh also continued, and the street fighting which now began continued through the 17th, 18th and 19th. On that fateful day General Bakht Khan broke his camp outside the Lahori Gate and went away. On 20th September the Emperor was captured at Humayun's tomb; he was betrayed into British hands by his elderly kinsman, Mirza Ilahi Bakhsh.



In all the above scenes Bahadur Shah's is the most important figure, the cynosure of all eyes, of friends as well as of foes, of the army and the inhabitants of Delhi as also of the British officers and their allies. All the time Bahadur Shah was assailed by formidable difficulties, the most telling of all being an empty treasury. Since May 1857 the British Government had stopped payments of all kinds to him. He was unable to pay his own servants and to provide for his large family. One day, it is reported, his daughter Nawab Khatun Zamani Begum was compelled to ask Banarsi Lal, the Royal treasurer, for a loan of Rs. 15. Such was the financial strain but Bahadur Shah held his head high and lowered not the cause for which he had accepted the leadership of the sepoys. He did not sell that cause at any price and resisted all kinds of baits and fears. Great were the temptations that dallied before him; greater still were the threats that were held out to him through repeated warnings; and sure was the destruction of himself and his household that threatened him in adhering to the Fort and fighting the English amidst the greatest financial strains and all kinds of drains on his resources. One day, it is said, he found one of the chieftains intriguing with the British. Thereupon he expressed his disapproval and said angrily, 'Until the English at Nynce Pul are not killed, I shall consider you their friend and that you are in treacherous communication with them. It is a great pity that for a few hours' security in the world you barter your eternal welfare; go off to Nynce Pul, complete your work there and return'.<sup>4</sup> There was sincerity even in his rebuke and his expressions impressed the friend and foe alike. A British spy warned the British on the eve of their grand assault of Delhi against their laying severe hands on the Royal house after the fall of the city;<sup>5</sup> such was the popularity which Bahadur Shah enjoyed. Greathed too was impressed. While speculating on 17th-18th September that the Palace is being defended by the King's own troops he said, 'But our shells must be knocking them about most unpleasantly and there will soon be a hole in the wall. If the King wishes to have the lives of his family and his own spared, he had better surrender the Palace and I should be glad to have that slaughter.'<sup>6</sup> Bahadur Shah did not surrender the Palace and fighting continued through the following day. Then in utter helplessness he left the Fort and fled in the direction of Humayun's tomb, not in the direction of the Qutb which he might have preferred in ordinary circumstances. Humayun's tomb lay in the neighbourhood of the shrine (*dargah*) of Nizamu'ddin Auliya where he wanted to stop in order to deposit the Box containing the Sacred Hairs of Prophet Muhammad. Making enquiries on the spot I came to know that Bahadur Shah's arrival with the said Box was strongly believed in the Dargah circles; and I was told that the Box was still preserved in the store room (*toshakhana*) of the Dargah and that it was exhibited to the public every year on 11th Rabiul Awwal, one

Cf. *infra*.

Cf. *infra*.

Delhi News, File 135; dated 4th-7th September 1857.

Delhi News, File 141; 11th September 1857.

Greathed—*Letters written during the siege of Delhi*, pp. 284-285.



day before the Prophet's birthday after the *Asr* prayer. That holy day happened to fall during my stay in the city on Sunday, 6th October 1957. I took my camera, and just at the moment the believers were exhibiting the Sacred Box I snapped it. It is also believed in the Dargah circles that Bahadur Shah was anxious to avoid public notice of his visit to the shrine with the object of saving it from desecration and pillage at the hands of the unscrupulous British soldiers. Accordingly he manoeuvred his flight from the Fort in such a manner that the performance has remained a mystery ever since, the details being not disclosed even to men like Hakim Ahsanullah Khan and Maulvi Fazl Haq. As a result speculation arose and some preposterous reports sprang.<sup>7</sup>

Zakaullah who always disparaged<sup>8</sup> Bahadur Shah has incidentally remarked that while the British were a solid mass like a wall of steel, the Indians were hopelessly divided. While one party was fighting nominally under the leadership of Bahadur Shah another party was with the British. And this party which was a hundred times stronger — for they included the Indian Princes — and more useful, for they comprised (i) the menials without whose essential services the British could not stand in the battlefield even for a day, and (ii) the spies who were sending all kinds of news about the weaknesses of the King and his army daily and hourly from the city of Dehli to the British Camp. These spies went about in disguise in the Royal Camp, in the city and the Palace and suggested to the British when and at which part of the city, they should make the final assault.<sup>9</sup>

Regarding Bahadur Shah some reports capable of prejudicing certain minds also proceeded from some anti-Bengali sources. General Bakht Khan with whom Bahadur Shah had identified himself and to whom he confided all kinds of powers is reported to have imprisoned 50 Bengalis, accusing them of maintaining correspondence with the British.<sup>10</sup> Further the report says that Bakht Khan imprisoned every Baboo who could read and write English.<sup>11</sup> According to another news 'some Bengalis who had been suspected were taken prisoner in Dehli and General Bakht Khan undertook to report about their conduct to the Commander-in-chief'.<sup>12</sup> Further it is reported that the Kotwal of Dehli wrote to Mirza Mughul the commander-in-chief 'to remove the 12 Bengalis under arrest to the Fort, there being no accommodation in the Kotwali'.<sup>13</sup> These alleged anti-Bengali moves may have affected in some parts of this country the attitude

<sup>7</sup> *Ide* (i) J.P.H.S., January 1958, pp. 12 ff.  
(ii) *infra*, footnote.

<sup>8</sup> *Ide infra*.

<sup>9</sup> (i) Zakaullah—T.U.A.S.I., pp. 616, 699.

(ii) M.P. Box 15, No. 6, August 16, 17, 20, 1857; No. 104, August 21, 1857; No. 12, August 26, 1857; No. 14, August 28, 1857; No. 17, September 13, 1857; Box 16, 18, September 1857; No. 23, September 8, 1857.

<sup>10</sup> *Delhi News*—July 25, 1857.

<sup>11</sup> *Delhi News*—July 25, 1857.

<sup>12</sup> M.P. Box 57, Aug. 30-31, 1857; Nos. 381-383.

<sup>13</sup> *Idem.*, Box 103, July 21, 1857; No. 175.



against Bahadur Shah even after a hundred years. When in 1957 every detail of the story was examined and the incident of 11th May, for instance, was telescoped, it was inferred that 'Bahadur Shah had not the courage to confront an unruly crowd and he sent Captain Douglas instead'<sup>14</sup>. But it is a fact that subsequently he confronted the unruly crowds more than once. On 7th August 1857 when much larger crowds of the sepoys attacked Hakim Ahsanullah Khan and wanted to kill him he pulled the latter safely out of the jaws of death<sup>15</sup>. Again on September 1857 he confronted them when there was a great tumult in the Palace about the distribution of pay. Two companies actually surrounded the Royal apartments. Bahadur Shah rushed into the crowds who were clamouring for pay, and said courageously, 'I never called you together, nor do I want you, nor have I any money to pay you'.<sup>16</sup> If he did not go out in the morning of May the 11th to confront the unruly crowd in question, the reason was that he did not then want to compromise his position by starting a massacre of Englishmen indiscriminately while the character of the rising was yet dubious and ominous. In fact he then found himself in a dilemma. He knew that success in the career on which the sepoys had embarked without making preparations was impossible. He also knew that he was surrounded on all sides by the British officers and spies. Says Cave-Browne the British chaplain attending the troops at Delhi, 'The King had at first been taken by surprise; the spirit of insurrection which he had evoked had broken out before the preconceived time. The thought of the strong European garrison at Mirath and of the dire retribution which might come from that quarter made him cautious. He hesitated before compromising himself. Messengers were despatched on camels along the Mirath road to give immediate intimation of the advance of any European force. About the middle of the day (11th May) they returned to the Palace and reported that not a soldier was within 20 miles. The old king now took courage. Mr. Rotton in his *Siege of Delhi* (p. 20) also mentions this circumstance. Another and a stronger guard was sent clown under a son and a grandson of the King to demand the immediate surrender of the Magazine in the King's name. On this being refused scaling ladders were sent out from the Palace and planted against the walls along the main road'<sup>17</sup>.

This was a correct reading of the Royal mind made by Cave-Browne. Similarly he made another reading when he reported about Bahadur Shah's letter addressed to the Maharaja of Patiala<sup>18</sup>; and this letter which was betrayed by the

<sup>14</sup> Sen, S. N.—*Eighteen Fifty-Seven*, p. 70.

<sup>15</sup> (i) Zakauallah—T.U.A.S.I., p. 664.

(ii) *Delhi News*, August 7, 1857.

(iii) Metcalfe—T.N.N., pp. 186-187.

<sup>16</sup> *Delhi News*, September 5, 1857.

<sup>17</sup> Cave-Browne—P.D., Vol. I., pp. 362-363.

<sup>18</sup> Says Cave-Browne, 'The Maharaja of Patiala . . . no sooner received this letter from the Lion's Mouth at his palace gate than he at once with unhesitating loyalty forwarded it to Mr. Barnes for transmission to the Commissioner.'

Cave-Browne—P. IX, I, pp. 224-225.



Maharaja is also attested by two telegrams<sup>19</sup>. Then Greathed testifies to the Emperor's endeavours to secure general support for the war. 'The King of Delhi', says he, 'has written to the mutineers at Lucknow to come here and assist in taking the batteries'<sup>20</sup>. According to Hakim Ahsanullah Khan the Emperor 'addressed letters to the troops at Nimuch and Ferozpur and received petitions from the regiments at Jhansi, Dinapur, Allahabad, Aligarh, Muthra, Bulandshahr, Roorki, Farrukhabad, Hansi, Sirsa, Karnal, Nasirabad, Saugor, Jubbulpur, Ambala, Phillaur, Jallandar, Sealkote, Jhelum, Rawalpindee, Loodhiana, Gurgaon, Rewari, Badshahpur, Rohtak, Hissar, Bijnor, Bareilly and Mainpuri. All these regiments were invited to proceed to Dehli at once'<sup>21</sup>; and circular letters to this effect were despatched to Rao Bhara the ruler of Kutch Bhoj, to Ranjit Singh, Chief of Jaisalmer and to Raja Gulub Singh of Jammu'<sup>22</sup>.

Then it is contended that Bahadur Shah lacked military knowledge and personal bravery<sup>23</sup>. But the incident from which, on the authority of Muinu'ddin Hasan the above inference has been drawn was related differently by Mukand Lal, the Emperor's private secretary, before the Military Tribunal. Muinu'ddin Hasan, indeed, had said, 'The mutineers represented to the King that the sepoys were reluctant to attack the English and demanded his presence in the field. This he promised to give. A large force was ordered to assemble in the evening. The King headed the force and passed by the Dehli Gate and showed himself to the assembled troops. Passing by the Lal Diggi Tank he went towards the Lahore Gate. One of the Palace dependents was substituted for the King who secretly retired to the city by a back way. This show of force ended in nothing. The troops gradually moved back to their own quarters and the threatened attack ended in smoke'<sup>24</sup>. To Mukand Lal the Judge Advocate put the following question: 'Did the Prisoner on any occasion go out of the Palace for the purpose of encouraging the troops to fight against the English?' 'Yes' replied Mukand Lal, 'two days after the assault, viz., on the 16th September he went in an open letter in the direction of the Magazine at the head of the army; but had scarcely proceeded 200 yards beyond the Palace when he halted for an hour and then returned, the army in the meantime dispersing.'<sup>25</sup> 'Do you know', said the Judge Advocate, 'what induced the Prisoner to halt after proceeding so short a distance and to what was it generally attributed?' 'He', replied Mukand Lal, 'had gone out with

<sup>19</sup> Tel. No. 8 of 27th May 1857 from the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Punjab, Rawalpindi, to the Government of India, Foreign Department, gives the translation of this letter and says that the Maharaja of Patiala delivered the original to the Commissioner, Cis-Sutlej States. *Idem P. L. of Mutiny Papers of 1857-1858 in Punjab Secretariat*, p. 39. Another telegram No. 139 of 23rd May 1857 tends to elucidate the contents saying, 'The letter from the King of Delhi to the Maharaja of Patiala invited the Maharaja to rise'. *Idem*, p. 30.

<sup>20</sup> Greathed—*Letters written during the siege of Delhi*, p. 134.

<sup>21</sup> *Pr. Tr. B.S.*—pp. 168-175.

<sup>22</sup> *Op. Cit.*, pp. 151-152.

<sup>23</sup> *S.M.R.*, pp. 119-120.

<sup>24</sup> Metcalfe.—*T.N.N.*, p. 68.

<sup>25</sup> *Pr. T. B. S.*—p. 104.



the army in order to dislodge the British from the city: when the troops became engaged, he stayed to encourage them<sup>26</sup>.

There is some lacuna in both of these narratives, both are incomplete and each tends to stress a feature. Mukand Lal says, 'The King had gone out with the army in order to dislodge the British from the city: when the troops became engaged, he stayed one hour to encourage them'. Mumtaz Ali Hasan says that the King went towards the Lahore Gate and then he secretly retired by a back way. From the information given by Hakim Ahsanullah Khan who was present on that occasion it appears that on his arrival in the battlefield the Emperor noticed signs of insincerity among the sepoys; so he returned to the Palace. The story runs as follows:

'Next day Maulvi Sarfaraz Ali and Maulvi Abdul Ghafur and many Maulvis from outside came to the King after 12 o'clock and importuned him to ride forth and take his troops with him otherwise the sepoys would make a disturbance asking, 'Why does not the King send out his servants to attack the Ridge (*Pahari*) if he is in truth the enemy of the English? Although the order has been given (to attack the *pahari*) yet the King's servants never advance beyond the Lahori Gate. True some boys went out one day with the sepoys and then officer was wounded and died. The Kamona (?) youth, i.e. Sirdar went out daily to the attack. He too, 4 days ago, was severely wounded. In short they continued to talk thus until the King, unable to help himself, set out.

'At this moment some officers of the army came up. Having gone out of the Fort by the Dehli Gate they stopped at the Ellenborough Tank (Dal Digger)'. 'As soon as I heard the news', continues Hakim Ahsanullah Khan, 'I went too. At that time people about the King said, 'Advance and place the guns on the further side of the magazine. The cavalcade was about to move on when I remonstrated and said, "Pray don't advance but return to the Fort for balls are lying about here even."

'After much discussion about the time of afternoon prayers the cavalcade returned to the Fort. I said, 'These people bring disgrace on Your Majesty for nothing. You never ought to have ridden forth! God forbid that the sepoys should take Your Majesty out to the front of the battle, and then run off and you be taken prisoner. Never. You had better mused over what they say',<sup>27</sup>

It is commonly believed that Hakim Ahsanullah Khan had ingratiated himself with the British<sup>28</sup>. But there is no documentary evidence available to convict him; rather there are some records which testify to the honest performance of duties on his part. His letters—written during the war to Lala Bebi Prasad directing the latter to arrange for the supply of food to the cavalry

If he stayed in the battlefield one hour he could not have remained then: with his lips sealed. He was in the habit of speaking to the sepoys. He always made some remarks addressing the battery men whenever he visited Salimgarh. *Vide* Metcalfe—T.N.N., pp. 145, 154, 159, 163, 169, 181, 198, 203, 204, 206.

J.P.H.S., January 1958, pp. 30-31.

*Vide infra*.



and infantry of the Badshahi Army proceeding to give battle to the English<sup>29</sup> — are a case in point. His own memoirs do not go beyond showing that suspicions were cast on him of sending news to the British; but he successfully removed the suspicions from the minds of his accusers by swearing on the Quran and saying, 'I will never write anything'<sup>30</sup>. Nor had he a hand in the explosion of the Magazine at Churiwala on 7th August 1857. Says Jiwan Lal, 'A great number of officers, assembled in the court, said, 'We are satisfied that the Hakim had nothing to do with the explosion of gunpowder'<sup>31</sup>. Nor had he written the seditious letter which the sepoys once attributed to him<sup>32</sup>. Says Chunni Lal, 'Ahsanullah Khan declared it was a forgery got up by some persons and impressions on it were from counterfeit seals of gypsum; and they (Ahsanullah Khan and Mahbub Ali Khan) took off their signets and threw before the soldiers. They further swore by the Quran that the seals on the paper were not theirs and that the document was a forgery'<sup>33</sup>. Subsequently when the Emperor went to inspect the Salimgarh fortifications he assured the soldiers that he was associated with them in a common cause and desired them to place every confidence in the Hakim. He told them that he would slay with his own hands any European they might seize and bring to him. On hearing this the troops were convinced and Hakim Ahsanullah was fully exculpated<sup>34</sup>. Bahadur Shah held the British spies responsible for endeavouring to bring the Hakim into bad odour. On another occasion he challenged the Hakim's accusers to bring forth a single objectionable letter with a genuine seal of the latter and he promised to change his opinion about him and punish him with his own hands. That differences of some kind did exist between the Hakim and his benevolent Royal master has been shown elsewhere<sup>35</sup>. Here it may be recalled that when on the occasion of Bakar-'id the Emperor banned cow-slaughter and ordered that 'if any Musalman should do so he would be blown away from a gun and whoever on the part of a Musalman helped to kill a cow would also be killed'<sup>36</sup>. Hakim Ahsanullah Khan demurred to such an order and said he would consult the Maulvis. On hearing this the Emperor became very angry, closed the audience and retired to the private apartments<sup>37</sup>. Hakim Ahsanullah Khan had also clashed with his Royal master in respect of the conferment of military commands and *khila'ts* on the Princes and strongly opposed him in the matter of awarding Royal consent to the murder of

<sup>29</sup> M.P., Box 151, Nos. 9-11-15.

<sup>30</sup> J.P.H.S., January 1958, pp. 5, 7.

<sup>31</sup> Metcalfe—T.N.N., p. 191.

<sup>32</sup> *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. III.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> It should be noted that Hakim Ahsanullah Khan who had no knowledge of the cold war that his Royal master had been waging with the East India Company since 1837 never rose to the height of Bahadur Shah's political intelligence.

<sup>36</sup> Metcalfe—T.N.N., p. 170.

<sup>37</sup> Metcalfe—T.N.N., p. 170.



the English prisoners, so persistently demanded by the sepoys<sup>38</sup>. That in spite of all this the Emperor did not like to give up the Hakim is a question which calls for an answer. In my opinion the answer lies in the character of Bahadur Shah which has been discussed in this book<sup>39</sup> and also in the fact that Hakim Ahsanullah Khan was the scion of a sufi family and was himself a man of sufi persuasion. He had enjoyed an unsullied reputation for many years in the Dehli territory and had been appointed court physician by Akbar Shah who extolled him and reposed great confidence in him<sup>40</sup>. Bahadur Shah did the same. He liked Hakim Ahsanullah Khan not only for his professional skill but also for his scholarship and literary pursuits. He considered him indispensable not only as physician but also as editor of his manuscripts and the supervisor of the Royal press and publications. The *Precis of Palace Intelligence* says:

'In the evening (Tuesday, 7th January 1851) Hakim Ahsanullah Khan presented the works of His Majesty printed in several volumes for inspection. His Majesty directed that the Princes and others should be informed that they could purchase any of the works at 5 rupees per volume'<sup>41</sup>.

Cognizance must also be taken of the details available about the character of the sepoys, their unbalanced judgment and habitual suspicions. They suspected everyone of being in league with the English. Beginning with Mahbub Ali Khan<sup>42</sup> and Hakim Ahsanullah Khan<sup>43</sup> they charged everyone in the Royal court and Family—Nawab Hamid Ali Khan<sup>44</sup>, Maulvi Sadru'ddin<sup>45</sup>, the Princes<sup>46</sup> who were their commanders of their own choice and Queen Zinat Mahal Begum<sup>47</sup>. In the last instance General Bakht Khan<sup>48</sup> and even the Emperor were drawn in the whirlpool<sup>49</sup>; none was spared and all were suspects in their eyes. This was a case of over suspicion which only betrays a diseased mind and a guilty conscience, the more so because they did not know their own duties and were incapable of distinguishing a friend from a foe. While they strongly suspected their best friends and would have them killed,—they were, and remained uniformly, blind to the army of mischievous British spies that wrought havoc in their midst.

<sup>38</sup> J.P.H.S., January 1958 p. 6 ff

<sup>39</sup> Chapter I.

<sup>40</sup> Syed Ahmad—*Tazkira-i Ahl-i Dehli*, pp. 46-47.

<sup>41</sup> MS. Miscellaneous, N. A.

<sup>42</sup> Metcalfe—T.N.N., p. 59.

<sup>43</sup> Metcalfe—T.N.N., p. 59.

<sup>44</sup> (i) *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 109.

(ii) Metcalfe—T.N.N., p. 191.

<sup>45</sup> (i) *Pr. Tr. B. S.*, p. 109.

(ii) Metcalfe—T.N.N., p. 191.

<sup>46</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>47</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>48</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>49</sup> *Op. cit.*



Regarding Zinat Mahal Begum, on whom fell the brunt of the sepoys' suspicions, the treatment that the British Authorities extended to her after the fall of Dehli is highly suggestive. In their eyes she was as much a convict as Bahadur Shah himself. They treated her equally cruelly and plundered her house, seized her personal hoardings as well as the security paper which Hodson had given her. Such was her fate at the hands of the British because she had been kind to their enemies—the sepoys. She had arranged of her own accord for the supply of food to the sepoys in the battlefield and had shown her readiness more than once to pay the Royal servants and the Army out of her private purse. Saiyed Jameelu'ddin, editor of the *Sadiqul Akhbar*, admired her for her spirit of self-sacrifice saying: 'The queen is prepared to pay the sepoys' pay out of her private purse'<sup>50</sup>. If she had expressed a desire for a peaceful settlement with the British, it was at bottom the same as Bahadur Shah's to help the 'mutineers' by interceding for them with the British authorities. With the same object she subsequently proposed a settlement through Mirza Ilahi Bakhsh<sup>51</sup>.

It should also be noted that at the time of the uprising in Dehli she gave evidence of her humanity by endeavouring to protect a helpless European girl who had sought shelter with her. To this effect she made a statement before Captain Davies in the Rangoon prison<sup>52</sup>. She claimed for herself the credit of writing a letter to the Governor of the North-West Provinces. This tends to explain the charge brought against her of 'opening secret correspondence with the British'<sup>53</sup>. But she failed to impress Captain Davies who continued to treat her as a convict.

Among the new sources of information which have been drawn upon in this book and could not find a place in the Chapter on Sources<sup>54</sup>, the following deserve particular notice here:

- (i) *Zafar-uz Zafar or Fath Nama-i Angrezi*<sup>55</sup>.
- (ii) *Khiyaban-i Tasawwuf*<sup>56</sup>.
- (iii) *List of Documents drawn up at the National Archives of India in connection with the centenary celebrations on 21st August, 1957.*
- (iv) *Azamgarh Proclamation.*
- (v) *Letter of an English Officer written after the fall of Dehli.*

(i) *Zafar-uz Zafar* (literally victory over Bahadur Shah Zafar) is a manuscript No. 129 of the Bankipur Library giving in Persian verse the story of the War of 1857 in Dehli by Francis Godlieu Quins; or Franz Gottlieb Kuen<sup>57</sup>

<sup>50</sup> M.P. — Box 4-6, Vol. 4.

<sup>51</sup> *Vide infra.*

<sup>52</sup> *Vide infra.*

<sup>53</sup> *Cf. supra.*

<sup>54</sup> *Vide infra.*

<sup>55</sup> MS. 129, Oriental Library, Bankipur.

<sup>56</sup> Raza Library, Rampur.

<sup>57</sup> (i) I.H.R.C. (1942). xix.

(ii) *Bengal, Past and Present*, 1955, July-December, pp. 89-91.



(1777-1861)—a Persian-Urdu poet of German race commonly known as Frasoo which was his pen-name. Describing him as a good poet of Urdu, the author of the *European Shuara-i Urdu* says that Frasoo's father named Augustan was employed under Begum Samru<sup>58</sup>. The manuscript written clearly, in Persian *nast'aliq* script comprises 2,380 verses<sup>59</sup> which the poet composed in the course of one year (May 1857-May 1858<sup>60</sup>). He says that immediately on their arrival from Mirath Bahadur Shah called the mutineers to a personal interview and speaking his mind to them made them swear to fight the English<sup>61</sup>. Then Frasoo describes the distress of the Europeans (white people) and his own misfortunes at the hands of the black (*siyahan*<sup>62</sup>). For having given shelter in his native village of Harcharanpur to some Englishmen—namely Hewett, Forrest, Granhir, Batson, Carteret, Gough and Thomas—he was seized by the sepoys headed by Shah Mall<sup>63</sup>, Nirpat Singh and Laj Ram Jat. They bound him hand and foot and beat him severely and plundered his house<sup>64</sup>. He was ransomed by a *mahajan* of Banali village<sup>65</sup> and was finally saved by Dunlop, William and Trumble—the British officers who setting out from Mirath for Dehli happened to arrive in time in the vicinity of Harcharanpur<sup>66</sup>. It was the personal notes, news-letters and despatches of the said British refugees and rescuers, besides his own bitter experiences that formed the chief sources of Frasoo's book<sup>67</sup>. To these may be added the stories that were related to Frasoo by the inhabitants of Sonhara village under the leadership of Ismail, Ram Bhai and Jasudi, the confirmed rebels who had roused many villages against the British and had worked in unison with the Jats and Musalman inhabitants of Harcharanpur, Nanwa, Kazim, Nanuhan, Arkhlan, Bajrol, Johri, Bajwarah, Pothi, Dhan-aura, Bodhera, Pois, Gorana, Jaglagulab, Baroli Bali, Banali Baghon, Santokhpur, Halvari, Barauth, Osaikh, Ladir, Aslat and Aslat Kharmast<sup>68</sup>. In the end Frasoo says,

دریں ملک بیگانہ و دشمن اند  
 ایں ہند و مسلمان ہر یک تن اند  
 طرفدار ہند و مسلمان شود  
 یکے طرف دیگر دگر آں شود

Sardar Ali—*European Shuara-i Urdu*, p. 22.

These verses in the MS. 129, Bankipur Library have been numbered by me for the first time.

Frasoo—*Fath Nama*, F. 98 b.

*Vide infra*.

*Fath Nama*, F. 85b. Verses 2014-2026 ff.

*Fath Nama*, F. 85b. Verses 2014-2026 ff.

*Op. cit.*

Cf. Telegram of 21st July 1837 which says, 'Shah Mall Jat has been attacked and killed with 6,000 followers by the Mirath Force. (*Press-List of Mutiny Papers of 1857-1858 in the Punjab Secretariat*, p. 166.)

*Fath Nama*: verses 2154-2250.

*Idem.*, F. 75b.

*Idem.*, F. 85b.



The English are (considered as) strangers and enemies in this country. The Hindus and Musalmans, though apparently two communities, really form one nation, one siding with the other<sup>69</sup>.

(ii) *Khiyaban-i Tasawwuf* (a venue of sufism) is the title of Bahadur Shah's masterpiece on Shaikh Sa'di's *Gulistan*. It is a voluminous work of 759 pages of large size printed in 1259 Hijra,<sup>70</sup> i.e. 6th year of Bahadur Shah's reign under the supervision of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan. I have seen and used a copy of it at the Raza Library, Rampur.

The *Khiyaban-i Tasawwuf* opens with a sermon in Arabic after which the Royal author says, 'I was yet the Heir-Apparent during the reign of my illustrious father Akbar Shah when I wrote several books including notably the *Lughat-o-Istilah-i Dakhani* also called *Talifat-i Abu Zafari* in 3 volumes published in 1226 Hijra<sup>71</sup>. I had compiled it after a close study of many reliable works. . . . Many commentaries on Shaikh Sa'di's works have been written but his true meaning, mission and message as a sufi of the Suharwardi order have not been brought out at all'. In other words the *Khiyaban-i Tasawwuf* is the first research work in this line. In it every saying of Shaikh Sa'di's has been carefully examined and explained, and a suitable commentary is given with many quotations from the Holy Quran, Hadis and the maxims of Hazrat Ali as well as from the history of Islam and Islamic world. In the end the author gives a chronogram, saying:

نوشت ولیعهد شہ اکبر ثانی  
چوں شرح گلستان ہے تبیان تصوف  
چوں کرد قلم لفظ بخرد در بر آمد  
تاریخ مع نام خیابان تصوف

(When the Heir-Apparent of Emperor Akbar II had written the commentary of the *Gulistan* containing a profound study of sufism, his pen scribbled the word 'bakhir'ad' which together with the name *Khiyaban-i Tasawwuf* turned out a chronogram).

(iii) Out of the 40 documents which the given List of Documents contains the 7th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 17th, 148th B, 19th, 20th, 31st A, 32nd, and 34th bring into relief some of the points which have been discussed in this book.

The 7th is a call to *jihad* made by Maulvi Liyaqat Ali of Allahabad. 'A weaver by birth and schoolmaster by profession, Liyaqat Ali assumed leadership of the inhabitants of Allahabad and strove to establish the new order of which Emperor Bahadur Shah was the champion'.

(Foreign, 31st December, 1858, No. 175)

The 11th is a proclamation from the Peshwa's archives issued by the Maratha Brahmins, calling on all the Brahmins of the Deccan between the age

<sup>69</sup> *Idem*, verses 2226-2227.

<sup>70</sup> 1843 A.D.

<sup>71</sup> 1811 A.D.



16 and 32 as well as all those who could use the sword to serve as soldiers in the Peshwa's army.

(Foreign Supplement, 30th December 1859, No. 651)

The 12th is an 'inflammatory Persian placard posted on a mosque at Hyderabad, calling on the government and people of Hyderabad to declare war on the English.

(Secret, December 18, 1857, No. 252-53)

The 16th reproduces an order issued by Mirza Mughul, the commander-in-chief, to all the officers enjoining that whoever took anything from any citizen without payment was liable to capital punishment.

(Mutiny Papers, 50-309, July 13, 1857)

The 17th gives one instance out of many showing that cow-slaughter was completely prohibited on the occasion of Bakar 'id (2nd August 1857). The proclamation to this effect issued by Mirza Mughul the Commander-in-chief was confirmed by Emperor Bahadur Shah. The Emperor's autograph in ink is clearly visible.

(Mutiny Papers, 50-309, July 13, 1857)

The 18th reproduces the Royal order sent to the-commander-in-chief asking him to arrest all those who plundered Dehli.

(Mutiny Papers, 43, 24, June 27, 1857)

The 18th B gives one out of the many instances, of the steps taken by Emperor Bahadur Shah to maintain order and to suppress law-breaking. In this case Mirza Mughul the commander-in-chief is particularly ordered to warn the people of Dehli against counterfeiting coins.

(Mutiny Papers, 57, No. 542)-

The 19th and 20th are a confirmation of the role that the Dehli Newspapers of 1857 played in making the War popular. The reader will find occasional references to this effect in the course of this book.

(Mutiny Papers, Collection, No. 2 and Box No. 1)

The 31st A announces the decision of the inhabitants of the historic Doaba, particularly the tract between Etawa and Fatehpur, to fight the English.

(Pol. December 30, 1859, Suppt. 626)

The 32nd is a double document illustrating Rani Lakshmi Bai's protests against the annexation of Jhansi. It also gives her letter to Dalhousie dated December 21, 1854 and her memorial to the Court of Directors, saying that her people did not want a change of rulers.

(Foreign, March 2, 1855, No. 75 KWA)

The last document No. 34 reproduces the Rani's letter in Marathi addressed to the Peshwa dated 14th February 1858 soliciting the Peshwa's help against the English.

(Foreign, December 30, 1858, Supplement  
Nos. 617-54, K.W.A.)



(iv) AZAMGARH PROCLAMATION<sup>72</sup>

It being clear as the noonday sun that Hindoos and Masulmans have been ruined by the faithless Infidels, it becomes necessary for every ambitious and aspiring man and for those devoted to this cause (especially for Kings and Chiefs who have been created by God expressly for the purpose of taking care of the people and of their rights) to sacrifice their lives and fortunes for improving the condition of the people. Several of the Princes of Dehli have with this view, travelled for the last several years in all quarters of Hindoostan, Persia and Afghanistan and one of them has succeeded in bringing the Persian and Afghanistan forces to this quarter of the globe.

It must be known that I, Aboo Moozuffer Sirajooddeen Buhadoor Shah Ghazee, Emperor of Hindoostan have determined to kill and extirpate the Christians<sup>73</sup> and to preserve and protect the public and after travelling a good deal have arrived here and planted the standard of Mahomed, for rallying around it not only Musulmans but Hindoos who, from the time of my forefathers were faithful and obedient subjects and who have joined me in killing the Christians<sup>74</sup> and to raise alike their standard of Muhabeer<sup>75</sup>. I am glad to proclaim that several Mohammedans and Hindoos have since joined us and assisted in exterminating the Christians, and that a force from the west<sup>76</sup> is very shortly expected to join and reinforce our cause. I therefore publish the following articles for general information and guidance and make known that any one who has not the means of defraying the expenses, may receive succour from the Imperial Treasury on making his wants known.

It should be further remembered that the books of Hindoo and Mahomedan Religion prophesy that after this year the British reign will end in Hindoostan and in several other places: every man should therefore remove from his mind the fear of its continuance, and should join our cause thus obtaining some benefit to himself, otherwise he will repent, and that in a short time. (*Couplet*: Do not waste time when you can make your fortune by immediately joining us, for the time is precious and once lost can never be restored).

Keep in mind that the outrages committed by our force are inseparable from Civil Warfare, and be assured that they will not continue long, though the well-wishers of the British may speak to the contrary about the continuance of such outrages for ever. Every man should present himself to us and state his

<sup>72</sup> The heading under which this Proclamation appears in the Records is this: *Translation of a Proclamation issued by the Rebels*. Political Consultations, 8<sup>th</sup> October, 1858.

Azamgarh is a town near the Gogra with Ballia to the east, Jaunpur and Ghazipur to the south, and Faizabad and Gorakhpur in the north.

<sup>73</sup> The term 'Christian' in the given translation is wrong and seriously misleading. It has been shown above (pp. 58-103) that Emperor Bahadur Shah II was no bigot and did not dislike the Christians. The term Christian should be replaced by 'British'.

<sup>74</sup> *I.e.* Mahavira.

<sup>75</sup> *I.e.*, Arabia and Iran.

<sup>76</sup>



grievances when immediate redress will be given and all his losses made good from the Imperial Treasury after the establishment of our reign.

1st. *Zamindars!* It is very well known that the British assess lands very highly and this has been the cause of your ruin. Besides, when sued by a mean labourer or a male or female servant, you are summoned without investigation to attend to their court and are thus dishonoured and degraded, and when you have to prosecute a case in their court you are put to the expense of doing so on stamp paper and have to pay court fees which are ruinous. Besides this you have to pay a percentage for roads and schools—all these grievances will be removed in our reign and the powers of all Zamindars thereby increased, and their complaints decided agreeably to the Shari'a and Shastra. It is therefore incumbent on you to make common cause with us; and those of you who will supply men and money to help us to kill these Christians and to meet the expenses of our Troops, will receive a perpetual remission of half the revenue of their *Ilaqas*, and those who supply only men or money will receive a remission of one quarter of the revenue for good, such as have, during the British rule lost their lands and will now join in this common cause will be replaced in possession of their lands and remission of a quarter of the Revenue will also be granted.

2nd. *Merchants!* You are also well aware that the faithless British have appropriated to themselves the monopoly of all lucrative trade such as indigo, opium, cloth . . . and left the less remunerative merchandise to you, and when you have to resort to their courts you have to pay large sums for stamp papers and court fees; moreover they realize money from the public in the shape of postage and school funds and you, like the Zamindars, are degraded by being summoned to their courts and imprisoned or fined on the assertion of men and low people. But during the King's Reign all these inconveniences will be put a stop to, and every description of trade, whether by sea or land, left to native merchants (Hindoos and Musalmans) and men will be posted at each stage on the road for your protection at the King's expense. Besides every assistance shall be given to the poorer members of your class. It is therefore necessary for you to assist us with men and money.

3rd. *Men of Service!* You likewise well know that in the Civil and Military Department, all the less lucrative and dignified situations are given to natives and the well paid and honourable ones to Europeans, for instance in the Military Line the highest post that a native attains is that of a Subadar on a salary of 60 or 70 Rupees a month and in Civil that of a Sadr Ameen on a salary of 500 Rupees—and jageers, rewards, maafees etc. are not known to be in existence while during our reign, the offices of Colonels, Generals, etc. which are now given to the Europeans only, and the ranks of Pansadee, Shash Hazaree, Punj Hazaree, Haft Hazaree, Sepah Salar in the military and those of Collector, Magistrate, Judge, Sadr Dewanee, Secretary, Governor-General, etc. in the Civil Departments and the situations of Wizarat, Qazi, Sifarati, Sooba, Nizamat Dewanee and yielding lacs of rupees will be granted to the natives of this country. Besides Jageers rewards maafees, etc. will be bestowed on them;



moreover it should be well understood that by remaining with the Christians you will be called Infidels in this world, and will forfeit your prospects in the next, and if any of you die while fighting against the British, you will gain a name in this world and obtain endless happiness in the next, therefore every one now in the service of the Firangees should leave them and join us and their salaries will at present be doubled or tripled and they will hereafter be promoted to higher grades. If any one cannot openly leave British employ they should secretly assist us as much as lies in their power. If any Telingas or Sawars, who have killed Christians and gone to their homes will come and join us, they will be paid, sepoy at 3 as. a day and Sowars at 8 and 12 as. besides the double *batha* and the monthly pay given by the Firangees. If any others will accept employment under us, they will get for the present as follows: —

Matchlockmen	...	...	2 as. a day
Each man with sword and shield	...	...	1½ as. a day
Sowar with a full size horse	...	...	8 as. a day
Sowar with poney	...	...	6 as. a day

But after the settlement of our rule they will get as follows: —

Each Sepoy	...	8 and 10 Rs. per month
Each Sowar	...	25 and 30 Rs. per month

4th. *Artizans!* You are also well aware that the Europeans import every sort of article from Europe leaving but a small trade in your hands, while in our reign every article will be manufactured by you which will tend to your benefit and profit. Besides the Emperor and his Chiefs will require precious articles which you will supply and which will greatly enhance your profits. You should therefore leave the British and join us and secure the good will of both God and man.

5th. *Scholars of both creeds of Hindoos and Musalmans! (Maulvies and Pundits!)* You are aware that the British are opposed to your religion and as the present is a Religious War you should join us and gain the good will of your Creator, otherwise you will be considered 'Sinners'. If you will join us you will receive *maafees* and lands from the Emperor.

It should be borne in mind that if any one of the above-mentioned classes of the people, after reading or hearing this Proclamation still adhere to the British, his property etc. will be confiscated and he and his family put to the sword.

Dated Uurutha (*sic*) Ilaqa Azamgarh (*Azimgurah*), the 16th Muharram<sup>77</sup> 1275, corresponding with 3rd Bhadoon 1265 Fuslee.

True Translation.

Sd. J. D. Forsythe,

Secretary to the Chief Comm. Oude.

<sup>77</sup> 25th August, 1858 A.D.



### *The legend of Bahadur Shah*

The above proclamation proves that the legend of Emperor Bahadur Shah II lived after his exit. Much before August 1858 Muharram 1275—the date of the Proclamation—he had been tried and found guilty by the British. While they were making plans to exile him from India, an attempt was made by Prince Firoz Shah—a direct descendant of Bahadur Shah I—who was still at war with the British to rally the Indians in the name of the Emperor. Therefore he issued the so-called Azamgarh Proclamation which was in fact a replica of Emperor Bahadur Shah II's Proclamation of 25th August 1857, already described in this book. To this effect I have invited the reader's attention in footnote 3 (ii) quoted above.

The story of Prince Firoz Shah lies outside the scope of this book. But he had an ideology similar to that of Bahadur Shah II. Both were intensely anti-British and endeavoured to enlist the support of the foreign princes in their war against the East India Company. By his trip to the Middle East on the eve of the outbreak of 1857 and afterwards on being defeated by the British on Indian soil by his retiring to Mecca where he died (1877/1204), Prince Firoz Shah proved that the War of 1857 in Dehli amounted to an armed Revolution and that it was not a mere local revolt of a few discontented sepoys in British employ.

#### **(v) Letter<sup>78</sup> of an English Officer written after the fall of Dehli**

'Upon examining the apartments occupied by the King and his chief officers in the Palace many papers were found that threw a light upon the intended proceedings of the rebel monarch; and from them it appeared that the kind of government to be permanently established for the city and immediately surrounding country was more of the nature of a military than of a Mohammedan government. It seems to have been a sort of constitutional monarchical nilocracy. The King was king and honoured as such like a constitutional monarch; but instead of a parliament, he had a council of soldiers in whom power rested and of whom he was in no degree a military commander. No Arabic or Persian names, forms or terms appear to have been introduced; but on the contrary the English terms and modes of business were generally adopted. All petitions seem to have been presented to the King; but the great authority to which almost all of them on all matters both civil and military were referred (by order endorsed on petition) was the Court—a body composed of a number of colonels, a brigade-major and a *seketur* (secretary) which latter functionary seems to have been the most important personage in Dehli. All the colonels etc. were sepoys who made their mark or at best signed in rough Hindoo characters. Very regular muster-rolls of regiments were kept up and authenticated in due form by the colonel adjutant and quartermaster. From these documents it also appears that they went so far into detail as to fill up the places of the European sergeant majors and quartermaster sergeants.

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Charles Ball—H.I.M., Vol. I, p. 521.



'One sepoy colonel had presented to the King a kind of memorandum on the best mode of administering the country after getting rid of the Firangees. First and foremost he advises His Majesty to collect as much money as he can from any quarter by any means whatever, as a capital to start upon. Second he proposes that the future administration should be based on British model; and then in many headings he goes into details evincing considerable thought and shrewdness. There was also among the papers a very long and enthusiastic account of the destruction of the European garrison of Fatehgarh. A petition was found from a man who sought to be appointed collector of the district in the rear of our army on a solemn pledge that he would collect the revenue and stop the supplies of the Europeans or if riot, would submit to be blown from a gun; but the prudent order is to be considered when the hill (British position) is taken! There were also many communications from native Princes who either promised or temporised much'.

Before closing this preface I solemnly declare that in writing this book I have been moved by no passion other than a burning desire to ascertain the truth. I have conducted the researches embodied in this book in the light of the following verse of the *Rajtarangini*:

(A writer of real parts is he whose narration of past events is free from anger and malice, and is firm like the word of the supreme arbiter —  
Saraswati.)

Now I let this unpretentious work of mine prepared under the most difficult circumstances swim or sink on its own merits. The reader is requested to note that the references to the Boxes in the footnotes of this book pertain to the actual contents of the Bastas. I have checked the alleged number of papers in many of them.

When the book was completed and already in the press I lighted upon some old publications in Bengali containing contemporary or quasi-contemporary and modern Bengali thought on the subject matter of this work. Different kinds of evidence also came into my hands. I decided to incorporate all this under six headings as follows.

#### **I. Bengali Thought as Expounded In**

- (i) Durga Das Bandopadhyaya's *Vidrohe Bangali*<sup>79</sup>
- (ii) Rajani Kanta Gupta's *History of the Sepoy War*<sup>80</sup>
- (iii) Panch Kori Bandopadhyaya's *History of the Sepoy War*<sup>81</sup>
- (iv) Nagendra Nath Basu's *Encyclopaedia*<sup>82</sup>
- (v) Ram Pran Gupta's *Mughul Dynasty*<sup>83</sup>
- (vi) Ananda Bazar Patrika's *India's First War of Independence*<sup>84</sup>

<sup>79</sup> Calcutta, 1924 A.D./1331 B.S.

<sup>80</sup> Calcutta, 1897 A.D.

<sup>81</sup> Calcutta, 1909 A.D.

<sup>82</sup> Calcutta 1904 A.D.

<sup>83</sup> Calcutta Ditto.



(vii) Parichaya's *Bengali Folklore of 1857*<sup>85</sup>

(i) Born in 1835 A.D. at Karnal in an orthodox Brahman family of West Bengal Durga Das inherited from his father Shiva Chandra—a cavalryman in the British army—his fervent devotion to the English. In 1851 when Shiva Chandra died Durga Das was employed in the British military service at Sultanpur. In 1856 he was posted at Bareilly where on the outbreak of the Mutiny (31<sup>st</sup> May 1857) his house was plundered by the sepoys who knew him as a friend of the English. He fled for his life seeking shelter in a local temple. Meanwhile a national government<sup>86</sup> was formed with Bahadur Shah as Emperor, Khan Bahadur Khan as Nawab Nazim, Shobha Ram—a staunch Hindu—as Divan and Bakht Khan as commander-in-chief, and Durga Das too was invited to join it. He was offered the post of Chief Accountant in the commissariat with a salary of Rs. 1000 per mensem.<sup>87</sup> But he was planning secretly to flee from Bareilly and join the British at Naini Tal<sup>88</sup>. He declined to accept the post and fled. In spite of his planned flight he was arrested on the way and his life was endangered more than once. He was, however, saved on all occasions by his Muslim friends—namely Muhammad Safi, a Sepoy officer, Hafiz Ni'mat Khan, a cousin of Khan Bahadur Khan, and Chunney Miyan, son of Hafiz Ni'mat Khan and son-in-law of Khan Bahadur Khan. Chunney Miyan, also saved the life of Kashi Prasad, younger brother of Durga Das, besides six other Bengalis<sup>89</sup>, all of whom were to be killed under the orders of Khan Bahadur Khan. Then Chunney Miyan enabled Durga Das to resume his journey to Naini Tal which he reached towards the close of 1857 with a

Calcutta May 10th, 1949 A.D.

August 1957

Some these works, which are out of print or rare, were secured for me by Maulvi Muinuddin Husayn. I thank him for his kindness.

This government must be called 'national' considering among other facts the following letter, dated 17th March 1858 of Saunders, the Commissioner, Dehli, to the Secretary to the Commissioner, Punjab, saying: 'I have the honour to forward a copy of the vernacular Proclamation issued by Khan Bahadur Khan, Nawab of Bareilly calling upon the Hindus to unite and make a common cause with the Musalmans against the British (*Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, I, p. 441). It should also be noted that Disraeli in the British Parliament had depicted the Rising of 1857 in India as 'a national revolt'. (*Idem*, p. 486). And according to an eyewitness 'Bahadur Shah was acclaimed Emperor by not less than 10,000 people of Bareilly.' p. 143).

Durga Das —

Durga Das justified his attitude of firm loyalty to the English, saying, 'I have eaten the salt of the English' (*Idem*, p. 148). Similar was the case with Munshi Jiwan Lal.

*Idem*, pp. 340, 361.



treasure of Rs. 25,000—a present<sup>90</sup> for the British, entrusted by Shiv Raj Singh, the Raja of Kumaon. From the British camp he marched at the head of a squadron organized by himself to fight the sepoys. He killed many of them and seized Haldwani<sup>91</sup> as well as Kaladhungi<sup>92</sup> (February 1858)<sup>93</sup>.

Durga Das considered the British rule in India as 'Ram Raj'<sup>94</sup> and looked upon the Rising of 1857 as an attempt on the part of 'the degenerate Musalmans to destroy Hindu society.'<sup>95</sup> He disliked Khan Bahadur Khan for his anti-Bengali measures<sup>96</sup> and the following order of his: 'Whosoever in Bareilly knows English must be arrested.'<sup>97</sup> He also disliked Bakht Khan who had issued a similar order at Dehli. 'Bakht Khan', he remarked, 'is a rustic highly conceited and extremely selfish. In my opinion he is not a good man. To meet his own needs he would flatter one enormously, otherwise his heart is as hard as stone'<sup>98</sup>. And Maulvi Fazl Haq<sup>99</sup> was equally disliked; since the latter, had ordered Durga Das, who was arrested in the course of his flight to Naini Tal and suspected as an agent of the British, 'to be blown up' at the mouth of a gun'<sup>100</sup>. But Durga Das doted on the British spies who brought him news pleasing to his heart. Says he:

'At the time of war spy service is highly essential and indispensable; it serves as a great divine weapon. I am of opinion that without spies the British could not stand in any war even for a day, particularly so in the Sepoy War. In this war the spies were the entire life; they were the essence of life; they constituted the thread of life. To a talented spy greater respect was shown than even to a worshipful deity, not only respect but also immeasurable love and equally immeasurable

<sup>90</sup> *Idem.* pp. 372, 375, 378.

<sup>91</sup> I.e., a place roughly 3 miles west of the Gola river in Naini Tal district.

<sup>92</sup> Kaladhungi stands about 12 miles north-west of Haldwani.

<sup>93</sup> This was the final acquisition of Haldwani and Kaladhungi for the British who appear to have occupied Haldwani in part in October 1857. Afterwards sporadic fighting continued until the given date. (*Idem.* p. 502; cf. *District -Gazetteer of Naini Tal*, p. 230).

<sup>94</sup> Durga Das — p. 217.

<sup>95</sup> *Idem.* cf. pp. 215-216.

<sup>96</sup> Khan Bahadur Khan is reported to have said, 'The Bengalis are the gurus of the English and should not be trusted' (*Idem.* p. 224). Fearing lest the Bengalis of Bareilly should go over to Naini Tal to join the British he prevented them from leaving the city unless they wanted to take their families to Bengal. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>97</sup> This order applied to all, i.e., to the Hindus as well as to the Musalmans and was not intended for the Bengalis only. But Durga Das's statement before Bakht Khan that he could maintain the accounts in English only for he knew no language other than English (p. 117)—although he knew five languages, i.e. Bengali, English, Persian, Urdu, and Hindi —made Bakht Khan as well as Khan Bahadur Khan suspicious.

<sup>98</sup> *Idem.* pp. 91, 92, 114.

<sup>99</sup> After the fall of Dehli, Maulvi Fazl Haq had escaped to Lakhaon whence he appears to have proceeded to Naini Tal district. According to the information given by Durga Das, Maulvi Fazl Haq was the commander-in-chief of the Sepoy Army at Haldwani and was a very important officer.

<sup>100</sup> *Idem.*, p. 272.



devotion, indulgence, affection and motherly care. At the sight of a spy (my) heart was filled with joy. I longed to take him into my arms and bestow on him my warm embraces. And I used to drink in his nectar-like words coming, out of his moon-like bright mouth to my heart's content'<sup>101</sup>.

The reader may well speculate what kind of news was so highly welcome to Durga Das! From the interest that according to his own account the British officers at Naini Tal evinced in the nature of Hindu-Muslim relations it would appear that the news really sought for in the British camp was about the 'expected or planned' outbreak of communal riots in the Badshahi army. And enquiries to that effect were made in the presence of Durga Das. We are told that a certain spy gave in reply a glowing account of the fight and bloodshed between the Hindus and Musalmans of Bareilly<sup>102</sup>.

It would not be out of place if reference were here made to the letters issued by the British officers during the war of 1857 in order to inflame communal feelings among the Hindus and Musalmans. According to one such letter they authorized 'the sum of Rs. 50,000 to be expended in an attempt to raise the Hindu population of Bareilly against the Musalman rebels'<sup>103</sup>.

(ii) Basing his account on those British writers who took the spies' reports verbatim, Rajanikanta Gupta says:

'Impatient through fear and desperation he (Bahadur Shah) used sometimes in his durbar and in the presence of nobles to uproot his white beard and moustache. Then pulling off his turban from his head he used to tear it into pieces . . . . A prince named Mirza Mughul having supported the English cause was compeled to appear before the Sepoys' court'.<sup>104</sup>

Finally as necessary link in the supposed chain of the pro-British intrigues of Bahadur Shah the author reproduces the well-known but mischievous story that 'the aged king offered to admit the British troops into the Fort through a secret gate'<sup>105</sup>.

At the end of his book the author reproduces two addresses that the rajas and zamindars of Bengal presented to Lord Canning after the war of 1857, saying:

'My Lord—we, the undersigned Rajas, Zamindars, Talookdars, Merchants and other Natives of Bengal, take the earliest opportunity on the retaking of Delhi, to offer your lordship in Council our warmest

<sup>01</sup> Translated by the writer.

<sup>02</sup> *Idem.*, pp. 459-460.

<sup>03</sup> *Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, I, p. 472.

<sup>04</sup> Translated by the writer from Rajanikanta Gupta's book, p. 110.

<sup>05</sup> Such is the essence of the 'unpublished documents' given in the *Bengal Past and Present* of 1957. And the above quotation shows that the contents of these unpublished documents had permeated Bengal before 1897.



congratulations on the signal success which has attended the British arms, under circumstances unparalleled in the annals of British India.....

'Happily remote from the scene of the outrages which have darkened the aspect of the land ... we have derived sincere consolation from the reflection that in Bengal proper there has been no disturbance, not even a symptom of disaffection; but that on the contrary the people have maintained that loyalty and devotion to the British Government which led their ancestors to hail, and as far, as they could, to facilitate, the rising ascendancy of that power. ....

.... So entirely have they identified their interests with those of their Rulers, that the natives of Bengal, men, women and children, have in every part of the scene of the mutinies, been exposed to the same rancour, and treated with the same cruelty, which the mutineers and their misguided countrymen have displayed towards the British within their reach . . . .<sup>106</sup>

(iii) Panch Kori Bandopadhyaya says:

'The Hindu-Muslim culture, which at the advent of the British had disappeared never to come back, still had left a hope of its recovery; and in the hope to recover it and restore that well-organized society in its proper place was made the beginning of the Sepoy War.

'To liberate themselves and the country from the high-handedness and insults of Lord Dalhousie's the sepoys throughout India recklessly and without thinking of the consequences jumped into the ocean of war ...

'When the sepoys resolved to uproot the British power they lost much of their time in determining who would rule the empire and finally settled that the old feeble Bahadur Shah be again their ruler. This was settled among the Hindus and Musalmans since Bahadur Shah had been well-known and profoundly familiar to them for a long time. To save themselves and the country from the government of the British strangers, such a determination was made; and having been once made nobody receded . . .

'Bahadur Shah was a man of patience, endurance and peace ... He was bold like his father and did not like to lower himself and damage his pride and self-respect by accepting the condition demanded by Auckland in the way of increasing the Royal allowance'<sup>107</sup>.

(iv) Nagendra Nath Basu says:

'Many still hold that he (Bahadur Shah) was the organizer of the Sepoy revolt of 1857.'<sup>108</sup>

(v) Ram Pran Gupta says:

<sup>106</sup> Translated by the writer from Rajamkarita Gupta's book, pp. 303-304.

<sup>107</sup> Translated by the writer from Panch Kori Bandopadhyaya's book, pp. 112-115.

<sup>108</sup> Translated. (Fifteenth Part), p. 447.



'In 1857 while Bahadur Shah, grandson of Shah Alam was living in Dehli enjoying the allowance given by the British the sepoys armed themselves to fight the British. Bahadur Shah joined the sepoys. For this crime of his the British, after extinguishing the sepoy revolt, banished him to Rangoon. There he remained in exile until a few years ago death came to his rescue and he left this world to enjoy everlasting peace. In this manner disappeared from India the name of Timur's dynasty.

O rulers of the world (India)! Where have you gone, you who possessed armies with might and main? India is missing you with a heavy heart till today and the whole world stands as a witness to the loss that she has suffered'<sup>109</sup>.

(vi) Ananda Bazar Patrika says:

'Having depicted India's First War of Independence as 'Sepoy Mutiny' the British rulers and historians have made a futile effort at undermining its historical importance and making light of it ... While in England the Industrial Revolution was in progress the British brought in the machinery and mill devils; and, in order to satisfy the overwhelming appetite of these devils, necessity arose to steal from India her economic prosperity. They began to destroy the cottage industry of India and turned her into a supplier of raw material. And the goods manufactured in the British factories were dumped in the Indian markets ...

'Further, as a result of the British colonial policy and commercial exploitation the Indian masses were ruined ... Even at this stage the British ambition did not stop. In the attempt to convert all the Indians into Christianity they undertook as a sacred duty to secure paradise for the peoples of India, rich with their mighty traditions of history. In the daily life of the Indians the English oppression, began to tell ... Not content with extracting money directly or indirectly from the people the British began to punish them with or without cause even to the extent of torturing them to death; and this became a regular practice. As a reaction from this political, economic and social revolution, the Indian mind in the preliminary stage was embittered against British rule. The sepoys only added fuel to the fire of the century-old malice and rage of the people.

'On Account of the oppression exercised on the Mughul Emperor Bahadur Shah, the Mussalmans of Dehli became ready to raise the standard of rebellion. The leaders of the War of Indian Independence selected Bahadur Shah as their commander who made an appeal to the Indians—Hindus and Musalmans—to cut off the chain of slavery through their combined efforts, sacrifice and bloodshed. Through a proclamation he promised to remove the grievances of the people by making a sacrifice of self. The people in a majority responded to his call.

<sup>109</sup> Translated by the writer from Ram Pran Gupta's book, p. 361.



He gave further evidence of his patriotism to the Hindus by writing personal letters<sup>110</sup> to the rajas of Jodhpur, Bikaner, Alwar and others, as shown below:

‘To drive away the Firangis from India by any means and at any cost is my only desire. I want to see the whole of India free and independent. Certainly it is not my desire to rule the country for myself by driving away the enemy. If you, rajas, draw your swords to drive away the enemy and then form a confederacy and government I would gladly entrust the sovereignty to you and will thus be freed from responsibility’<sup>111</sup>.

(vii) Under the heading of ‘Bengali Folk-lore of 1857’ a scholar<sup>112</sup> in the *Parichaya*: says:<sup>113</sup>

Tr. ‘While he was pining as an exile in Rangoon the British officers mocked at Bahadur Shah, saying:

‘The batteries have no strength left, O Zafar ! the firing of Indian guns as also the plying of India’s sword is over. Now you should make entreaties for your life’s safety.’<sup>114</sup>

To this mockery Bahadur Shah replied saying:

‘As long as there remains even a spark of Faith in the valiant soldiers, so long they will continue to fight and the sword of India will ply until they seize the throne of London.’<sup>115</sup>

The fact that the contents of the above-mentioned Urdu verses formed part of the Bengali folklore is a pointer to the kind of feeling and belief then current in certain parts of Bengal.

## II. A Verse of Bahadur Shah Zafar

<sup>116</sup>

عالم صورت میں تو میں صورت آدم میں ہوں  
عالم معنی میں لیکن اور ہی عالم میں ہوں

‘In the world of forms I am in human form.

But in the world of spirits I am in a different state.’

This verse of Bahadur Shah Zafar’s was exploited after the fall of Dehli. It supplied the necessary material for the grotesque figure depicted in the *Asbab-i Ghadr*.<sup>117</sup>

<sup>110</sup> For confirmation of these letters, see above.

(Translated by the writer from —Ananda Bazar Patrika)

<sup>111</sup> For confirmation of these letters, see above.

(Translated by the writer from —Ananda Bazar Patrika)

<sup>112</sup> See above.

<sup>113</sup> — A Bengali journal — (August 1957), p. 72.

<sup>114</sup> Cf. *infra*.

<sup>115</sup> Cf. above.

<sup>116</sup> Bahadur Shah Zafar—*Diwan-i Awwal*.

<sup>117</sup> *Ide*, above.



### III. Prince Firoz Shah—a true warrior in the cause of India's liberation—speaks:

'.... and I who am the grandson of Abu Zafar Siraju'ddin Bahadur Shah Ghazi, Emperor of India, having in the course of four come here to extirpate the infidels residing in the eastern part of the country and to liberate and protect the poor helpless people now groaning under iron rule, have by the aid of the *mujahideen* erected the standard of Muhammad and persuaded the orthodox Hindus who had been subject to my ancestors and have been and are still accessories in the destruction of the English, to raise the standard of Mahavir....

The above proclamation of Prince Firoz Shah which is the famous Azamgarh proclamation has now been published under the heading of 'Proclamation of Bahadur Shah'<sup>118</sup>. It shows that Prince Firoz Shah was neither a nephew<sup>119</sup> nor a son<sup>120</sup> of Bahadur Shah II; he was his grandson.

The following is another proclamation of Prince Firoz Shah which throws light on his role in the War even after the exit of his royal grandfather, Bahadur Shah II .... It also shows that he was waging the war of India's liberation and independence. He speaks:

'O Hindoostanee Brethren ! . . . . Before the commencement of these calamities of the English I went on a pilgrimage to Mecca; on my return when I arrived at . . . and saw the condition of the English, I thanked God. As I am by nature a seeker after . . . . religious excellence, just and equitable and the obstructor of tyranny, therefore enticing the people to rebellion as I came along I travelled from Bombay to Gwalior, intending first to arrange and consolidate affairs and then to fight . . . . 130,000 men, old and new soldiers, have been induced to swear to join me and I will soon, collecting all these, purify the land from all Nazarenes'<sup>121</sup> . . . .

'The reason of the delay there has been in burying the English is that the commands of God have been disregarded inasmuch as the soldiers have wickedly put women and children to death, and have without the orders of their leaders, given themselves to loot in such a way that they generally convert victory into defeat and the common

<sup>118</sup> *Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, I, pp. 453-458.

<sup>119</sup> It has been contended that Prince Firoz Shah—son of Nizam Bakht, a direct descendant of Bahadur Shah I—was a nephew of Bahadur Shah II (*Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, II, Editor's Appendix, p. 655.)

<sup>120</sup> It has also been contended, that Prince Firoz Shah was a son of Bahadur Shah II's. He was 'one of the chief rebels in the outbreak of 1857 and the British Government offered a reward of 10,000 rupees for his apprehension. It was reported that he made his appearance in the Serony jungles. Some Arabs who have recently arrived at Haiderabad, state that he is now (1866) in Arabia and supports himself by begging among the rich merchants'. (Beale, T. W.—*Oriental Biographical Dictionary* (1881), p. 83.)

<sup>121</sup> *I.e.* the English.



people have been much oppressed. When you have rectified these faults, you will succeed as I have promised you . . . .

‘ . . . Therefore again I urge you and urge you one and all to join me, prompted only by the desire of doing God’s work.

‘ . . . On the day and date I will march from the city, let all who wish, come then.

‘ . . . My advice is this: abandon every other work; give your life to your beloved or death will take it. Decide which of these alternatives is preferable’.<sup>122</sup>

#### IV. More Contemporary Evidence

(i) His Majesty watched lion and elephants’ and hounds’ fight and rewarded handsomely Mir Fath Ali Khan who showed great bravery in killing the lion. His Majesty granted him the title of Nasru’ddaula Saiyed Fath Ali Hoshiyar Khan Bahadur Ghazanfar Jang.

(M.P. Vol. 12, No. 18).

(ii) His Majesty<sup>123</sup> insisted on Europeans taking off their shoes when they entered his presence.

(*Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, p. 61).

(iii) His Majesty<sup>124</sup> granted the title of Dilawaru’l Mulk Raja Gulab Singh Bahadur Fath Jang to Gulab Singh, ruler of Jammu and Kashmir.

(*Idem.*, pp. 87-88).

(iv) *Sepoys addressing Bahadur Shah on their arrival from Mirath:*

‘You are the king of both the worlds— terrestrial and spiritual . . . The English have been ruling on your behalf . . . A dispute between the Government and the Indian soldiers ensued . . . This dispute now has been continuing for the last four months . . . We have circulated letters in our regiments of the Infantry and Cavalry to the effect that the entire army should totally refuse to honour the order and leave service, and in case any stringent measures are taken a *revolt should break out on one and the same date all over India.*

(*Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, I, p. 405).

(v) ‘ . . . a document has been discovered at Dehli containing the names of all those to whom the King of Dehli has for many years past been in the habit of making presents of money. It is affirmed that the document contains the names of men in almost every regiment throughout the late Bengal Army and of many native functionaries in high civil employ.’

(*Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, I, pp. 400-1 and *Friend of India*, January 7, 1857, p. 8).

<sup>122</sup> (i) *Abstract N.W.P. Narrative Foreign*, 1858.

(ii) *Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, I, pp. 462-463.

<sup>123</sup> The text has ‘King of Delhi’.

<sup>124</sup> The text has ‘King of Delhi’.



(vi) *Proclamation of Nana Sahib*<sup>125</sup>

'Tyranny, wickedness and injustice having been practised by the Kafir (*Kuffar*) English on the faithful and sin-fearing, I have been commissioned by God to punish the Kafirs by annihilating them to re-establish the Hindu and Musalman kingdoms as formerly and to protect our country. ...

... This proclamation is published by order of Ulee Shan<sup>126</sup> Bundeegan<sup>127</sup> Ulee Hoozoor<sup>128</sup>, the Emperor of Dehli<sup>129</sup>.

## V. Rabindra Nath Tagore's Thought

*Translation of the original Bengali*<sup>130</sup>

'The other day I looked through the stormy scenes of the Rebellion (of 1857) and visualized many a brave man, roused to action through zeal, marching about and struggling amidst the chaos that reigned from province to province of India.

'It has been contended that during the Sepoy War many stalwarts spent their energies to the point of bravery improperly. Even if this contention were accepted, this much must be conceded that those sepoys were really brave. Their names deserve to be recorded by the side of the bravest and greatest heroes of the world.

'How unfortunate is this country that the life story of such heroes has to be collected from the pages of the biased history written by the foreigners. Of the Sepoy war period we can specify the names of many brave warriors, who if they had been born in Europe, would have been immortalised in the pages of history, in the lyric verses of the poets and on marble statues and lofty monuments'.

Rabindra Nath

(in: Mahdi Husain: *Bahadur Shah II*... Delhi 1958)



<sup>25</sup> *A History of the Freedom Movement in India*, Bombay Vol. I, (1957), p. 254.

<sup>26</sup> I.e., عالی شان بندگان عالی حضور (His Majesty)

<sup>27</sup> I.e., عالی شان بندگان عالی حضور (His Majesty)

<sup>28</sup> I.e., عالی شان بندگان عالی حضور (His Majesty)

<sup>29</sup> Panta Pradhan Peshwa, according to Dr. P. M. Joshi. (*Idem*, p. 253.)

<sup>30</sup> Taken from Mani Bagchi's *History of the Sepoy War*, Calcutta, 1957.







## THE IMPACT OF THE "REVOLT" OF 1857 ON BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY

The great revolution of 1857, miscalled "the Indian Mutiny" was an important episode in the history of the British rule in India. It was in the words of an Indian historian, "the first and direct challenge" to the British rule in India on an extensive scale.<sup>1</sup> As it not only inspired the general national movement for the freedom of India from the British yoke which started half a century later,<sup>2</sup> but it also had a tremendous impact on the British colonial policy in India. The British public opinion was terribly shocked by the "revolt". As a result the people demanded the abolition of the Company's rule and the subjection of the Indian Empire to the direct supervision of the Crown. The East India Company had established by a Charter granted by the British Government in 1600; after 1773 it was renewed every twenty years, in 1793, 1813, 1833 and 1853. Everytime the British Parliament had increased its controlling power over the Company.<sup>3</sup>

Whenever the Company, annexed a State or deposed a prince, or committed a wrong of any magnitude, it got the previous approval of the British Government.<sup>4</sup> However, after the "revolt", it was convenient to throw the blame for everything on the East India Company. Lord Dalhousie's policy of annexing the princely states by force or by fraud, for instance, was well known in England, and it was described by the English writers as the policy of "magnificent conquest". This policy, more than anything else, was responsible for precipitating Indian resentment.<sup>5</sup> Commenting on it an American journal quoted the following extract from an English paper:

"Not only did Lord Dalhousie seize upon the territories of Indian princes, but he could not keep his hands off the shawls and trinkets of their women. His subordinate instruments were permitted to carry out the annexation in a spirit of paltry plunder, and with a vulgar brutality that would have disgraced a sheriff's officer."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> R.C. Majumdar, *The Sepoy Mutiny and the Revolt of 1857*, Calcutta, 1957, p. 278. See also *Risalah Asbab Baghwat-i-Hmd* by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (in Urdu), Karachi.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> B.G. Gokhale, *The Making of the Indian Nation*, Bombay, 1958, p. 131.

<sup>4</sup> "The Rebellion in India", *North American Review* (Boston), April 1858, p. 515.

<sup>5</sup> "The Rebellion in India", p. 508, *North American Review* (Boston), April 1858, p. 515.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 508-509.



A great Muslim reformer, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, in his *Essays on the Causes of the Indian Revolt*, written in Urdu and published immediately after the "revolt", points out that such actions as auction, sale of zamindari land, heavy assessment of lands and abolition of proprietary rights, and the interference with the customs and religion of the people had caused unrest in India, which produced the great upheaval.<sup>7</sup>

It is not within the scope of this paper to examine the causes of the "revolt", but a brief reference to them is essential in order to understand and appraise the changes that were brought about in the British colonial policy after 1858. The great upheaval had convinced the British that everything was not going well in India and that the Company's policies were a magnificent failure. John Bright, speaking in the Parliament on June 24, 1858, charged that "the Government of India had not been a good Government; that grave errors—if not grievous crimes—have been committed in that country."<sup>8</sup> To this he added:

"Throughout almost all the presidencies, and throughout those presidencies most of which had been longest under British rule, the cultivators of the soil, the great body of the population of India, are in a condition of great impoverishment, of great dejection, and of great suffering...The taxes of India are more onerous and oppressive than the taxes of any other country in the world."<sup>9</sup>

The speech of Mr. Bright and many others who participated in the debate gave the impression that India was too vast to be governed by a trading Company. Soon the demand for the abolition of the Company gained momentum. The influential *Economist* in its issue of November 28, 1857 wrote:

"This charge is at once inevitable and most desirable for the efficient and responsible management of our Indian affairs.... The present system has been long becoming less and less of a reality. The Court of Directors are elected by a wholly irresponsible body of men who are little or not at all directly interested in the efficient Government of India. The best and ablest servants of India have always been naturally reluctant to undergo the humiliation of a canvass for a seat at the Board. The fault of political error and weakness has never been traceable to any one distinct centre. Her Majesty's Government have been negatively responsible for every error that has been made, and yet directly and positively responsible for very little."<sup>10</sup>

The opposition to the Company's rule had become so strong that the British Parliament at last proceeded to transfer the responsibility for the Government of India from the Company to the Crown. This transfer, however, did not take place without an eloquent protest from the directors of the Company. John Stuart Mill, on behalf of the Company, drew up a petition and duly presented it to the Government. Its contents were a denial of the charges of mis-government and

<sup>7</sup> See Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, *Risalah Asbab Bughawat-i-Hind*, Karachi.

<sup>8</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, N.S., Vol. CLI, Col 331.

<sup>9</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, N.S., Vol. CLI, Col. 335.

<sup>10</sup> *The Economist* (London), November 28, 1857, p. 1318.



responsibility for the "mutiny".<sup>11</sup> In Parliament Colonel Sykes presented the Company's case. Like many others, his arguments did not carry conviction with the majority.<sup>12</sup> As a matter of fact the revolt had so shaken the British administration in India that its reorganization could not be left to the Company. The Parliament, therefore, proceeded to the task of accomplishing the transfer.

The act for the better Government of India was carried through the Parliament on July 8 and received the royal assent on August 2, 1858. However, it must be pointed out that the first India Bill was introduced by Palmerston, but he was turned out on the "conspiracy to murder Bill". A few weeks later Disraeli, urged by Ellenborough, put forward a new scheme, but it was not accepted by the Parliament. Finally, Lord John Russell's suggestion that the House should proceed by resolutions was accepted. Fourteen resolutions were accordingly laid before the Parliament. They formed the basis of an Act which regulated the Government of India from London for sixty-two years.<sup>13</sup>

The India Act of 1858, also known as the Act for the better Government of India, was the first direct consequence of the revolt. The British Government, took over the control from the Company. In other words, India was to be governed by and in the name of the Queen of England. The place of the Board of Control and Court of Directors was taken by a Secretary of State, who was to be assisted by a council of fifteen members. Eight members of the Secretary's council were to be appointed by the Crown and the remaining seven were to be elected by the directors of the East India Company.<sup>14</sup> The salary of the Secretary of State and the cost of his office were to be paid from the revenues of India.<sup>15</sup>

The Secretary of State was to be the head of the Indian administration located in England. He was responsible to and represented the supreme power of Parliament. Every year, he presented Indian accounts to the Parliament, the debates over which became an occasion for reviewing Indian affairs.<sup>16</sup> The office of the Secretary of State gained further importance because, as Sir Ilbert put it, "the patronage of the more important appointments in India was vested either in the crown or in the Secretary of State in Council."<sup>17</sup> So far as other appointments were concerned, they were to be made through the Civil Service Commission and by competitive examination. All natural born subjects were eligible for taking this examination, which was held under rules to be made by the Secretary of State in Council with the assistance of the Civil Service Commission.<sup>18</sup>

Another change brought about by the India Act was that all the naval and military forces of the Company, numbering 240,000 officers and men, were

<sup>11</sup> Cecil Putnam Cross, *The Development of Self-Government in India*, Chicago, p. 18.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>13</sup> Cecil Putnam Cross, *The Development of Self-Government in India*, Chicago, 1922, pp. 18-19.

<sup>14</sup> *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, New York, 1932, Vol. 5, p. 208.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Sir Courtenay Ilbert, *The Government of India*, Oxford, 1916, p. 96.

<sup>17</sup> Sir Courtenay Ilbert, *The Government of India*, Oxford, 1916, p. 96.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*



transferred to the Crown. The Indian navy was abolished and the defence of India against serious attack by sea was undertaken by the Royal navy.<sup>19</sup>

The change effected by the Government of India Act, 1858, was formally announced by the Queen's Proclamation of 1st November which "has long been referred to as India's Magna Carta."<sup>20</sup> In this proclamation, the Queen stated; "We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all other subjects, and those obligations by the blessing of Almighty God we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfill."<sup>21</sup> It was also clearly stated that no attempt would be made to interfere with the religion of the Queen's Indian subjects. It should be noted that one of the causes of the revolt was the fear among the people of India that the British Government would convert them to Christianity. Sayyid Ahmad Khan described this fear in these words: "During the general famine of 1837, numbers of orphans were converted to Christianity and this fact was considered throughout the North-Western provinces as convincing proof of the intention of the Government to reduce the country to poverty, and thus make its people Christians."<sup>22</sup> The Queen, therefore, by promising religious freedom, tried to set the Indian fears at rest.

Besides, the proclamation gave promise of the employment of Indians in the Government service by the following stipulation: "And that it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to discharge".<sup>23</sup>

The sentiments expressed through the public proclamation were noble and they appeared to be inspired by the desire to regulate the relations between the ruler and the ruled, between Englishmen and Indians. Unfortunately, however, these sentiments were never sincerely carried out; in many parts of India there was an uneasy feeling after the revolt. The people were not sure how the victors would treat them. And the victors were not sure whether they should trust the Indians. The weekly *Economist* appeared to be speaking for the British Government when it wrote:

"We cannot rule by bayonets alone, if once the masses of people become permanently disaffected towards us, no amount of military expenditure would enable us to hold the present Indian Empire...the mutiny produced the instant disruption of Civil Government, anarchy and confusion. And this was the consequence of that wide interval between us and the people which prevents them from understanding our character and the nature of our policy....How, then, to bridge over the terrible chasm, is the great problem of the British Government to solve."<sup>24</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Sir William Hunter, *A Brief History of the Indian People*, Oxford, 1907, p. 223.

<sup>20</sup> Sir C.Y. Chintamani, *Indian Politics Since the Mutiny*, Allahabad, 1939, p. 17.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>22</sup> Quoted by R.C. Majumdar, *The Sepoy Mutiny and the Revolt of 1857*, pp. 258-259.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Chintamani, *Indian Politics Since the Mutiny*, p. 18.

<sup>24</sup> *The Economist*, London, December 11, 1858, p. 1373.



This sort of realization led to many more changes in the British policy in India. For instance, instead of confining educational facilities to the higher classes, a system of instruction adaptable to the masses of the people was created. The idea underlying this change was not only to educate the masses but to create a new class which should be closely tied with the British. Such a class eventually came into being, and it consisted of the Indian members of the services, usually in subordinate positions. The policy before the revolution was not to employ the Indians except when it could not be helped. The experience had demonstrated, as Nehru observed, that "Indians employed were so dependent on the British administration and rule that they could be relied upon and treated as agent of that rule."<sup>25</sup> Thus the process of Indianization of the administration in its subordinate ranks turned out to be an useful method of strengthening the British rule. In the words of Nehru again, "it created a civil army and garrison everywhere, which was more important ever than the military army of occupation."<sup>26</sup>

Thus the new education policy helped to strengthen the British hold on the country, which had been reconquered after a desparate struggle. If Britain had any intention of relinquishing control over India, she might have pursued a different policy. There was no doubt among the Company's Governors that India would sooner or later be free to govern herself. As Lord Hastings said in 1818: "A time not very remote will arrive, when England will, on sound principles of policy, wish to relinquish the domination which she has gradually assumed over this country."<sup>27</sup> Also Macaulay, in 1833, had declared on behalf of the British Government that when Indians would be able to govern themselves like Englishmen through representative institutions that would be "the proudest day in English history."<sup>28</sup> Many other distinguished Englishmen of that period had made statements to this effect. However, after the revolution, the British rulers no longer spoke of relinquishing control over India. On the other hand, they began to use all sorts of means to consolidate their rule. The Indians, particularly the Muslim aristocracy, were distrusted because of the role they had played in the revolution which failed. And, moreover, the British rulers found it fruitful to create fissiparous tendencies and divisions among the Indian people. According to Professor Phillips "in Bengal, for example, in 1871 of the 773 Indians occupying responsible Government posts, the Muslims, despite their total numerical equality in the province with Hindus, held only 92 as compared with the Hindus, 681. Yet little more than a century before the Muslims, as the intellectual and political power in India, had held the monopoly of such appointments."<sup>29</sup>

Evidently the great revolt brought about an important change in the technique of British rule. Essentially, the change was the creation of an educated class closely linked with the British, and a policy of balancing different interests or

<sup>25</sup> Jawahar Lal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, Calcutta, 955, p. 346.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 347.

<sup>27</sup> Quoted by C.H. Philips, *India*, London, 1948, p. 92.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91.



elements.

The same kind of technique was applied on matters concerning the reorganization of the Indian army. For instance, tribal and communal loyalties were encouraged and various groups within the army were organised in such a way that they could not express national sentiments. They were generally isolated from the people and even ordinary newspapers were not allowed to reach them.<sup>30</sup> Besides, the number of English troops were increased to 60,000 and the Indian soldiers reduced to 140,000. Most important weapons of warfare were kept in the hands of the English.<sup>31</sup>

Moreover, to facilitate the mobilization of the army, the means of communication were rapidly improved. New roads and railways were constructed in order to link the far and remote corners of the sub-continent. By 1865, the telegraph routes between important cities of India were opened.

The growth of the system of communications had profound economic consequences. The new communications provided greater access to the interior and thus facilitated the sale of English manufactured goods, such as Lancashire-made cotton cloth and engineering equipments for railways and bridges. At the same time Indian raw materials, such as cotton, food grains could be easily brought to the ports to be shipped to England in exchange for manufactured goods. Thus India, in the words of Freda Utley, became "for the British Empire a source of enormous profit, an area comprising one-fifth of the world's population, administered mainly with a view to extracting the utmost possible amount of profit for Britain. True, the necessity of not killing the goose that lays the golden egg is recognised as it was not recognised in the days of the East India Company."<sup>32</sup>

However, despite the new economic changes, the Indian masses slipped deep into misery and poverty. They were taxed beyond the possibility of paying. Although great portion of India's wealth came from the land, nothing was done to improve the condition of peasants or to improve their methods of cultivation. The basis of India's trade with Britain was the exchange of raw material for manufactured goods. Therefore, only an increase in agricultural productivity could improve the condition of masses. But Britain wanted to do nothing which would curtail the power of big land-owners and princes, who were the basic vested interests. The general attitude of the British Government on this matter was expressed by an English weekly in these words: "We must avoid the mistake of discouraging the growth of a landed aristocracy—an element in society so obviously valued by the people themselves and so great a source of strength to the Government."<sup>33</sup> Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India, in a letter addressed to Disraeli in 1877 also pointed out:

"I am convinced that the fundamental political mistake of able and

<sup>30</sup> Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

<sup>31</sup> Lester Hutchinson, *The Empire of the Nabobs*, London, 1937, p. 146.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 160.

<sup>33</sup> *The Economist*, London, December 11, 1853, p. 1373.



experienced Indian officials is the belief that we can hold India securely by what they call good Government, that is to say, by improving the condition of the ryot, strictly administering justice, spending immense sums on irrigation works etc. Politically speaking, the Indian peasantry is an inert mass. If it ever moves at all it will move in obedience, not to its British benefactors, but to its native chiefs and princes, however, tyrannical they may be.... They are a powerful aristocracy. To....utilise the Indian aristocracy is, I am convinced, the most important problem before us."<sup>34</sup>

In fact most of the Indian princes had not taken part in the great revolt. On the other hand they had given active support to the British in suppressing it. Acknowledging the role of princely states in 1857, Lord Canning had observed that they served as "break waters in the storm which would have swept over us in one great wave."<sup>35</sup> Lord Elphinston also acknowledged the role of the princes when he said: "Where should we have been if Scindia, the Nizam and the Sikh chiefs etc., had been annexed, the subordinate agencies abolished, the whole army thrown into one and the revenue system brought in to one mould?"<sup>36</sup> The policy of the Company, as it has already been pointed out, was that of intervention and annexation, which began with Auckland and was carried to the extreme by Lord Dalhousie. The latter's governorship in India was marked by the annexation of the Punjab, Oudh and Nagpur as well as those states to which his famous "policy of lapse"<sup>37</sup> was applied. The policy of lapse had made India a cauldron of discontent which boiled over in the great revolt.

In November 1857, when the British Government took stock of the situation in India, it was recognised that Lord Dalhousie's policies of annexation were harmful. In the proclamation, which after several re-draftings at the Queen's wish, was issued in the name of the Queen, it was declared:

"We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity and honour of native princes as our own; and we desire that they as well as our own subjects should enjoy the prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good Government."<sup>38</sup>

Thus the British Government tried to make it clear to the people that it had no intention of making fresh extensions of territory in India. It was already provided in the Indian Act that "all treaties made by the Company, shall be binding upon Her Majesty."<sup>39</sup> It meant that the States were recognised as separate entities.

Nevertheless, the proclamation of the Crown and the last clause of India Act were not considered enough to set at rest the fears of the Indian princes. So in

<sup>34</sup> Quoted in *The British Crown and The Indian States*, London, p. 75.

<sup>35</sup> Quoted by V.P. Menon, *The Integration of the Indian States*, New York, 1956, p. 9.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> The policy of lapse was that a state, after the death of its ruler who was without a legal heir, was considered a part of British India.

<sup>38</sup> Quoted by V.P. Menon, *The Integration of the Indian States*, *op.cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*



1861, Lord Canning issued *Sanads* (Letters of Recognition) to about one-hundred and forty of the more important States giving the princes the right to adopt their successors in accordance to their law and custom in the event of the failure of direct or natural heir.<sup>40</sup> The successors of the princes, however, were to be approved by the Government of India which was to be regarded as the paramount power. British residents were appointed to the courts of the princes in order to supervise the administration of the States.

Many princes still remained somewhat discontented because they considered that "the right of adoption already belonged to them, according to the law of their state, as an attribute of their sovereignty" and "that the *Sanads* were a mere recognition of all inherent rights."<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, the granting of *sanads* by Lord Canning to some extent relieved the feeling of insecurity among the princes, and no more was heard of annexation.

The British Government remained benevolently disposed towards the Indian princes. In 1876, when Queen Victoria assumed the title of the Empress of India, Disraeli said during a debate in the Parliament that the addition of the title 'Empress of India' did not affect the right, dignity and honour of the Indian princes as guaranteed in the Proclamation of 1858.<sup>42</sup> The British Government knew that in order to continue to rule India, the support of the rulers of 562 old princely States was as essential as the support of civil servants who were economically dependent on the Government. In 1858, however, the British did not foresee the rise of a middle class, whose emergence was made possible by the rapid development of the means of communication which stimulated the growth of commerce and industry. Besides, the opportunity to study in English universities had made it possible for the Indians of the middle class to become acquainted with the ideas of European nationalism as well as of English liberalism and socialism. As time passed on the contacts of the people of India with the outside world increased and they became more and more conscious of their economic backwardness. Moreover, the people of India became affected by the ideas the British "had nurtured and propagated, from their own Magna Carta to the poetry of Milton and Shelley, from Lord Byron's support of the Greek independence movement in 1820 to the sympathy of British poets for Kossuth and Mazzini, from the economic theories of Bentham to those of Twney and Laski."<sup>43</sup> How could those who administered Britain in 1858 be aware of the fact that their policies would set into motion a train of ideas and events which would eventually lead the people of the sub-continent on the road to independence.

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<sup>40</sup> *The British Crown and the Indian States*, London, 1929, p. 57.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>43</sup> Vera Micheles Dean, *New Patterns of Democracy in India*, Cambridge, 1959, p. 68.



K. M. ASHRAF

## MUSLIM REVIVALISTS AND THE REVOLT OF 1857

If one reads through the official and British records of 1857 one gathers the vague impression that Muslim revivalist groups and the Wahhabis<sup>1</sup> in particular had something to do with it. There are casual references to calls for *Jihad* (holy war) in almost all places, to *Fatwas* of Maulavis in big cities, to the display of the Green Flag in important rebel centres—all of which suggest a certain Muslim revivalist colouring to the events of 1857. It was even put on record at the trial of Bahadur Shah that the rebel leader General Bakht Khan was a Wahhabi, and he had appointed a certain Sarfaraz Ali as the leader of the *jihadis* (religious warriors), and that Wahhabi contingents joined the Delhi rebels from various places, including one from Tonk.<sup>2</sup>

All this gives, however, no comprehensive or clear picture of their role in or of their contribution to this revolt. In fact, it is never fully appreciated that the revivalist trend was the decisive factor in the political orientation of the Muslims, and the Wahhabis were the only people who came not only armed with a consistent anti-British ideology but also with the backing of a network of organised centres spread all over northern India, with contacts in the south and moral influence on the Muslim intelligentsia throughout the country. In a sense, the Wahhabi outlook on politics and religious life embodied the century-old hostility of the Muslim ruling classes to the growing encroachments of the British, as also, the urge of the working masses for better and happier conditions of life. It is not, therefore, surprising if the Wahhabi leaders of the day displayed both the vigour and tenacity of the working people and the confusions of a decadent ruling class.

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The term "Wahhabi" is certainly inaccurate inasmuch as the political objectives of the so-called Indian Wahhabis and their social outlook in general were derived, not from the doctrines of Abdul Wahhab of Nejd (d. 1787), but from the earlier teachings of Shah Waliullah of Delhi (d. 1762). Some Muslim revivalists like Ubaidullah Sindhi (1861-1948), Ghulam Sarwar and Ajmal Khan have therefore chosen to style themselves "Waliullahis" or followers of Shah Waliullah. I have, however, retained the term because of its popular and historical associations.

*Trial of the Ex-King of Delhi.*



In this paper we propose to examine the role of the Wahhabis during the Revolt of 1857. But for a proper understanding of the factors which gave its specific form to the Muslim revivalist tradition in India, we shall have to begin somewhat earlier.

## I. THE TRADITION

### *Shah Waliullah*

The Ulema (especially those of the Sunnite variety and belonging to the School of Abu Hanifa), were the traditional adjuncts of the Moghul Empire. As a rule they took charge of the educational institutions, supplied cadre for the judiciary and supervised state charities. With the compilation of *Fatawa-i-Alamgiri*, the great compendium of Shariat Law under Aurangzeb, and its enforcement, the Ulema acquired a fairly decisive voice in state affairs. This became all the more pronounced after his death as the Moghul Empire began to decline soon after and the problem of the rehabilitation of the Timurides became desperately urgent both for the Moghul rulers and for the Ulema who depended on them. It is at this stage that Shah Waliullah (d. 1762) emerged as the most original and constructive thinker of the revivalist school as he had a clear appreciation of political realities. He began by recognising that the concentration of wealth in some families and its maldistribution in general, were evils which inevitably led to degeneration and chaos in society. He, therefore, observed that there was the imperative need for a fair and equitable distribution of national wealth, a corresponding balanced structure of society and guarantee of security and social freedom to all producers. The denial of these conditions, he maintained, spelt the destruction of civil society.

Shah Waliullah traced the decline of the Moghul Empire to the heavy and unbearable taxes which peasants, artisans and traders, in other words, those engaged in production, had to pay to maintain the ruling class in comfort and luxury. To create a new ideological basis for the reconstruction of the Muslim state, he emphasised the original teachings of the Koran in the light of Muhammad's traditions and also tried to bridge the ever-widening gulf between the doctrines of Khilafat and Imamat (or between the Sunni and the Shia schools of thought) on the one hand, and between the Shariat and Tariqat, or the formalistic-dogmatic and mystic trends, on the other. Shah Waliullah is easily the foremost inspirer of all revivalist schools of 19th century which organised and led a series of anti-British movements.<sup>3</sup>

### *Sultan Tipu*

In the Deccan, the Muslims were faced not with the abstract problem of idealistic radical reconstruction of Muslim society, but with the concrete fact of

<sup>3</sup> For a brief review of Shah Waliullah's teachings, see *History of Philosophy — Eastern and Western*, vol. I, article on Waliullah. For a detailed study of his theories and philosophical exposition of Islam, see his *Hujjat-allah-al Baligha*, (Arabic text, Cairo edition).



British aggression. Sultan Tipu, who raised the standard of Islamic revivalism, therefore, instead of looking backwards, lavishly borrowed both from the contemporary revolutionary ideas of the French Revolution of 1789 and from the military science of Napoleon. His "Ahmadi" contingent of Muslim neo-converts was modelled on the most modern European pattern and resembled the Janissaries of the Ottoman Turks rather than the army of the Moghul nobles. To fortify his professions of Islamic revivalism he sometimes referred to the writings of Sayyid Ahmad Sirhindi of Jahangir's time. According to the *Wellesley Papers*, a regular Jacobin club was established in Seringapatam and one night the members, including Tipu, ceremoniously burnt all symbols of royalty and thereafter addressed one another as "citizen." This trend towards egalitarianism is corroborated by the fact that Tipu issued orders requiring his soldiers to greet one another in the simple Islamic style, the *Salam-o 'Alaikum* being answered by *Wa'-Alaikum-as-Salam*,<sup>4</sup> without the usual elaborate ceremonial of the feudal courts. Within his own territory Tipu undertook to provide means of livelihood for all Muslims; and those of them who wanted to engage in trade or take to husbandry were provided by the State with the necessary funds and land, according to the needs of the individual.<sup>5</sup>

Tipu had singled out the British as the main enemy of the Muslims. He appealed to all Moghul rulers, including the Moghul Emperor, Shah Alam, to join him in the new anti-British crusade.<sup>6</sup> As Shah Alam, being merely a pensioner of the Scindhia, did not join in the venture. Tipu ordered his own name to be inserted in the Friday sermon thereby superseding that of the Moghul Emperor.<sup>7</sup> As a sovereign ruler of Islam and the upholder of revivalism Tipu not only preached *Jihad* against the British within his dominions and in the neighbouring State of Hyderabad, but also sent his emissaries to far-off Bengal and Kathiawar.<sup>8</sup> It is symptomatic of the new spirit of revived Islam that Tipu chose to fight and die, sword in hand, when Seringapatam was occupied by the British in 1799.

The spirit of anti-British resistance which he had aroused was very much in evidence soon after in the Vellore Mutiny of 1806, which in the words of General Briggs was "the first effort made by the discontented Mohammadans to affect the destruction of our power in the South." The General further noted that the Mohammedan soldiers of his own regiment, then stationed in Hyderabad, were "deeply implicated in hostile intrigues" and that many of his British officers slept "with loaded pistols under their pillows."<sup>9</sup> This was, in fact, a dress rehearsal for 1857 and Lord Bentinck, the then governor of Madras, noted that

<sup>4</sup> Mahmud, *Sahifa-i-Tipu Sultan*, vol. II., p. 244.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 250-52.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 238.

<sup>7</sup> In his letter of 2 August 1786 to Shah Alam, he calls himself *Khadim-i-Din-i Muhammadi* (Servant of the Faith of Muhammad), (*Ibid.*, vol. II., p. 8).

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 381.

<sup>9</sup> Evans Bell, *Memoir of General Briggs*, p. 24.



the Indian infantry and cavalry "had been" ingeniously worked up into a question of religion "and the malcontents were planning to re-establish a Muslim government under one of the sons of Sultan Tipu."<sup>10</sup> To prevent "a great explosion" as the conspiracy had reached the most remote parts of the army, he called for extreme vigilance.<sup>11</sup>

Under these conditions it was only natural if in 1857 the Muslims of Seringapatam regularly prayed for the success of the Delhi rebels at the tomb of Tipu,<sup>12</sup> and Bahadur Shah, the titular head of the Delhi rebel government, in turn, remembered with shame and humiliation that the anti-British crusade of Sultan Tipu had not been supported by the Indian soldiery.<sup>13</sup>

### *Faraizi Revivalists of Bengal*

The Faraizis of Bengal represent a radical agrarian trend in the development of the Muslim revivalist movement. They followed in the wake of the Permanent Settlement (1793), and the British economic policy which had overthrown the old Muslim landlords and ruined the handicrafts of Bengal, reducing the population of Dacca from 150,000 to 20,000. The Faraizis openly preached the expropriation of landlords without compensation.<sup>14</sup> Shariatullah of Faridpur, who founded the Faraizi movement in 1804, thus began by uniting the peasantry against the exactions of the new zamindars in the name of resuscitated faith. "There was also a general feeling at that time that the real object of the Faraizis was the expulsion of the alien rulers and the restoration of Mohammedan power." This significant observation was later made by Dampier, the Superintendent of Police to the government of Bengal,<sup>15</sup> and was, in any case, confirmed by the open anti-British activities of Dudu Miyan, the son and successor of Shariatullah.

Dudu Miyan followed the military campaign of Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi against the Sikhs in 1831 (to be discussed later) by his own independent, though unsuccessful action, against the soldiers of the East India Company in Baraset. He went further than his father in openly advocating that "No man has a right to levy taxes on God's earth," He also established village courts under pious elders and "anyone daring to take cases to British courts was dealt with by social penalties."<sup>16</sup> The Faraizis were thus "Red Republicans" in politics and "broke into the houses of Hindu and Muslim landholders with perfect impartiality." Dampier had further noted that the gathering of 80,000 Faraizis, which asserted

<sup>10</sup> John Bradshaw, *Sir Thomas Munro*. pp. 135-26.

<sup>11</sup> *loc. cit.*

<sup>12</sup> Mahmud, *op. cit.*, vol. I., p. 29.

<sup>13</sup> The relevant verse runs as follows: *Itabar-i-Sabr-o-taqat Khak men rakkhun Zafar—Fauji Hindustan ne kab sath Tipu ka diya* (Trust and patience be damned, oh Zafar, when did the soldiery of India support Tipu). Quoted by Amir Ahmad Alavi, *Bahadur Shah Zafar*, p. 182.

<sup>14</sup> They taught: "Land belongs to God and its yield to those who plough the land." Quoted by Ashraf, *Notes on the Muslim Question*, (MS.), p. 12.

<sup>15</sup> Chaudhuri, *Civil Disturbances in India*, p. 113n.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11



complete equality, was drawn from the "lower classes."<sup>17</sup> Dudu Miyan thus inevitably came into conflict with the Hindu and Muslim landed aristocracy and the British planters in the districts of the 24 Parganas, Nadia, and Faridpur. He even organised the peasant riots in 1838, 1841, 1844 and 1846. In 1857, when the news of the Delhi uprising arrived, he was arrested and taken into custody.<sup>18</sup>

### ***The Wahhabi Call for Jihad***

With the entry of Lord Lake into Delhi in 1803 began a new chapter in the history of the Ulema, who were now called upon to define the legal position of Muslims *vis-à-vis* the British rulers in the light of Koranic doctrines and the injunctions of the Shariat. This was by no means a simple task since the Shariat had nowhere provided for the concept of Muslims as a conquered people. Luckily for them, the mantle of Shah Waliullah had fallen on the worthy and fearless Shah Abdul Aziz, who unhesitatingly declared that the whole land from "this city (*i.e.*, Delhi) to Calcutta" had passed into the possession of the "Nasranis" (the British), who now held sovereign and paramount power, and that the so-called Muslim rulers of Hyderabad, Lucknow and Rampur existed only on their sufferance.<sup>19</sup> In other words, India, according to Shah Abdul Aziz, had technically ceased to be "land of Islam" (*Dar-ul-Islam*) and was henceforth to be considered an "enemy territory" (*Dar-ul-Harb*).

This created an entirely new and grave situation, for in case of India being declared a *Dar-ul-Harb*, it was incumbent on the Muslims either to wage a Jihad against the British or migrate to some free Muslim country. There was no other choice. If, for some unavoidable reason, they were to live under the British rule, they were to make all possible efforts to overthrow it. There could be no amity or friendship with the British usurpers. It was in fact absolutely forbidden (*haram*).

The next task was to choose the leader (Imam) who would conduct the holy war and to pledge one's fealty and service (*b'eat*) to him.<sup>20</sup>

In due course Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi (1786-1831) was selected as the Imam and the Commander of the Faithful (*Amir-al-Muslimin*), with Muhammad Ismail (d. 1831) of Waliullah's family, as his lieutenant and chief organizer of military campaigns. The latter fanatically held that those who refused to accept the Imamate (in this case of Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi), or backed out after accepting it, were to be treated as traitors to Islam and were subject to the same penalties as any other infidel.<sup>21</sup> It is also significant that these Wahhabis (who later formed a government under Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi based professedly on Koranic principles) considered all time honoured illegal cesses and impositions

<sup>17</sup> Hunter, *The Indian Muslims*, pp. 101-02.

<sup>18</sup> Chaudhuri, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

<sup>19</sup> Abdul Aziz, *Fatwa-i-Azizi*, vol. I., pp. 16, 17.

<sup>20</sup> "Once the Imam is chosen by the Muslims....It is not permissible to delay the pledge of fealty to him" (*Ibid.*, vol. II., p. 77).

<sup>21</sup> Mirza Hairat, *Hayat-i-Tayyiba*, p. 278.



on petty traders, ryots and artisans as opposed to the letter and spirit of Islam. They openly censured the local officials, including the Kazis and Kotwals for their extortionate demands. Mohammad Ismail's ingenuity discovered the basis for these radical reforms in *Fatwa* issued during the rule of Timur himself, the great ancestor of the Moghul emperors.<sup>22</sup> The Wahhabis similarly taught the people to take the law into their own hands and to defy the government "if obedience to its laws amounted to a breach of God's commandments."<sup>23</sup> Their followers went about openly preaching that all acts of an oppressor and a tyrant were to be resisted.<sup>24</sup>

Curiously enough the concept of Imam, as evolved by the leading Wahhabi thinkers, was defined in the spirit of absolutism and their *Amir* (leader) was modelled on the military despots who had sat on the throne of Delhi. Any popular or democratic pattern of government appeared to be completely alien to them. In their terminology the Imam was a "Son of the Prophet" and his functionaries were his "dutiful servants and devoted slaves." If any of the Imam's followers considered himself equal to him in status, he was accused of "disloyalty to salt" (*namak harami*) and such lapse on his part naturally incurred "royal displeasure."<sup>25</sup> Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi himself used to address Muhammad Ishaq, the son of Shah Abdul Aziz, as "His Exalted Highness" (*Sahibzada' wala tabar*). This partly explains why the Wahhabis ended up by restoring the old and decadent feudal order and by entrusting to the feudal chiefs even the sacred cause of Islamic revival for which so many of them had laid down their lives.

For our immediate purpose, however, it is well to remember that the Wahhabis of India aroused the masses of Muslims to free themselves both from the political tyranny of the British and the Muslim oppressors, as well as from the economic exploitation of Indian vested interests. They helped to eliminate somewhat class distinctions within Muslim society and inspired the intelligentsia to unite with the discontented mass of common people for the cause of regeneration. Thanks to the pioneering efforts of these Wahhabi leaders, the movement of religious revivalism created a broad basis of unity against the British among the various sections of Muslim society—the expropriated aristocrat, the ruined handicraftsman, the frustrated Ulema and the discontented soldier—as also among Muslims and Hindus. In the words of Dr. Hunter, their system was "essentially adapted to the hopes and fears of a restless populace."<sup>26</sup>

To appreciate fully the magnetism and appeal of the Wahhabi demand for *Jihad*, let us study the reactions of two notable aristocrats, Momin Khan (1800-52), a leading Urdu and Persian poet, and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 283. The word used for "illegal impositions" is "*Malhai-Na-haq*."

<sup>23</sup> The doctrine is laid down in the form of a *hadis*: See Muhammad Ismail, *Mansab-i-Imamat*.

<sup>24</sup> In this context, see verses quoted from *Hariq-al-Ashrar* in Muhammad Ismail, *Taqwiyat-al-Imam*.

<sup>25</sup> Muhammad Ismail, *op. cit.*

<sup>26</sup> Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 102.



98), the famous social reformer and Wahhabi who later tried to repudiate what he had preached up to 1846.<sup>27</sup>

Momin Khan composed a *masnawi*,<sup>28</sup> both in Persian and in Urdu, to glorify the *Jihad* of "the Amir of Islamic armies and the virtuous Imam" (i.e., Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi) against the Sikhs, and, incidentally, to "refresh his own faith." He was no friend of the Christian invaders either and his activities involved him in serious trouble with the British authorities of Delhi.<sup>29</sup> His devotion to the Imam and to the cause of the Wahhabis in general, remained unshaken to the end of his life.<sup>30</sup> He concluded his Urdu *masnawi* with a prayer, asking God for his martyrdom in the company of the "warriors of Islam."

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan while speaking of eminent personalities of Delhi in his book, not only includes some of the Wahhabi leaders, but also extols the Wahhabite call to *Jihad* in exaggerated terms of religious piety. To him Shah Abdul Aziz is "the foremost among the Ulema" and their undisputed leader and teacher; Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi is not only blessed with "the honour of martyrdom in the company of believers of pure faith" but had previous intimation of the event from God through divine inspiration (*kashf*). It is, therefore, natural if millions of Muslims feel convinced of the great virtue of holy war, look upon the sacrifice of their life and property in "the way of God" as a religious blessing (*sa'adat*) and follow the "royal road" of *Jihad* shown to them by Mohammad Ismail and Abdul Hai.<sup>31</sup>

Fifteen years after the death of Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi and Mohammad Ismail (when the Wahhabi volunteers were trekking to the far-off colony of Sittana beyond the North West Frontier Province to fight the British) Sir Syed still persisted in his admiration for this "obedience to the precepts of Muhammad" and considered *Jihad* an "act of extreme religious piety, the spiritual benefits (*sawab*) of which accrue to the sacred soul of Muhammad Ismail, the martyr who led it."<sup>32</sup> When, late in his life, Sir Syed passed over to the camp of the British, he prompted Chiragh Ali to explain away the Koranic doctrines relating to *Jihad* as designed only for defensive purposes and, in any case, without a mandatory character.<sup>33</sup>

The spark of *Jihad* which gave faith and courage even to Sir Syed before 1846 became a glowing flame by the time of the 1857 revolt and there are

<sup>27</sup> Sir Syed's comments on the Wahhabi leaders reproduced here were first published in 1846 in his *Asar-as-Sanadid* (chap. IV) but were deleted from subsequent editions of the book. This chapter has now been republished (in Urdu) under the title *Tazkira-i-Ahl-i Dehli* by Anjuman-i Taraqqi Urdu of Pakistan.

<sup>28</sup> Momin Khan, *Kulliyat*.

<sup>29</sup> He refers to it in a verse. *Vide* Momin Khan, *Persian Diwan* (MS.).

<sup>30</sup> Momin Khan, *op. cit.*

<sup>31</sup> Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, *op. cit.*

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>33</sup> Chiragh Ali held that the *Jihad*, far from being a *Farz-i-Ain* (Absolute and mandatory duty) was *Farz-i-kifayat*, that is, of a permissive and symbolic character. *Vide* p. 137 of his book *Tahqiq-al-Jihad*.



instances on record when men of academic taste gave up their life-long occupation of teaching and joined the "warriors" in fighting the British.<sup>34</sup>

### *Wahhabis in Action before 1857*

It is outside the scope of the present essay to discuss either the lives or the military exploits of the early Wahhabi leaders. Those interested in such details may read the story in Hunter's book. What interests us in the context of 1857 is their plan of organisation together with their technique of conspiratorial work, which survived their military collapse in 1831.

As early as 1820 Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi, the Imam, appointed his trusted agents in all important towns of north India who were put under the regional *khalifas*, nominated by the central leadership. Patna, for instance, as the regional centre for Bengal, was put in charge of Muhammad Husain.<sup>35</sup>

It is interesting to note that no sooner was *Jihad* declared against the Sikh government on December 21, 1826, than these agencies started to enlist recruits—for Mujahid camp on the frontier. Similarly, when a regular Wahhabi government was established, first at Peshawar and then at Sittana and financial assistance was demanded, this network of Wahhabi organisations immediately began to collect the *zakat*, or religious tithes, for its support. Since the work was secretive and dangerous, the *khalifas*, or regional organisers were required to make periodic reports in person at the headquarters in Sittana. In due course the Wahhabis established a regular secretariat, a finance department and other paraphernalia of government under an Imam-king, who functioned until long afterwards in full vigour. But the activities of the Wahhabi centres in north India were assuming slowly a pronounced anti-British character and aroused the suspicion of the British authorities.

The Wahhabis, it should be remembered, were sometimes obliged to send recruits and funds over distances of up to 2,000 miles which led to the establishment of a chain of *khanqahs* (hospices) under trusted and experienced agents all along the route from Bengal to Sittana. To conceal their real vocation these agents engaged in various kinds of trade and professions. For instance, suppose a recruit set out from Bengal, say, for the Wahhabi camp on the frontier, he was received on his way at the end of each stage of his journey by the head of the Wahhabi hospice, and thus passed from stage to stage until he arrived at his destination. A code language was similarly developed to help the transmission of large sums of money and of arms and ammunition.

In fact, the three striking features of this conspiratorial technique, as revealed in the course of the Wahhabi trials after 1857, were the resourcefulness and sagacity of their agents; the secrecy with which complicated operations were conducted; the absolute fidelity which the members of the organisation displayed

<sup>34</sup> Take for instance, the Pathan tutor in the service of a Delhi nobleman who joined the rebels "in search of martyrdom." *Vide* Agha Mirza Beg, *Karnama-i-Sarwari*, p. 7.

<sup>35</sup> Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 5.



towards each other; and their resolve to persevere till death in the service of the cause which they believed to be God's own.<sup>36</sup>

When in 1820 Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi went to Calcutta in pursuance of his professed object of fighting the Sikhs (on account of the alleged suppression of Islam in Ranjit Singh's domains) the British were almost anxious to encourage and support him. But sometime later when the Wahhabis of the frontier enlisted the support of the Swat ruler (whose Anglophobia was well known) and began to engage in anti-British wars, the British had to revise their attitude and policy. This became all the more urgent when they discovered that the Wahhabi volunteers were fighting on the side of their enemies during the Afghan War, and Mubariz-ud Dowlah, a brother of the Nizam, claiming to be a deputy of the late Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi and the *Rais-al Muslimin* (ruler of Muslims) was establishing contacts all over the country with the aim of overthrowing both the British and their henchman, the Nizam.<sup>37</sup>

In 1851 the British learnt to their dismay that the Wahhabis were plotting in the Punjab to overthrow them and were in correspondence "with our troops" for that purpose. Between 1850 and 1857 the Wahhabis continued to instigate the frontier tribes against the British, which led to no less than 16 British expeditions, involving 33,000 regular troops. In 1857 the Wahhabi centre on the frontier coordinated its plans with those of the rebels in Delhi and Lucknow, and tried to organise an anti-British rising on a countrywide scale. In this connection, the ruler of Swat, the Akhund, contacted the Indian army units on the frontier and in the Punjab<sup>38</sup> and the situation became so menacing that General Sir Sidney Cotton had to proceed to the frontier with 5,000 men. By 1883, when measures were taken for the final destruction of the Wahhabi centre at Sittana on the frontier, the British had undertaken 20 military expeditions, aggregating 60,000 regular troops besides irregulars and police auxiliaries.<sup>39</sup>

## II. THE ROLE OF WAHHABIS IN 1857

### Organisation and Programme

Some Indian scholars hold that the revolt of 1857 was no more than an uncoordinated and spontaneous outburst of a section of the discontented soldiery and should not be treated in any sense as a war of independence or a national uprising. This view of 1857 is not supported by some of the best informed British observers who carefully investigated the problem on the spot. For instance, Alexander Duff, whose series of letters on "the Indian Rebellion" was published

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 84-90 for details.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 14. In 1838 Wilayat Ali and Maulavi Salim, two important Wahhabi leaders had gone to the Deccan and established a strong secret organisation under Mubariz-ud Dowlah which was discovered by the British Resident only in 1839. Mubariz-ud Dowlah was eventually imprisoned in Golconda Fort and died there in 1851 (*Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad*, vol. I., pp. 128-33).

<sup>38</sup> Ashraf, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

<sup>39</sup> Hunter, *op. cit.*, for details.



immediately after the revolt, "could not but regard and pronounce the mutiny and rebellion as the result of political conspiracy."<sup>40</sup> He considered it "not a mere military revolt, but a rebellion, a revolution," "a rebellion on the part of vast multitudes beyond the Sepoy army, against British supremacy and sovereignty."<sup>41</sup> Similarly Malleson, whose exhaustive account of 1857 is well enough known and who renewed his enquiries later when Indians could communicate with him freely, was convinced that "extraneous causes were at work to promote an ill-feeling, a hatred not personal but national."<sup>42</sup>

If one notes the sequence of events ever since the days Sultan Tipu, who tried to mobilize the whole of India in his anti-British crusade, and the Mutiny of Vellore (in 1806), when India witnessed a miniature 1857, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that during the intervening half century Indians as a whole were consciously preparing for a countrywide movement of resistance against the British rulers. The only notable exceptions were the class of new landholders and the Anglicized intelligentsia of the Presidency towns who owed their newly acquired wealth and social position to the British and somehow felt that their fortunes were linked up with them.<sup>43</sup>

Thanks to this long preparation, the freedom fighters of India had, by 1857, acquired a certain grasp of the national and international situation and a solid base in the Indian army. For instance, towards the end of the 18th century both Tipu, the Sultan of Mysore, and Vazir Ali, the Nawab of Oudh, had tried to enlist the support of anti-British forces home and abroad, and such diplomatic moves were very much in evidence in 1857.

Besides, ever since the rising of Indian soldiers in Vellore (1806), unofficial political committees of soldiers were a regular feature of army life. In the forties these committees, especially in the Punjab and the Frontier Provinces formed contacts with the Wahhabi leaders, who had already developed their technique of conspiratorial work through a chain of hospices and secret agents. Out of such traditions and contacts emerged eventually both the elected committees of soldiers which virtually took over the government in Delhi and Lucknow in 1857, and the trained military personnel, who displayed amazing resourcefulness and courage in fighting the British army.

It is equally important to note that by 1857 the leaders of the anti-British movements had begun to talk in terms of a popular programme. That the old machinery of the feudal state needed overhauling was taken for granted, at least among the Wahhabi leaders, ever since the days of Shah Waliullah. Sultan Tipu had, in fact, improved on this when his government took over the responsibility of providing for unemployment. The most difficult was the problem of poor and landless peasants and the Faraizis of Bengal had already included the abolition,

<sup>40</sup> Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, p. 195.

<sup>41</sup> Quoted by Desai, *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*, pp. 282-283.

<sup>42</sup> Malleson, *The Indian Mutiny of 1857*, Preface, p. viii.

<sup>43</sup> Duff, *op. cit.*, p. 181, gives an estimate of the various classes of Indians who stood by the British in 1857.



even the expropriation of the landlords in their programme. Thus Bakht Khan was only putting into practice a traditional demand of the anti-British movement when he abolished the salt and sugar taxes and penalised hoarding in Delhi. Similar measures were taken by Maulavi Ahmadullah and the soldiers' committee in Lucknow. It is interesting to note that on one occasion the rebel government of Delhi offered five *bighas* of rent-free land in perpetuity to the family of every soldier who gave his life fighting against the British.<sup>44</sup> Some scholars, in fact, hold that the popular upsurge both in Delhi and Oudh in 1857, soon assumed the character of a regular peasant war in the countryside which so scared the vested interests in the Provincial government of the "mutineers" that they "committed suicide as a free people" and passed over to the camp of the enemy.<sup>45</sup>

This is not to deny that the patriots sometimes exhibited rank opportunism in exploiting the religious prejudices of the masses and denounced some of the beneficent reforms of the British administrators, for instance the abolition of Sati, the encouragement of widow remarriage, and to some extent the modification of caste.<sup>46</sup> Since the Hindu and Muslim masses were united, the rebel government at Delhi banned the slaughter of cows as a gesture of good will to the Hindus; while the Hindu rebel leaders (for instance Nana Sahib) returned the compliment by maintaining all the state symbols of the Moghul government—for instance, the use of the lunar calendar, the inscription of "Bismillah" in official communications and reports and even the observance of Friday as a public holiday.

### ***Bahadur Shah: A Symbol of National Unity***

The popular leaders of the revolt of 1857 similarly realised that in Bahadur Shah, the nominal King of Delhi who was just then facing the prospect of complete effacement at the hands of the British,<sup>47</sup> they had a priceless symbol of national unity behind whom the various classes and communities of India could unite.<sup>48</sup> They agreed not only to put him at the head of the central

<sup>44</sup> Zakaullah, *Tarikh-i Uruj*, etc.

<sup>45</sup> *India To-day*, Feb.-March 1952, p. 55.

<sup>46</sup> Kaye, *Mutiny Papers Misc.*, 727.

<sup>47</sup> The British authorities had already informed Bahadur Shah that he was to vacate the Red Fort along with other members of the royal family and was not to nominate anyone as his successor. In other words, the very name of the Timurides was going to be effaced from the memory of the people. Bahadur Shah refers to this prospect of extinction of the Moghul rule in a pathetic verse saying that "the business of (formally) administering the State was confined to him alone. After him, there was to be neither a successor nor the name of the (Moghul) state" (Quoted in Zakaullah, *op. cit.*, p. 310).

<sup>48</sup> Sleeman notes with anger and sorrow that the ruler of Dholpur and the chiefs of Bundelkhand, though created by the British and could not conceivably benefit by the regime of Bahadur Shah, still designated themselves on their Seal of office as the "Slave and creature of that Imperial Warrior for the Faith of Islam" (*Rambles and Recollections*, p. 309).



government with Delhi as the capital, but also to observe the traditional formalities of the highly centralised Moghul administration.<sup>49</sup>

Such a prospect was particularly pleasing to the soul of the Muslim revivalists who had always dreamt of a strong and unified state and would have rejoiced to see a descendant of the great Amir Timur playing the role of an Imam-King. It may be said to the credit of Bahadur Shah that he did come up to the expectations! To the Muslim revivalist he was a Ghazi, to the Iranian for the Shi'ites of Lucknow an Imamate, to the mystic a Murshid and Pir who had his disciples (*chelas*) after the Hindu fashion. The intelligentsia universally admired for his genuine love of poetry and literature. Besides in the event of the restoration of his regal authority he held out the prospect of considerable concessions to win the support of all classes of people. To the ruling Hindu chiefs he offered the right to adoption;<sup>50</sup> to the old landholding classes, the annulment of the Permanent Settlement together with very substantial reduction of rent; to the Indian tradesmen, the abolition of all British monopolies and the burdensome taxes, coupled with government subsidies and facilities for the transportation of their goods. To the government employees was offered substantial increase of pay—a minimum of from two to three hundred rupees to higher officials—and double the pay to the soldier. Even the artisans were promised security of employment which would no doubt ensure their prosperity." The saintly monarch, of course, remembered the pundits, faqirs and other holy men, who were to receive big endowments of rent-free lands from him in the grand manner of an Akbar or Alamgir.<sup>51</sup> In fairness to the short-lived regime of the patriots under Bahadur Shah, it should be admitted that the functionaries of the new administration in Delhi, Lucknow, Bareilly and in several other places, discharged their duties with remarkable efficiency, discipline and

<sup>49</sup> As an illustration: The leaders of the popular army in Lucknow made it clear to Mirza Birjis Qadr, who was anxious to ascend the throne of Oudh, that his status and position were to be determined by the Emperor of Delhi. And when the royal *firman* confirming his appointment as ruler of Oudh, arrived, it was received with the traditional salute of 21 guns. Similarly, when the question of coinage came up for discussion, the leaders of the army refused to accept the suggestion that the coins should be issued in the name of the ruler of Oudh. It was a royal prerogative of the Emperor of Delhi and was maintained as such. In fact, some of the higher functionaries of the Oudh government, not excluding commander-in-chief and governor, were directly appointed by the central government and the official reporter—the *akhbar-navis*—of Bahadur Shah was always present at the Lucknow Durbar to report to the headquarters any and every breach of rules or conventions. It was because of these well-known conventions that no sooner was the government established in Oudh than a duly accredited emissary proceeded to Delhi with the customary *Nazar* and when on 16 November 1857, news of the Delhi massacres at the hands of the British was received in Lucknow, six or seven English prisoners were immediately killed as a measure of retaliation (Kamaluddin Haider, *Qaisar al-Tawarikh*, vol. II., pp. 225-40, 242, 262; also Ram Sahai, *Tatimma Tarikh-i-Suba Awadh*, p. 86).

<sup>50</sup> For his *farman* relating to adoption, see Kanhayya Lal, *Tarikh-i-Baghawat*, etc., pp. 386-387.

<sup>51</sup> Bahadur Shah's *farman*, quoted in Kaye, *Indian Mutiny Papers, Misc.*, 726. (India Office, London).



conscientiousness and upheld the honour of the provisional government even after its overthrow at the hands of the enemy.<sup>52</sup>

### III. LEADERSHIP OF 1857 AND THE WAHHABIS

There have been vague speculations as to who were the leaders behind the great national movement of 1857 and some people naturally imagine that the uprising was probably planned by Bahadur Shah and Wajid Ali Shah, as representatives of the two distinguished royal families of northern India. It is even suggested that they *jointly* incited the Hindustani army and planned a general massacre of Europeans, to be followed by an attack of the other Indian ruling chiefs on the British army.<sup>53</sup> There is, however, very little evidence to support this contention. On the contrary, from materials available, it appears that Wajid Ali Shah or Bahadur Shah for that matter, played a very minor role even when they had a say in the affairs of the provisional government. From the letters discovered at the house of one Pir Ali in 1857 at Patna, one gathers that besides the Wahhabis, two other groups were operating professedly on behalf of the rulers of Delhi and Lucknow respectively. But the evidence is by no means conclusive to prove that they were authorised by these dignitaries.<sup>54</sup> Among the members of the royal family of Delhi who can claim to have actively participated in and led the resistance movement, Prince Firoz Shah,<sup>55</sup> a grandson of the

<sup>52</sup> It is instructive to note that the emissary of Oudh mentioned earlier arrived in Delhi just when the British army was on the point of forcing its entry into the city and no one could have blamed him if he chose to return. But the emissary refused to go without delivering his *Nazar* to the Emperor in person and receiving a proper receipt from the royal treasury (Kamaluddin Haider, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-242).

When in 1872, Liaquat Ali, the famous rebel leader who formed the provisional government at Allahabad in 1857, was brought to trial before a British Court and charged with waging war against Her Majesty, he justified his action with great dignity by declaring: "I considered myself subordinate to Bahadur Shah." He was condemned to transportation for life and cheerfully submitted to the sentence without a hint of retracting (*The Times*, London, June, 17, 1872).

<sup>53</sup> Kanhayya Lal, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>54</sup> Jata Shankar Jha, *The Patna Conspiracy of 1857*, Indian Historical Records Proceedings, 1956.

<sup>55</sup> Few details are available about this valiant Moghul prince. He was a son of Mirza Nazim and a maternal grandson of Shah Alam. Sometime in 1856, that is, before outbreak of the revolt he had gone to Mecca on pilgrimage (*Haj*) and found to his great satisfaction on return that there was a countrywide revolt against the British. The "rebel" soldiers from Indore and the Afghan *Mujahids* from Gwalior and Dholpur joined him on the way, and with this force he laid siege to Agra and then proceeded to Mewar. Delhi had probably fallen to the British when he was trying to contact the patriotic leaders in the capital. In any case, we find him proceeding to Lucknow via Farrukhabad and Shahjahanpur (which were the strongholds of the patriots), to join forces with Ahmadullah. He was invited and agreed to join the provisional government of Ahmadullah at Mohammadi. His movements thereafter are somewhat obscure. There is a legend that he crossed over to Russia (Kamaluddin Haider, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 468). Another version, which is more likely to be correct, traces him back to Mecca where we find him in the company of other distinguished Wahhabi Ulema, for instance, Muhammed Ishaq, Haji Imdadullah etc., who had fled to Arabia after the collapse of the resistance movement. He is



Moghul emperor Farrukh Siyar, depended for support on the Wahhabi Pathan contingent of soldiers who had joined him after being discharged from the service of the Mahratta princes. In the case of the Begum of Oudh, the guiding spirit was, of course, the famous "Maulavi of Fyzabad," who, from all accounts can legitimately claim to be "the rain and the hand of the conspiracy."<sup>56</sup> It can be asserted with confidence that while Ahmadullah was not strictly a Wahhabi, in other words, belonging to the Sect of Ahl-i-hadis or a traditionalist, he was certainly a revivalist like Deccanese countryman, Sultan Tipu, and worked for the same ideals of political regeneration. In any case, he working in closest cooperation with the group of Wahhabis and the followers of Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi.<sup>57</sup>

The dominating figure of the revolt and the leader of the central government at Delhi, however, is Bakht Khan, the Rohilla warrior from Sultanpur (Oudh). Bakht Khan possessed a rich experience of military training under the British and assumed the title of "Lord Commander" when he superseded the decadent prince, Mirza Moghul, in the command of the patriotic forces in Delhi.<sup>58</sup> Bakht Khan was, from all accounts, a confirmed and fanatical

reported to have died in Arabia in 1895 (Intizamullah Shahabi, *Ghadar ke Chand Ulema*, p. 135).

<sup>56</sup> Malleon, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

<sup>57</sup> (Maulavi) Ahmadullah is a meteoric figure in the 1857 movement. He is a not even a northerner and hails from Madras, claiming descent from the Qutb Shahi dynasty of Golconda. What is really significant is the fact that his father is reported to have been a courtier of Tipu. In any case, he was probably educated in Hyderabad and then in London and returned to India after a visit to Iran and Arabia. His itinerary in India on return is a very long and interesting one. We find him visiting Sambhar, Jaipur, Tonk, in Rajputana, then Gwalior (presumably to visit his Pir, Mahrab Shah who was important enough to be mentioned on the coins of the Mohammadi government), Delhi and Agra, before settling down in Fyzabad. He was essentially a revivalist in his outlook and while in Delhi, he was in contact with persons like Sadruddin, the *Mufti*, and Fazle Haq, the *Sadr* of Delhi. In Fyzabad, he was arrested by the British for his seditious activities and was actually waiting to be hanged when the rebellion broke out in Lucknow. Henceforth the story of the resistance movement in Lucknow, is the record of his perseverance, courage, resourcefulness and of his military talents displayed in battles against the trained generals of the British army. When Delhi, Kanpur and Allahabad fell to the British, Lucknow kept the standard of national resistance flying, and when it was no more possible to defend it, Ahmadullah and the patriotic leaders from other centres fought in Shahjahanpur and finally entrenched themselves in Mohammadi with Ahmadullah as king and head of the new government. He now assumed the title of "Defender of the Faith of Muhammad" (*Hami-i-Din-i-Muhammad*) in true revivalist style and struck his coins in the name of Mahrab Shah, his spiritual preceptor. Before long, however, he was treacherously murdered on 15 June 1858 (Intizamullah Shahabi, *East India Company Aur Baghi' Ulema*, pp. 48-49).

<sup>58</sup> Little is known about the early life of Bakht Khan who was a Rohilla and claimed to be related to the royal family of Oudh through his mother. He is reported to have served the British army as an ordinary Risaldar in the Afghan war, then promoted to the rank of an artillery officer and finally as Subedar at Neemuch. After the outbreak of 1857 we find him in Bareilly for a while helping Nawab Bahadur Khan (the Rohilla leader of provisional government in Bareilly) in driving the British out of Rohilkhand. From Bareilly he went to assist Nana Sahib in recruiting soldiers from Badaun and Farrukhabad. Finally he started for Delhi with 14,000 troops, and



Wahhabis who arrived in Delhi with a band of Wahhabi organisers and appointed his spiritual guide, Maulavi Sarfaraz Ali<sup>59</sup> as the "Imam" of the contingent of "religious warriors" (*Mujahids*) numbering several thousands.<sup>60</sup>

It is thanks to these Wahhabi activists that the morale of the army was kept up to the last moment in spite of serious initial mistakes of strategy and the political backwardness of the royal family.<sup>61</sup> The Wahhabi volunteers not only carried on the fight in difficult situations but occasionally snatched the initiative from the enemy even when patriotic resistance had broken down.<sup>62</sup> Some idea of the spirit of Wahhabis may be gathered from the fact that every soldier in the camp of Bakht Khan had taken a pledge to fight the British to the last. When Delhi fell, Bakht Khan first tried to persuade Bahadur Shah to accompany him and lend his support in building a second front on a better strategic site and when the king refused, he joined forces with Ahmadullah in the provisional government at Mohammadi and became the commander-in-chief and defence minister with Sarfaraz Ali as the "Chief Qazi" and Nana Sahib as diwan or prime minister. Finally when they had to give up Mohammadi, the last stronghold of the patriots, in face of the British attack and Ahmadullah was treacherously killed, Bakht Khan crossed over into Nepal with Nana Sahib and others.

The administration of Delhi under Bakht Khan and the Wahhabis is well worth a study for its democratic policies. We have already noted that Bakht Khan abolished duty on such articles of common consumption as salt and sugar, penalised hoarding and offered five *bighas* of rent-free land in perpetuity to the

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three regiments of cavalry, a park of artillery and a few lakhs of rupees in cash, appropriated from the Bareilly treasury (Kamaluddin Haider, *op. cit.*).

<sup>59</sup> Maulavi Sarfaraz Ali was a disciple of Karamat Ali of Jaunpur, the famous Khalifa of Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi and a leading figure in the Wahhabi movement (Kamaluddin Haider, *op. cit.*, p. 445).

<sup>60</sup> Among Wahhabi volunteers who came to Delhi, those from Jaipur, Jhansi, Hissar, Bhopal including 6,000 from Nasirabad are specially mentioned. The Wahhabi centre on the Frontier offered to send 1,400 volunteers under the Akhund, the ruler of Swat who was known to be a patron and supporter of the Wahhabis. Tonk sent a contingent of 600 with the promise of a further batch of 2,000. 200 men arrived from Najibabad, the old Rohilla centre (now in Bijnor district in Uttar Pradesh) (Amir Ahmad Alavi, *op. cit.*, p. 242; see also Hasan Nizami, *Ghadar ki Subh-o Sham*, for details).

<sup>61</sup> When Delhi fell and Bahadur Shah was in panic, Bakht Khan explained to him the reason for the failure, viz., the initial mistake they had committed in choosing to fight with the city of Delhi as the base and the heights of the Ridge in the hands of the enemy. He also related how Prince Mirza Moghal, who was an amateur and a fool took up the command and made a mess of everything. (Amir Ahmed Alavi, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-139).

<sup>62</sup> When on 14 September 1857 British troops succeeded in forcing their way into Delhi, the Wahhabis mobilised the Muslims in the Jama Masjid area and in their initial attack, they drove but the advancing British columns, inflicting on them more than 400 casualties (Hasan Nizami, *Ghadar ki Subh-o Sham*, for details). Eventually, when the Jama Masjid area was occupied by the enemy there was nothing to see but piles of corpses for over a furlong right up to Kotwali (Zahir Dehlavi, *Dastan-i Ghadar*, pp. 113-14). This explains why the Jama Masjid was not restored to the Muslims for a long time and the British authorities were planning to demolish this mosque as they had destroyed several others. Most of the houses of Muslims, however, in this area were destroyed (Ghalib's Urdu letters, for details).



families of those soldiers who happened to die in the fight against the British. We have also mentioned the pledge of the patriotic army to fight to the last and their amazing morale even when the enemy had surrounded them on all sides.

The administration under Bakht Khan was based on the support of the common people, on the alliance of the soldiery (who were mainly outsiders) and the artisans and the workers from within the city.<sup>63</sup> Bakht Khan was himself an embodiment of the spirit of the revivalist movement. Simple in habits, he lived and moved about like a common soldier who could not be recognised on his first entry in Delhi and was ridiculed both for his uncouth appearance and for his unsophisticated, even boorish manners. But he fought the British and out-generalled them for weeks together. He made sincere though unsuccessful attempts to see that the civilian population of Delhi was not inconvenienced because of the army, and strict discipline was observed under all circumstances. No wonder if the whole of the degenerate crowd of princely commanders, and aristocrats who formed the advisory council of Bahadur Shah during the first few weeks of the provisional government, just faded away after the arrival of Bakht Khan and the formation of the soldier's committee with its democratic constitution and attempt at observance of rules.

#### IV. WAHHABIS OUTSIDE DELHI

We have already noted that long before the outbreak of 1857, the leaders of the Wahhabi movement had built up a network of their organisation in all important centres in North India, with regional khalifas and trusted local agents. After the death of Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi in 1832 they also established contacts with Muslim centres of the Deccan like Hyderabad and Mysore and with some of the States of Central India and Rajputana, for instance, Bhopal, Tonk, Jaipur, etc. Their influence in cantonments and in soldiers' committees of the Hindustani army was already noticeable in 1840. In a word, one might say that by 1857 the Wahhabis had developed a countrywide political organisation and in the region of the Doab in particular, say from Delhi to Allahabad, every town of note had its organised and functioning group of Wahhabis and other Muslim revivalists, all united in their intense hatred of the British and anxious to participate in a general uprising. This provided, in fact, the political and organisational base which helped Bakht Khan and other Wahhabi leaders to capture the provisional government of Delhi.

The year 1857 opened with the distribution of *chappatis* all over the countryside, accompanied by inspired rumours of the impending overthrow of British rule and some sort of consultations among the soldiers' committees.<sup>64</sup> This was soon followed by the "cartridge incident" in Barrackpur and thereafter

<sup>63</sup> Ghalib, *Kulliyat-i Ghalib*, p. 192.

<sup>64</sup> Malleon is of opinion that the plan of *chappatis* was designed by Ahmadullah. Numerous *Bhavisyavanis* (or auguries of future events) were then in circulation and Zakaullah, in his *Tarikh* (*op. cit.*), has quoted one in Persian verse which was probably meant to influence the Muslim intelligentsia.



any one could see that some kind of general uprising was going to break out. In fact, tentative dates for such an uprising were announced to the people all over North India through popular whispering campaigns. Meanwhile, on the higher plane, leaders like Ahmadullah, who was in touch with various groups of Muslims and Nana Sahib, who represented the views of the Hindu aristocracy, contacted one another and mutually agreed on some plan of action which was popularised among the lower ranks by all kinds of local people – the Ulama, the tradesmen, the old landlords, even common sadhus and itinerant faqirs. In any case, the Hindustani soldiers of Meerut and the gate-keepers of Delhi city both knew the tasks that were allotted to them for the 10th of May, 1857.<sup>65</sup>

Once the signal was given by the entry of Meerut Sowars and the proclamation of the provisional government in Delhi under Bahadur Shah, the network of Wahhabi organisations immediately came into action all over northern India, particularly in predominantly Muslim areas. True to the convention, members of every revivalist group first chose their leader (*Amir*) for the holy war (*Jihad*) and bound themselves to him by an oath of fidelity (*b'eat*). Then unfurling the green flag of Islam, they took out a procession, calling for the enlistment of volunteers (*Mujahids*) and popularising the *Fatwa* relating to *Jihad*. Meanwhile, the armoury was raided, the treasury was looted, and the prison gates were thrown open. In some cases, the revenue records were burnt, and the *Sahukars* were forced to write off debts.

This was followed by some sort of armed attack on the British barracks or on the local English officials, as the case may be, and the central government at Delhi was asked either to nominate one of their men as administrator for the area, failing which they delegated such powers to one of their own nominees, invariably to the leader of the local group. In any case, in the new administrative set-up of the area, the common people had a very big voice and if there was a regular unit of the army in the locality, the elected committee of the soldiers took charge of the affairs.

Let us illustrate these developments with examples from some of the cities and towns of India.

**Lucknow:** No sooner the news of the revolt spread in the city on 30 May, the Wahhabis of Lucknow unfurled the green flag and paraded the streets, followed by a crowd of about 1,500 people. They asked the people to enlist as volunteers in the cause of the *Jihad* against the British. In due course, they released the famous Maulavi Ahmadullah who was waiting to be hanged and asked him to assume the leadership of the resistance movement. In fact, the revivalist sentiment was so strong, that the army commander of the provisional government himself adopted the green flag his official banner and, to add to its sanctity, tied a copy the Koran over it. In due course, flags of other denominations

<sup>65</sup> Ghalib, *op. cit.*



also appeared and every group tried to hoist its flag high as possible.<sup>66</sup>

*Patna:* In Patna, before the Wahhabi leaders of Sadiqpur could take any steps, they were put under arrest by the British commissioner. A local bookseller, however, who had very close association with the Wahhabi centre, took over the leadership of the resistance movement and organised an armed detachment of volunteers. Their action resulted in the death of an Englishman and was of such magnitude that Sikh troops had to be called to suppress them.<sup>67</sup>

*Agra:* The people of Agra immediately raised a force of *Mujahids* under the leadership of Dr. Wazir Khan, the noted Wahhabi scholar and surgeon, and besieged the British garrison in the Fort. Dr. Wazir Khan, however, was too important a person to be left out of account. He had to join the central leadership of the Wahhabis and followed Bakht Khan and Sarfaraz Ali first to Delhi and then to Lucknow and Mohammadi.<sup>68</sup> The Wahhabis then merged with the local resistance movement as a whole.

*Hyderabad:* Hyderabad, as we know, was a strong centre of the Wahhabis ever since the days of Mubariz-ud Dowlah and the revivalist sentiments were particularly strong among the Muslim soldiery. During the 1857 movement two well-known Wahhabi leaders, Turrabaz Khan and Maulavi Allauddin organised an attack of the soldiery against the British Residency, in spite of the efforts of the Nizam to dissuade Muslims from joining the movement. Eventually the attack failed and the Wahhabi leaders were arrested. Turrabaz Khan was later shot and Maulavi Allauddin was deported to the Andamans.<sup>69</sup>

*Allahabad:* In Allahabad, as soon as the news of the revolt reached, the Hindustani soldiers in the Fort killed the British officers and took charge of the ammunition and of military stores. Meanwhile, Liaqat Ali, the famous Wahhabi leader, who lived originally in Chail but had then settled in Allahabad city unfurled the green flag in the name of Bahadur Shah and, accompanied by Ram Chandra, another leader of patriotic forces, established the headquarters of the Allahabad government in Khusraw Bagh.

Liaqat Ali was either authorised by the central government at Delhi or invested by the local rebels with necessary powers; in any case, he functioned as the governor of Allahabad on behalf of the king of Delhi until the British troops

<sup>66</sup> This provided an excellent opportunity to British spies who took out a flag of their own in the name of Hanuman, the popular God of Hindus, and hoisted it in the midst of the rebel camp on a pipal tree. The trick was only discovered when British guns started using it as target for their shells (Kamaluddin Haider, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-87, for details).

<sup>67</sup> Ali Muhammad Shad, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

<sup>68</sup> Wazir Khan came originally from an Afghan family of Bihar and went to Murshidabad for his English education. He was then sent to England for the study of medicine and returned as a qualified surgeon. He was then appointed as surgeon to a Calcutta hospital and later at Agra where he came in touch with Ahmadullah and formed an association (Majlis) of the Ulema. He was fond of the study of Greek and Hebrew and used to engage in polemics with Christian missionaries. In 1857 when he arrived in Delhi he was nominated to the state council of Bahadur Shah and occupied a similar position in the government at Mohammadi.

<sup>69</sup> Ashraf, *op. cit.*, p. 14.



dislodged him after the initial victory of the patriotic forces. Liaquat Ali then joined Ahmadullah in Lucknow and took part in the resistance movement until he was arrested on the border of Nepal. We have already referred to his trial and deportation in 1872.

Similar actions on a smaller scale were reported from Aligarh, Shahjahanpur, Hissar, Bareilly and from several other places, not excluding the cantonment area in the Punjab and the Frontier. We shall conclude these illustrations with a passing reference to the founder of the Deoband seminary (situated in Sahranpur district of Uttar Pradesh).

*Shamli:* In Shamli, near Meerut, the local unit of the revivalist Muslims chose their Imam-commander and a Kazi to form the nucleus of the rebel government, and immediately organised their armed volunteers to attack the local unit of the British artillery.<sup>70</sup> But since the resistance movement collapsed soon afterwards and the provisional government of Delhi fell, the leaders of the Shamli rising migrated to Arabia. However, Muhammad Qasim, one of the participants in the Shamli engagement who founded the Deoband *Dar-ul-ulum* or religious seminary and in that connection laid down the fundamental rules of the institution, forbade his followers to accept any government aid and banned the teaching of English.<sup>71</sup>

## V. AFTER THE REVOLT

After the failure of the 1857 revolt the entire Muslim population in several places was massacred and the Wahhabi leaders were hunted out throughout Northern India for summary execution. Hundreds of them, including several distinguished Ulema, were blown by the cannon, while others were deported to the penal settlement of the Andamans. In fact, among the first batch of prisoners to arrive in the Andamans were such well known Wahhabi leaders of the revolt as Mufti Mazhar Karim of Delhi and Munishi Inayat Ahmad of Lucknow, followed by the victims of the Ambala (1865) and Patna (1869) Wahhabi trials. It is a remarkable testimony to the undying vigour and tenacity of these Wahhabi leaders that the irrepressible Maulana Ahmadullah of Patna who was deported there, organised the assassination of Lord Mayo, the viceroy of India, on his official visit to the Settlement in 1872. Meanwhile, the Wahhabi centre at Sittana, continued to function — “the centre towards which the hopes alike of our disloyal subjects and our enemies beyond the frontier turn” (Hunter).

It is interesting to note that in 1888 when Sir Syed Ahmad Khan founded his Patriotic Association to wean the Muslims away from the Indian National Congress, the Wahhabis of Ludhiana (in the Punjab) published a book of *Fatwas* in support of the Congress entitled *Nusrat-al Abrar*, comprising over one

<sup>70</sup> Husain Ahmad, *op. cit.*, vol. II., pp. 43-44.

<sup>71</sup> Manazir Ahsan Gilani: *Sawaneh Qasimi*, vol. II., p. 221. It is interesting to note that Husain Ahmad, himself a congressman and the principal of Deoband seminary recently declined the title conferred on him by the President of the Indian Republic.



hundred *Fatwas*, including two from the leaders of Deoband.<sup>72</sup> Similarly, when World War I broke out, the Wahhabi centre on the Frontier took a leading part in the establishment of the first "Indian independent government" at Kabul. The end of the war saw the Wahhabis participating in and leading the great movement of non-cooperation, initiated by Mahatma Gandhi. A Wahhabi nucleus still exists on the Frontier though it is now devoid of any political significance.<sup>73</sup>

One could easily point to Fazle Haq Khayrabadi as the symbol of the Muslim spirit of 1857. Although technically not a Wahhabi himself and even hostile to their creed and religious practices, he consistently supported their anti-British actions. In his *Risala-i Ghadariyya*,<sup>74</sup> written in elegant Arabic during his imprisonment in the Andamans, he characterised his anti-British stand as the only true path a Muslim could follow, irrespective of the fact whether he was a Wahhabi or not.<sup>75</sup> This helped the Wahhabis in assuming the unchallenged leadership of the Muslims as a whole in the events of 1857 and it is no wonder if the British authorities considered them "a persistently belligerent class" and "a source of permanent danger to the Empire."<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Husain Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

<sup>73</sup> Muhammad Ali Kasuri in *Tarikh-wa Siyasiyat*, 1951-52. See bibliography.

<sup>74</sup> Also called *al Thaurat-al Hind*. See bibliography.

<sup>75</sup> He says "I have done no wrong save that I have no feelings for the British (or for other *Kafirs*) and I can't be sympathetic towards them. This is strictly in accordance with the well-known injunction of the Koran ordering the believers not to live on terms of amity with them (Abdus Shahid Khan Sherwani, *Baghi Hindustan*, p. 488). Accused of signing the *Fatwa* of Jihad in Delhi, he frankly acknowledged the charge although he could have been discharged for want of evidence.

<sup>76</sup> W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Mussulmans*, Dedication.



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MIRZA ALI AZHAR

## HADRAT MAHAL'S ROLE IN THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

Hadrat Mahal, wife of Wajid 'Ali Shah, the much maligned ruler of Awadh, is one of those unfortunate historical figures who have been totally forgotten. Her services during the War of Independence, 1857-58, deserved a better fate but very few people know anything about the sufferings that she cheerfully bore for the cause of freedom.

Before 1857 she lived an ordinary, humdrum, although luxurious, life in one of the palaces. On February 6, 1856, Wajid 'Ali Shah was deposed and Awadh annexed to the territories of the East India Company. About a month later the deposed king left Lucknow for Cawnpore *en route* to Calcutta. As all the ladies could not accompany the king, some of them were left behind and Hadrat Mahal was one of them.

When the news of the Meerut outbreak and the capture of Delhi reached Lucknow, Sir Henry Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner, was already on the alert. But his best efforts notwithstanding, the whole of Awadh rose against the British and declared independence. Sitapur, Fyzabad, Daryabad, Sultanpur and Salone followed in quick succession. "Thus in the course of ten days," writes Forrest, the official historian of the "Indian Mutiny", "English administration in Oudh had vanished like a dream and not left a wrack behind. The troops mutinied and the people threw off their allegiance, but there was no revenge, no cruelty. The brave and turbulent population, with a few exceptions, treated the fugitives of the ruling race with marked kindness, and the high courtesy and chivalry of the Barons of Oudh was conspicuous in their dealings with their fallen masters who in the day of their power, had from the best motives inflicted on many of them a grave wrong."<sup>1</sup>

Sir Henry Lawrence could not cope with the situation and his health broke down "under the rapidity with which disasters were piling themselves upon him." He was ordered complete rest but not before he had recommended Major Banks as his successor. In the meantime the British agents approached Raja Man Singh of Ajudhya who assured them of his loyalty to the British<sup>2</sup> and promised to protect the refugees but, for fear of retaliation from the people, he would not act openly. In spite of the whole province being honeycombed with foreign agents and the

<sup>1</sup> G. W. Forrest: *Selections from State Papers*, vol. II, p. 37.

<sup>2</sup> Kamal-al-din: *Qaysar-al-Tawarikh*, p. 212.



treacherous attitude of some of the "vested interests," the mass of the people rose to a man to avenge the wrong committed by the British against their homeland in the preceding year (1856).

On the 30th of June 1857, Lawrence tried to stop the entry of the regiments that had assembled at Nawabgunj (Barabanki), twenty miles from Lucknow. A battle was fought at Chinhut, only eight miles from the city, in which the British were badly defeated. Sir Henry and his shattered forces took refuge in the Residency and the memorable siege began.<sup>3</sup> Sir Henry defended it with all his skill but was mortally wounded by a shell and died on 4th July 1857 leaving Major Banks as his successor.

Now Lucknow had become the centre of revolt and all the regiments that had thrown off the British yoke and the country people, who had struck for freedom, converged on the city. Next to Delhi, Lucknow became the nerve-centre of the national struggle.

On July 5, 1857, only one day after the death of the British Chief Commissioner, Mirza Birjis Qadr, son of the exiled king Wajid 'Ali Shah from Hadrat Mahal, was seated on his ancestral throne.<sup>4</sup> He was only eleven years<sup>5</sup> old. The administration of the civil and military affairs was entrusted by a "Court" to Sharaf-al-Dawlah Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, Nasir-al-Dawlah 'Ali Muhammad Khan (better known as Mammu Khan) and Maharajah Balkrishn<sup>6</sup> under the general supervision of Hadrat Mahal.

The first act of the new administration was to issue an Ordinance in the name of Ta'lluqahdars and Zamindars, etc., exhorting them to join the King in turning out the foreign aggressors.<sup>7</sup> General Hisam-al-Dawlah was asked to enlist fresh Najeeb battalions.

The appeal of the new Government was responded to with enthusiasm and some of the prominent Ta'lluqadars who joined the new regime were:

1. Raja Nawab 'Ali Khan of Mahmudabad.
2. Drigbijay Singh of Mahona.
3. Muhammad Husain Qidwai.
4. Rajah Debi Baksh Singh of Gonda.
5. Rajah Lal Madho Singh of Amethi.
6. Rana Beni Madho of Biswara.
7. Raghunath Singh of Khajurgaon.
8. Kalian Khan on behalf of the Raja of Nanparah.<sup>8</sup>

The only leading Ta'lluqadar who hesitated to respond was Raja Man Singh of Ajudhya. He had already been won over by Captain Alexander Orr, the Assistant Commissioner. When he was openly charged with collusion with the

<sup>3</sup> G. W. Forrest: *Selections from State Papers*, vol. II, p. 49.

<sup>4</sup> *Qaysar-al-Tawarikh*, p. 225.

<sup>5</sup> Najmul Ghani: *Tarikh-i-Awadh*, vol. II, p. 285.

<sup>6</sup> *Qaysar-al-Tawarikh*, pp. 228-9.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 229.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p.p. 234-36.



British by the national leaders he saw no other alternative but to present himself at the Darbar. He joined the forces that had besieged the Residency and was posted at the *Sher Darwazah*. Due to the heterogenous elements that made up the besieging army, unrelieved by any cementing factor, the siege dragged on with varying success. In spite of numerous instances of personal valour the treacherous elements would not allow them to pull their weight together and succeeded in sowing the seeds of discord and corrupting the leaders of the movement.

Opposed to the divided counsels of the patriots having no experience of field operations were the best British military brains of the day presided over by Lord Canning, the Governor-General and his staff officers. Sir Henry Havelock was selected for "quelling all disturbances at Allahabad.....Lucknow, and.....Cawnpore; and that he should take prompt measures for dispersing and utterly destroying all mutineers and insurgents." Hero of many an action, such as the battles of Ava, Ghaznah, Jalalabad, Maharajpur, Mudke etc., he went forth with the support of the whole British empire to crush the upsurge of a "brave but turbulent people" for independence.

After capturing Bithur, Havelock crossed into Awadh on 25th July and on the 29th the hotly contested battle of Unnao took place where the British lost heavily. The superior military skill of Havelock brought him a decisive victory over the Awadh patriots but their valour extorted a grudging praise even from their enemies. "The Oudh gunners," writes Forrest "highly trained soldiers, however, maintained the conflict with singular obstinacy and perished fighting around their guns<sup>9</sup>". At the next battle of Basharatganj, only eight miles ahead, which was fought the same day Havelock had to face the grim determination of the patriots. He was compelled to fall back on Mungulwar and await re-inforcements before he could proceed further on his way to Lucknow.

With fresh reinforcements Havelock, for the second time, advanced and fought the second battle of Basharatganj on 5th August. But here too he met with such a determined opposition that he again gave up the attempt to attack Lucknow and for the second time fell back on Mungulwar. We can imagine the mental anguish of the old general when he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief "I must prepare Your Excellency for my abandonment, with great grief and reluctance, of the hope of relieving Lucknow.....an advance to the walls of Lucknow involves the loss of this force<sup>10</sup>."

After another action on 12th August Havelock decided to re-cross the Ganges and return to Cawnpore, which he did on August 13. The people of Awadh, nicknamed "*Budmashes*" by the arrogant foreigners, had proved that even the best English soldiers of the day, led by the ablest British Commanders, could not face the stout resistance put up by them for their hearths and homes. "Our troops, however, were severely tried; the advance into Cawnpore" admits an English Officer "seemed as much as it was possible for men to endure——. But

G. W. Forrest: *Selections from State Papers*, vol. II, p. 196.  
*Ibid.*, p. 202.



*what we then endured was comparatively light in comparison with what we encountered while advancing into Oudh, and again in returning hither*<sup>11</sup>.

Havelock having failed, in spite of two successive attempts, in advancing on Lucknow much less "quelling all disturbances" there as originally ordered by the Governor-General, the latter decided to send some other general. He selected Sir James Outram for the task. He had to his credit the Bombay saying 'A fox is a fool and a lion a coward by the side of Sir James Outram.' For more than a month preparations were made, and forces assembled to make a final bid to invade Awadh and capture Lucknow.

On September 21, at last, the British army under the command of Outram and Havelock invaded Awadh for the second time. After successive battles at Mungulwar, Buneer and Alambagh, which were as usual bitterly fought, the relieving force halted at the last mentioned place for a day to rest.

After a long and mature deliberation the British force attacked Lucknow on September 25. But in order to carry the strongly held Charbagh Bridge the Britishers hit upon a ruse. They advanced, under the cover of hundreds of cattle<sup>12</sup> to prevent the Hindu soldiery from returning the fire. But every inch of the ground was contested and the attacking force suffered heavily under the steady fire of the opposing soldiers.

Now let us turn to the other side of the picture. One of the earliest administrative acts of the new government was to send a memorial (*Arzdasht*) to the emperor of Delhi who gave his approval to the accession of Mirza Birjis Qadr as the new *Wazir*. The heterogeneous elements that had collected found the boy-king and the Queen-mother were further increased by the defeat of Nana Sahib at Cawnpore and the fall of Delhi. Nana Sahib himself came to Lucknow and was received as a state guest. With the arrival of the claimant for the Peshwa's *gaddi* a new disturbing factor was introduced into the hastily collected forces that had been fighting for their freedom. The British were utilising to the full their opportunities of creating suspicions and discord among the leaders of the patriotic forces. The most prominent among these leaders, besides the royal party, were Risaldar Sayyid Barkat Ahmad and Captain Suba Singh of the Sepoy army, Mawlawi Ahmadullah alias *Danka Shah*, some of the *Ta'lluqdars* with their *Gohars*, Nana Sahib with his entourage (after the fall of Cawnpore), General Bakht Khan and Prince Firuz Shah (after the fall of Delhi).

From the outset it was evident that the patriots lacked harmony and could not therefore be expected to put up a planned resistance against the trained and well-directed British army. But the national army of Awadh, without any leadership worth the name, fought with usual stubbornness. Raja Man Singh fought so well at Charbagh that the title of "*Farzand*" was bestowed on him by the Queen mother. Others who distinguished themselves at this battle were Tajammul Husain Khan of Bhatwamau, who was seriously wounded and Mir Najaf 'Ali and

<sup>11</sup> Major North: *Journal of an English Officer in India*, p. 120

<sup>12</sup> *Qaysar-al-Tawarikh*, p. 239.



Mirza Imam 'Ali Beg, who did not leave their guns, although they were cut to pieces.<sup>13</sup>

The greatest weakness of the national leadership lay in the divided counsels that hindered the prosecution of a successful war against the enemy. These differences of opinion were exploited to the full by the enemy. The Queen's control, in spite of her best efforts, could not be firm due to the disruptive activities of the enemy's agents. The palace itself was swarming with spies and the behaviour of some of the wives of the ex-king (who were living at Lucknow) became very suspicious. The officers of the national army approached the Begam Sahibah in a body and demanded the expulsion of all these ladies. With the greatest difficulty, she could pacify the infuriated soldiers but only after the promise that proper measures would be taken at the proper time.

The indiscipline of the sepoys, who had already been notorious for arrogance and had given no little headache to their British commanders, increased. Even their *Subedars* or *Risaldars* could not control them and they began to indulge in looting the civil population. When these cases were reported to the boy-king Mirza Birjis Qadr, he sent for the officers and admonished them, on which they promised to restrain the soldiery.<sup>14</sup>

After the first relief of Lucknow on September 25, 1857, in which Outram and Havelock had brought reinforcements to the besieged in the Residency, the main efforts of the British forces were concentrated in clearing the surroundings from the insurgents. But due to the heavy losses suffered by them they were not bold enough to evacuate the Baillie Guard. The whole month of October was again spent in preparations.

On the 14th November 1857 Sir Colin Campbell, the Commander-in-Chief, advanced on Lucknow and succeeded in relieving the Residency for the second time. The garrison was completely withdrawn from the Residency in the midnight of November 22.

In spite of the two reliefs of the Lucknow Residency, Awadh was not subdued. The Britishers knew that unless Awadh, "*the fecund nursery of sepoys*" was subjugated there would be no peace in the sub-continent. But they dared not attack the province unless in sufficient strength. "After the experience lately gained of the *stubborn spirit of Oudh*" wrote the Commander-in-Chief "the reduction of that province could not be attempted with an army of less than 30,000 men." According to Colonel Napier "20,000 men are necessary for the first operation of subduing the city. That having been performed it will be necessary to leave a garrison in occupation, consisting of at least, 10,000 men—viz., 6000 in the city, and 4000 in a chain of posts to the Cawnpore Road—until the whole province shall have been conquered and the rebels driven out of their last stronghold."<sup>15</sup>

Sir Colin wished to attack Rohilkhand first, and informed the Governor

*Qaysar-al-Tawarikh*, p. 267-8.

*Ibid.*, p. 233.

Forrest: *Selections from State Papers*, vol. II p. 357.



General that "Oudh ought to wait till the autumn of 1858, when with the countries occupied in strength all round it, the proper subjugation of Rajahs and people might be expected without risk and much loss". But Lord Canning thought otherwise: "I think it of more importance to re-establish our power in the centre and capital of Oudh, *which has scarcely been in our possession two years*, than to recover our older possessions. Every eye in India is upon Oudh as it was upon Delhi. Oudh is not only the rallying place of the sepoys, the place to which they all look, and by the doings in which their own hopes and prospects rise or fall—but it represents a dynasty; there is a king of Oudh seeking his own. *Oudh and our dealings with it have been in every native's mind for the last two years.*"<sup>16</sup>

On March 2, 1858 Sir Colin attacked Lucknow with "*the largest and most effective army that had ever assembled in India*"<sup>17</sup>. The Indians had not the ghost of a chance against such a formidable force led by renowned soldiers like Colin Campbell and Outram. They concentrated on the city and the exodus began.

Begam Sahibah with Mirza Birjis Qadr left the *Farhat Afza* palace (near Qaysar Bagh) and retreated to the western part of the city. General Outram three times offered tempting terms to the Begam, but she refused to surrender. On March, 16, 1858, she left Lucknow and through Bharawan, Mahmudabad and Bitholee went to Bondi (Distt. Bahraich) on the other side of the Ghagra river. Here (at Bondi) she became the centre of all the disgruntled elements. The civil population welcomed her heartily and paid the revenue willingly. Finally she left for Nepal, where she was allowed to live in peace. A last offer was sent to her at Nayakot (Nepal) to return. The government offered her a suitable allowance with permission to live at Fyzabad or Lucknow, but she declined it.<sup>18</sup> She preferred to live and die a free person.

Even after about one hundred years the people of Bondi, Nanparah and other places in the Bahraich district, both Hindus and Muslims, talk about the Begam Sahiba with respect and affection. The writer of these lines has seen many a sturdy *Thakur* and *Pathan*, in the interior of the district, wistfully talking of the lady with tears in their eyes. No doubt "the agony endured by Oudh seventy years ago is resented to-day far beyond the borders of Oudh."<sup>19</sup>

The Begam, in spite of her inherent weakness as a *pardahnashin* lady, fought against the greatest imperialist power of the day with dauntless courage. She was supported in her patriotic stand by the brave population of Awadh, both Hindus and Muslims. "*Neither our threats nor our blandishments*" admits Russell who was with Sir Colin Campbell in his winter campaign "*have prevailed on the Oudh chiefs to renounce the cause of their supposed king, or to submit to our rule.*"<sup>20</sup> As to the justice of the cause free, impartial verdict has always been in favour of the people of Awadh. "*The Oudh villager or 'badmash,'* who, whatever

<sup>16</sup> Forrest: *Selections from State Papers*, vol. II p. 357.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. II p. 397.

<sup>18</sup> K. Haydar: *Qaysar al-Tawarikh*, p. 368.

<sup>19</sup> E. Thompson: *The Other Side of the Medal*, p. 121.

<sup>20</sup> W. H. Russell: *My Diary in India*, Vol. II, p. 277.



other acts of injustice and rapine he may have committed, and whatever his private character" admits Majendie, "cannot be said to have been guilty of rebellion, nor had done any of these deeds, but simply taken advantage of a great revolt to strike a blow for his country, which we had taken from him, and who was fighting whether wisely or not is another question — with at least a show of right upon his side and in a cause which was not wholly vile — it would have been more satisfactory if for the people of Oude — sepoys excepted — there had been some mercy and quarter."<sup>21</sup>

But the power-drunk victors would not make any distinction between the innocent and the guilty. "At the time of the capture of Lucknow — a season of indiscriminate massacre—such distinction was not made," writes Majendie, "and the unfortunate who fell into the hands of our troops was made short work of — sepoy or Oudh villager, it mattered not — no questions were asked! his skin was black, and did not that suffice? A piece of rope and the branch of a tree, or a rifle bullet through his brain, soon terminated the poor devil's existence."<sup>22</sup> The torch-bearers of Christian civilisation had decided to "show these rascally Musalmans" writes Roberts (later Lord Roberts of Kandahar) "that, with God's help, Englishmen will still be masters of India"<sup>23</sup> The inhuman atrocities, the orgy of murder and rape committed in diabolical manner could not but extort a note of protest from persons worthy of respect. "All these kinds of vindictive, unchristian, Indian torture such as sewing Mohammedans in pig-skins, smearing them with pork-fat before execution, and burning their bodies, and forcing Hindus to defile themselves, are disgraceful, and ultimately recoil on ourselves. They are spiritual and mental tortures to which we have no right to resort, and which we dare not perpetrate in the face of Europe."<sup>24</sup> No wonder the horrors committed by the British champions of civilisation in the years 1857-58 terrorised the country to such an extent that the very soul of the nation was killed. The country had to wait for another hundred years (till 1947) to regain that independence for which the Lucknow queen died in a distant land. It now pulsates with life and self-respect and can speak out the anguish of the soul, undeterred by the frown of the foreign master and unhampered by the vile practices of the detestable sycophant.

(in: *Journal of Pakistan Historical Society* (Karachi), Vol. I, Pt. III (July 1953), pp. 244-253).

<sup>21</sup> Majendie: *Up among the Pandies*, p. 195.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 195-6.

<sup>23</sup> *Letters written during the Indian Mutiny*.

<sup>24</sup> W. H. Russel: *My Diary in India*, vol. II, p. 43.







MOHAMMAD SULEMAN BADAYUNI

## A NOTE ON TWO LITTLE KNOWN FIGHTERS IN THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1857-58

Sahaswan, a tahsil and town of some importance in the district of Badayun is situated at a short distance from the river Mahawa.

It is a place of considerable antiquity and tradition relates that it was founded<sup>1</sup> by a Hindu chieftain, named Sahasrabahan or Sahastrabahan, but the date is not known, nor can it be easily fixed. A very ancient temple stands near the lake, Dhund Jhil. It is said that the rajahs of Qannawj and Dihli used to visit the place on hunting expeditions.

The ruins of a fort of the time<sup>2</sup> of 'Ala-al-Din Khalji indicates even today the antiquity of the building and the town. The following inscription on the fort shows that it was built by the orders of the great Khalji monarch.

”بنائے ایں حصن رفیع الارکان از برائے مامن اہل ایمان بفرمان مجلس اعلیٰ خدایگان زبدہ سلاطین جہاں سایہ رحمان علامہ الدین والدین الوائق  
بفرمان اللہ المجاہد فی سبیل اللہ ابوالمظفر محمد شاہ السلطان ناصر امیر المومنین غلہ اللہ ملکہ تاریخ غرہ جمادی الاولیٰ روز جمعہ مبارک مئخصد سال از ہجرت  
نبی علیہ السلام والتحیۃ“

In the days of the Rohilla ascendancy Sahaswan was under the jurisdiction of 'Abdullah Khan, the eldest son of Nawwab 'Ali Muhammad Khan. In the time of Wellesley the region known as Rohilkhand became a part of the East India Company's dominion. Originally there were only two districts in this area—Moradabad and Bareilly; Sahaswan formed part of the larger district of Moradabad, but later it was made a tahsil in Bareilly.

In 1824 it became the headquarters of the present district of Badayun and Mr. Setan was appointed district magistrate and collector. In 1838 the headquarters were shifted to Badayun.

The population of Sahaswan according to the census of 1951 was 21,422, the Muslims being in majority. It has always been a centre of learning and some well-known scholars were born and flourished there. Mawlawi 'Abd-al-Bari,

<sup>1</sup> The District Gazetteer, Badayun, P. 239.

<sup>2</sup> Sabhat-al-Marjan fi Zikr-i-'Ulema-i-Sahaswan by Abdul Baqi, p. 7.



Shams-ul-'Ulama Mawlawi Amir Ahmad and Mawlawi Muhammad Bashir may be mentioned by way of illustrations.

The title of Shamsul-'Ulama was conferred on Mawlawi Amir Ahmad in the first batch of the recipients of that title in recognition of their learning. Mawlawi Muhammad Bashir was a scholar of such eminence that Ishaq b. 'Abd-al-Rahman b. Hasan b. Muhammad b. Wahhab Najdi came<sup>3</sup> to him to study *Hadith*.

Sahaswan had not only the distinction of being a centre of learning but was also the birthplace of soldiers and noblemen who sacrificed their lives and property in the cause of freedom during the War of Independence, 1857-58.

Mir Muhammad Hasan Khan of Sahaswan was a *mir munshi* in the secretariate of Awadh government. One of his sons Mir Fida Husayn Khan was a captain in the army of Awadh, the other son, Muhammad Husayn Khan held the post of a collector. They were also owners of considerable property and were among the leading *ta'alluqah-dars*.

Mir Muhammad Husayn Khan was<sup>4</sup> the *nazim* of Khayrabad when the War of Independence broke out in 1857. He decided to join the struggle for freedom and marched towards Tandah<sup>5</sup> at the head of a group of *mujahids*. Tandah soon became a strong-hold of the *mujahids*. Muhammad Husayn Khan collected an army, took<sup>6</sup> possession of Gorakhpur and established the authority of the national government. Through his efforts the movement thus gained much strength in that region.

Muhammad Husayn Khan attacked Khalilabad, fifteen miles from Gorakhpur, with a force consisting of 5,000 fighters.

Mr. Bird, the collector of Gorakhpur offered resistance. In spite of artillery and cavalry that he had under his command the *mujahids* inflicted<sup>7</sup> a crushing defeat and Bird fled away. The victors seized the treasury and its contents were distributed among them by their leader. Though a victor on the field of battle Muhammad Husayn failed to consolidate his position. The Company's forces made a determined attempt to recover their lost position. A fierce action was fought and Bird had the day this time. The revolutionary forces were completely routed and Muhammad Husayn was surrounded by the enemy forces. Concealing his identity he managed to reach Gorakhpur.

A *khila't* with title of *Muqarrab-al-Dawlah* was conferred<sup>8</sup> on Mir Muhammad Husayn Khan for his services in the War of liberation by the government of Birjis Qadr.

<sup>3</sup> Muhammad b. Abd-al-Wahhab, p. 59.

<sup>4</sup> *Baghi Hindustan* by 'Abd-al-Shahid Khan Sherwani, p. 200.

<sup>5</sup> *Qaysar-al-Tawarikh*, vol. II p. 3-5.

<sup>6</sup> Kaye and Malleeson, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, vol. VI, p. 59.

<sup>7</sup> Kaye and Malleeson, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, vol. VI p. 59.

<sup>8</sup> *Qaysar-al-Tawarikh*, vol. VI, p. 305.



Wingfield, the commissioner of Bahraich assisted by Bird, and Jang Bahadur of Nepal now marched on Gorakhpur to face the *nazim*. A battle was fought<sup>9</sup> which resulted in the defeat of the *nazim*.<sup>10</sup>

When the news of the *nazim*'s defeat reached Lucknow, Nadir Mirza *wasiqadar* sent Mir Fida Husayn with Rajah Man Singh to help the *nazim* in order to face the British and Nepali forces but the rajah cheated him.

The rajah's army did not obey the *nazim* and<sup>11</sup> left him alone. In the company of Nādir Mirza the *nazim* presented himself before Hadrat Mahal, the Queen of Awadh at Bari but unfortunately here also they met with a defeat. Muhammad Husayn now went into hiding in order to save himself from falling into the hands of the enemy.

In 1859 the British authority was re-established, and peace and order were restored. After the Proclamation of Queen Victoria the two brothers Mir Muhammad Husayn Khan and Mir Fida Husayn Khan came out of their hiding. A case was filed against them but both were discharged as a result of the efforts of Mir Mawdud Bakhsh who had been loyal to the British and acted as a *risalahdar*. The orders for their discharge were issued from Calcutta. But it was only their lives that were saved. Their property was confiscated and the magnificent houses owned by them were blown by cannon and turned into ruins. A similar treatment was meted out to their neighbours and relations.

The two brothers spent the remaining days of their lives in obscurity in their native town of Sahaswan. Mir Muhammad Husayn Khan met his death in 1888 and his brother Mir Fida Husayn died in 1897.

Another notable *mujahid*<sup>12</sup> belonging to this family, named Sayyid Niaz Ahmad who was a scholar as well as a soldier attained martyrdom with a *tasbeeh* (beads) in his hand and the *kalimah* on his lips.

in: *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society* (Karachi), V/i (January 1957), pp. 24-127).

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Kaye and Malleson *History of the Indian Mutiny* vol. VI p. 59.

The fall of Gorakhpur was followed as usual by indiscriminate executions; "Ten men were hung the day after we arrived, and six on the following day; how many more since it is not easy to say, as the gallows was removed from the conspicuous spot it occupied in consequence of an intimation from the Nepalese chief that it was displeasing to him to see bodies hanging." [From a letter quoted in *Indian Mutiny* (vol. II, p. 228) by Ball.

It is needless to add that here as in several other engagements the revolutionaries suffered a defeat because of the treachery of the Gurkhas.

*Qaysar-al-Tawarikh*, vol. II p. 307.

*Sabhat-al-Marjan-fi-Zikr-i-'Ulema-i Sahaswan*, p. 53.

The photos of the two brothers were secured from their descendants.







## THE ROLE OF THE PUNJAB IN THE REVOLT OF 1857

The leaders and the organisers of the movement fully realised the importance of the Punjab in the moments of war against the British imperialism in India. They propagated their cause in this region with all their might and limited resources at their disposal. The British on the other hand had also realised that the disaffection at Bengal and Oudh was also taking roots in the Punjab. Though here "the disease had not yet broken out, but it had shown premonitory symptoms."<sup>1</sup> It was in 1856-57 that the Gurkha regiment from Jutogh and the Purbiah army was encamped together at Ambala for annual exercise. The latter did not waste this opportunity and persuaded the former to rise against the masters at suitable and proper time.<sup>2</sup> It was in May, 1857, that the Government buildings and stores were set on fire in the darkness of the night and this process continued till the outbreak of the mutiny. The Kotwal of the city had told the authorities that seditious feelings were found among the civilians as well as the army men. In spite of the fact that chiefs of this area specially and the people generally played a pro-British role, yet the Muslim population had been comparatively busy in inspiring the sepoys and the people against the rulers. Ajoon Khan, a Muslim outlaw, was accused of seducing the sepoys at Abazye, a fortress at the Swat river.<sup>3</sup> In August, 1856, a letter from the Akhoond of Swat to Fateh Khan of Pindi Gheb was captured which announced the correspondence between the Muslims of Lucknow and Amir Dost Muhammad Khan of Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the correspondence between Fateh Khan and the Akhoond, in itself was a red signal. It was in these circumstances that the telegram announcing the rising at Meerut reached Lahore on 12 May, 1857.

At that time the entire force in the Punjab consisted of twelve European regiments (including one of cavalry) and of these some were stationed at the extreme ends, four at Ambala and three in the Peshawar valley. While the native force comprised of two troops and three companies of artillery, six light cavalry,

<sup>1</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, Vol.1, p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> Hare Edwards *Memoires* (London, 1900) Part I, p. 7., quoted by Muin-ul-Haq, *op. cit.*, pp. 248-49.

<sup>3</sup> Kaye. *op. cit.*, p. 495.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* Report by Mr. Forsyth. p. 496.



and twenty-six infantry regiments of regulars and eight of irregular cavalry, besides the entire local force Sikhs and the Punjabis.

The total number of the force garrisoned in the Punjab was 59,656, which consisted of 35,900 Hindustanis (chiefly regulars) 13,430 Punjabis (irregulars) and 10,326 Europeans.

Lahore, the capital of the Punjab was quartered with four native regiments (three of infantry and one of cavalry) and the European force consisting of Queen's 81st with the troops of horse artillery and four reserve companies of foot artillery. The natives here outnumbered the Europeans by eight to one.

Sir John Lawrence was at Rawalpindi and Robert Montgomery the judicial Commissioner, devolved the duty of meeting the danger. He accordingly summoned a conference of the leading officers of the civil station at Anarkali, viz., Mr. Donald Mcleod, financial Commissioner, Mr. A. A. Robert, the Commissioner, Major Ommaney, Chief Engineer, Colonel Macpherson, Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Captain Lawrence, the Commander of the Punjab Police; and Captain Hutchinson, the Assistant of Major Ommaney. Robert Montgomery told them that, "Nothing but prompt vigorous course would save the city."<sup>5</sup>

Then he, along with Colonel Macpherson drove to the cantonment to consult about the affairs and decisions wade by the council about disarming the soldiers with 37 year's old Brigadier Corbett, the Commander of the army at Lahore. In the beginning, Corbett did not whole-heartedly support the others in disarming the soldiers. He was not prepared to offend the prejudices of his soldiers by actually disarming them. But in the meanwhile a Sikh brought the news that the soldiers at Mian Mir are intriguing to subjugate the fort on the following day or two. Moreover, on 12 May, Lawrence sent a telegram telling Montgomery that the greater portion of the native regular army would have to be disarmed.<sup>6</sup> Now Corbett thought it wise to agree with Montgomery and his council's decision.

The fort was ordinarily garrisoned by one company of the European regiment, one company of the foot artillery, and a wing of the native infantry. The plan of the sepoys was that one thousand men of both the regiments which were garrisoned together in the fort were to rush on the officers, seize the gate, take possession of the citadel, the magazine and the treasury, to overpower the small body of the Europeans, some 80 men of H.M.'s 81st and 70 men of the artillery. The rising was then to become general in the cantonment. So after

<sup>5</sup> Holmes, T.R. *op. cit.*, p. 314.

<sup>6</sup> Cooper, Fredric. *The Crisis in the Punjab from the 10th of May until the fall of Delhi* (London, 1858) p. 236.

Lieutenant-General Sir George McMun is wrong when he says, "Lawrence being a little disturbed at the disarming at Mian Mir which he felt must upset any regiment still loyal." *The Indian Mutiny in Perspective*, (London, 1931) p. 75. We find no documents supporting his cause.



knowing the plot Brigadier Corbett ordered for the general parade on the following morning. He knew the importance of the fort which "commands the city of Lahore, that it contains the treasure and arsenal, that at Ferozepur, fifty miles distant, there is another arsenal, the largest in this part of India, and had these two fallen, the North-Western Provinces and the Punjab must have been for the time being irrevocably lost, the lives of all Europeans in these regions sacrificed, Delhi would not have been taken, and India must have been conquered."

A ball which was scheduled on 13 May was not postponed though all the cares were taken to meet any ugly situation which might arise. The men enjoyed dancing till 2 o' clock, but fortunately no incident occurred.

On the morning of 14 May the troops were called for parade. The Europeans were placed on the right, the native infantry in the centre, and the native cavalry on the left. Then the native regiments were ordered to change front to the rear. While they were occupied in this new manoeuvre, H.M.'s 81st changed front and marched round, left shoulders forward so as to present a line along the new position of the native corps, the artillery beyond and behind them also moving round and loading as they went. Then Lieutenant Mocatta adjutant of the 26th light infantry read an address and told that as the mutinous spirit was spreading, it had been decided to disarm them not for the peace of the country which Britain could maintain but to save them from any sort of temptation which could ruin their past deeds.

The sepoys hesitated for a moment, but clearly listened the voice "Eighty-first load", and the clang of the ramnads. Now the resistance was useless, so they piled up their arms. Thus sixteenth, twenty-sixth, and forty-ninth N.I. regiments were disarmed in the presence of only 350 Europeans, and marched off to their lines. "Never was a more decisive victory gained. By the morning's work Montgomery and Corbett had not only saved the capital of the Punjab, they had saved the empire."<sup>8</sup>

In spite of disarming the regiments, the situation was not still very calm. The sepoys committed the actions of rage whenever they found the time to do so. A sepoy of the disarmed 10th Irregular, seized a sword and attacked on the Europeans, but was captured and punished with five years imprisonment. Another man on another occasion rushed out of a city gate with a sword, cut down the sentry, but was shot down by a mounted policeman. On 9 June two men of the 35th N. I. were found guilty of sedition and were blown from the guns by the orders of the court martial. Moreover some papers were discovered which clearly indicated the mutinous spirit in the sepoys and several trials of such parties were held.<sup>9</sup>

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From Robert Montgomery, Judicial Commissioner to R. Temple Esquire, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner Punjab.—No. 149, dated Lahore, 24 March, 1858. Mutiny Record. Reports. Part II, Vol. VIII, Pt. II, (Lahore, 1911).

Holmes, T. R. *op. cit.*, p. 315.

Robert Montgomery *op. cit.*, Para. 58.



The 26th N. I. mutinied on 30th July murdered Major Spencer, their commanding officer, one non-commissioned European, and two native officers. They ran towards Delhi, and due to the heavy dust storm could not be chased. But unfortunately they were entrapped by the Tehsildar of Ajnala, and he killed 150 of them in a skirmish. In the meanwhile Fredric Cooper the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar reached there and imprisoned them, 280 in number, only a few could manage to escape. In the eyes of Cooper the ill-fated sepoys were murderers and he decided to kill them all. The supply of rope for hanging them was not sufficient so he decided to shoot them. Cooper himself relates this cruel and inhuman story in these words, "About 150 having been thus executed, one of the executioners swooned away (he was the oldest of the firing party) and a little respite was allowed. The proceeding, the number had arrived at two hundred and thirty seven; when the district officer was informed that the remainder refused to come out of bastion, where they had been imprisoned temporarily a few hours before. Expecting rush and resistance, preparations were made against escape; but little expectation was entertained of the real and awful fate which had fallen on the remainder of mutineers: they had anticipated, by a few short hours, their doom. The doors were opened, and, behold they were nearly all dead! unconsciously, the tragedy of Holwell's Black Hole had been re-enacted. No cries had been heard during the night . . . Forty-five bodies dead from fright, exhaustion, fatigue, heat and partial suffocation . . ."<sup>10</sup>

This butchery on the part of Cooper was officially appreciated. Lawrence wrote to him, "I congratulate you on your success against the 26th N.I. You and your police acted with much energy and spirit, and deserve well the state."<sup>11</sup>

The rising of 26th N.I. alerted the English and drastic measures were taken to face any sort of danger. The fort was garrisoned with four thousand men, and all its gates were closed except one. As the Punjabis seemed to be loyal, so those who were on leave were called back. The European residents formed a company of 136 volunteers and for some times Anarkali was guarded by them. A danger signal was also arranged, the roads to cantonment were patrolled by the police during the night. Moreover the press was brought under the strict control of censorship. "The editor of the 'Moartizae' was imprisoned for publishing treasonable matter, and his paper was stopped. The editor of 'Chashma-e-Faiz' was ordered to remove his establishment from Sialkot to Lahore where his paper, together with the two already published at the capital, was put under rigid surveillance."<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Cooper, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-63.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 167-168. Montgomery also appreciated his action in these words, "All honour to you for what you have done, and right well you do it ... It will be a feather to your cap as long as you live. The other three regiments here were very shaky yesterday, but hardly think they will now go. I wish they would, as they are a nuisance, and not a man would escape if they do."

<sup>12</sup> *Selection from the Public Correspondence of the Administration for the Affairs of the Punjab.* (Lahore, 1859) pp. 6-7.



On 24 July, restrictions were placed on the sale of lead, sulphur, percussion, caps and all other things, which could help to make ammunitions. On 29 June Hindustani population including civil officers were disarmed. 2536 Hindustanis who were unemployed in the city of Lahore were expelled from the city. The district officers in the most cases had the post bags opened in their presence and suspicious letters were suppressed. The guards on the ferries were increased, and every man who crossed the ferries, specially coming from Delhi were carefully watched, and suspicious men were detained.

As mentioned before, Amir Dost Muhammad Khan was silenced with the British gold. Gulab Singh, the leader of the Sikhs who could be seduced to war at any moment "was cajoled into active allegiance."<sup>13</sup> Nawab of Bahawalpur promised to remain neutral. The Rajas of Patiala and Jhind were even more active than the Europeans to suppress the rising.

After saving Lahore and taking successful measures for the safety of the capital of the province, the authorities turned to the other important cities.

Ambala at that time was stationed with H.M.'s 9th lancers, 2 troops of horse artillery, with the 4th (native) light cavalry, and 5th and 60th N.I. regiments. The total number of the Europeans was about 250. It was very important to control this city as the G.T. road runs through it. The city had been the target of the sepoys' activities since nine months. A few months back "A fanatic attacked on the Adjutant Lieutenant Baugh of 34th N.I. and sepoy on the main guard looked passive and exulting spectator."<sup>14</sup> This was the first show of force at Ambala.

Moreover, it was only two months back General Anson visited the corps at Ambala while on his tour to the North-West Provinces. He addressed the sepoys on 22 March and told them that the news about the cartridge was false. He also ordered that the musketry practice of the sepoys should be suspended till further orders. On 28 March the sepoys gave a statement which was presented to the General through Lieutenant E.M. Martineau. In this statement as interpreted by the Lieutenant the sepoys assured of their loyalty and obedience to carry on any sort of orders but also told that if they fired the greased cartridge, "They become outcasts for ever unacknowledged not only in their corps but also in their families and their homes."<sup>15</sup> But inspite of this meak protest it was decided that the sepoys should be compelled to fire the cartridge in defiance of their prejudices and their fears. Accordingly on the morning of the 17 April the sepoys used the cartridge but the Government property worth thirty thousand rupees was burnt on the same night, and then these fires became nightly occurrences.

On 10 May which is the date of the outbreak at Meerut, the sepoy regiments at Ambala rushed out of their lines, and began to load against their

<sup>13</sup> Cooper. *op. cit.*, p. 238.

<sup>14</sup> G.C. Barnes, Commissioner and Superintendent of Cis-Sutlej states to Robert Montgomery Esq. *Mutiny Record*. (Reports), (Lahore 1911) Vol. VIII, pt. 1. No.54 Ambala, 5 February, 1858.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*



native officers but General Bernard succeeded in pacifying them. "On the next day he issued an address promising them, if they behaved well their misconduct on the 10th should be overlooked."<sup>16</sup> In these circumstances the news of the revolt reached here on 11 May. On 12 May Barnes ordered Mr. Andrew and Assistant Commissioner of Ambala to proceed to Karnal with Patiala sowars. The Rajas of Nabha, Kotla and Ludhiana on request mobilised their troops to safeguard the road. Raja of Jhind took the duty of protecting Karnal and also sent spies to Delhi for the foreign interest. Captain Wyld was sent in command of 4th light cavalry and two companies under Captain Garstin to overawe the people of Judgree. The reason being was that the Gujars of Saharanpur had arisen and it was probable that these people who had contacts with them may follow their foot-prints.

In Ropur, Mohur Singh, a sikh 'Karinda' of the late chief Bhup Singh rose but was suppressed. Three of the ring-leaders with Mohur Singh were executed. Rest of the sepoys were disarmed and some were court martialled. In the meanwhile highway robberies started but the culprits were detected and executed. These small risings may have taken the shape of a terrible war but for the assistance rendered by the Rajas of Patiala and Thaneswar with about 2,000 men awed the sepoys. Moreover, the Jagirdars of Ambala city, Judgree, Ropur, Khusrar and Naringhur supplied 459 foot, 259 sawars and 19,166 rupees, 12 annas and 9 pennies to the Britishers which was obviously a great disheartening fact to the sepoys and also the local people.<sup>17</sup>

Finally towards the end of June the local population was also disarmed and Government received about 1240 arms. The 5th, 45th and 57th N.I. regiments were disarmed without any difficulty. One of the regiments the 60th mutinied and a few soldiers of this regiment could only manage to reach Delhi. This was the only help which Ambala district rendered to the revolutionaries.

Ferozepur was the largest arsenal in upper India. It consisted of two native infantry regiments the 45th and the 57th besides the 10th native cavalry. The white soldiers in the Brigade consisted of two companies of foot artillery, a light field battery and H.M.'s 61st regiment. The quantity of the stores was so large that if "had these gone, the British flag would not have been waving over the walls of Delhi."<sup>18</sup> So during the meeting at Lahore, Robert Montgomery did not overlook Ferozepur and informed Brigadier Innes (who had taken the charge just two days back) about the disarming of the sepoys at Lahore. The authorities had been informed about the disaffection prevailing among the sepoys. A native officer had openly declared at a court of inquiry that not a man of the corps would touch the cartridge. It was also told that meetings were held during the night at which seditious language was used.<sup>19</sup> But rivalry between the two regiments gave a sign of satisfaction to the officers. On 13 May Innes held a

<sup>16</sup> G. C. Barnes to Montgomery Esq., No. 54. *op. cit.*, Para. 5.

<sup>17</sup> Report of Mr. T. D. Forsyth, Deputy Commissioner, Ambala. *op. cit.*, pp. 37-39.

<sup>18</sup> Cooper. *op. cit.*, p.

<sup>19</sup> Cave-Browne. *op. cit.*, p. 105. (Vol. II)



parade to judge the temper of the men, but his judgement met with a "strong protest from their commanding officers."<sup>20</sup> He made a compromise with only two N.I. corps to be disarmed. He also sent one hundred men under Major Redmond to guard the magazine. So according to the program at 5 p.m. the 45th and 54th were called to their parade ground and ordered to march towards their camping grounds which were at two miles distant. The 57th reached to the allotted ground but 45th instead of taking the main cantonment road, took a shorter route through Sadar bazar, from where they could see the Europeans in shooting position. It was obvious that the scene aroused their suspicions that they were going to be entrapped. Moreover, "Fanatic moulvies and disaffected baniahs were at hand to insite them; 'Dagha hai' (There is treachery) became the cry."<sup>21</sup> Two hundred of them broke off, loaded their guns and ran to the ramparts. Their attack was repulsed but Major Redmond was badly wounded. Now the sepoys attacked the cantonment and burnt to ashes the memorial church, Roman Catholic Chapel, mess houses, hospital and a number of Government houses and other buildings. During the night the 57th remained quiet. On the following morning Brigadier Innes sent Colonal Darwel to persuade the regiments to pile up the arms, and as a result a company of 45th, 57th, and 61st gave their arms after a minor hesitation. This obviously weakened the position of the sepoys who now made an escape to Delhi. Major Mardson the D.C. went in their pursuit but except a few they managed to reach their destination.<sup>22</sup> Brigadier Innes was accused for putting the task of disarming the soldiers on tomorrow. Lawrence was not happy on his achievements as he "had missed an excellent opportunity of teaching the sepoys a lesson which would have cowed them for hundred of miles."<sup>23</sup>

Jullundur: The telegram telling about the affairs at Meerut reached Lahore through this station. Colonel Hartay who was commanding the station in the temporary absence of Brigadier Johnstone was informed of the disarming of the soldiers at Lahore. On the next day meeting of the officers was called and the situation was discussed. The problem of this district was of a peculiar nature. It contained four out stations; Hoshiarpur, Nurpur, Kangra and Phillaur all with considerable men and ammunition, "—all held by Purbiah regiments, without a European soldier, and with only a small body of police."<sup>24</sup> Jullundur proper was garrisoned with 8<sup>th</sup> (King's) 1 troop, and company of artillery, with the 6th (native) light cavalry and the 36th and 61st N.I. regiments. The 36th N. I. had been stationed at Meerut, and it was very recent that it was brought to Jullundur. So it could not be overlooked that it might have the same feelings which made the troops to rise at Meerut. The 61st had been camped with the 19th and the 34th N.I. at Lucknow, and the later two were responsible for the trouble at Burhanpur.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108.

<sup>22</sup> Kaye and Malleeson, vol. II, p. 332.

<sup>23</sup> M. R. (Correspondence). Lawrence to Anson dated 21 May, 1857. Enclosure to secret letters from India.

<sup>24</sup> Cave-Browne. *op. cit.*, p. 115.



So the danger could be apprehended from both the regiments at any time. There had been also several cases of fire in the past. Another incident which made the situation more critical was a writing on a wall which declared three men of a bad character and they were the favourites of the whites. Spies also brought the news of the secret meetings during the night.<sup>25</sup> Moreover the officers feared the outstanding number of the purbiahs and the lack of Punjab police and the Europeans at Ludhiana.<sup>26</sup> Notwithstanding all this and assurances which were given to the sepoys that, "so long as they remain quiet, not a hair of their head should be touched."<sup>27</sup> Brigadier Innes decided to disarm them on the morning of 6 June. But the plan was postponed till the morning of 7 June, but again on 7 June it was put off. This wavering policy of the officers excited the soldiers and on the night of 7 June at 11 p.m. they attacked some of their officers, plundered the treasure, and after having divided the plunder they divided themselves into two groups, one marched towards Phillaur and the other which was smaller one left for Hoshiarpur. A force was sent in their pursuit but it proved ineffective as it delayed itself. On its way the larger party was joined by the soldiers from Phillaur (3rd N.I.). This shows that the rising was preplanned and the soldiers at Phillaur had secret contacts with soldiers at Jullundur. Holmes also supports this view.<sup>28</sup> The sepoys now made for Ludhiana but the bridge on the river was cut down by a civilian named Ferington, so now there was no other alternative for them, than to cross the river at a ferry known as Lussara Ghat. While all the plans of Johnstone had failed, Rickett, the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana, took a prompt action, taking Lieutenant G. A. Williams along, who was then commanding the sikh regiment, Nabha men and two guns in the pursuit of the soldiers. While this force was looking for the sepoys, unexpectedly they challenged them and consequently the fight started. The cavalry and infantry provided by the Raja of Nabha ran away at the very first volley.<sup>29</sup> Sikhs fought bravely, but the spirit, firmness, determination, and of course the love for freedom of the sepoys gallantly repulsed the attack. Williams was wounded, and Rickett found it wise to retreat.

Johnstone's strategy was severely criticised as firstly he did not disarm the soldiers at proper time and secondly he wasted five hours while pursuing the mutineers due to heat, which is no excuse for inefficiency in this critical hours of war. Anyhow, his conduct "was approved at the horse guards, it was condemned in India."

Ludhiana: After winning the victory over Rickett the sepoys marched towards Ludhiana. They reached here at 11 o'clock on 9 June. This city had

<sup>25</sup> Muinul Haq. *op. cit.*, p. 267.

<sup>26</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

<sup>27</sup> Muinul Haq. *op. cit.*, p. 267.

<sup>28</sup> "The mutineers broke up into two detachments, the larger of which made for Phillaur, where probably in consequence a pre-concerted plan, they were joined by a native portion of garrison." Holmes, T. R. *op. cit.*, p. 337.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* p. 231.



mixed population and in addition to the people of different religions it had a colony of 'Kabuli Muslims'. They had come from Kabul and claimed to be the descendants of Shah Shuja, therefore, they were known as 'Shahzadas' and enjoyed a great respect with the locals.<sup>30</sup> The sepoys expected a great support from them. Anyhow the sepoys reaching here were joined by the local garrisons, and civilians,<sup>31</sup> they plundered the houses of the Government officials, released the prisoners and finally marched towards Delhi. Johnstone on the request of Rickett's sent a force in pursuit, but that was too late to face this victorious band of men. Rickett's showed bravery when these men had left for Delhi and "Charged through the city and swept the rabble; and some twenty Kashmiries, who had joined in the temporary confusion and began to pillage were summarily hanged."<sup>32</sup>

Phillaur has been spoken as the key of the Punjab. It was garrisoned with the 3rd regiment N.I and enjoyed a great strategic importance. Standing on the right bank of the Sutlej in district Jullundur, commanded Grand Trunk Road, the only link between Punjab and Delhi. A few soldiers of this station joined with the sepoys from Ludhiana, and ran to Delhi. "Its loss at this crisis would have been a heavy blow indeed; and its danger was imminent."<sup>33</sup> The organisers of the movement never ignored its importance and the fort was to be taken quietly by the 3rd N.I. on the morning of the 15 May.<sup>34</sup> On the other hand the authorities at Jullundur only 24 miles away from here took the full care of the fort and on 12 May a detachment of European troops was sent in the darkness of the night. They succeeded in arranging signaling system inside the fort. The hope of the both, sepoys and the English lay on Raja Ranbhir Singh of Kapurthala; who was to arrive from a pilgrimage to Hardwar. The 3rd N.I. tried their level best to persuade the Raja's men to join them.<sup>35</sup> But unfortunately the Raja like the other ruling princes of the area unpatriotically decided to support the British. So the hopes of this small band of freedom lovers could not materialize due to the treacherous and coward attitude of the Raja. On the morning of 13 May reinforcements reached in the fort, and no other alternative then to surrender the arms was left for the sepoys.<sup>36</sup> The Commissioner of the Trans-Sutlej states praised the treacherous conduct of the Raja in these words, "To the decided part thus taken by the Raja at the commencement of the outbreak, I attribute in a great measure the safety of the civil station of Jullundur at the night of the mutiny."<sup>37</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Cave-Browne. Vol. I, p. 254.

<sup>31</sup> Holmes, T. R. *op. cit.*, p. 331.

<sup>32</sup> Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

<sup>33</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 120.

<sup>35</sup> Muinul Haq. *op. cit.*, p. 252.

<sup>36</sup> A few sepoys went to Delhi as they escaped in the darkness of the night.

<sup>37</sup> M. R. Reports Vol. VIII. Pt. I. From Edward John Lake to Robert Montgomery No. 6, Jullundur 5 Jan. 1858, Para. 20.



Rawalpindi: Till the end of June, the British authorities were satisfied with their position in the Punjab, though some regiments were still armed at Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Jhelum, Gurdaspore and Amritsar. They were confident that due to the loyalty of the local population and the Rajas, and the efficiency of the moveable column, they would be able to face any sort of emergency. Anyhow to avoid further danger it was decided to disarm the sepoy at the above-mentioned places also. So on 7 July a parade was held with the purpose to disarm the 14th and 58th N.I. regiments. Everything went smoothly according to the programme but when the sepoy saw the Europeans advancing in shooting position, they were frightened and bolted to their lines. The authorities, fortunately became successful to disarm the 58th but the 14th ran away without doing any harm to anything. The sepoy of the 14th also could not manage to reach their destination, they were captured by the police and the local population as the price had been set for every rebel head. They were punished only with the loss of their arms as they did no harm to anything.

Jhelum: The authorities while deciding about disarmament decided to disarm the sepoy at Jhelum and Rawalpindi simultaneously. The 14th and 39th N.I. regiments at Jhelum were looked upon with great suspicion. Major Clement Browne, the Deputy Commissioner, caught hold of some intercepted letters but Major Knatch Bull assured him and Colonel Gerard, the Commanding Officer about the loyalty of the men.<sup>38</sup> Anyhow not trusting the 39th N.I. Lawrence ordered the regiment to march towards Shahpore. "The regiment thought they were selected for service against some petty chieftain."<sup>39</sup> The 14th was weakened as Lawrence called a detachment of this regiment with the pretext that they would escort treasure to Rawalpindi.<sup>40</sup> The real purpose of both these measures was to weaken the sepoy force at Jhelum, so that the small body of Europeans may be able to control the situation. Furthermore the moveable column on its way to Lahore halted here to exert the impression of force on the remaining soldiers. The local authorities were also very careful and the guards were set at the ferries on the Jhelum and the Indus.

But inspite of all these measures, as mentioned before, it was finally decided to disarm the soldiers and General Gowan ordered Colonel Ellice to march towards Jhelum with H.M.'s 24th, three horse artillery guns under Lieutenant Cooke; and Lind's Multani horse. To keep the mission a secret the Colonel was asked to open the sealed orders, when they were only one march from Jhelum. At Dinah the sealed orders were opened, telling the Colonel to disarm the soldiers at Jhelum. After making a plan he ordered the Multani horse to advance through cantonment and himself rode to Colonel Gerard to discuss with him the whole affair. Then the plan was brought into action and according to the arrangements the Multani horse moved in and took ground on the extreme

<sup>38</sup> Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 33 men of the 39th were left at Jhelum. They behaved properly and piled up the arms when asked by Colonel Macdonald.

<sup>40</sup> Muinul Haq. *op. cit.*, p. 272.



right of the cantonment. In the meanwhile the 14th N.I. went quietly to its own parade ground still knowing nothing about the trap. One hundred Sikhs were separated as they were trustworthy, and were ordered to stand apart. In this manoeuvre the day dawned. "The detachment under Colonel Ellice was to arrive in the cantonment a little before daybreak to effect the disarming, but unfortunately it arrived when the sun was up, and the 14th had got wind of their fate."<sup>41</sup> Seeing the Europeans they started firing. Then they returned to their lines and took refuge in the building of quarter-guard. The Multani horse were ordered to charge but the verandah and the roof of the quarter-guard proved a strong defence line for the sepoys. Within ten minutes they killed ten men and wounded twenty-eight of the attackers. The Europeans apparently none too well handled, attacked and met with heavy loss."<sup>42</sup> Colonel Ellice, Lt. Streathfold and Chichester were wounded in this contest. Anyhow the Multanis became successful to drive them to the lines of the 39<sup>th</sup>, where they could not stand for long as the regimental magazine there was blown up. Now they ran to a village named Saemlee. The Europeans wasted time and reached Saemlee at 5 p.m. and fighting commenced again. The sepoys fought bravely and on the English side "All order was lost,—The amunition began to fail, and the infantry were ordered to retire. The artillery were losing horses and men fast—."<sup>43</sup> Howtizar was captured by the sepoys and Captain Spring was mortally wounded. The battle ended with the glorious victory of the side of the sepoys.

During the night the sepoys left the village and wanted to cross the river to reach Delhi, but unfortunately the ferries were under the strict control of the British men and their supporters. So they dispersed in different directions and tried to cross the river individually. The end of the unfortunate regiment was very tragic. They were five hundred in number when they left Jhelum, about 150 were killed in the contests with their enemies, 180 were captured and mostly hanged, 120 were captured by the Kashmir authorities and handed over to the British, they were also court martialled and majority of them were also put to death. The fate of the rest 50 in number is unknown. On the side of the British 44 were killed and 109 wounded.

Sialkot was one of the biggest military stations in the Punjab. It was garrisoned with one troop of horse artillery; one light field battery (both of Europeans); H.M.'s 52nd light infantry, the 9th light cavalry; the 35th and 46th N.I. regiments. Just like Ambala, Sialkot was also the headquarter of the musketry depot for instruction in the use of new enfield rifles. So the parties from almost every regiment in the Punjab were or had been here. Consequently "a fair opportunity of learning each others, sentiments of the cartridge was thus conveniently afforded——."<sup>44</sup> Moreover to strengthen the moveable column the

<sup>41</sup> Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

<sup>42</sup> McMun, George, Lieutenant General. *The Indian Mutiny in Perspective*. (London 1935), p. 167.

<sup>43</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, p. 56-57.

<sup>44</sup> Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 132.



most of the Europeans were called from here, inspite of the protest of the commanding officer Brigadier Brind. The sepoy here were in contact with the leaders of the revolt as the "names of the 35th L.I. and 46th N.I. were down in the King of Delhi's book as played to join in the mutiny so long ago as last January."<sup>45</sup> A letter which was captured confirmed to the authorities the above statement.<sup>46</sup> Due to these causes Brigadier Brind was requested to disarm his men. Unfortunately he could not obey the orders, not due to the confidence in his men as Cooper says, but the reason being was that, "every effected European soldier had been withdrawn for the column. To have acted otherwise would only have hastened the catastrophe."<sup>47</sup> The officers had fully realised the danger and on the night of 8 July that happened, what was feared. The immediate cause of the outbreak was a trooper of the 9th, who was on leave and brought the news that the moveable column was moving towards Sialkot to disarm them. Finally the news about the affairs of Jhelum gave the final touch to the whole affair.

There were totally 40 able bodied Europeans with a number of women and children, who inspite of the request of Lawrence to leave for Lahore, stayed here. They all were roused in the darkness of the night by the gun shots, slogans and shoutings of the sepoys. The Europeans now could only think to run to the fort which they wisely did. While escaping to the fort Brigadier Brind was shot from the back, but he managed to reach in the fort only to die during the night. Dr. Graham, Dr. J. Graham, Captain Bishop, Rev. J. Hunter, his wife and baby were also murdered while escaping to the fort. The English authors condemn the sepoys for brutality in Sialkot. The fact is that only one woman and one baby were murdered for which they could be blamed and the murderer of these two was not a soldier but a degraded flogger of Sialkot District Jail.<sup>48</sup> On the other hand the daughter of Dr. Graham was allowed to proceed to the fort, and it was also a trooper who carried her honourably to the quarter-guard.<sup>49</sup> No other women and children were even touched but those Europeans who escaped to Gujranwala were provided every possible facility by the civilians. The five churches for which Sialkot was famous at that time, were not harmed, while the Governmental buildings as the District Courts and the D.C.'s residence were fully damaged. Another example that they did not want to kill the Europeans is that they did not attack the fort, which was merely a mudwork and could not stand before the charge of twelve pounder gun which the mutineers had at their disposal.<sup>50</sup>

In the meanwhile a large number of local population joined them, and they left Sialkot hoping the 15th N.I. from Jhelum to join them in the way.

<sup>45</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, p. 60n.

<sup>46</sup> Muinul Haq. *op. cit.*, p. 276.

<sup>47</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>48</sup> Surendar Nath Sen. *Eighteen Fifty Seven* (Delhi 1957), p. 338.

<sup>49</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

<sup>50</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, p. 62.



The report about the affairs at Sialkot reached Robert Montgomery at 11 o'clock in the night. He at once sent a messenger to Nicholson as the telegraphic wire made no sign. The news reached to Nicholson at Amritsar. The authorities at once collected carts, ponies and buggies on which they could lay hand upon to supply the column conveniences to reach Gurdaspore. Nicholson at this time had at his disposal 3rd troop and 2nd Brigade horse artillery, three guns; No. 17 light field battery; H.M.'s 52nd light infantry; detachments of 3rd and 4th Punjab infantry; 1st company police battalion, and two newly raised risalahs. So At Gurdaspore, Nicholson came to know that the sepoys were trying to cross the river at Trimu Ghat. On the other hand the sepoys were fully unaware about the movement of the column. They could not at once cross the river as the boats had been scattered by the civil authorities. In the evening they saw the moveable column moving towards them, and at once took positions and commenced firing wildly. The column had far much superior equipments, and the sepoys were not prepared for the full scale battle, so they retreated and tried to recross the river. In this attempt they were unfortunately entrapped in an island. The water rose and consequently they were entrapped in the island. Now they had deep water impossible to cross on their back, and the European guns in the front. In this fight about three hundred sepoys were killed. Captain Adams who wanted to write a report to the General and, "having no ink he wrote in blood, which was fresh and plentiful around him."<sup>51</sup> Due to darkness this first fight ended in the evening. The poor sepoys had no way out but to remain helplessly on the island.

Nicholson kept himself busy for three days in making preparations to fight against the sepoys, and the later in the meanwhile starved on the island. The fight started again, result is evident, the poor men were slaughtered like cows, many drowned, only a few escaped to Kashmir but were brought back to Sialkot and hanged.

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The attitude of the civilians in the Punjab was of divided nature. At some places as Gugaira, Murree and Narinji the civilians took arms against the Europeans but it were also the Punjabis who fought against the sepoys garrisoned in the Punjab; at Jhelum, Murdan and Trimmoo Ghat. If we analyse the part played by the civilians and the rajas of the Punjab in the events of 1857, we find the people divided equally in both the camps. If at one place the people saved the lives of the whites, then at the other place, we find they have also murdered them. If it were the Punjabis who helped Cooper to detect and execute the sepoys from Lahore, then those were also the Punjabis who helped the sepoys with all their might at Ludhiana, and many of them were consequently hanged for this act. Just like the rest of India the people of the Punjab were also divided into two groups, pro-British and anti-British. We should also take this into consideration that the case of the Punjab from the civilians point of view, was a bit different from the rest of India. Here at Lahore, Multan and other stations the sepoys were timely

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Muinul Haq. *op. cit.*, quoted from the *Punjab Reports*.



disarmed, and the people got no time and chance to join them or support their cause. The moveable column gave crushing blow to the intentions of the civilians, who had no leader, no arms and no guidance from the centre to do something for the cause. Strict control of the Government over the ferries, the Sikh rule, loyal rajas, conduct of Dost Muhammad Khan and many other such factors are responsible for the quiet, and converted the foes into friends in the Punjab.

The civilians of Peshawar valley were in no good terms with the Government. The most of the tribes were in the state of 'blockade' and were prohibited to enter in Peshawar. The new policies of the Government were obnoxious to them; but it is also obvious that they had not forgotten the Sikh rule of massacre and pillage. When the news of the rising reached there, the men from the surrounding villages flocked towards Peshawar and "clouds of Afghan horsemen darkened the horizon." When the chiefs were requested to supply men "not a single chief responded."<sup>52</sup> This shows that they had not come with good intentions, as first of all most of them were not entitled to enter in Peshawar due to 'blockade', moreover the denial of the chiefs to support the British shows that they were ready to join the sepoys against the 'Feringhees'. It was due to these circumstances that Lawrence was ready to hand over the valley to Amir Dost Muhammad Khan of Afghanistan.<sup>53</sup> But the authorities at Peshawar successfully disarmed the sepoys on 23 May. The Afghans and Pathans who had come to Peshawar, now had no other alternative than to join the English. They had seen with their own eyes that the purbiahs, whose kins were fighting bloody battles against the Government; who had a large number of grievances against their masters; and who had ample stores of ammunition at their disposal to give outlet to their grievances were cowed without a single fire. "They were disappointed"<sup>54</sup> and thought it better to join the Government who was obviously stronger, and they wisely did it. In spite of all this there were people who instigated the men for rising. On 9 July Malik Siraj-ud-Din, the chief of the Sipah tribe in the Khyber, wrote to the sepoys of the 18th Irregular cavalry to rise against the whites and join him.<sup>55</sup> But unfortunately the letter was captured and the chief was coerced to loyalty. But such examples are very rare in the valley.

On the other hand a large number of people remained loyal to the Government and responded to the calls. Fateh Khan Khatak offered the services voluntarily and was appointed with his men to guard the ferries and boat on the bridge at Attock. The local zamindars of Nowshehra cooperated with the Government, hunted the sepoys who ran away after the battle with Chamberlain and handed them over to the Government.<sup>56</sup> This was done partly for the sake of

<sup>52</sup> M. R. Correspondence. Pt. I, vol. VII. Edwards to James, *op. cit.*, para 2.

<sup>53</sup> Muinul Haq. *op. cit.*, p. 265.

<sup>54</sup> Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

<sup>55</sup> Muinul Haq. *op. cit.*, p. 283.

<sup>56</sup> The "zamindars behaved wonderfully and brought fugitives with their money all safe," Cooper, p. 64.



money.<sup>57</sup> The sepoy of the 55th N.I. who ran to Swat were given asylum for a short time, but that was done as it served the purpose of Mubarak Shah, and not for the sake of uprising against the Government. When the Swatees felt that the sepoy were of no use for them they drove them away from the valley only to die, to starve and to be hanged. Now the sepoy accompanied by the ex-ruler of Swat Syed Mubarak Shah reached in a village named Punjar in the Kashmir valley.<sup>58</sup> Here Molvi Inayat Ali, who had been preaching  *Jihad*  supported them whole heartedly.<sup>59</sup> It was due to his influence and inspiring speeches that Khan of Punjar Muqarab Khan, and his cousin Mir Baz Khan joined the cause of the sepoy. The Khan successfully alliened the two neighbouring villages with him, and they all rose against the Government and refused to pay the revenue. When the authorities at Mardan came to know about all these affairs, Major Vaughan started from there to attack on this small band of men. In the battle which followed, a large number of civilians alongwith the sepoy were killed. Mir Baz Khan who was the commander of this small force was also slain while fighting, two other leaders Malik Zarif and Jan Muhammad were taken prisoners and then hanged; the two villages were totally burnt and some were partly damaged. The rest of the men dispersed only to gather at a neighbouring village called Narinji and started preparing for the next battle under the leadership of Molvi Inayat Ullah. On 21 July they were suddenly and surprisingly attacked by Captain James, who was offered a terrible resistance. In spite of the sudden attack only "a few minutes sufficed to convert each peaceful labourer into an armed soldier, and every hut into a fortress", but before a well-equipped army the tired sepoy and untrained civilians could not stand for long; and retreated. On 2 August the battle started again. In the gap of 20 clays, Captain James received reinforcements from Peshawar; and in this battle the poor civilians and sepoy were badly defeated. Most of them were killed and the "village was utterly destroyed."<sup>60</sup>

In Murree the rising was purely organised by the civilians. The village population around the city hated the whites who mostly use to come here for merry making, enjoyment or improving their health. The news about the affairs at Delhi reached to the civilians in the beginning of June and they started putting the jungles on fire, which belonged to the Government. Due to the critical time "the Assistant Commissioner was instructed not to punish the offenders, but to affect to believe that the tracts burnt did not have the useful wood" and were set on fire by the Government orders.<sup>61</sup>

Only a few days later the villagers of Kahira Kabuti came out openly against the Government and refused to pay the revenue, but unfortunately their leaders Faqir Khan and Muhammad Khan fell into the hands of the English, who kept them in Murree as hostages. The outcome was negotiations, and as both the

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>58</sup> Details above.

<sup>59</sup> Cave-Browne, Vol. II. *op. cit.*, p. 93n.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* p. 95.

<sup>61</sup> Muinul Haq. *op. cit.*, p. 274.



parties feared from each other, a bargain was struck; the leaders were released, and the village submitted to the British raj.

After the rise in Kahira Kabuti for a few week there was calm in all the villages around Murree. But on 1 September some 300 men of Mullote, Rewat, Bhuttien, Dhar, Jawa and many other villages of Dhoond tribe attacked on Murree. Unfortunately the English knew all the plans of the villagers, as their secrets were disclosed to the authorities by a man named Hakim Khan of Lora, who was in the sepoy guard of Mrs. Lawrence and belonged to the Dhoond tribe, so the authorities were fully prepared to repulse the attack of the ill-equipped and ill-armed villagers, which they successfully did.

At Murree there was no sufficient force to face another attack which was expected at any moment; so the affairs were telegraphed to Rawalpindi and Jhelum with the request for reinforcement. In the meanwhile the Assistant Commissioner Mr. Geo Battye called the Pirs of Pullassee to help the Government. They responded to the call and on 3 September, with the help of their disciples, they attacked on Topa and Kooldena hills, which were under the control of the freedom fighters.<sup>62</sup> The hills were recaptured and the villagers were drove away from there. On the same day the reinforcement consisting of Sikhs, Police and irregular levies reached Murree. A force was sent "under Uman Chand to destroy the villages of Dhar and Jawa", which they cruelly did.<sup>63</sup> For these minor insurrections in Murree hills, which practically did no harm to the British, the two above-mentioned villages were burnt, their cattle and other property was confiscated, 15 persons were executed, 9 prisoned for life, 4 for 14 years, and 189 were sentenced from 13 years to 1 year imprisonment.<sup>64</sup> Among the men who were hanged two were "doctors - intelligent, well educated men."<sup>65</sup>

When the companies of the 14th N.I. fled away from the cantonment of Rawalpindi, the price was set for their heads and on "the next morning their heads were brought in by the villagers" but alive.<sup>66</sup> Moreover no attack was made on the cantonment or on any other Government property, and practice no disturbance occurred in the district inspite of some expectations. The conduct of the people was so satisfactory for the authorities that they felt no need for confiscating the arms of the civilians which were confiscated in Lahore, Ludhiana and many other cities.

In Jhelum District the disturbance occurred only in the lower part of Pind Dadan Khan. When the people of this area listened about the rising against the foreign rule, they also declined to submit as the rules and consequently denied to obey the rules and pay the revenue. The authorities from Jhelum at once sent

<sup>62</sup> M.R. Reports. Vol.VIII. Pt. I. Report of Lieutenant Geo Battye, Assistant Commissioner Murree. No. 5 dated 9 Jan. 1858 para 5-6.

<sup>63</sup> M.R. Reports. Vol.VIII. Pt. I. Report of Edward Thornton, Commissioner and Superintendent of Jhelum Division. No. 80. Camp Gujrat dated 25 Feb. 1858. Para 197.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, para 198.

<sup>65</sup> M.R. Reports. Vol.VIII. Pt. I. Report of Lieutenant Geo Battye. *op. cit.*, para 15.

<sup>66</sup> Cave-Browne, Vol. II. *op. cit.*, p. 52.



sawars to coerce them to submission, so that seditious feelings should not take root in the other villages. The rising was finally crushed and they were terrified to submission.

Except this case the population of the district remained fully loyal to the Government. When the sepoys rose here, no civilians came to their help as in the case of Sialkot. The people generally remained loyal, the revenue was paid normally, and even in some cases the zamindars paid the autumn revenue in advance. Cooper says about the people of this district that "their disposition towards our rule was uniformly excellent."<sup>67</sup> The Sikhs of this area particularly helped the Government whole-heartedly. Those who had fought for the freedom of their homeland in the Anglo-Sikh wars, and now were given no privileges due to their past deeds, utilized this golden opportunity to win the favours. Cooper is very much true when he guesses, that the open help from the Sikhs was a signal for the strong position of the British as "No man hopes to regain confiscated land from a state he thinks tottering to its fall."<sup>68</sup> One hundred men of this area joined the army to fight against their brethren in those critical moments.<sup>69</sup>

In Sialkot the civilians joined the war physically, besides simply refusing to pay the revenue, like their neighbours. Receiving the tales of the restoration of the Mughal dynasty, and the rise in Sialkot the villagers started towards the city with all the arms available to them. The Gujurs only looted the Government property,<sup>70</sup> and the crowds of camp followers and private servants joined the sepoys to fight for the cause.<sup>71</sup> Most of them remained with the sepoys in all thick and thin and shared their hardships at Trimmoo Ghat and Kashmir. In the neighbouring district of Gujranwala the civilians remained loyal and showed sympathies with the Europeans. When some Europeans ran away from Sialkot, the civilians of Daska area provided them every possible help. The ladies who were sick were provided palanquins; which they carried on their shoulders up to Gujranwala. About 200 men joined the new levies, and contributed 91,000 rupees as a loan to the Government.<sup>72</sup>

The area between Lahore and Multan, which is the central part of Bari Doab was mainly populated by Lungreals, Kharals, Bhatties, Baluchies and Watto tribes; played the most active part in the events of 1857. The tribes had migrated to this area from the neighbouring territories as the land here was very fertile. Whatsoever their creed and religion before coming here was; now they were the followers of Islam."<sup>73</sup> When the news of the uprising was received by

<sup>67</sup> Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> M.R. Reports. Vol.VIII. Pt. I. Report of J. W. Macnoble. Offg. Deputy Commissioner, Jhelum. Dated 1 Feb. 1858.

<sup>70</sup> Details above.

<sup>71</sup> Cave-Browne, Vol. II. p. 68-69.

<sup>72</sup> M.R. Reports. Vol.VIII. Pt. I. Report of Lieutenant Colonel J. Clarke; Deputy Commissioner Gujranwala. No. 71. Dated 30 Jan. 1858.

<sup>73</sup> Cave-Browne, Vol. II. *op. cit.*, p. 202.



the authorities here they as a precautionary measure withdrew all the licences for carrying the matchlocks and distributed them among the newly raised Police.<sup>74</sup> So that these tribes may not be able to create disturbances. The Droga of the jail of District Gugaira was dismissed from his service as he allowed Ahmad Khan, the chief of Kharal tribe to visit the prisoners. Anyhow no incident occurred till 8 July when the lumberdars of Lukhoke in Pakpatan tehsil declined to pay the revenue and the chaprasis who went to collect the revenue were driven out from the villages.<sup>75</sup> When police and irregulars were sent against them, they ran away. They were later on captured, fined and imprisoned.<sup>76</sup> On 18 July the prisoners of Gugaira jail tried to escape away during the night, but only 20 succeeded in this attempt and about 40 of the prisoners were killed and wounded.<sup>77</sup>

After this incident quiet prevailed for one month. Perhaps the reason being for this was the alliance and obedience of the chiefs of Multan district; the constant passage of the loyal soldiers from here; and the timely disarming of the sepoys. So the authorities were confident that no one would dare to rise as they knew nothing about the anxiety prevailing among the people. Ahmad Khan the head of the Kharal tribe was "in constant communication with the rebels of Delhi and Hansi, and (as he boasted) with the king of Delhi himself."<sup>78</sup> Moreover some convicts from the central jail of Agra were released and when they returned to their homes in this region, they told the people about the prospects, strength, and intensity of the uprising in the rest of India. "They made an appeal to their kinsmen to rise against the British rules and put it to an end as their brethren had done elsewhere."<sup>79</sup>

So on 17 September the Kharals rose against the Government with the support of the neighbouring tribes, under the leadership of Ahmad Khan. The news of the uprising was given by the stoppage of the mail at Lahore and Multan. In Gugaira the news about the rising was brought to Elphinston by Sarfraz Khan Kharal at 11 p.m.<sup>80</sup> and he at once telegraphed the affairs to Multan.

From Multan Major Chamberlain started towards Gugaira with some cavalry and Godon's Sikhs who were passing through Multan and en route to Amritsar Chamberlain reached Cheecha Watani on 23 September and utilised the serai and a two-storied tower as a fort. Leopold Berkeley, the extra-Assistant Commissioner of Gugaira, was sent by the Deputy Commissioner to march towards Chak Jhumra and drive the Kharals away from there; which he successfully did. In the meanwhile the Wattoo tribe joined Ahmad Khan and the

<sup>74</sup> M.R. Reports. Vol.VIII. Pt. II. Report of Lieutenant N. W. Elphinstone, Assistant Commissioner (late incharge District Gugaira) Camp Tibbee. Dated 30 Jan. 1858 para 6.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, para 7.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> M. R. Reports. Pt. II. Vol. VIII. Report of G. C. Hamilton Commissioner and Superintendent of Multan Division. No. 42. Dated 24 Feb., 1858.

<sup>78</sup> Cave-Browne, Vol. II. p. 203-204.

<sup>79</sup> Muinul Haq. *op. cit.*, p. 290.

<sup>80</sup> M. R. Reports. Pt. II. Vol. VIII. Elphinston. *op. cit.*, para. 7.



fight commenced again only ten miles from Gugaira, and again the villagers were dispersed. After the defeat on 2 September an other party of the freedom fighters under the leadership of Bahawal, Salabat and Wallee Dad attacked on Berkeley. The fight continued for a day and the freedom fighters retreated only to fall back on the Berkeleys force on the following day. This attack was so sudden that 50 men of the Irregulars and police alongwith Berkeley were slain. The rest of the men saved their lives as the Kuttar Mukhee battalion came to their rescue at the very proper time. Now Captain Elphinston the Deputy Commissioner of Gugaira sent a party of the Punjab Irregular; a detachment of Sikh cavalry and Gugaira levy under Captain S. Black and Lieutenant Chichester against Ahmad Khan. In a fight against this force Ahmad Khan along with his son was killed. His death was an irreparable lose to the cause, and the freedom fighters lost a valuable leader.

Chamberlain in the serai of Cheecha Watani was not a besieger but besieged. His position was becoming critical as the number of freedom fighters was increasing at every moment. "Even the women took their part, moving along the tops of the house with their skirts stretched out, so as to cover the matchlock men as they crept about from point to point." They were firing furiously on the serai and the tower; "If a man showed himself for one minute, he was almost sure to be knocked over."<sup>81</sup> Chamberlain had no way out than to wait for the reinforcement. He sent the messages for help to Multan, Lahore and all the other surrounding stations. Lawrence on knowing about the affairs sent three horse artillery guns, one squadron of Lahore light horse, one company of H.M.'s 81st foot, and two companies of a new Punjab levy. This force was offered a stout resistance by the freedom fighters in the superbbs of Harrapa, but they repulsed the attack and managed to reach Cheecha Watani. Brigadier Farquharson started from Multan on 25 September with two horse artillery guns; 250 newly raised Punjabis; some Police and 100 sabres of the first Irregular cavalry. Captain Hockin moved from Leiah towards Cheecha Watni with his 17th Irregular cavalry from Jhang Captain Dawes, the Deputy Commissioner, sent a number of policemen which he could spare. Major Voyle also marched with 100 men of mounted police alongwith Sutlej so that the Nawab of Bahawalpore may not be able to help the freedom fighters.<sup>82</sup>

When the freedom fighters at Cheecha Watni got the news from their spies about the forces coming from all sides they left the city and entred in Julle Jungle.

Now the main task before these forces was to vanish the freedom fighters and clear the road between Lahore and Multan. Colonal Paton took the charge of the road from Lahore to Gugaira, and Chamberlain from Gugaria to Multan. The later was still on the way for his mission, when he received the news that the freedom fighters attacked on Kamalia. Mr. Mahon the Extra Assistant Commissioner of Kamalia who was "in constant dread of being attacked, and

<sup>81</sup> Cave-Browne, Vol. II. *op. cit.*, p. 207.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 211-212.



applied for succour", but cowardly retreated towards Jhang without waiting for the reinforcements.<sup>83</sup> When Chamberlain reached Kamalia he found that the villagers had run away after plundering the city.

Now the freedom fighters from all the corners gathered in the jungle alongwith their cattle. Chamberlain pitched up his camp on the bank of the jungle out of the musket range and waited for the reinforcements. In the meanwhile Cureton alongwith his police from Jhang joined him. Hamilton with the Lungreal force camped on the bank of the Ravi in the rear of freedom fighters. Now they were sandwiched between these two forces. They were "awed by the guns, which were never before seen in that fastness, and perhaps still more by the knowledge that their neighbours chiefs were on the side of the English."<sup>84</sup> Now they had no other way than to escape. Many of them were killed due to heavy firing and the rest ran away leaving the dead bodies of their friends there, whom they could not lift with them. A very large number of cattle, goats and sheep was captured by the British. This defeat gave crushing blow to the freedom fighters and their rising was now almost suppressed. A small band of men which was perhaps very furious, attacked on the irregular under Major Voyle at Shooke village twice during the night but were repulsed both the times. After this no incident occurred in the district. The British forces very cruelly burnt the villages and inflicted severe punishment on their captives.<sup>85</sup>

The biggest reason for the defeat of the freedom fighters was the lack of organisation and equipment, which is also the biggest cause for the defeat of the freedom lovers throughout India. Moreover the chiefs whole heartedly cooperated with the Government. When the Lungreals were asked to join Major Voyle against their brethern; "this duty they willingly performed rendering good services during the whole of the insurrection."<sup>86</sup> Same was the case with the chiefs of Multan District. Moreover the neutrality of the Nawab of Bahawalpore disheartened the freedom fighters and they felt that they had no hand on their back to support them in the long days of war against the Europeans, who had far more superior resources.

Ludhiana is the district which played prominent role in helping the Government as well as the sepoys. The Jagirdars, petty chiefs, and the men of influence helped the Government with all their might. On the very first call of the Deputy Commissioner, the Jagirdars provided 80 horse men.<sup>87</sup> Mith Singh a Sikh chief came to Ludhiana without any call and offered 50 horse men for assistance.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 213.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 217.

<sup>85</sup> John Lawrence writes in one of his reports, "I am not aware of any orders which I have given for burning any villages. I believe I have given none whatsoever on the subject. I hear that Mr.— before he retreated from Koti Kamalia caused all his prisoners to be shot. I beg that he may not be employed again in any military expedition. This is not the way put down the insurrection." Bosworth Smith. Vol. II. p. 141 quoted by Muinul Haq. *op. cit.*, p. 222.

<sup>86</sup> M. R. Reports. Pt. II. Vol. VIII. Report of Hamilton. *op. cit.*, para 47.

<sup>87</sup> M.R. Reports. Pt.I. Vol.VIII. Report of G.H. Ricketts Esq. Deputy Commissioner Ludhiana. Dated 22 Feb. 1858. para 5.



He also volunteered a considerable sum of money and ammunition in the dark days of 1857. Sardar Basant Singh of Khurree estate, the Bhudour chiefs, Rai Imam Bakhsh of Rai Kote, and Luton Chaudhries provided the Government men, money and ammunition according to their status.

On the other hand the population of the proper city of Ludhiana helped the sepoys as warmly as the chiefs to the Government. 'Kabuli Shahzadas', who were the descendants of Shah Zaman and Shah Shuja enjoyed a great influence with the people. Their families were getting about 75000 rupees from the Government as a pension.<sup>88</sup> So their rising against the foreigners is astonishing as the pensions, jagirs, and the headship of small states was a popular political bribe of the day; and the recipients of these privileges generally remained loyal with the Government. Anyhow one of these Shahzadas, Safdar Jang, who was the leader of the majority of his family and was very influential in the area around joined the sepoys under the influence of a maulvi, was also "in secret alliance with Akhund of Swat whom he provided the arms."<sup>89</sup> The Shahzada with a small band of men marched towards Delhi, but unfortunately died in the way due to fatigue and sunstroke. All other Shahzadas also with the exception of Sikandar Khan, Hassan Khan and Saleh Muhammad who were the men of no important note and saved the children of American missionary school, helped the sepoys and played leading role in the outrages committed in the city.

The Maulvi also took the leadership of "his disciples, hoisted green ensign of his faith, and led them to Delhi."<sup>90</sup>

The people of the city showed a great warmth for the uprising and about 200 of them entered in the fort on the call of the sepoys to help them to mount the guns.<sup>91</sup> The Gujurs, Syeds, Kashmiries, small land-holders and the butchers flocked towards the cantonment to take part in the plunder and disorder prevailed in the city for 36 hour. Cooper only dared to hang the unarmed Kashmiries and the men of other castes, when the sepoys and the civil freedom fighters had left for Delhi.<sup>92</sup>

The Muslim village population of Ludhiana, who possessed land alongwith the bank of Sutlej river responded to the call of the Maulvi. Some of them joined him and went to Delhi to fight against the English. The rest who remained in the villages and could not go towards Delhi due to one reason or the other also hated the English. When Rickett's asked them about the round-about of the sepoys; they provided him wrong information and tried their level best to mislead him.<sup>93</sup> One cannot help to praise the innocent help of the Muslim farmers to the cause of freedom fighters.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, para 19.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, para 25.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> The guns were 24 pounder with 10 inches howitzer, and it needed 250 men to bring them out of the fort.

<sup>92</sup> Details above.

<sup>93</sup> M. R. Reports. Pt. I. Vol. VIII. G. C. Ricketts. *op. cit.*, para. 49.



The Sikhs who fought against the English in the Sikh Wars, and were more akin to the Purbiahs than the Punjabis took no part at all in the rising. The lust of power and urge to govern cannot be accepted to have died in the short period of ten years. But instead of fighting for their lost honour, they "came forward anxiously for service, and infused no doubt a portion of their spirit into the Jat population, from which class our Sikh troops are recruited."<sup>94</sup>

In Ferozepur the leadership of all the classes who disliked to be the slaves of a foreign power was not in the hands of any jagirdar or any other influential person but a Muslim fakir led them in the battlefield. He collected a large number of followers and declared a crusade against the 'Feringhees'. When Major Mardson, the Deputy Commissioner, came to know about all the affairs he wasted no time in attacking the place where the fakir and his followers had gathered. The fakir was overpowered and executed with the number of his followers.<sup>95</sup>

It is note worthy that in the Punjab the saintly men played a major role in the struggle for freedom. At Peshawar a fakir was executed for spying and carrying seditious letters, same was the case in Multan, Swat and Lahore. In most of the reports, the incharge of the district and other officers write in the first paragraphs that they by one way or the other got rid of fakirs who were suspected for carrying on letters from one place to the others and preaching sedition.<sup>96</sup>

As far the attitude of the chiefs of the native states was concerned they remained loyal to the Government. All the states with the exception of Bahawalpore were situated in the Cis-Sutlej and Trans-Sutlej states division and all of them tried their utmost with men, money and ammunition to support the Government; with the exception of Kulu. It is a small principality near Kangra which was ruled by a Rajput clan in the 18th century. Somewhere between 1810 and 1820, its chief died. The throne was contested by the son and Kishan Singh the brother of the deceased Raja. In the fight which followed Kishan Singh was defeated and imprisoned. While he was in jail his wife gave birth to a son who was named Partab Singh.<sup>97</sup>

Kishan Singh died in the jail and when Partab Singh grew young he proved himself a brave and courageous man. In 1846 he disappeared in an Anglo Sikh war and was supposed to have died. Ten years later a fakir appeared in the village Trimali and claimed to be Partab Singh. His wife recognized him but after some hesitation.<sup>98</sup> His old fame enabled him to win the support of a large number of men, and he became their leader. The rising of 1857 gave him a good chance to win the headship of the state which was vacant now, and to achieve this end he "sent letters and emissaries to the people of neighbouring villages with a message

<sup>94</sup> M. R. Reports. Pt. I. Vol. VIII. G. H. Ricketts. *op. cit.*, para. 49.

<sup>95</sup> M. R. Reports. Pt. I. Vol. VIII. Robert Montgomery.

<sup>96</sup> See the Reports of Robert Montgomery, Edwards and Handerson.

<sup>97</sup> When Kishan Singh was told this happy news, he "repudiated the unexpected honour, saying it was no child of his." Cave-Browne Vol. I. p. 306.

<sup>98</sup> Muinul Haq. *op. cit.*, p. 272.



that he should be accepted as their leader and the authority of the British Government be thrown off."<sup>99</sup> But his letters fell in the hands of spies and consequently he was attacked, captured and hanged alongwith his five chief supporters. This was the only contribution of the 'royal blood' of the Punjab semi-independent states to the cause of freedom fighters. But in this case also the bias historians have tried to prove that the motive was not the love for freedom but the headship of the state.

On the eve of the uprising Captain Ferington sent a message to the Raja of Kapurthala who had come back from Hardawar, requesting for help. He responded to the call and reached Jullundur with his force, his viziers and brother Kanwar Bikarma Singh to assist the English. When some men of his force at Phillaur were asked by the sepoy to help them; they were fully disappointed by their negative answer.<sup>100</sup> It was due to his and his men's attitude that the planned rising at Phillaur could not be materialised.

On 7 June the sepoy rose in Jullundur but they neither harmed to anything nor released the convicts from the jail, as their brethren did at the most of the places. This was "attributed to the presence of the Allowalia Raja and his troops, who supplied all the principal guards in the civil lines."<sup>101</sup>

The troops of Raja took an active part in suppressing the sepoy who had created disturbance at Sialkot and also protected the city of Hoshiarpur from their possible onslaught. Besides this help the Raja supplied 8 guns, 2156 horse and 2846 foot to support the English.<sup>102</sup> The help rendered by the Raja thus took away the courage from the people to rise. The civilians and the sepoy needed a great strength to fight against the combined forces of the Raja and the English which they very much lacked.

The Raja of Jhind outdistanced in his loyalty to the English than the other native chiefs. He was at Sungarwar when he received the news of the rising. He at once proceeded towards Ghabdah to receive the instructions from Ludhiana having ordered his General Khan Singh to organise the troops. He did this without any call or request for help from the English.<sup>103</sup> His messenger whom he had despatched to Ludhiana brought the instruction to protect the Grand Trunk road, which he successfully did in the five months of war. His troops also served as a vanguard for the British forces till Panipat. His men under the command of Captain McAndrew were responsible for providing the provisions and transporting it to Delhi. His troops also advanced towards Meerut and thus re-established communication with that station.<sup>104</sup>

The other small rajas also joined the English against their brethren.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> Details above.

<sup>101</sup> M. R. Reports. Pt. II. Vol. VIII. Report of Major Edward John Lake, Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Sutlej states. No. 6. Dated Jullundur 5 Feb. 1858.

<sup>102</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 190.

<sup>104</sup> M. R. Reports. Pt. I. Vol. VIII. Robert Montgomery, *op. cit.*, para 18.



Vazeer Ghoshan the regent of Mandi State, supplied 125 matchlockmen to the Hoshiarpur authorities and 50 men to the Jullundur authorities. He also contributed one lakh and twenty five thousand rupees to the Government as a loan and was responsible for the quiet in the hill tracks of his area.<sup>105</sup>

The Raja of Nabha supplied 2 guns, 600 horse and 600 foot to the Government to suppress the uprising.<sup>106</sup>

Raja Ram Singh of Seeba and Raja Jodheer Chand of Nadoeen personally went to see John Lawrence and offered their humble services<sup>107</sup> and supplied men according to their own status, the strength of which has not been recorded anywhere.

(Abdul Ghani Sameen: *The Role of the Punjab in the Revolt of 1857*. M. A. Thesis, Journalism Deptt., University of the Punjab, Lahore)



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<sup>105</sup> M. R. Reports. Edwards John Lake. *op. cit.*, Para 61.

<sup>106</sup> Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

<sup>107</sup> M. R. Reports. Pt. I. Vol. VIII. John Lawrence. *op. cit.*, Para. 64.



## THE PUNJAB IN AND THE OUTBREAK OF 1857\*

(The following is a brief account of the events relating to the war of independence 1857 in various divisions of the Punjab.)

### The Cis-Sutlej Division

"...Towards the close of March last ... the station of Umballa contained the following troops:—

- Her Majesty's 9th Lancers.
- 4th Regiment, Bengal Cavalry.
- 5th Bengal Native Infantry.
- 60th Bengal Native Infantry.
- 2 troops, Horse Artillery (Europeans).

At Umballa the incendiary fires began early in March, and continued, at intervals, until the outbreak. The sepoys were all along suspected, and even among themselves the 5th Native Infantry accused the 60th Regiment, and the 60th Regiment to 5th while both accused the soldiers of the Musketry Depot. An offer of 1,000 rupees reward. . . failed to discover the perpetrators. The houses and property of the officers and men attached to the depot, or assigned to them for shelter, were especially marked out for destruction; and the Government also was a heavy loser. Affairs remained in this unsettled state until Sunday, the 10th of May . . . the day on which the Native troops at Meerut broke out into mutiny ... On that day, the two sepoys' regiments at Umballa, probably by concert with their comrades at Meerut, rushed out of their lines, broke open the bells of arms, and began to form and lead under the direction of their Native Officers. General Barnard...rode down, attended by his staff, and succeeded in pacifying the sepoys. The men returned to their lines, and restored their arms to the places where they were usually kept. Next day General Barnard issued an address to the native regiments, assuring them...that their misconduct on the 10th would be overlooked...

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Material for this Chapter has been taken from:

Mutiny Reports, Punjab Government Records, vol. VIII, Parts I and II, Lahore, 1911. Suri, V.S.: "The Punjab and re-capture of Delhi 1857" *Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society*, vol. VI, December 1940, pp. 98—105.



...The sepoy guards at Phillour and Ferozepoor were speedily set aside by European troops, and the inestimable advantage of two well-stocked arsenals was secured for our side. Their preservation...is attributable to the telegraph...

At this time I was at Kussowlee....I reached Umballa on the night of the 13th. Mr. Forsyth had written to summon the Maharaja of Putteeala and the Rajahs of Nabha and Jheend. . . .As my first thoughts were for the protection of my own division, I made the following arrangements.

The first object was to provide for the safety of the Grand Trunk Road, and the two stations of Thanesar and Loodiana, which were without reliable troops. I accordingly directed the Rajah of Jheend to proceed to Kurnaul with all his available forces. Captain McAndrew... Assistant Commissioner at Umballa, was deputed to accompany him, and started at once with some Putteeala sowars. The Maharajah of Putteeala...sent a detachment of all arms, and three guns, under his brother, to Thanesar...The Rajah of Nabha and the Nawab of Maleir Kotla were requested to march with their men to Loodiana, and the Rajah of Fureedkote was desired to place himself under...the Deputy Commissioner, Ferozepoor. Thus all points of the main line of road were secured; and the Rajah of Jheend was also instructed to collect supplies and carriage for the field force, to protect the station of Kurnaul and to get trustworthy intelligence of the mutineers at Delhi...At the same time a telegraph station was established at Kurnaul.

My next thought was for the treasure; at Umballa there were 3½ lakhs... at Thanesar about a lakh... At Loodiana the treasure (about 1½ lakhs) was guarded by a company of the 3rd Native Infantry from Phillour. At Ferozepoor there was a considerable sum in the hands of a detachment of the 57th Native Infantry, and the Simla treasure was guarded by a party of Goorkhas of the Nusseeree Battalion. The Umballa treasure was escorted by the sepoys themselves, and lodged safely in the quarter-guard of the 1st Bengal Fussiliers...Captain McNeile, at Thanesar, adopted the same means for sending in his treasure to Umballa; Mr. Ricketts sent his money to Phillour, and the Deputy Commissioner at Ferozepoor removed his treasure to the fort, and placed it under charge of a guard from Her Majesty's 61st Regiment. Thus all the public money in the treasuries in the plains was at once placed in security...The branch treasury at Kussowlee was not so fortunate. The money belonging to government, about 30,000 rupees, was saved by the Assistant Commissioner... But the deposits lodged... by the Commissariat officer and Executive Engineer were carried off by the Goorkhas; and though 12,963 rupees were eventually recovered.... the balance of 20,080 rupees, was lost. . .

The station of Umballa was left with four weak companies (about 250 men) of the 2nd Bengal Fussiliers, the 5th Regiment, Native Infantry, and some 6-pounder guns, to man which we had only Native Artillerymen. A redoubt was erected, with the church in the centre, and the remaining residents were concentrated in the houses around. A militia was formed of uncovenanted officers; and the magazine, the treasure, and the commissariat stores were all lodged in the redoubt, which was garrisoned by a company of the Fussiliers. ..Throughout the campaigns, the most important military stores were constantly sent down under the



charge of contingents furnished by the Chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej states; their troops protected our stations, and patrolled the Grand Trunk Road from Ferozepoor and Phillour down to the very walls of Delhi. The safety of this province may be attributed to their loyalty and good example. The Rajah of Jheend... acted as the vanguard of the army, and by my directions kept always in advance. When the first detachment of Europeans reached Kurnaul this little band proceeded 22 miles further to Paneeput, quieting the country, securing the road, and collecting supplies; and in this manner they advanced boldly to within 20 miles of Delhi. A detachment of the Jheend troops seized the bridge at Bhagput, and thus enabled the Meerut force to join headquarters. A party of the Jheend sowars... rode into Meerut, and opened our communication with that station. The troops of the Maharajah of Putteeala guarded Thanesar and Umballa; and the safety of Loodiana was entrusted to the Rajah of Nabha and the Kotla Nawab...

...It became the duty of myself and the district officers to take every precaution to preserve the territory from the surrounding contagion. The first measure was to close the ferries on the Jumna... The police, strengthened by the Jagheerदार contingents, were put on the alert, the roads were well patrolled and explicit instructions given "to attack and destroy any plundering band seen in the actual commission of crime..." Every available officer was sent into the interior to preserve the peace and furnished with an escort of horse and foot to repress disorder wherever it might show itself. Captain McNeile took the field in person at Thanesar. Mr. Levien, the Assistant Commissioner, was sent to the banks of the Jumna; and Lieutenant Parsons, the other Assistant Commissioner, was despatched to Kythal... Mr. Plowden, of the Civil Service at Umballa, was deputed... to Jagadree, an important town on the Jumna, on the high road to Saharanpoor; here also we had a bridge of boats. ... The districts of Loodiana and Ferozepoor were less disturbed, and there was full work for the Civil authorities in supplying carriage for the guns and ammunition issuing daily out of the arsenals, in providing escorts, and in facilitating the passage of the heavy Siege Train across the sands and branches of the Sutlej...

The 'Rangurhs' of Paneeput and Hissar were in successful rebellion, and taunted their brethren in the Cis-Sutlej territory with their want of courage ... Men's minds were further unsettled by the passing of mutineers of the 45th and 57th Native Infantry from the cantonment of Ferozepoor, and by alarming stories ... of the desperate position of the British in India. Towards the end of May and beginning of June, daring outrages were of daily occurrence. The Grand Trunk Road for some days was not safe ... Frequent fights occurred, and the police were afraid even to report the state of affairs. The country was getting rapidly disorganized. This was not the time for hesitation: every highway robber that was seized was immediately hanged, and at my request the districts of Thanesar and Umballa, from the 5th June, were placed under summary law ... The two companies sent to Roopur, so far from maintaining order, were the first to excite sedition... They were, of course, recalled, but on their way back the worst of them absconded. However, five were singled out and ... were tried by myself and Mr.



Forsyth on the 5th June, and hanged the same day.

... The people of these States sympathized with the mutineers, who were regarded as martyrs for their caste; they would plunder any stragglers; but they would not seize and hand them up to justice ...

... Mr. Plowden found the eastern portion of the Umballa district comparatively quiet; but Saharanpoor was in great disorder. He immediately crossed, and employed the detachments under Captain Wyld and Garstin in punishing robbers and in restoring confidence. I left him at liberty to do as he liked ... Several Goojur villages were destroyed, and bands of armed plunderers were dispersed. The temper of the sepoy, however, was uncertain, and there was no real dependence to be placed on them; at one time they refused to march; on another occasion some mutinied and went off to Delhi. At last, on the 12th July ... the sepoy, 80 in number, mutinied in a body ...

... On the morning of the 8th June I was informed ... that the Jullundur Brigade had mutinied, and were in full march to the Sutlej ... The bridge of boats was broken up, and the ghauts closed to the right and left of Phillour. But at the Lussara Ferry ... their advanced guard ... managed to seize a boat that was on the Jullundur side, and, crossing over it took possession of the others also, they were joined by the 3rd Regiment, Native Infantry, at Phillour, and now consisted of a strong column, nearly three regiments of Infantry and one of Cavalry, but without guns. Mr. Ricketts, the Deputy Commissioner of Loodiana, with two guns of the Nabha Rajah, and a detachment of the 4th Sikh Infantry under Lieutenant Williams, then encamped at Loodiana, opposed the crossing with the utmost gallantry, but they were unsupported ... Next day, at 12 o'clock, the mutineers marched into Loodiana, broke open the gaol, and ... plundered the Mission premises and the property of supposed British partisans ... They marched liesurely away, and got clear off to Delhi ... They were befriended by the people, who gave them supplies and guided them by secluded paths across the country. Mr. Forsyth started to intercept them with a party of the police battalion, but was not successful.

This incident did not improve our position in the Cis-Sutlej States. However, the increase of lawlessness was met with increased severity and zeal on the part of the district officers. The people of Thanesar withheld their revenue, but Captain McNeile declared that such recusancy was an act of rebellion, and that wilful defaulters would be punished as traitors; the threat was enough to bring them to reason ... Serious outrages began to occur at Mookutsur in the Ferozepoor district, but the march of General Van Cortlandt's force quieted the country, and the opportunity was taken at the same time to execute one or two of the worst offenders ...

About this time also a petty insurrection arose at Jeytokee in the Nabha territory. It was speedily put down by Major Marsden, Deputy Commissioner of Ferozepoor ... The police at Assund, on the border, were attacked and driven in by some insurgents. Assund is well-known for the bold and lawless of its population. Captain McNeil marched there in force, and the people deserted; but the gateways



of the village were found barricaded, and entrenchments had been commenced round the village site. To strike an example, the houses were destroyed and such property as remained was given up to plunder ...

At the suggestion of the Chief Commissioner we commenced on the 17th June to disarm the people. The bazaars in cantonments had been previously disarmed, and even the police, who were mostly Hindustanees, were allowed no other weapons than sticks. Mr. Ricketts took the opportunity of the presence of Major Coke's regiment to disarm the town of Loodiana. The search was effectually made, and upwards of 10 cart-loads of arms of all sorts were seized and confiscated. The several officers out of camp were busily engaged in the same duty. A proclamation was issued declaring the carrying of arms to be a misdemeanor ...

...A proclamation was issued in the vernacular, pointing out the causes which had led to the temporary want of money and calling upon all who had the means, to come forward and show their loyalty to the British Government ... by contributions to the loan, which was declared to be open for one year only, at 6 per cent per annum ... The wealthy bankers were given distinctly to understand that their demeanor in this matter would be taken as the test of their attachment to the British rule, and those who held back would lose the confidence and good-will of the local authorities. The measure proved successful. The collections realised were as follows:

Where realized		Amount Rs.	Remarks
From Putteeala		5,00,000	N.B.—More would have been furnished, but it was not required. Kulsea and Fureedkhote
„ Nabha		2,50,000	
„ other chiefs		85,000	
By Deputy Commissioner			
	Umballa	2,53,591	Partly from Hill Chiefs.
„ „ „	Thanesar	2,35,000	
„ „ „	Loodiana	2,32,400	
„ „ „	Ferozepoor	1,70,300	
„ „ „	Simla	91,300	
	Total	18,17,591	

... There is not much more to be said. The crisis with us was from the 11th May till the end of July. After that the people gradually returned to their allegiance, and the peace was not again disturbed. Re-inforcements passed down, and helped to tranquilize the country... In the beginning of September desertions became frequent among the disarmed sepoy of the 5th and the depot of the 60th Native Infantry, left at Umballa. They were ordered into the Umballa gaol; on being paraded for the purpose, a voice from the ranks called out, "fly" and they instantly broke and fled. The Europeans fired and pursued them. In ten minutes 135 were killed, 33 were made prisoners, and the rest, about 40 men, made good their



escape.”<sup>1</sup>

### The Trans-Sutlej Division

“... The force in the Jullundur Doab and in the Kangra Hills consisted of twelve guns, or two troops of Horse Artillery, ... the one European, the other native, of five regiments of Native Infantry, one regiment of European Infantry, two regiments of Cavalry and a Police Battalion. After deducting men absent on furlough, it may be stated in round numbers that there were six thousand natives to nine hundred Europeans, Her Majesty’s 8th and the Artillery troop not having their full complement.

... Early in June an attempt was made in Kooloo to excite the population to rise in rebellion against us. This movement was organized by one Purtab Singh, who pretended to be the rightful Rajah or Chief of the principality of Kooloo. He gave out that all Europeans in the Punjab and in Hindoostan had been massacred... it was promptly repressed and detected by the vigilance of Major Hay and the native officials of Kooloo...

A telegraph message communicated by ... Superintendent at Jullundur (Mr. Rees) informed Brigadier Hartley of what had occurred at Delhi. He convened a council of Commanding officers and Heads of departments at which it was determined to place Europeans in the Fort of Phillour. Twelve hours after the resolution... the measure had been carried out. At the same time a Telegraph Office was opened in the Fort of Phillour ...

Captain Farrington also wisely took upon himself the responsibility of applying for aid to Raja Rundheer Singh Ahluwalia, the Raja of Kapoorthala. This Chief came at the head of his troops, bringing with him his brother Kowur Bikrama Singh and his principal advisers. To the decided part thus taken by the Rajah at the commencement of the outbreak, I attribute in a great measure the safety of the civil station of Jullundur ... and the security we enjoyed in the Jullundur Doab throughout the crisis ...

From the first, measures were taken by Captain Farrington at Jullundur, by Colonel Abbott at Hoshiarpur, and by Major Taylor at Kangra, to put public buildings in a state of defence. Precautions were also taken for the safe custody of treasure ...

On the 3rd of May, the Mess House of the 33rd Native Infantry at Hoshiarpur was burnt to the ground. There is every reason to suppose that this was the act of incendiaries ...

On the 11th of May came intelligence of the Delhee catastrophe; this was followed almost immediately by the open mutiny of the Ferozepoor Brigade, the Simla panic, and a partial insurrection at Nalaghur...

Fires were more or less frequent; a seditious notice was placarded at the Pay Office threatening certain Native Officers who had been commended by the

<sup>1</sup> From George Carnac Barnes, Commissioner and Superintendent to Robert Montgomery, Judicial Commissioner at Umballa, 5th February, 1858. *Mutiny Reports*, vol. viii, part 1, pp. 1-20.



General Commanding for their loyalty; ... with all this there was a marked readiness to take offence, and demands were made quite incompatible with a proper state of discipline ...

When however, I had opportunities for testing the temper of the troops, and found that their acts betokened open defiance of constituted authority, my views changed, and I strongly recommended that one if not both regiments, should be disarmed ...

That on the night of the mutiny no attempt was made to release the convicts from the jail, to rob the Treasury or to plunder property, private and public, must be attributed to the presence of the Ahluwalia Rajah and his troops, who supplied all the principal guards in the civil lines. On the morning, following the mutiny, the Rajah and his brother went through the city of Jullundur reassuring the towns' people, who were disposed to close their shops and desert the place. He also detached a body of his Cavalry in pursuit of the mutineers....

It was at this time that the wisdom of the policy which had organised a Movable Column became apparent. It moved in the direction of Jullundur, where its arrival was preceded by the gallant officer in command, Brigadier-General Chamberlain, who had many arrangements to make consequent upon the withdrawal of all reliable troops from the Jullundur Doab ...

A proposition was made by Brigadier-General Chamberlain to disarm the 33rd and 35th Regiments of Native Infantry. A few days afterwards, this was most skilfully managed by Brigadier-General Nicholson, upon whom the command of the Movable Column devolved when General Chamberlain proceeded to Delhee as Adjutant-General of the army ...

First and foremost among them has been Rajah Rundheer Singh Ahluwalia, whose active and zealous co-operation exercised the best influence upon all classes of the population...

The good services of Vazeer Goshaon, the Regent of Mundee, next call for prominent notice. At my request he supplied 125 match lock-men to the local authorities of Hoshiarpoor and sent some 50 men with myself to Jullundur. Vazeer Goshaon, in compliance with the expressed wishes of the Chief Commissioner, had made arrangements for furnishing me with a large number of men, if any call had arisen for their services...

... The Rajah of Chumba afforded protection to ladies and children at the hill sanatorium of Dalhousie. He also captured thirty of the Sealkote mutineers and made them over to the local authorities of Kangra.

Hameedoolla Khan, ex-Rajah of Rajouree, resident in the Kangra district, where he draws his pension, afforded Major Taylor valuable aid in raising levies, and his brother Nowab Khan, who fought for us at Mooltan, joined Major Taylor at Noorpoor with a band of retainers...

Rajah Ram Singh of Seeba and Rajah Jodhbeer Chand of Nadoun came in person at the commencement of this outbreak to meet me and tender offers of assistance.

Konwur Sochait Singh, a younger son of the late Rajah of Kapoorthulla,



repaired on the first intelligence of this outbreak to the headquarters of the Hoshiarpur district, and taking a house adjacent to that of the Deputy Commissioner, showed himself on all occasions ready and anxious to support our cause ...

Goroo Sadho Singh of Kurtarpur was prevented by sickness from attending in person at Jullundur, but his followers did good service."<sup>2</sup>

### Lahore Division

"There were in the division:

	<i>Europeans</i>	<i>Natives</i>
Artillery	716	434
2 British Regiments of Foot	1,706	—
3 Regiments, Native Cavalry	29	1,164
6 Regiments, Native Infantry	78	5,587
School of Musketry	27	165
Grand total	2,556	7,350

From the very composition of this force, containing as it did—9 regiments of Hindoostanees and upwards of 400 Hindoostanee Golundaze and Gun Lascars, it could not but happen that there should be great sympathy with everything that took place, even at the most remote stations, connected with the feelings and prejudices of the Bengal Army.

The native soldiers, however, above enumerated, by no means represent the number of Hindoostanees in this part of the country...

There were thousands of Hindoostanee syces, grass-cutters and Artillery drivers, and thousands of Hindoostanee camp-followers and bazar people at all the large military stations, while there were hundreds of Hindoostanee domestic servants at every place.

Lastly, the Hindoostanee element prevailed in all the more responsible and lucrative appointments in all departments and offices.

Of 6 native extra Assistants attached to this Division, 5 were from Hindoostan.

Of 19 Tehseeldars and 47 Cotwals and Thanedars about one-half of the former and one-third of the latter were Hindoostanees. The proportion among the Tehseel and Thanah Mohurirs was about the same, or from a half to a third.

As to the Serishtedars, Nazirs and Mohurirs at all the Sudder offices, the greater number were from the old North-Western Provinces, and there were not a few Poorbeahs among the orderly jemadars, chaprassies and muzkoorees and also among the same grades in the Tehseels and Thanahs.

... Recently, conquered Punjab was held in subjection by a large

<sup>2</sup> From Major Edward Lake, Commissioner and Superintendent to Robert Montgomery Jullundur, 5th January, 1858, *Mutiny Reports*, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-162.



proportion of Hindoostanee troops, while the revenues were collected and the laws were administered in a great measure through the medium of Hindoostanee officials ...

Some time in April a seditious paper was found ... on the parade ground of the School of Musketry at Sealkote.

Incendiary fires occurred at Umballa, and I have since ascertained that a very suspicious fire took place towards the end of April in one of the public offices at Umritsur, but it was extinguished before much harm was done.

... Deeming it my duty to ascertain the state of feeling of the troops at Meean Meer, about whom there had been many rumours, I went the same day to cantonments accompanied by Mr. Egerton, the Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, and heard from Captain Piercy, the Cantonment Joint Magistrate, that the native troops were disaffected, and that they held nocturnal meetings ...

At daybreak on Wednesday, the 13th of May ... two-and-a-half regiments of Native Infantry and a regiment of Light Cavalry (were) disarmed by Brigadier Corbett with two troops of Horse Artillery and six weak companies of Her Majesty's 81st Foot ...

... Colonel Smith ... had with equal tact and success disarmed the wing of the 26th Native Infantry, which with a few Europeans, had heretofore formed the garrison of our stronghold. Some of the men of Soobhan Khan's Police Battalion were thrown into the fort to assist the Europeans in sentry duty, and the Treasury, which had up to this time been guarded by a detachment from one of the disarmed regiments, was also made over to the Police Battalion ...

... Captain Cripps, the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Goojranwalla, the same day, got rid of his treasury guard, consisting of a Native Officer and 40 men of the 46th Native Infantry from Sealkote, whose places were supplied by part of the Jail guard, which was formed of men of the Police Battalion...

Mr. Naesmyth, the Deputy Commissioner of Goordaspoor, on the 19th May sent the greater part of his treasure, about seven lacs of rupees, into Amritsar under an escort of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry ...

At Sealkote Brigadier Brind by a judicious disposition of the Artillery and Her Majesty's 52nd Regiment commanded the lines of both the Native Infantry Regiments, but they as well as the Cavalry were allowed to retain their arms and to perform duty as before...

During the forenoon of May 14 ... Brigadier Corbett wrote ... that the disarmed regiments had resolved to break away in a body, in the evening, for Ferozepore; (and) that he had determined to follow them with his guns ...

The animosity between the Sikhs and the Poorbeahs is notorious, and the former gave out that they would not allow the latter to pass through their country. It was therefore determined to take advantage of this ill-feeling and to stimulate it by the offer of rewards for every Hindoostanee sepoy who should be captured.

The moment it became known that the sepoys contemplated a general move, expresses were sent off to the Deputy Commissioner at Kussoor, to rouse the people and to intercept the deserters. Mr. Cooper relates how Dewan Nurain



Singh, the Agent of Sirdar Kanh Singh of Attaree, responded to Mr. MacNaughten's call on that side, while the capture of many sepoys who stealthily deserted from Meean Meer during the night of the 14th shows that the people in the direction of Puttee and Kusoor were equally true to their instinct...

There were many suspicious persons going about in the guise of Hindoo and Mohamedan fuqueers. These were arrested and either required to give security or were thrown into prison or deported.

The ferries were guarded with the double object of preventing emissaries from entering the Punjab, as also deserters from here from swelling the numbers of the disaffected at and about Delhi and Meerut ...

On the 8th June intelligence was received of the mutiny at Jullundur, and on the following day two sepoys of the 35th Native Infantry were blown from guns on the Anarkullee parade ground by order of General Chamberlain for using mutinous language. The effect was most salutary on the 35th and other native troops of the column, on the disarmed regiments at Meean Meer, on Hindoostanees generally and on the people at large, for there were many mischievous rumours and reports and much seditious talking at this time...

On the 7th July, the 14th Native Infantry at Jheelum refused to give up their arms and made a violent and determined resistance. On the receipt of the intelligence at Amritsar, General Nicholson, who had returned to that place with the Movable Column, disarmed the 59th Native Infantry.

Within 48 hours of the outbreak at Jheelum, the wing of the 9th Cavalry and the 46th Native Infantry at Sealkote mutinied.

The movement commenced about daybreak of the 9th July by the Cavalry galloping, armed and equipped, to the lines of the 46th Native Infantry, to the jail and to the lines of the Mounted Police. The European officers who proceeded to the lines of their respective regiments on hearing the commotion were either warned off or fired at ...

Brigadier Brind was hotly pursued by several troopers and received a wound, of which he died a few hours afterwards in the fort.

Dr. Graham, the Superintending Surgeon, was shot dead by a trooper while driving his daughter in a buggy.

Dr. J.C. Graham, the Medical Store-Keeper, was similarly murdered while trying to escape with his wife, another lady and some children in his carriage.

Captain Bishop, the Major of Brigade, who fled from his carriage, which contained his family, apparently in order to draw off the troopers from it, was followed and had his brains deliberately blown out...

During the morning, the prisoners in the jail, to the number of upwards of three hundred, were liberated and many of the jail buildings were destroyed. The treasury, in which a small amount of cash (Rs. 11,341) was kept for current expenses, was plundered thereof and of stamps to the value of about a lac of rupees, but many of the latter were recovered ...

By 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the mutineers had ransacked many of the houses in cantonments, had collected all the public and private carriage and every



horse in the place, and accompanied by a great number of private servants, by not a few of the police and other public servants, and by almost the whole of the residents of the sudder bazar, marched for Goordaspoor. ...

During the day of the 10th, it was ascertained that the mutineers had marched in the direction of Goordaspoor. That evening, General Nicholson set out with a portion of the Movable Column for Goordaspoor. He left three guns and about two companies of the 52nd at Amritsar to overawe the 35th and 59th Regiments, Native Infantry, and the wing of the 9th cavalry. His force consisted of 128 European and 61 Native Artillerymen, 658 of Her Majesty's 52nd Light Infantry, about 2 companies of a frontier Police Battalion (Shere Dib) and some newly raised Sikh horsemen...

The rebels were known to be approaching the Ravee, but all the boats had been scuttled two days previously when the news of the mutiny at Jheelum was received, and it was supposed that the river was nowhere fordable for many miles ...

The necessary means having been obtained, on Thursday, the 16th July, General Nicholson attacked and carried the position on the island, captured the gun, slew many of the mutineers and drove the rest into the water, in which numbers were drowned while others got on to sand-banks and small islands in the middle of the river, whence escape was difficult, as the country-people were up on both sides ...

A hundred and forty-one mutineers were handed over by the Kardar of Jasrota in the Jummoo territory, whither all who escaped fled, to Lieutenant McMahon, who remained encamped with a party of levies for some weeks on the frontier ...

Hundreds of those who cast in their lot with the mutineers and accompanied them from Sealkote were arrested, soundly flogged and sent back to Sealkote in case any specific charge of plunder, desertion of service or otherwise might be brought against them ...

On the 30th July, the 26th Regiment Native Infantry, supposed to be the quietest and best disposed of the Hindoostanee Regiments at Meean Meer, rose ... and went off in a body about 11 A.M. during a dust-storm ...

A cordon of Police chowkees was now placed at round the cantonment of Meean Meer, and on the 4th August, the remaining disarmed regiments were removed from their lines and put into tents within range of guns which were drawn up in front of the barracks of H. M's 81st Regiment. This has been the position of the 16th and 49th Regiments, Native Infantry, and 8th Cavalry ever since. The removal of these regiments from their lines was a delicate operation, carried out with complete success by General Gowan and Brigadier Corbett. The whole of the lines of the 16th Grenadiers were thrown down and levelled.

The 35th and 59th Regiments of Native Infantry remained and still remain at or in the neighbourhood of Amritsar, watched by horsemen and the Police, while a small body of troops is at hand to act against them if necessary...

In the meantime the Khurruls and other wild and turbulent tribes in the



Googaira district rose in insurrection, disarmed the police and cut off the communication with Mooltan . . .

Owing to the nature and extent of the country and the paucity of troops, the disturbance was not very easily put down. The main body of the rebels was collected on the Ravee below Googaira, and it was chiefly the country between that place and Mooltan that was disturbed... During this interval the chiefs of the Wuttoos, Korashees and other tribes in that neighbourhood also came in and the people settled down in their villages. The main body of the rebels, moreover, who had taken up a position in a dense grass jungle called the "Jullee" on an island in the middle of the river, were driven out from thence by the troops on the left bank of the river and fled in the direction of Pak Pattan and towards the Sutlej."<sup>3</sup>

"Translation of a Proclamation addressed to the Native Soldiers of the regiments of Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery, &c., cantoned at Lahore, (*vide* paragraph 60 of letter No. 106, dated 20th March, 1858, from Commissioner, Lahore—22 *supra*).

"From your Brother Soldiers, Hindoo and Mahomedan, who have assembled at Delhi.

To our Brothers, Hindoo and Mussalman, who are employed at Lahore and other places in the Punjab."

It is a matter of much regret that although we have for the sake of our religion revolted from the English, and considering you our associates have collected treasure from every place and made arrangements for fighting, and moreover had killed all the European soldiers, the enemies of our faith, and through the assistance of God, been victorious, why then are you, who are our relatives and connections and brothers in arms, sitting idle there? Such conduct is unbecoming. In whatever way you can, destroy the enemies of your religion and come to Delhi. All the revolted troops from Calcutta to Peshawar are collecting in Delhi. It is proper to fight in defence of our faith; thousands of Hindoos and Mussalmans have joined us for the purposes. Don't remain there on any account, and if European soldiers, should oppose you on your way, kill them by all means.

Don't think of your pay and service; ... there are appointments of Rs. 12 per month here and food and drink, in abundance. Those who are slain in this contest if Mahomedans will become a martyr, and if Hindoos, will become 'Hykont Bashees'.

Do not entertain any fears, but come at once. All the sepahees have in consultation issued a proclamation throughout Hindoostan. All the country, Hindoo and Mussulman, &c., is with us. A copy of the proclamation is forwarded to you with this. Hear its contents and become acquainted with the particulars. You

<sup>3</sup> From A.A. Roberts, Commissioner and Superintendent to Robert Montgomery, Lahore, 20th March, 1858. *Mutiny Reports, op. cit.*, pp. 227-249.



should have 10,20, 50, or more copies of it written in a legible hand and suspended in every place where there may be a cantonment...."<sup>4</sup>

Translation of an inflammatory placard discovered on a Garden Gate at Sealkote—(Vide paragraph 104 of letter No. 106, dated 20th March, 1858, from the Commissioner, Lahore—22 *supra*).

(Firmaun by the Commander-in-Chief, Maharaja Shere Singh, Chief of Hindoostan and Punjab).

"On this date, the 1st Jeth, Sumbut 1914, this Firmaun is issued to the Hindoos and Mussulmans of the Punjab, for this reason that the Europeans are scamps (budmashes) and never publish news concerning the war; therefore, this firmaun is issued. In the first place god (Sut Gooroo) so ordered it that we have been involved in misfortune for the last ten years. There was no hope of liberation, but in the 'Durgah' of 'Sut Gooroo' there is no want of power. God so willed it that the senses of these worldly-wise vagabonds disappeared in the draught. They attempted to subvert our religions, so that all else may be ruined and they alone may be raised. But Fate Confounds wisdom. When the Padree Sahib arrived at Delhi, he ordered the troops to bite the cartridges. All night the troops continued silent. When morning dawned and the cock crew, the din of human voices rose. Jurakun Singh, Soobahdar Buhadoor, having made ready his troops, "had all the vegabonds massacred and placed the King on the throne." Firmauns were addressed to the entire Hindoostan army, who massacred those in their respective cantonments. The fact of the Padree, was well sweetened! At the present time Jurakun Singh is marching about in the direction of Calcutta, placing his own men in every thanah and tehseel. The Raja of Burhma is at Calcutta itself with an-army of one lac and forty thousand men. Not a single soul of the vagabonds is allowed to enter. Hazrut Mirza Bae is now at Delhi with several thousand soldiers. Be assured ! God will not permit them to escape alive from this country. In the same manner as they caused dogs to be killed, will they themselves be killed. They have already retreated 40 miles from Delhi towards Lahore. If God assisted us we shall soon make over their wives to our sweepers. Any Hindoo or Mussalman who may kill a Feringhee will be well rewarded and taken care of. For the rest all is well."<sup>5</sup>

"Translation of an inflammatory placard discovered on a Garden Gate at Sealkote—(Vide paragraph 104 of letter No. 106, dated 20th March, 1858, from the Commissioner of Lahore—22 *supra*).

[This firmaun is issued to the English vagabonds (Budmashes)].

"Be it known to you that when I march towards Lahore you will find it difficult to escape, because the army of the Punjab will join me *en masse*. Rest

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 258-259.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 259-60.



assured, the Punjab will never be yours, and I know that your bones will be broken to pieces in this province, and you will fall into difficulties. If you consult your own good you will be off to Europe at once. You may thus be saved, but you are helpless. God has confounded you; nothing good can enter your minds."<sup>6</sup>

### Jhelum Division

"Rapid changes were made in the location of the Native troops... for... separation of regiments that were at the time brigaded together... The places to which these troops, were removed are situated out of this Division. The Kumaon Battalion, a loyal regiment, was sent away on service.

The effect of these measures was to diminish the force; at Jhelum to one Native Infantry Regiment, the 14th, and also to reduce largely, the Hindoostanee troops in the Rawul Pindee district.

On the 16th of May, I wrote to Captain McKenzie directing him to apply to the Commanding Officer of the 35th Native Infantry for the recall of the half company to headquarters, and also to forward his treasure into Sealkote at once... On the 17th, similar instructions respecting the detachments of the 46th at Shahpoor were sent to ... Mr. Ouseley ...

Hardly were these slight precautions adopted when the news of our danger began to be known among the people. The effect struck me as very peculiar. Great interest was exhibited, but there seemed less of the shock of surprise than I had expected to see...

On the same morning, Lieutenant Battye and Captain Berry proceeded to Kooldunna. . .and attacked the rebels who fled after firing a volley which wounded one volunteer. Our party then went to Kunnetak . . .and destroyed it. . .

On the 9th, Major Becher heard from his Thanadar at Nara that, although Hussun Ali had ostensibly seceded from the confederacy, Puhlwan Khan of Bhagun, who had received Baz Khan of Mullote and other Kurruls, talked of putting Tayub Khan, a nephew of the Sirdar, at their head and simultaneously attacking the fort of Nara and the station of Murree. . .

On the 12th, several letters were despatched to me by Major Becher announcing that Sirdar Hussun Ali Khan had come in and professed to believe that none of our fugitives were harboured in his country. . . One of the letters spoke in general terms, of treasonable confederacies being formed, while another instanced Pukli, the northern part of Hazara, as the place where danger was brewing.

On the same date, the Thanadar of Bukkote, a thanah of Huzarah. . . came to me to report an extensive confederacy which. . .was being formed against us. . .

On the 13th, Major Becher informed me that Puhlwan Khan and other headmen of Kurrul villages had come into him, and he begged we would say no more of attacking the Kurruls lest we should terrify them into committing themselves. We were also requested not to send any men into the Kurrul country to arrest our fugitives, but were to content ourselves with despatching two persons to

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 260-61.



the Thanadar of Nara, that these might be sent with Puhlwan Khan and an agent of Sirdar Hussun Ali's and in their company search for our refugees among the Kurruls."<sup>7</sup>

### **Multan Division**

"Many instances of growing disaffection could be adduced, but one or two willfully exemplify:—

1st—A sepoy rushed into the Assistant Commissioner's Kutchery two hours before the arrival of the post conveying the Calcutta Gazette announcing the disbanding of the 34th Regiment, Native Infantry, and asked "what is the news". Receiving in reply that the post had not arrived he left with an incredulous smile, implying knowledge of more than inclined to disclose.

2nd—The sepoys daily surrounded the post office asking unusual and inquisitive questions to the bodily fear and alarm of the whole establishment.

3rd—Family remittances invariably made through Government, but lately through native agency, were re-demanded in cash payment.

4th—The price and purchase of gold mohurs increased hourly, warranting the anxiety to rid themselves of cumbersome silver. . .

The Editor of the native newspaper published at Mooltan had also been instructed by the Commissioner to submit his paper for inspection prior to its publication, and to this order, the Editor gave a ready compliance.

The whole of the native correspondence was stopped and examined. Only one or two letters of importance were discovered, one leading to the execution of the author. Most of the ferries were closed, and those which remained open were carefully guarded. All fakeers, foreigners and suspected persons were arrested, and every possible measure taken to prevent news from other parts of the country reaching the Native troops. . .

The disaffection of the 69th Regiment, Native Infantry, now no longer admitting of a doubt . . . About 9 P.M. of the same evening orders were received from the Punjab Government, addressed to the Commissioner and Major Chamberlain, for the immediate disarming of the Native Infantry Regiments. . . The same night, arrangements were made for carrying the order into effect, but no communication was made to the residents of cantonments until next morning. . .

... Simultaneously with the disarming of the troops in cantonments a strong guard of the 69th Regiment, Native Infantry, at the local treasury in the 'Edgah was disarmed...

The only inhabitants of rank at Mooltan are the descendants of the Mahomedan saints, who are also the guardians of the district, and a few remains of the old Pathan nobility. The former have much influence with the community, and.

<sup>7</sup> From Edward Thornton, Commissioner and Superintendent to R. Montgomery, Camp Goojrat, 23rd February 1858, *Mutiny Report*, Vol. VIII, Part I, pp. 313-55.



. . . that at this crisis, they, with one exception, stood faithful to the British Government and in general, were anxious to evince their loyalty by every means in their power. . .

The most conspicuous amongst these was Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Kooreshee, within the enceinte of the fort. The Pathan Chiefs had rendered eminent service during the last Punjab War, and on the present occasion they also shewed their readiness to come forward in aid of the State, but they had little influence in the country.

By order of the Punjab Government, Ghulam Moostapha Khan, Khagwanee, organized a resallah of Irregular Cavalry, with which he afterwards did good service under General Cortlandt. . .

On the evening of the day of the disarming, three or four sepoy of the 69th Regiment, Native Infantry, deserted; one was caught, brought to trial before a Court-martial and condemned to death.<sup>8</sup> Sundry disclosures, however, made by him. . . obtained him a reprieve, but the execution parade was to allow some arrests to be made from among the mutineers.

On this occasion, Nahur Khan, Soobadar-Major of the 69th Regiment, Native Infantry, and some others of that regiment were arrested and at once confined in separate guards.<sup>9</sup> Most of them subsequently were released from the want. . . of evidence against them, but the enquiries instituted in their cases, produced evidence which led to the conviction of the leading mutineers. . .

The Chiefs of the Lungreal clan, who held a strong position in the pasture tracts of the Mooltan district, were directed to join Major Voyle, and this duty they willingly performed, rendering good service during the whole of the insurrections.

The chiefs of the clans of the Mooltan district, on the Ravee, were also called upon for aid, and they at once obeyed the summons. Salabut Singana, a leading man of that tribe, immediately attended at the tehseel of Seraie Sidhoo with 100 followers and he was followed by the Hirraj and other clans. The services of these men were most useful. They. . . protected the tehseel and the pergunna. . . (and) prevented the spread of the insurrection into Shorkot and the country to the west of the Chenab. . .

While these operations were in progress on the Ravee, the detachment under Major Voyle and Captain Tronson had continued to occupy Pakputtun, the smallness of their force preventing their undertaking any active operations against the insurgents on the Sutlej. . .

On the requisition of the Commissioner, Major Jackson marched towards Jumlera on the 15th October, and, receiving information of a large body of marauders near Jeewan Shah, he detached a party of about 25 Infantry and 50

<sup>8</sup> Note.—A man of the 2nd Punjab Infantry was tried at the same time and another of that regiment had been previously condemned to imprisonment by the Commissioner for seditious language.

<sup>9</sup> Note.—Nahur Khan was sent to the fort. A horse was provided for him from the 1st regiment, Irregular Cavalry, but he had scarcely mounted when it reared and fell on him,—an omen which the natives present were not slow to interpret as a warning of his fate.



sowars to attack them. The marauders opposed the detachment, but were defeated with the loss of 70 killed. . .

On the 2nd November, strong bodies of Infantry were sent into the jungles on the Sutlej, supported by the Artillery and Cavalry on the open ground. These services were effectually performed, but the insurgents had taken advantage of the delay which had occurred and dispersed into the Bhawalpoor territory.

After this, no operations of importance occurred. The successful attempts on their stronghold at Jullee and their camp in the Bar and the incursions of the troops into their fastnesses on the Sutlej had shown them the utter hopelessness of their attempts to oppose the Government. On the 7th November, Mahomed Kattya, the Chief of that tribe, surrendered himself to the Commissioner, and his example was ultimately followed by all the leaders of the rebellion who had not been arrested or slain."<sup>10</sup>

### **Leiah Division**

"The feeling of security of Leiah was first in some degree ruffled by the arrival of a part of the 17th Regiment, Irregular Cavalry, under Captain Hockin, and again by rumours of the mutiny of the 9th Irregulars at Meanwallee; but there appears to have been no real cause for alarm — Captain Hockin's men were too few in number to be mischievous, if even so inclined, and it turned out that only 30 men of the 9th Irregulars had mutinied; 25 of these, however, did come towards Leiah, but were attacked and destroyed by a detachment sent from thence under command of Captain Hockin. . .

The districts of Derah Ismail Khan and Derah Ghazee Khan situated on an ever-troubled border and containing very many Hindoostanees in the nominally Punjab regiments, gave grave cause for anxiety. . .

This feeling was by no means lessened by the unwelcome, but unavoidable, advent of the 39th Regiment, Native Infantry, at Derah Ismail Khan and subsequently of 200 of the 9th Irregular Cavalry to Bunnoo. . .

The feeling of the people, themselves a warlike race, was providentially on the side of Government; and the District Officers were thus able to raise from the Irregular Levies, capable of keeping in check with the aid of the loyal portion of the Punjab regiments."<sup>11</sup>

### **Peshawar Division**

"The strength of the Kohat force upto the middle of May was, as usual, three complete regiments of Punjab Infantry, one regiment of Punjab Cavalry, one 9-pounder battery with a 24-pounder Hawitzer and two mountain guns, also a detachment of Garrison Company of Artillery. . .

After (the orders had been given to stop the use of new cartridges) not a

<sup>10</sup> Major Hamilton, Commissioner and Superintendent to R. Montgomery, Multan, 24th February 1858. *Mutiny Report*, Vol. VIII, Part II, pp. 2—26.

<sup>11</sup> From Major C. Brown, Commissioner and Superintendent to R. Montgomery, Camp Khangurh, 15th February 1858; *Mutiny Reports*, Vol. VIII, Part II, pp. 79-80.



whisper of anything improper amongst the force forming the regular garrison, has ever reached me, though on the 29th May there was an increase of Hindoostanees, being 3 companies, about 230 men, of the 58th Native Infantry, which with 2nd Punjab Irregular Cavalry, mostly Hindoostanees (the Sikhs having gone under Lieutenant Nicholson towards Lahore), about 250 Hindoostanees in 6th Punjab Infantry and 50 in 3rd Punjab Infantry, gave this race a strong body for evil had there been any bad feeling in the country or neighbouring hills.

Early on the morning of the 8th July, orders were received for the disarming of the 58th detachment, and this was done quietly. . . The measure was well timed, as some men of the detachment had once or twice been heard speaking in a manner which evinced bad feeling. . .

The people of the district never evinced the slightest tendency to revolt; and although in Upper Meeranzye, people talked of our rule being ended, no one ever disobeyed an order or delayed a day in paying revenue.

The Toorees (inhabitants of Koorrum and subjects of Cabul) at one time appeared disposed to be troublesome; but they did no harm and soon ceased to require watching. . .

The Afreedees of the Kohat Pass have. . . for some time kept their Pass the safest portion of the road in the whole country; but since the beginning of these disturbances, there has not in the seven months. . . been one single charge of crime for them to answer to, not even a petty theft. . .

A party in Boree were inclined to give trouble by plundering on the Peshawar side, but they were peaceably brought to reason. . .

Though the conduct of the people has been invariably good—in fact so much so that I could have confidently entrusted the cantonment to their keeping, had occasion required me to call out the few troops,—yet there is no doubt that it is to the Khans and Mulicks that we are mainly indebted for this good feeling. . . Khwajah Mahomed Khan's hearty and energetic goodwill, and his craving for news of our successes, his bounty to any messenger who brought him any, and his gifts when he heard of the fall of Delhi, give unmistakable evidence of his feeling...

Next comes Bahadoor Shere Khan, whose services were with you in Peshawar from the day of the disarming, when with a few horsemen he joined you, leaving this at a couple of hours' notice. He too is worthy of notice as having done some good, zealous service.

Gholam Mahomed Khan Shukkurdurra, Jaffir Khan Khuttuck, and Moozuffer Khan, Tehsildar of Hungoo, showed a very proper feeling, and did good service in every way in their power."<sup>12</sup>

### **Sir John Lawrence's role in the recapture of Delhi**

"Delhi was the political pivot of the crisis of 1857. Centrally situated, it

<sup>12</sup> From Lt.-Col. H. B. Edwardes, Commissioner and Superintendent to R. Montgomery—Peshawar, 22nd February 1858. *Mutiny Reports*, Vol. VIII, Part II, pp. 102—110.



had been, through centuries, the imperial capital of Hindustan. During the crisis, the presence there of the last Moghul Emperor had afforded the rebels a rallying-point. A mysterious halo had been woven round the occupation of the city—as a symbol of military and political supremacy—in the minds of many people. So long as it remained in the hands of the mutineers, the last flicker of the phantom Empire would provoke further disturbances in the country. The strategical, fortified position of the city, with its vast commercial wealth, large stores of arms and ammunition in the magazine and the growing swarm of rebels pouring into it, would render its recapture more difficult in proportion to the delay in its assault.

In the words of Sir John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, 'the prestige of the Empire had come to devolve on Delhi', and a speedy and crushing assault on the seat of rebellion alone 'would determine the issue.' This fundamental fact appears to have dominated his mind from the moment that the news of the outbreak had been received in the Punjab. In almost every dispatch, he untiringly urged upon the Governor-General at Calcutta and the Commander-in-Chief at Ambala the supreme necessity of an early assault on Delhi. . . .<sup>13</sup>

First in initiative, Sir John Lawrence was foremost in organising the assault on the Imperial City. He was prepared to set it on foot alone, in case the Calcutta authorities regretted their inability to undertake it until reinforcements had arrived from abroad. The Commander-in-Chief, too, apparently under similar considerations appeared to procrastinate. The Chief Commissioner had persistently urged on the Central Government to expedite the step. Every despatch to the Commander-in-Chief emphasized the necessity and called for the earliest action. . . .

The task of organizing an assault exclusively from the Punjab resources presented formidable difficulties. The over-whelming numbers of mutineers shut up in the fortified city were equipped with vast wealth and materials of war. But once determined on the point, Sir John Lawrence would not see it suffer on account of in-action or lack of resources. Writing to H. Greathead he said: 'To my mind mere danger will arise from delay than from assaulting. . . .'<sup>14</sup>

Early in June an effective Field Force was stationed on the 'Ridge' before Delhi. While reinforcements were coming from the Punjab and Meerut, this limited force, despite the critical danger of being enveloped, would serve as a check against the pouring of more mutineers into the citadel and at the same time would oppose the spread of the insurrection from Delhi as a centre. . . .

"The general optimism about the immediate fall of Delhi, on the appearance of the British force before it, faded away after the first contested engagements with the enemy. The inadequate Delhi force had to deal with the

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In almost all the successive official communiques of narrative of events in the province, the Chief Commissioner sought to bring home, the urgency of the fall of Delhi. Particularly Nos. 55-60 ring with this note.

R. Bosworth Smith, *Life of Lord Lawrence*, Vol. ii, pp. 203-204.



trained native soldiery of the same stock as they had on their own side. The mutineers, placed in a fortified position, for the time being, rich in resources, were decidedly superior in numbers as well. In the opinion of sound authorities on military craft, the thin British force before it, exposed to severe weather conditions (June and July) and decimated by disease, were the besieged rather than the besiegers. Unless it was substantially reinforced at the earliest, retreat with the most disastrous consequences, would not have been a distant prospect. The Punjab alone was the source of succour. The Chief Commissioner kept his word.

A long stream of baggage train, arms and ammunition was poured down the Grand Trunk Road. The line of over 300 miles of road through the territory occupied by the enemy was valiantly guarded by the troops of Maharaja of Patiala. In the first week of July, about 3,250 men in all, were despatched to Delhi.<sup>15</sup> Hardly twenty days afterwards, 1,700 more had been sent the same way. As many as 2,000 more troops were further promised. In order to achieve this, Lawrence had dangerously reduced his resources in the Punjab. At a time when danger was to be apprehended from every quarter in the province itself, no more than 2,400 infantry were retained. About 9,000 Europeans and natives besides some 30 guns were locked up in Peshawar and Kohat. But with his 'unalterable resolution' Sir John Lawrence was determined more than ever to sustain and reinforce the Delhi Force with the last resources of the province...

Still further requisitions for levies and materials for war<sup>16</sup> and the gloomy prospects of the English attack failed to unnerve the Chief Commissioner or to impair his confidence of ultimate success. The acuteness of the distress only added an extra fillip to his unabated courage and resource fullness. The last throw of the dice was cast. Literally to the last man, all that was best, strong and reliable was spared and the scanty holdings of the province were squeezed to the utmost. The Punjab itself, although the outward crust of peace and loyalty was preserved, had developed into a powder magazine. The spark before Delhi, if once things went against the English, was to decide the issue. The Chief Commissioner had not mistaken the growing symptoms of the malady and had delicately timed the concentration on Delhi.<sup>17</sup>

Under Nicholson, the Hercules of the Punjab, foremost amongst those who held rebellion in leash on the Frontier during the crisis; it was proposed to

<sup>15</sup> June 17, 1857, Chief Commissioner to Harvey Greathead, Delhi.

Description:	7 Companies of H. M.'s	8th	...	600
5	"	61 <sup>st</sup>	...	450
European Artillerymen			...	200
1st Panjab Rifles (Cokes)			...	800
4th Sikhs (Battrey's)			...	800
Panjab Cavalry			...	400
			...	3,250

<sup>16</sup> No. 390, July 25, 1857. Brigadier Wilson to Sir John Lawrence, "Mutiny Papers" *op. cit.*

<sup>17</sup> No. 63, September 11, 1857. Official communique of events No. 52 clearly depicts the state of affairs in the Punjab.



drain the Punjab cup to its dregs.<sup>18</sup> The famous warden of the Frontier who with his movable column had flashed like lightning wherever mutiny raised its head — was despatched to Delhi at the head of the same column, so vital to the peace and tranquility of the province itself. Besides reinforcements and the certainty of the collapse of resistance, if only they could break into the city, General Wilson responsible for the execution of the task, appeared to be too solid to be roused to bold and vigorous action, which alone would carry the day. Lawrence continued, nevertheless, to stimulate him, as when he wrote: 'Every day's delay is fraught with serious danger. Everyday disaffection and mutiny spread. Everyday adds to the native princes taking part against us. Peshawar is the political volcano which may explode any day. The coming rains could render all military operations impossible. There was little hope of being reinforced from below...'<sup>19</sup>

Finding it difficult to rouse the Commander-in-Chief from his lethargy, Sir John Lawrence thought it expedient to spur on some of the other more energetic spirits on the scene—Chamberlain, Norman and Nicholson — whom he hoped to infuse with his own spirit and of whose potentialities and peculiarities he was well aware. The Chief Commissioner never meant to side-track the authority of General Wilson. He was impelled by anxiety for the earliest achievement of the task, which, as his earlier untiring endeavours had shown, depended in his mind upon the maxim, 'Now or never'....

Still the final assault was delayed till the second week of September. The Siege train arrived at Delhi on the 4th and Wilde's regiment and the Jammu troops followed close behind. About a week more was required to elaborate the plans....

"At last on the 7th the ground was broken and the first battery attack was opened under Alexander Taylor. The besieged numbered more than 40,000 strong and had about 300 guns. By the 13th, the work had been pretty well done. Breaches were reported, 'difficult but practicable.' The assault was ordered at 3 next morning. After another thunder, the breaches were attempted. . . Soon the whole line facing the Ridge was occupied and the British flag was run up upon the Kabul gate. . . At last on the 20th, the tidings of the fall of Delhi were flashed to all parts of the Empire."<sup>20</sup>

(in: *A Book of Readings on the History of the Punjab, 1799-1947*. By Ikram Ali Malik. Lahore 1970, pp. 193-223).

<sup>18</sup> September 6, 1857. Sir John Lawrence to the Governor-General, Calcutta.

<sup>19</sup> No. 133, September 18, 1857. Chief Commissioner to the Secretary to Government of India. Official communique of the progress of affairs before Delhi, "Mutiny Papers", *op.cit.*

<sup>20</sup> Suri, V.S. *op. cit.* pp. 98-105.







S. MOINUL HAQ

# 1857 IN THE PUNJAB, FRONTIER AND THE SIND REGION

## I

The organizers of the Movement seem to have fully realized the importance of propagating their cause in the areas now covered by Pakistan; there is abundant evidence to prove that they had been carrying on their work in this area simultaneously with their activities in the upper and eastern Provinces.<sup>1</sup> Edward Hare refers to an incident which is of considerable significance. "In the winter of 1856-57," he writes, "we were encamped at Umballa with the annual army of exercise. The mutinous sepoy took advantage of the assembly of so many of their regiments to arrange their plans and they tried their utmost to corrupt the Goorkha regiment which came down with us for exercise from Jutogh, near Simla."<sup>2</sup> As early as the beginning of May, 1857, it was reported about Ambala that the fires had become "an almost nightly occurrence". It was however significant that they were "directed against property belonging to Government or officers attached to

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Cave-Browne's assessment of the situation in the Panjab, which at the time included the Frontier region also, is correct. He says: "That the disaffection which had disclosed itself in Bengal and Oude had also extended among the native troops in the province, there can be little doubt. The disease had not yet broken out, but it had shown premonitory symptoms." See Vol. I, p. 41.

However, the British Government had certain circumstances in their favour as far as the population of the Panjab was concerned. The Muslims who were in majority had passed through a terrible ordeal of over half a century of Sikh rule. It was almost a reign of terror for them and, therefore, it is not surprising that they had felt a relief on the fall of the Sikh power. Only eight years had passed to the establishment of British rule, and this period was not long enough for the people to form a correct idea of what this change would mean. In the population there existed a "gulf between the Sikhs and the Muhammadans of the Panjab;" this could be well utilized by a Government which believed in and acted upon the policy of *divide at impera*. Referring to the policy of British officers at Amritsar, Cave-Browne says: "To keep the two classes thus in mutual check—to counterbalance race by race, and creed by creed—was the great aim of the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. F. Cooper, on whom the duty devolved." See Vol. I, p. 104. Hare, Edward, *Memoirs*, (London, 1900), p. 101.



the Depot or assigned to them for shelter during the hot months.”<sup>3</sup> Later, a Sikh sepoy informed Deputy-Commissioner Forsyth, that the soldiers were indignant and excited and there was every likelihood of a general rising. The Kotwal also reported that a Pandit had prophesied that blood would be shed within a week in Delhi, Meerut or Ambala. As in Delhi, most of the authorities here, too, did not attach much importance to these incidents. However, some precautionary measures were adopted by the Government: district officers in most cases had the post bags opened in their presence and suspicious letters were suppressed. The vernacular press was also kept under control through repressive measures; the editor of the *Moortizae* was imprisoned for publishing treasonable matter, and his paper was stopped . . . The editor of the *Cheshma i Feiz* was ordered to remove his establishment from Sealkote to Lahore where his paper, together with the two already published at the capital, was put under rigid surveillance.”<sup>4</sup>

### Plans of the Revolutionaries betrayed

The telegram carrying the news of the outbreak of the Revolution at Delhi had reached Ambala in the afternoon (11 May); from here reports were sent to all important stations on the following morning. Sir John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner, was in Rawalpindi; consequently Montgomery, the next senior official who was present in Lahore, “held an immediate consultation with the Officers,” and then proceeded to the cantonments at Mian-Mir to consult Brigadier Corbett. They agreed that the Hind-Pakistani troops should be deprived of their ammunition and gun caps. Soon after this, a Sikh Non-commissioned Officer betrayed the plans of the sepoys to his superiors. It had been decided that on 15 May when a wing of the 26th Sipahis on guard at the fort would be relieved by a wing of the 49th N. I, they would all rise and take possession of the citadel, the magazine and the treasury, and their comrades at Mian-Mir would follow suit. Then the sepoys would go to the jail, release the prisoners and establish their own machinery of administration. The betrayal of these plans by the Sikh informer upset the whole programme of the Revolutionaries.

### Hind-Pakistani forces disarmed at Lahore

The British authorities took a prompt decision to disarm the native troops; this was to be carried out by a *coup d'état* on the following morning. The entire Brigade was to come to the parade ground, “*avowedly* to hear the general order for disbanding the seven companies of the 34th N. I. at Barrackpore, *really* to enact a drama.” The decision was kept secret; even a ball arranged for the night was postponed. Early in the morning the parade was held. When it was over the Hind-Pakistani Regiments were ordered to ground arms, which they did though not without some hesitation. In the meantime some European troops had been sent to the Fort; here, too, the sepoys were disarmed and ordered to march to Mian Mir.

<sup>3</sup> G. C. Barnes to R. Montgomery, 7 May, 1857. *Mutiny Records*, VII, Part I, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> *Punjab Mutiny Report* (Selections from the Public Correspondence of the Administration for the Affairs of the Punjab, Lahore, 1859), pp. 6-7.



The same night messengers were sent to Ferozepur, Multan and Kangra, and troops despatched to Govindgarh<sup>6</sup> and Phillaur. At Amritsar a rumour had spread that the disarmed sepoy of Lahore were coming to help the Regiments posted there to capture the fort of Govindgarh. The Deputy Commissioner, G. Cooper, took with him a party of Irregular horsemen and loyal Sikhs to guard the fort gates. His Assistant went out of the town, collected a body of villagers and took the road to Lahore to intercept the disarmed sepoy. About midnight they met some Companies of the 81st, coming from Lahore. Before daybreak they reached the fort and made it safe against possible attacks. Montgomery's prompt action in Lahore had far-reaching effects on the course of the Revolution. The plans of the Revolutionaries were upset, and they could not act according to their original programme. However, the Movement could not be suppressed in its entirety, and at a number of places we find the people and the sepoy rising against the British Government as and when they found the circumstances favourable to their cause.

### Ferozepur

Ferozepur, the largest arsenal in Upper India, could not have been overlooked by the organizers of the Revolutionaries; nor could Montgomery forget it in his discussions at Lahore on 12 May. Brigadier Innes, who held the command of the station, had been informed of the decision about the disarming of the sepoy in Lahore; he also knew that the Regiments at Ferozepur had shown signs of disaffection.<sup>7</sup> On 13 May he held a parade to judge for himself the temper of his men; their conduct was not above suspicion, and "it was plain that something was coming." He held a meeting of the local authorities, and it was decided that immediate disarming of the whole force being a measure that could not be attempted without danger the two corps, the 45th N. I. and the 57th N. I., should be placed apart and disarmed separately on the next day. Accordingly they were called to their parade grounds and ordered to march off to their respective camping sites which were about two miles apart. The 57th obeyed the orders and reached the allotted ground where they bivouacked for the night; but the 45th took road passing through the Sadr Bazaar. From here they could see the European soldiers filing into the gateway of the entrenchment containing the magazine. Their suspicions were roused and "fanatic moulvies and disaffected bunneahs were at hand to incite them; '*Dagha hai*.' (There is treachery.) became the cry."<sup>8</sup> A few Companies, however, separated themselves from the main body and were soon within the entrenchment; the Europeans resisted their attack on the Magazine and

<sup>5</sup> Cave-Browne, I, 92-100; *Punjab Mutiny Report*, para. 57.

<sup>6</sup> It had no strategic advantage, but the Sikhs had a special regard for it, because it was named after Guru Govind Singh.

<sup>7</sup> "A placard" writes Case-Browne, "had been posted up in cantonments, threatening the life of their commandant. A native officer had openly declared at a court of inquiry that not a man of the corps would touch a cartridge. It was known also that meetings were held night after night, at which seditious language was used." Vol. I, p. 105; *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, p. 47.

<sup>8</sup> Cave-Browne, I, 108.



saved it, and to make it more secure additional Companies were thrown in.<sup>9</sup> The Revolutionaries now attacked the cantonment and burnt to ashes a number of houses and other buildings. On the following morning the 57th was disarmed. This weakened the position of the Revolutionaries, who, now decided to make an escape. They were pursued for several miles, but ultimately they managed to reach Delhi.<sup>10</sup> Brigadier Innes was censured for not disarming the two corps immediately. Lawrence thought he had "missed an excellent opportunity of teaching a lesson to the sepoys" and was sorry that the Revolutionaries "got off with little loss."<sup>11</sup>

### Phillaur

Phillaur, situated on the banks of the Sutlaj, was important because it had an arsenal. The authorities at Jullundur, only twenty-four miles from Phillaur, decided on 12 May to send a detachment of European troops in the darkness of night; arrangements were also made to open a signalling office inside the fort. Before dawn these troops reached Phillaur. The Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana was apprised of the situation and asked to take care of the bridge of boats on the river. At Jullundur itself precautionary measures were adopted to prevent the possibility of an attack by the cavalymen; heaps of *kankar*<sup>12</sup> were irregularly laid in a manner that although the guns could move about, a cavalry charge would not be easy. The Commanding Officer's hope lay in the loyalty of the Raja of Kapurthala who happened to arrive at Phillaur on his way back from a pilgrimage to Hardwar. The emissaries of the 3rd N. I. cantoned at Phillaur, met the Raja's men and tried to persuade them to join the Revolution; but, like most of the other Ruling Princes the Raja decided to support the British. He immediately broke camp, went to Jullundur and placed his escort at the disposal of the British Commandant and assured him of his loyalty to the Company's Government.

The Revolutionaries had planned a rising and an attack on the fort at Phillaur for the morning of 15 May; it was to become the rendezvous of their forces in the Panjab. Their plans could not materialize because reinforcements arrived early in the morning on 13 May, and the Raja of Kapurthala threw himself on the side of British Government. Praising this unpatriotic act of the Raja, the Commissioner of Trans-Sutlej States wrote: 'To the decided part thus taken by the Rajah at the commencement of the outbreak I attribute in a great measure the safety of the civil station of Jalundhur on the night of the mutiny . . .'<sup>13</sup>

<sup>9</sup> The Sadr Kotwal was suspected with having supplied scaling ladders to the sepoys; he was tried by a court-martial and sentenced to 14 years, imprisonment *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, p. 50.

<sup>10</sup> Kaye and Malleson, II, 332; also see *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 359, no 54.

<sup>11</sup> John Lawrence to the Commander-in-Chief, dated 21 May, Rawalpindi; see Bosworth Smith, I, p. 147.

<sup>12</sup> *Kankar*: small pieces of lime stone.

<sup>13</sup> *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, p. 147.



## Multan

Another important town alerted by Montgomery was Multan; it had been for centuries the great emporium of trade with Kabul and Kashmir in the north, and Sind, the Persian Gulf and Arabia in the south and west; it also commanded the land route connecting the north-western regions with the rest of the world. Equally important was the fact that Multan lay at the only route connecting the Panjab and the north-western regions with Bombay, and, for that matter, with England, its loss to the British would have created for them great difficulties. Multan had not remained unaffected by the Revolutionary spirit. In the bazaars, Revolution was openly talked about; the crowding of the sepoys at the post office and their impatience to receive their letters "implied a knowledge that any mail might bring them the signal for an outbreak."<sup>14</sup> Some of the officers had seen more definite symptoms of disaffection: Major Crawford Chamberlain, Commander of the 'Skinner's Horse' (1st Irregular Cavalry), for instance, was informed by his *Risaldar* that the sepoys were trying "to tamper with this men;" on the night of 11 May a man muffled up to the eyes came to the senior *Risaldar* of the 1st Irregulars and asked him point-blank what the intentions of his Regiment were; gold *mohurs* were being sold at premium, and the sepoys preferred transmission of their money through private agencies to Government remittances.<sup>15</sup> These unmistakable signs clearly showed 'which way the wind blew.' The countryside had a population of sturdy and religious-minded men who could have easily joined the Movement if the British Government had not adopted repressive measures. On 14 May, Major Chamberlain called three or four 'native officers' of each corps and "harranged them on the enormity of a soldier being *nimuk-haram* (false to his salt)." It was proposed that they should all set their seals to a declaration that they would be responsible for their respective corps; but none agreed to take that responsibility, and one of them clearly said that they would not be obeyed by their men. It was also pointed out that according to the general rumour two boxes full of greased cartridges had been brought from Bombay and were in the Magazine. Chamberlain ordered a parade and had the cartridges examined by the soldiers themselves.<sup>16</sup>

The fort was taken over by the Commissioner; its weak points were strengthened and heavy guns placed in commanding positions. From the countryside the influential men were summoned and detained as hostages for the good conduct of their respective clans; ferries were guarded and *faqirs* and suspicious characters arrested and confined.<sup>17</sup> The precautions taken by the authorities, however, could not stop the Revolutionaries from attempting a rising. On 9 June an order was received that the 62nd and 69th N. I. posted in Multan should be disarmed. Some men of the disarmed 69th escaped in the night; one of

<sup>14</sup> Cave-Browne, I, 120.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 121. Also see the letter of Major F. E. Voyle, Deputy-Commissioner of Multan, to Major G. W. Hamilton, Commissioner and Superintendent, dated 30 January, 1858, in *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p, 30 *et. seq.*

<sup>16</sup> Cave-Browne, I, 125.

<sup>17</sup> Cave Browne, pp 127-28.



them was however caught and condemned to death. On the night preceding the day of his execution, he disclosed some secrets of the Revolutionaries. He was reprieved but as a result of these disclosures the Subahdar-Major and ten other men of the 69th were hanged as "traitors".

It was discovered subsequently that the Revolutionaries had decided to rise against their officers on the night of 7 June. The Woordie-Major of the 1st Irregular Cavalry and a doctor betrayed the secret to Major Chamberlain by requesting him to remove his family, but he did not accept the advice. The Revolutionaries however, failed to carry out their programme, and "a merciful Providence intervened between the Christians and the fate prepared for them."<sup>18</sup>

### Peshawar

The valley of Peshawar, which was a part of the Province of the Panjab until the end of the nineteenth century, had in its neighbourhood a number of Pathan tribes whose relations with the British Government at this time were by no means friendly.<sup>19</sup> Beyond the tribal area lay the Amirate of Kabul. The friendship of its Ruler, Dost Muhammad Khan, "had been purchased by our British gold, but he had never ceased to deplore the dismemberment of his empire by the Sikhs," and "it was difficult to feel any confidence in his forbearance at such a time."<sup>20</sup> The news of the outbreak of the Revolution reached Peshawar late in the night on 11 May; on the following morning detailed and authentic reports confirmed the story. A council of war was held on the 13th at the residence of the Commander of the Division, General Reed; it was attended by Brig. Sydney Cotton, who commanded the Peshawar Brigade, Herbert Edwardes,<sup>21</sup> the Commissioner, John Nicholson, the Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawar, and Neville Chamberlain who had been called from Kohat by express message. Here it was decided that General Reed should assume the chief command and meet John Lawrence at Rawalpindi.

The next resolution of the council was that a Movable Column should be organized to operate in any part of the Panjab, where danger might threaten the British power. It was also resolved that the ferry at Attock should be secured and Hind-Pakistani Regiments isolated.<sup>22</sup> Chamberlain was given the command of the

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 265-10; also see *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 31.

<sup>19</sup> "There was hardly one tribe that was not what is technically called *in a state of blockade*,... All intercourse with Peshawar, all traffic with the city, all trading through the valley . . . the very privilege of *entering the valley* . . . was forbidden ..." Cave-Browne, I, 139-40; also see pp. 152-54.

<sup>20</sup> Kay and Malleon, II, 337.

<sup>21</sup> Edwardes was a bigoted Christian: "like many other Anglo-Indian officers of a past generation, he was a man of strong religious convictions, and an ardent, perhaps a rash, supporter of missionary effort." Holmes, p. 318.

<sup>22</sup> The general impression of the British authorities was that the Sikhs as well as the Panjabi and Pathan Muslims had no sympathy with the Hindustani sepoys and would not make common cause with them. They had followed a policy of creating feelings of estrangement among the peoples of the various regions. "The Sikh" writes Cave-Browne, "despises the Hindostanee and the Mohammedan of the Punjab and Frontier disowns his degenerate (often uncircumcised) Poorbeah name-Sake," See Vol. I, p. 146, n. 1.



Movable Column; to avoid complications he was raised to the rank of Brigadier-General. On 16 May Edwardes was summoned by John Lawrence for consultation. When he returned to his post, five days later, he learnt that the danger had not actually subsided; on the contrary it was now gathering force and threatened Peshawar.<sup>23</sup>

### Intercepted letters

The sepoy letters intercepted by the Government had left no doubt as to the widespread nature of the Revolutionary Movement. Among these were copies from Thanesar, Patna, Swat and Sitanah, calling upon the sepoys to *declare* themselves; besides these some had come from Meerut, Delhi and other places in that area, in which appeals were made to them to join the Movement and act as their kinsmen had done on that side. A letter, more startling than all the rest, showed that the danger was far nearer than many could suspect. It was from the 51st N. I., and was addressed to the 64th at Shubkuddur. "This letter," it ran, "is sent from the Peshawar cantonment to the whole *Heriot*' regiment ... may it reach the subahdar Bahadoor." After some complimentary phrases it continued, "... on the 22nd day of this month the cartridges will be given to the *Duherne*' regiment, so do whatever seems to you proper ... all are discontented with this business, whether small or great. What more need be written? Do as you think best." A postscript added to it said: "In whatever way you can manage it, come into Peshawar on the 21st, inst. Thoroughly understand that point! In fact, eat *there* and *here*."<sup>24</sup> This letter was delivered to a sepoy of the 64th on the evening of 18 May; he handed it over to the officer commanding his detachment. It is difficult to explain the motives of the sepoy in betraying his comrades.

Another document equally interesting fell into the hands of the Extra-Assistant Commissioner of Peshawar, Wakefield, on the following day. He found a *faqir* sitting under a tree near his house in circumstances which created a suspicion in his mind. He ordered him to be searched and found with him nothing except a small bag containing fifty new rupees. When interrogated the *faqir* said that he had collected them by begging in the Lines of the 24th N. I. Wakefield became more suspicious and ordered another search. A "small bag or 'housewife' was detected *in the hollow of the armpit* avowedly for the purpose of carrying antimony for the eyes." It, however, had a Persian note, which read thus: "My beloved Moollah; Salam! Salutation to you ... this is the point, that instantly on receiving this; on the 2nd day of the festival of the Eed, you must—Yes.

<sup>23</sup> It was evident that the capture of Peshawar by the Revolutionaries would endanger the British position in the entire area of the Punjab and north-west.

Cave-Browne relates an interesting story of a Sikh who, on being asked by an officer why he was so anxious about Peshawar, rolled up the end of his scarf and said: "If Peshawar goes, the whole Punjab will be rolled up in rebellion *like this*" Vol. I, p. 153; also see Holmes, p. 323.

\* The 64th N. I.

† The 51st N. I.

<sup>24</sup> See *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, 141-42; also quoted in Cave-Browne, I, 155-56.



must—come here; and if it be easy, bring a few pounds of fruits with you. Now is the time! Admit no fear into your heart. Such an opportunity will not occur again. Set out, I enjoin you.—(Signed) Fakeer Moollah Naeem.” The interpretation of the contents of the letter was easy enough; “a few pounds of fruit” mentioned in the note, according to Colonel Edwardes, meant the heads of English officers. However, the *faqir* was arrested and hanged.<sup>25</sup>

A letter from ‘Kuleefa Nathoo’ at Thanesar was addressed to friends in Swat. It said: “On all four sides there is disturbance, and on account of cartridges the whole of the native army as far as Lahore have become disaffected.”<sup>26</sup>

### The 55th N. I. and 51st N. I.

These startling revelations clearly proved the existence of widespread plans of the Revolutionaries, and Edwardes and Nicholson had not to wait long to witness the outcome. On the night of 21 May, a messenger came in to tell them that some Companies of the 55th N. I. had risen at Naushahrah.<sup>27</sup> The two officers went to Brigadier Cotton and roused him from sleep; he held a council and decided to disarm the Hind-Pakistani Regiments. Within an hour four Regiments were paraded and disarmed. This proved to be a wise step, for some of the local Chiefs who had to witness the parade were now convinced that the British authorities could still assert their supremacy, and it was now easy for them to raise levies.<sup>28</sup> After the disarming of the Regiments a Column was organized for being sent to Hoti Mardan where the main body of the 55th was posted, but it held back because the authorities became nervous on account of the rumours that the 64 N. I. was about to advance on the city of Peshawar. On that night about two hundred fifty sepoy belonging to the 51st N. I. slipped away from the Lines in the hope of securing the sympathy and cooperation of the tribesmen. Edwardes immediately issued an order putting a price on every deserter. The result was that “the following morning saw many a wretched fugitive brought in alive, and the Affreedee and Mohmund whom he had trusted carrying off to his home the ‘head-money’, and all the spoil, sometimes no inconsiderable sum, that he found on the person of his luckless captive . . .”<sup>29</sup>

The British policy of corrupting the tribesmen by offering them “rewards”

<sup>25</sup> Cave-Browne, I, 156-57; *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, 143.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143, n. 2.

<sup>27</sup> A detachment of the 55th N. I. was on duty at the Attock ferry. Fath Khan Khatak who was also posted there informed a British officer in the fort on the morning of 21 May, that the detachment of the 55th N. I. was in a ‘mutinous state’. The report proved to be too true. The “mutinous” detachment soon marched away towards Naushahrah. The Commanding Officer at Naushahrah had, however, been informed of this incident. He came out, met them at the Attock road and disarmed them. When the other Companies of the same Regiment saw their comrades as prisoners they also rose. *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, pp. 145-46.

<sup>28</sup> John Lawrence wrote to the Commissioner of Peshawar: “I look on the disarming of the four corps at Peshawar as a master-stroke. . .” Quoted in Kaye and Malleeson, II, p. 361.

<sup>29</sup> Cave-Browne, I, p. 162.

The Subahdar-Major of the Regiment was hanged; he was the first Revolutionary at Peshawar to give his life in the cause of freedom. *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 149.



for the capture of the sepoys proved effective in creating antagonism and hatred between the different sections of the people of the subcontinent.

### Mardan

The men of the 55th N. I. who had risen at Naushahrah liberated their comrades whom the officers had disarmed and imprisoned on their way from the Attock ferry. They wanted to go to Mardan-Hoti, but the bridge having been demolished by the enemy, they returned to their lines; a couple of them, however, managed to cross the stream and report the events of the day to their comrades at Mardan. Colonel Spottiswoode had implicit confidence in his men; he had written to Brig. Cotton not to send troops against them as he was ready "to stake his own life on their staunchness."<sup>30</sup> This request was ignored and the Column prepared for the purpose left Peshawar on the night of 23 May. The Hind-Pakistani officers of the Regiment learnt on the following day that forces were already on their way to operate against them, they asked Spottiswoode to explain what this treachery meant; he could not satisfy them. It was too much for him, and he immediately committed suicide.<sup>31</sup>

The Column from Peshawar reached Mardan on the morning of 25 May; the 55th had by that time left the place, only 120 of them remaining there. Nicholson who accompanied the Column as Political Officer went out in pursuit of the party. The Revolutionaries, it may be mentioned, had been in contact with some people in Swat and the neighbouring hills.<sup>32</sup> "The 55th", to quote Nicholson himself, "fought determinately," but they were forced to disperse in the neighbouring villages; 120 of them died resisting, 150 were taken captive and many were wounded in the course of a full day's pursuit on 25 May. They were received with favour by the people of the Lund Khur valley, and about 600 managed to enter Swat.

### Swat and the neighbouring areas

Under the influence of their religious leader, Akhund Sahib, the people of Swat had accepted Sayyid Akbar Shah as their Ruler. He had died on 11 May; his son, Mubarak, had put forward his claims to the throne of his father. The majority of the people, however, were against him. It was about this time that the Revolutionary sepoys arrived in Swat. The young Prince Mubarak immediately

<sup>30</sup> There were two hundred Sikhs in his Regiment. They offered to fight the rest of the sepoys if they were separated, but the Colonel's confidence in his men was so strong that he rejected the proposal. Kaye and Malleon, II, 364.

<sup>31</sup> Cave-Browne (Vol. I, p. 170, n. 2.) attributes Spottiswoode's suicide to lack of moral courage on his part. Holmes (p. 326) refers to it as "insane generosity." There are undoubtedly harsh judgment.

<sup>32</sup> It was discovered later that the emissaries of the Movement had been working in the 55th, the 64th N. I, and 10th Irregular Cavalry as well as in Swat and the country around; "two Hindoostanee moulvies in the collectorate of Murdan were the hosts of the emissaries who passed to and fro. They both fled the night before the force came from Peshawar, but one was caught months afterwards and hanged." *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, 152.



took them into his service, but he had no money to maintain an army. The Akhund Sahib told them to leave the valley; they were provided with guides and asked to move to the other side of the Indus. This decision of Akhund Sahib about Swat's attitude towards the Revolution was solely prompted by the local conditions which were uncertain. Otherwise, "had the Akhoond of Swat," writes Edwardes in his official report, "at this time, standing forward as the champion of the faith, preached a crescentade against us, and hushing intestine strife, moved across the passes and descended into Peshawur Valley, with all the prestige of the 55th Sepoys in his favour, I do not doubt that he would have excited among our subjects that spirit of religious zeal which may be overlaid for a while, but never extinguished by material prosperity. Instead of this he suddenly sided with the popular party, dismissed the 55th Sepoys with guides to conduct them across the Indus and expelled the young King from Swat."<sup>33</sup> This is a correct assesment of the situation, and there can be no doubt that with the departure of the sepoys of the 55th from Swat the course of the Revolution was changed in that region.

After suffering great hardships the Revolutionary sepoys decided to go to Kashmir; their route lay through Hazara. On 23 June, Major Becher, the Deputy-Commissioner of that district, was informed of their movements by Muhammad Khan Malik of Butrul in Kounsh. He had enclosed with his note a letter from Jamal Khan, an influential member of the *Jirgah* of Ullye,<sup>34</sup> asking for assistance and safe passage for 600 'Hindoostanee soldiers.' They had corssed the Indus on rafts of skins and halted by the side of the river near Jamal Khan's village. Becher directed the Sayyids of Kaghan, the sons of Muzaffar Khan of Nundyar and some other leading persons, to collect their followers and secure the passes at the head of the Pakhli valley. On the following day (24 June) Becher left Abbotabad and reached Dodyal which was three miles from Shinkyari and controlled all the principal roads. Muhammad Amin Khan and Muzaffar Khan wanted to enter Ullye and fight the Revolutionaries. Becher did not allow them to do so, because they "had doubtless purposes of their own to serve"; in fact they were in communication with the party in Ullye opposed to Jamal Khan whose sympathies with the Revolutionaries were not a secret. On 27 June the Revolutionaries came to the village of Raeshung<sup>35</sup> on the Nundyar border; they turned back and on the following morning went to another village which belonged to Sayyid Ghulam 'Ali Shah and Dilaram Shah. Becher succeeded in persuading the Sayyids to attack the Revolutionaries; in the contest Gkulam 'Ali Shah's son was wounded. This made the Sayyids and their *murids* more bitter against the

<sup>33</sup> *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, 160-61.

<sup>34</sup> "The independent district of Ullye, ... is about two days journey from our extreme possession of Kounsh; between them intervenes the independent district of Nundyar: all are held by Swatees of a common ancestry, and Kounsh is held in a jageer or fief by Mohamed Ameen Khan, Chief of Gurhee and head of the Swatees in Huzara." Becher to Edwardes, 4 January 1858. *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 115.

<sup>35</sup> Here one of their Jamadars made an appeal to his comrades to give up the idea of flight and lay down their lives fighting like soldiers. His appeal was not accepted: he took his musket and ended his life. *Ibid*, p. 117.



Revolutionaries who were now faced with miseries and hardships; "the knapsacks and bayonets and many of the muskets were cast down the rocks, and a large payment in silver could scarcely procure a seer of flour."<sup>36</sup>

Becher had succeeded in thoroughly exciting the Sayyids of Kaghan against the Revolutionaries who had by this time (5 July) reached a place called Bela Sanpan. They were surrounded and charged by the Sayyids and the Kuhistanis. In the fight that ensued some of the Revolutionaries were killed, but they ultimately succeeded in capturing the bridge and the village. It was about this time that their further molestation was stopped by a *mulla* who had received a message from the Akhund Sahib.<sup>37</sup> Becher now sent word to another chief, Shit Ahmad Khan, who was a vassal of the Maharaja of Kashmir. On 15 July the Sayyids brought fifty-four Revolutionaries as captives; thirteen of them were taken to Shinkyari and hanged in the presence of the troops. The *mulla* who had stopped their molestation took them to Kote Gali; from here they went to a place called Nuri-Nar, near the Lalusar Lake. The Sayyids again attacked them; after a short resistance they surrendered, and of 124 men who were made captive all except a few were executed;<sup>38</sup> 23 of these Revolutionaries fell into the hands of Maharaja Ranbir Singh of Kashmir. He did not like to lag behind the Sayyids of Kaghan in demonstrating his loyalty to the British. He surrendered them to the British, and like their comrades these were also executed.<sup>39</sup>

On 26 May Nicholson learnt that Ajun Khan, "a noted outlaw" descended from the hills and came down to Prangar; it was believed that he had been invited by a detachment of the 64th stationed in the fort of Abazyi. If he had been joined by the Revolutionary sepoy of the 55th and "boldly come down to Abazyi and got the fort betrayed to him by the garrison the whole frontier would have been in a flame." But the force under Colonel Chute and Nicholson had been considerably reinforced, and they were now in a position to move against Ajun Khan. The successful disarming of the fortress at Peshawar had left an impression on the people that the British were still capable of sustaining themselves. Ajun Khan, therefore, decided not to risk an engagement with them. He soon withdrew into the hills.<sup>40</sup>

### Peshawar versus Delhi controversy

The defeat of the Revolutionaries in different parts of the Panjab and the North-west proved of immense advantage to the British. For them the only means of educating public opinion were personal contacts and postal correspondence; both were rendered ineffective by the Company's Government. Besides this the

<sup>36</sup> *Mutiny Records*, VIII. Pt. II, p. 118.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.

<sup>38</sup> The treacherous conduct of the Sayyids was not appreciated even by the people of the area. Sayyid 'Abd al-Jabbar Shah in his work, *Kitab al-Ibrat* has quoted a local song expressing a condemnation of the treachery. For the song and its Urdu translation see Mihr, Ghulam Rasul, 1857, (Lahore, 1957), p. 332.

<sup>39</sup> *Mutiny Records*, Vol. VIII, Pt. II, p. 120.

<sup>40</sup> *Mutiny Records*, VIII. Pt. II, p. 152-53.



British authorities had excited communal and regional prejudices of the people by painting the struggle for freedom as a mutiny of the "Hindustanis" who formed the bulk of the men in the Bengal Army. To win the sympathy of the Sikhs it was enough to point out that the leader of the Movement was a Muslim Monarch. The Panjab Chiefs, to quote Holme's comments, "remembering the tyranny of the Khalsa army, had no desire for the success of a revolt which threatened to place them at the mercy of an insolent soldiery. Even if there had been a general spirit of disaffection, it would have been weakened by the national antipathy between Sikh and Mohamedan."<sup>41</sup>

John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, had early realized that the recovery of Delhi, was indispensable for the very existence of British rule in India. In the Panjab and Frontier region conditions were not alarming, but in Delhi and other parts of the subcontinent the situation was every day growing more delicate. Lawrence, therefore, decided to send all possible help to the armies besieging the capital of Bahadur Shah. As early as 9 June he wrote to Edwardes that "day after day, more and more regiments fall away," and it was, therefore, necessary to calmly consider the consequences of the permanent loss of Delhi. He thought that if an attempt was made "to hold the whole country, we shall be cut up in detail". To save Delhi, he proposed, 'we could easily retire from Peshawar early in the day,' because "at the eleventh hour, it would be difficult, perhaps impossible." His plan was to hand over Peshawar to Dost Muhammad and thereby "make a merit of our necessities." When the friendship of the Afghans is thus secured "we could . . . hold Attock in strength, and have the Indus for our barrier." Edwardes did not agree with this proposal. Peshawar, he thought, was the "anchor of the Punjab," and should not be abandoned under any circumstances. The idea of purchasing Dost Muhammad's friendship by ceding Peshawar appeared to him to be ridiculous because the surrender of the territory would be interpreted as the end of British dominion in the subcontinent, and he laid emphasis on this point by reminding Lawrence that "Caulbul would come again."<sup>42</sup>

In the meantime, however, Lawrence had written to the Governor-General for a verdict on what has sometimes been called the Peshawar versus Delhi controversy.<sup>43</sup> The correspondence between Lawrence and the Peshawar authorities dragged on, both parties remaining firm in their views. To Lawrence's arguments in favour of sending ever more reinforcements to Delhi and thereby weakening the British position in the Panjab, Cotton replied in these words: "If General Reed cannot take Delhi with eight thousand men, he will not take it with

<sup>41</sup> Holmes, p. 311.

<sup>42</sup> Bosworth Smith, II, 49-52.

<sup>43</sup> In a letter dated 21st July, John Lawrence wrote to his brother: "I have proposed to the Governor-General that, in the event of necessity, I may give up Peshawar and Kohat; this would give us 3000 European Infantry 3200 Panjabee Infantry, some few cavalry, and 3 odd guns. With such addition we might take Delhi." See *Intelligence Records*, I. 435.

It may be mentioned that this letter was written nearly 3 weeks after Henry Lawrence had been killed at Lucknow.



nine thousand or ten thousand . . . Make sure of one practicable policy. If General Reed, with all the men you have sent him, cannot get into Delhi, *let Delhi go*."<sup>44</sup> Lawrence did not agree with this view; he continued sending reinforcements to the besiegers of Delhi. On 24 July he again wrote to Canning saying rather emphatically that "the Punjab will prove short work to the mutineers when the Delhi army is destroyed." Before this letter was received by Canning, he had given a verdict against Lawrence.<sup>45</sup> The Governor-General thought that such a proposal from the Chief Commissioner was perhaps the result of his failing health and a nervous tension.<sup>46</sup> However, throughout the earlier weeks of the War, Lawrence continued sending reinforcements to the Delhi Field Force.

#### The Movable Column: Lahore, 3 June

On receiving reports of the outbreak the authorities at Peshawar had decided to form a Movable Column which could go to any place where it was needed.<sup>47</sup> As the formation of the Column needed some time the Guides Corps stationed at Mardan was ordered to proceed to Delhi; they reached their destination on 9 June 1857. The Column commanded by Chamberlain reached Lahore on 3 June. Here, six days later, they witnessed the public execution of two sepoys of the 35th Light Infantry who were "charged with using seditious language, and endeavouring to instigate their comrades to open mutiny." The Column reached Amritsar on the 10th.

#### Jullunder

The departure of the Column from Lahore had been hastened owing to disturbing news from Jullunder. Its Deputy Commissioner, Captain Farrington, had taken precautionary measures to keep the town quiet, but the aspect of affairs in the cantonments was not quite satisfactory. There had been several cases of fires; the merchants and shop-keepers of the Sadr Bazaar had started removing their property to the city. A foolish step taken by the authorities excited the sepoys; they had been assured that "so long as they remained quiet, not a hair of their heads should be touched," and yet under orders from Lawrence the treasure "had been rescued from the sepoy guard." Subsequently it was divided into two parts, each being placed in the custody of a separate guard; the sepoys could easily see the humiliation to which they were thus subjected. Spies brought reports of secret nightly meetings, and fires were also revived; a more definite indication was provided by a writing in charcoal on a wall at the Paymaster's office. Three persons who were known favourites of the British officers were mentioned as men

<sup>44</sup> Ms. Correspondance quoted in Holmes, p. 356.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> As late as 1878, this proposal of Lawrence was being criticized in his country. On 9 December, Lord Cranbrook, speaking on the Second Afghan War referred to it in these words: " . . . the retiring modesty which a noble lord exhibited on a former occasion, having wished England to retire behind the Indus". John Lawrence replied in his speech the same evening that he was still prepared to defend his policy if challenged to do so. Bosworth Smith, II, 47-48, 67.

<sup>47</sup> The suggestion for a Movable Column was made by Nicholson; Edwardes and Cotton readily agreed with the proposal. See Cave-Browne I, 142, 144.



of bad character: inquiries were made but with no results. The authorities were alarmed and decided upon disarming the sepoys on the morning of 6 June; in the afternoon the plan was dropped. It was again decided to disarm them on Sunday morning (7 June), but it was again put off. The sepoys could easily read the nervousness of their officers: the same night they rose at about 11 p. m. Some of the officers were attacked, and the treasure chests were plundered. Soon after midnight the sepoys assembled on the main road, and then they broke up into two detachments; the larger party made for Phillaur while the smaller one took the road to Hoshiarpur. A force was sent in pursuit of the larger detachment, but it was delayed on the way. The Revolutionary sepoys were joined by the 3rd N. I. and proceeded towards the bridge which they wanted to cross on their way to Ludhiana. The bridge was found to have been cut away by the orders of a civilian, Thornton.<sup>48</sup>

Determined to continue their march to Ludhiana the Revolutionaries decided to cross the river at a ferry known as Lussara Ghat, about four miles from the bridge. Ricketts, Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana, had the town with three Companies of the 4th Sikhs, commanded by Lieutenant G. A. Williams, a force of Nabha's men and two guns with the object of stopping the Revolutionaries from crossing the river. He went to Phillaur and crossed the river in a Government ferry boat; he was told that the sepoys were seen pushing upwards to one of the ferries. He, therefore, recrossed the stream and taking Williams and his men moved upwards to Lussara Ghat, where he reached at ten o'clock in the night. As they were pushing on in the sandy bed of the river they were challenged. In reply they unlimbered the guns, but the horses dragging one of them took fright and fled; "at the first volley the Nabha rajah's cavalry and infantry bolted away," and the men of the 4th Sikhs had to fight out the battle alone against the bulk of the Revolutionary sepoys who had crossed the ferry. Ricketts was handling the 9 pounder which worked effectively, while Williams was directing his Sikh soldiers. The Revolutionaries fought with firmness and determination, and after two hours' struggle the British forces found their pressure to be too heavy. Suddenly the clouds covering the moon moved away; the Revolutionaries saw the enemy's ranks and "poured in a murderous volley, to which the gallant Sikhs could reply but feebly." Williams was wounded and fell; he was taken to the rear and then sent to Ludhiana. The struggle was now over; for Ricketts there was no course left but to make a retreat, which of course he did.<sup>49</sup>

### Ludhiana

The Revolutionaries triumphantly marched forward and captured Ludhiana on the forenoon of 9 June. It was a city of mixed population and had a regular colony of the Kabulis—descendants of Shah Zaman and Shah Shuja' and a

<sup>48</sup> Thornton had come to Phillaur from Ludhiana to pay the troops of the 3rd N. I. On seeing the sepoys moving towards the bridge, he rushed to the spot, crossed the bridge and had it cut away. See *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Part I, 102.

<sup>49</sup> Cave-Browne, I, 254-60; *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. I, 104. Kaye and Malleon, II, 379-80.



large number of their dependents and retainers; these princes were known as *Shahzadabs*. One of these *Shahzadabs*, who had joined the Revolution, had taken along with him some of his kinsmen to Delhi with a view to participate in its defence, but unfortunately he had died of fatigue.<sup>50</sup> Sardar Jang, "another Sudozye prisoner" distinguished himself by actively joining the struggle for independence. He was influenced by the preachings of a *mawlawi* who "was indefatigable in exciting the Mussulman population, causing seditious meetings and giving so much trouble that I was obliged to request your permission to expel him for a time from the city."<sup>51</sup> The Kashmiri *shawl-workers* who had settled in Ludhiana also joined the Revolution, but their activities remained confined to burning and plundering the Government stores and offices and supplying information to the sepoys about their main supporters; a number of these artisans were executed for their participation in the Movement.<sup>52</sup>

The entire Muslim population of Ludhiana, particularly the Sayyids and the Gujars, had been prepared for a *jihad* by a *mawlawi*, "he had twice roused" wrote Ricketts, "the whole of the Mahomedan population to the verge of an outbreak; his influence extended to all classes."<sup>53</sup> He was respected throughout the district. At one time he had also worked in collaboration with the Akhund of Swat.<sup>54</sup>

Thus the citizens of Ludhiana were ready to receive the Revolutionaries when they came there after their victory over Ricketts in the battle of the Hussarah Ghat. Here they were joined by the *mawlawi*; "he collected all his disciples, hoisted the green ensign of his faith, and led them to Delhi."<sup>55</sup> They did not take the Grand Trunk Road, and by-passed Ambala. The British sent a force from there to intercept them, but it could not meet them, and they managed to reach Delhi, in time to take an active part in the important battle of 23 June. "... The Hindu portion of the population, the principal chowdries, traders, and the banking community, ... quietly shut themselves up with their money bags in places of safety and concealment, and allowed matters to take their course."<sup>56</sup> A few days after their departure the 1st Punjab Irregulars came to Ludhiana and it was with their help that Ricketts brought its people under his control; he "mercilessly executed all who had been found guilty of violent crimes, disarmed the city population ... and imposed a heavy fine upon them."<sup>57</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Among the *Kabuli Shahzaddabs*, Hasan Khan, was with the British Government and actively fought on their side; Salih Muhammad also remained loyal. Another, Sikandar by name, is stated to have given protection in his dwelling to "the Christian children supported and educated by the American mission". *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, pp. 92-93.

<sup>51</sup> G. H. M. Ricketts to G. C. Barnes, dated 22 February, 1858. See *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, 92.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 94.

<sup>53</sup> *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, p. 94.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> Holmes, p. 332; "None suffered eventually from the riot," says the *Panjab Mutiny Report*, "except the rioters themselves, and the city which harboured them. 22 of the plunderers were



### Kulu

Kulu, a small hill principality near Kangra, was ruled by a Rajput family. On the death of its chief in the twenties of the nineteenth century the claim of his son was contested by his uncle. In a battle fought between them the uncle, Kishan Singh, was defeated and captured; subsequently he died in the prison. His supporters produced a child, Partab Singh, as his son.<sup>58</sup> Partab grew to be an active trooper and took part in the Sikh War of 1845-46. He was supposed to have been killed in the War, and, therefore, a pension was given to his widow. Ten years later, in 1855, a *faqir* appeared in the village of Tirmali and gave himself out as Partab Singh; he was recognized by his "wife" although not without some hesitation on her part. He was thus able to gather around him a small retinue and live like a chief. On the outbreak of the Revolution he was tempted to assert his position. He sent letters and emissaries to the people of the neighbouring villages with a message that he should be accepted as their leader and the authority of the British Government be thrown off. Some of his letters, however, fell into the hands of the Assistant-Commissioner: he was taken prisoner and hanged with five of his chief supporters. He was believed by some officers to have been made a tool by the workers of the Movement. "It may perhaps be a question," says Cave-Browne, "whether this man originated this conspiracy, or was not rather the tool of others, who remained concealed behind the dignity of their position, and put him forth as the firebrand to kindle the flames of sedition throughout the country, ready themselves to step in and reap the fruits of the intrigue."<sup>59</sup>

## (II)

### THE PANJAB, FRONTIER AND SIND REGION

#### Rawalpindi

By the end of June 1857, the British authorities in the Panjab were making official announcements to the effect that the Province was "perfectly quiet". This, however, was not the full truth; it was true that no fresh reports of violence were coming from the districts, but nothing could have been more misleading than to believe that the several Hind-Pakistani Regiments stationed<sup>60</sup> at different places would not rise whenever they found an opportunity to do so. Of all these Regiments the 14th N. I. posted at Jhelum was looked upon with great suspicion.

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hanged the next day, and the city was fined Rs. 55,294", para. 31.

<sup>58</sup> When Kishan Singh was in prison it was notified that his wife had given birth to a boy; "but instead of rejoicing like a worthy Rajpoot at the birth of a son, he repudiated the unexpected honour, saying that it was no child of his." See Cave-Browne, I, 306.

<sup>59</sup> Cave-Browne, I, 308; also see *Punjab Mutiny Report*, para 53.

<sup>60</sup> The following Regiments had not been disarmed: the 58th N. I. (Rawalpindi); the 14th N. I. (Jhelum); the 46th N.I. and a wing of the 9th Light Cavalry (Sialkot); the 59th N. I. (Amritsar); the 4th N. I. (Kangra and Nurpur); the 2nd Irregular Cavalry (Gurdaspur).



Lawrence, therefore, decided to weaken it by calling a detachment of two of its Companies on the pretext that they would escort treasure to Rawalpindi. To the west of the district flowed the mighty Indus which separated it from Peshawar as well as parts of the tribal territory. It was a well-known fact that the people of Sitanah and Mangalthanah were in contact with the Nawabs of Tonk and Jhajar, and some influential persons in the North-Western Provinces.<sup>61</sup> The local authorities, had, therefore, taken precautionary steps against possible dangers, particularly in respect of guarding the ferries on the Indus and the Jhelum, in this work they had enlisted the support of a number of the landlords.

Nevertheless, the officers were constantly in a state of fear. Kanhayya Lai says on the authority of a personal letter that on 4 June a sepoy of the 58th N. I. was stated to have told the people that he still had ten bullets which he would use when he would be required to do so. This created a panic, the writer continues, and a number of families left their houses to take refuge in the barracks. The sepoy was later arrested.<sup>62</sup> However, the situation soon became so threatening that it was decided to disarm two Companies of the 14th N. I. and the 58th N. I.: 7 June, was fixed for carrying this out. A parade was called for that day early in the morning, avowedly for the proclamation of an order that the heirs of soldiers killed in action would be given pensions. At the parade an order to this effect was read. The Brigadier then gave word that the Infantry and Artillery were to wheel to the left. The sepoys now realized that they had been deceived; they immediately rushed to their Lines. Their officers endeavoured to persuade them to lay down their arms. The 58th complied with their demand, but the Companies of the 14th fled towards the city. Some of them escaped but a price having been set on them "the next morning their heads were brought in by the villagers."<sup>63</sup>

### **Jhelum and Murree: symptoms of unrest**

It was arranged that the sepoy Companies at Jhelum should be disarmed simultaneously with those at Rawalpindi. As at some other important stations, symptoms of unrest were becoming evident in this area also. In his report the Commissioner of the division, Edward Thornton, admits that "great interest was exhibited"<sup>64</sup> by the people in the Revolution and reports of occurrences elsewhere, but they remained observant and professed loyalty, obviously waiting for a suitable moment. Among certain sections, however, a feeling of unrest existed and it was generally believed that something *would* happen. Edward Thornton says that a thoroughly reliable person whose loyalty was unquestionable, "communicated to me in confidence his great distress at the calamity, as his belief was we could not succeed." He was so much convinced of the coming of the Revolution that he had not only "removed his family to a place of special shelter," but "his conduct as respected several parties who were likely to take the lead at a

<sup>61</sup> *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, p. 364.

<sup>62</sup> For details see Kanhayya Lai, *op. cit.* pp. 221-22.

<sup>63</sup> Cave-Browne, II, 52.

<sup>64</sup> Edward Thornton to R. Montgomery, 23 February, 1858. *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, p. 315.



season of disorganization seemed to be regulated by a wish to establish claims to their consideration in the time of need".<sup>65</sup>

From Murree also reports had been received about the violation of rules relating to fires in the neighbouring forests. In view of the threatening situation the Assistant-Commissioner was instructed not to punish the offenders, but to affect to believe that the tracts burnt did not have useful wood and were, therefore, exempt from the restrictions laid down by the Government. Even in cases about which it was impossible for him to appear ignorant, "he had better do no more than send for the headmen and remind them of the rules and enjoin carefulness;....." Another indication was provided by the unruly behaviour of the people of a village called Kakira Kuhuttee. The situation was, however, brought under control by the detention of its landlords, Faqir Khan and Muhammad Khan, as hostages, in Murree. An attempt to seize the headman of Kakira Kuhuttee did not succeed and was given up as inexpedient. Besides these indirect indications, a definite case was detected on 1 July; a Jamadar in Chakwal was found "plotting" against the Tahsildar and spreading reports of the restoration of Bahadur Shah. He was arrested and convicted.

### The rising at Jhelum

The arrangements for disarming the sepoys in Jhelum were kept secret to the last moment, because the authorities had a fairly clear idea of the uncertain conditions in that area. Colonel Ellice, Commander of the 24th Queens, who was given sealed orders, reached Dinah on 6 July. In the night all the troops who were to be employed in disarming the 14th N. I. and the 39th N. I. entered the cantonments and took positions. A Sikh detachment of about 100 men had been separated from the 14th and was standing apart. As the Europeans advanced forward, the sepoys took alarm and began loading. Their officer and Sikh comrades fled towards the Europeans as soon as they started firing. The sepoys now returned to the Lines, making the brick building of the quarter-guard their advanced defence. The Multani Horse were ordered to charge; but the sepoys had taken shelter in the verandah and on the battlemented roof of the quarter-guard and in their own huts.<sup>66</sup> In a short contest; lasting ten minutes, of the two hundred and forty attackers nine had fallen and twenty-eight were wounded. The Infantry and the Artillery now came to their help. The sepoys resisted the pressure, but were ultimately forced to make for the Lines of the 39th. They could not stay here for long, because the Regimental Magazine was blown up. They moved to the village of Saemlee; here they could get a respite, because the British soldiers spent some time in doing justice to the abundant stores in the mess house of the 39th.<sup>67</sup> About 5 p. m. in the afternoon fighting recommenced. The Artillery being in the front and

<sup>65</sup> *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, 318-19.

<sup>66</sup> The huts were loop-holed, which shows that they were prepared for this eventuality.

<sup>67</sup> "The men of H. M. 24th . . . unfortunately, finding out the 39th N. I. mess-house and Major Knatchbull's far-famed stores, they helped themselves, perhaps too freely; so that for a time all order was lost." Cave-Browne, II, 55.



rather near the village the sepoy could "pick off the gunners with fatal precision," while the grape shot from the side of the attackers spent itself on the mud walls of village houses. As the men and horses were falling fast and ammunition running short, orders were given for a retreat. The Revolutionaries came out of the village, made a sally and captured the howitzer which their enemy had left behind at the time of his retreat. It was now dark and the British gave up the idea of any further attempt to seize the village. The news of the defeat was telegraphed to Rawalpindi, from where reinforcements were despatched immediately. On the following morning, however, it was discovered that the Revolutionaries had evacuated the village. They wanted to cross the river but the bridge of boats and ferries were under the control of the landlords who were in sympathy with their enemy. They tried to disperse in different directions in private boats which were in the river, but in this attempt many of them were captured and executed. The 14th N. I. was thus destroyed, but the losses suffered by the British were not inconsiderable. In a single day forty-four officers and men were killed and one hundred and nine wounded.<sup>68</sup>

### Sialkot

Sialkot played a significant role in the Revolution. On receiving the news of the outbreak of the Revolution the Deputy Commissioner had, as a precautionary step, written to an American missionary on 14 May "Please suspend your preaching for a season—especially do not allow your native preachers to go about."<sup>69</sup> These measures of the local officers however proved ineffective and could not stop the activities of the workers of the Movement. The 66th N. I. posted there pledged itself to joining the Revolutionary forces months before its outbreak. Colonel Farquharson was later informed by a sepoy who had saved his life that "the names of the 35th N. I. and the 46th N. I. were down in the King of Delhi's book as pledged to join in the mutiny so long ago as last January".<sup>70</sup> A 'seditious' letter had been seized as early as February in the musketry depot.<sup>71</sup> A reminder to the pledge given by the sepoy and instructions to rise were communicated to the people concerned through an Imperial *shuqqah*. The bearer of this letter passed through the village of Tulwundee, a day before the outbreak of the Revolution in Sialkot. "An officer of the 46th N. I.," writes Cave-Browne, "on galloping down the lines, met his pay-havaldar, and asked him what the disturbance all meant; the havaldar replied that four troopers of the 9th Cavalry had just been through the lines and said that 'the *chhuppa* (printed letter or circular) had come, and' added the havaldar, 'What can we do?'"<sup>72</sup> This is corroborated by Hakim Ahsan-Allah Khan in his evidence at Bahadur Shah's trial.

<sup>68</sup> Cave-Browne, II, pp. 52-58; also see *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, pp. 245-46, Kaye and Malleon, II, 469-471.

<sup>69</sup> See Rich, Captain Gregory, *The Mutiny in Sialkot* (Sialkot, 1924), p. 8.

<sup>70</sup> Cave-Browne, II, 60n.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69, n 2.

<sup>72</sup> Cave-Browne, II, 60 n.



He says that a petition was sent by the Revolutionaries of Sialkot to the Emperor requesting him to allow them to proceed to Delhi; "a reply was ordered to be sent."<sup>73</sup> The truth however is that "for weeks the outburst had been expected, and every English inhabitant of Sialkot had thought painfully over the coming crisis, and had calculated the best means of escape."<sup>74</sup> The sepoys in Sialkot were thus ready to rise, and, it was for this reason that on receiving reports of the successful defiance of authority by the 14th N. I. at Jhelum they became excited and rose immediately. It is significant that the domestic servants of the European officers in Sialkot were loyal not to their employers but to the cause of the Revolution.<sup>75</sup>

On the night of 8 July the troopers of the 9th Cavalry took necessary steps and established pickets on the main roads. It was still dark when the officers were roused from their sleep by the uproar of the rising and learnt that the crisis had come. A loyal trooper rushed to the house of his officer, Captain Balmain, and informed him of the rising; the latter roused Brigadier Brind and went to the Lines in the hope of keeping his men, under control, which, he did not realize, had now become impossible. The officers tried to make for the fort. They were pursued, "and a ball from the pistol of a mounted trooper entered the broad back of the Brigadier, and he was carried to the fort only to die."<sup>76</sup> On the parade ground of the 46th some of the sepoys were more considerate; they told their officers to leave the place immediately, who, no other road being open, fled towards Gujranwala. Doctor Graham, the Superintending Engineer, was driving in a buggy towards the fort. He was shot in the carriage, but his daughter, who accompanied him, was allowed to take shelter in a garden: from here a trooper took her to the Cavalry quarterguard where she found Colonel and Mrs. Campbell. A few other Europeans also were attacked, but several succeeded in reaching the fort, the Deputy Commissioner, Monckton, and his Assistant, McMahon, being among them. A missionary, J. Hunter, and his wife were seized and killed by some chaprasis near the jail.<sup>77</sup> The Revolutionaries had in the meantime broken the jail and released the convicts; the kutchery was burnt to ashes and the houses of the Deputy-Commissioner and other officers were plundered. It may be mentioned, however, that not one of the five churches, for which Sialkot was famous, was damaged. The Revolutionary troops, joined in numbers by the people, now took the road to Hoshiarpur, hoping to meet the men of the 15th N. I. who, they

<sup>73</sup> *Trial*, p. 272: Ahsan-Allah Khan puts this correspondence "two months and upwards" after the outbreak in May; it appears that he has miscalculated the time.

Actually, on the evening of 8 July, "a messenger had come from Delhi, bringing a summons from the King commanding them to join the Royal Army." Cf. Kaye and Malleon, II, p. 471.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Kaye and Malleon, II, 472.

<sup>75</sup> As an illustration the case of the cook of Brigadier Brind is quoted; he was supposed to have removed the caps of his master's pistol in the night. See Cave-Browne, II, p. 68n; also see Rich, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

<sup>76</sup> Kaye and Malleon, II, 473.

<sup>77</sup> Cave-Browne, II, 65 and note. Subsequently a Resaldar and a Subahdar of police were hanged for not saving them. It has been stated that the Hunters were killed by a mob led by Hurmat, the leader of the Revolutionaries at Sialkot. See Rich, pp. 24-25.



believed, had escaped from Jhelum. No sooner had they left Sialkot than the Gujars living in the neighbouring villages rushed to the cantonments and "flocked in like vultures to the prey"; they demolished the buildings and plundered the property they could lay hands upon.<sup>78</sup>

No time was lost in sending the reports of the rising at Sialkot to Lahore, Kangra, Ferozepur and Amritsar. On 9 July, Nicholson, who had brought the Movable Column to Amritsar four days earlier, succeeded in disarming the 59th N. I. Next day (10 July) a messenger from Lahore brought the report of the outbreak at Sialkot; almost simultaneously came the direct message sent from there asking Nicholson to take the Column to Gurdaspur and disarm the 2nd Irregulars. By nine o'clock the Column was in motion; eighteen hours later it entered Gurdaspur. The Revolutionaries were still on the banks of the Ravi, about eight miles from Gurdaspur, and they could never have expected to find the Column there. An unfortunate incident placed them under a further handicap. Two men of the 46th had come to the camp in the crowd of villagers who had brought milk, eggs and vegetables. They were arrested and confessed that they were emissaries and had come to raise the 2nd Irregulars.<sup>80</sup> Had these men succeeded in carrying back the report that the Column had arrived there the Revolutionaries would have certainly changed their strategy, but, as things stood, they remained ignorant of Nicholson's movements. When they reached the Trimmu Ghat they found that the boats had been scuttled by the district authorities of Gurdaspur; nevertheless, they crossed the Ravi on the morning of 12 July wading through the water up to their throats.<sup>81</sup> The same day early in the afternoon Nicholson arrived within a mile of the river bank: he could see the Revolutionaries actually crossing the river.

### Battle of Trimmu Ghat

The Revolutionaries gave the enemy no time, and, to quote Colonel Bouchier, who participated in the action, "scarcely had the artillery crossed the bridge, and were forming on the opposite side, screened by the Punjab levies, than down came the 9th Cavalry on their flanks (before the 52nd could form to receive them), gnashing their teeth, and worked up to the utmost with intoxicating drugs; they cut right and left at the gunners and drivers.<sup>82</sup> Away scampered the mounted levies back to Goordaspore; the enemy pushed out their skirmishers to within fifty yards of the guns, and a tremendous volley from the whole line, delivered as

<sup>78</sup> Cave-Browne, II, 68-69.

<sup>79</sup> The official report says that the district officers of Lahore and Amritsar "were ordered to seize every ekka, bylee, and pony that was to be seen, and to despatch them under police guards to General Nicholson's camp at Amritsar on urgent public service. These vehicles on their arrival there were promptly loaded with British soldiers, and the force started at dusk for Gurdaspur, which is at a distance of forty-four miles from Amritsar, reaching it at 3 p. m. of July 11." Quoted in Kaye and Malleon, II, 480 n.

<sup>80</sup> Cave-Browne, II, 74-75 and notes; *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. 1, pp 295-96.

<sup>81</sup> Report of the Deputy-Commissioner of Gurdaspur in *Mutiny Records* VIII, Pt. 1, p. 296.

<sup>82</sup> In his official report Nicholson says that he did not oppose their passage across the river because they "might break away southwards, and so escape me." Quoted in Cave-Browne, II, p. 322.



simultaneously as if on parade at Sialkote, made things look very ugly".<sup>83</sup> But against heavy odds<sup>84</sup> and superior equipment the Revolutionaries could not carry their successful charge to its logical end; they had not come prepared for a full scale battle against the Movable Column. They were forced to make a retreat and decided to recross the river. Here, however, they met with a calamity which they had not anticipated in the least. The river at this place is divided into two channels with an island between them. The southern channel was deep with a strong current, and they knew it; but the other one, which was shallow and fordable, when they had waded through it, had by now risen and become absolutely unfordable. Having been thus entrapped they made what little preparations they could to meet the attack of the enemy, which they knew was almost certain; they ran up a breast work close to the edge of the water and placed an old gun behind it; an attempt was also made to fortify the walls of a small village which was situated on the northern end of the Island.<sup>85</sup>

Nicholson, on the other hand, had both time and equipment to prepare himself for a decisive attack on the entrapped contingent of the Revolutionaries. He took three full days to get ready, and it was not before the morning of 16 July that the British guns were brought down to the bank of the river; they were immediately put into action. This was, however, to draw off the attention of the Revolutionaries from the movements of the Infantry which could thus proceed unobserved to the southern end of the island. They took positions and reconnoitered the ground which was covered with thick brushwood. Without any loss of time the skirmishers marched forward and pushed back the pickets of the Revolutionaries. "It was now helter-skelter", wrote an eyewitness in the *Lahore Chronicle*, "they ran to the head of the island, were followed up by our fellows, and took to the water; many of them must have been drowned; numbers were like mud-larks on sand-banks and small islands,... There is deep water on the other side, and the villagers are up,....."<sup>86</sup> Many were drowned when trying to escape; some were caught by the police. About a hundred managed to escape into Kashmir but under pressure from Lawrence the Maharaja expelled them from his State. They wandered in the hills for some time and wanted to go to Awadh, but in August 1858 they were captured by the Deputy-Commissioner of Kulu in Kangra Valley.<sup>87</sup> "In short," wrote the latter, "few could altogether have escaped; many were executed at Goordaspore; at Shuckurgurh. I presided at the disposal of several camp followers; innumerable were flogged, deprived of their ill-gotten gain, and sent back to the place from which they came there to receive the punishment that awaited them for any act of violence or crime."<sup>88</sup>

As a result of the message sent after the outbreak at Sialkot the 10th Light

<sup>83</sup> Bouchier's *Eight Months Campaign*, quoted in Cave-Browne, II, p. 76.

<sup>84</sup> See Nicholson's official report quoted in Cave-Browne, II, p. 323, para 14.

<sup>85</sup> According to Nicholson there were only 300 Revolutionaries on the island.

<sup>86</sup> The *Lahore Chronicle*, quoted in Cave-Browne, II, p. 79.

<sup>87</sup> Cave-Browne, II, p. 80 n.

<sup>88</sup> *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, p. 297.



Cavalry was disarmed and dismounted at Ferozepur on 11 July, and the two wings of the 4th N. I. at Kangra and Nurpur.<sup>89</sup> Soon after this, the emissaries of the Revolutionary Movement began to work among the men of the 10th Cavalry. "In the meanwhile," says Cave-Browne, "emissaries from Delhi had been among them; in spite of the strictest *espionage*, letters breathing sedition would find their way into the lines, then two of the Irregular Cavalry corps, sent back from Delhi under a cloud, passed through a wing of the 17th Irregular cavalry, bound for Fera, under captain P. R. Hockin, who had dropped seventeen suspicious characters *en-passant*, to be taken care of in the Ferozepore jail."<sup>90</sup> On 19 August the men of 10th Cavalry rose and after minor triumphs they managed to leave for Delhi.

### Tribal Area

By the end of June the Revolutionary Movement had entered the region generally known as the tribal area. To the south-west of Peshawar stood a fort named after a British officer, Colonel Mackeson, who had been murdered in September, 1853. Some men of the 24th N. I. stationed here had contacts with the Bussee Khail Afridis in the hilly tracts hard by. When Edwardes, Commissioner of Peshawar, came to know of these developments he persuaded the tribesmen to ask the men of the 24th N. I. to give them in writing that the fort would be surrendered.<sup>92</sup> The Afridis obtained this promise in writing and gave it to Edwardes. On the night of 6 July, the British forces marched out of Peshawar, reaching the fort before daybreak. The sepoys were surprised; they were ordered to come out of the fort and lay down their arms; this was considered to be a great achievement. "Edwardes deserves great credit," wrote a correspondent in a letter to *The Times*, "for this peaceful termination of his expedition; for knowing the fort, he had taken the precaution of seizing the keep, the fort itself having no gates."<sup>93</sup>

Another incident pertaining to this area may be mentioned. On 9 July Malik Siraj al-Din, leader of the Sipah tribe, and a powerful chief in the Khyber, sent a letter to the *sawars* of the 18th Irregular Cavalry offering "an asylum in the writer's hills to any 'black-men' either of the Cavalry or Infantry, who chose to mutiny and come to him . . ." The letter hinted that the writer had the authority of Kabul for this invitation. It was taken by some of the *sawars* to their officer. When the Malik was asked if the letter was genuine he acknowledged it and said: "If the black-men had come he meant to give them up." After this incident the Malik remained loyal to the British.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>89</sup> *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, p. 213, 341; also see Cave-Browne, II, 104-05.

<sup>90</sup> Cave-Browne, II, p. 106.

<sup>91</sup> For the rising of the 10th Cavalry and their successful march to Delhi see *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, 409, 412—17; Cave-Browne, II, p. 190, n. 3.

<sup>92</sup> Cave-Browne, II, p. 90.

The official report says that the sepoys had promised to give 3,000 rupees to the Afridis of Baree for escorting them to a ferry on the Indus. See *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 163.

<sup>93</sup> Quoted in Cave-Browne, II, p. 91 n.

<sup>94</sup> See *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 164.



**Narinji**

Far more serious than these incidents was the battle of Narinji.<sup>95</sup> A small group of the sepoys of the 55th N.I. had accompanied the expelled ruler of Swat, Sayyid Mubarak Shah, into the valley of Panjtar, where a colony of the Revolutionaries had grown up under the leadership of Mawlawi 'Inayat 'Ali, a successor of the great Sayyid Ahmad Shahid.<sup>96</sup> Mawlawi 'Inayat 'Ali had been preaching *jihad* in the neighbouring area for some time, and a number of people had come under his influence, including the Khan of Panjtar, Muqarrab Khan. The Khan sent a small party of the Revolutionaries under the command of his cousin, Mir Baz Khan, towards Mardan to "raise the standard of the Prophet" and work among the people. When the British authorities came to know of the movements of Baz Khan's party, they sent a force against him under Major Vaughan, Commandant of the fort of Mardan. He fell upon the tiny group of the Revolutionaries on 2 July and overwhelmed them, killing Mir Baz Khan; other leaders, Jan Muhammad Khan and Malik Zarif, were taken prisoner and hanged; two villages were totally burnt and some were fired. The Revolutionaries however continued their work; emissaries from Delhi as well as Peshawar were arriving in this area and informing the people about the progress of the Revolution in other parts of the sub-continent. Mawlawi 'Inayat 'Ali now set up his headquarters at Narinji and planted there the standard of the Revolutionaries.<sup>97</sup> The village had a small population of about 400 souls, but they were devoted to the cause of freedom and acknowledged the authority of Mawlawi 'Inayat 'Ali. Thus, to quote the sarcastic remark of the report, "The holy war seemed auspiciously opened with every requisite: a priest, a banner, a fastness, a howling crowd of bigots and several days' provisions."<sup>98</sup> On 21 July, Captain James attacked this small hamlet of the Revolutionaries with a strong force and took its occupants completely by surprise. Nevertheless they put up a determined resistance; "a few minutes sufficed to convert each peaceful labourer into an armed soldier, and every hut into a fortress; out rushed several Ghazees (Mohammedan martyrs), but they were quickly cut down by the 2nd Cavalry; and the lower part of the village was soon mastered and set on fire: but the remainder still held out desperately."<sup>99</sup> In spite of superior numbers and equipment the British forces had to fall back on Sewa. They did not find themselves strong enough to renew the attack and waited for reinforcements from Peshawar. These having arrived on 2 August, they moved forward on the following morning; the Revolutionaries were ready to receive their charge. The main body of the British forces advanced by the direct route towards the village,

<sup>95</sup> Narinji: "The mountain village was so strongly situated that the police scarcely dared to go near it", *Ibid.*, pp. 166-67.

<sup>96</sup> Sayyid Ahmad Shahid: For an account of his life and work see *H.F.M.*, Vol. I, pp. 557-600.

<sup>97</sup> "The Ghazees came with the moulvie at their head and planted their standard (embroidered with butchery from the Koran) on the heights of Nowrunjee". Edwardes' report about Peshawar Division in *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 166; also see Holmes, p. 364.

<sup>98</sup> Cave-Browne, II, p. 93 n.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*



but a detachment was separated with orders to mount the hill by a side-path. The Revolutionaries now found themselves between two forces, far superior to them, both in numbers and equipment. They made a retreat; "the moulti of course, was clear away; he and the leading fanatics had gone off the night before, the cattle also, and all valuables, had been removed in anticipation of such a result. The village, however, was utterly destroyed."<sup>100</sup>

Peshawar itself had not been successfully quietened, and although the British had put it almost in a state of siege, and the sepoys had been disarmed, they still occupied their Lines; these of course, were closely guarded. They were not in open revolt, but they were not wholly inactive either. Reports were reaching the officers that arms locally made were being purchased and probably secreted in the Lines; the 27th N. I. and 51st N. I. were suspected most. On 28 August, an order was issued that the sepoys were to move out into tents on the plain near their respective parade-grounds; precautions were also taken by their officers to meet resistance in case it was offered. The evacuation of the Lines began early in the morning and was carried out without any incident. About midday when the work of search was still going on the sepoys posted at quarter-guard in the Lines of the 51st N. I. made a sudden rush on Captain Bartlett who was supervising the operations.<sup>101</sup> Simultaneously with this came the rising of the entire Regiment, "with a whirr like a covey of partridges," to use the Captain's expression. Then followed a brief but contested action in which "the sepoys fought well."<sup>102</sup> They were, however, overpowered by the enemy who had the advantage of superior arms and equipment, and "then began that memorable fusillade which commenced on the parade at Peshawar, and ended at Jumrood."<sup>103</sup> The losses of the sepoys were heavy; 660 out of a total of 871 were either "killed in the pursuit or subsequently executed by sentence of court martial."<sup>104</sup>

## Lahore

In the central and eastern districts of the Province also the Revolutionary Movement had been spreading fast and was growing stronger every day. Towards the end of July a letter was intercepted at the Post Office of Ambala; it was addressed by a seemingly quiet *bayragi* (priest) to the chief pundit of the Maharaja of Patiala, requesting him to use his influence to alienate his Chief from the 'unclean cow-slaying English'. The *bayragi* was seized and hanged.<sup>105</sup> More surprising was the case of the 26th N. I. The Regiment posted at Mian Mir (Lahore) had been disarmed in May. On 30 July, however, they rose, put to death

<sup>100</sup> Cave-Browne, II, p. 95.

<sup>101</sup> Captain Bartlett was the Postmaster and Cantonment Magistrate; he was an object of special hatred to the sepoys because among his duties were the interception of their letters and supervision of the executions.

<sup>102</sup> Cave-Browne, II, p. 113.

<sup>103</sup> *Punjab Mutiny Report*, para. 164.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> Cave-Browne, II, pp. 96-97 n. Also see Holmes, p. 362.



their commanding officer, Major Spencer, and escaped, but instead of proceeding eastwards to Delhi they took the opposite direction. They were engaged by the Tahsildar of Ajnala and detained at the banks of the river until 31 July, when Frederick Cooper, Deputy-Commissioner of Amritsar, arrived on the scene with a small force. The Revolutionaries were "in a sorry plight: famished and footsore, on an island, with no means of defence or escape." Some of them surrendered, and some were brought by the villagers who had seized them, when they were trying to escape. In all Cooper had "500 rebel sepoys" bound in ropes and taken to Ajnala.

Cooper's barbarous treatment may be read in his own words. "It was midnight before all were safely lodged in the police station. A drizzling rain coming on prevented the commencement of the execution; so a rest until day-break was announced. Before dawn another batch of sixty was brought in, and as the police station was then nearly full, they were ushered into a large tower or bastion.

"Previously, . . . the Deputy-Commissioner had ordered out a large supply of rope, in case the numbers captured were few enough for hanging (trees being scarce), and also a reserve of fifty Sikh Levies for a firing party, in case of the numbers demanding wholesale executions". Continuing the account he says that "when the execution commenced," the number of prisoners was "282 of all ranks, besides numbers of camp-followers." A dry well was discovered for the disposal of the corpses of the dishonoured soldiers." Cooper takes relish in using language which was shocking even to his own countrymen. "The climax of fortunate coincidences," he adds, "seemed to have arrived when it was remembered that the 1st of August was the anniversary of the great Mahomedan sacrificial festival of the Bukra Eed. A capital excuse was thus afforded to permit the Hindoostanee Mussulman horseman to return to celebrate it at Umritsar; while the single, Christian, unembarrassed by their presence, and aided by the faithful Sikhs, might perform a ceremonial sacrifice of a different nature (and the nature of which they had not been made aware of) on the same morrow," Cooper describes the hideous details of the killings. The Revolutionaries on their part demonstrated by their actions that they were conscious of sacrificing their lives for a cause. When two hundred and thirty-seven of them had thus been put to death, the doors of the bastion were opened" to let the prisoners come out. "And behold !" continues the writer, "they were nearly all dead ! unconsciously, the tragedy of Holveil's Black Hole had been re-enacted".<sup>106</sup> Cooper was later condemned, both for the butchery and the mode in which he has described his actions. In his minute on the services of the civil officers, Lord Canning wrote about Cooper: "I hope (he) will be judged by his acts, done under stern necessity, rather than by the narrative of them."<sup>107</sup> Whether there was a "stern necessity" of butchering all the captives is highly doubtful.

<sup>106</sup> Cooper, Frederic, *The Crisis in the Punjab* (London: 1858), pp. 159-162, gives the number of Cooper's victims as 283, but this figure cannot be accepted against Cooper's own admission; he says: "there fell by the law nearly 500 men." See p. 163; also see Holmes, p. 363.

<sup>107</sup> Cave-Browne, II, p. 103 n.



About a fortnight after the dispersal of the 51st N. I. another Revolutionary leader gave the British Government some trouble. Sayyid Amir with a band of about 50 Mohmunds and the men of the 51st who had escaped came down the hills and attacked the fort of Michni.<sup>108</sup> The Revolutionaries made an appeal to the men of the "Kelat-i-Ghilzi" who garrisoned the fort and requested them not to offer resistance if they had any regard for their faith and country which they wanted to liberate from the bondage of foreign rule. Edwardes admits: "We had no troops to move against them. It was a time for yielding with as good a grace as could be assumed." However, he succeeded in winning over the tribesmen by offering them the restoration of their confiscated privileges," and was able to persuade them to withdraw from the fort and settle the matter through negotiation. "The Mohmunds," writes Edwardes, "sent in their hostages to Peshawar, packed the Syud off unceremoniously and sat down quietly to wait for the return of peace in Hindoostan. The relief was indescribable."<sup>109</sup>

### Gugera

In September the Gugera district in Multan division became the scene of the greatest rising of the Revolutionaries in central Panjab. The region between Lahore and Multan was the home of sturdy peasants and cattle-rearing clansmen; the Lungreal, Khurruls and the Kathias may specially be mentioned. Besides these some other tribes—the Bhattis and Baluchis, for instance—had come from the neighbouring territories. To ensure safety of the important commercial road connecting Lahore with Multan and, through it, with Sind and Bombay, it was necessary to have a thorough control over this part of the Panjab. At Gugera which stood at a commanding position on this route precautionary steps were taken by the local authorities as soon as the news of the outbreak of the Revolution had reached them: the Treasury Guard (the 49th N. I.) was disarmed, a scrutiny of postal correspondence was started and extra police recruited.<sup>110</sup> In the last week of June, 1857, the jail overseer was dismissed from service, because he used to allow Ahmad Khan Khurrul, who subsequently became the chief leader of the Revolutionaries in this area, to pay visits to the prison house. Despite the precaution taken by the authorities the prisoners in the jail seem to have come under the influence of the agents of the Revolutionaries. On 26 July they rose and, in the words of the Assistant Commissioner, "were in a savage state of excitement." Equally "savage" were the measures taken to control them: "fifty-one prisoners were killed and wounded, and the *emeute* was promptly suppressed. Ahmad Khan Khurrul was suspected of having worked up the prisoners; but this could not be established by evidence, and after being kept under surveillance for some time he was released."<sup>111</sup>

However, if the authorities believed that they had crushed the

<sup>108</sup> Cave-Browne, II, p. 129.

<sup>109</sup> Cave-Browne, II, p. 129; *P. M. R.*, para 165. Also see *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, pp. 177-78.

<sup>110</sup> *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, pp. 41-42.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid*, p. 44.



Revolutionaries and secured the region they were grossly mistaken. Ahmad Khan was a man of courage and determination; he had contacts with the Revolutionary leaders at Delhi and other places and even with the Emperor.<sup>112</sup> An impetus to their activities was provided by the released convicts of the central jail at Agra. Many of them returned to their homes in Gugera and Multan and told the people how the Movement was growing in strength and intensity and how it was spreading in other parts of the subcontinent. They made an appeal to their kinsmen to rise against the British rule and put it to an end as their brethren had done elsewhere. The Khurruls led by Ahmad Khan rose on 16 September, and were soon joined by a number of people; in a short time the entire region was in the grip of the Revolution.<sup>113</sup> L. Berkeley who was sent with a small contingent of horsemen to capture Ahmad Khan before he crossed the Ravi opposite to the village of Jhumra. He failed to do this, but when reinforcements arrived the Revolutionaries left the village which was burnt by the British forces.

Ahmad Khan who had succeeded in winning over the support of the Wattu tribe, came up with the British forces at a place not far from Gugera. In a severe fight which ensued, "Ahmad Khan and his followers fought stoutly; and Captain Black and Lieutenant Chichester were surrounded more than once during the melee, the country being by no means favourable for the action of cavalry."<sup>114</sup> Both sides suffered heavy losses. "This expedition" says Elphinstone's report, "though attended with severe loss on our side, thus ended in irreparable disaster to the insurgents. Ahmad Khan had been the chief instigator of the movement; his reputation for success in former insurrections was considerable, and his influence over the tribes on the Ravee unbounded."<sup>115</sup> On 2 September Berkeley was attacked near Kure Shah village by another party of the Revolutionaries "composed of the Futtanah, Turhanah, and Moordanah tribes, and led by their chiefs, Bhawul, Sullabut, and Walleedad." The Revolutionaries were dispersed but only to fall upon Berkeley's forces on the following day, near the bank of the river. Here they had hidden themselves in the long grass standing by the side of the water. Berkeley was defeated and slain in the action along with more than fifty of his men; "and the loss would have been still more severe had it not been for a party of the Kuttar Mookhee Battalion, who rallied their comrades near the banks of the river and opposed a determined front to the pursuing enemy." Among other leaders of the Revolutionaries, Muhammad Khan Khattia and Mir Bahawal Fatwanah deserve to be specifically mentioned. The latter was considered to be "the greatest

<sup>112</sup> See Cave-Browne, II, pp. 203-04.

<sup>113</sup> In his report Lt. Elphinstone, Assistant Commissioner, says: "The first information of the intended insurrection was brought to me by Surfiraz Khan, Khurral, in the night of the 16th. He insisted on seeing me about 11 p. m... and on being admitted informed me that all the Chiefs of the Ravee tribes, who were present at the Sudder on heavy *moochulkas*, had fled with all their followers, and that there could be no doubt that they intended to rise immediately. This was confirmed by other sources..." *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 45; also see Kaye and Malletson, V, p. 211.

<sup>114</sup> Cave-Browne, II, 208. Also see *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 49.

<sup>115</sup> *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, pp. 50-51.



man among them, the bravest and most influential."<sup>116</sup>

### Harappa and Chichawatni

Nevertheless, the Revolutionaries continued the struggle: they seized the Tahsil of Harappa and besieged the *sarai* of Chichawatni behind which Major Crawford Chamberlain<sup>117</sup> had taken shelter after repulsing one of their parties on the afternoon of 23 September. He had seized a small two-storied tower which was considered to be 'the key' of the *sarai*. Soon after nightfall the Revolutionaries attacked the British force: they were provided with a shelter by the walls of the gardens and the houses in the village and their sharpshooters could ply the *sarai* and the tower "with almost incessant musketry" even the women were helping them, "moving along the tops of the houses with their skirts stretched out, so as to cover the matchlockmen as they crept about from point to point." Chamberlain did not have the courage to risk a sortie, for, he feared, it would involve heavy loss of life. The pressure of the fire of the Revolutionaries was continually increasing, and "if a man showed himself for one minute, he was almost sure to be knocked over."<sup>118</sup> Chamberlain, therefore, sent messages for reinforcements and decided to wait for them. Lawrence had already despatched reinforcements to relieve the forces at Gogera. Paton who commanded the reinforcing Column from Lahore found on the morning of 26 September that the Revolutionaries had thrown themselves across the road, about two miles from Harappa. However, on seeing that the enemy had a stronger force and better equipment they withdrew without risking a battle; Paton could not go in their pursuit and decided to proceed to Chichawatni where he reached by midday. Two days later reinforcements also arrived from Multan, as well as another detachment from Lahore, under Captain Snow and McAndrew. On the way they had met a party of the Revolutionaries near Muhammadpur and had lost few of their men in the skirmish.<sup>120</sup>

The reports of the outbreak of the Revolution in Gogera had alerted the authorities in the neighbouring stations: Captain Hockin left Leia with a wing of the 17th Irregular Cavalry and moved along the right bank of the Ravi to stop the Revolutionaries from crossing the river; Captain Hawes had moved out of Jhang "to arrest the spread of the insurrection in that quarter," while Captain Tronson and Major Voyle, the Deputy Commissioner of Multan, proceeded along the right bank of the Sutlej to cut off communications with the country of "that most dangerous of our neighbours, *our nominal ally*, the Nawab of Bahawalpoor."<sup>121</sup>

<sup>116</sup> Cave-Browne, II, 214.

<sup>117</sup> He had come from Multan with a force of the 1st Irregular Cavalry and Sikh Infantry. See *P. M. R.*, para, 126.

<sup>118</sup> Cave-Brown, II, 207.

<sup>119</sup> The first messenger carried Chamberlain's note sewn in the sole of his shoes: this was miscarried. Another note was sent through a small boy: this reached Colonel Paton about midnight. See Cave-Browne, II, p. 210.

<sup>120</sup> Lieutenant Elphinstoae's official report in *Mutiny Records*, VIII. Pt. II, p. 52.

<sup>121</sup> Cave-Browne, II, p. 212.

G. W. Hamilton, Commissioner of Multan Division, refers to the Nawab as "...the more than



The main task before the forces now concentrating at Chichawatni was to guard the road between Lahore and Multan. Colonel Paton took charge of the portion from Lahore to Gugera, while Chamberlain was to move towards Multan. He was still on his way when distressing reports came from Kamalia, an important town across the river; McMahon, the Extra-Assistant Commissioner of the district was in dread of being attacked by the Revolutionaries. On 2 October Chamberlain retracted his steps and proceeded to Kamalia, but before he reached there McMahon had retreated and escaped to Jhang, leaving the town in the hands of Revolutionaries. Chamberlain crossed the river on 6 October and immediately moved towards Kamalia; it had been evacuated by the Revolutionaries who had plundered the wealthy *banyahs*.<sup>122</sup> The Revolutionaries had their own reasons for punishing some sections of the population of Kamalia. The British forces had also been burning villages and inflicting severe punishments on their captives, and John Lawrence had to administer a rebuke to the authorities concerned. He wrote: "I am not aware of any orders which I have given for burning villages. I believe I have given none whatever on the subject. I hear that Mr.... before he retreated from Koti-Kumalia caused all his prisoners to be shot. I beg that he may not be employed again in any military expedition. This is not the way to put down the insurrection."<sup>123</sup>

Chamberlain was unable to control the situation for "jungle fighting was madness, with all to lose and nothing to gain;" he therefore decided to wait for reinforcements. His assessment of the situation, it appears, was not wrong, because the Revolutionaries were determined to make any sacrifices whatsoever for their cause.<sup>124</sup>

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doubtful Mahomedan ally of Bahawalpoor, holding a large tract of the left banks of the Indus and Sutlej, ever ready in the event of any further disaster to intrigue with our troops, invade the British territories and by his presence stimulate the people to rebellion and lay siege to the fort." *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, pp. 1-2.

<sup>122</sup> The official report says that "the cultivators (which sect alone formed the rebel forces) are deeply indebted to the money-lenders and bunneeahs, it was an object with them to efface all proof of their indebtedness. They did so most effectually." *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 74. They had done it by destroying the records. It is to be noted, however, that this was not the only reason of the punishment of the *banyahs* by the Revolutionaries. Sometimes they acted as spies supplying information to the British officers. On the day preceding the occupation of Chichawatni by Chamberlain, "a letter was received in the afternoon from a bunya named 'Kunya' at Cheechawatnee stating that the news of the arrival of a small party of cavalry at Dobooree had reached his village, near which was a strong gathering of rebels, and that no advance should be made in that direction without guns. The messenger who brought the letter computed the rebels at 3 to 4000, led by Mahomed, Lall and Nutto, Chiefs of the Khatya tribe, who would undoubtedly oppose the detachment." *Report of Major Chamberlain's Column*, paras. 5 and 19 in *Mutiny Records*, VIII Pt. II, pp. 65, 66, 74.

<sup>123</sup> Bosworth Smith, II, p. 141.

<sup>124</sup> Bahawal Khan Fatwanah, and other leaders of the Revolutionaries wrote a letter to Mir Barkat 'All 'Woordie-Major' of the 1st Irregular Cavalry telling him that "it is highly unbecoming and improper that you should be engaged in any hostile operations against the followers of Islam; because the Holy Prophet (may praises and blessings be upon his exalted head) has forbidden and proscribed it." After repeating oaths on Islam, the Prophet and the *Qur'an* they offered



In the meantime reports were received that the Revolutionaries were concentrating in the jungle stronghold of Julli, which lay between the joint forces of Chamberlain and Cuerton and Hamilton's detachment from Multan, which was supported by a number of landlords of the neighbouring area.<sup>125</sup> On 10 October Chamberlain moved to Julli, having received reinforcements two days earlier.<sup>126</sup> The Revolutionaries had never expected that heavy guns could be brought against them into a dense jungle; they could not therefore stand for long continuous firing from them. They left Julli on 22 October, crossed the Ravi and made for the Sutlej in the hope of entering Bahawalpur territories.<sup>127</sup> An attempt was made to go in their pursuit but it did not meet with success. Chamberlain was however able to capture a large number of cattle and sheep left behind by them.<sup>128</sup>

### Leiah

Captain Hockin who had left Leiah with a wing of the 17th Irregular Cavalry was marching along the right bank of the river when reports came that the 9th Irregular Cavalry had risen at Kalabagh on the Indus, on its way to Bannu.<sup>129</sup> The leader of the Revolutionary *sawars* was Risaldar Wazir Khan, "one of the bravest men in the Indian army".<sup>130</sup> Having fired a few shots on their Commandant, Captain Campbell<sup>131</sup>, they made for the Ravi. A party of the Moohanee Horse under Cowan and Ensign Chalmers met them. Chalmers was severely wounded and his men fled away; Cowan fell back on a village and sent news to Captain Hockin, who had already started in that direction immediately on receiving the first report of the outbreak. When Hockin came upon the Revolutionaries Risaldar Wazir Khan stepped forward and challenged Risaldar 'Ali Wardi Khan of the 17th Cavalry to "let us see which is the best man". In the 'passage of arms' that followed Wazir Khan was mortally wounded; soon after, the men of 17th Cavalry fell upon the Revolutionaries and overwhelmed them by

Barkat 'Ali a *carte blanche*: "We tender whatever you may desire for your comfort and happiness, and we will henceforth consider you the lord and leader of our fortunes.... You can do with us exactly as you please; whatever you order will be obeyed". An appeal was also made to forget the past: "pray banish it from your memory". The letter ended with an apology, it had to be without an envelope because the writers had none with them; nor, they said, they could find a more elegant writer. However, Barkat 'Ali thought that he could have a better future in remaining loyal to the British. Cave-Browne, II, pp. 215-16n.

<sup>125</sup> Cave-Browne writes Jublee in place of Julli. See vol. II, p. 217.

<sup>126</sup> Major Chamberlain's Column (Report). *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 75.

<sup>127</sup> "It was subsequently discovered that the rebels left Jhullee the previous day at *midday*, and, although they passed within 200 yards of the village of a Syud who had professed the greatest friendship and subservience to the British Government, he gave no information whatever and denied all knowledge of their departure, until the 'Koora' or spoor of many cattle, goats, sheep, horses, men, etc., gave him the lie". *Ibid.*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 77.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>129</sup> The 9th I. C. had been withdrawn from Delhi because they were regarded with suspicion.

<sup>130</sup> Cave-Browne, I, p. 220.

<sup>131</sup> He was not hurt of the four shots which entered the doolie in which he was sleeping, two passed through over his head and two lodged in his plow.



sheer weight of numbers.

### Sind

The annexation of Sind had taken place only fifteen years before the outbreak of the Revolution. Bartle Frere, who had been appointed its Commissioner in 1850<sup>132</sup>, was of the view that it was 'safe', and had therefore he not hesitated in sending the strongest of his Regiments, the 1st Fusiliers, to Multan. Two months later he found it necessary to issue a proclamation and take other precautionary measures.<sup>133</sup> In his circular letter sent with copies of the proclamation Frere says that it was suggested to him on various occasions that some proclamation or notification should be issued by him: He had, however, abstained from complying 'with these suggestions because he thought such notifications "often do more harm than good."' But in July he had to change his opinion because "it appears certain that missionaries have been despatched in this direction, with a view to disturb the public peace, and that alarming rumours have been put in circulation in various parts of the Province". In the proclamation which was originally written in Persian he admits that "some evil disposed persons have of late come in the direction of Sind from Hindoostan and elsewhere spreading mischievous reports.....Moreover many sepoy of the Bengal Army have treacherously deserted from their Regiments and spread themselves over the country to try to seduce the faithful soldiers of the British Government from their alliance."<sup>134</sup> The Government directed its agents to find out such persons and hand them over to the nearest police stations. A threat of the confiscation of property was given to those who would be found guilty of withholding information; the spreading of seditious reports was made punishable with death. By September, however, the activities of the Revolutionaries had penetrated as far as the Qalat territory.<sup>135</sup>

### Karachi

The results of the work done by the "missionaries" of the Revolution appeared in the form of the risings of the sepoy Regiments at different places. Karachi took the lead. In 1857 the 'native' town was, to quote Burton, "a mass of low mud hovels and high mud houses, with flat mud roofs, windowless mud walls and numerous mud ventilations, surrounded by a tumble-down parapet of mud

<sup>132</sup> Early in 1856 Frere had gone to England; he had returned in March, 1857.

<sup>133</sup> Circular No. 1026 of 1857—Political Department (From H. B. E. Frere Esquire, Commissioner of Sind, dated 16 July 1857)—*Secret Letters*.

<sup>134</sup> It is rather significant that the Commissioner mentions "evil disposed persons" as well as "sepoys". Evidently the former were the workers sent by the organizers of the Movement or *missionaries* as Frere calls them.

<sup>135</sup> Bartle Frere's letter to Lawrence contains the following report about Qalat: "The Khelat papers sent to you will show that disaffected people are trying to stir up strife there, but I am in great hopes, Capt. Merewether will be able to set all right without detaining the upwards bound troops." John Lawrence Papers (MS.) In India Office Library, No. 132.



built upon a low platform of mud covered-rock<sup>136</sup>. To the east of the town at a short distance was the vast area covered by the British cantonment. On the Frere Street were the bungalows of the officers, which formed the front row of the military quarters. Behind these houses were the regimental Lines, those of the British soldiers in the south and the Hind-Pakistani Regiments to the north of Saddar Bazaar.

On 13 September<sup>137</sup> at about eleven o'clock in the night Major McGregor, the Commanding Officer of the 21st N. I., received information that his Regiment had made plans to rise at midnight,<sup>138</sup> and, after seizing the treasure, it would proceed to Hyderabad. McGregor immediately rushed to the town to inform the authorities. Colonel Stiles, Commanding Officer of the 2nd European Light Infantry, strengthened the mess-guard where the families of the officers were to take shelter; a guard was also posted at the Treasury. Major Blake marched with his Horse-Artillery to the rear of the Lines of the 21st N. I. and took positions in front of the parade ground. The "assembly" was sounded and the men of the 21st completely taken by surprise had to obey the order. On the roll being called it was discovered that twenty-seven men had escaped with their muskets. However, the Regiment was disarmed and after a short harangue by General Scott the men returned to their Lines. Ten of the Revolutionary sepoys who had escaped were taken captive and tried by a court-martial. They were sentenced to death and on the same day (17 September) seven of them were hanged and three blown up by guns.

The search for the Revolutionaries was now undertaken on an elaborate scale. Descriptive rolls of the sepoys who had escaped were made out and sent by Major Marston, Captain of Police, to various *thanahs*, and directions were issued that the ferries were to be watched; the people living in the countryside were put 'on the alert'. The plan was successfully executed and information about their movements became available. Strong parties were sent in their pursuit. "Nine were taken on the other side of the Hubb, by a party under Soobahdar Allah Yar Khan..." The Revolutionaries had unfortunately entered the village of the Subahdar and asked for conveyance "to go and join the Jam of Bayla." The Subahdar waited until it was dark; he then put guard round the hill which they had occupied, leaving one road open. He ordered some matchlocks to be fired at random giving an impression that a contingent of troops had arrived. "When day dawned on the morning of the 15th he took up their tracks, and by a rapid pursuit, caught them off their guard, among some thick jungle and at once charged them.....all were

<sup>136</sup> Quoted in *Gazetteer of the Province of Sind*, Karachi District (Bombay, 1919), p. 59.

<sup>137</sup> This is the date given by Bartle Frere in his official report to Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay. On the morning of 14 September he sent his first report (No. 325, dated the 14th September, 1857). See *Secret Letters*, No. 328 of 1857, dated the 21st September.

Kanhayya Lall also gives the same date; he mentions Sunday which was 13 September. Seep. 257.

Charles Bill gives 14 September which is not correct unless by the phrase "the night of the 14th" he means the night preceding 14 September. See Vol. II, p. 156.

<sup>138</sup> According to Kanhayya Lall the information was given by a havaladar and other persons. See p. 257.



secured uninjured." Within the next two or three days more were captured—one was taken from the neighbourhood of 'Mugger' (Mangu) Pir.<sup>139</sup> In his report dated 21 September, Frere sums up the results of the efforts of the pursuing parties in these words: "Of the 31 mutineers 24 have been captured alive and brought in of whom 18 were tried and sentenced to death, 17 were executed; the sentence of one commuted to transportation, and three yet remain to be tried, three were shot in a fight by the Police, three have been tracked, pursued and captured, but not brought in and only four remain to be accounted for."<sup>140</sup>

### Hyderabad

In Hyderabad also "for several days rumours had reached me of an intended rising of the Golundauze but I was unable to trace them to any foundation, and regarded them merely as Bazar rumours. It was however evident to me, that a *feeling of insecurity existed to a great extent amongst the people*, which it was advisable to allay..."<sup>141</sup> An unpatriotic 'native' officer reported to the Commander that the sepoys had planned a rising and that the people of the town would join hands with them. He took preemptory steps to secure the Treasury and the pay office and then ordered the sepoys to assemble for a parade. They were all disarmed, and apparently showed no signs<sup>2</sup> of resentment. In the night, a few of them disappeared: but they were captured and blown away with guns.<sup>142</sup> Frere's brief report sent to John Lawrence was that "we have had a very narrow escape at Hyderabad. The Subahdar Major of the Golundazes Batty, reported his men plotting...The Brigadier determined to disarm them which he effected very skilfully and.....secured the guns which he moved into the Fort where.....they are safe..."<sup>143</sup> The captive Revolutionaries were brought before the authorities, and, "our punishments here at Hyderabad seemed to have checked the disaffection in the native regiments and will I hope have the same effects at Shikarpoor, where the same kind of plot has been discovered just in time."<sup>144</sup>

In Upper Sind, comparatively nearer to the main centres of the Movement than Karachi and Hyderabad, the workers of the Revolutionaries seem to have achieved better results. Darya Khan, was one of their leaders who worked in Jacobabad; he was also in contact with the sepoys at Shikarpur. In his report dated 1 October, Frere writes: "I have no doubt that but for the promptitude, and decision shown by Captain Montgomery in arresting these men at Shikarpoor, and by Captain Merewether in imprisoning and removing Durya Khan, the traitorous Jekranee Chief at Jacobabad, the men of the artillery who broke out into mutiny at

<sup>139</sup> For a brief description see *Gazetteer of the Province of Sind*, Vol. I. Karachi District, (Bombay, 1919), pp. 100-01.

<sup>140</sup> *Secret Letters*, No. 328 of 1857, (Frere to Elphinstone, dated Karachi, 21 September, 1857).

<sup>141</sup> Report of the Magistrate of Hyderabad, to the Commissioner, *Sind Records*, No. 1185 of 1857, Military Department. (Italics are mine.)

<sup>142</sup> Kanhayya Lall, *op. cit.*, pp. 369-70.

<sup>143</sup> Lawrence Papers, (MS), I. O. No. 131.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 132.



Shikarpoor.....would have been joined by many discontented spirits, both there and at Jacobabad....."<sup>145</sup> Darya Khan was sent to Sukkur; from there he was put on board a river steamer and taken to Karachi "to undergo his sentence of imprisonment for life in the jail of Ahmednuggur or such other place as your Lordship in Council may direct....."<sup>146</sup> Despite these repressive measures adopted by the authorities a small number of 'native' artillerymen rose on the night of 23 September and took their guns to the parade-ground.<sup>147</sup> The rest of the men belonging to this Regiment and others available were brought into action against them: within two hours they were overpowered.<sup>148</sup> The risings at Karachi, Hyderabad and Shikarpur were small compared to the events of the War in other parts of the subcontinent. However they do establish the fact that Sind, Beluchistan, Qalat and the neighbouring areas did not remain wholly unaffected by the Movement.

(in: S. Moinul Haq: *The Great Revolution of 1857*. Karachi 1968, pp. 248-301)



<sup>145</sup> The leaders arrested were Subahdar Bihari Misr, Havaladar Imam 'Ali Shah (16th Regiment) and Muhammad Shah camp-follower. They were arrested two days before the rising at Shikarpur, "after a conference at which they had endeavoured to induce the Police to join them in mutiny."

*Secret Letters*, No. 360 of 1857 (Frere to Elphinstone, dated 1 October, 1857).

<sup>146</sup> *Secret Letters*, No. 198, 857—(Frere to Elphinstone, dated 17 October, 1857).

<sup>147</sup> Kanhayya Lal says, their number was fourteen or sixteen, p. 223.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*







S. EHTESHAM HUSAIN

## URDU LITERATURE AND THE REVOLT

It is commonly said that Urdu literature is a product of the Darbar (the court), the Khanqah (the shrine of the Sufis) and the Bazaar (the market place). Undoubtedly it is an oversimplification of a complex historical process of integration and disintegration of facts, conditions and ideas stretching over centuries. The triangle represents the influence of the feudal order, the religious-cum-social milieu and the common man's desire to find expression in literature. It is significant that the rise of Urdu poetry in Northern India took place in the latter 18th and early 19th centuries and coincided with the decay of the feudal order. Viewed from this angle the period appears to have lost all vitality, unable to express even the values of the departing age. In an obscure sense this was also the age of a new awakening, the beginning of a new awareness which was inherent in the changing historical, political and social conditions. Urdu poetry then had the anguish, the confusion, the pathos, the uncertainty of the age and it would be futile to search for ideas and ideals other than these. The atmosphere in which these poets lived, the taste of the patrons for whom they wrote and, in most cases, the absence of any common link between the poets and the people—all these contributed to the degeneration of poetry, often into mere word-play. It had to be highly standardized in form, limited in thought and mechanically subservient to traditions.

It was only with the advent of the East India Company rule that the poets and writers began to realize the gravity of the new situation. When Sirajuddaula was killed by the British, his friend and collaborator, Raja Ram Narain "Maozoon" cried in anguish:

Oh! where have gone the mad lovers who roamed  
about in the desert,

And where have vanished those days of love?

And "Mushafi" wrote:

All the wealth and splendour that India had

The infidel Englishmen have squeezed out by treachery.

Then came the revolt, the big flare-up of the vague, undefined,



unorganized yet intense national sentiment. Most of the big and small Darbars that patronized the poets had tumbled down. Oudh, the great centre of arts and culture, was annexed by the British in 1856. The Moghul rule at Delhi had been reduced to a mere symbol. A new Empire that had no roots in Indian soil and alien to Indian culture came into being. It may not be very fruitful to look for literary productions of high quality dealing directly with the revolt or its consequences, though such literature is also to be found. Rather it would be more useful to treat literature also as the product of certain historical and economic forces that motivated the revolt itself. A great part of the literary output since then reveals a different spirit. Henceforth the poets and writers may also be classified as leaders of thought inasmuch as they visualised literature as a formative process in the development of the nation. For them literature must play a role in awakening of the people to new consciousness. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Khwaja Altaf Husain "Hali," Maulana Mohammad Husain "Azad," Dr. Nazir Ahmad, Maulana Shibli, Maulana Zakauallah, Chiragh Ali, Mohsinul Mulk and Viqarul Mulk, to name only the most important ones, all believed in bringing literature in line with life and making it serve life. This could not have been possible in a conscious way earlier.

While we talk of the impact of the revolt on Urdu literature, we should be careful to note that the nature of the great revolt was not clearly comprehended at the time. In most cases it was treated as a "scourge of God," the foul play of fate, the evil-eye of the sky, the mere change of times and "the result of our misdeeds." These subjective interpretations of an historical event of such importance drove them into wrong directions and consequently no attempt was made to analyse its extent and nature. Not only this. It was interpreted in certain quarters, evidently under British influence, as a revolt against established authority. This idea gained such firm ground that it took a long time to link the traditions of the revolt with the national movement. An objective assessment may yet take some time as new materials become available and more facts are brought to light.

We shall take first the works written during the revolt. Out of the many works the important ones are: *Khutoot-i-Ghalib* (the letters of Ghalib), *Dastanbo* (The Persian Diary of Ghalib written during the revolt), *Dastan-i-Ghadar* (The story of the Mutiny) by Zaheer Dehlavi, *Tarikh-i-Sarkashi-i-Bijnor* (The History of the Rebellion at Bijnor) by Sir Syed Ahmad, *Risala-i-Asbab-i-Baghawat-i-Hind* (A Treatise on the Causes of the Indian Revolt) by Sir Syed Ahmad, *Tarikh-i-Hind*, vol. IX (History of India), by Zakauallah, *Roznamcha-i-Ghadr* (The Diary of the Mutiny) written by an Englishman and translated by Dr. Nazir Ahmad, Agha Hajju "Sharaf," a long poem on the sack of Lucknow, many poems of Wajid Ali Shah, Munir Shikohabadi, Bahadur Shah "Zafar" and Barq Lacknawi and *Fughan-i-Delhi* (The Lament of Delhi), a collection of some fifty poems first published in 1861 and various poems and articles written mostly in Delhi newspapers during and following the upheaval. There may still be others but we may skip them over as we do not propose to give in this article a catalogue of such books.

Analysing some of the above writings we come to certain very remarkable



conclusions. Mirza Asadullah Khan "Ghalib," the renowned Urdu poet has been accepted as the most representative poet of the culture and tradition of the period. Being of the same stock as others of the dying Moghul court, he had developed relations with the Britishers and had even admired certain of their qualities and achievements. He was the first writer of significance who found British achievements in science and political organization more progressive in some respects than those achieved even by the great Moghul, Akbar, and this he mentioned in one of his Persian poems meant to be a foreword to a new edition of Abul Fazl's *Ain-i-Akbari*, prepared by Sir Syed, sometime in 1855. It was such a scathing criticism of the old order that even Sir Syed could not agree to append it to his work. Ghalib, who was then attached to the court of Bahadur Shah maintained close relations with all dignitaries at Delhi and when the revolt spread he was inevitably embroiled in it. After the British occupied Delhi his house was guarded by the armies of the Maharaja of Patiala (being the house of one of his respected friends) which saved it from the loot and arson indulged in by the victorious British. Besides other literary engagements Ghalib was then working on a Diary in Persian which, though a good literary piece, does not contain much of historical value. In the scores of letters that he wrote to different types of people all over India, there is much information about conditions in Delhi. He speaks of the "terror" of the "Blacks" and the "Whites," of the death of his English and Indian friends and patrons, of the turning of Delhi into a military camp where no one could move about without something like a curfew pass, of the trial of many innocent aristocrats of Delhi and the difficulties of everyday life. He does not attach any political significance to these events but he knows that the old days were not to come back. It may be interesting to read a few lines from one of his Ghazals which mentions the event directly:

As every militaryman of England today can do what he wills,  
Men are mortally afraid  
To come out into the market place  
The *Chowk* has become a place for murder  
And the home is nothing but a prison.

Ghalib is very critical of the behaviour of the British towards Delhi people in general and Muslims in particular after the suppression of the revolt. Of his friends, Sheikh Imam Baksh "Sahbai," a great scholar and poet, was shot along with two of his sons. Maulana Fazle Haq, the distinguished scholar was sent to the Andamans where he wrote a book in Arabic on the great revolt entitled *As-Sauratul-Hindiyya* (The Indian Revolution); Nawab Mustafa Khan "Shefta" was sent to jail; Maulana Mohammad Baqir, a great Shia Divine, the founder of the first important literary newspaper in Urdu and the father of Mohammed Husain "Azad" was shot dead and Ghalib was a witness to all this. His Ghazals forcefully express the sorrow and agony born of these fateful days. Much of these facts has been preserved in books like *Ghalib Ka Roznamcha* (The Diary of Ghalib), *Angreson ki Bipta* (The sufferings of the Englishmen), *Bahadur Shah ka Muqaddama* (The trial of Bahadur Shah), all written by Khwaja Hasan Nizami;



*Delhi ki Akhri Bahar* and *Naubat-i-Panjroze* (The Transitory Joy) by Rashidul Khairi; *Bahadur Shah Zajar* by Amir Ahmed Alavi and *Bahadur Shah Zafar aur Unka Ahd* by Rais Ahmad Jafri.

‘Munir’ Shikohabadi was a famous poet of the Lucknow school, attached to the Nawab of Farrukhabad. He was arrested, summarily tried and sent to the Andamans. He has written various poems dealing with his personal affliction as well as the national catastrophe.

Mohammed Husain ‘Azad’ composed a poem on the ‘Victory of Armies of the East’ over the Britishers. It was published in his father’s *Delhi Urdu Akhbar* of May 24, 1857, and has only recently been discovered.

Earlier I have mentioned books that were the result of personal experience of their authors or an evolution of the situation arising out of the revolt. Sir Syed Ahmad (who had not received the knighthood then) wrote a history of the rebellion at Bijnor. He had not till then assumed leadership of the Muslim intelligentsia. His political career begins with the publication of the book, entitled *Causes of the Indian Revolt*, written in Urdu, and subsequently translated into English. This book provides a searching analysis of the events. He places the blame on the British whose policy had denied them the goodwill of the population. ‘It was for the government to try and win the friendship of its subjects, not the subjects to try and win that of the government.’ He added, ‘Now English government has been in existence upward a century, and up to the present hour it has not secured the affection of the people.’ It is a very controversial political document, as has been the role of Sir Syed himself, but nevertheless, it must be stated that no student of our history can ignore it.

Zaheer Dehlavi was a young but eminent poet attached to the court of Bahadur Shah. After a lapse of some years he wrote his autobiography and named it *Dastan-i-Ghadr* (The Story of the Mutiny). He gives a detailed account of the happenings in Delhi, his sufferings and the woes of those who were suspected of being collaborators or sympathisers of the rebels.

There is yet another book, an anthology of poems, entitled *Fughan-i-Dehli* (The Lament of Delhi) published in 1861, which deserves mention as it contains the poems of some forty poets on the ruin and plunder of Delhi. They mostly deal with the sufferings of the noble and the cultured people of Delhi who had to face hardships never experienced before. They describe the events very vaguely and indicate that the Muslims have been the chief victims. Several of them point out that not a single able-bodied young man in Delhi escaped the gallows. Some of the poems end on the optimistic note that Delhi will flourish again and the good old days will be back.

This is also the tone of several poems written by Lucknow poets. They sing of the writers’ loyalty to the king and to the city of Lucknow which had been reduced to utter ruin. They are a kind of elegy focusing on trivial matters, rather than lament over the national loss. One cannot, however, be very critical of these poets whose sense of patriotism and national unity was coloured by local loyalties and devotion.



To understand the impact of the revolt on the tradition of Urdu literature, we shall have to analyse the post-revolt developments and the way they influenced men's minds. Just after the transfer of power from the East India Company to the Crown, the proclamation about religious freedom proved to be an indirect invitation to think in terms of religion. It was also a suggestion for the middle and the upper classes to think only of the welfare of their own communities. It was, in other words, a signal for a sort of religious revivalism and the glorification of the past. This may sound strange but we find that the idea of a unified nation suffered a setback after the struggle of 1857. Even our best writers, in almost all the Indian languages, began to look upon the achievements of their forefathers with nostalgia. In certain sense this indeed was a sign of awakening but the narrow religious outlook prevented their writings from becoming part of national literature. Had it been otherwise, we would probably have had much greater works (at least in thought content) from Bankim Chandra Chatterji, Sir Syed, Bhartendu and his friends, Hali and Shibli. The national spirit shrouded in the religious mode of thinking can be discerned if one analyses the literature of the post-1857 period. For a clearer expression of this, however, one shall have to reach for writings of the twentieth century.

Pratap Narain then cried Hindu-Hindi-Hindustan and Sir Syed and Nazir Ahmad spoke of Muslims as a separate nation, although the circumstances clearly indicate that they were either under evil foreign influence or naively misguided.

While reading modern literature we must not close our eyes to the duality that it possessed, a duality that spoke of progress and reaction, of hope and despondency, fear and courage, loyalty to the ruling class and protest against its ways and methods. This signified an important stage in the development of the national consciousness. This newly-gained consciousness had to be expressed in new forms of literature and henceforth we see the development in new literary genres in both prose and poetry. Novel, drama, essay, biography, criticism and long reflective poems came into vogue and in several cases a synthesis with the older forms was achieved. The emergence of the press helped the development and popularisation of the new forms.

If we study the writings of Sir Syed, Azad, Hali, Nazir Ahmad, Shibli and Sharar in the light of these observations we shall see that they had awakened to the needs of the people and wanted to infuse them with hope. Hali's motto throughout was: "We must change with the time." The Holy Quran was being read for twelve hundred years but no one had quoted it for prompting Muslims to accept and accelerate the pace of change. Now Hali quoted from the Quran, "God does not change the conditions of a people who do not care to change their own conditions." All these writers had accepted the need for change and wrote about it. They wanted their followers to shake off despair and begin a new life. It is not just a coincidence that Sir Syed, Hali, Azad, Shibli and Sharar all wrote on "Hope" in prose or verse. They brought literature down to earth to serve the people, to spread knowledge, to prepare people to accept the change of the times and to shape their own destiny.

The gradual development of the national consciousness among the Urdu



writers is a long story and it is not possible to mention even the names of the writers and their books that were the outcome of the political consciousness released by the revolt. Most of these writers did not stop writing even during the darkest days of political oppression and they sang in the voice of Brij Mohan Chakbast:

Let them seal my lips and let them put me into the prison but  
They cannot put fetters on my ideas.

It is not the purpose of this short essay to provide a history of the national movement as reflected in Urdu literature. The author's purpose is only to provide a glimpse into the working of the minds of our writers just after they had been put on the high seas of a turbulent political life. The revolt had released their pent up anger and energy and they have used it for the cause of Indian freedom and progress to this day. This is the meaning and significance that Urdu writers have derived from the great revolt.

(in: *Rebellion 1857. A Symposium*. Edited by P. C. Joshi. New Delhi 1957, pp. 236-244).





## GHALIB AND THE REVOLT OF 1857

The orthodox historian may have heard of Ghalib (Mirza Asadullah Khan) as a celebrated Urdu poet but not as a fellow historian who was commissioned by Bahadur Shah to write the official history of the Moghul dynasty. In any case, he is probably unaware of the fact that the great national poet not only chose to live in Delhi under the rule of the rebels but also kept a diary of day to day events of this memorable period in Persian, entitled *Dastanbo*. The entries in this diary begin with the arrival of the Meerut Sowars on May 11, 1857, and go up to September 20 when the British troops succeeded in overpowering the resistance of popular forces in Delhi. In some respects, this diary covers the developments up to the fall of Lucknow (July 1858).

What actually prompted the author to compose this unique document is not very clear.<sup>1</sup> But in any case, it saw the light of day after the British were in full possession of Delhi and we shall not be very far wrong in assuming that the original was suitably revised to meet the requirements of the situation. As it now stands, the record of events in Ghalib's diary is all too brief and does not mention some important matters which were common knowledge. It is particularly inadequate in its treatment of all significant developments. It looks as if the author had no leisure to rewrite his diary and confined himself to deleting some passages and interpolating a few afterthoughts—all evidently to save his skin.<sup>2</sup>

The story opens in a mood of exhilaration, with the masses of people in revolt on all sides and armies converging on Delhi to fight the British troops on the Ridge. But no sooner the action commences—which lasted four months and ten days—than the author becomes more and more reticent and uncommunicative and after a few lines of a general nature we are abruptly informed that “the Indian forces had no choice but to retreat in face of the British onslaught on the Kashmiri

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<sup>1</sup> In one of his Urdu letters, Ghalib observes how, when on May 11, the uprising began in Delhi, he shut himself in his house (which was situated in the heart of the city) and “since one” can’t live without some occupation (*shaghl*), I started writing my own experiences (*sarguzasht*) and added what I came to learn from others” (*Ud-i Hindi*, p. 14). Similar remarks in his diary (*Kulliyat-i-Nasr-i Ghalib*, p. 387).

<sup>2</sup> For his fear of prosecution, see *Kulliyat*.



Gate.”<sup>3</sup> He now diverts from the main theme and except for a few stray, though revealing, references to the resistance movement in the country, he is mainly concerned with his own domestic problems and with his family services to the British in the earlier period.

This reticence on the part of the author to discuss the details of the uprising, as also his studied professions of loyalty to alien conquerors, could be easily understood and appreciated if we keep in mind the savage massacres that were then going on. The slightest suspicion of his complicity in the rebellion would surely have sent him to the gallows.<sup>4</sup> Besides, Ghalib depended for his living on a pension and before the authorities could be persuaded to restore it, he had to prove his *bona fides*. This was all the more necessary in the case of one who belonged to the aristocracy and had been a tutor, a courtier and a friend to Bahadur Shah, the Moghul king of Delhi,<sup>5</sup> and who, even while admiring the modernizing influence of the British regime in India, could not be reconciled to the aggressive policies of the British, particularly the annexation of Oudh.<sup>6</sup> Sometime later when the rigours of martial law relaxed and peaceful conditions prevailed, Ghalib became ever more vocal in his criticism of British high-handedness, he refused to share the illusion of the landed gentry that the new rulers would share political power with them.<sup>7</sup> He openly sympathised with the sufferings of his rebel friends and fallen aristocracy in general.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 388.

<sup>4</sup> It is generally estimated that 27,000 persons were hanged or shot in the city of Delhi alone. Amongst those who were massacred was the family of Sahbai, a famous poet and friend of Ghalib.

<sup>5</sup> The author deliberately deletes all references to Bahadur Shah and the royal princes in his diary (*Kulliyat*, p. 398) and heaves a sigh of agony and relief when the death of Bahadur Shah in exile was reported. The poet wrote that death had “liberated him from the chains of mortal existence and from imprisonment at the hands of the British” (*Urdu-i Mualla*, pp. 120-21).

<sup>6</sup> Writing to a friend in Oudh (Ghulam Husain Bilgrami) a few weeks before the uprising on February 23, 1857, Ghalib comments: “Just think of the (evil) days we are fated to live in. ... Even though it may not concern me directly, the ruin of the state of Oudh has depressed me all the more. In fact, I hold that if an Indian has no feelings for Oudh he must be devoid of an elementary sense of justice” (*Ibid.*, p. 403). When towards the end of his diary he has to record the fall of Lucknow, Ghalib is frankly gloomy and, in commenting on the events, confines himself to a verse from Sadi, purporting to say that “submission to the rulers on the part of the subjugated is no more than the mechanical and passive movement of a ball in response of the stroke of polo stick” (*Kulliyat*, p. 405).

<sup>7</sup> When it was reported to the author that the ruler of Alwar was going to be reinstated with full powers, Ghalib (who subscribed to the primacy of Determinism over Free Will in the philosophical controversy of the age) sarcastically remarked in a letter to a friend: “Just at the moment all of us are in the same boat. They say the Maharajah is going to be restored to his powers in November. But (take it from me) that his powers will be of the same nature as those, conferred on us, human beings, by God Almighty; for verily the initiative rests with Him and the human beings only come in for blame. ...” (*Ud-i Hindi*, p. 93).

<sup>8</sup> As an illustration, take the case of Maulana Fazle Haq (of Khayrabad) who was later condemned to life imprisonment in the Andamans and died there. When in 1861, a friend of his visited Calcutta, Ghalib anxiously asked him to enquire into the affairs of the Maulana (*Urdu-i Maulla*, p. 14); and when the latter passed away, the author openly lamented over “the death of such an



Be that as it may, the fact remains that when the tide turned against him towards the middle of September 1857, he had to, like many of his friends, put personal safety above everything else. We cannot, therefore, blame the poet for arguing his carefully prepared defence before the authorities concerned. He pleaded that his family had always been loyal to the British and that he had been granted life pension on that very score; he had kept himself severely aloof both from the royalists and the rebels during the days of the uprising and had, in fact, shut himself in his house; he had chosen to stay in town after the entry of the British troops, when so many among the gentry and the pensioners had fled.<sup>9</sup> And he submitted his Persian diary to the higher authorities both in India and in England, in support of his alibi. His reasons for this are not far to seek. A master of that peculiar enigmatic style of writing—so dear to the litterateurs of the Moghul court in the 19th century—he could skilfully conceal the meaning even when he professes to reveal it. To add to the obscurity of both the form and the content of his writing, Ghalib, exploited on this occasion his well known bias for literary purity in Persian.<sup>10</sup> In a word, he took good care to see that his diary was not used either against himself or against those of his friends who had taken a leading part in the uprising.<sup>11</sup>

This, however, should not detract from *Dastanho's* value as source material and its validity as authority for some of the events connected with the uprising in Delhi. I need not emphasise that the author's love of objective truth and

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estimable friend as the Pride of Creation (*Fakhr-i-yad-o-takwin*) Maulana Fazle Haq," while he himself was doomed to drag on his "miserable existence" (*Ibid.*, p. 420). As to his solicitude for the old aristocracy, there are frequent references in his collection of letters. As a typical instance: Ghalib in his letter to Yusuf Mirza, dated November 28, 1858, says "who on earth could gauge my feelings except the Almighty? You know that people sometimes go mad under the burden of sorrows and lose their wits. I should not be surprised if I were unhinged by these disastrous events; it would be amazing if I were not. I confess and hold Ali as my witness that because of intense grief for the dead and the acute anxiety for the living, the world around me now looks dark and sinister. ... To think that I am alive while the wives and children of erstwhile nobles and aristocrats have to go begging in the streets for their daily bread!" (*Ibid.*, pp. 254-55). It should not be forgotten that about this time the author himself was facing near-destitution. Once he had only one rupee and seven annas between himself and starvation! (*Ibid.*, pp. 250-51). Commenting on the destruction of the mansions of nobility at the hands of the British, Ghalib on one occasion compared the British to the "bully of a monkey who is bent on mischief and destroys the houses of all and sundry with impunity." "Damn thy arrogance, O beast," he concluded (*Ibid.*, p. 288).

<sup>9</sup> *Kulliyat*, p. 389. Also in his letter dated January 14, 1885, addressed to Nawab Yusuf Ali Khan of Rampur (*Makatib-i Ghalib*, p. 9).

<sup>10</sup> *Kulliyat*, p. 397. Also *Ud-i Hindi*, p. 14. From his diary Ghalib has excluded even ordinary Arabic words and terms, which were then current.

<sup>11</sup> It is interesting to note that the author does not even mention by name people like Maulana Fazle Haq and Mufti Sadruddin who were known to have sponsored the Fatwa of the Muslim Ulema in support of  *Jihad*  against the British and were among his intimate and lifelong companions. In fact, the only person mentioned in his diary is Hakim Ahsanullah, who had acquired notoriety by his support of the British in the camp of the rebels and the fact is duly emphasized by Ghalib (*Kulliyat*, p. 387).



his passion for humanism are as characteristic of this as of all his other writings.<sup>12</sup> For obvious reasons, however, the narration of events in the diary is vague and impersonal. But precisely because he has chosen to omit the dramatic incidents and the role of some individuals, Ghalib has unwittingly succeeded in imparting to us, even in this fragment, some of the dynamism of this great movement of national resistance and a glimpse of the new social forces that were involved. Whatever the limitations of his treatment in the current version of his Persian diary, it is certainly an invaluable document for every conscientious student of the events of 1857.<sup>13</sup>

We shall now place before the readers a few selected extracts from *Dastanbo* and leave them to judge its merits for themselves.

#### *The Masses in Revolt*

The poet is somewhat puzzled as the scene opens; "The people fight the rulers; the troopers shed the blood of the (British) commanders and then rejoice over it, unmindful of consequences" (*Kulliyat*, p. 380).

#### *The Partisans of the British are Paralyzed*

"Since the rush of the torrent may not be checked by the aid of straw, each one (among the supporters of the British) found himself helpless and sat down in (the solitude of) his home to mourn (at the turn of events). Count me as one of these mourners" (*Ibid.*, p. 382).

#### *Welcome to Meerut Sowars on Arrival*

"Some of the malicious Sowars... from Meerut entered the city, all of them composed but vociferous and in their eagerness to kill their masters, thirsting for the blood of the English. The watchmen of the city gates... who had full knowledge of the secret plot (literally 'fellow oath-takers'. *ham-sogand*).... welcomed these uninvited or (may be) invited guests;...(in any case) the Sowars....found the sentries hospitable...." (*Ibid.*).

#### *The Revolt Spreads*

"By and by, news came pouring in from far off cities that hotheads of every regiment in each cantonment have killed their (British) commanders. And just as the dancing girl is roused to sing by the tune of music, the ungrateful

<sup>12</sup> Introducing his diary Ghalib observes: "In truth, it does not behove an emancipated mind to conceal the truth, particularly a pseudo-Muslim like me who does not owe allegiance to any particular denomination or creed and pays no heed whatsoever to a good name" (*Kulliyat*, p. 407). It should be noted in this connection that, in spite of his admiration for the bravery displayed by the rebels in their fight with the British, Ghalib never forgave them for shedding the blood of innocent Englishmen in Delhi. For his humanism see, among others, his observations in *Urdu-i Maulla* (p. 42).

<sup>13</sup> A condensed Urdu edition of his diary by Mirza Yaqub Beg Nami was first published from Delhi in 1922 by Hasan Nizami .. under the title *Ghalib ka Roznamcha*. I have failed to find a reference to Ghalib's diary in any of the innumerable official and non-official histories of 1857.



soldiers and workmen in their thousands joined heartily (literally 'their hearts became one'); and, far or near, even without uttering a single word among themselves, they got down to their respective tasks.... These unmanly troops of skilled fighters have a bond of solidarity of their own like a broom. On their march they make a fine display without the usual exercises and fight the battles even without (proper) command" (*Ibid.*).

#### *Feudal Aristocracy Goes into the Background*

"They laid into dust both the honour and the mansions (literally 'the dust of their lane') of those who were distinguished for wisdom and good name, while those who had neither power nor pelf shot into prominence... Fancy! these worthless fellows now demand compliancy with their orders from the very elements.... (It is an evil day when) men of valour are scared of their own shadows and a mere trooper lords over all and sundry (literally 'over the king and the beggar') (*Ibid.*, pp. 384-85).

#### *Popular Armies Gather in Delhi*

Ghalib notes how as soon as they arrived in Delhi, the various detachments of troopers first handed over the gold and silver with them to the royal treasury, then went to the Red Fort "to put their foreheads on the threshold of the King" and later moved about with a martial air in the city.

"And lo! there emerged from every nook and corner a soldier, from every pathway a platoon and from each direction an army and all began to move about on the land.... These are wonderful times and the hour of those who have triumphed. Just now within and without the city of Delhi, there have gathered something like fifty thousand infantry; and cavalry" (*Ibid.*, p. 385).

#### *Popular Pressure on the Indian Ruling Chiefs*

"Tafazzul Husain Khan, the renowned (ruler) of Farrukhabad put (literally 'rubbed') his forehead in the presence of the king even though from afar and thus affirmed his allegiance. Khan Bahadur Khan (of Bareilly) sent to the royal presence an offering of a hundred and one gold coins and an elephant and a horse with silver trappings... Nawab Yusuf Ali Khan Bahadur (of Rampur) .... who for so long had been firm in his attachment to the English rulers, was compelled to send a formal message (of loyalty to Bahadur Shah) and thereby silenced the voice of his (critical) neighbours. In Lucknow.... the wise minister (literally "one who knows the job") Sharaf-ud Dowlah raised to the throne a ten-year-old boy from among the sons of Wajid Ali Shah... and designated himself (as his) *Peshkar* and adviser.... He sent his emissary to the royal court (at Delhi) with handsome presents.... (In short) the star of good fortune of the king ascended so high that the face of the Britishers (literally 'the *Khaki*-wearers') was concealed; from it" (*Ibid.*, pp. 387-88).

#### *The Fight with the British*



"Day in and day out shells from both sides fall from the air like common pebbles. The heat of May and June together with the glare of the sun is ever on the increase .... The warriors of the royal force daily gather from all over (the city) after sunrise, go to fight like lions. . . . and return just before sunset" (*Ibid.*, p. 386).

#### *The Mansion of Hakim Ahsanullah is Burnt Down*

"They looted the mansion of Hakim Ahsanullah, the supporter of the British (literally 'who was working for the victory of the British') which looked like a Chinese picture gallery and set fire to the antechamber of his reception hall" (*Ibid.* p. 387).

#### *British Offensive and the Retreat*

On September 14, 1857 came the British attack and now "in face of the British onslaught on the Kashmiri Gate, the Indian forces (literally 'the black troops') had no choice but to retreat" (*Ibid.*, p. 388).

#### *People Resist to the Last*

When the British captured the city from the hands of the popular army, the common people joined the soldiers and took to street fighting. "Some from among the hoodlums and the rabble of the city now began to engage the stout-hearted occupation troops.... For two or three days every nook and corner of the city from Kashmiri Gate onwards was converted into a regular battle-field and the three outlets....the Ajmeri Darwaza, the Turkman Darwaza and the Delhi Darwaza—remained in the hands of the (rebel) soldiers" (*Ibid.*, 389).

As a result when Delhi was finally occupied "so many ... from among the high and the low, that none could count, escaped from the city through these three gates" (*Ibid.*).

#### *The Morale of People*

Speaking of the civilians in his own quarter, Ghalib notes, "though the entrance (to the lane) has been blockaded, there is still such fearlessness (in the atmosphere) that people force open the gates, go out into the open and bring in their supplies" (*Ibid.*).

#### *Resistance in the Countryside and Around Delhi*

Finally, when Delhi formally passed into the hands of the British on October 7, 1857, the resistance in the countryside had by no means subsided. "Even now," notes the author, "vast numbers of rebels in Bareilly, Farrukhabad and Lucknow are determined to fight in organised groups and to dispute (the possession of) every acre of the soil (literally 'from Farsang to Farsang') . . . ." <sup>14</sup> (In the neighbourhood of Delhi) the Meos of Sohna and Null (Gurgaon District) have created uproar in such fashion that you would imagine lunatics had broken loose

<sup>14</sup> Farsang is a measure of distance.



from their chains. Tula Ram.... is still at large in Rewari and has now joined his forces with those of Devi, the Meo, and operates under him. This group, in those hilly and forest regions, has its own independent plan of fighting the (British) rulers. In a word you might almost say that the very elements in India are in a ferment" (*Ibid.*, p. 397).

#### *A Domestic Scene — Collecting Rain Water*

After September 15, all grain shops were shut down and the sweepers, the washermen, the barbers and the hawkers left the city. As a result, for two days and nights there was nothing to eat or to drink. Ghalib was naturally at his wit's end when "suddenly the clouds gathered and it began to rain. We (in our house) spread a sheet of cloth, put a big jar under it, and thus collected rain water. They say, the clouds gather the water from the sea and pour it on the land; but on this occasion, the precious clouds phoenixwise fetched water from the Stream of Life itself. In any case, what Alexander so vainly sought after in the days of his kingship, this (humble) parched-throat, drinker of salt water, discovered it in these hours of misery."<sup>15</sup>

#### *Plunder and Massacre*

With the British occupation of the city began the new phase of what the author characterised as "the fire of fury of (our new) masters": "The victors advanced through the passage in front of Kashmiri Gate which leads to the market and killed whomsoever they could find on the road. Not one among the gentry and the sober but barred the entrance to his house" (*Ibid.*, pp. 388-89). Ghalib suddenly noticed that "there were gallows on every side and the roads look fearful. ... Now no one dares come out and talk to us, nor do we venture to go out and look around for ourselves"....<sup>16</sup> (*Ibid.*, pp. 391-92).

(As to the plunder and loot of the city) "the general order to the troops is to spare the life of one who immediately surrenders and to take all his belongings; in case, one puts up resistance, they are to take his life together with his goods. In any case, looking at so many corpses (all over the city), one suspects that they have been massacred, since their heads are no more visible on their shoulders" (*Ibid.*, p. 395).<sup>17</sup>

"Jhajjar, Bahadurgarh, Ballabgarh, Loharu, Farrukhnagar, Dujana and

<sup>15</sup> This is an allusion to the fable of "Sikander" and his search for "thre water of immortality" (*ab-i-hayat*).

<sup>16</sup> It is during these days that the author composed his famous Urdu verses describing the martial law, when "every English Tommy behaved like God Almighty and one was afraid of going out of his house. The Chowk was then turned into a slaughter house while the homes looked like a prison. In a word, very particles of dust in Delhi cried aloud for the blood of Mussalman" (*Urdu-i Mualla*, p. 373).

<sup>17</sup> He is more explicit in an Urdu letter where he called it "general massacre" (*Ibid.*, p. 138). In another letter he referred, among other "invaders of Delhi, to the British who "destroyed life, property, honour, homes together with dwellers, in fact, the very earth and sky;—in a word, all that connotes life" (*Ud-i Hindi*, p. 90).



Pataudi, are the seven states in the neighbourhood of the city whose chiefs are attached to the British Agency at Delhi. Of these, the rulers of five states are detained (for punishment) in the Fort and the remaining two are anxious for their fate. They hanged the rulers of Jhajjar, Ballabgarh and Farrukhnagar separately on different days" (*Ibid.*, pp. 400-01).

Thereafter Delhi looked like a big prison. In the words of our author: "In this city the prison is situated outside the town and the police lockup ('the abode of lamentation') within. They have crowded these two places with so many people that you almost feel one human being was packed into the other. The Angel of Death alone knows the number of those from these two prison houses who have died on the gallows from time to time. The Muslim residents in the city do not now exceed a thousand; they are either relations of the prisoners or otherwise, pension-holders...." (*Ibid.*, pp. 403-04).

### *The Hour of Despair and a Vision of the Future*

Ghalib was naturally heartbroken at the sight of this "City of the Dead" (*Shahr-i khamoshan*) as he called it where "he was once known to thousands, had a companion in every home and a friend in every home and an every establishment." It was painful for him to think that "the city was empty of Muslims. In the darkness of night their homes are without light and by day the chimneys of their walls emit no smoke." In this hour of desolation and despair the poet saw nothing but death and starvation facing the Muslims as a community (*Ibid.*, p. 410). Soon, however, somewhere on the horizon a dim vision appeared and the poet concluded on a note of mystic hope:

The harp player, when he strikes the chord  
One can see what he is after,  
Happiness lies concealed behind the veil of sorrow,  
Not for wrath does the washerman beat the cloth.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> In another place the author refers to the British extinguishing the candle but at the same time announcing the tidings of the dawn and pointing the way to the light of the sun.







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